Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 oval:ssg-installed_OS_is_rhel8:def:1 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.0 oval:ssg-installed_OS_is_rhel8_0:def:1 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.1 oval:ssg-installed_OS_is_rhel8_1:def:1 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.10 oval:ssg-installed_OS_is_rhel8_10:def:1 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.2 oval:ssg-installed_OS_is_rhel8_2:def:1 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.3 oval:ssg-installed_OS_is_rhel8_3:def:1 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.4 oval:ssg-installed_OS_is_rhel8_4:def:1 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.5 oval:ssg-installed_OS_is_rhel8_5:def:1 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.6 oval:ssg-installed_OS_is_rhel8_6:def:1 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.7 oval:ssg-installed_OS_is_rhel8_7:def:1 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.8 oval:ssg-installed_OS_is_rhel8_8:def:1 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.9 oval:ssg-installed_OS_is_rhel8_9:def:1 draft Guide to the Secure Configuration of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This guide presents a catalog of security-relevant configuration settings for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8. It is a rendering of content structured in the eXtensible Configuration Checklist Description Format (XCCDF) in order to support security automation. The SCAP content is is available in the scap-security-guide package which is developed at https://www.open-scap.org/security-policies/scap-security-guide. Providing system administrators with such guidance informs them how to securely configure systems under their control in a variety of network roles. Policy makers and baseline creators can use this catalog of settings, with its associated references to higher-level security control catalogs, in order to assist them in security baseline creation. This guide is a catalog, not a checklist, and satisfaction of every item is not likely to be possible or sensible in many operational scenarios. However, the XCCDF format enables granular selection and adjustment of settings, and their association with OVAL and OCIL content provides an automated checking capability. Transformations of this document, and its associated automated checking content, are capable of providing baselines that meet a diverse set of policy objectives. Some example XCCDF Profiles, which are selections of items that form checklists and can be used as baselines, are available with this guide. They can be processed, in an automated fashion, with tools that support the Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP). The DISA STIG, which provides required settings for US Department of Defense systems, is one example of a baseline created from this guidance. Do not attempt to implement any of the settings in this guide without first testing them in a non-operational environment. The creators of this guidance assume no responsibility whatsoever for its use by other parties, and makes no guarantees, expressed or implied, about its quality, reliability, or any other characteristic. The SCAP Security Guide Project https://www.open-scap.org/security-policies/scap-security-guide Red Hat and Red Hat Enterprise Linux are either registered trademarks or trademarks of Red Hat, Inc. in the United States and other countries. All other names are registered trademarks or trademarks of their respective companies. anssi app-srg bsi cis cis-csc cjis cnss cobit5 cui dcid disa hipaa isa-62443-2009 isa-62443-2013 ism iso27001-2013 nerc-cip nist nist-csf os-srg ospp pcidss pcidss4 stigid stigref 0.1.72 SCAP Security Guide Project SCAP Security Guide Project Frank J Cameron (CAM1244) <cameron@ctc.com> 0x66656c6978 <0x66656c6978@users.noreply.github.com> Håvard F. Aasen <havard.f.aasen@pfft.no> Jack Adolph <jack.adolph@gmail.com> Edgar Aguilar <edgar.aguilar@oracle.com> akuster <akuster808@gmail.com> Gabe Alford <redhatrises@gmail.com> Firas AlShafei <firas.alshafei@us.abb.com> Rodrigo Alvares <ralvares@redhat.com> Christopher Anderson <cba@fedoraproject.org> Craig Andrews <candrews@integralblue.com> angystardust <angystardust@users.noreply.github.com> anivan-suse <anastasija.ivanovic@suse.com> anixon-rh <55244503+anixon-rh@users.noreply.github.com> Stephen L Arnold <sarnold@vctlabs.com> Ikko Ashimine <eltociear@gmail.com> Chuck Atkins <chuck.atkins@kitware.com> Bharath B <bhb@redhat.com> Ryan Ballanger <root@rballang-admin-2.fastenal.com> Alex Baranowski <alex@euro-linux.com> Eduardo Barretto <eduardo.barretto@canonical.com> Molly Jo Bault <Molly.Jo.Bault@ballardtech.com> Andrew Becker <A-Beck@users.noreply.github.com> Gabriel Becker <ggasparb@redhat.com> Alexander Bergmann <abergmann@suse.com> Dale Bewley <dale@bewley.net> Jose Luis BG <bgjoseluis@gmail.com> binyanling <binyanling@uniontech.com> Joseph Bisch <joseph.bisch@gmail.com> Jeff Blank <blank@eclipse.ncsc.mil> Olivier Bonhomme <ptitoliv@ptitoliv.net> Lance Bragstad <lbragstad@gmail.com> Ted Brunell <tbrunell@redhat.com> Marcus Burghardt <maburgha@redhat.com> Matthew Burket <mburket@redhat.com> Blake Burkhart <blake.burkhart@us.af.mil> Patrick Callahan <pmc@patrickcallahan.com> George Campbell <gcampbell@palantir.com> Nick Carboni <ncarboni@redhat.com> Carlos <64919342+carlosmmatos@users.noreply.github.com> James Cassell <james.cassell@ll.mit.edu> Frank Caviggia <fcaviggia@users.noreply.github.com> Eric Christensen <echriste@redhat.com> Dan Clark <danclark@redhat.com> Jayson Cofell <1051437+70k10@users.noreply.github.com> David du Colombier <djc@datadoghq.com> Commandcracker <lukas.fricke.dev@gmail.com> Caleb Cooper <coopercd@ornl.gov> cortesana <acortes@redhat.com> Richard Maciel Costa <richard.maciel.costa@canonical.com> Xavier Coulon <xavier.coulon@suse.com> Deric Crago <deric.crago@gmail.com> crleekwc <crleekwc@gmail.com> cueball23 <christoph.alms@westnetz.de> cyarbrough76 <42849651+cyarbrough76@users.noreply.github.com> Maura Dailey <maura@eclipse.ncsc.mil> Klaas Demter <demter@atix.de> denknorr <dennis.knorr@suse.com> dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> dhanushkar-wso2 <dhanushkar@wso2.com> Andrew DiPrinzio <andrew.diprinzio@jhuapl.edu> dom <dominique.blaze@devinci.fr> Jean-Baptiste Donnette <jean-baptiste.donnette@epita.fr> Marco De Donno <mdedonno1337@gmail.com> dperrone <dperrone@redhat.com> drax <applezip@gmail.com> Sebastian Dunne <sdunne@redhat.com> François Duthilleul <francoisduthilleul@gmail.com> Greg Elin <gregelin@gitmachines.com> eradot4027 <jrtonmac@gmail.com> ermeratos <manuel.ermer@atos.net> Alexis Facques <alexis.facques@mythalesgroup.io> Henry Finucane <hfinucane@zscaler.com> Leah Fisher <lfisher047@gmail.com> Yavor Georgiev <strandjata@gmail.com> Alijohn Ghassemlouei <alijohn@secureagc.com> Swarup Ghosh <swghosh@redhat.com> ghylock <ghylock@gmail.com> Andrew Gilmore <agilmore2@gmail.com> Joshua Glemza <jglemza@nasa.gov> Nick Gompper <forestgomp@yahoo.com> David Fernandez Gonzalez <david.fernandezgonzalez@canonical.com> Loren Gordon <lorengordon@users.noreply.github.com> Gene Gotimer <otherdevopsgene@portinfo.com> Patrik Greco <sikevux@sikevux.se> Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> guangyee <gyee@suse.com> Christian Hagenest <christian.hagenest@suse.com> Marek Haicman <mhaicman@redhat.com> Vern Hart <vern.hart@canonical.com> Alex Haydock <alex@alexhaydock.co.uk> Rebekah Hayes <rhayes@corp.rivierautilities.com> Trey Henefield <thenefield@gmail.com> Henning Henkel <henning.henkel@helvetia.ch> hex2a <hex2a@users.noreply.github.com> John Hooks <jhooks@starscream.pa.jhbcomputers.com> Jakub Hrozek <jhrozek@redhat.com> De Huo <De.Huo@windriver.com> Robin Price II <robin@redhat.com> Yasir Imam <yimam@redhat.com> Jiri Jaburek <jjaburek@redhat.com> Keith Jackson <keithkjackson@gmail.com> Marc Jadoul <mgjadoul@laptomatic.auth-o-matic.corp> Jeremiah Jahn <jeremiah@goodinassociates.com> Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> Jessicahfy <Jessicahfy@users.noreply.github.com> Stephan Joerrens <Stephan.Joerrens@fiduciagad.de> Hunter Jones <hjones2199@gmail.com> Jono <jono@ubuntu-18.localdomain> justchris1 <justchris1@justchris1.email> Kacper <kacper@kacper.se> Kai Kang <kai.kang@windriver.com> Charles Kernstock <charles.kernstock@ultra-ats.com> Yuli Khodorkovskiy <ykhodorkovskiy@tresys.com> Sherine Khoury <skhoury@redhat.com> Nathan Kinder <nkinder@redhat.com> Lee Kinser <lee.kinser@gmail.com> Evgeny Kolesnikov <ekolesni@redhat.com> Peter 'Pessoft' Kolínek <github@pessoft.com> Luke Kordell <luke.t.kordell@lmco.com> Malte Kraus <malte.kraus@suse.com> Seth Kress <seth.kress@dsainc.com> Felix Krohn <felix.krohn@helvetia.ch> kspargur <kspargur@kspargur.csb> Amit Kumar <amitkuma@redhat.com> Fen Labalme <fen@civicactions.com> Dexter Le <dexter.le@sap.com> Ade Lee <alee@redhat.com> Christopher Lee <Crleekwc@gmail.com> Ian Lee <lee1001@llnl.gov> Jarrett Lee <jarrettl@umd.edu> Joseph Lenox <joseph.lenox@collins.com> Jan Lieskovsky <jlieskov@redhat.com> Markus Linnala <Markus.Linnala@knowit.fi> Flos Lonicerae <lonicerae@gmail.com> Simon Lukasik <slukasik@redhat.com> Milan Lysonek <mlysonek@redhat.com> Fredrik Lysén <fredrik@pipemore.se> Mackemania <8738793+Mackemania@users.noreply.github.com> Caitlin Macleod <caitelatte@gmail.com> Nick Maludy <nmaludy@gmail.com> Lokesh Mandvekar <lsm5@fedoraproject.org> Matus Marhefka <mmarhefk@redhat.com> Jamie Lorwey Martin <jlmartin@redhat.com> Carlos Matos <cmatos@redhat.com> Robert McAllister <rmcallis@redhat.com> Karen McCarron <kmccarro@redhat.com> Michael McConachie <michael@redhat.com> Marcus Meissner <meissner@suse.de> Khary Mendez <kmendez@redhat.com> Rodney Mercer <rmercer@harris.com> Matt Micene <nzwulfin@gmail.com> Brian Millett <bmillett@gmail.com> Takuya Mishina <tmishina@jp.ibm.com> Mixer9 <35545791+Mixer9@users.noreply.github.com> mmosel <mmosel@kde.example.com> Thomas Montague <montague.thomas@gmail.com> Zbynek Moravec <zmoravec@redhat.com> Kazuo Moriwaka <moriwaka@users.noreply.github.com> Michael Moseley <michael@eclipse.ncsc.mil> Renaud Métrich <rmetrich@redhat.com> Joe Nall <joe@nall.com> Neiloy <neiloy@redhat.com> Axel Nennker <axel@nennker.de> Michele Newman <mnewman@redhat.com> nnerdmann <128606223+nnerdmann@users.noreply.github.com> Sean O'Keeffe <seanokeeffe797@gmail.com> Jiri Odehnal <jodehnal@redhat.com> Ilya Okomin <ilya.okomin@oracle.com> Kaustubh Padegaonkar <theTuxRacer@gmail.com> Michael Palmiotto <mpalmiotto@tresys.com> Eryx Paredes <eryxp@lyft.com> Max R.D. Parmer <maxp@trystero.is> Arnaud Patard <apatard@hupstream.com> Jan Pazdziora <jpazdziora@redhat.com> pcactr <paul.c.arnold4.ctr@mail.mil> Kenneth Peeples <kennethwpeeples@gmail.com> Nathan Peters <Nathaniel.Peters@ca.com> Frank Lin PIAT <fpiat@klabs.be> Stefan Pietsch <mail.ipv4v6+gh@gmail.com> piggyvenus <piggyvenus@gmail.com> Vojtech Polasek <vpolasek@redhat.com> Orion Poplawski <orion@nwra.com> Jennifer Power <barnabei.jennifer@gmail.com> Nick Poyant <npoyant@redhat.com> Martin Preisler <mpreisle@redhat.com> Wesley Ceraso Prudencio <wcerasop@redhat.com> Raphael Sanchez Prudencio <rsprudencio@redhat.com> Miha Purg <miha.purg@canonical.com> T.O. Radzy Radzykewycz <radzy@windriver.com> rain-Qing <yangyuqing6@qq.com> Kenyon Ralph <kenyon@kenyonralph.com> Mike Ralph <mralph@redhat.com> Federico Ramirez <federico.r.ramirez@oracle.com> rchikov <rumen.chikov@suse.com> Rick Renshaw <Richard_Renshaw@xtoenergy.com> Paul Rensing <prensing@cimetrics.com> Chris Reynolds <c.reynolds82@gmail.com> rhayes <rhayes@rivierautilities.com> Pat Riehecky <riehecky@fnal.gov> rlucente-se-jboss <rlucente@redhat.com> Juan Antonio Osorio Robles <juan.osoriorobles@eu.equinix.com> Paul Roche <paul.roche@menlosecurity.com> Jan Rodak <hony.com@seznam.cz> Matt Rogers <mrogers@redhat.com> Jesse Roland <jesse.roland@onyxpoint.com> Joshua Roys <roysjosh@gmail.com> rrenshaw <bofh69@yahoo.com> Chris Ruffalo <chris.ruffalo@gmail.com> Benjamin Ruland <benjamin.ruland@gmail.com> rumch-se <77793453+rumch-se@users.noreply.github.com> Rutvik <32413084+rutvik23@users.noreply.github.com> rutvik23 <rutksh@gmail.com> Ray Shaw (Cont ARL/CISD) rvshaw <rvshaw@esme.arl.army.mil> Earl Sampson <ESampson@suse.com> sampsone <esampson@suse.com> Willy Santos <wsantos@redhat.com> Nagarjuna Sarvepalli <snagarju@redhat.com> Anderson Sasaki <33833274+ansasaki@users.noreply.github.com> Gautam Satish <gautams@hpe.com> Watson Sato <wsato@redhat.com> Satoru SATOH <satoru.satoh@gmail.com> Alexander Scheel <alexander.m.scheel@gmail.com> Bryan Schneiders <pschneiders@trisept.com> Robert Schweikert <rjschwei@suse.com> shaneboulden <shane.boulden@gmail.com> Vincent Shen <wenshen@redhat.com> Dhriti Shikhar <dhriti.shikhar.rokz@gmail.com> Spencer Shimko <sshimko@tresys.com> Mark Shoger <mshoger@redhat.com> Shane Siebken <shane.siebken@capellaspace.com> THOBY Simon <Simon.THOBY@viveris.fr> Thomas Sjögren <konstruktoid@users.noreply.github.com> Jindrich Skacel <102800748+jskacel@users.noreply.github.com> Alexandre Skrzyniarz <alexandre.skrzyniarz@laposte.net> Francisco Slavin <fslavin@tresys.com> sluetze <13255307+sluetze@users.noreply.github.com> Dave Smith <dsmith@eclipse.ncsc.mil> David Smith <dsmith@fornax.eclipse.ncsc.mil> Kevin Spargur <kspargur@redhat.com> Kenneth Stailey <kstailey.lists@gmail.com> Leland Steinke <leland.j.steinke.ctr@mail.mil> Justin Stephenson <jstephen@redhat.com> Brian Stinson <brian@bstinson.com> Jake Stookey <jakestookey@gmail.com> Jonathan Sturges <jsturges@redhat.com> svet-se <svetlin.boychev@suse.com> teacup-on-rockingchair <315160+teacup-on-rockingchair@users.noreply.github.com> Ian Tewksbury <itewk@redhat.com> Philippe Thierry <phil@reseau-libre.net> Simon THOBY <git@nightmared.fr> Derek Thurston <thegrit@gmail.com> tianzhenjia <jiatianzhen@cmss.chinamobile.com> Greg Tinsley <gtinsley@redhat.com> Paul Tittle <ptittle@cmf.nrl.navy.mil> tom <tom@localhost.localdomain> tomas.hudik <tomas.hudik@embedit.cz> Jeb Trayer <jeb.d.trayer@uscg.mil> TrilokGeer <tgeer@redhat.com> Viktors Trubovics <viktors.trubovics@suse.com> Nico Truzzolino <nico.truzzolino@gmx.de> Brian Turek <brian.turek@gmail.com> Matěj Týč <matyc@redhat.com> VadimDor <29509093+VadimDor@users.noreply.github.com> Trevor Vaughan <tvaughan@onyxpoint.com> vtrubovics <82443408+vtrubovics@users.noreply.github.com> Samuel Warren <swarren@redhat.com> wcushen <54533890+wcushen@users.noreply.github.com> Shawn Wells <shawn@shawndwells.io> Whidix <31294015+Whidix@users.noreply.github.com> Daniel E. White <linuxdan@users.noreply.github.com> Bernhard M. Wiedemann <bwiedemann@suse.de> Roy Williams <roywilli@roywilli.redhat.com> Willumpie <willumpie@xs4all.nl> Rob Wilmoth <rwilmoth@redhat.com> win97pro <win97pro@protonmail.com> Lucas Yamanishi <lucas.yamanishi@onyxpoint.com> Xirui Yang <xirui.yang@oracle.com> yarunachalam <yarunachalam@suse.com> Guang Yee <guang.yee@suse.com> Achilleas John Yfantis <ayfantis@redhat.com> YiLin.Li <YiLin.Li@linux.alibaba.com> YuQing <yyq0391@163.com> Kevin Zimmerman <kevin.zimmerman@kitware.com> Luigi Mario Zuccarelli <luzuccar@redhat.com> Jan Černý <jcerny@redhat.com> Michal Šrubař <msrubar@redhat.com> https://github.com/ComplianceAsCode/content/releases/latest ANSSI-BP-028 (enhanced) This profile contains configurations that align to ANSSI-BP-028 v2.0 at the enhanced hardening level. ANSSI is the French National Information Security Agency, and stands for Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d'information. ANSSI-BP-028 is a configuration recommendation for GNU/Linux systems. A copy of the ANSSI-BP-028 can be found at the ANSSI website: https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/administration/guide/recommandations-de-securite-relatives-a-un-systeme-gnulinux/ An English version of the ANSSI-BP-028 can also be found at the ANSSI website: https://cyber.gouv.fr/publications/configuration-recommendations-gnulinux-system ANSSI-BP-028 (high) This profile contains configurations that align to ANSSI-BP-028 v2.0 at the high hardening level. ANSSI is the French National Information Security Agency, and stands for Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d'information. ANSSI-BP-028 is a configuration recommendation for GNU/Linux systems. A copy of the ANSSI-BP-028 can be found at the ANSSI website: https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/administration/guide/recommandations-de-securite-relatives-a-un-systeme-gnulinux/ An English version of the ANSSI-BP-028 can also be found at the ANSSI website: https://cyber.gouv.fr/publications/configuration-recommendations-gnulinux-system ANSSI-BP-028 (intermediary) This profile contains configurations that align to ANSSI-BP-028 v2.0 at the intermediary hardening level. ANSSI is the French National Information Security Agency, and stands for Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d'information. ANSSI-BP-028 is a configuration recommendation for GNU/Linux systems. A copy of the ANSSI-BP-028 can be found at the ANSSI website: https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/administration/guide/recommandations-de-securite-relatives-a-un-systeme-gnulinux/ An English version of the ANSSI-BP-028 can also be found at the ANSSI website: https://cyber.gouv.fr/publications/configuration-recommendations-gnulinux-system ANSSI-BP-028 (minimal) This profile contains configurations that align to ANSSI-BP-028 v2.0 at the minimal hardening level. ANSSI is the French National Information Security Agency, and stands for Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d'information. ANSSI-BP-028 is a configuration recommendation for GNU/Linux systems. A copy of the ANSSI-BP-028 can be found at the ANSSI website: https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/administration/guide/recommandations-de-securite-relatives-a-un-systeme-gnulinux/ An English version of the ANSSI-BP-028 can also be found at the ANSSI website: https://cyber.gouv.fr/publications/configuration-recommendations-gnulinux-system 2.0.0 CIS Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Benchmark for Level 2 - Server This profile defines a baseline that aligns to the "Level 2 - Server" configuration from the Center for Internet Security® Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Benchmark™, v2.0.0, released 2022-02-23. This profile includes Center for Internet Security® Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CIS Benchmarks™ content. https://www.cisecurity.org/benchmark/red_hat_linux/ 2.0.0 CIS Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Benchmark for Level 1 - Server This profile defines a baseline that aligns to the "Level 1 - Server" configuration from the Center for Internet Security® Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Benchmark™, v2.0.0, released 2022-02-23. This profile includes Center for Internet Security® Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CIS Benchmarks™ content. https://www.cisecurity.org/benchmark/red_hat_linux/ 2.0.0 CIS Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Benchmark for Level 1 - Workstation This profile defines a baseline that aligns to the "Level 1 - Workstation" configuration from the Center for Internet Security® Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Benchmark™, v2.0.0, released 2022-02-23. This profile includes Center for Internet Security® Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CIS Benchmarks™ content. https://www.cisecurity.org/benchmark/red_hat_linux/ 2.0.0 CIS Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Benchmark for Level 2 - Workstation This profile defines a baseline that aligns to the "Level 2 - Workstation" configuration from the Center for Internet Security® Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Benchmark™, v2.0.0, released 2022-02-23. This profile includes Center for Internet Security® Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CIS Benchmarks™ content. https://www.cisecurity.org/benchmark/red_hat_linux/ 5.4 Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Security Policy This profile is derived from FBI's CJIS v5.4 Security Policy. A copy of this policy can be found at the CJIS Security Policy Resource Center: https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/cjis-security-policy-resource-center https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/cjis-security-policy-resource-center TBD Unclassified Information in Non-federal Information Systems and Organizations (NIST 800-171) From NIST 800-171, Section 2.2: Security requirements for protecting the confidentiality of CUI in nonfederal information systems and organizations have a well-defined structure that consists of: (i) a basic security requirements section; (ii) a derived security requirements section. The basic security requirements are obtained from FIPS Publication 200, which provides the high-level and fundamental security requirements for federal information and information systems. The derived security requirements, which supplement the basic security requirements, are taken from the security controls in NIST Special Publication 800-53. This profile configures Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 to the NIST Special Publication 800-53 controls identified for securing Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI)." Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) Essential Eight This profile contains configuration checks for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 that align to the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) Essential Eight. A copy of the Essential Eight in Linux Environments guide can be found at the ACSC website: https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/publications/hardening-linux-workstations-and-servers https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/publications/hardening-linux-workstations-and-servers Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) The HIPAA Security Rule establishes U.S. national standards to protect individuals’ electronic personal health information that is created, received, used, or maintained by a covered entity. The Security Rule requires appropriate administrative, physical and technical safeguards to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and security of electronic protected health information. This profile configures Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 to the HIPAA Security Rule identified for securing of electronic protected health information. Use of this profile in no way guarantees or makes claims against legal compliance against the HIPAA Security Rule(s). https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/index.html Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) ISM Official This profile contains configuration checks for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 that align to the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) Information Security Manual (ISM) with the applicability marking of OFFICIAL. The ISM uses a risk-based approach to cyber security. This profile provides a guide to aligning Red Hat Enterprise Linux security controls with the ISM, which can be used to select controls specific to an organisation's security posture and risk profile. A copy of the ISM can be found at the ACSC website: https://www.cyber.gov.au/ism https://www.cyber.gov.au/ism 4.2.1 Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems This profile reflects mandatory configuration controls identified in the NIAP Configuration Annex to the Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems (Protection Profile Version 4.2.1). This configuration profile is consistent with CNSSI-1253, which requires U.S. National Security Systems to adhere to certain configuration parameters. Accordingly, this configuration profile is suitable for use in U.S. National Security Systems. https://www.niap-ccevs.org/Profile/Info.cfm?PPID=442&id=442 4.0 PCI-DSS v4.0 Control Baseline for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Payment Card Industry - Data Security Standard (PCI-DSS) is a set of security standards designed to ensure the secure handling of payment card data, with the goal of preventing data breaches and protecting sensitive financial information. This profile ensures Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured in alignment with PCI-DSS v4.0 requirements. https://docs-prv.pcisecuritystandards.org/PCI%20DSS/Standard/PCI-DSS-v4_0.pdf Red Hat Corporate Profile for Certified Cloud Providers (RH CCP) This profile contains the minimum security relevant configuration settings recommended by Red Hat, Inc for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 instances deployed by Red Hat Certified Cloud Providers. Standard System Security Profile for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This profile contains rules to ensure standard security baseline of a Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 system. Regardless of your system's workload all of these checks should pass. V1R12 DISA STIG for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This profile contains configuration checks that align to the DISA STIG for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 V1R12. In addition to being applicable to Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, DISA recognizes this configuration baseline as applicable to the operating system tier of Red Hat technologies that are based on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, such as: - Red Hat Enterprise Linux Server - Red Hat Enterprise Linux Workstation and Desktop - Red Hat Enterprise Linux for HPC - Red Hat Storage - Red Hat Containers with a Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 image https://public.cyber.mil/stigs/downloads/?_dl_facet_stigs=operating-systems%2Cunix-linux V1R12 DISA STIG with GUI for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This profile contains configuration checks that align to the DISA STIG with GUI for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 V1R12. In addition to being applicable to Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, DISA recognizes this configuration baseline as applicable to the operating system tier of Red Hat technologies that are based on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, such as: - Red Hat Enterprise Linux Server - Red Hat Enterprise Linux Workstation and Desktop - Red Hat Enterprise Linux for HPC - Red Hat Storage - Red Hat Containers with a Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 image Warning: The installation and use of a Graphical User Interface (GUI) increases your attack vector and decreases your overall security posture. If your Information Systems Security Officer (ISSO) lacks a documented operational requirement for a graphical user interface, please consider using the standard DISA STIG for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 profile. https://public.cyber.mil/stigs/downloads/?_dl_facet_stigs=operating-systems%2Cunix-linux System Settings Contains rules that check correct system settings. Installing and Maintaining Software The following sections contain information on security-relevant choices during the initial operating system installation process and the setup of software updates. Prefer to use a 64-bit Operating System when supported Prefer installation of 64-bit operating systems when the CPU supports it. There is no remediation besides installing a 64-bit operating system. BP28(R10) Use of a 64-bit operating system offers a few advantages, like a larger address space range for Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) and systematic presence of No eXecute and Execute Disable (NX/XD) protection bits. CCE-83694-0 System and Software Integrity System and software integrity can be gained by installing antivirus, increasing system encryption strength with FIPS, verifying installed software, enabling SELinux, installing an Intrusion Prevention System, etc. However, installing or enabling integrity checking tools cannot prevent intrusions, but they can detect that an intrusion may have occurred. Requirements for integrity checking may be highly dependent on the environment in which the system will be used. Snapshot-based approaches such as AIDE may induce considerable overhead in the presence of frequent software updates. Software Integrity Checking Both the AIDE (Advanced Intrusion Detection Environment) software and the RPM package management system provide mechanisms for verifying the integrity of installed software. AIDE uses snapshots of file metadata (such as hashes) and compares these to current system files in order to detect changes. The RPM package management system can conduct integrity checks by comparing information in its metadata database with files installed on the system. Integrity Scan Notification Email Address Specify the email address for designated personnel if baseline configurations are changed in an unauthorized manner. root@localhost Verify Integrity with RPM The RPM package management system includes the ability to verify the integrity of installed packages by comparing the installed files with information about the files taken from the package metadata stored in the RPM database. Although an attacker could corrupt the RPM database (analogous to attacking the AIDE database as described above), this check can still reveal modification of important files. To list which files on the system differ from what is expected by the RPM database: $ rpm -qVa See the man page for rpm to see a complete explanation of each column. Verify File Hashes with RPM Without cryptographic integrity protections, system executables and files can be altered by unauthorized users without detection. The RPM package management system can check the hashes of installed software packages, including many that are important to system security. To verify that the cryptographic hash of system files and commands matches vendor values, run the following command to list which files on the system have hashes that differ from what is expected by the RPM database: $ rpm -Va --noconfig | grep '^..5' If the file was not expected to change, investigate the cause of the change using audit logs or other means. The package can then be reinstalled to restore the file. Run the following command to determine which package owns the file: $ rpm -qf FILENAME The package can be reinstalled from a yum repository using the command: $ sudo yum reinstall PACKAGENAME Alternatively, the package can be reinstalled from trusted media using the command: $ sudo rpm -Uvh PACKAGENAME This rule can take a long time to perform the check and might consume a considerable amount of resources depending on the number of packages present on the system. It is not a problem in most cases, but especially systems with a large number of installed packages can be affected. See https://access.redhat.com/articles/6999111. 11 2 3 9 5.10.4.1 APO01.06 BAI03.05 BAI06.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS06.02 3.3.8 3.4.1 CCI-000366 CCI-001749 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.312(b) 164.312(c)(1) 164.312(c)(2) 164.312(e)(2)(i) 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 4.3.4.4.4 SR 3.1 SR 3.3 SR 3.4 SR 3.8 SR 7.6 A.11.2.4 A.12.1.2 A.12.2.1 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 CM-6(d) CM-6(c) SI-7 SI-7(1) SI-7(6) AU-9(3) PR.DS-6 PR.DS-8 PR.IP-1 Req-11.5 11.5.2 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 6.1.1 The hashes of important files like system executables should match the information given by the RPM database. Executables with erroneous hashes could be a sign of nefarious activity on the system. CCE-80857-6 - name: 'Set fact: Package manager reinstall command' set_fact: package_manager_reinstall_cmd: yum reinstall -y when: ansible_distribution in [ "Fedora", "RedHat", "CentOS", "OracleLinux" ] tags: - CCE-80857-6 - CJIS-5.10.4.1 - NIST-800-171-3.3.8 - NIST-800-171-3.4.1 - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(c) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(d) - NIST-800-53-SI-7 - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) - NIST-800-53-SI-7(6) - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 - high_complexity - high_severity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - rpm_verify_hashes - name: 'Set fact: Package manager reinstall command (zypper)' set_fact: package_manager_reinstall_cmd: zypper in -f -y when: ansible_distribution == "SLES" tags: - CCE-80857-6 - CJIS-5.10.4.1 - NIST-800-171-3.3.8 - NIST-800-171-3.4.1 - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(c) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(d) - NIST-800-53-SI-7 - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) - NIST-800-53-SI-7(6) - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 - high_complexity - high_severity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - rpm_verify_hashes - name: Read files with incorrect hash command: rpm -Va --nodeps --nosize --nomtime --nordev --nocaps --nolinkto --nouser --nogroup --nomode --noghost --noconfig register: files_with_incorrect_hash changed_when: false failed_when: files_with_incorrect_hash.rc > 1 check_mode: false when: (package_manager_reinstall_cmd is defined) tags: - CCE-80857-6 - CJIS-5.10.4.1 - NIST-800-171-3.3.8 - NIST-800-171-3.4.1 - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(c) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(d) - NIST-800-53-SI-7 - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) - NIST-800-53-SI-7(6) - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 - high_complexity - high_severity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - rpm_verify_hashes - name: Create list of packages command: rpm -qf "{{ item }}" with_items: '{{ files_with_incorrect_hash.stdout_lines | map(''regex_findall'', ''^[.]+[5]+.* (\/.*)'', ''\1'') | map(''join'') | select(''match'', ''(\/.*)'') | list | unique }}' register: list_of_packages changed_when: false check_mode: false when: - files_with_incorrect_hash.stdout_lines is defined - (files_with_incorrect_hash.stdout_lines | length > 0) tags: - CCE-80857-6 - CJIS-5.10.4.1 - NIST-800-171-3.3.8 - NIST-800-171-3.4.1 - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(c) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(d) - NIST-800-53-SI-7 - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) - NIST-800-53-SI-7(6) - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 - high_complexity - high_severity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - rpm_verify_hashes - name: Reinstall packages of files with incorrect hash command: '{{ package_manager_reinstall_cmd }} ''{{ item }}''' with_items: '{{ list_of_packages.results | map(attribute=''stdout_lines'') | list | unique }}' when: - files_with_incorrect_hash.stdout_lines is defined - (package_manager_reinstall_cmd is defined and (files_with_incorrect_hash.stdout_lines | length > 0)) tags: - CCE-80857-6 - CJIS-5.10.4.1 - NIST-800-171-3.3.8 - NIST-800-171-3.4.1 - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(c) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(d) - NIST-800-53-SI-7 - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) - NIST-800-53-SI-7(6) - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 - high_complexity - high_severity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - rpm_verify_hashes # Find which files have incorrect hash (not in /etc, because of the system related config files) and then get files names files_with_incorrect_hash="$(rpm -Va --noconfig | grep -E '^..5' | awk '{print $NF}' )" if [ -n "$files_with_incorrect_hash" ]; then # From files names get package names and change newline to space, because rpm writes each package to new line packages_to_reinstall="$(rpm -qf $files_with_incorrect_hash | tr '\n' ' ')" yum reinstall -y $packages_to_reinstall fi Verify and Correct Ownership with RPM The RPM package management system can check file ownership permissions of installed software packages, including many that are important to system security. After locating a file with incorrect permissions, which can be found with: rpm -Va | awk '{ if (substr($0,6,1)=="U" || substr($0,7,1)=="G") print $NF }' run the following command to determine which package owns it: $ rpm -qf FILENAME Next, run the following command to reset its permissions to the correct values: $ sudo rpm --setugids PACKAGENAME Profiles may require that specific files be owned by root while the default owner defined by the vendor is different. Such files will be reported as a finding and need to be evaluated according to your policy and deployment environment. This rule can take a long time to perform the check and might consume a considerable amount of resources depending on the number of packages present on the system. It is not a problem in most cases, but especially systems with a large number of installed packages can be affected. See https://access.redhat.com/articles/6999111. 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 6 9 5.10.4.1 APO01.06 APO11.04 BAI03.05 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 MEA02.01 3.3.8 3.4.1 CCI-001494 CCI-001496 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.1 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 5.2 SR 7.6 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.12.1.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R4.2 CIP-003-8 R6 CIP-007-3 R4 CIP-007-3 R4.1 CIP-007-3 R4.2 CM-6(d) CM-6(c) SI-7 SI-7(1) SI-7(6) AU-9(3) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-1 Req-11.5 11.5.2 SRG-OS-000256-GPOS-00097 SRG-OS-000257-GPOS-00098 SRG-OS-000278-GPOS-00108 6.1.14 Ownership of binaries and configuration files that is incorrect could allow an unauthorized user to gain privileges that they should not have. The ownership set by the vendor should be maintained. Any deviations from this baseline should be investigated. CCE-82196-7 - name: Read list of files with incorrect ownership command: rpm -Va --nodeps --nosignature --nofiledigest --nosize --nomtime --nordev --nocaps --nolinkto --nomode register: files_with_incorrect_ownership failed_when: files_with_incorrect_ownership.rc > 1 changed_when: false check_mode: false tags: - CCE-82196-7 - CJIS-5.10.4.1 - NIST-800-171-3.3.8 - NIST-800-171-3.4.1 - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(c) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(d) - NIST-800-53-SI-7 - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) - NIST-800-53-SI-7(6) - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 - high_complexity - high_severity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - rpm_verify_ownership - name: Create list of packages command: rpm -qf "{{ item }}" with_items: '{{ files_with_incorrect_ownership.stdout_lines | map(''regex_findall'', ''^[.]+[U|G]+.* (\/.*)'', ''\1'') | map(''join'') | select(''match'', ''(\/.*)'') | list | unique }}' register: list_of_packages changed_when: false check_mode: false when: (files_with_incorrect_ownership.stdout_lines | length > 0) tags: - CCE-82196-7 - CJIS-5.10.4.1 - NIST-800-171-3.3.8 - NIST-800-171-3.4.1 - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(c) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(d) - NIST-800-53-SI-7 - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) - NIST-800-53-SI-7(6) - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 - high_complexity - high_severity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - rpm_verify_ownership - name: Correct file ownership with RPM command: rpm --setugids '{{ item }}' with_items: '{{ list_of_packages.results | map(attribute=''stdout_lines'') | list | unique }}' when: (files_with_incorrect_ownership.stdout_lines | length > 0) tags: - CCE-82196-7 - CJIS-5.10.4.1 - NIST-800-171-3.3.8 - NIST-800-171-3.4.1 - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(c) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(d) - NIST-800-53-SI-7 - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) - NIST-800-53-SI-7(6) - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 - high_complexity - high_severity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - rpm_verify_ownership # Declare array to hold set of RPM packages we need to correct permissions for declare -A SETPERMS_RPM_DICT # Create a list of files on the system having permissions different from what # is expected by the RPM database readarray -t FILES_WITH_INCORRECT_PERMS < <(rpm -Va --nofiledigest | awk '{ if (substr($0,6,1)=="U" || substr($0,7,1)=="G") print $NF }') for FILE_PATH in "${FILES_WITH_INCORRECT_PERMS[@]}" do RPM_PACKAGE=$(rpm -qf "$FILE_PATH") # Use an associative array to store packages as it's keys, not having to care about duplicates. SETPERMS_RPM_DICT["$RPM_PACKAGE"]=1 done # For each of the RPM packages left in the list -- reset its permissions to the # correct values for RPM_PACKAGE in "${!SETPERMS_RPM_DICT[@]}" do rpm --setugids "${RPM_PACKAGE}" done Verify and Correct File Permissions with RPM The RPM package management system can check file access permissions of installed software packages, including many that are important to system security. Verify that the file permissions of system files and commands match vendor values. Check the file permissions with the following command: $ sudo rpm -Va | awk '{ if (substr($0,2,1)=="M") print $NF }' Output indicates files that do not match vendor defaults. After locating a file with incorrect permissions, run the following command to determine which package owns it: $ rpm -qf FILENAME Next, run the following command to reset its permissions to the correct values: $ sudo rpm --setperms PACKAGENAME Profiles may require that specific files have stricter file permissions than defined by the vendor. Such files will be reported as a finding and need to be evaluated according to your policy and deployment environment. This rule can take a long time to perform the check and might consume a considerable amount of resources depending on the number of packages present on the system. It is not a problem in most cases, but especially systems with a large number of installed packages can be affected. See https://access.redhat.com/articles/6999111. 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 6 9 5.10.4.1 APO01.06 APO11.04 BAI03.05 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 MEA02.01 3.3.8 3.4.1 CCI-001493 CCI-001494 CCI-001495 CCI-001496 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.312(b) 164.312(c)(1) 164.312(c)(2) 164.312(e)(2)(i) 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.1 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 5.2 SR 7.6 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.12.1.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R4.2 CIP-003-8 R6 CIP-007-3 R4 CIP-007-3 R4.1 CIP-007-3 R4.2 CM-6(d) CM-6(c) SI-7 SI-7(1) SI-7(6) AU-9(3) CM-6(a) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-1 Req-11.5 11.5.2 SRG-OS-000256-GPOS-00097 SRG-OS-000257-GPOS-00098 SRG-OS-000258-GPOS-00099 SRG-OS-000278-GPOS-00108 6.1.14 Permissions on system binaries and configuration files that are too generous could allow an unauthorized user to gain privileges that they should not have. The permissions set by the vendor should be maintained. Any deviations from this baseline should be investigated. CCE-80858-4 - name: Read list of files with incorrect permissions command: rpm -Va --nodeps --nosignature --nofiledigest --nosize --nomtime --nordev --nocaps --nolinkto --nouser --nogroup register: files_with_incorrect_permissions failed_when: files_with_incorrect_permissions.rc > 1 changed_when: false check_mode: false tags: - CCE-80858-4 - CJIS-5.10.4.1 - NIST-800-171-3.3.8 - NIST-800-171-3.4.1 - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(c) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(d) - NIST-800-53-SI-7 - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) - NIST-800-53-SI-7(6) - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 - high_complexity - high_severity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - rpm_verify_permissions - name: Create list of packages command: rpm -qf "{{ item }}" with_items: '{{ files_with_incorrect_permissions.stdout_lines | map(''regex_findall'', ''^[.]+[M]+.* (\/.*)'', ''\1'') | map(''join'') | select(''match'', ''(\/.*)'') | list | unique }}' register: list_of_packages changed_when: false check_mode: false when: (files_with_incorrect_permissions.stdout_lines | length > 0) tags: - CCE-80858-4 - CJIS-5.10.4.1 - NIST-800-171-3.3.8 - NIST-800-171-3.4.1 - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(c) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(d) - NIST-800-53-SI-7 - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) - NIST-800-53-SI-7(6) - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 - high_complexity - high_severity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - rpm_verify_permissions - name: Correct file permissions with RPM command: rpm --setperms '{{ item }}' with_items: '{{ list_of_packages.results | map(attribute=''stdout_lines'') | list | unique }}' when: (files_with_incorrect_permissions.stdout_lines | length > 0) tags: - CCE-80858-4 - CJIS-5.10.4.1 - NIST-800-171-3.3.8 - NIST-800-171-3.4.1 - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(c) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(d) - NIST-800-53-SI-7 - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) - NIST-800-53-SI-7(6) - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 - high_complexity - high_severity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - rpm_verify_permissions # Declare array to hold set of RPM packages we need to correct permissions for declare -A SETPERMS_RPM_DICT # Create a list of files on the system having permissions different from what # is expected by the RPM database readarray -t FILES_WITH_INCORRECT_PERMS < <(rpm -Va --nofiledigest | awk '{ if (substr($0,2,1)=="M") print $NF }') for FILE_PATH in "${FILES_WITH_INCORRECT_PERMS[@]}" do # NOTE: some files maybe controlled by more then one package readarray -t RPM_PACKAGES < <(rpm -qf "${FILE_PATH}") for RPM_PACKAGE in "${RPM_PACKAGES[@]}" do # Use an associative array to store packages as it's keys, not having to care about duplicates. SETPERMS_RPM_DICT["$RPM_PACKAGE"]=1 done done # For each of the RPM packages left in the list -- reset its permissions to the # correct values for RPM_PACKAGE in "${!SETPERMS_RPM_DICT[@]}" do rpm --restore "${RPM_PACKAGE}" done Verify Integrity with AIDE AIDE conducts integrity checks by comparing information about files with previously-gathered information. Ideally, the AIDE database is created immediately after initial system configuration, and then again after any software update. AIDE is highly configurable, with further configuration information located in /usr/share/doc/aide-VERSION. Install AIDE The aide package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install aide BP28(R51) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 2 3 5 7 8 9 5.10.1.3 APO01.06 BAI01.06 BAI02.01 BAI03.05 BAI06.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS04.07 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 DSS06.06 CCI-002696 CCI-002699 CCI-001744 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 4.3.4.4.4 SR 3.1 SR 3.3 SR 3.4 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.6 1034 1288 1341 1417 A.11.2.4 A.12.1.2 A.12.2.1 A.12.4.1 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.8.2.3 CM-6(a) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-7 PR.DS-1 PR.DS-6 PR.DS-8 PR.IP-1 PR.IP-3 Req-11.5 11.5.2 SRG-OS-000445-GPOS-00199 RHEL-08-010359 5.3.1 SV-251710r880730_rule The AIDE package must be installed if it is to be available for integrity checking. CCE-80844-4 - name: Ensure aide is installed package: name: aide state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80844-4 - CJIS-5.10.1.3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010359 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_aide_installed [[packages]] name = "aide" version = "*" include install_aide class install_aide { package { 'aide': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=aide # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "aide" ; then yum install -y "aide" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Build and Test AIDE Database Run the following command to generate a new database: $ sudo /usr/sbin/aide --init By default, the database will be written to the file /var/lib/aide/aide.db.new.gz. Storing the database, the configuration file /etc/aide.conf, and the binary /usr/sbin/aide (or hashes of these files), in a secure location (such as on read-only media) provides additional assurance about their integrity. The newly-generated database can be installed as follows: $ sudo cp /var/lib/aide/aide.db.new.gz /var/lib/aide/aide.db.gz To initiate a manual check, run the following command: $ sudo /usr/sbin/aide --check If this check produces any unexpected output, investigate. BP28(R51) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 2 3 5 7 8 9 5.10.1.3 APO01.06 BAI01.06 BAI02.01 BAI03.05 BAI06.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS04.07 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 DSS06.06 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 4.3.4.4.4 SR 3.1 SR 3.3 SR 3.4 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.6 A.11.2.4 A.12.1.2 A.12.2.1 A.12.4.1 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.8.2.3 CM-6(a) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-7 PR.DS-1 PR.DS-6 PR.DS-8 PR.IP-1 PR.IP-3 Req-11.5 11.5.2 SRG-OS-000445-GPOS-00199 RHEL-08-010359 5.3.1 SV-251710r880730_rule For AIDE to be effective, an initial database of "known-good" information about files must be captured and it should be able to be verified against the installed files. CCE-80675-2 - name: Build and Test AIDE Database - Ensure AIDE Is Installed ansible.builtin.package: name: '{{ item }}' state: present with_items: - aide when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80675-2 - CJIS-5.10.1.3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010359 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 - aide_build_database - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Build and Test AIDE Database - Build and Test AIDE Database ansible.builtin.command: /usr/sbin/aide --init changed_when: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80675-2 - CJIS-5.10.1.3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010359 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 - aide_build_database - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Build and Test AIDE Database - Check Whether the Stock AIDE Database Exists ansible.builtin.stat: path: /var/lib/aide/aide.db.new.gz register: aide_database_stat when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80675-2 - CJIS-5.10.1.3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010359 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 - aide_build_database - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Build and Test AIDE Database - Stage AIDE Database ansible.builtin.copy: src: /var/lib/aide/aide.db.new.gz dest: /var/lib/aide/aide.db.gz backup: true remote_src: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - (aide_database_stat.stat.exists is defined and aide_database_stat.stat.exists) tags: - CCE-80675-2 - CJIS-5.10.1.3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010359 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 - aide_build_database - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "aide" ; then yum install -y "aide" fi /usr/sbin/aide --init /bin/cp -p /var/lib/aide/aide.db.new.gz /var/lib/aide/aide.db.gz else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure AIDE to Verify the Audit Tools The operating system file integrity tool must be configured to protect the integrity of the audit tools. CCI-001496 AU-9(3) AU-9(3).1 SRG-OS-000278-GPOS-00108 RHEL-08-030650 5.3.3 SV-230475r880722_rule Protecting the integrity of the tools used for auditing purposes is a critical step toward ensuring the integrity of audit information. Audit information includes all information (e.g., audit records, audit settings, and audit reports) needed to successfully audit information system activity. Audit tools include but are not limited to vendor-provided and open-source audit tools needed to successfully view and manipulate audit information system activity and records. Audit tools include custom queries and report generators. It is not uncommon for attackers to replace the audit tools or inject code into the existing tools to provide the capability to hide or erase system activity from the audit logs. To address this risk, audit tools must be cryptographically signed to provide the capability to identify when the audit tools have been modified, manipulated, or replaced. An example is a checksum hash of the file or files. CCE-85964-5 - name: Ensure aide is installed package: name: '{{ item }}' state: present with_items: - aide when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-85964-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030650 - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3).1 - aide_check_audit_tools - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Set audit_tools fact set_fact: audit_tools: - /usr/sbin/auditctl - /usr/sbin/auditd - /usr/sbin/augenrules - /usr/sbin/aureport - /usr/sbin/ausearch - /usr/sbin/autrace - /usr/sbin/rsyslogd when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-85964-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030650 - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3).1 - aide_check_audit_tools - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure existing AIDE configuration for audit tools are correct lineinfile: path: /etc/aide.conf regexp: ^{{ item }}\s line: '{{ item }} p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512' with_items: '{{ audit_tools }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-85964-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030650 - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3).1 - aide_check_audit_tools - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Configure AIDE to properly protect audit tools lineinfile: path: /etc/aide.conf line: '{{ item }} p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512' with_items: '{{ audit_tools }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-85964-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030650 - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3).1 - aide_check_audit_tools - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "aide" ; then yum install -y "aide" fi if grep -i '^.*/usr/sbin/auditctl.*$' /etc/aide.conf; then sed -i "s#.*/usr/sbin/auditctl.*#/usr/sbin/auditctl p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512#" /etc/aide.conf else echo "/usr/sbin/auditctl p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512" >> /etc/aide.conf fi if grep -i '^.*/usr/sbin/auditd.*$' /etc/aide.conf; then sed -i "s#.*/usr/sbin/auditd.*#/usr/sbin/auditd p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512#" /etc/aide.conf else echo "/usr/sbin/auditd p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512" >> /etc/aide.conf fi if grep -i '^.*/usr/sbin/ausearch.*$' /etc/aide.conf; then sed -i "s#.*/usr/sbin/ausearch.*#/usr/sbin/ausearch p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512#" /etc/aide.conf else echo "/usr/sbin/ausearch p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512" >> /etc/aide.conf fi if grep -i '^.*/usr/sbin/aureport.*$' /etc/aide.conf; then sed -i "s#.*/usr/sbin/aureport.*#/usr/sbin/aureport p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512#" /etc/aide.conf else echo "/usr/sbin/aureport p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512" >> /etc/aide.conf fi if grep -i '^.*/usr/sbin/autrace.*$' /etc/aide.conf; then sed -i "s#.*/usr/sbin/autrace.*#/usr/sbin/autrace p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512#" /etc/aide.conf else echo "/usr/sbin/autrace p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512" >> /etc/aide.conf fi if grep -i '^.*/usr/sbin/augenrules.*$' /etc/aide.conf; then sed -i "s#.*/usr/sbin/augenrules.*#/usr/sbin/augenrules p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512#" /etc/aide.conf else echo "/usr/sbin/augenrules p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512" >> /etc/aide.conf fi if grep -i '^.*/usr/sbin/rsyslogd.*$' /etc/aide.conf; then sed -i "s#.*/usr/sbin/rsyslogd.*#/usr/sbin/rsyslogd p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512#" /etc/aide.conf else echo "/usr/sbin/rsyslogd p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512" >> /etc/aide.conf fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure Periodic Execution of AIDE At a minimum, AIDE should be configured to run a weekly scan. To implement a daily execution of AIDE at 4:05am using cron, add the following line to /etc/crontab: 05 4 * * * root /usr/sbin/aide --check To implement a weekly execution of AIDE at 4:05am using cron, add the following line to /etc/crontab: 05 4 * * 0 root /usr/sbin/aide --check AIDE can be executed periodically through other means; this is merely one example. The usage of cron's special time codes, such as @daily and @weekly is acceptable. BP28(R51) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 2 3 5 7 8 9 5.10.1.3 APO01.06 BAI01.06 BAI02.01 BAI03.05 BAI06.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS04.07 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 DSS06.06 CCI-001744 CCI-002699 CCI-002702 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 4.3.4.4.4 SR 3.1 SR 3.3 SR 3.4 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.6 A.11.2.4 A.12.1.2 A.12.2.1 A.12.4.1 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.8.2.3 SI-7 SI-7(1) CM-6(a) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-7 PR.DS-1 PR.DS-6 PR.DS-8 PR.IP-1 PR.IP-3 Req-11.5 11.5.2 SRG-OS-000363-GPOS-00150 SRG-OS-000446-GPOS-00200 SRG-OS-000447-GPOS-00201 5.3.2 By default, AIDE does not install itself for periodic execution. Periodically running AIDE is necessary to reveal unexpected changes in installed files. Unauthorized changes to the baseline configuration could make the system vulnerable to various attacks or allow unauthorized access to the operating system. Changes to operating system configurations can have unintended side effects, some of which may be relevant to security. Detecting such changes and providing an automated response can help avoid unintended, negative consequences that could ultimately affect the security state of the operating system. The operating system's Information Management Officer (IMO)/Information System Security Officer (ISSO) and System Administrators (SAs) must be notified via email and/or monitoring system trap when there is an unauthorized modification of a configuration item. CCE-80676-0 - name: Ensure AIDE is installed package: name: '{{ item }}' state: present with_items: - aide when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80676-0 - CJIS-5.10.1.3 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SI-7 - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 - aide_periodic_cron_checking - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Set cron package name - RedHat set_fact: cron_pkg_name: cronie when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_os_family == "RedHat" or ansible_os_family == "Suse" tags: - CCE-80676-0 - CJIS-5.10.1.3 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SI-7 - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 - aide_periodic_cron_checking - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Set cron package name - Debian set_fact: cron_pkg_name: cron when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_os_family == "Debian" tags: - CCE-80676-0 - CJIS-5.10.1.3 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SI-7 - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 - aide_periodic_cron_checking - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Install cron package: name: '{{ cron_pkg_name }}' state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80676-0 - CJIS-5.10.1.3 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SI-7 - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 - aide_periodic_cron_checking - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Configure Periodic Execution of AIDE cron: name: run AIDE check minute: 5 hour: 4 weekday: 0 user: root job: /usr/sbin/aide --check when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80676-0 - CJIS-5.10.1.3 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SI-7 - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 - aide_periodic_cron_checking - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "aide" ; then yum install -y "aide" fi if ! grep -q "/usr/sbin/aide --check" /etc/crontab ; then echo "05 4 * * * root /usr/sbin/aide --check" >> /etc/crontab else sed -i '\!^.* --check.*$!d' /etc/crontab echo "05 4 * * * root /usr/sbin/aide --check" >> /etc/crontab fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure Notification of Post-AIDE Scan Details AIDE should notify appropriate personnel of the details of a scan after the scan has been run. If AIDE has already been configured for periodic execution in /etc/crontab, append the following line to the existing AIDE line: | /bin/mail -s "$(hostname) - AIDE Integrity Check" root@localhost Otherwise, add the following line to /etc/crontab: 05 4 * * * root /usr/sbin/aide --check | /bin/mail -s "$(hostname) - AIDE Integrity Check" root@localhost AIDE can be executed periodically through other means; this is merely one example. BP28(R51) 1 11 12 13 15 16 2 3 5 7 8 9 BAI01.06 BAI06.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 CCI-001744 CCI-002699 CCI-002702 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 6.2 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 CM-6(a) CM-3(5) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-7 PR.IP-1 PR.IP-3 SRG-OS-000363-GPOS-00150 SRG-OS-000446-GPOS-00200 SRG-OS-000447-GPOS-00201 RHEL-08-010360 SV-230263r902716_rule Unauthorized changes to the baseline configuration could make the system vulnerable to various attacks or allow unauthorized access to the operating system. Changes to operating system configurations can have unintended side effects, some of which may be relevant to security. Detecting such changes and providing an automated response can help avoid unintended, negative consequences that could ultimately affect the security state of the operating system. The operating system's Information Management Officer (IMO)/Information System Security Officer (ISSO) and System Administrators (SAs) must be notified via email and/or monitoring system trap when there is an unauthorized modification of a configuration item. CCE-82891-3 - name: XCCDF Value var_aide_scan_notification_email # promote to variable set_fact: var_aide_scan_notification_email: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure AIDE is installed package: name: '{{ item }}' state: present with_items: - aide when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82891-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010360 - NIST-800-53-CM-3(5) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - aide_scan_notification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Configure Notification of Post-AIDE Scan Details cron: name: run AIDE check minute: 5 hour: 4 weekday: 0 user: root job: /usr/sbin/aide --check | /bin/mail -s "$(hostname) - AIDE Integrity Check" {{ var_aide_scan_notification_email }} when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82891-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010360 - NIST-800-53-CM-3(5) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - aide_scan_notification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "aide" ; then yum install -y "aide" fi var_aide_scan_notification_email='' CRONTAB=/etc/crontab CRONDIRS='/etc/cron.d /etc/cron.daily /etc/cron.weekly /etc/cron.monthly' # NOTE: on some platforms, /etc/crontab may not exist if [ -f /etc/crontab ]; then CRONTAB_EXIST=/etc/crontab fi if [ -f /var/spool/cron/root ]; then VARSPOOL=/var/spool/cron/root fi if ! grep -qR '^.*/usr/sbin/aide\s*\-\-check.*|.*\/bin\/mail\s*-s\s*".*"\s*.*@.*$' $CRONTAB_EXIST $VARSPOOL $CRONDIRS; then echo "0 5 * * * root /usr/sbin/aide --check | /bin/mail -s \"\$(hostname) - AIDE Integrity Check\" $var_aide_scan_notification_email" >> $CRONTAB fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure AIDE to Use FIPS 140-2 for Validating Hashes By default, the sha512 option is added to the NORMAL ruleset in AIDE. If using a custom ruleset or the sha512 option is missing, add sha512 to the appropriate ruleset. For example, add sha512 to the following line in /etc/aide.conf: NORMAL = FIPSR+sha512 AIDE rules can be configured in multiple ways; this is merely one example that is already configured by default. System Crypto Modules must be provided by a vendor that undergoes FIPS-140 certifications. FIPS-140 is applicable to all Federal agencies that use cryptographic-based security systems to protect sensitive information in computer and telecommunication systems (including voice systems) as defined in Section 5131 of the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, Public Law 104-106. This standard shall be used in designing and implementing cryptographic modules that Federal departments and agencies operate or are operated for them under contract. See https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-2.pdf To meet this, the system has to have cryptographic software provided by a vendor that has undergone this certification. This means providing documentation, test results, design information, and independent third party review by an accredited lab. While open source software is capable of meeting this, it does not meet FIPS-140 unless the vendor submits to this process. 2 3 APO01.06 BAI03.05 BAI06.01 DSS06.02 3.13.11 CCI-000366 4.3.4.4.4 SR 3.1 SR 3.3 SR 3.4 SR 3.8 A.11.2.4 A.12.2.1 A.12.5.1 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.4 SI-7 SI-7(1) CM-6(a) PR.DS-6 PR.DS-8 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 5.3.3 File integrity tools use cryptographic hashes for verifying file contents and directories have not been altered. These hashes must be FIPS 140-2 approved cryptographic hashes. CCE-86404-1 # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "aide" ; then yum install -y "aide" fi aide_conf="/etc/aide.conf" forbidden_hashes=(sha1 rmd160 sha256 whirlpool tiger haval gost crc32) groups=$(LC_ALL=C grep "^[A-Z][A-Za-z_]*" $aide_conf | cut -f1 -d ' ' | tr -d ' ' | sort -u) for group in $groups do config=$(grep "^$group\s*=" $aide_conf | cut -f2 -d '=' | tr -d ' ') if ! [[ $config = *sha512* ]] then config=$config"+sha512" fi for hash in "${forbidden_hashes[@]}" do config=$(echo $config | sed "s/$hash//") done config=$(echo $config | sed "s/^\+*//") config=$(echo $config | sed "s/\+\++/+/") config=$(echo $config | sed "s/\+$//") sed -i "s/^$group\s*=.*/$group = $config/g" $aide_conf done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure AIDE to Verify Access Control Lists (ACLs) By default, the acl option is added to the FIPSR ruleset in AIDE. If using a custom ruleset or the acl option is missing, add acl to the appropriate ruleset. For example, add acl to the following line in /etc/aide.conf: FIPSR = p+i+n+u+g+s+m+c+acl+selinux+xattrs+sha256 AIDE rules can be configured in multiple ways; this is merely one example that is already configured by default. The remediation provided with this rule adds acl to all rule sets available in /etc/aide.conf BP28(R51) 2 3 APO01.06 BAI03.05 BAI06.01 DSS06.02 CCI-000366 4.3.4.4.4 SR 3.1 SR 3.3 SR 3.4 SR 3.8 A.11.2.4 A.12.2.1 A.12.5.1 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.4 SI-7 SI-7(1) CM-6(a) PR.DS-6 PR.DS-8 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040310 SV-230552r880724_rule ACLs can provide permissions beyond those permitted through the file mode and must be verified by the file integrity tools. CCE-84220-3 - name: Gather list of packages package_facts: manager: auto when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '' tags: - CCE-84220-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040310 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SI-7 - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) - aide_verify_acls - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Get rules groups shell: | set -o pipefail LC_ALL=C grep "^[A-Z][A-Za-z_]*" /etc/aide.conf | grep -v "^ALLXTRAHASHES" | cut -f1 -d '=' | tr -d ' ' | sort -u || true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '''aide'' in ansible_facts.packages' register: find_rules_groups_results tags: - CCE-84220-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040310 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SI-7 - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) - aide_verify_acls - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure the acl rule is present when aide is installed. replace: path: /etc/aide.conf regexp: (^\s*{{ item }}\s*=\s*)(?!.*acl)([^\s]*) replace: \g<1>\g<2>+acl when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '''aide'' in ansible_facts.packages' with_items: '{{ find_rules_groups_results.stdout_lines | map(''trim'') | list }}' tags: - CCE-84220-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040310 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SI-7 - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) - aide_verify_acls - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "aide" ; then yum install -y "aide" fi aide_conf="/etc/aide.conf" groups=$(LC_ALL=C grep "^[A-Z][A-Za-z_]*" $aide_conf | grep -v "^ALLXTRAHASHES" | cut -f1 -d '=' | tr -d ' ' | sort -u) for group in $groups do config=$(grep "^$group\s*=" $aide_conf | cut -f2 -d '=' | tr -d ' ') if ! [[ $config = *acl* ]] then if [[ -z $config ]] then config="acl" else config=$config"+acl" fi fi sed -i "s/^$group\s*=.*/$group = $config/g" $aide_conf done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure AIDE to Verify Extended Attributes By default, the xattrs option is added to the FIPSR ruleset in AIDE. If using a custom ruleset or the xattrs option is missing, add xattrs to the appropriate ruleset. For example, add xattrs to the following line in /etc/aide.conf: FIPSR = p+i+n+u+g+s+m+c+acl+selinux+xattrs+sha256 AIDE rules can be configured in multiple ways; this is merely one example that is already configured by default. The remediation provided with this rule adds xattrs to all rule sets available in /etc/aide.conf BP28(R51) 2 3 APO01.06 BAI03.05 BAI06.01 DSS06.02 CCI-000366 4.3.4.4.4 SR 3.1 SR 3.3 SR 3.4 SR 3.8 A.11.2.4 A.12.2.1 A.12.5.1 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.4 SI-7 SI-7(1) CM-6(a) PR.DS-6 PR.DS-8 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040300 SV-230551r627750_rule Extended attributes in file systems are used to contain arbitrary data and file metadata with security implications. CCE-83733-6 - name: Gather list of packages package_facts: manager: auto when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '' tags: - CCE-83733-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040300 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SI-7 - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) - aide_verify_ext_attributes - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Get rules groups shell: | set -o pipefail LC_ALL=C grep "^[A-Z][A-Za-z_]*" /etc/aide.conf | grep -v "^ALLXTRAHASHES" | cut -f1 -d '=' | tr -d ' ' | sort -u || true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '''aide'' in ansible_facts.packages' register: find_rules_groups_results tags: - CCE-83733-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040300 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SI-7 - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) - aide_verify_ext_attributes - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure the xattrs rule is present when aide is installed. replace: path: /etc/aide.conf regexp: (^\s*{{ item }}\s*=\s*)(?!.*xattrs)([^\s]*) replace: \g<1>\g<2>+xattrs when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '''aide'' in ansible_facts.packages' with_items: '{{ find_rules_groups_results.stdout_lines | map(''trim'') | list }}' tags: - CCE-83733-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040300 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SI-7 - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) - aide_verify_ext_attributes - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "aide" ; then yum install -y "aide" fi aide_conf="/etc/aide.conf" groups=$(LC_ALL=C grep "^[A-Z][A-Za-z_]*" $aide_conf | grep -v "^ALLXTRAHASHES" | cut -f1 -d '=' | tr -d ' ' | sort -u) for group in $groups do config=$(grep "^$group\s*=" $aide_conf | cut -f2 -d '=' | tr -d ' ') if ! [[ $config = *xattrs* ]] then if [[ -z $config ]] then config="xattrs" else config=$config"+xattrs" fi fi sed -i "s/^$group\s*=.*/$group = $config/g" $aide_conf done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Audit Tools Must Be Group-owned by Root Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 systems providing tools to interface with audit information will leverage user permissions and roles identifying the user accessing the tools, and the corresponding rights the user enjoys, to make access decisions regarding the access to audit tools. Audit tools include, but are not limited to, vendor-provided and open source audit tools needed to successfully view and manipulate audit information system activity and records. Audit tools include custom queries and report generators. Audit tools must have the correct group owner. CCI-001493 CCI-001494 CCI-001495 AU-9 SRG-OS-000256-GPOS-00097 SRG-OS-000257-GPOS-00098 SRG-OS-000258-GPOS-00099 RHEL-08-030640 SV-230474r627750_rule Protecting audit information also includes identifying and protecting the tools used to view and manipulate log data. Therefore, protecting audit tools is necessary to prevent unauthorized operations on audit information. CCE-86239-1 - name: Test for existence /sbin/auditctl stat: path: /sbin/auditctl register: file_exists when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86239-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030640 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_group_ownership - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner 0 on /sbin/auditctl file: path: /sbin/auditctl group: '0' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86239-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030640 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_group_ownership - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /sbin/aureport stat: path: /sbin/aureport register: file_exists when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86239-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030640 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_group_ownership - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner 0 on /sbin/aureport file: path: /sbin/aureport group: '0' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86239-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030640 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_group_ownership - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /sbin/ausearch stat: path: /sbin/ausearch register: file_exists when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86239-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030640 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_group_ownership - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner 0 on /sbin/ausearch file: path: /sbin/ausearch group: '0' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86239-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030640 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_group_ownership - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /sbin/autrace stat: path: /sbin/autrace register: file_exists when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86239-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030640 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_group_ownership - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner 0 on /sbin/autrace file: path: /sbin/autrace group: '0' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86239-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030640 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_group_ownership - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /sbin/auditd stat: path: /sbin/auditd register: file_exists when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86239-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030640 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_group_ownership - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner 0 on /sbin/auditd file: path: /sbin/auditd group: '0' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86239-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030640 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_group_ownership - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /sbin/rsyslogd stat: path: /sbin/rsyslogd register: file_exists when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86239-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030640 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_group_ownership - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner 0 on /sbin/rsyslogd file: path: /sbin/rsyslogd group: '0' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86239-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030640 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_group_ownership - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /sbin/augenrules stat: path: /sbin/augenrules register: file_exists when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86239-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030640 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_group_ownership - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner 0 on /sbin/augenrules file: path: /sbin/augenrules group: '0' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86239-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030640 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_group_ownership - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then chgrp 0 /sbin/auditctl chgrp 0 /sbin/aureport chgrp 0 /sbin/ausearch chgrp 0 /sbin/autrace chgrp 0 /sbin/auditd chgrp 0 /sbin/rsyslogd chgrp 0 /sbin/augenrules else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Audit Tools Must Be Owned by Root Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 systems providing tools to interface with audit information will leverage user permissions and roles identifying the user accessing the tools, and the corresponding rights the user enjoys, to make access decisions regarding the access to audit tools. Audit tools include, but are not limited to, vendor-provided and open source audit tools needed to successfully view and manipulate audit information system activity and records. Audit tools include custom queries and report generators. Audit tools must have the correct owner. CCI-001493 CCI-001494 CCI-001495 AU-9 SRG-OS-000256-GPOS-00097 SRG-OS-000257-GPOS-00098 SRG-OS-000258-GPOS-00099 RHEL-08-030630 SV-230473r744008_rule Protecting audit information also includes identifying and protecting the tools used to view and manipulate log data. Therefore, protecting audit tools is necessary to prevent unauthorized operations on audit information. CCE-86259-9 - name: Test for existence /sbin/auditctl stat: path: /sbin/auditctl register: file_exists when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86259-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030630 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_ownership - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner 0 on /sbin/auditctl file: path: /sbin/auditctl owner: '0' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86259-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030630 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_ownership - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /sbin/aureport stat: path: /sbin/aureport register: file_exists when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86259-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030630 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_ownership - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner 0 on /sbin/aureport file: path: /sbin/aureport owner: '0' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86259-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030630 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_ownership - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /sbin/ausearch stat: path: /sbin/ausearch register: file_exists when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86259-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030630 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_ownership - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner 0 on /sbin/ausearch file: path: /sbin/ausearch owner: '0' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86259-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030630 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_ownership - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /sbin/autrace stat: path: /sbin/autrace register: file_exists when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86259-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030630 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_ownership - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner 0 on /sbin/autrace file: path: /sbin/autrace owner: '0' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86259-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030630 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_ownership - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /sbin/auditd stat: path: /sbin/auditd register: file_exists when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86259-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030630 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_ownership - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner 0 on /sbin/auditd file: path: /sbin/auditd owner: '0' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86259-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030630 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_ownership - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /sbin/rsyslogd stat: path: /sbin/rsyslogd register: file_exists when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86259-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030630 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_ownership - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner 0 on /sbin/rsyslogd file: path: /sbin/rsyslogd owner: '0' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86259-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030630 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_ownership - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /sbin/augenrules stat: path: /sbin/augenrules register: file_exists when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86259-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030630 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_ownership - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner 0 on /sbin/augenrules file: path: /sbin/augenrules owner: '0' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86259-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030630 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_ownership - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then chown 0 /sbin/auditctl chown 0 /sbin/aureport chown 0 /sbin/ausearch chown 0 /sbin/autrace chown 0 /sbin/auditd chown 0 /sbin/rsyslogd chown 0 /sbin/augenrules else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Audit Tools Must Have a Mode of 0755 or Less Permissive Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 systems providing tools to interface with audit information will leverage user permissions and roles identifying the user accessing the tools, and the corresponding rights the user enjoys, to make access decisions regarding the access to audit tools. Audit tools include, but are not limited to, vendor-provided and open source audit tools needed to successfully view and manipulate audit information system activity and records. Audit tools include custom queries and report generators. Audit tools must have a mode of 0755 or less permissive. CCI-001493 AU-9 SRG-OS-000256-GPOS-00097 SRG-OS-000257-GPOS-00098 SRG-OS-000258-GPOS-00099 RHEL-08-030620 SV-230472r627750_rule Protecting audit information also includes identifying and protecting the tools used to view and manipulate log data. Therefore, protecting audit tools is necessary to prevent unauthorized operations on audit information. CCE-86227-6 - name: Test for existence /sbin/auditctl stat: path: /sbin/auditctl register: file_exists when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86227-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030620 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_permissions - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure permission u-s,g-ws,o-wt on /sbin/auditctl file: path: /sbin/auditctl mode: u-s,g-ws,o-wt when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86227-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030620 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_permissions - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /sbin/aureport stat: path: /sbin/aureport register: file_exists when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86227-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030620 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_permissions - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure permission u-s,g-ws,o-wt on /sbin/aureport file: path: /sbin/aureport mode: u-s,g-ws,o-wt when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86227-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030620 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_permissions - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /sbin/ausearch stat: path: /sbin/ausearch register: file_exists when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86227-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030620 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_permissions - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure permission u-s,g-ws,o-wt on /sbin/ausearch file: path: /sbin/ausearch mode: u-s,g-ws,o-wt when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86227-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030620 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_permissions - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /sbin/autrace stat: path: /sbin/autrace register: file_exists when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86227-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030620 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_permissions - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure permission u-s,g-ws,o-wt on /sbin/autrace file: path: /sbin/autrace mode: u-s,g-ws,o-wt when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86227-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030620 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_permissions - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /sbin/auditd stat: path: /sbin/auditd register: file_exists when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86227-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030620 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_permissions - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure permission u-s,g-ws,o-wt on /sbin/auditd file: path: /sbin/auditd mode: u-s,g-ws,o-wt when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86227-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030620 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_permissions - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /sbin/rsyslogd stat: path: /sbin/rsyslogd register: file_exists when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86227-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030620 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_permissions - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure permission u-s,g-ws,o-wt on /sbin/rsyslogd file: path: /sbin/rsyslogd mode: u-s,g-ws,o-wt when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86227-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030620 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_permissions - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /sbin/augenrules stat: path: /sbin/augenrules register: file_exists when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86227-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030620 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_permissions - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure permission u-s,g-ws,o-wt on /sbin/augenrules file: path: /sbin/augenrules mode: u-s,g-ws,o-wt when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86227-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030620 - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - configure_strategy - file_audit_tools_permissions - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then chmod u-s,g-ws,o-wt /sbin/auditctl chmod u-s,g-ws,o-wt /sbin/aureport chmod u-s,g-ws,o-wt /sbin/ausearch chmod u-s,g-ws,o-wt /sbin/autrace chmod u-s,g-ws,o-wt /sbin/auditd chmod u-s,g-ws,o-wt /sbin/rsyslogd chmod u-s,g-ws,o-wt /sbin/augenrules else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) The Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) is a computer security standard which is developed by the U.S. Government and industry working groups to validate the quality of cryptographic modules. The FIPS standard provides four security levels to ensure adequate coverage of different industries, implementation of cryptographic modules, and organizational sizes and requirements. FIPS 140-2 is the current standard for validating that mechanisms used to access cryptographic modules utilize authentication that meets industry and government requirements. For government systems, this allows Security Levels 1, 2, 3, or 4 for use on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8. See http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html for more information. Enable Dracut FIPS Module To enable FIPS mode, run the following command: fips-mode-setup --enable To enable FIPS, the system requires that the fips module is added in dracut configuration. Check if /etc/dracut.conf.d/40-fips.conf contain add_dracutmodules+=" fips " The system needs to be rebooted for these changes to take effect. System Crypto Modules must be provided by a vendor that undergoes FIPS-140 certifications. FIPS-140 is applicable to all Federal agencies that use cryptographic-based security systems to protect sensitive information in computer and telecommunication systems (including voice systems) as defined in Section 5131 of the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, Public Law 104-106. This standard shall be used in designing and implementing cryptographic modules that Federal departments and agencies operate or are operated for them under contract. See https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-2.pdf To meet this, the system has to have cryptographic software provided by a vendor that has undergone this certification. This means providing documentation, test results, design information, and independent third party review by an accredited lab. While open source software is capable of meeting this, it does not meet FIPS-140 unless the vendor submits to this process. CCI-000068 CCI-000803 CCI-002450 1446 CIP-003-8 R4.2 CIP-007-3 R5.1 SC-12(2) SC-12(3) IA-7 SC-13 CM-6(a) SC-12 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000478-GPOS-00223 RHEL-08-010020 SV-230223r928585_rule Use of weak or untested encryption algorithms undermines the purposes of utilizing encryption to protect data. The operating system must implement cryptographic modules adhering to the higher standards approved by the federal government since this provides assurance they have been tested and validated. CCE-82155-3 - name: Check to see the current status of FIPS mode command: /usr/bin/fips-mode-setup --check register: is_fips_enabled changed_when: false failed_when: false when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and not ( lookup("env", "container") == "bwrap-osbuild" ) ) tags: - CCE-82155-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010020 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-7 - NIST-800-53-SC-12 - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2) - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) - NIST-800-53-SC-13 - enable_dracut_fips_module - high_severity - medium_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Enable FIPS mode command: /usr/bin/fips-mode-setup --enable when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and not ( lookup("env", "container") == "bwrap-osbuild" ) ) - is_fips_enabled.stdout.find('FIPS mode is enabled.') == -1 tags: - CCE-82155-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010020 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-7 - NIST-800-53-SC-12 - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2) - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) - NIST-800-53-SC-13 - enable_dracut_fips_module - high_severity - medium_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Enable Dracut FIPS Module lineinfile: path: /etc/dracut.conf.d/40-fips.conf line: add_dracutmodules+=" fips " when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and not ( lookup("env", "container") == "bwrap-osbuild" ) ) tags: - CCE-82155-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010020 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-7 - NIST-800-53-SC-12 - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2) - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) - NIST-800-53-SC-13 - enable_dracut_fips_module - high_severity - medium_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && ! ( [ "${container:-}" == "bwrap-osbuild" ] ) ); then fips-mode-setup --enable FIPS_CONF="/etc/dracut.conf.d/40-fips.conf" if ! grep "^add_dracutmodules+=\" fips \"" $FIPS_CONF; then echo "add_dracutmodules+=\" fips \"" >> $FIPS_CONF fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable FIPS Mode To enable FIPS mode, run the following command: fips-mode-setup --enable The fips-mode-setup command will configure the system in FIPS mode by automatically configuring the following: Setting the kernel FIPS mode flag (/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled) to 1Creating /etc/system-fipsSetting the system crypto policy in /etc/crypto-policies/config to Loading the Dracut fips module The system needs to be rebooted for these changes to take effect. This rule DOES NOT CHECK if the components of the operating system are FIPS certified. You can find the list of FIPS certified modules at https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/validated-modules/search. This rule checks if the system is running in FIPS mode. See the rule description for more information about what it means. CCI-000068 CCI-000803 CCI-002450 1446 CIP-003-8 R4.2 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CM-3(6) SC-12(2) SC-12(3) IA-7 SC-13 CM-6(a) SC-12 FCS_COP.1(1) FCS_COP.1(2) FCS_COP.1(3) FCS_COP.1(4) FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.2 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000478-GPOS-00223 SRG-OS-000396-GPOS-00176 RHEL-08-010020 SV-230223r928585_rule Use of weak or untested encryption algorithms undermines the purposes of utilizing encryption to protect data. The operating system must implement cryptographic modules adhering to the higher standards approved by the federal government since this provides assurance they have been tested and validated. CCE-80942-6 - name: XCCDF Value var_system_crypto_policy # promote to variable set_fact: var_system_crypto_policy: !!str tags: - always - name: Enable FIPS Mode - Check to See the Current Status of FIPS Mode ansible.builtin.command: /usr/bin/fips-mode-setup --check register: is_fips_enabled ignore_errors: true changed_when: false when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and not ( lookup("env", "container") == "bwrap-osbuild" ) ) - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80942-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010020 - NIST-800-53-CM-3(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-7 - NIST-800-53-SC-12 - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2) - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) - NIST-800-53-SC-13 - enable_fips_mode - high_severity - medium_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Enable FIPS Mode - Enable FIPS Mode ansible.builtin.command: /usr/bin/fips-mode-setup --enable when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and not ( lookup("env", "container") == "bwrap-osbuild" ) ) - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - is_fips_enabled.stdout.find('FIPS mode is enabled.') == -1 tags: - CCE-80942-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010020 - NIST-800-53-CM-3(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-7 - NIST-800-53-SC-12 - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2) - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) - NIST-800-53-SC-13 - enable_fips_mode - high_severity - medium_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Enable FIPS Mode - Configure Crypto Policy ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/crypto-policies/config regexp: ^(?!#)(\S+)$ line: '{{ var_system_crypto_policy }}' create: true when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and not ( lookup("env", "container") == "bwrap-osbuild" ) ) - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80942-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010020 - NIST-800-53-CM-3(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-7 - NIST-800-53-SC-12 - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2) - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) - NIST-800-53-SC-13 - enable_fips_mode - high_severity - medium_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Enable FIPS Mode - Verify that Crypto Policy is Set (runtime) ansible.builtin.command: /usr/bin/update-crypto-policies --set {{ var_system_crypto_policy }} when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and not ( lookup("env", "container") == "bwrap-osbuild" ) ) - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80942-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010020 - NIST-800-53-CM-3(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-7 - NIST-800-53-SC-12 - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2) - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) - NIST-800-53-SC-13 - enable_fips_mode - high_severity - medium_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - restrict_strategy [customizations] fips = true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && ! ( [ "${container:-}" == "bwrap-osbuild" ] ) ) && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then var_system_crypto_policy='' fips-mode-setup --enable stderr_of_call=$(update-crypto-policies --set ${var_system_crypto_policy} 2>&1 > /dev/null) rc=$? if test "$rc" = 127; then echo "$stderr_of_call" >&2 echo "Make sure that the script is installed on the remediated system." >&2 echo "See output of the 'dnf provides update-crypto-policies' command" >&2 echo "to see what package to (re)install" >&2 false # end with an error code elif test "$rc" != 0; then echo "Error invoking the update-crypto-policies script: $stderr_of_call" >&2 false # end with an error code fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure '/etc/system-fips' exists On a system where FIPS mode is enabled, /etc/system-fips must exist. To enable FIPS mode, run the following command: fips-mode-setup --enable The system needs to be rebooted for these changes to take effect. System Crypto Modules must be provided by a vendor that undergoes FIPS-140 certifications. FIPS-140 is applicable to all Federal agencies that use cryptographic-based security systems to protect sensitive information in computer and telecommunication systems (including voice systems) as defined in Section 5131 of the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, Public Law 104-106. This standard shall be used in designing and implementing cryptographic modules that Federal departments and agencies operate or are operated for them under contract. See https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-2.pdf To meet this, the system has to have cryptographic software provided by a vendor that has undergone this certification. This means providing documentation, test results, design information, and independent third party review by an accredited lab. While open source software is capable of meeting this, it does not meet FIPS-140 unless the vendor submits to this process. CCI-000068 CCI-000803 CCI-002450 CIP-003-8 R4.2 CIP-007-3 R5.1 SC-12(2) SC-12(3) IA-7 SC-13 CM-6(a) SC-12 Use of weak or untested encryption algorithms undermines the purposes of utilizing encryption to protect data. The operating system must implement cryptographic modules adhering to the higher standards approved by the federal government since this provides assurance they have been tested and validated. Set kernel parameter 'crypto.fips_enabled' to 1 System running in FIPS mode is indicated by kernel parameter 'crypto.fips_enabled'. This parameter should be set to 1 in FIPS mode. To enable FIPS mode, run the following command: fips-mode-setup --enable To enable strict FIPS compliance, the fips=1 kernel option needs to be added to the kernel boot parameters during system installation so key generation is done with FIPS-approved algorithms and continuous monitoring tests in place. The system needs to be rebooted for these changes to take effect. System Crypto Modules must be provided by a vendor that undergoes FIPS-140 certifications. FIPS-140 is applicable to all Federal agencies that use cryptographic-based security systems to protect sensitive information in computer and telecommunication systems (including voice systems) as defined in Section 5131 of the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, Public Law 104-106. This standard shall be used in designing and implementing cryptographic modules that Federal departments and agencies operate or are operated for them under contract. See https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-2.pdf To meet this, the system has to have cryptographic software provided by a vendor that has undergone this certification. This means providing documentation, test results, design information, and independent third party review by an accredited lab. While open source software is capable of meeting this, it does not meet FIPS-140 unless the vendor submits to this process. CCI-000068 CCI-000803 CCI-000877 CCI-001453 CCI-002418 CCI-002450 CCI-002890 CCI-003123 CIP-003-8 R4.2 CIP-007-3 R5.1 SC-12(2) SC-12(3) IA-7 SC-13 CM-6(a) SC-12 SRG-OS-000033-GPOS-00014 SRG-OS-000125-GPOS-00065 SRG-OS-000250-GPOS-00093 SRG-OS-000393-GPOS-00173 SRG-OS-000394-GPOS-00174 SRG-OS-000396-GPOS-00176 SRG-OS-000423-GPOS-00187 SRG-OS-000478-GPOS-00223 RHEL-08-010020 SV-230223r928585_rule Use of weak or untested encryption algorithms undermines the purposes of utilizing encryption to protect data. The operating system must implement cryptographic modules adhering to the higher standards approved by the federal government since this provides assurance they have been tested and validated. CCE-84027-2 System Cryptographic Policies Linux has the capability to centrally configure cryptographic polices. The command update-crypto-policies is used to set the policy applicable for the various cryptographic back-ends, such as SSL/TLS libraries. The configured cryptographic policies will be the default policy used by these backends unless the application user configures them otherwise. When the system has been configured to use the centralized cryptographic policies, the administrator is assured that any application that utilizes the supported backends will follow a policy that adheres to the configured profile. Currently the supported backends are: GnuTLS libraryOpenSSL libraryNSS libraryOpenJDKLibkrb5BINDOpenSSH Applications and languages which rely on any of these backends will follow the system policies as well. Examples are apache httpd, nginx, php, and others. SSH client RekeyLimit - size Specify the size component of the rekey limit. This limit signifies amount of data. After this amount of data is transferred through the connection, the session key is renegotiated. The number is followed by K, M or G for kilobytes, megabytes or gigabytes. Note that the RekeyLimit can be also configured according to elapsed time. 512M 512M 1G SSH client RekeyLimit - time Specify the time component of the rekey limit. The session key is renegotiated after the defined amount of time passes. The number is followed by units such as H or M for hours or minutes. Note that the RekeyLimit can be also configured according to amount of transfered data. 1h 1h The system-provided crypto policies Specify the crypto policy for the system. DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT:NO-SHA1 FIPS FIPS:OSPP LEGACY FUTURE NEXT Install crypto-policies package The crypto-policies package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install crypto-policies FCS_COP.1(1) FCS_COP.1(2) FCS_COP.1(3) FCS_COP.1(4) FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.2 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000396-GPOS-00176 SRG-OS-000393-GPOS-00173 SRG-OS-000394-GPOS-00174 Centralized cryptographic policies simplify applying secure ciphers across an operating system and the applications that run on that operating system. Use of weak or untested encryption algorithms undermines the purposes of utilizing encryption to protect data. CCE-82723-8 - name: Ensure crypto-policies is installed package: name: crypto-policies state: present tags: - CCE-82723-8 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_crypto-policies_installed [[packages]] name = "crypto-policies" version = "*" include install_crypto-policies class install_crypto-policies { package { 'crypto-policies': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=crypto-policies if ! rpm -q --quiet "crypto-policies" ; then yum install -y "crypto-policies" fi Configure BIND to use System Crypto Policy Crypto Policies provide a centralized control over crypto algorithms usage of many packages. BIND is supported by crypto policy, but the BIND configuration may be set up to ignore it. To check that Crypto Policies settings are configured correctly, ensure that the /etc/named.conf includes the appropriate configuration: In the options section of /etc/named.conf, make sure that the following line is not commented out or superseded by later includes: include "/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/bind.config"; CIP-003-8 R4.2 CIP-007-3 R5.1 SC-13 SC-12(2) SC-12(3) SRG-OS-000423-GPOS-00187 SRG-OS-000426-GPOS-00190 RHEL-08-010020 SV-230223r928585_rule Overriding the system crypto policy makes the behavior of the BIND service violate expectations, and makes system configuration more fragmented. CCE-80934-3 function remediate_bind_crypto_policy() { CONFIG_FILE="/etc/named.conf" if test -f "$CONFIG_FILE"; then sed -i 's|options {|&\n\tinclude "/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/bind.config";|' "$CONFIG_FILE" return 0 else echo "Aborting remediation as '$CONFIG_FILE' was not even found." >&2 return 1 fi } remediate_bind_crypto_policy Configure System Cryptography Policy To configure the system cryptography policy to use ciphers only from the policy, run the following command: $ sudo update-crypto-policies --set The rule checks if settings for selected crypto policy are configured as expected. Configuration files in the /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends are either symlinks to correct files provided by Crypto-policies package or they are regular files in case crypto policy customizations are applied. Crypto policies may be customized by crypto policy modules, in which case it is delimited from the base policy using a colon. The system needs to be rebooted for these changes to take effect. System Crypto Modules must be provided by a vendor that undergoes FIPS-140 certifications. FIPS-140 is applicable to all Federal agencies that use cryptographic-based security systems to protect sensitive information in computer and telecommunication systems (including voice systems) as defined in Section 5131 of the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, Public Law 104-106. This standard shall be used in designing and implementing cryptographic modules that Federal departments and agencies operate or are operated for them under contract. See https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-2.pdf To meet this, the system has to have cryptographic software provided by a vendor that has undergone this certification. This means providing documentation, test results, design information, and independent third party review by an accredited lab. While open source software is capable of meeting this, it does not meet FIPS-140 unless the vendor submits to this process. 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) 1446 CIP-003-8 R4.2 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R7.1 AC-17(a) AC-17(2) CM-6(a) MA-4(6) SC-13 SC-12(2) SC-12(3) FCS_COP.1(1) FCS_COP.1(2) FCS_COP.1(3) FCS_COP.1(4) FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.2 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 2.2.7 SRG-OS-000396-GPOS-00176 SRG-OS-000393-GPOS-00173 SRG-OS-000394-GPOS-00174 RHEL-08-010020 1.6.1 SV-230223r928585_rule Centralized cryptographic policies simplify applying secure ciphers across an operating system and the applications that run on that operating system. Use of weak or untested encryption algorithms undermines the purposes of utilizing encryption to protect data. CCE-80935-0 - name: XCCDF Value var_system_crypto_policy # promote to variable set_fact: var_system_crypto_policy: !!str tags: - always - name: Configure System Cryptography Policy lineinfile: path: /etc/crypto-policies/config regexp: ^(?!#)(\S+)$ line: '{{ var_system_crypto_policy }}' create: true tags: - CCE-80935-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010020 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-MA-4(6) - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2) - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) - NIST-800-53-SC-13 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.7 - configure_crypto_policy - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Verify that Crypto Policy is Set (runtime) command: /usr/bin/update-crypto-policies --set {{ var_system_crypto_policy }} tags: - CCE-80935-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010020 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-MA-4(6) - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2) - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) - NIST-800-53-SC-13 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.7 - configure_crypto_policy - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: configure-crypto-policy.service enabled: true contents: | [Unit] Before=kubelet.service [Service] Type=oneshot ExecStart=update-crypto-policies --set {{.var_system_crypto_policy}} RemainAfterExit=yes [Install] WantedBy=multi-user.target var_system_crypto_policy='' stderr_of_call=$(update-crypto-policies --set ${var_system_crypto_policy} 2>&1 > /dev/null) rc=$? if test "$rc" = 127; then echo "$stderr_of_call" >&2 echo "Make sure that the script is installed on the remediated system." >&2 echo "See output of the 'dnf provides update-crypto-policies' command" >&2 echo "to see what package to (re)install" >&2 false # end with an error code elif test "$rc" != 0; then echo "Error invoking the update-crypto-policies script: $stderr_of_call" >&2 false # end with an error code fi Configure GnuTLS library to use DoD-approved TLS Encryption Crypto Policies provide a centralized control over crypto algorithms usage of many packages. GnuTLS is supported by system crypto policy, but the GnuTLS configuration may be set up to ignore it. To check that Crypto Policies settings are configured correctly, ensure that /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/gnutls.config contains the following line and is not commented out: +VERS-ALL:-VERS-DTLS0.9:-VERS-SSL3.0:-VERS-TLS1.0:-VERS-TLS1.1:-VERS-DTLS1.0 CCI-001453 AC-17(2) SRG-OS-000250-GPOS-00093 SRG-OS-000423-GPOS-00187 RHEL-08-010295 SV-230256r877394_rule Overriding the system crypto policy makes the behavior of the GnuTLS library violate expectations, and makes system configuration more fragmented. CCE-84254-2 - name: 'Configure GnuTLS library to use DoD-approved TLS Encryption: set_fact' set_fact: path: /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/gnutls.config correct_value: +VERS-ALL:-VERS-DTLS0.9:-VERS-SSL3.0:-VERS-TLS1.0:-VERS-TLS1.1:-VERS-DTLS1.0 lineinfile_reg: \+VERS-ALL:-VERS-DTLS0\.9:-VERS-SSL3\.0:-VERS-TLS1\.0:-VERS-TLS1\.1:-VERS-DTLS1\.0 tags: - CCE-84254-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010295 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) - configure_gnutls_tls_crypto_policy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: 'Configure GnuTLS library to use DoD-approved TLS Encryption: stat' stat: path: '{{ path }}' follow: true register: gnutls_file tags: - CCE-84254-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010295 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) - configure_gnutls_tls_crypto_policy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: 'Configure GnuTLS library to use DoD-approved TLS Encryption: Add' lineinfile: path: '{{ path }}' regexp: '{{ lineinfile_reg }}' line: '{{ correct_value }}' create: true when: not gnutls_file.stat.exists or gnutls_file.stat.size <= correct_value|length tags: - CCE-84254-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010295 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) - configure_gnutls_tls_crypto_policy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Configure GnuTLS library to use DoD-approved TLS Encryption block: - name: 'Configure GnuTLS library to use DoD-approved TLS Encryption: Existing value check' lineinfile: path: '{{ path }}' create: false regexp: '{{ lineinfile_reg }}' state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: gnutls - name: 'Configure GnuTLS library to use DoD-approved TLS Encryption: Update' replace: path: '{{ path }}' regexp: (\+VERS-ALL(?::-VERS-[A-Z]+\d\.\d)+) replace: '{{ correct_value }}' when: gnutls.found is defined and gnutls.found != 1 when: gnutls_file.stat.exists and gnutls_file.stat.size > correct_value|length tags: - CCE-84254-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010295 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) - configure_gnutls_tls_crypto_policy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy CONF_FILE=/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/gnutls.config correct_value='+VERS-ALL:-VERS-DTLS0.9:-VERS-SSL3.0:-VERS-TLS1.0:-VERS-TLS1.1:-VERS-DTLS1.0' grep -q ${correct_value} ${CONF_FILE} if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then # We need to get the existing value, using PCRE to maintain same regex existing_value=$(grep -Po '(\+VERS-ALL(?::-VERS-[A-Z]+\d\.\d)+)' ${CONF_FILE}) if [[ ! -z ${existing_value} ]]; then # replace existing_value with correct_value sed -i "s/${existing_value}/${correct_value}/g" ${CONF_FILE} else # ***NOTE*** # # This probably means this file is not here or it's been modified # unintentionally. # ********** # # echo correct_value to end echo ${correct_value} >> ${CONF_FILE} fi fi Configure Kerberos to use System Crypto Policy Crypto Policies provide a centralized control over crypto algorithms usage of many packages. Kerberos is supported by crypto policy, but it's configuration may be set up to ignore it. To check that Crypto Policies settings for Kerberos are configured correctly, examine that there is a symlink at /etc/krb5.conf.d/crypto-policies targeting /etc/cypto-policies/back-ends/krb5.config. If the symlink exists, Kerberos is configured to use the system-wide crypto policy settings. 0418 1055 1402 CIP-003-8 R4.2 CIP-007-3 R5.1 SC-13 SC-12(2) SC-12(3) SRG-OS-000120-GPOS-00061 RHEL-08-010020 SV-230223r928585_rule Overriding the system crypto policy makes the behavior of Kerberos violate expectations, and makes system configuration more fragmented. CCE-80936-8 - name: Configure Kerberos to use System Crypto Policy file: src: /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/krb5.config path: /etc/krb5.conf.d/crypto-policies state: link tags: - CCE-80936-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010020 - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2) - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) - NIST-800-53-SC-13 - configure_kerberos_crypto_policy - configure_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - reboot_required rm -f /etc/krb5.conf.d/crypto-policies ln -s /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/krb5.config /etc/krb5.conf.d/crypto-policies Configure Libreswan to use System Crypto Policy Crypto Policies provide a centralized control over crypto algorithms usage of many packages. Libreswan is supported by system crypto policy, but the Libreswan configuration may be set up to ignore it. To check that Crypto Policies settings are configured correctly, ensure that the /etc/ipsec.conf includes the appropriate configuration file. In /etc/ipsec.conf, make sure that the following line is not commented out or superseded by later includes: include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/libreswan.config CIP-003-8 R4.2 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CM-6(a) MA-4(6) SC-13 SC-12(2) SC-12(3) FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.4 FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.6 Req-2.2 SRG-OS-000033-GPOS-00014 RHEL-08-010020 SV-230223r928585_rule Overriding the system crypto policy makes the behavior of the Libreswan service violate expectations, and makes system configuration more fragmented. CCE-80937-6 - name: Configure Libreswan to use System Crypto Policy lineinfile: path: /etc/ipsec.conf line: include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/libreswan.config create: true tags: - CCE-80937-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010020 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-MA-4(6) - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2) - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) - NIST-800-53-SC-13 - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2 - configure_libreswan_crypto_policy - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy function remediate_libreswan_crypto_policy() { CONFIG_FILE="/etc/ipsec.conf" if ! grep -qP "^\s*include\s+/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/libreswan.config\s*(?:#.*)?$" "$CONFIG_FILE" ; then # the file might not end with a new line echo -e '\ninclude /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/libreswan.config' >> "$CONFIG_FILE" fi return 0 } remediate_libreswan_crypto_policy Configure OpenSSL library to use System Crypto Policy Crypto Policies provide a centralized control over crypto algorithms usage of many packages. OpenSSL is supported by crypto policy, but the OpenSSL configuration may be set up to ignore it. To check that Crypto Policies settings are configured correctly, you have to examine the OpenSSL config file available under /etc/pki/tls/openssl.cnf. This file has the ini format, and it enables crypto policy support if there is a [ crypto_policy ] section that contains the .include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config directive. CCI-001453 CIP-003-8 R4.2 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R7.1 AC-17(a) AC-17(2) CM-6(a) MA-4(6) SC-13 SC-12(2) SC-12(3) Req-2.2 SRG-OS-000250-GPOS-00093 RHEL-08-010293 SV-230254r877394_rule Overriding the system crypto policy makes the behavior of the Java runtime violates expectations, and makes system configuration more fragmented. CCE-80938-4 - name: Configure OpenSSL library to use System Crypto Policy - Search for crypto_policy Section ansible.builtin.find: paths: /etc/pki/tls patterns: openssl.cnf contains: ^\s*\[\s*crypto_policy\s*] register: test_crypto_policy_group tags: - CCE-80938-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010293 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-MA-4(6) - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2) - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) - NIST-800-53-SC-13 - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2 - configure_openssl_crypto_policy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Configure OpenSSL library to use System Crypto Policy - Search for crypto_policy Section Together With .include Directive ansible.builtin.find: paths: /etc/pki/tls patterns: openssl.cnf contains: ^\s*\.include\s*(?:=\s*)?/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config$ register: test_crypto_policy_include_directive tags: - CCE-80938-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010293 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-MA-4(6) - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2) - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) - NIST-800-53-SC-13 - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2 - configure_openssl_crypto_policy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Configure OpenSSL library to use System Crypto Policy - Add .include Line for opensslcnf.config File in crypto_policy Section ansible.builtin.lineinfile: create: true insertafter: ^\s*\[\s*crypto_policy\s*]\s* line: .include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config path: /etc/pki/tls/openssl.cnf when: - test_crypto_policy_group.matched > 0 - test_crypto_policy_include_directive.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80938-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010293 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-MA-4(6) - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2) - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) - NIST-800-53-SC-13 - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2 - configure_openssl_crypto_policy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Configure OpenSSL library to use System Crypto Policy - Add crypto_policy Section With .include for opensslcnf.config File ansible.builtin.lineinfile: create: true line: |- [crypto_policy] .include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config path: /etc/pki/tls/openssl.cnf when: test_crypto_policy_group.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80938-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010293 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-MA-4(6) - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2) - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) - NIST-800-53-SC-13 - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2 - configure_openssl_crypto_policy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy OPENSSL_CRYPTO_POLICY_SECTION='[ crypto_policy ]' OPENSSL_CRYPTO_POLICY_SECTION_REGEX='\[\s*crypto_policy\s*\]' OPENSSL_CRYPTO_POLICY_INCLUSION='.include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config' OPENSSL_CRYPTO_POLICY_INCLUSION_REGEX='^\s*\.include\s*(?:=\s*)?/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config$' function remediate_openssl_crypto_policy() { CONFIG_FILE=/etc/pki/tls/openssl.cnf if test -f "$CONFIG_FILE"; then if ! grep -q "^\\s*$OPENSSL_CRYPTO_POLICY_SECTION_REGEX" "$CONFIG_FILE"; then printf '\n%s\n\n%s' "$OPENSSL_CRYPTO_POLICY_SECTION" "$OPENSSL_CRYPTO_POLICY_INCLUSION" >> "$CONFIG_FILE" return 0 elif ! grep -q "^\\s*$OPENSSL_CRYPTO_POLICY_INCLUSION_REGEX" "$CONFIG_FILE"; then sed -i "s|$OPENSSL_CRYPTO_POLICY_SECTION_REGEX|&\\n\\n$OPENSSL_CRYPTO_POLICY_INCLUSION\\n|" "$CONFIG_FILE" return 0 fi else echo "Aborting remediation as '$CONFIG_FILE' was not even found." >&2 return 1 fi } remediate_openssl_crypto_policy Configure OpenSSL library to use TLS Encryption Crypto Policies are means of enforcing certain cryptographic settings for selected applications including OpenSSL. OpenSSL is by default configured to modify its configuration based on currently configured Crypto Policy. Editing the Crypto Policy back-end is not recommended. Check the crypto-policies(7) man page and choose a policy that configures TLS protocol to version 1.2 or higher, for example DEFAULT, FUTURE or FIPS policy. Or create and apply a custom policy that restricts minimum TLS version to 1.2. For example for versions prior to crypto-policies-20210617-1.gitc776d3e.el8.noarch this is expected: $ sudo grep -i MinProtocol /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 Or for version crypto-policies-20210617-1.gitc776d3e.el8.noarch and newer this is expected: $ sudo grep -i MinProtocol /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config TLS.MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 DTLS.MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 This rule doesn't come with a remediation, automatically changing the crypto-policies may be too disruptive. Ensure the variable xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_value_var_system_crypto_policy is set to a Crypto Policy that satisfies OpenSSL minimum TLS protocol version 1.2. Custom policies may be applied too. CCI-001453 AC-17(2) SRG-OS-000125-GPOS-00065 SRG-OS-000250-GPOS-00093 SRG-OS-000393-GPOS-00173 SRG-OS-000394-GPOS-00174 RHEL-08-010294 SV-230255r877394_rule Without cryptographic integrity protections, information can be altered by unauthorized users without detection. CCE-84255-9 Configure SSH to use System Crypto Policy Crypto Policies provide a centralized control over crypto algorithms usage of many packages. SSH is supported by crypto policy, but the SSH configuration may be set up to ignore it. To check that Crypto Policies settings are configured correctly, ensure that the CRYPTO_POLICY variable is either commented or not set at all in the /etc/sysconfig/sshd. CCI-001453 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) CIP-003-8 R4.2 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R7.1 AC-17(a) AC-17(2) CM-6(a) MA-4(6) SC-13 FCS_SSH_EXT.1 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 FCS_SSHC_EXT.1 Req-2.2 2.2.7 SRG-OS-000250-GPOS-00093 RHEL-08-010287 4.2.22 SV-244526r877394_rule Overriding the system crypto policy makes the behavior of the SSH service violate expectations, and makes system configuration more fragmented. CCE-80939-2 - name: Configure SSH to use System Crypto Policy lineinfile: dest: /etc/sysconfig/sshd state: absent regexp: ^(?i)\s*CRYPTO_POLICY.*$ tags: - CCE-80939-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010287 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-MA-4(6) - NIST-800-53-SC-13 - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.7 - configure_ssh_crypto_policy - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required SSH_CONF="/etc/sysconfig/sshd" sed -i "/^\s*CRYPTO_POLICY.*$/Id" $SSH_CONF Harden OpenSSL Crypto Policy Crypto Policies are means of enforcing certain cryptographic settings for selected applications including OpenSSL. OpenSSL is by default configured to modify its configuration based on currently configured Crypto Policy. However, in certain cases it might be needed to override the Crypto Policy specific to OpenSSL and leave rest of the Crypto Policy intact. This can be done by dropping a file named opensslcnf-xxx.config, replacing xxx with arbitrary identifier, into /etc/crypto-policies/local.d. This has to be followed by running update-crypto-policies so that changes are applied. Changes are propagated into /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config. This rule checks if this file contains predefined Ciphersuites variable configured with predefined value. CIP-003-8 R4.2 CIP-007-3 R5.1 SC-8(1) SC-13 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1 SRG-OS-000396-GPOS-00176 SRG-OS-000424-GPOS-00188 SRG-OS-000478-GPOS-00223 The Common Criteria requirements specify that certain parameters for OpenSSL are configured e.g. cipher suites. Currently particular requirements specified by CC are stricter compared to any existing Crypto Policy. CCE-84286-4 - name: Remove configuration from backend file /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config lineinfile: path: /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config regexp: Ciphersuites\s*=\s*.* state: absent tags: - CCE-84286-4 - NIST-800-53-SC-13 - NIST-800-53-SC-8(1) - harden_openssl_crypto_policy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure that the correct crypto policy configuration exists in /etc/crypto-policies/local.d/opensslcnf-ospp.config copy: dest: /etc/crypto-policies/local.d/opensslcnf-ospp.config content: |2 Ciphersuites = TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 tags: - CCE-84286-4 - NIST-800-53-SC-13 - NIST-800-53-SC-8(1) - harden_openssl_crypto_policy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Update system crypto policy for changes to take effect command: cmd: update-crypto-policies tags: - CCE-84286-4 - NIST-800-53-SC-13 - NIST-800-53-SC-8(1) - harden_openssl_crypto_policy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy cp="Ciphersuites = TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" file="/etc/crypto-policies/local.d/opensslcnf-ospp.config" backend_file="/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config" sed -i "/Ciphersuites\s*=\s*/d" "$backend_file" printf "\n%s\n" "$cp" >> "$file" update-crypto-policies Harden SSH client Crypto Policy Crypto Policies are means of enforcing certain cryptographic settings for selected applications including OpenSSH client. To override the system wide crypto policy for Openssh client, place a file in the /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/ so that it is loaded before the 05-redhat.conf. In this case it is file named 02-ospp.conf containing parameters which need to be changed with respect to the crypto policy. This rule checks if the file exists and if it contains required parameters and values which modify the Crypto Policy. During the parsing process, as soon as Openssh client parses some configuration option and its value, it remembers it and ignores any subsequent overrides. The customization mechanism provided by crypto policies appends eventual customizations at the end of the system wide crypto policy. Therefore, if the crypto policy customization overrides some parameter which is already configured in the system wide crypto policy, the SSH client will not honor that customized parameter. CIP-003-8 R4.2 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R7.1 AC-17(a) AC-17(2) CM-6(a) MA-4(6) SC-13 FCS_SSHC_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000033-GPOS-00014 SRG-OS-000250-GPOS-00093 SRG-OS-000393-GPOS-00173 SRG-OS-000394-GPOS-00174 The Common Criteria requirements specify how certain parameters for OpenSSH Client are configured. Particular parameters are RekeyLimit, GSSAPIAuthentication, Ciphers, PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, MACs and KexAlgorithms. Currently particular requirements specified by CC are stricter compared to any existing Crypto Policy. CCE-82225-4 #the file starts with 02 so that it is loaded before the 05-redhat.conf which activates configuration provided by system vide crypto policy file="/etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-ospp.conf" echo -e "Match final all\n\ RekeyLimit 512M 1h\n\ GSSAPIAuthentication no\n\ Ciphers aes256-ctr,aes256-cbc,aes128-ctr,aes128-cbc\n\ PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ssh-rsa,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256\n\ MACs hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256\n\ KexAlgorithms ecdh-sha2-nistp521,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp256,diffie-hellman-group14-sha1\n" > "$file" Configure SSH Client to Use FIPS 140-2 Validated Ciphers: openssh.config Crypto Policies provide a centralized control over crypto algorithms usage of many packages. OpenSSH is supported by system crypto policy, but the OpenSSH configuration may be set up incorrectly. To check that Crypto Policies settings for ciphers are configured correctly, ensure that /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config contains the following line and is not commented out: Ciphers The system needs to be rebooted for these changes to take effect. System Crypto Modules must be provided by a vendor that undergoes FIPS-140 certifications. FIPS-140 is applicable to all Federal agencies that use cryptographic-based security systems to protect sensitive information in computer and telecommunication systems (including voice systems) as defined in Section 5131 of the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, Public Law 104-106. This standard shall be used in designing and implementing cryptographic modules that Federal departments and agencies operate or are operated for them under contract. See https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-2.pdf To meet this, the system has to have cryptographic software provided by a vendor that has undergone this certification. This means providing documentation, test results, design information, and independent third party review by an accredited lab. While open source software is capable of meeting this, it does not meet FIPS-140 unless the vendor submits to this process. CCI-000068 CCI-000877 CCI-001453 CCI-002418 CCI-002890 CCI-003123 AC-17(2) SRG-OS-000033-GPOS-00014 SRG-OS-000125-GPOS-00065 SRG-OS-000250-GPOS-00093 SRG-OS-000393-GPOS-00173 SRG-OS-000394-GPOS-00174 SRG-OS-000423-GPOS-00187 RHEL-08-010020 SV-230223r928585_rule Overriding the system crypto policy makes the behavior of the OpenSSH client violate expectations, and makes system configuration more fragmented. By specifying a cipher list with the order of ciphers being in a “strongest to weakest” orientation, the system will automatically attempt to use the strongest cipher for securing SSH connections. CCE-85902-5 - name: XCCDF Value sshd_approved_ciphers # promote to variable set_fact: sshd_approved_ciphers: !!str tags: - always - name: 'Configure SSH Daemon to Use FIPS 140-2 Validated Ciphers: openssh.config' block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config create: true regexp: ^.*Ciphers\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config lineinfile: path: /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config create: true regexp: ^.*Ciphers\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config lineinfile: path: /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config create: true regexp: ^.*Ciphers\s+ line: Ciphers {{ sshd_approved_ciphers }} state: present tags: - CCE-85902-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010020 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) - harden_sshd_ciphers_openssh_conf_crypto_policy - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - reboot_required - restrict_strategy sshd_approved_ciphers='' if [ -e "/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^.*Ciphers\s\+/d" "/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config" else touch "/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config" cp "/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config" "/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config.bak" # Insert at the end of the file printf '%s\n' "Ciphers ${sshd_approved_ciphers}" >> "/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config.bak" Configure SSH Server to Use FIPS 140-2 Validated Ciphers: opensshserver.config Crypto Policies provide a centralized control over crypto algorithms usage of many packages. OpenSSH is supported by system crypto policy, but the OpenSSH configuration may be set up incorrectly. To check that Crypto Policies settings for ciphers are configured correctly, ensure that /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config contains the following text and is not commented out: -oCiphers= The system needs to be rebooted for these changes to take effect. System Crypto Modules must be provided by a vendor that undergoes FIPS-140 certifications. FIPS-140 is applicable to all Federal agencies that use cryptographic-based security systems to protect sensitive information in computer and telecommunication systems (including voice systems) as defined in Section 5131 of the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, Public Law 104-106. This standard shall be used in designing and implementing cryptographic modules that Federal departments and agencies operate or are operated for them under contract. See https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-2.pdf To meet this, the system has to have cryptographic software provided by a vendor that has undergone this certification. This means providing documentation, test results, design information, and independent third party review by an accredited lab. While open source software is capable of meeting this, it does not meet FIPS-140 unless the vendor submits to this process. CCI-000877 CCI-001453 AC-17(2) SRG-OS-000125-GPOS-00065 SRG-OS-000250-GPOS-00093 RHEL-08-010291 SV-230252r917873_rule Overriding the system crypto policy makes the behavior of the OpenSSH server violate expectations, and makes system configuration more fragmented. By specifying a cipher list with the order of ciphers being in a “strongest to weakest” orientation, the system will automatically attempt to use the strongest cipher for securing SSH connections. CCE-85897-7 - name: XCCDF Value sshd_approved_ciphers # promote to variable set_fact: sshd_approved_ciphers: !!str tags: - always - name: 'Configure SSH Server to Use FIPS 140-2 Validated Ciphers: opensshserver.config: Set facts' set_fact: path: /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config correct_value: -oCiphers={{ sshd_approved_ciphers }} tags: - CCE-85897-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010291 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) - harden_sshd_ciphers_opensshserver_conf_crypto_policy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: 'Configure SSH Server to Use FIPS 140-2 Validated Ciphers: opensshserver.config: Stat' stat: path: '{{ path }}' follow: true register: opensshserver_file tags: - CCE-85897-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010291 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) - harden_sshd_ciphers_opensshserver_conf_crypto_policy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: 'Configure SSH Server to Use FIPS 140-2 Validated Ciphers: opensshserver.config: Create' lineinfile: path: '{{ path }}' line: CRYPTO_POLICY='{{ correct_value }}' create: true when: not opensshserver_file.stat.exists or opensshserver_file.stat.size <= correct_value|length tags: - CCE-85897-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010291 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) - harden_sshd_ciphers_opensshserver_conf_crypto_policy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: 'Configure SSH Server to Use FIPS 140-2 Validated Ciphers: opensshserver.config' block: - name: Existing value check lineinfile: path: '{{ path }}' create: false regexp: '{{ correct_value }}' state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: opensshserver - name: Update/Correct value replace: path: '{{ path }}' regexp: (-oCiphers=\S+) replace: '{{ correct_value }}' when: opensshserver.found is defined and opensshserver.found != 1 when: opensshserver_file.stat.exists and opensshserver_file.stat.size > correct_value|length tags: - CCE-85897-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010291 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) - harden_sshd_ciphers_opensshserver_conf_crypto_policy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy sshd_approved_ciphers='' CONF_FILE=/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config correct_value="-oCiphers=${sshd_approved_ciphers}" # Test if file exists test -f ${CONF_FILE} || touch ${CONF_FILE} # Ensure CRYPTO_POLICY is not commented out sed -i 's/#CRYPTO_POLICY=/CRYPTO_POLICY=/' ${CONF_FILE} grep -q "'${correct_value}'" ${CONF_FILE} if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then # We need to get the existing value, using PCRE to maintain same regex existing_value=$(grep -Po '(-oCiphers=\S+)' ${CONF_FILE}) if [[ ! -z ${existing_value} ]]; then # replace existing_value with correct_value sed -i "s/${existing_value}/${correct_value}/g" ${CONF_FILE} else # ***NOTE*** # # This probably means this file is not here or it's been modified # unintentionally. # ********** # # echo correct_value to end echo "CRYPTO_POLICY='${correct_value}'" >> ${CONF_FILE} fi fi Harden SSHD Crypto Policy Crypto Policies are means of enforcing certain cryptographic settings for selected applications including OpenSSH server. The SSHD service is by default configured to modify its configuration based on currently configured Crypto-Policy. However, in certain cases it might be needed to override the Crypto Policy specific to OpenSSH Server and leave rest of the Crypto Policy intact. This can be done by dropping a file named opensshserver-xxx.config, replacing xxx with arbitrary identifier, into /etc/crypto-policies/local.d. This has to be followed by running update-crypto-policies so that changes are applied. Changes are propagated into /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config. This rule checks if this file contains predefined CRYPTO_POLICY environment variable configured with predefined value. CIP-003-8 R4.2 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R7.1 AC-17(a) AC-17(2) CM-6(a) MA-4(6) SC-13 SC-12(2) SC-12(3) FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000250-GPOS-00093 SRG-OS-000033-GPOS-00014 SRG-OS-000120-GPOS-00061 The Common Criteria requirements specify that certain parameters for OpenSSH Server are configured e.g. supported ciphers, accepted host key algorithms, public key types, key exchange algorithms, HMACs and GSSAPI key exchange is disabled. Currently particular requirements specified by CC are stricter compared to any existing Crypto Policy. CCE-82176-9 cp="CRYPTO_POLICY='-oCiphers=aes256-ctr,aes128-ctr,aes256-cbc,aes128-cbc -oMACs=hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256 -oGSSAPIKeyExchange=no -oKexAlgorithms=ecdh-sha2-nistp521,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp256,diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 -oHostKeyAlgorithms=ssh-rsa,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 -oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes=rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256'" file=/etc/crypto-policies/local.d/opensshserver-ospp.config #blank line at the begining to ease later readibility echo '' > "$file" echo "$cp" >> "$file" update-crypto-policies Configure SSH Client to Use FIPS 140-2 Validated MACs: openssh.config Crypto Policies provide a centralized control over crypto algorithms usage of many packages. OpenSSH is supported by system crypto policy, but the OpenSSH configuration may be set up incorrectly. To check that Crypto Policies settings are configured correctly, ensure that /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config contains the following line and is not commented out: MACs The system needs to be rebooted for these changes to take effect. System Crypto Modules must be provided by a vendor that undergoes FIPS-140 certifications. FIPS-140 is applicable to all Federal agencies that use cryptographic-based security systems to protect sensitive information in computer and telecommunication systems (including voice systems) as defined in Section 5131 of the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, Public Law 104-106. This standard shall be used in designing and implementing cryptographic modules that Federal departments and agencies operate or are operated for them under contract. See https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-2.pdf To meet this, the system has to have cryptographic software provided by a vendor that has undergone this certification. This means providing documentation, test results, design information, and independent third party review by an accredited lab. While open source software is capable of meeting this, it does not meet FIPS-140 unless the vendor submits to this process. CCI-000877 CCI-001453 AC-17(2) SRG-OS-000125-GPOS-00065 SRG-OS-000250-GPOS-00093 RHEL-08-010020 SV-230223r928585_rule Overriding the system crypto policy makes the behavior of the OpenSSH client violate expectations, and makes system configuration more fragmented. CCE-85870-4 - name: XCCDF Value sshd_approved_macs # promote to variable set_fact: sshd_approved_macs: !!str tags: - always - name: 'Configure SSH Daemon to Use FIPS 140-2 Validated MACs: openssh.config' block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config create: true regexp: ^.*MACs\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config lineinfile: path: /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config create: true regexp: ^.*MACs\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config lineinfile: path: /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config create: true regexp: ^.*MACs\s+ line: MACs {{ sshd_approved_macs }} state: present tags: - CCE-85870-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010020 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) - harden_sshd_macs_openssh_conf_crypto_policy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy sshd_approved_macs='' if [ -e "/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^.*MACs\s\+/d" "/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config" else touch "/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config" cp "/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config" "/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config.bak" # Insert at the end of the file printf '%s\n' "MACs ${sshd_approved_macs}" >> "/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config.bak" Configure SSH Server to Use FIPS 140-2 Validated MACs: opensshserver.config Crypto Policies provide a centralized control over crypto algorithms usage of many packages. OpenSSH is supported by system crypto policy, but the OpenSSH configuration may be set up incorrectly. To check that Crypto Policies settings are configured correctly, ensure that /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config contains the following text and is not commented out: -oMACS= The system needs to be rebooted for these changes to take effect. System Crypto Modules must be provided by a vendor that undergoes FIPS-140 certifications. FIPS-140 is applicable to all Federal agencies that use cryptographic-based security systems to protect sensitive information in computer and telecommunication systems (including voice systems) as defined in Section 5131 of the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, Public Law 104-106. This standard shall be used in designing and implementing cryptographic modules that Federal departments and agencies operate or are operated for them under contract. See https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-2.pdf To meet this, the system has to have cryptographic software provided by a vendor that has undergone this certification. This means providing documentation, test results, design information, and independent third party review by an accredited lab. While open source software is capable of meeting this, it does not meet FIPS-140 unless the vendor submits to this process. CCI-000877 CCI-001453 AC-17(2) SRG-OS-000125-GPOS-00065 SRG-OS-000250-GPOS-00093 RHEL-08-010290 SV-230251r917870_rule Overriding the system crypto policy makes the behavior of the OpenSSH server violate expectations, and makes system configuration more fragmented. CCE-85899-3 - name: XCCDF Value sshd_approved_macs # promote to variable set_fact: sshd_approved_macs: !!str tags: - always - name: 'Configure SSH Server to Use FIPS 140-2 Validated MACs: opensshserver.config: Set facts' set_fact: path: /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config correct_value: -oMACs={{ sshd_approved_macs }} tags: - CCE-85899-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010290 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) - harden_sshd_macs_opensshserver_conf_crypto_policy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: 'Configure SSH Server to Use FIPS 140-2 Validated MACs: opensshserver.config: Stat' stat: path: '{{ path }}' follow: true register: opensshserver_file tags: - CCE-85899-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010290 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) - harden_sshd_macs_opensshserver_conf_crypto_policy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: 'Configure SSH Server to Use FIPS 140-2 Validated MACs: opensshserver.config: Create' lineinfile: path: '{{ path }}' line: CRYPTO_POLICY='{{ correct_value }}' create: true when: not opensshserver_file.stat.exists or opensshserver_file.stat.size <= correct_value|length tags: - CCE-85899-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010290 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) - harden_sshd_macs_opensshserver_conf_crypto_policy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: 'Configure SSH Server to Use FIPS 140-2 Validated MACs: opensshserver.config' block: - name: Existing value check lineinfile: path: '{{ path }}' create: false regexp: '{{ correct_value }}' state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: opensshserver - name: Update/Correct value replace: path: '{{ path }}' regexp: (-oMACs=\S+) replace: '{{ correct_value }}' when: opensshserver.found is defined and opensshserver.found != 1 when: opensshserver_file.stat.exists and opensshserver_file.stat.size > correct_value|length tags: - CCE-85899-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010290 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) - harden_sshd_macs_opensshserver_conf_crypto_policy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy sshd_approved_macs='' CONF_FILE=/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config correct_value="-oMACs=${sshd_approved_macs}" # Test if file exists test -f ${CONF_FILE} || touch ${CONF_FILE} # Ensure CRYPTO_POLICY is not commented out sed -i 's/#CRYPTO_POLICY=/CRYPTO_POLICY=/' ${CONF_FILE} grep -q "'${correct_value}'" ${CONF_FILE} if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then # We need to get the existing value, using PCRE to maintain same regex existing_value=$(grep -Po '(-oMACs=\S+)' ${CONF_FILE}) if [[ ! -z ${existing_value} ]]; then # replace existing_value with correct_value sed -i "s/${existing_value}/${correct_value}/g" ${CONF_FILE} else # ***NOTE*** # # This probably means this file is not here or it's been modified # unintentionally. # ********** # # echo correct_value to end echo "CRYPTO_POLICY='${correct_value}'" >> ${CONF_FILE} fi fi OpenSSL uses strong entropy source By default, OpenSSL doesn't always use a SP800-90A compliant random number generator. A way to configure OpenSSL to always use a strong source is to setup a wrapper that defines a shell function that shadows the actual openssl binary, and that ensures that the -rand /dev/random option is added to every openssl invocation. To do so, place the following shell snippet exactly as-is to /etc/profile.d/openssl-rand.sh: # provide a default -rand /dev/random option to openssl commands that # support it # written inefficiently for maximum shell compatibility openssl() ( openssl_bin=/usr/bin/openssl case "$*" in # if user specified -rand, honor it *\ -rand\ *|*\ -help*) exec $openssl_bin "$@" ;; esac cmds=`$openssl_bin list -digest-commands -cipher-commands | tr '\n' ' '` for i in `$openssl_bin list -commands`; do if $openssl_bin list -options "$i" | grep -q '^rand '; then cmds=" $i $cmds" fi done case "$cmds" in *\ "$1"\ *) cmd="$1"; shift exec $openssl_bin "$cmd" -rand /dev/random "$@" ;; esac exec $openssl_bin "$@" ) This setting can cause problems on computers without the hardware random generator, because insufficient entropy blocks the program until enough entropy is available. 1277 1552 FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 This rule ensures that openssl invocations always uses SP800-90A compliant random number generator as a default behavior. CCE-82721-2 - name: Put a file with shell wrapper to configure OpenSSL to always use strong entropy copy: dest: /etc/profile.d/openssl-rand.sh content: | # provide a default -rand /dev/random option to openssl commands that # support it # written inefficiently for maximum shell compatibility openssl() ( openssl_bin=/usr/bin/openssl case "$*" in # if user specified -rand, honor it *\ -rand\ *|*\ -help*) exec $openssl_bin "$@" ;; esac cmds=`$openssl_bin list -digest-commands -cipher-commands | tr '\n' ' '` for i in `$openssl_bin list -commands`; do if $openssl_bin list -options "$i" | grep -q '^rand '; then cmds=" $i $cmds" fi done case "$cmds" in *\ "$1"\ *) cmd="$1"; shift exec $openssl_bin "$cmd" -rand /dev/random "$@" ;; esac exec $openssl_bin "$@" ) tags: - CCE-82721-2 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - openssl_use_strong_entropy - restrict_strategy cat > /etc/profile.d/openssl-rand.sh <<- 'EOM' # provide a default -rand /dev/random option to openssl commands that # support it # written inefficiently for maximum shell compatibility openssl() ( openssl_bin=/usr/bin/openssl case "$*" in # if user specified -rand, honor it *\ -rand\ *|*\ -help*) exec $openssl_bin "$@" ;; esac cmds=`$openssl_bin list -digest-commands -cipher-commands | tr '\n' ' '` for i in `$openssl_bin list -commands`; do if $openssl_bin list -options "$i" | grep -q '^rand '; then cmds=" $i $cmds" fi done case "$cmds" in *\ "$1"\ *) cmd="$1"; shift exec $openssl_bin "$cmd" -rand /dev/random "$@" ;; esac exec $openssl_bin "$@" ) EOM Operating System Vendor Support and Certification The assurance of a vendor to provide operating system support and maintenance for their product is an important criterion to ensure product stability and security over the life of the product. A certified product that follows the necessary standards and government certification requirements guarantees that known software vulnerabilities will be remediated, and proper guidance for protecting and securing the operating system will be given. The Installed Operating System Is FIPS 140-2 Certified To enable processing of sensitive information the operating system must provide certified cryptographic modules compliant with FIPS 140-2 standard. There is no remediation besides switching to a different operating system. System Crypto Modules must be provided by a vendor that undergoes FIPS-140 certifications. FIPS-140 is applicable to all Federal agencies that use cryptographic-based security systems to protect sensitive information in computer and telecommunication systems (including voice systems) as defined in Section 5131 of the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, Public Law 104-106. This standard shall be used in designing and implementing cryptographic modules that Federal departments and agencies operate or are operated for them under contract. See https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-2.pdf To meet this, the system has to have cryptographic software provided by a vendor that has undergone this certification. This means providing documentation, test results, design information, and independent third party review by an accredited lab. While open source software is capable of meeting this, it does not meet FIPS-140 unless the vendor submits to this process. CCI-000803 CCI-002450 CIP-003-8 R4.2 CIP-007-3 R5.1 SC-12(2) SC-12(3) IA-7 SC-13 CM-6(a) SC-12 The Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication 140-2, (FIPS PUB 140-2) is a computer security standard. The standard specifies security requirements for cryptographic modules used to protect sensitive unclassified information. Refer to the full FIPS 140-2 standard at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips140-2/fips1402.pdf for further details on the requirements. FIPS 140-2 validation is required by U.S. law when information systems use cryptography to protect sensitive government information. In order to achieve FIPS 140-2 certification, cryptographic modules are subject to extensive testing by independent laboratories, accredited by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). CCE-80830-3 The Installed Operating System Is Vendor Supported The installed operating system must be maintained by a vendor. Red Hat Enterprise Linux is supported by Red Hat, Inc. As the Red Hat Enterprise Linux vendor, Red Hat, Inc. is responsible for providing security patches. There is no remediation besides switching to a different operating system. 18 20 4 APO12.01 APO12.02 APO12.03 APO12.04 BAI03.10 DSS05.01 DSS05.02 CCI-000366 4.2.3 4.2.3.12 4.2.3.7 4.2.3.9 A.12.6.1 A.14.2.3 A.16.1.3 A.18.2.2 A.18.2.3 CM-6(a) MA-6 SA-13(a) ID.RA-1 PR.IP-12 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010000 SV-230221r858734_rule An operating system is considered "supported" if the vendor continues to provide security patches for the product. With an unsupported release, it will not be possible to resolve any security issue discovered in the system software. CCE-80947-5 Endpoint Protection Software Endpoint protection security software that is not provided or supported by Red Hat can be installed to provide complementary or duplicative security capabilities to those provided by the base platform. Add-on software may not be appropriate for some specialized systems. Configure Backups of User Data The operating system must conduct backups of user data contained in the operating system. The operating system provides utilities for automating backups of user data. Commercial and open-source products are also available. Operating system backup is a critical step in maintaining data assurance and availability. User-level information is data generated by information system and/or application users. Backups shall be consistent with organizational recovery time and recovery point objectives. Install Virus Scanning Software Virus scanning software can be used to protect a system from penetration from computer viruses and to limit their spread through intermediate systems. The virus scanning software should be configured to perform scans dynamically on accessed files. If this capability is not available, the system must be configured to scan, at a minimum, all altered files on the system on a daily basis. If the system processes inbound SMTP mail, the virus scanner must be configured to scan all received mail. 12 13 14 4 7 8 APO01.06 APO13.02 BAI02.01 BAI06.01 DSS04.07 DSS05.01 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS06.06 CCI-000366 CCI-001239 CCI-001668 4.3.4.3.8 4.4.3.2 SR 3.2 SR 3.3 SR 3.4 SR 4.1 A.12.2.1 A.14.2.8 A.8.2.3 CM-6(a) DE.CM-4 DE.DP-3 PR.DS-1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 Virus scanning software can be used to detect if a system has been compromised by computer viruses, as well as to limit their spread to other systems. CCE-83879-7 Install Intrusion Detection Software The base Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 platform already includes a sophisticated auditing system that can detect intruder activity, as well as SELinux, which provides host-based intrusion prevention capabilities by confining privileged programs and user sessions which may become compromised. In DoD environments, supplemental intrusion detection and antivirus tools, such as the McAfee Host-based Security System, are available to integrate with existing infrastructure. Per DISA guidance, when these supplemental tools interfere with proper functioning of SELinux, SELinux takes precedence. Should further clarification be required, DISA contact information is published publicly at https://public.cyber.mil/stigs/ 1 12 13 14 15 16 18 7 8 9 APO01.06 APO13.01 DSS01.03 DSS01.05 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 CCI-001263 4.3.3.4 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) DE.CM-1 PR.AC-5 PR.DS-5 PR.PT-4 Req-11.4 Host-based intrusion detection tools provide a system-level defense when an intruder gains access to a system or network. CCE-80831-1 McAfee Endpoint Security Software In DoD environments, McAfee Host-based Security System (HBSS) and VirusScan Enterprise for Linux (VSEL) is required to be installed on all systems. The age of McAfee defintion file before requiring updating Specify the amount of time (in seconds) before McAfee definition files need to be updated. 2592000 86400 604800 2592000 Enable nails Service The nails service is used to run McAfee VirusScan Enterprise for Linux and McAfee Host-based Security System (HBSS) services. The nails service can be enabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl enable nails.service 12 13 14 4 7 8 APO01.06 APO13.02 BAI02.01 BAI06.01 DSS04.07 DSS05.01 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS06.06 CCI-000366 CCI-001239 CCI-001668 4.3.4.3.8 4.4.3.2 SR 3.2 SR 3.3 SR 3.4 SR 4.1 A.12.2.1 A.14.2.8 A.8.2.3 CM-6(a) SC-28 SI-3(a) DE.CM-4 DE.DP-3 PR.DS-1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 Virus scanning software can be used to detect if a system has been compromised by computer viruses, as well as to limit their spread to other systems. - name: Enable service nails block: - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto - name: Enable service nails systemd: name: nails enabled: 'yes' state: started masked: 'no' when: - '"nails" in ansible_facts.packages' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-28 - NIST-800-53-SI-3(a) - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_nails_enabled [customizations.services] enabled = ["nails"] include enable_nails class enable_nails { service {'nails': enable => true, ensure => 'running', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'nails.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'nails.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'nails.service' else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Install McAfee Virus Scanning Software Install McAfee VirusScan Enterprise for Linux antivirus software which is provided for DoD systems and uses signatures to search for the presence of viruses on the filesystem. Due to McAfee HIPS being 3rd party software, automated remediation is not available for this configuration check. 12 13 14 4 7 8 APO01.06 APO13.02 BAI02.01 BAI06.01 DSS04.07 DSS05.01 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS06.06 CCI-000366 CCI-001239 CCI-001668 4.3.4.3.8 4.4.3.2 SR 3.2 SR 3.3 SR 3.4 SR 4.1 A.12.2.1 A.14.2.8 A.8.2.3 CM-6(a) SC-28 SI-3(a) DE.CM-4 DE.DP-3 PR.DS-1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 Virus scanning software can be used to detect if a system has been compromised by computer viruses, as well as to limit their spread to other systems. Install the McAfee Runtime Libraries and Linux Agent Install the McAfee Runtime Libraries (MFErt) and Linux Agent (MFEcma). The McAfee Runtime Libraries (MFErt) and Linux Agent (MFEcma) are dependencies for VirusScan Enterprise for Linux (VSEL) and Host-based Security System (HBSS) to run. Virus Scanning Software Definitions Are Updated Ensure virus definition files are no older than 7 days or their last release. 12 13 14 4 7 8 APO01.06 APO13.02 BAI02.01 BAI06.01 DSS04.07 DSS05.01 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS06.06 CCI-000366 CCI-001239 CCI-001668 4.3.4.3.8 4.4.3.2 SR 3.2 SR 3.3 SR 3.4 SR 4.1 A.12.2.1 A.14.2.8 A.8.2.3 CM-6(a) SC-28 SI-3(a) SI-3(b) SI-3(2) DE.CM-4 DE.DP-3 PR.DS-1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 Virus scanning software can be used to detect if a system has been compromised by computer viruses, as well as to limit their spread to other systems. McAfee Endpoint Security for Linux (ENSL) McAfee Endpoint Security for Linux (ENSL) is a suite of software applications used to monitor, detect, and defend computer networks and systems. Install McAfee Endpoint Security for Linux (ENSL) Install McAfee Endpoint Security for Linux antivirus software which is provided for DoD systems and uses signatures to search for the presence of viruses on the filesystem. The McAfeeTP package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install McAfeeTP Due to McAfee Endpoint Security for Linux (ENSL) being 3rd party software, automated remediation is not available for this configuration check. CCI-001263 CCI-000366 SI-2(2) SRG-OS-000191-GPOS-00080 RHEL-08-010001 SV-245540r942951_rule Virus scanning software can be used to detect if a system has been compromised by computer viruses, as well as to limit their spread to other systems. CCE-86260-7 Ensure McAfee Endpoint Security for Linux (ENSL) is running Install McAfee Endpoint Security for Linux antivirus software which is provided for DoD systems and uses signatures to search for the presence of viruses on the filesystem. Due to McAfee Endpoint Security for Linux (ENSL) being 3rd party software, automated remediation is not available for this configuration check. CCI-001263 CCI-000366 SI-2(2) SRG-OS-000191-GPOS-00080 RHEL-08-010001 SV-245540r942951_rule Virus scanning software can be used to detect if a system has been compromised by computer viruses, as well as to limit their spread to other systems. CCE-86261-5 McAfee Host-Based Intrusion Detection Software (HBSS) McAfee Host-based Security System (HBSS) is a suite of software applications used to monitor, detect, and defend computer networks and systems. Install the Host Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS) Module Install the McAfee Host Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS) Module if it is absolutely necessary. If SELinux is enabled, do not install or enable this module. Installing and enabling this module conflicts with SELinux. Per DoD/DISA guidance, SELinux takes precedence over this module. Due to McAfee HIPS being 3rd party software, automated remediation is not available for this configuration check. 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 APO01.06 APO07.06 APO08.04 APO10.05 APO11.06 APO12.01 APO12.02 APO12.03 APO12.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 APO13.02 BAI08.02 BAI08.04 DSS01.03 DSS01.05 DSS02.04 DSS02.05 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.04 DSS03.05 DSS04.05 DSS05.01 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.01 DSS06.02 MEA03.03 MEA03.04 CCI-000366 CCI-001233 CCI-001263 4.2.3 4.2.3.12 4.2.3.7 4.2.3.9 4.3.3.4 4.3.4.5.2 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.3.4.5.9 4.4.3.2 4.4.3.3 4.4.3.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.4 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.3 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 3.9 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.12.1.1 A.12.1.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.3 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.2 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.14.2.8 A.15.2.1 A.16.1.1 A.16.1.2 A.16.1.3 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.6 A.16.1.7 A.18.1.4 A.18.2.2 A.18.2.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 Clause 16.1.2 Clause 7.4 CM-6(a) DE.AE-1 DE.AE-2 DE.AE-3 DE.AE-4 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-5 DE.CM-6 DE.CM-7 DE.DP-2 DE.DP-3 DE.DP-4 DE.DP-5 ID.RA-1 PR.AC-5 PR.DS-5 PR.IP-8 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.CO-3 Req-11.4 SRG-OS-000191-GPOS-00080 SRG-OS-000196 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 Without a host-based intrusion detection tool, there is no system-level defense when an intruder gains access to a system or network. Additionally, a host-based intrusion prevention tool can provide methods to immediately lock out detected intrusion attempts. Install the Asset Configuration Compliance Module (ACCM) Install the Asset Configuration Compliance Module (ACCM). Due to HBSS ACCM being 3rd party software, automated remediation is not available for this configuration check. 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 APO01.06 APO07.06 APO08.04 APO10.05 APO11.06 APO12.01 APO12.02 APO12.03 APO12.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 APO13.02 BAI08.02 BAI08.04 DSS01.03 DSS01.05 DSS02.04 DSS02.05 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.04 DSS03.05 DSS04.05 DSS05.01 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.01 DSS06.02 MEA03.03 MEA03.04 CCI-000366 CCI-001263 4.2.3 4.2.3.12 4.2.3.7 4.2.3.9 4.3.3.4 4.3.4.5.2 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.3.4.5.9 4.4.3.2 4.4.3.3 4.4.3.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.4 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.3 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 3.9 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.12.1.1 A.12.1.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.3 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.2 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.14.2.8 A.15.2.1 A.16.1.1 A.16.1.2 A.16.1.3 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.6 A.16.1.7 A.18.1.4 A.18.2.2 A.18.2.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 Clause 16.1.2 Clause 7.4 CM-6(a) DE.AE-1 DE.AE-2 DE.AE-3 DE.AE-4 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-5 DE.CM-6 DE.CM-7 DE.DP-2 DE.DP-3 DE.DP-4 DE.DP-5 ID.RA-1 PR.AC-5 PR.DS-5 PR.IP-8 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.CO-3 Req-11.4 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 Without a host-based intrusion detection tool, there is no system-level defense when an intruder gains access to a system or network. Additionally, a host-based intrusion prevention tool can provide methods to immediately lock out detected intrusion attempts. Install the Policy Auditor (PA) Module Install the Policy Auditor (PA) Module. Due to McAfee being 3rd party software, automated remediation is not available for this configuration check. 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 APO01.06 APO07.06 APO08.04 APO10.05 APO11.06 APO12.01 APO12.02 APO12.03 APO12.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 APO13.02 BAI08.02 BAI08.04 DSS01.03 DSS01.05 DSS02.04 DSS02.05 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.04 DSS03.05 DSS04.05 DSS05.01 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.01 DSS06.02 MEA03.03 MEA03.04 CCI-000366 CCI-001263 4.2.3 4.2.3.12 4.2.3.7 4.2.3.9 4.3.3.4 4.3.4.5.2 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.3.4.5.9 4.4.3.2 4.4.3.3 4.4.3.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.4 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.3 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 3.9 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.12.1.1 A.12.1.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.3 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.2 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.14.2.8 A.15.2.1 A.16.1.1 A.16.1.2 A.16.1.3 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.6 A.16.1.7 A.18.1.4 A.18.2.2 A.18.2.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 Clause 16.1.2 Clause 7.4 CM-6(a) DE.AE-1 DE.AE-2 DE.AE-3 DE.AE-4 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-5 DE.CM-6 DE.CM-7 DE.DP-2 DE.DP-3 DE.DP-4 DE.DP-5 ID.RA-1 PR.AC-5 PR.DS-5 PR.IP-8 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.CO-3 Req-11.4 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 Without a host-based intrusion detection tool, there is no system-level defense when an intruder gains access to a system or network. Additionally, a host-based intrusion prevention tool can provide methods to immediately lock out detected intrusion attempts. Disk Partitioning To ensure separation and protection of data, there are top-level system directories which should be placed on their own physical partition or logical volume. The installer's default partitioning scheme creates separate logical volumes for /, /boot, and swap. If starting with any of the default layouts, check the box to \"Review and modify partitioning.\" This allows for the easy creation of additional logical volumes inside the volume group already created, though it may require making /'s logical volume smaller to create space. In general, using logical volumes is preferable to using partitions because they can be more easily adjusted later.If creating a custom layout, create the partitions mentioned in the previous paragraph (which the installer will require anyway), as well as separate ones described in the following sections. If a system has already been installed, and the default partitioning scheme was used, it is possible but nontrivial to modify it to create separate logical volumes for the directories listed above. The Logical Volume Manager (LVM) makes this possible. See the LVM HOWTO at http://tldp.org/HOWTO/LVM-HOWTO/ for more detailed information on LVM. Encrypt Partitions Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 natively supports partition encryption through the Linux Unified Key Setup-on-disk-format (LUKS) technology. The easiest way to encrypt a partition is during installation time. For manual installations, select the Encrypt checkbox during partition creation to encrypt the partition. When this option is selected the system will prompt for a passphrase to use in decrypting the partition. The passphrase will subsequently need to be entered manually every time the system boots. For automated/unattended installations, it is possible to use Kickstart by adding the --encrypted and --passphrase= options to the definition of each partition to be encrypted. For example, the following line would encrypt the root partition: part / --fstype=ext4 --size=100 --onpart=hda1 --encrypted --passphrase=PASSPHRASE Any PASSPHRASE is stored in the Kickstart in plaintext, and the Kickstart must then be protected accordingly. Omitting the --passphrase= option from the partition definition will cause the installer to pause and interactively ask for the passphrase during installation. By default, the Anaconda installer uses aes-xts-plain64 cipher with a minimum 512 bit key size which should be compatible with FIPS enabled. Detailed information on encrypting partitions using LUKS or LUKS ciphers can be found on the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Documentation web site: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/8/html/security_hardening/encrypting-block-devices-using-luks_security-hardening . 13 14 APO01.06 BAI02.01 BAI06.01 DSS04.07 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 DSS06.06 3.13.16 CCI-001199 CCI-002475 CCI-002476 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(b)(1) 164.310(d) 164.312(a)(1) 164.312(a)(2)(iii) 164.312(a)(2)(iv) 164.312(b) 164.312(c) 164.314(b)(2)(i) 164.312(d) SR 3.4 SR 4.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R4.2 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CM-6(a) SC-28 SC-28(1) SC-13 AU-9(3) PR.DS-1 PR.DS-5 SRG-OS-000405-GPOS-00184 SRG-OS-000185-GPOS-00079 SRG-OS-000404-GPOS-00183 RHEL-08-010030 SV-230224r917864_rule The risk of a system's physical compromise, particularly mobile systems such as laptops, places its data at risk of compromise. Encrypting this data mitigates the risk of its loss if the system is lost. CCE-80789-1 Ensure /boot Located On Separate Partition It is recommended that the /boot directory resides on a separate partition. This makes it easier to apply restrictions e.g. through the noexec mount option. Eventually, the /boot partition can be configured not to be mounted automatically with the noauto mount option. BP28(R12) The /boot partition contains the kernel and bootloader files. Access to this partition should be restricted. CCE-83336-8 [[customizations.filesystem]] mountpoint = "/boot" size = 1073741824 part /boot Ensure /dev/shm is configured The /dev/shm is a traditional shared memory concept. One program will create a memory portion, which other processes (if permitted) can access. If /dev/shm is not configured, tmpfs will be mounted to /dev/shm by systemd. This rule does not have a remedation. It is expected that this will be managed by systemd and will be a tmpfs partition. 1.1.2.2.1 Any user can upload and execute files inside the /dev/shm similar to the /tmp partition. Configuring /dev/shm allows an administrator to set the noexec option on the mount, making /dev/shm useless for an attacker to install executable code. It would also prevent an attacker from establishing a hardlink to a system setuid program and wait for it to be updated. Once the program was updated, the hardlink would be broken and the attacker would have his own copy of the program. If the program happened to have a security vulnerability, the attacker could continue to exploit the known flaw. CCE-86282-1 Ensure /home Located On Separate Partition If user home directories will be stored locally, create a separate partition for /home at installation time (or migrate it later using LVM). If /home will be mounted from another system such as an NFS server, then creating a separate partition is not necessary at installation time, and the mountpoint can instead be configured later. BP28(R12) 12 15 8 APO13.01 DSS05.02 CCI-000366 CCI-001208 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 CM-6(a) SC-5(2) PR.PT-4 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010800 1.1.2.3.1 SV-230328r902723_rule Ensuring that /home is mounted on its own partition enables the setting of more restrictive mount options, and also helps ensure that users cannot trivially fill partitions used for log or audit data storage. CCE-81044-0 [[customizations.filesystem]] mountpoint = "/home" size = 1073741824 part /home Ensure /opt Located On Separate Partition It is recommended that the /opt directory resides on a separate partition. BP28(R12) The /opt partition contains additional software, usually installed outside the packaging system. Putting this directory on a separate partition makes it easier to apply restrictions e.g. through the nosuid mount option. CCE-83340-0 [[customizations.filesystem]] mountpoint = "/opt" size = 1073741824 part /opt Ensure /srv Located On Separate Partition If a file server (FTP, TFTP...) is hosted locally, create a separate partition for /srv at installation time (or migrate it later using LVM). If /srv will be mounted from another system such as an NFS server, then creating a separate partition is not necessary at installation time, and the mountpoint can instead be configured later. BP28(R12) Srv deserves files for local network file server such as FTP. Ensuring that /srv is mounted on its own partition enables the setting of more restrictive mount options, and also helps ensure that users cannot trivially fill partitions used for log or audit data storage. CCE-83387-1 [[customizations.filesystem]] mountpoint = "/srv" size = 1073741824 part /srv Ensure /tmp Located On Separate Partition The /tmp directory is a world-writable directory used for temporary file storage. Ensure it has its own partition or logical volume at installation time, or migrate it using LVM. BP28(R12) 12 15 8 APO13.01 DSS05.02 CCI-000366 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 CM-6(a) SC-5(2) PR.PT-4 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010543 1.1.2.1.1 SV-230295r627750_rule The /tmp partition is used as temporary storage by many programs. Placing /tmp in its own partition enables the setting of more restrictive mount options, which can help protect programs which use it. CCE-80851-9 [[customizations.filesystem]] mountpoint = "/tmp" size = 1073741824 part /tmp Ensure /usr Located On Separate Partition It is recommended that the /usr directory resides on a separate partition. BP28(R12) The /usr partition contains system software, utilities and files. Putting it on a separate partition allows limiting its size and applying restrictions through mount options. CCE-83343-4 [[customizations.filesystem]] mountpoint = "/usr" size = 5368709120 part /usr Ensure /var Located On Separate Partition The /var directory is used by daemons and other system services to store frequently-changing data. Ensure that /var has its own partition or logical volume at installation time, or migrate it using LVM. BP28(R12) 12 15 8 APO13.01 DSS05.02 CCI-000366 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 CM-6(a) SC-5(2) PR.PT-4 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010540 1.1.2.4.1 SV-230292r902718_rule Ensuring that /var is mounted on its own partition enables the setting of more restrictive mount options. This helps protect system services such as daemons or other programs which use it. It is not uncommon for the /var directory to contain world-writable directories installed by other software packages. CCE-80852-7 [[customizations.filesystem]] mountpoint = "/var" size = 3221225472 part /var Ensure /var/log Located On Separate Partition System logs are stored in the /var/log directory. Ensure that /var/log has its own partition or logical volume at installation time, or migrate it using LVM. BP28(R12) BP28(R47) 1 12 14 15 16 3 5 6 8 APO11.04 APO13.01 BAI03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 MEA02.01 CCI-000366 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 CIP-007-3 R6.5 CM-6(a) AU-4 SC-5(2) PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010541 1.1.2.6.1 SV-230293r902720_rule Placing /var/log in its own partition enables better separation between log files and other files in /var/. CCE-80853-5 [[customizations.filesystem]] mountpoint = "/var/log" size = 5368709120 part /var/log Ensure /var/log/audit Located On Separate Partition Audit logs are stored in the /var/log/audit directory. Ensure that /var/log/audit has its own partition or logical volume at installation time, or migrate it using LVM. Make absolutely certain that it is large enough to store all audit logs that will be created by the auditing daemon. BP28(R43) 1 12 13 14 15 16 2 3 5 6 8 APO11.04 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI04.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 MEA02.01 CCI-000366 CCI-001849 164.312(a)(2)(ii) 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.2 SR 7.6 A.12.1.3 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.17.2.1 CIP-007-3 R6.5 CM-6(a) AU-4 SC-5(2) PR.DS-4 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 FMT_SMF_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000341-GPOS-00132 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 SRG-APP-000357-CTR-000800 RHEL-08-010542 1.1.2.7.1 SV-230294r627750_rule Placing /var/log/audit in its own partition enables better separation between audit files and other files, and helps ensure that auditing cannot be halted due to the partition running out of space. CCE-80854-3 [[customizations.filesystem]] mountpoint = "/var/log/audit" size = 10737418240 part /var/log/audit Ensure /var/tmp Located On Separate Partition The /var/tmp directory is a world-writable directory used for temporary file storage. Ensure it has its own partition or logical volume at installation time, or migrate it using LVM. BP28(R12) SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010544 1.1.2.5.1 SV-244529r902737_rule The /var/tmp partition is used as temporary storage by many programs. Placing /var/tmp in its own partition enables the setting of more restrictive mount options, which can help protect programs which use it. CCE-82730-3 [[customizations.filesystem]] mountpoint = "/var/tmp" size = 1073741824 part /var/tmp GNOME Desktop Environment GNOME is a graphical desktop environment bundled with many Linux distributions that allow users to easily interact with the operating system graphically rather than textually. The GNOME Graphical Display Manager (GDM) provides login, logout, and user switching contexts as well as display server management. GNOME is developed by the GNOME Project and is considered the default Red Hat Graphical environment. For more information on GNOME and the GNOME Project, see https://www.gnome.org. Remove the GDM Package Group By removing the gdm package, the system no longer has GNOME installed installed. If X Windows is not installed then the system cannot boot into graphical user mode. This prevents the system from being accidentally or maliciously booted into a graphical.target mode. To do so, run the following command: $ sudo yum remove gdm CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 1.8.1 Unnecessary service packages must not be installed to decrease the attack surface of the system. A graphical environment is unnecessary for certain types of systems including a virtualization hypervisor. CCE-82367-4 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-82367-4 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_gdm_removed - name: Ensure gdm is removed package: name: gdm state: absent when: '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-82367-4 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_gdm_removed include remove_gdm class remove_gdm { package { 'gdm': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=gdm # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q gdm; then # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove gdm # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on gdm. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "gdm" ; then yum remove -y "gdm" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Make sure that the dconf databases are up-to-date with regards to respective keyfiles By default, DConf uses a binary database as a data backend. The system-level database is compiled from keyfiles in the /etc/dconf/db/ directory by the dconf update command. More specifically, content present in the following directories: /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d /etc/dconf/db/local.d 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(A) Req-6.2 8.2.8 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 1.8.2 Unlike text-based keyfiles, the binary database is impossible to check by OVAL. Therefore, in order to evaluate dconf configuration, both have to be true at the same time - configuration files have to be compliant, and the database needs to be more recent than those keyfiles, which gives confidence that it reflects them. CCE-81003-6 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-81003-6 - PCI-DSS-Req-6.2 - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 - dconf_db_up_to_date - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Run dconf update ansible.builtin.command: cmd: dconf update when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81003-6 - PCI-DSS-Req-6.2 - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 - dconf_db_up_to_date - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then dconf update else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure GNOME3 DConf User Profile By default, DConf provides a standard user profile. This profile contains a list of DConf configuration databases. The user profile and database always take the highest priority. As such the DConf User profile should always exist and be configured correctly. To make sure that the user profile is configured correctly, the /etc/dconf/profile/user should be set as follows: user-db:user system-db:local system-db:site system-db:distro Failure to have a functional DConf profile prevents GNOME3 configuration settings from being enforced for all users and allows various security risks. Configure GNOME Login Screen In the default GNOME desktop, the login is displayed after system boot and can display user accounts, allow users to reboot the system, and allow users to login automatically and/or with a guest account. The login screen should be configured to prevent such behavior. For more information about enforcing preferences in the GNOME3 environment using the DConf configuration system, see https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/7/html/desktop_migration_and_administration_guide/> and the man page dconf(1). Disable the GNOME3 Login Restart and Shutdown Buttons In the default graphical environment, users logging directly into the system are greeted with a login screen that allows any user, known or unknown, the ability the ability to shutdown or restart the system. This functionality should be disabled by setting disable-restart-buttons to true. To disable, add or edit disable-restart-buttons to /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/00-security-settings. For example: [org/gnome/login-screen] disable-restart-buttons=true Once the setting has been added, add a lock to /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example: /org/gnome/login-screen/disable-restart-buttons After the settings have been set, run dconf update. 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 3.1.2 CCI-000366 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) CM-7(b) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 A user who is at the console can reboot the system at the login screen. If restart or shutdown buttons are pressed at the login screen, this can create the risk of short-term loss of availability of systems due to reboot. - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - dconf_gnome_disable_restart_shutdown - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Disable the GNOME3 Login Restart and Shutdown Buttons ini_file: dest: /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/00-security-settings section: org/gnome/login-screen option: disable-restart-buttons value: 'true' create: true no_extra_spaces: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - dconf_gnome_disable_restart_shutdown - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Prevent user modification of GNOME disablement of Login Restart and Shutdown Buttons lineinfile: path: /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock regexp: ^/org/gnome/login-screen/disable-restart-buttons line: /org/gnome/login-screen/disable-restart-buttons create: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - dconf_gnome_disable_restart_shutdown - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Dconf Update command: dconf update when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - dconf_gnome_disable_restart_shutdown - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories # If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. # The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/login-screen\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|gdm.d' | cut -d":" -f1) DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/00-security-settings" DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d" mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] then if grep -q "^\\s*disable-restart-buttons\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" then sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)disable-restart-buttons(\s*=)/#\1disable-restart-buttons\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" fi fi [ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/login-screen\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" then printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/login-screen]" >> ${DCONFFILE} fi escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "true")" if grep -q "^\\s*disable-restart-buttons\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" then sed -i "s/\\s*disable-restart-buttons\\s*=\\s*.*/disable-restart-buttons=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" else sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/login-screen\\]|a\\disable-restart-buttons=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" fi dconf update # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/login-screen/disable-restart-buttons$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|gdm.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks" mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] then sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/login-screen/disable-restart-buttons$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" fi if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/login-screen/disable-restart-buttons$" /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/ then echo "/org/gnome/login-screen/disable-restart-buttons" >> "/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" fi dconf update else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the GNOME3 Login User List In the default graphical environment, users logging directly into the system are greeted with a login screen that displays all known users. This functionality should be disabled by setting disable-user-list to true. To disable, add or edit disable-user-list to /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/00-security-settings. For example: [org/gnome/login-screen] disable-user-list=true Once the setting has been added, add a lock to /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example: /org/gnome/login-screen/disable-user-list After the settings have been set, run dconf update. CM-6(a) AC-23 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-020032 1.8.3 SV-244536r743857_rule Leaving the user list enabled is a security risk since it allows anyone with physical access to the system to quickly enumerate known user accounts without logging in. CCE-86195-5 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-86195-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020032 - NIST-800-53-AC-23 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - dconf_gnome_disable_user_list - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Disable the GNOME3 Login User List ini_file: dest: /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/00-security-settings section: org/gnome/login-screen option: disable-user-list value: 'true' no_extra_spaces: true create: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86195-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020032 - NIST-800-53-AC-23 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - dconf_gnome_disable_user_list - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Prevent user modification of GNOME3 disablement of Login User List lineinfile: path: /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock regexp: ^/org/gnome/login-screen/disable-user-list$ line: /org/gnome/login-screen/disable-user-list create: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86195-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020032 - NIST-800-53-AC-23 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - dconf_gnome_disable_user_list - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Dconf Update command: dconf update when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86195-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020032 - NIST-800-53-AC-23 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - dconf_gnome_disable_user_list - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories # If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. # The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/login-screen\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|gdm.d' | cut -d":" -f1) DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/00-security-settings" DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d" mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] then if grep -q "^\\s*disable-user-list\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" then sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)disable-user-list(\s*=)/#\1disable-user-list\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" fi fi [ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/login-screen\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" then printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/login-screen]" >> ${DCONFFILE} fi escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "true")" if grep -q "^\\s*disable-user-list\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" then sed -i "s/\\s*disable-user-list\\s*=\\s*.*/disable-user-list=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" else sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/login-screen\\]|a\\disable-user-list=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" fi dconf update # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/login-screen/disable-user-list$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|gdm.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks" mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] then sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/login-screen/disable-user-list$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" fi if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/login-screen/disable-user-list$" /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/ then echo "/org/gnome/login-screen/disable-user-list" >> "/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" fi dconf update else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the GNOME3 Login Smartcard Authentication In the default graphical environment, smart card authentication can be enabled on the login screen by setting enable-smartcard-authentication to true. To enable, add or edit enable-smartcard-authentication to /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/00-security-settings. For example: [org/gnome/login-screen] enable-smartcard-authentication=true Once the setting has been added, add a lock to /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example: /org/gnome/login-screen/enable-smartcard-authentication After the settings have been set, run dconf update. CCI-000765 CCI-000766 CCI-000767 CCI-000768 CCI-000771 CCI-000772 CCI-000884 CCI-001948 CCI-001954 IA-2(3) IA-2(4) IA-2(8) IA-2(9) IA-2(11) Req-8.3 SRG-OS-000375-GPOS-00160 SRG-OS-000376-GPOS-00161 SRG-OS-000377-GPOS-00162 Smart card login provides two-factor authentication stronger than that provided by a username and password combination. Smart cards leverage PKI (public key infrastructure) in order to provide and verify credentials. - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - NIST-800-53-IA-2(11) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(3) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(4) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(8) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(9) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.3 - dconf_gnome_enable_smartcard_auth - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Enable the GNOME3 Login Smartcard Authentication ini_file: dest: /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/00-security-settings section: org/gnome/login-screen option: enable-smartcard-authentication value: 'true' create: true no_extra_spaces: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-53-IA-2(11) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(3) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(4) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(8) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(9) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.3 - dconf_gnome_enable_smartcard_auth - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Prevent user modification of GNOME3 disablement of Smartcard Authentication lineinfile: path: /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock regexp: ^/org/gnome/login-screen/enable-smartcard-authentication$ line: /org/gnome/login-screen/enable-smartcard-authentication create: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-53-IA-2(11) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(3) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(4) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(8) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(9) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.3 - dconf_gnome_enable_smartcard_auth - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Dconf Update command: dconf update when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-53-IA-2(11) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(3) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(4) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(8) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(9) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.3 - dconf_gnome_enable_smartcard_auth - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories # If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. # The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/login-screen\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|gdm.d' | cut -d":" -f1) DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/00-security-settings" DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d" mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] then if grep -q "^\\s*enable-smartcard-authentication\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" then sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)enable-smartcard-authentication(\s*=)/#\1enable-smartcard-authentication\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" fi fi [ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/login-screen\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" then printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/login-screen]" >> ${DCONFFILE} fi escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "true")" if grep -q "^\\s*enable-smartcard-authentication\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" then sed -i "s/\\s*enable-smartcard-authentication\\s*=\\s*.*/enable-smartcard-authentication=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" else sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/login-screen\\]|a\\enable-smartcard-authentication=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" fi dconf update # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/login-screen/enable-smartcard-authentication$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|gdm.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks" mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] then sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/login-screen/enable-smartcard-authentication$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" fi if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/login-screen/enable-smartcard-authentication$" /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/ then echo "/org/gnome/login-screen/enable-smartcard-authentication" >> "/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" fi dconf update else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the GNOME3 Screen Locking On Smartcard Removal In the default graphical environment, screen locking on smartcard removal can be enabled by setting removal-action to 'lock-screen'. To enable, add or edit removal-action to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example: [org/gnome/settings-daemon/peripherals/smartcard] removal-action='lock-screen' Once the setting has been added, add a lock to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example: /org/gnome/settings-daemon/peripherals/smartcard/removal-action After the settings have been set, run dconf update. CCI-000056 CCI-000058 SRG-OS-000028-GPOS-00009 SRG-OS-000030-GPOS-00011 RHEL-08-020050 SV-230351r792899_rule Locking the screen automatically when removing the smartcard can prevent undesired access to system. CCE-83910-0 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-83910-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020050 - dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Detect if removal-action can be found on /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ find: path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ contains: ^\s*removal-action register: dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal_config_files when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83910-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020050 - dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Configure removal-action - default file ini_file: dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d//00-security-settings section: org/gnome/settings-daemon/peripherals/smartcard option: removal-action value: '''lock-screen''' create: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal_config_files is defined and dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal_config_files.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-83910-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020050 - dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Configure removal-action - existing files ini_file: dest: '{{ item.path }}' section: org/gnome/settings-daemon/peripherals/smartcard option: removal-action value: '''lock-screen''' create: true with_items: '{{ dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal_config_files.files }}' when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal_config_files is defined and dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal_config_files.matched > 0 tags: - CCE-83910-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020050 - dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Detect if lock for removal-action can be found on /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ find: path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks contains: ^\s*removal-action register: dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal_lock_files when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83910-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020050 - dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Prevent user modification removal-action - default file lineinfile: path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock regexp: ^/org/gnome/settings-daemon/peripherals/smartcard/removal-action$ line: /org/gnome/settings-daemon/peripherals/smartcard/removal-action create: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal_lock_files is defined and dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal_lock_files.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-83910-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020050 - dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Prevent user modification removal-action - existing files lineinfile: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^/org/gnome/settings-daemon/peripherals/smartcard/removal-action$ line: /org/gnome/settings-daemon/peripherals/smartcard/removal-action create: true with_items: '{{ dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal_lock_files.files }}' when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal_lock_files is defined and dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal_lock_files.matched > 0 tags: - CCE-83910-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020050 - dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Dconf Update - removal-action command: dconf update when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83910-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020050 - dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories # If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. # The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/settings-daemon/peripherals/smartcard\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1) DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings" DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d" mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] then if grep -q "^\\s*removal-action\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" then sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)removal-action(\s*=)/#\1removal-action\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" fi fi [ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/settings-daemon/peripherals/smartcard\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" then printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/settings-daemon/peripherals/smartcard]" >> ${DCONFFILE} fi escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "'lock-screen'")" if grep -q "^\\s*removal-action\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" then sed -i "s/\\s*removal-action\\s*=\\s*.*/removal-action=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" else sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/settings-daemon/peripherals/smartcard\\]|a\\removal-action=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" fi dconf update # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/settings-daemon/peripherals/smartcard/removal-action$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks" mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] then sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/settings-daemon/peripherals/smartcard/removal-action$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" fi if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/settings-daemon/peripherals/smartcard/removal-action$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ then echo "/org/gnome/settings-daemon/peripherals/smartcard/removal-action" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" fi dconf update else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Set the GNOME3 Login Number of Failures In the default graphical environment, the GNOME3 login screen and be configured to restart the authentication process after a configured number of attempts. This can be configured by setting allowed-failures to 3 or less. To enable, add or edit allowed-failures to /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/00-security-settings. For example: [org/gnome/login-screen] allowed-failures=3 Once the setting has been added, add a lock to /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example: /org/gnome/login-screen/allowed-failures After the settings have been set, run dconf update. 3.1.8 FMT_MOF_EXT.1 Setting the password retry prompts that are permitted on a per-session basis to a low value requires some software, such as SSH, to re-connect. This can slow down and draw additional attention to some types of password-guessing attacks. CCE-80771-9 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80771-9 - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 - dconf_gnome_login_retries - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Enable the GNOME3 Login Number of Failures ini_file: dest: /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/00-security-settings section: org/gnome/login-screen option: allowed-failures value: '3' create: true no_extra_spaces: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80771-9 - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 - dconf_gnome_login_retries - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Prevent user modification of GNOME3 Login Number of Failures lineinfile: path: /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock regexp: ^/org/gnome/login-screen/allowed-failures$ line: /org/gnome/login-screen/allowed-failures create: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80771-9 - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 - dconf_gnome_login_retries - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Dconf Update command: dconf update when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80771-9 - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 - dconf_gnome_login_retries - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories # If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. # The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/login-screen\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|gdm.d' | cut -d":" -f1) DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/00-security-settings" DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d" mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] then if grep -q "^\\s*allowed-failures\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" then sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)allowed-failures(\s*=)/#\1allowed-failures\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" fi fi [ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/login-screen\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" then printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/login-screen]" >> ${DCONFFILE} fi escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "3")" if grep -q "^\\s*allowed-failures\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" then sed -i "s/\\s*allowed-failures\\s*=\\s*.*/allowed-failures=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" else sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/login-screen\\]|a\\allowed-failures=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" fi dconf update # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/login-screen/allowed-failures$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|gdm.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks" mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] then sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/login-screen/allowed-failures$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" fi if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/login-screen/allowed-failures$" /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/ then echo "/org/gnome/login-screen/allowed-failures" >> "/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" fi dconf update else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable GDM Automatic Login The GNOME Display Manager (GDM) can allow users to automatically login without user interaction or credentials. User should always be required to authenticate themselves to the system that they are authorized to use. To disable user ability to automatically login to the system, set the AutomaticLoginEnable to false in the [daemon] section in /etc/gdm/custom.conf. For example: [daemon] AutomaticLoginEnable=false 11 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 3.1.1 CCI-000366 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) CM-7(b) PR.IP-1 FIA_UAU.1 8.3.1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00229 RHEL-08-010820 SV-230329r877377_rule Failure to restrict system access to authenticated users negatively impacts operating system security. CCE-80823-8 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80823-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010820 - NIST-800-171-3.1.1 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.1 - gnome_gdm_disable_automatic_login - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Disable GDM Automatic Login ini_file: dest: /etc/gdm/custom.conf section: daemon option: AutomaticLoginEnable value: 'false' no_extra_spaces: true create: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80823-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010820 - NIST-800-171-3.1.1 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.1 - gnome_gdm_disable_automatic_login - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then if rpm --quiet -q gdm then if ! grep -q "^AutomaticLoginEnable=" /etc/gdm/custom.conf then sed -i "/^\[daemon\]/a \ AutomaticLoginEnable=False" /etc/gdm/custom.conf else sed -i "s/^AutomaticLoginEnable=.*/AutomaticLoginEnable=False/g" /etc/gdm/custom.conf fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable GDM Guest Login The GNOME Display Manager (GDM) can allow users to login without credentials which can be useful for public kiosk scenarios. Allowing users to login without credentials or "guest" account access has inherent security risks and should be disabled. To do disable timed logins or guest account access, set the TimedLoginEnable to false in the [daemon] section in /etc/gdm/custom.conf. For example: [daemon] TimedLoginEnable=false 11 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 3.1.1 CCI-000366 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) IA-2 PR.IP-1 FIA_UAU.1 8.3.1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00229 Failure to restrict system access to authenticated users negatively impacts operating system security. CCE-80824-6 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80824-6 - NIST-800-171-3.1.1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-IA-2 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.1 - gnome_gdm_disable_guest_login - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Disable GDM Guest Login ini_file: dest: /etc/gdm/custom.conf section: daemon option: TimedLoginEnable value: 'false' no_extra_spaces: true create: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80824-6 - NIST-800-171-3.1.1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-IA-2 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.1 - gnome_gdm_disable_guest_login - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then if rpm --quiet -q gdm then if ! grep -q "^TimedLoginEnable=" /etc/gdm/custom.conf then sed -i "/^\[daemon\]/a \ TimedLoginEnable=false" /etc/gdm/custom.conf else sed -i "s/^TimedLoginEnable=.*/TimedLoginEnable=false/g" /etc/gdm/custom.conf fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable XDMCP in GDM XDMCP is an unencrypted protocol, and therefore, presents a security risk, see e.g. XDMCP Gnome docs. To disable XDMCP support in Gnome, set Enable to false under the [xdmcp] configuration section in /etc/gdm/custom.conf. For example: [xdmcp] Enable=false 1.8.10 XDMCP provides unencrypted remote access through the Gnome Display Manager (GDM) which does not provide for the confidentiality and integrity of user passwords or the remote session. If a privileged user were to login using XDMCP, the privileged user password could be compromised due to typed XEvents and keystrokes will traversing over the network in clear text. CCE-86007-2 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-86007-2 - gnome_gdm_disable_xdmcp - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Disable XDMCP in GDM ini_file: path: /etc/gdm/custom.conf section: xdmcp option: Enable value: 'false' create: true mode: 420 when: '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-86007-2 - gnome_gdm_disable_xdmcp - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q gdm; then # Try find '[xdmcp]' and 'Enable' in '/etc/gdm/custom.conf', if it exists, set # to 'false', if it isn't here, add it, if '[xdmcp]' doesn't exist, add it there if grep -qzosP '[[:space:]]*\[xdmcp]([^\n\[]*\n+)+?[[:space:]]*Enable' '/etc/gdm/custom.conf'; then sed -i "s/Enable[^(\n)]*/Enable=false/" '/etc/gdm/custom.conf' elif grep -qs '[[:space:]]*\[xdmcp]' '/etc/gdm/custom.conf'; then sed -i "/[[:space:]]*\[xdmcp]/a Enable=false" '/etc/gdm/custom.conf' else if test -d "/etc/gdm"; then printf '%s\n' '[xdmcp]' "Enable=false" >> '/etc/gdm/custom.conf' else echo "Config file directory '/etc/gdm' doesnt exist, not remediating, assuming non-applicability." >&2 fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi GNOME Media Settings GNOME media settings that apply to the graphical interface. Disable GNOME3 Automounting The system's default desktop environment, GNOME3, will mount devices and removable media (such as DVDs, CDs and USB flash drives) whenever they are inserted into the system. To disable automount within GNOME3, add or set automount to false in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example: [org/gnome/desktop/media-handling] automount=false Once the settings have been added, add a lock to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example: /org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount After the settings have been set, run dconf update. 12 16 APO13.01 DSS01.04 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.03 3.1.7 CCI-000366 CCI-000778 CCI-001958 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.6 A.11.2.6 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.AC-3 PR.AC-6 3.4.2 SRG-OS-000114-GPOS-00059 SRG-OS-000378-GPOS-00163 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 1.8.6 1.8.7 Disabling automatic mounting in GNOME3 can prevent the introduction of malware via removable media. It will, however, also prevent desktop users from legitimate use of removable media. CCE-89904-7 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-89904-7 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - PCI-DSSv4-3.4.2 - dconf_gnome_disable_automount - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Disable GNOME3 Automounting - automount ini_file: dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings section: org/gnome/desktop/media-handling option: automount value: 'false' create: true no_extra_spaces: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-89904-7 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - PCI-DSSv4-3.4.2 - dconf_gnome_disable_automount - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Prevent user modification of GNOME3 Automounting - automount lineinfile: path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock regexp: ^/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount$ line: /org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount create: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-89904-7 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - PCI-DSSv4-3.4.2 - dconf_gnome_disable_automount - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Dconf Update command: dconf update when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-89904-7 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - PCI-DSSv4-3.4.2 - dconf_gnome_disable_automount - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories # If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. # The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1) DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings" DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d" mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] then if grep -q "^\\s*automount\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" then sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)automount(\s*=)/#\1automount\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" fi fi [ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" then printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling]" >> ${DCONFFILE} fi escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "false")" if grep -q "^\\s*automount\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" then sed -i "s/\\s*automount\\s*=\\s*.*/automount=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" else sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling\\]|a\\automount=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" fi dconf update # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks" mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] then sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" fi if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ then echo "/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" fi dconf update else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable GNOME3 Automount Opening The system's default desktop environment, GNOME3, will mount devices and removable media (such as DVDs, CDs and USB flash drives) whenever they are inserted into the system. To disable automount-open within GNOME3, add or set automount-open to false in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example: [org/gnome/desktop/media-handling] automount-open=false Once the settings have been added, add a lock to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example: /org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount-open After the settings have been set, run dconf update. 12 16 APO13.01 DSS01.04 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.03 3.1.7 CCI-000366 CCI-000778 CCI-001958 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.6 A.11.2.6 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.AC-3 PR.AC-6 3.4.2 SRG-OS-000114-GPOS-00059 SRG-OS-000378-GPOS-00163 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 1.8.6 1.8.7 Automatically mounting file systems permits easy introduction of unknown devices, thereby facilitating malicious activity. Disabling automatic mounting in GNOME3 can prevent the introduction of malware via removable media. It will, however, also prevent desktop users from legitimate use of removable media. CCE-83693-2 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-83693-2 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - PCI-DSSv4-3.4.2 - dconf_gnome_disable_automount_open - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Disable GNOME3 Automounting - automount-open ini_file: dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings section: org/gnome/desktop/media-handling option: automount-open value: 'false' create: true no_extra_spaces: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83693-2 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - PCI-DSSv4-3.4.2 - dconf_gnome_disable_automount_open - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Prevent user modification of GNOME3 Automounting - automount-open lineinfile: path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock regexp: ^/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount-open$ line: /org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount-open create: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83693-2 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - PCI-DSSv4-3.4.2 - dconf_gnome_disable_automount_open - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Dconf Update command: dconf update when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83693-2 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - PCI-DSSv4-3.4.2 - dconf_gnome_disable_automount_open - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories # If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. # The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1) DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings" DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d" mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] then if grep -q "^\\s*automount-open\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" then sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)automount-open(\s*=)/#\1automount-open\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" fi fi [ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" then printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling]" >> ${DCONFFILE} fi escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "false")" if grep -q "^\\s*automount-open\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" then sed -i "s/\\s*automount-open\\s*=\\s*.*/automount-open=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" else sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling\\]|a\\automount-open=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" fi dconf update # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount-open$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks" mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] then sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount-open$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" fi if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount-open$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ then echo "/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount-open" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" fi dconf update else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable GNOME3 Automount running The system's default desktop environment, GNOME3, will mount devices and removable media (such as DVDs, CDs and USB flash drives) whenever they are inserted into the system. To disable autorun-never within GNOME3, add or set autorun-never to true in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example: [org/gnome/desktop/media-handling] autorun-never=true Once the settings have been added, add a lock to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example: /org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/autorun-never After the settings have been set, run dconf update. 12 16 APO13.01 DSS01.04 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.03 3.1.7 CCI-000366 CCI-000778 CCI-001958 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.6 A.11.2.6 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.AC-3 PR.AC-6 SRG-OS-000114-GPOS-00059 SRG-OS-000378-GPOS-00163 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 1.8.8 1.8.9 Automatically mounting file systems permits easy introduction of unknown devices, thereby facilitating malicious activity. Disabling automatic mount running in GNOME3 can prevent the introduction of malware via removable media. It will, however, also prevent desktop users from legitimate use of removable media. CCE-83742-7 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-83742-7 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - dconf_gnome_disable_autorun - low_complexity - low_severity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Disable GNOME3 Automounting - autorun-never ini_file: dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings section: org/gnome/desktop/media-handling option: autorun-never value: 'true' create: true no_extra_spaces: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83742-7 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - dconf_gnome_disable_autorun - low_complexity - low_severity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Prevent user modification of GNOME3 Automounting - autorun-never lineinfile: path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock regexp: ^/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/autorun-never$ line: /org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/autorun-never create: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83742-7 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - dconf_gnome_disable_autorun - low_complexity - low_severity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Dconf Update command: dconf update when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83742-7 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - dconf_gnome_disable_autorun - low_complexity - low_severity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories # If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. # The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1) DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings" DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d" mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] then if grep -q "^\\s*autorun-never\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" then sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)autorun-never(\s*=)/#\1autorun-never\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" fi fi [ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" then printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling]" >> ${DCONFFILE} fi escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "true")" if grep -q "^\\s*autorun-never\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" then sed -i "s/\\s*autorun-never\\s*=\\s*.*/autorun-never=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" else sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling\\]|a\\autorun-never=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" fi dconf update # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/autorun-never$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks" mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] then sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/autorun-never$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" fi if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/autorun-never$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ then echo "/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/autorun-never" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" fi dconf update else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable All GNOME3 Thumbnailers The system's default desktop environment, GNOME3, uses a number of different thumbnailer programs to generate thumbnails for any new or modified content in an opened folder. To disable the execution of these thumbnail applications, add or set disable-all to true in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example: [org/gnome/desktop/thumbnailers] disable-all=true Once the settings have been added, add a lock to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example: /org/gnome/desktop/thumbnailers/disable-all After the settings have been set, run dconf update. This effectively prevents an attacker from gaining access to a system through a flaw in GNOME3's Nautilus thumbnail creators. 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 An attacker with knowledge of a flaw in a GNOME3 thumbnailer application could craft a malicious file to exploit this flaw. Assuming the attacker could place the malicious file on the local filesystem (via a web upload for example) and assuming a user browses the same location using Nautilus, the malicious file would exploit the thumbnailer with the potential for malicious code execution. It is best to disable these thumbnailer applications unless they are explicitly required. - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - dconf_gnome_disable_thumbnailers - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - unknown_severity - unknown_strategy - name: Disable All GNOME3 Thumbnailers ini_file: dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings section: org/gnome/desktop/thumbnailers option: disable-all value: 'true' create: true no_extra_spaces: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - dconf_gnome_disable_thumbnailers - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - unknown_severity - unknown_strategy - name: Prevent user modification of GNOME3 Thumbnailers lineinfile: path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock regexp: ^/org/gnome/desktop/thumbnailers/disable-all$ line: /org/gnome/desktop/thumbnailers/disable-all create: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - dconf_gnome_disable_thumbnailers - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - unknown_severity - unknown_strategy - name: Dconf Update command: dconf update when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - dconf_gnome_disable_thumbnailers - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - unknown_severity - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories # If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. # The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/desktop/thumbnailers\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1) DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings" DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d" mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] then if grep -q "^\\s*disable-all\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" then sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)disable-all(\s*=)/#\1disable-all\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" fi fi [ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/desktop/thumbnailers\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" then printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/desktop/thumbnailers]" >> ${DCONFFILE} fi escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "true")" if grep -q "^\\s*disable-all\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" then sed -i "s/\\s*disable-all\\s*=\\s*.*/disable-all=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" else sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/desktop/thumbnailers\\]|a\\disable-all=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" fi dconf update # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/desktop/thumbnailers/disable-all$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks" mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] then sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/desktop/thumbnailers/disable-all$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" fi if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/desktop/thumbnailers/disable-all$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ then echo "/org/gnome/desktop/thumbnailers/disable-all" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" fi dconf update else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi GNOME Network Settings GNOME network settings that apply to the graphical interface. Disable WIFI Network Connection Creation in GNOME3 GNOME allows users to create ad-hoc wireless connections through the NetworkManager applet. Wireless connections should be disabled by adding or setting disable-wifi-create to true in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example: [org/gnome/nm-applet] disable-wifi-create=true Once the settings have been added, add a lock to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example: /org/gnome/nm-applet/disable-wifi-create After the settings have been set, run dconf update. 3.1.16 Wireless network connections should not be allowed to be configured by general users on a given system as it could open the system to backdoor attacks. - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - NIST-800-171-3.1.16 - dconf_gnome_disable_wifi_create - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Disable WiFi Network Connection Creation in GNOME3 ini_file: dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings section: org/gnome/nm-applet option: disable-wifi-create value: 'true' create: true no_extra_spaces: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-171-3.1.16 - dconf_gnome_disable_wifi_create - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Prevent user modification of GNOME3 disablement of WiFi lineinfile: path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock regexp: ^/org/gnome/nm-applet/disable-wifi-create$ line: /org/gnome/nm-applet/disable-wifi-create create: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-171-3.1.16 - dconf_gnome_disable_wifi_create - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Dconf Update command: dconf update when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-171-3.1.16 - dconf_gnome_disable_wifi_create - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories # If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. # The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/nm-applet\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1) DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings" DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d" mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] then if grep -q "^\\s*disable-wifi-create\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" then sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)disable-wifi-create(\s*=)/#\1disable-wifi-create\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" fi fi [ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/nm-applet\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" then printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/nm-applet]" >> ${DCONFFILE} fi escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "true")" if grep -q "^\\s*disable-wifi-create\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" then sed -i "s/\\s*disable-wifi-create\\s*=\\s*.*/disable-wifi-create=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" else sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/nm-applet\\]|a\\disable-wifi-create=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" fi dconf update # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/nm-applet/disable-wifi-create$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks" mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] then sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/nm-applet/disable-wifi-create$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" fi if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/nm-applet/disable-wifi-create$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ then echo "/org/gnome/nm-applet/disable-wifi-create" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" fi dconf update else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable WIFI Network Notification in GNOME3 By default, GNOME disables WIFI notification. This should be permanently set so that users do not connect to a wireless network when the system finds one. While useful for mobile devices, this setting should be disabled for all other systems. To configure the system to disable the WIFI notication, add or set suppress-wireless-networks-available to true in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example: [org/gnome/nm-applet] suppress-wireless-networks-available=true Once the settings have been added, add a lock to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example: /org/gnome/nm-applet/suppress-wireless-networks-available After the settings have been set, run dconf update. 3.1.16 Wireless network connections should not be allowed to be configured by general users on a given system as it could open the system to backdoor attacks. - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - NIST-800-171-3.1.16 - dconf_gnome_disable_wifi_notification - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Disable WiFi Network Notification in GNOME3 ini_file: dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings section: org/gnome/nm-applet option: suppress-wireless-networks-available value: 'true' create: true no_extra_spaces: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-171-3.1.16 - dconf_gnome_disable_wifi_notification - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Prevent user modification of GNOME3 disablement of WiFi lineinfile: path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock regexp: ^/org/gnome/nm-applet/suppress-wireless-networks-available$ line: /org/gnome/nm-applet/suppress-wireless-networks-available create: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-171-3.1.16 - dconf_gnome_disable_wifi_notification - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Dconf Update command: dconf update when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-171-3.1.16 - dconf_gnome_disable_wifi_notification - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories # If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. # The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/nm-applet\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1) DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings" DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d" mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] then if grep -q "^\\s*suppress-wireless-networks-available\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" then sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)suppress-wireless-networks-available(\s*=)/#\1suppress-wireless-networks-available\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" fi fi [ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/nm-applet\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" then printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/nm-applet]" >> ${DCONFFILE} fi escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "true")" if grep -q "^\\s*suppress-wireless-networks-available\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" then sed -i "s/\\s*suppress-wireless-networks-available\\s*=\\s*.*/suppress-wireless-networks-available=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" else sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/nm-applet\\]|a\\suppress-wireless-networks-available=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" fi dconf update # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/nm-applet/suppress-wireless-networks-available$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks" mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] then sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/nm-applet/suppress-wireless-networks-available$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" fi if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/nm-applet/suppress-wireless-networks-available$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ then echo "/org/gnome/nm-applet/suppress-wireless-networks-available" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" fi dconf update else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi GNOME Remote Access Settings GNOME remote access settings that apply to the graphical interface. Require Credential Prompting for Remote Access in GNOME3 By default, GNOME does not require credentials when using Vino for remote access. To configure the system to require remote credentials, add or set authentication-methods to ['vnc'] in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example: [org/gnome/Vino] authentication-methods=['vnc'] Once the settings have been added, add a lock to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example: /org/gnome/Vino/authentication-methods After the settings have been set, run dconf update. 3.1.12 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) Username and password prompting is required for remote access. Otherwise, non-authorized and nefarious users can access the system freely. CCE-80772-7 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80772-7 - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 - dconf_gnome_remote_access_credential_prompt - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Require Credential Prompting for Remote Access in GNOME3 ini_file: dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings section: org/gnome/Vino option: authentication-methods value: '[''vnc'']' create: true no_extra_spaces: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80772-7 - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 - dconf_gnome_remote_access_credential_prompt - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Prevent user modification of GNOME3 Credential Prompting for Remote Access lineinfile: path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock regexp: ^/org/gnome/Vino/authentication-methods$ line: /org/gnome/Vino/authentication-methods create: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80772-7 - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 - dconf_gnome_remote_access_credential_prompt - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Dconf Update command: dconf update when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80772-7 - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 - dconf_gnome_remote_access_credential_prompt - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories # If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. # The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/Vino\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1) DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings" DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d" mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] then if grep -q "^\\s*authentication-methods\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" then sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)authentication-methods(\s*=)/#\1authentication-methods\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" fi fi [ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/Vino\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" then printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/Vino]" >> ${DCONFFILE} fi escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "['vnc']")" if grep -q "^\\s*authentication-methods\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" then sed -i "s/\\s*authentication-methods\\s*=\\s*.*/authentication-methods=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" else sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/Vino\\]|a\\authentication-methods=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" fi dconf update # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/Vino/authentication-methods$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks" mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] then sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/Vino/authentication-methods$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" fi if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/Vino/authentication-methods$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ then echo "/org/gnome/Vino/authentication-methods" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" fi dconf update else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Require Encryption for Remote Access in GNOME3 By default, GNOME requires encryption when using Vino for remote access. To prevent remote access encryption from being disabled, add or set require-encryption to true in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example: [org/gnome/Vino] require-encryption=true Once the settings have been added, add a lock to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example: /org/gnome/Vino/require-encryption After the settings have been set, run dconf update. 1 11 12 13 15 16 18 20 3 4 6 9 BAI03.08 BAI07.04 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS03.01 3.1.13 CCI-000366 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 4.4.3.3 SR 7.6 A.12.1.1 A.12.1.2 A.12.1.4 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 CM-6(a) AC-17(a) AC-17(2) DE.AE-1 PR.DS-7 PR.IP-1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 Open X displays allow an attacker to capture keystrokes and to execute commands remotely. CCE-80773-5 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80773-5 - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - dconf_gnome_remote_access_encryption - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Require Encryption for Remote Access in GNOME3 ini_file: dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings section: org/gnome/Vino option: require-encryption value: 'true' create: true no_extra_spaces: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80773-5 - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - dconf_gnome_remote_access_encryption - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Prevent user modification of GNOME3 Encryption for Remote Access lineinfile: path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock regexp: ^/org/gnome/Vino/require-encryption$ line: /org/gnome/Vino/require-encryption create: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80773-5 - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - dconf_gnome_remote_access_encryption - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Dconf Update command: dconf update when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80773-5 - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - dconf_gnome_remote_access_encryption - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories # If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. # The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/Vino\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1) DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings" DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d" mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] then if grep -q "^\\s*require-encryption\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" then sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)require-encryption(\s*=)/#\1require-encryption\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" fi fi [ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/Vino\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" then printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/Vino]" >> ${DCONFFILE} fi escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "true")" if grep -q "^\\s*require-encryption\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" then sed -i "s/\\s*require-encryption\\s*=\\s*.*/require-encryption=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" else sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/Vino\\]|a\\require-encryption=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" fi dconf update # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/Vino/require-encryption$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks" mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] then sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/Vino/require-encryption$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" fi if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/Vino/require-encryption$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ then echo "/org/gnome/Vino/require-encryption" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" fi dconf update else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure GNOME Screen Locking In the default GNOME3 desktop, the screen can be locked by selecting the user name in the far right corner of the main panel and selecting Lock. The following sections detail commands to enforce idle activation of the screensaver, screen locking, a blank-screen screensaver, and an idle activation time. Because users should be trained to lock the screen when they step away from the computer, the automatic locking feature is only meant as a backup. The root account can be screen-locked; however, the root account should never be used to log into an X Windows environment and should only be used to for direct login via console in emergency circumstances. For more information about enforcing preferences in the GNOME3 environment using the DConf configuration system, see http://wiki.gnome.org/dconf and the man page dconf(1). Screensaver Inactivity timeout Choose allowed duration (in seconds) of inactive graphical sessions 600 900 1800 300 900 Screensaver Lock Delay Choose allowed duration (in seconds) after a screensaver becomes active before displaying an authentication prompt 10 5 0 0 Enable GNOME3 Screensaver Idle Activation To activate the screensaver in the GNOME3 desktop after a period of inactivity, add or set idle-activation-enabled to true in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example: [org/gnome/desktop/screensaver] idle-activation-enabled=true Once the setting has been added, add a lock to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example: /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/idle-activation-enabled After the settings have been set, run dconf update. 1 12 15 16 5.5.5 DSS05.04 DSS05.10 DSS06.10 3.1.10 CCI-000057 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 A.18.1.4 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.4 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 CM-6(a) AC-11(a) PR.AC-7 FMT_MOF_EXT.1 Req-8.1.8 8.2.8 SRG-OS-000029-GPOS-00010 A session time-out lock is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from the immediate physical vicinity of the information system but does not logout because of the temporary nature of the absence. Rather than relying on the user to manually lock their operating system session prior to vacating the vicinity, GNOME desktops can be configured to identify when a user's session has idled and take action to initiate the session lock. Enabling idle activation of the screensaver ensures the screensaver will be activated after the idle delay. Applications requiring continuous, real-time screen display (such as network management products) require the login session does not have administrator rights and the display station is located in a controlled-access area. CCE-80774-3 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80774-3 - CJIS-5.5.5 - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 - NIST-800-53-AC-11(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 - dconf_gnome_screensaver_idle_activation_enabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Enable GNOME3 Screensaver Idle Activation ini_file: dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings section: org/gnome/desktop/screensaver option: idle-activation-enabled value: 'true' create: true no_extra_spaces: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80774-3 - CJIS-5.5.5 - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 - NIST-800-53-AC-11(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 - dconf_gnome_screensaver_idle_activation_enabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Prevent user modification of GNOME idle-activation-enabled lineinfile: path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock regexp: ^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/idle-activation-enabled$ line: /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/idle-activation-enabled create: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80774-3 - CJIS-5.5.5 - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 - NIST-800-53-AC-11(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 - dconf_gnome_screensaver_idle_activation_enabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Dconf Update command: dconf update when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80774-3 - CJIS-5.5.5 - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 - NIST-800-53-AC-11(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 - dconf_gnome_screensaver_idle_activation_enabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories # If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. # The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1) DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings" DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d" mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] then if grep -q "^\\s*idle-activation-enabled\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" then sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)idle-activation-enabled(\s*=)/#\1idle-activation-enabled\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" fi fi [ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" then printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver]" >> ${DCONFFILE} fi escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "true")" if grep -q "^\\s*idle-activation-enabled\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" then sed -i "s/\\s*idle-activation-enabled\\s*=\\s*.*/idle-activation-enabled=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" else sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]|a\\idle-activation-enabled=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" fi dconf update # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/idle-activation-enabled$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks" mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] then sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/idle-activation-enabled$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" fi if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/idle-activation-enabled$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ then echo "/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/idle-activation-enabled" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" fi dconf update else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure Users Cannot Change GNOME3 Screensaver Idle Activation If not already configured, ensure that users cannot change GNOME3 screensaver lock settings by adding /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/idle-activation-enabled to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example: /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/idle-activation-enabled After the settings have been set, run dconf update. 1 12 15 16 5.5.5 DSS05.04 DSS05.10 DSS06.10 3.1.10 CCI-000057 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 A.18.1.4 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.4 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 CM-6(a) PR.AC-7 FMT_MOF_EXT.1 Req-8.1.8 SRG-OS-000029-GPOS-00010 A session lock is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from the immediate physical vicinity of the information system but does not want to logout because of the temporary nature of the absense. CCE-83858-1 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-83858-1 - CJIS-5.5.5 - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 - dconf_gnome_screensaver_idle_activation_locked - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Prevent user modification of GNOME Screensaver idle-activation-enabled lineinfile: path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock regexp: ^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/idle-activation-enabled$ line: /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/idle-activation-enabled create: true when: '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-83858-1 - CJIS-5.5.5 - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 - dconf_gnome_screensaver_idle_activation_locked - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Dconf Update command: dconf update when: '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-83858-1 - CJIS-5.5.5 - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 - dconf_gnome_screensaver_idle_activation_locked - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q gdm; then # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/idle-activation-enabled$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks" mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] then sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/idle-activation-enabled$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" fi if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/idle-activation-enabled$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ then echo "/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/idle-activation-enabled" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" fi dconf update else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Set GNOME3 Screensaver Inactivity Timeout The idle time-out value for inactivity in the GNOME3 desktop is configured via the idle-delay setting must be set under an appropriate configuration file(s) in the /etc/dconf/db/local.d directory and locked in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks directory to prevent user modification. For example, to configure the system for a 15 minute delay, add the following to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings: [org/gnome/desktop/session] idle-delay=uint32 900 1 12 15 16 5.5.5 DSS05.04 DSS05.10 DSS06.10 3.1.10 CCI-000057 CCI-000060 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 A.18.1.4 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.4 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 AC-11(a) CM-6(a) PR.AC-7 FMT_MOF_EXT.1 Req-8.1.8 8.2.8 SRG-OS-000029-GPOS-00010 SRG-OS-000031-GPOS-00012 RHEL-08-020060 1.8.4 SV-230352r646876_rule A session time-out lock is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from the immediate physical vicinity of the information system but does not logout because of the temporary nature of the absence. Rather than relying on the user to manually lock their operating system session prior to vacating the vicinity, GNOME3 can be configured to identify when a user's session has idled and take action to initiate a session lock. CCE-80775-0 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80775-0 - CJIS-5.5.5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020060 - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 - NIST-800-53-AC-11(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 - dconf_gnome_screensaver_idle_delay - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: XCCDF Value inactivity_timeout_value # promote to variable set_fact: inactivity_timeout_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Set GNOME3 Screensaver Inactivity Timeout ini_file: dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings section: org/gnome/desktop/session option: idle-delay value: uint32 {{ inactivity_timeout_value }} create: true no_extra_spaces: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80775-0 - CJIS-5.5.5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020060 - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 - NIST-800-53-AC-11(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 - dconf_gnome_screensaver_idle_delay - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Dconf Update command: dconf update when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80775-0 - CJIS-5.5.5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020060 - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 - NIST-800-53-AC-11(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 - dconf_gnome_screensaver_idle_delay - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then inactivity_timeout_value='' # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories # If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. # The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/desktop/session\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1) DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings" DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d" mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] then if grep -q "^\\s*idle-delay\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" then sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)idle-delay(\s*=)/#\1idle-delay\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" fi fi [ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/desktop/session\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" then printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/desktop/session]" >> ${DCONFFILE} fi escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "uint32 ${inactivity_timeout_value}")" if grep -q "^\\s*idle-delay\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" then sed -i "s/\\s*idle-delay\\s*=\\s*.*/idle-delay=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" else sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/desktop/session\\]|a\\idle-delay=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" fi dconf update else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Set GNOME3 Screensaver Lock Delay After Activation Period To activate the locking delay of the screensaver in the GNOME3 desktop when the screensaver is activated, add or set lock-delay to uint32 in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example: [org/gnome/desktop/screensaver] lock-delay=uint32 After the settings have been set, run dconf update. 1 12 15 16 DSS05.04 DSS05.10 DSS06.10 3.1.10 CCI-000056 CCI-000057 CCI-000060 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 A.18.1.4 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.4 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 AC-11(a) CM-6(a) PR.AC-7 FMT_MOF_EXT.1 Req-8.1.8 8.2.8 SRG-OS-000029-GPOS-00010 SRG-OS-000031-GPOS-00012 RHEL-08-020031 1.8.4 SV-244535r743854_rule A session lock is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from the immediate physical vicinity of the information system but does not want to logout because of the temporary nature of the absense. CCE-80776-8 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80776-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020031 - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 - NIST-800-53-AC-11(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_delay - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_screensaver_lock_delay # promote to variable set_fact: var_screensaver_lock_delay: !!str tags: - always - name: Set GNOME3 Screensaver Lock Delay After Activation Period ini_file: dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings section: org/gnome/desktop/screensaver option: lock-delay value: uint32 {{ var_screensaver_lock_delay }} create: true no_extra_spaces: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80776-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020031 - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 - NIST-800-53-AC-11(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_delay - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Dconf Update command: dconf update when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80776-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020031 - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 - NIST-800-53-AC-11(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_delay - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then var_screensaver_lock_delay='' # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories # If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. # The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1) DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings" DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d" mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] then if grep -q "^\\s*lock-delay\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" then sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)lock-delay(\s*=)/#\1lock-delay\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" fi fi [ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" then printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver]" >> ${DCONFFILE} fi escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "uint32 ${var_screensaver_lock_delay}")" if grep -q "^\\s*lock-delay\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" then sed -i "s/\\s*lock-delay\\s*=\\s*.*/lock-delay=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" else sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]|a\\lock-delay=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" fi dconf update else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable GNOME3 Screensaver Lock After Idle Period To activate locking of the screensaver in the GNOME3 desktop when it is activated, add or set lock-enabled to true in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example: [org/gnome/desktop/screensaver] lock-enabled=true Once the settings have been added, add a lock to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example: /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled After the settings have been set, run dconf update. 1 12 15 16 5.5.5 DSS05.04 DSS05.10 DSS06.10 3.1.10 CCI-000056 CCI-000058 CCI-000060 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 A.18.1.4 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.4 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 CM-6(a) PR.AC-7 FMT_MOF_EXT.1 Req-8.1.8 8.2.8 SRG-OS-000028-GPOS-00009 SRG-OS-000030-GPOS-00011 RHEL-08-020030 SV-230347r627750_rule A session lock is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from the immediate physical vicinity of the information system but does not want to logout because of the temporary nature of the absense. CCE-80777-6 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80777-6 - CJIS-5.5.5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020030 - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_enabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Dconf Update command: dconf update when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_distribution == 'SLES' tags: - CCE-80777-6 - CJIS-5.5.5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020030 - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_enabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Enable GNOME3 Screensaver Lock After Idle Period ini_file: dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings section: org/gnome/desktop/screensaver option: lock-enabled value: 'true' create: true no_extra_spaces: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_distribution != 'SLES' tags: - CCE-80777-6 - CJIS-5.5.5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020030 - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_enabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Prevent user modification of GNOME lock-enabled lineinfile: path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock regexp: ^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled$ line: /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled create: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_distribution != 'SLES' tags: - CCE-80777-6 - CJIS-5.5.5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020030 - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_enabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Enable GNOME3 Screensaver Lock After Idle Period ini_file: dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings section: org/gnome/desktop/lockdown option: disable-lock-screen value: 'false' create: true no_extra_spaces: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_distribution == 'SLES' tags: - CCE-80777-6 - CJIS-5.5.5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020030 - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_enabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Prevent user modification of GNOME disable-lock-screen lineinfile: path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock regexp: ^/org/gnome/desktop/lockdown/disable-lock-screen$ line: /org/gnome/desktop/lockdown/disable-lock-screen create: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_distribution == 'SLES' tags: - CCE-80777-6 - CJIS-5.5.5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020030 - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_enabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Check GNOME3 screenserver disable-lock-screen false command: gsettings get org.gnome.desktop.lockdown disable-lock-screen register: cmd_out when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_distribution == 'SLES' tags: - CCE-80777-6 - CJIS-5.5.5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020030 - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_enabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Update GNOME3 screenserver disable-lock-screen false command: gsettings set org.gnome.desktop.lockdown disable-lock-screen false when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_distribution == 'SLES' tags: - CCE-80777-6 - CJIS-5.5.5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020030 - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_enabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Dconf Update command: dconf update when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80777-6 - CJIS-5.5.5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020030 - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_enabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories # If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. # The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1) DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings" DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d" mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] then if grep -q "^\\s*lock-enabled\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" then sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)lock-enabled(\s*=)/#\1lock-enabled\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" fi fi [ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" then printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver]" >> ${DCONFFILE} fi escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "true")" if grep -q "^\\s*lock-enabled\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" then sed -i "s/\\s*lock-enabled\\s*=\\s*.*/lock-enabled=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" else sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]|a\\lock-enabled=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" fi dconf update # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks" mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] then sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" fi if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ then echo "/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" fi dconf update else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure Users Cannot Change GNOME3 Screensaver Lock After Idle Period If not already configured, ensure that users cannot change GNOME3 screensaver lock settings by adding /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings. For example: /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled After the settings have been set, run dconf update. 1 12 15 16 5.5.5 DSS05.04 DSS05.10 DSS06.10 3.1.10 CCI-000056 CCI-000057 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 A.18.1.4 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.4 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 CM-6(a) PR.AC-7 FMT_MOF_EXT.1 Req-8.1.8 SRG-OS-000028-GPOS-00009 SRG-OS-000030-GPOS-00011 RHEL-08-020082 SV-244539r743866_rule A session lock is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from the immediate physical vicinity of the information system but does not want to logout because of the temporary nature of the absense. CCE-87261-4 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-87261-4 - CJIS-5.5.5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020082 - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_locked - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Prevent user modification of GNOME Screensaver lock-enabled lineinfile: path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock regexp: ^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled$ line: /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled create: true when: '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-87261-4 - CJIS-5.5.5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020082 - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_locked - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Dconf Update command: dconf update when: '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-87261-4 - CJIS-5.5.5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020082 - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_locked - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q gdm; then # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks" mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] then sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" fi if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ then echo "/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" fi dconf update else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Implement Blank Screensaver To set the screensaver mode in the GNOME3 desktop to a blank screen, add or set picture-uri to string '' in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example: [org/gnome/desktop/screensaver] picture-uri=string '' Once the settings have been added, add a lock to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example: /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/picture-uri After the settings have been set, run dconf update. 1 12 15 16 5.5.5 DSS05.04 DSS05.10 DSS06.10 3.1.10 CCI-000060 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 A.18.1.4 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.4 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 AC-11(1) CM-6(a) AC-11(1).1 PR.AC-7 FMT_MOF_EXT.1 Req-8.1.8 8.2.8 SRG-OS-000031-GPOS-00012 Setting the screensaver mode to blank-only conceals the contents of the display from passersby. CCE-80778-4 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80778-4 - CJIS-5.5.5 - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 - NIST-800-53-AC-11(1) - NIST-800-53-AC-11(1).1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 - dconf_gnome_screensaver_mode_blank - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Implement Blank Screensaver ini_file: dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings section: org/gnome/desktop/screensaver option: picture-uri value: string '' create: true no_extra_spaces: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80778-4 - CJIS-5.5.5 - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 - NIST-800-53-AC-11(1) - NIST-800-53-AC-11(1).1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 - dconf_gnome_screensaver_mode_blank - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Prevent user modification of GNOME picture-uri lineinfile: path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock regexp: ^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/picture-uri$ line: /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/picture-uri create: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80778-4 - CJIS-5.5.5 - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 - NIST-800-53-AC-11(1) - NIST-800-53-AC-11(1).1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 - dconf_gnome_screensaver_mode_blank - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Dconf Update command: dconf update when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80778-4 - CJIS-5.5.5 - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 - NIST-800-53-AC-11(1) - NIST-800-53-AC-11(1).1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 - dconf_gnome_screensaver_mode_blank - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories # If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. # The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1) DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings" DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d" mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] then if grep -q "^\\s*picture-uri\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" then sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)picture-uri(\s*=)/#\1picture-uri\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" fi fi [ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" then printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver]" >> ${DCONFFILE} fi escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "string ''")" if grep -q "^\\s*picture-uri\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" then sed -i "s/\\s*picture-uri\\s*=\\s*.*/picture-uri=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" else sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]|a\\picture-uri=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" fi dconf update # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/picture-uri$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks" mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] then sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/picture-uri$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" fi if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/picture-uri$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ then echo "/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/picture-uri" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" fi dconf update else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Full User Name on Splash Shield By default when the screen is locked, the splash shield will show the user's full name. This should be disabled to prevent casual observers from seeing who has access to the system. This can be disabled by adding or setting show-full-name-in-top-bar to false in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example: [org/gnome/desktop/screensaver] show-full-name-in-top-bar=false Once the settings have been added, add a lock to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example: /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/show-full-name-in-top-bar After the settings have been set, run dconf update. FMT_MOF_EXT.1 Setting the splash screen to not reveal the logged in user's name conceals who has access to the system from passersby. CCE-80779-2 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80779-2 - dconf_gnome_screensaver_user_info - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Disable Full Username on Splash Screen ini_file: dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings section: org/gnome/desktop/screensaver option: show-full-name-in-top-bar value: 'false' create: true no_extra_spaces: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80779-2 - dconf_gnome_screensaver_user_info - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Prevent user modification of GNOME show-full-name-in-top-bar lineinfile: path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock regexp: ^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/show-full-name-in-top-bar$ line: /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/show-full-name-in-top-bar create: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80779-2 - dconf_gnome_screensaver_user_info - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Dconf Update command: dconf update when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80779-2 - dconf_gnome_screensaver_user_info - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories # If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. # The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1) DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings" DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d" mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] then if grep -q "^\\s*show-full-name-in-top-bar\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" then sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)show-full-name-in-top-bar(\s*=)/#\1show-full-name-in-top-bar\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" fi fi [ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" then printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver]" >> ${DCONFFILE} fi escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "false")" if grep -q "^\\s*show-full-name-in-top-bar\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" then sed -i "s/\\s*show-full-name-in-top-bar\\s*=\\s*.*/show-full-name-in-top-bar=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" else sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]|a\\show-full-name-in-top-bar=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" fi dconf update # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/show-full-name-in-top-bar$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks" mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] then sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/show-full-name-in-top-bar$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" fi if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/show-full-name-in-top-bar$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ then echo "/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/show-full-name-in-top-bar" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" fi dconf update else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure Users Cannot Change GNOME3 Screensaver Settings If not already configured, ensure that users cannot change GNOME3 screensaver lock settings by adding /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-delay to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example: /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-delay After the settings have been set, run dconf update. 1 12 15 16 DSS05.04 DSS05.10 DSS06.10 3.1.10 CCI-000057 CCI-000060 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 A.18.1.4 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.4 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 CM-6(a) PR.AC-7 FMT_MOF_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000029-GPOS-00010 SRG-OS-000031-GPOS-00012 RHEL-08-020080 1.8.5 SV-230354r743990_rule A session time-out lock is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from the immediate physical vicinity of the information system but does not logout because of the temporary nature of the absence. Rather than relying on the user to manually lock their operating system session prior to vacating the vicinity, GNOME desktops can be configured to identify when a user's session has idled and take action to initiate the session lock. As such, users should not be allowed to change session settings. CCE-80780-0 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80780-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020080 - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - dconf_gnome_screensaver_user_locks - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Prevent user modification of GNOME lock-delay lineinfile: path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock regexp: ^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-delay$ line: /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-delay create: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80780-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020080 - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - dconf_gnome_screensaver_user_locks - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Dconf Update command: dconf update when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80780-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020080 - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - dconf_gnome_screensaver_user_locks - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-delay$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks" mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] then sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-delay$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" fi if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-delay$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ then echo "/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-delay" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" fi dconf update else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure Users Cannot Change GNOME3 Session Idle Settings If not already configured, ensure that users cannot change GNOME3 session idle settings by adding /org/gnome/desktop/session/idle-delay to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example: /org/gnome/desktop/session/idle-delay After the settings have been set, run dconf update. 1 12 15 16 DSS05.04 DSS05.10 DSS06.10 3.1.10 CCI-000057 CCI-000060 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 A.18.1.4 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.4 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 CM-6(a) PR.AC-7 FMT_MOF_EXT.1 Req-8.1.8 8.2.8 SRG-OS-000029-GPOS-00010 SRG-OS-000031-GPOS-00012 RHEL-08-020081 1.8.5 SV-244538r743863_rule A session time-out lock is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from the immediate physical vicinity of the information system but does not logout because of the temporary nature of the absence. Rather than relying on the user to manually lock their operating system session prior to vacating the vicinity, GNOME desktops can be configured to identify when a user's session has idled and take action to initiate the session lock. As such, users should not be allowed to change session settings. CCE-80781-8 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80781-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020081 - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 - dconf_gnome_session_idle_user_locks - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Prevent user modification of GNOME Session idle-delay lineinfile: path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock regexp: ^/org/gnome/desktop/session/idle-delay$ line: /org/gnome/desktop/session/idle-delay create: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80781-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020081 - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 - dconf_gnome_session_idle_user_locks - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Dconf Update command: dconf update when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80781-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020081 - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 - dconf_gnome_session_idle_user_locks - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/desktop/session/idle-delay$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks" mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] then sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/desktop/session/idle-delay$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" fi if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/desktop/session/idle-delay$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ then echo "/org/gnome/desktop/session/idle-delay" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" fi dconf update else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi GNOME System Settings GNOME provides configuration and functionality to a graphical desktop environment that changes grahical configurations or allow a user to perform actions that users normally would not be able to do in non-graphical mode such as remote access configuration, power policies, Geo-location, etc. Configuring such settings in GNOME will prevent accidential graphical configuration changes by users from taking place. Disable Ctrl-Alt-Del Reboot Key Sequence in GNOME3 By default, GNOME will reboot the system if the Ctrl-Alt-Del key sequence is pressed. To configure the system to ignore the Ctrl-Alt-Del key sequence from the Graphical User Interface (GUI) instead of rebooting the system, add or set logout to '' in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example: [org/gnome/settings-daemon/plugins/media-keys] logout='' Once the settings have been added, add a lock to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example: /org/gnome/settings-daemon/plugins/media-keys/logout After the settings have been set, run dconf update. 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 3.1.2 CCI-000366 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) CM-7(b) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040171 SV-230530r646883_rule A locally logged-in user who presses Ctrl-Alt-Del, when at the console, can reboot the system. If accidentally pressed, as could happen in the case of mixed OS environment, this can create the risk of short-term loss of availability of systems due to unintentional reboot. CCE-84028-0 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-84028-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040171 - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - dconf_gnome_disable_ctrlaltdel_reboot - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Disable Ctrl-Alt-Del Reboot Key Sequence in GNOME3 ini_file: dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings section: org/gnome/settings-daemon/plugins/media-keys option: logout value: '''''' create: true no_extra_spaces: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84028-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040171 - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - dconf_gnome_disable_ctrlaltdel_reboot - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Prevent user modification of GNOME disablement of Ctrl-Alt-Del lineinfile: path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock regexp: ^/org/gnome/settings-daemon/plugins/media-keys/logout$ line: /org/gnome/settings-daemon/plugins/media-keys/logout create: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84028-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040171 - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - dconf_gnome_disable_ctrlaltdel_reboot - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Dconf Update command: dconf update when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84028-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040171 - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - dconf_gnome_disable_ctrlaltdel_reboot - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories # If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. # The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/settings-daemon/plugins/media-keys\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1) DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings" DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d" mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] then if grep -q "^\\s*logout\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" then sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)logout(\s*=)/#\1logout\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" fi fi [ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/settings-daemon/plugins/media-keys\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" then printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/settings-daemon/plugins/media-keys]" >> ${DCONFFILE} fi escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "''")" if grep -q "^\\s*logout\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" then sed -i "s/\\s*logout\\s*=\\s*.*/logout=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" else sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/settings-daemon/plugins/media-keys\\]|a\\logout=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" fi dconf update # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/settings-daemon/plugins/media-keys/logout$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks" mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] then sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/settings-daemon/plugins/media-keys/logout$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" fi if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/settings-daemon/plugins/media-keys/logout$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ then echo "/org/gnome/settings-daemon/plugins/media-keys/logout" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" fi dconf update else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Geolocation in GNOME3 GNOME allows the clock and applications to track and access location information. This setting should be disabled as applications should not track system location. To configure the system to disable location tracking, add or set enabled to false in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example: [org/gnome/system/location] enabled=false To configure the clock to disable location tracking, add or set geolocation to false in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example: [org/gnome/clocks] geolocation=false Once the settings have been added, add a lock to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example: /org/gnome/system/location/enabled /org/gnome/clocks/geolocation After the settings have been set, run dconf update. Power settings should not be enabled on systems that are not mobile devices. Enabling power settings on non-mobile devices could have unintended processing consequences on standard systems. - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - dconf_gnome_disable_geolocation - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Disable Geolocation in GNOME3 - location tracking ini_file: dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings section: org/gnome/system/location option: enabled value: 'false' create: true no_extra_spaces: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - dconf_gnome_disable_geolocation - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Disable Geolocation in GNOME3 - clock location tracking ini_file: dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings section: org/gnome/clocks option: gelocation value: 'false' create: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - dconf_gnome_disable_geolocation - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Prevent user modification of GNOME geolocation - location tracking lineinfile: path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock regexp: ^/org/gnome/system/location/enabled$ line: /org/gnome/system/location/enabled create: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - dconf_gnome_disable_geolocation - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Prevent user modification of GNOME geolocation - clock location tracking lineinfile: path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock regexp: ^/org/gnome/clocks/geolocation$ line: /org/gnome/clocks/geolocation create: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - dconf_gnome_disable_geolocation - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Dconf Update command: dconf update when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - dconf_gnome_disable_geolocation - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories # If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. # The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/system/location\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1) DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings" DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d" mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] then if grep -q "^\\s*enabled\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" then sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)enabled(\s*=)/#\1enabled\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" fi fi [ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/system/location\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" then printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/system/location]" >> ${DCONFFILE} fi escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "false")" if grep -q "^\\s*enabled\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" then sed -i "s/\\s*enabled\\s*=\\s*.*/enabled=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" else sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/system/location\\]|a\\enabled=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" fi dconf update # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories # If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. # The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/clocks\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1) DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings" DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d" mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] then if grep -q "^\\s*geolocation\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" then sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)geolocation(\s*=)/#\1geolocation\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" fi fi [ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/clocks\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" then printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/clocks]" >> ${DCONFFILE} fi escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "false")" if grep -q "^\\s*geolocation\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" then sed -i "s/\\s*geolocation\\s*=\\s*.*/geolocation=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" else sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/clocks\\]|a\\geolocation=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" fi dconf update # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/system/location/enabled$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks" mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] then sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/system/location/enabled$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" fi if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/system/location/enabled$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ then echo "/org/gnome/system/location/enabled" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" fi dconf update # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/clocks/geolocation$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks" mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] then sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/clocks/geolocation$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" fi if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/clocks/geolocation$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ then echo "/org/gnome/clocks/geolocation" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" fi dconf update else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Power Settings in GNOME3 By default, GNOME enables a power profile designed for mobile devices with battery usage. While useful for mobile devices, this setting should be disabled for all other systems. To configure the system to disable the power setting, add or set active to false in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example: [org/gnome/settings-daemon/plugins/power] active=false Once the settings have been added, add a lock to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example: /org/gnome/settings-daemon/plugins/power After the settings have been set, run dconf update. Power settings should not be enabled on systems that are not mobile devices. Enabling power settings on non-mobile devices could have unintended processing consequences on standard systems. Disable User Administration in GNOME3 By default, GNOME will allow all users to have some administratrion capability. This should be disabled so that non-administrative users are not making configuration changes. To configure the system to disable user administration capability in the Graphical User Interface (GUI), add or set user-administration-disabled to true in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example: [org/gnome/desktop/lockdown] user-administration-disabled=true Once the settings have been added, add a lock to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example: /org/gnome/desktop/lockdown/user-administration-disabled After the settings have been set, run dconf update. 3.1.5 FMT_MOD_EXT.1 Allowing all users to have some administratrive capabilities to the system through the Graphical User Interface (GUI) when they would not have them otherwise could allow unintended configuration changes as well as a nefarious user the capability to make system changes such as adding new accounts, etc. CCE-80769-3 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80769-3 - NIST-800-171-3.1.5 - dconf_gnome_disable_user_admin - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Detect if user-administration-disabled can be found on /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ find: path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ contains: ^\s*user-administration-disabled register: dconf_gnome_disable_user_admin_config_files when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80769-3 - NIST-800-171-3.1.5 - dconf_gnome_disable_user_admin - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Configure user-administration-disabled - default file ini_file: dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d//00-security-settings section: org/gnome/desktop/lockdown option: user-administration-disabled value: 'true' create: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - dconf_gnome_disable_user_admin_config_files is defined and dconf_gnome_disable_user_admin_config_files.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80769-3 - NIST-800-171-3.1.5 - dconf_gnome_disable_user_admin - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Configure user-administration-disabled - existing files ini_file: dest: '{{ item.path }}' section: org/gnome/desktop/lockdown option: user-administration-disabled value: 'true' create: true with_items: '{{ dconf_gnome_disable_user_admin_config_files.files }}' when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - dconf_gnome_disable_user_admin_config_files is defined and dconf_gnome_disable_user_admin_config_files.matched > 0 tags: - CCE-80769-3 - NIST-800-171-3.1.5 - dconf_gnome_disable_user_admin - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Detect if lock for user-administration-disabled can be found on /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ find: path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks contains: ^\s*user-administration-disabled register: dconf_gnome_disable_user_admin_lock_files when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80769-3 - NIST-800-171-3.1.5 - dconf_gnome_disable_user_admin - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Prevent user modification user-administration-disabled - default file lineinfile: path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock regexp: ^/org/gnome/desktop/lockdown/user-administration-disabled$ line: /org/gnome/desktop/lockdown/user-administration-disabled create: true when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - dconf_gnome_disable_user_admin_lock_files is defined and dconf_gnome_disable_user_admin_lock_files.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80769-3 - NIST-800-171-3.1.5 - dconf_gnome_disable_user_admin - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Prevent user modification user-administration-disabled - existing files lineinfile: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^/org/gnome/desktop/lockdown/user-administration-disabled$ line: /org/gnome/desktop/lockdown/user-administration-disabled create: true with_items: '{{ dconf_gnome_disable_user_admin_lock_files.files }}' when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - dconf_gnome_disable_user_admin_lock_files is defined and dconf_gnome_disable_user_admin_lock_files.matched > 0 tags: - CCE-80769-3 - NIST-800-171-3.1.5 - dconf_gnome_disable_user_admin - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Dconf Update - user-administration-disabled command: dconf update when: - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80769-3 - NIST-800-171-3.1.5 - dconf_gnome_disable_user_admin - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories # If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. # The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/desktop/lockdown\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1) DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings" DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d" mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] then if grep -q "^\\s*user-administration-disabled\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" then sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)user-administration-disabled(\s*=)/#\1user-administration-disabled\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" fi fi [ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/desktop/lockdown\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" then printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/desktop/lockdown]" >> ${DCONFFILE} fi escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "true")" if grep -q "^\\s*user-administration-disabled\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" then sed -i "s/\\s*user-administration-disabled\\s*=\\s*.*/user-administration-disabled=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" else sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/desktop/lockdown\\]|a\\user-administration-disabled=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" fi dconf update # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/desktop/lockdown/user-administration-disabled$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks" mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] then sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/desktop/lockdown/user-administration-disabled$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" fi if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/desktop/lockdown/user-administration-disabled$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ then echo "/org/gnome/desktop/lockdown/user-administration-disabled" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" fi dconf update else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi SAP Specific Requirement SAP (Systems, Applications and Products in Data Processing) is enterprise software to manage business operations and customer relations. The following section contains SAP specific requirement that is not part of standard or common OS setting. Sudo Sudo, which stands for "su 'do'", provides the ability to delegate authority to certain users, groups of users, or system administrators. When configured for system users and/or groups, Sudo can allow a user or group to execute privileged commands that normally only root is allowed to execute. For more information on Sudo and addition Sudo configuration options, see https://www.sudo.ws. Group name dedicated to the use of sudo Specify the name of the group that should own /usr/bin/sudo. root root sudogrp Sudo - logfile value Specify the sudo logfile to use. The default value used here matches the example location from CIS, which uses /var/log/sudo.log. /var/log/sudo.log /var/log/sudo.log Sudo - passwd_timeout value Defines the number of minutes before the sudo password prompt times out. Defining 0 means no timeout. The default timeout value is 5 minutes. 5 0 1 2 3 5 Sudo - timestamp_timeout value Defines the number of minutes that can elapse before sudo will ask for a passwd again. If set to a value less than 0 the user's time stamp will never expire. Defining 0 means always prompt for a password. The default timeout value is 5 minutes. 5 0 1 2 3 5 15 Sudo - umask value Specify the sudo umask to use. The actual umask value that is used is the union of the user's umask and the sudo umask. The default sudo umask is 0022. This guarantess sudo never lowers the umask when running a command. 0022 0022 0027 0077 Install sudo Package The sudo package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install sudo BP28(R19) 1382 1384 1386 CM-6(a) FMT_MOF_EXT.1 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000324-GPOS-00125 4.3.1 sudo is a program designed to allow a system administrator to give limited root privileges to users and log root activity. The basic philosophy is to give as few privileges as possible but still allow system users to get their work done. CCE-82214-8 - name: Ensure sudo is installed package: name: sudo state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82214-8 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_sudo_installed [[packages]] name = "sudo" version = "*" include install_sudo class install_sudo { package { 'sudo': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=sudo # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "sudo" ; then yum install -y "sudo" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure sudo Runs In A Minimal Environment - sudo env_reset The sudo env_reset tag, when specified, will run the command in a minimal environment, containing the TERM, PATH, HOME, MAIL, SHELL, LOGNAME, USER and SUDO_* variables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, env_reset is enabled by default This should be enabled by making sure that the env_reset tag exists in /etc/sudoers configuration file or any sudo configuration snippets in /etc/sudoers.d/. BP28(R58) Forcing sudo to reset the environment ensures that environment variables are not passed on to the command accidentaly, preventing leak of potentially sensitive information. CCE-83820-1 - name: Ensure env_reset is enabled in /etc/sudoers lineinfile: path: /etc/sudoers regexp: ^[\s]*Defaults.*\benv_reset\b.*$ line: Defaults env_reset validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s tags: - CCE-83820-1 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudo_add_env_reset if /usr/sbin/visudo -qcf /etc/sudoers; then cp /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.bak if ! grep -P '^[\s]*Defaults[\s]*\benv_reset\b.*$' /etc/sudoers; then # sudoers file doesn't define Option env_reset echo "Defaults env_reset" >> /etc/sudoers fi # Check validity of sudoers and cleanup bak if /usr/sbin/visudo -qcf /etc/sudoers; then rm -f /etc/sudoers.bak else echo "Fail to validate remediated /etc/sudoers, reverting to original file." mv /etc/sudoers.bak /etc/sudoers false fi else echo "Skipping remediation, /etc/sudoers failed to validate" false fi Ensure sudo Ignores Commands In Current Dir - sudo ignore_dot The sudo ignore_dot tag, when specified, will ignore the current directory in the PATH environment variable. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, env_reset is enabled by default This should be enabled by making sure that the ignore_dot tag exists in /etc/sudoers configuration file or any sudo configuration snippets in /etc/sudoers.d/. BP28(R58) Ignoring the commands in the user's current directory prevents an attacker from executing commands downloaded locally. CCE-83810-2 - name: Ensure ignore_dot is enabled in /etc/sudoers lineinfile: path: /etc/sudoers regexp: ^[\s]*Defaults.*\bignore_dot\b.*$ line: Defaults ignore_dot validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s tags: - CCE-83810-2 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudo_add_ignore_dot if /usr/sbin/visudo -qcf /etc/sudoers; then cp /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.bak if ! grep -P '^[\s]*Defaults[\s]*\bignore_dot\b.*$' /etc/sudoers; then # sudoers file doesn't define Option ignore_dot echo "Defaults ignore_dot" >> /etc/sudoers fi # Check validity of sudoers and cleanup bak if /usr/sbin/visudo -qcf /etc/sudoers; then rm -f /etc/sudoers.bak else echo "Fail to validate remediated /etc/sudoers, reverting to original file." mv /etc/sudoers.bak /etc/sudoers false fi else echo "Skipping remediation, /etc/sudoers failed to validate" false fi Ensure Privileged Escalated Commands Cannot Execute Other Commands - sudo NOEXEC The sudo NOEXEC tag, when specified, prevents user executed commands from executing other commands, like a shell for example. This should be enabled by making sure that the NOEXEC tag exists in /etc/sudoers configuration file or any sudo configuration snippets in /etc/sudoers.d/. BP28(R58) Restricting the capability of sudo allowed commands to execute sub-commands prevents users from running programs with privileges they wouldn't have otherwise. CCE-83747-6 - name: Ensure noexec is enabled in /etc/sudoers lineinfile: path: /etc/sudoers regexp: ^[\s]*Defaults.*\bnoexec\b.*$ line: Defaults noexec validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s tags: - CCE-83747-6 - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudo_add_noexec if /usr/sbin/visudo -qcf /etc/sudoers; then cp /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.bak if ! grep -P '^[\s]*Defaults[\s]*\bnoexec\b.*$' /etc/sudoers; then # sudoers file doesn't define Option noexec echo "Defaults noexec" >> /etc/sudoers fi # Check validity of sudoers and cleanup bak if /usr/sbin/visudo -qcf /etc/sudoers; then rm -f /etc/sudoers.bak else echo "Fail to validate remediated /etc/sudoers, reverting to original file." mv /etc/sudoers.bak /etc/sudoers false fi else echo "Skipping remediation, /etc/sudoers failed to validate" false fi Ensure sudo passwd_timeout is appropriate - sudo passwd_timeout The sudo passwd_timeout tag sets the amount of time sudo password prompt waits. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, the default passwd_timeout value is 5 minutes. The passwd_timeout should be configured by making sure that the passwd_timeout= tag exists in /etc/sudoers configuration file or any sudo configuration snippets in /etc/sudoers.d/. Reducing the time sudo waits for a a password reduces the time the process is exposed. CCE-83964-7 - name: XCCDF Value var_sudo_passwd_timeout # promote to variable set_fact: var_sudo_passwd_timeout: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure passwd_timeout is enabled with the appropriate value in /etc/sudoers lineinfile: path: /etc/sudoers regexp: ^[\s]*Defaults\s(.*)\bpasswd_timeout=[-]?.+\b(.*)$ line: Defaults \1passwd_timeout={{ var_sudo_passwd_timeout }}\2 validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s backrefs: true register: edit_sudoers_passwd_timeout_option tags: - CCE-83964-7 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudo_add_passwd_timeout - name: Enable passwd_timeout option with appropriate value in /etc/sudoers lineinfile: path: /etc/sudoers line: Defaults passwd_timeout={{ var_sudo_passwd_timeout }} validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s when: edit_sudoers_passwd_timeout_option is defined and not edit_sudoers_passwd_timeout_option.changed tags: - CCE-83964-7 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudo_add_passwd_timeout var_sudo_passwd_timeout='' if /usr/sbin/visudo -qcf /etc/sudoers; then cp /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.bak if ! grep -P '^[\s]*Defaults[\s]*\bpasswd_timeout=\w+\b\b.*$' /etc/sudoers; then # sudoers file doesn't define Option passwd_timeout echo "Defaults passwd_timeout=${var_sudo_passwd_timeout}" >> /etc/sudoers else # sudoers file defines Option passwd_timeout, remediate if appropriate value is not set if ! grep -P "^[\s]*Defaults.*\bpasswd_timeout=${var_sudo_passwd_timeout}\b.*$" /etc/sudoers; then escaped_variable=${var_sudo_passwd_timeout//$'/'/$'\/'} sed -Ei "s/(^[\s]*Defaults.*\bpasswd_timeout=)[-]?.+(\b.*$)/\1$escaped_variable\2/" /etc/sudoers fi fi # Check validity of sudoers and cleanup bak if /usr/sbin/visudo -qcf /etc/sudoers; then rm -f /etc/sudoers.bak else echo "Fail to validate remediated /etc/sudoers, reverting to original file." mv /etc/sudoers.bak /etc/sudoers false fi else echo "Skipping remediation, /etc/sudoers failed to validate" false fi Ensure Only Users Logged In To Real tty Can Execute Sudo - sudo requiretty The sudo requiretty tag, when specified, will only execute sudo commands from users logged in to a real tty. This should be enabled by making sure that the requiretty tag exists in /etc/sudoers configuration file or any sudo configuration snippets in /etc/sudoers.d/. BP28(R58) Restricting the use cases in which a user is allowed to execute sudo commands reduces the attack surface. CCE-83790-6 - name: Ensure requiretty is enabled in /etc/sudoers lineinfile: path: /etc/sudoers regexp: ^[\s]*Defaults.*\brequiretty\b.*$ line: Defaults requiretty validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s tags: - CCE-83790-6 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudo_add_requiretty if /usr/sbin/visudo -qcf /etc/sudoers; then cp /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.bak if ! grep -P '^[\s]*Defaults[\s]*\brequiretty\b.*$' /etc/sudoers; then # sudoers file doesn't define Option requiretty echo "Defaults requiretty" >> /etc/sudoers fi # Check validity of sudoers and cleanup bak if /usr/sbin/visudo -qcf /etc/sudoers; then rm -f /etc/sudoers.bak else echo "Fail to validate remediated /etc/sudoers, reverting to original file." mv /etc/sudoers.bak /etc/sudoers false fi else echo "Skipping remediation, /etc/sudoers failed to validate" false fi Ensure sudo umask is appropriate - sudo umask The sudo umask tag, when specified, will be added the to the user's umask in the command environment. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, the default umask value is 0022. The umask should be configured by making sure that the umask= tag exists in /etc/sudoers configuration file or any sudo configuration snippets in /etc/sudoers.d/. BP28(R58) The umask value influences the permissions assigned to files when they are created. A misconfigured umask value could result in files with excessive permissions that can be read or written to by unauthorized users. CCE-83860-7 - name: XCCDF Value var_sudo_umask # promote to variable set_fact: var_sudo_umask: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure umask is enabled with the appropriate value in /etc/sudoers lineinfile: path: /etc/sudoers regexp: ^[\s]*Defaults\s(.*)\bumask=[-]?.+\b(.*)$ line: Defaults \1umask={{ var_sudo_umask }}\2 validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s backrefs: true register: edit_sudoers_umask_option tags: - CCE-83860-7 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudo_add_umask - name: Enable umask option with appropriate value in /etc/sudoers lineinfile: path: /etc/sudoers line: Defaults umask={{ var_sudo_umask }} validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s when: edit_sudoers_umask_option is defined and not edit_sudoers_umask_option.changed tags: - CCE-83860-7 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudo_add_umask var_sudo_umask='' if /usr/sbin/visudo -qcf /etc/sudoers; then cp /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.bak if ! grep -P '^[\s]*Defaults[\s]*\bumask=\w+\b\b.*$' /etc/sudoers; then # sudoers file doesn't define Option umask echo "Defaults umask=${var_sudo_umask}" >> /etc/sudoers else # sudoers file defines Option umask, remediate if appropriate value is not set if ! grep -P "^[\s]*Defaults.*\bumask=${var_sudo_umask}\b.*$" /etc/sudoers; then escaped_variable=${var_sudo_umask//$'/'/$'\/'} sed -Ei "s/(^[\s]*Defaults.*\bumask=)[-]?.+(\b.*$)/\1$escaped_variable\2/" /etc/sudoers fi fi # Check validity of sudoers and cleanup bak if /usr/sbin/visudo -qcf /etc/sudoers; then rm -f /etc/sudoers.bak else echo "Fail to validate remediated /etc/sudoers, reverting to original file." mv /etc/sudoers.bak /etc/sudoers false fi else echo "Skipping remediation, /etc/sudoers failed to validate" false fi Ensure Only Users Logged In To Real tty Can Execute Sudo - sudo use_pty The sudo use_pty tag, when specified, will only execute sudo commands from users logged in to a real tty. This should be enabled by making sure that the use_pty tag exists in /etc/sudoers configuration file or any sudo configuration snippets in /etc/sudoers.d/. BP28(R58) Req-10.2.5 2.2.6 4.3.2 Requiring that sudo commands be run in a pseudo-terminal can prevent an attacker from retaining access to the user's terminal after the main program has finished executing. CCE-83798-9 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-83798-9 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudo_add_use_pty - name: Ensure use_pty is enabled in /etc/sudoers lineinfile: path: /etc/sudoers regexp: ^[\s]*Defaults.*\buse_pty\b.*$ line: Defaults use_pty validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-83798-9 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudo_add_use_pty # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q sudo; then if /usr/sbin/visudo -qcf /etc/sudoers; then cp /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.bak if ! grep -P '^[\s]*Defaults[\s]*\buse_pty\b.*$' /etc/sudoers; then # sudoers file doesn't define Option use_pty echo "Defaults use_pty" >> /etc/sudoers fi # Check validity of sudoers and cleanup bak if /usr/sbin/visudo -qcf /etc/sudoers; then rm -f /etc/sudoers.bak else echo "Fail to validate remediated /etc/sudoers, reverting to original file." mv /etc/sudoers.bak /etc/sudoers false fi else echo "Skipping remediation, /etc/sudoers failed to validate" false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure Sudo Logfile Exists - sudo logfile A custom log sudo file can be configured with the 'logfile' tag. This rule configures a sudo custom logfile at the default location suggested by CIS, which uses /var/log/sudo.log. Req-10.2.5 2.2.6 4.3.3 A sudo log file simplifies auditing of sudo commands. CCE-83601-5 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-83601-5 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudo_custom_logfile - name: XCCDF Value var_sudo_logfile # promote to variable set_fact: var_sudo_logfile: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure logfile is enabled with the appropriate value in /etc/sudoers lineinfile: path: /etc/sudoers regexp: ^[\s]*Defaults\s(.*)\blogfile=[-]?.+\b(.*)$ line: Defaults \1logfile={{ var_sudo_logfile }}\2 validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s backrefs: true register: edit_sudoers_logfile_option when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-83601-5 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudo_custom_logfile - name: Enable logfile option with appropriate value in /etc/sudoers lineinfile: path: /etc/sudoers line: Defaults logfile={{ var_sudo_logfile }} validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s when: - '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' - edit_sudoers_logfile_option is defined and not edit_sudoers_logfile_option.changed tags: - CCE-83601-5 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudo_custom_logfile # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q sudo; then var_sudo_logfile='' if /usr/sbin/visudo -qcf /etc/sudoers; then cp /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.bak if ! grep -P '^[\s]*Defaults[\s]*\blogfile\s*=\s*("(?:\\"|\\\\|[^"\\\n])*"\B|[^"](?:(?:\\,|\\"|\\ |\\\\|[^", \\\n])*)\b)\b.*$' /etc/sudoers; then # sudoers file doesn't define Option logfile echo "Defaults logfile=${var_sudo_logfile}" >> /etc/sudoers else # sudoers file defines Option logfile, remediate if appropriate value is not set if ! grep -P "^[\s]*Defaults.*\blogfile=${var_sudo_logfile}\b.*$" /etc/sudoers; then escaped_variable=${var_sudo_logfile//$'/'/$'\/'} sed -Ei "s/(^[\s]*Defaults.*\blogfile=)[-]?.+(\b.*$)/\1$escaped_variable\2/" /etc/sudoers fi fi # Check validity of sudoers and cleanup bak if /usr/sbin/visudo -qcf /etc/sudoers; then rm -f /etc/sudoers.bak else echo "Fail to validate remediated /etc/sudoers, reverting to original file." mv /etc/sudoers.bak /etc/sudoers false fi else echo "Skipping remediation, /etc/sudoers failed to validate" false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure a dedicated group owns sudo Restrict the execution of privilege escalated commands to a dedicated group of users. Ensure the group owner of /usr/bin/sudo is . Changing group owner of /usr/bin/sudo to a group with no member users will prevent any and all escalatation of privileges. Additionally, the system may become unmanageable if root logins are not allowed. This rule doesn't come with a remediation, before remediating the sysadmin needs to add users to the dedicated sudo group. BP28(R38) Restricting the set of users able to execute commands as privileged user reduces the attack surface. CCE-83982-9 Ensure Users Re-Authenticate for Privilege Escalation - sudo !authenticate The sudo !authenticate option, when specified, allows a user to execute commands using sudo without having to authenticate. This should be disabled by making sure that the !authenticate option does not exist in /etc/sudoers configuration file or any sudo configuration snippets in /etc/sudoers.d/. BP28(R5) BP28(R59) 1 12 15 16 5 DSS05.04 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 CCI-002038 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 A.18.1.4 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 IA-11 CM-6(a) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-7 SRG-OS-000373-GPOS-00156 SRG-OS-000373-GPOS-00157 SRG-OS-000373-GPOS-00158 RHEL-08-010381 SV-230272r854027_rule Without re-authentication, users may access resources or perform tasks for which they do not have authorization. When operating systems provide the capability to escalate a functional capability, it is critical that the user re-authenticate. CCE-82202-3 - name: Find /etc/sudoers.d/ files ansible.builtin.find: paths: - /etc/sudoers.d/ register: sudoers tags: - CCE-82202-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010381 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-11 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudo_remove_no_authenticate - name: Remove lines containing !authenticate from sudoers files ansible.builtin.replace: regexp: (^(?!#).*[\s]+\!authenticate.*$) replace: '# \g<1>' path: '{{ item.path }}' validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s with_items: - path: /etc/sudoers - '{{ sudoers.files }}' tags: - CCE-82202-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010381 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-11 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudo_remove_no_authenticate for f in /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/* ; do if [ ! -e "$f" ] ; then continue fi matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]+\!authenticate.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do # comment out "!authenticate" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" /usr/sbin/visudo -cf $f &> /dev/null || echo "Fail to validate $f with visudo" fi done Ensure Users Re-Authenticate for Privilege Escalation - sudo NOPASSWD The sudo NOPASSWD tag, when specified, allows a user to execute commands using sudo without having to authenticate. This should be disabled by making sure that the NOPASSWD tag does not exist in /etc/sudoers configuration file or any sudo configuration snippets in /etc/sudoers.d/. This rule is disabled on Red Hat Virtualization Hosts and Managers, it will report not applicable. RHV requires to perform operations as root without being asked for password. BP28(R5) BP28(R59) 1 12 15 16 5 DSS05.04 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 CCI-002038 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 A.18.1.4 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 IA-11 CM-6(a) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-7 SRG-OS-000373-GPOS-00156 SRG-OS-000373-GPOS-00157 SRG-OS-000373-GPOS-00158 RHEL-08-010380 SV-230271r854026_rule Without re-authentication, users may access resources or perform tasks for which they do not have authorization. When operating systems provide the capability to escalate a functional capability, it is critical that the user re-authenticate. CCE-82197-5 - name: Find /etc/sudoers.d/ files ansible.builtin.find: paths: - /etc/sudoers.d/ register: sudoers tags: - CCE-82197-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010380 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-11 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudo_remove_nopasswd - name: Remove lines containing NOPASSWD from sudoers files ansible.builtin.replace: regexp: (^(?!#).*[\s]+NOPASSWD[\s]*\:.*$) replace: '# \g<1>' path: '{{ item.path }}' validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s with_items: - path: /etc/sudoers - '{{ sudoers.files }}' tags: - CCE-82197-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010380 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-11 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudo_remove_nopasswd for f in /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/* ; do if [ ! -e "$f" ] ; then continue fi matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]+NOPASSWD[\s]*\:.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do # comment out "NOPASSWD" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" /usr/sbin/visudo -cf $f &> /dev/null || echo "Fail to validate $f with visudo" fi done Ensure Users Re-Authenticate for Privilege Escalation - sudo The sudo NOPASSWD and !authenticate option, when specified, allows a user to execute commands using sudo without having to authenticate. This should be disabled by making sure that NOPASSWD and/or !authenticate do not exist in /etc/sudoers configuration file or any sudo configuration snippets in /etc/sudoers.d/." 1 12 15 16 5 DSS05.04 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 CCI-002038 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 A.18.1.4 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 IA-11 CM-6(a) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-7 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000373-GPOS-00156 4.3.4 4.3.5 Without re-authentication, users may access resources or perform tasks for which they do not have authorization. When operating systems provide the capability to escalate a functional capability, it is critical that the user re-authenticate. CCE-82279-1 - name: Find /etc/sudoers.d/ files ansible.builtin.find: paths: - /etc/sudoers.d/ register: sudoers tags: - CCE-82279-1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-11 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudo_require_authentication - name: Remove lines containing NOPASSWD from sudoers files ansible.builtin.replace: regexp: (^(?!#).*[\s]+NOPASSWD[\s]*\:.*$) replace: '# \g<1>' path: '{{ item.path }}' validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s with_items: - path: /etc/sudoers - '{{ sudoers.files }}' tags: - CCE-82279-1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-11 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudo_require_authentication - name: Find /etc/sudoers.d/ files ansible.builtin.find: paths: - /etc/sudoers.d/ register: sudoers tags: - CCE-82279-1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-11 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudo_require_authentication - name: Remove lines containing !authenticate from sudoers files ansible.builtin.replace: regexp: (^(?!#).*[\s]+\!authenticate.*$) replace: '# \g<1>' path: '{{ item.path }}' validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s with_items: - path: /etc/sudoers - '{{ sudoers.files }}' tags: - CCE-82279-1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-11 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudo_require_authentication for f in /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/* ; do if [ ! -e "$f" ] ; then continue fi matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]+NOPASSWD[\s]*\:.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do # comment out "NOPASSWD" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" /usr/sbin/visudo -cf $f &> /dev/null || echo "Fail to validate $f with visudo" fi done for f in /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/* ; do if [ ! -e "$f" ] ; then continue fi matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]+\!authenticate.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do # comment out "!authenticate" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" /usr/sbin/visudo -cf $f &> /dev/null || echo "Fail to validate $f with visudo" fi done Require Re-Authentication When Using the sudo Command The sudo timestamp_timeout tag sets the amount of time sudo password prompt waits. The default timestamp_timeout value is 5 minutes. The timestamp_timeout should be configured by making sure that the timestamp_timeout tag exists in /etc/sudoers configuration file or any sudo configuration snippets in /etc/sudoers.d/. If the value is set to an integer less than 0, the user's time stamp will not expire and the user will not have to re-authenticate for privileged actions until the user's session is terminated. CCI-002038 IA-11 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000373-GPOS-00156 SRG-OS-000373-GPOS-00157 SRG-OS-000373-GPOS-00158 RHEL-08-010384 4.3.6 SV-237643r861088_rule Without re-authentication, users may access resources or perform tasks for which they do not have authorization. When operating systems provide the capability to escalate a functional capability, it is critical that the user re-authenticate. CCE-87838-9 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-87838-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010384 - NIST-800-53-IA-11 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudo_require_reauthentication - name: XCCDF Value var_sudo_timestamp_timeout # promote to variable set_fact: var_sudo_timestamp_timeout: !!str tags: - always - name: Require Re-Authentication When Using the sudo Command - Find /etc/sudoers.d/* files containing 'Defaults timestamp_timeout' ansible.builtin.find: path: /etc/sudoers.d patterns: '*' contains: ^[\s]*Defaults\s.*\btimestamp_timeout[\s]*=.* register: sudoers_d_defaults_timestamp_timeout when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-87838-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010384 - NIST-800-53-IA-11 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudo_require_reauthentication - name: Require Re-Authentication When Using the sudo Command - Remove 'Defaults timestamp_timeout' from /etc/sudoers.d/* files ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*Defaults\s.*\btimestamp_timeout[\s]*=.* state: absent with_items: '{{ sudoers_d_defaults_timestamp_timeout.files }}' when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-87838-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010384 - NIST-800-53-IA-11 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudo_require_reauthentication - name: Require Re-Authentication When Using the sudo Command - Ensure timestamp_timeout has the appropriate value in /etc/sudoers ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/sudoers regexp: ^[\s]*Defaults\s(.*)\btimestamp_timeout[\s]*=[\s]*[-]?\w+\b(.*)$ line: Defaults \1timestamp_timeout={{ var_sudo_timestamp_timeout }}\2 validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s backrefs: true register: edit_sudoers_timestamp_timeout_option when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-87838-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010384 - NIST-800-53-IA-11 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudo_require_reauthentication - name: Require Re-Authentication When Using the sudo Command - Enable timestamp_timeout option with correct value in /etc/sudoers ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/sudoers line: Defaults timestamp_timeout={{ var_sudo_timestamp_timeout }} validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s when: - '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' - | edit_sudoers_timestamp_timeout_option is defined and not edit_sudoers_timestamp_timeout_option.changed tags: - CCE-87838-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010384 - NIST-800-53-IA-11 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudo_require_reauthentication - name: Require Re-Authentication When Using the sudo Command - Remove timestamp_timeout wrong values in /etc/sudoers ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/sudoers regexp: ^[\s]*Defaults\s.*\btimestamp_timeout[\s]*=[\s]*(?!{{ var_sudo_timestamp_timeout }}\b)[-]?\w+\b.*$ state: absent validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-87838-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010384 - NIST-800-53-IA-11 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudo_require_reauthentication # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q sudo; then var_sudo_timestamp_timeout='' if grep -Px '^[\s]*Defaults.*timestamp_timeout[\s]*=.*' /etc/sudoers.d/*; then find /etc/sudoers.d/ -type f -exec sed -Ei "/^[[:blank:]]*Defaults.*timestamp_timeout[[:blank:]]*=.*/d" {} \; fi if /usr/sbin/visudo -qcf /etc/sudoers; then cp /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.bak if ! grep -P '^[\s]*Defaults.*timestamp_timeout[\s]*=[\s]*[-]?\w+.*$' /etc/sudoers; then # sudoers file doesn't define Option timestamp_timeout echo "Defaults timestamp_timeout=${var_sudo_timestamp_timeout}" >> /etc/sudoers else # sudoers file defines Option timestamp_timeout, remediate wrong values if present if grep -qP "^[\s]*Defaults\s.*\btimestamp_timeout[\s]*=[\s]*(?!${var_sudo_timestamp_timeout}\b)[-]?\w+\b.*$" /etc/sudoers; then sed -Ei "s/(^[[:blank:]]*Defaults.*timestamp_timeout[[:blank:]]*=)[[:blank:]]*[-]?\w+(.*$)/\1${var_sudo_timestamp_timeout}\2/" /etc/sudoers fi fi # Check validity of sudoers and cleanup bak if /usr/sbin/visudo -qcf /etc/sudoers; then rm -f /etc/sudoers.bak else echo "Fail to validate remediated /etc/sudoers, reverting to original file." mv /etc/sudoers.bak /etc/sudoers false fi else echo "Skipping remediation, /etc/sudoers failed to validate" false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure only owner and members of group owner of /usr/bin/sudo can execute it Remove the execute permission bit of /etc/bin/sudo for the other users. To properly set the permissions of /usr/bin/sudo, run the command: $ sudo chmod 4110 /usr/bin/sudo BP28(R57) Restricting the set of users able to execute commands as privileged user reduces the attack surface. CCE-83574-4 - name: Test for existence /usr/bin/sudo stat: path: /usr/bin/sudo register: file_exists tags: - CCE-83574-4 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sudo_restrict_others_executable_permission - name: Ensure permission u-wr,g-wrs,o-xwrt on /usr/bin/sudo file: path: /usr/bin/sudo mode: u-wr,g-wrs,o-xwrt when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-83574-4 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sudo_restrict_others_executable_permission chmod u-wr,g-wrs,o-xwrt /usr/bin/sudo The operating system must restrict privilege elevation to authorized personnel The sudo command allows a user to execute programs with elevated (administrator) privileges. It prompts the user for their password and confirms your request to execute a command by checking a file, called sudoers. Restrict privileged actions by removing the following entries from the sudoers file: ALL ALL=(ALL) ALL ALL ALL=(ALL:ALL) ALL This rule doesn't come with a remediation, as the exact requirement allows exceptions, and removing lines from the sudoers file can make the system non-administrable. CCI-000366 CM-6(b) CM-6(iv) SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010382 SV-237641r646893_rule If the "sudoers" file is not configured correctly, any user defined on the system can initiate privileged actions on the target system. CCE-83425-9 Only the VDSM User Can Use sudo NOPASSWD The sudo NOPASSWD tag, when specified, allows a user to execute commands using sudo without having to authenticate. Only the vdsm user should have this capability in any sudo configuration snippets in /etc/sudoers.d/. Without re-authentication, users may access resources or perform tasks for which they do not have authorization. When operating systems provide the capability to escalate a functional capability, it is critical that the user re-authenticate. CCE-82365-8 Ensure sudo only includes the default configuration directory Administrators can configure authorized sudo users via drop-in files, and it is possible to include other directories and configuration files from the file currently being parsed. Make sure that /etc/sudoers only includes drop-in configuration files from /etc/sudoers.d, or that no drop-in file is included. Either the /etc/sudoers should contain only one #includedir directive pointing to /etc/sudoers.d, and no file in /etc/sudoers.d/ should include other files or directories; Or the /etc/sudoers should not contain any #include, @include, #includedir or @includedir directives. Note that the '#' character doesn't denote a comment in the configuration file. CCI-000366 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010379 SV-251711r833385_rule Some sudo configurtion options allow users to run programs without re-authenticating. Use of these configuration options makes it easier for one compromised accound to be used to compromise other accounts. CCE-86377-9 - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/sudoers create: false regexp: ^#includedir.*$ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes tags: - CCE-86377-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010379 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sudoers_default_includedir - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/sudoers lineinfile: path: /etc/sudoers create: false regexp: ^#includedir.*$ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 tags: - CCE-86377-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010379 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sudoers_default_includedir - name: Insert correct line into /etc/sudoers lineinfile: path: /etc/sudoers create: false regexp: ^#includedir.*$ line: '#includedir /etc/sudoers.d' state: present tags: - CCE-86377-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010379 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sudoers_default_includedir - name: Ensure sudoers doesn't include other non-default file lineinfile: path: /etc/sudoers create: false regexp: ^[#@]include[\s]+.*$ state: absent tags: - CCE-86377-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010379 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sudoers_default_includedir - name: Ensure sudoers doesn't have non-default includedir lineinfile: path: /etc/sudoers create: false regexp: ^@includedir[\s]+.*$ state: absent tags: - CCE-86377-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010379 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sudoers_default_includedir - name: Find out if /etc/sudoers.d/* files contain file or directory includes find: path: /etc/sudoers.d patterns: '*' contains: ^[#@]include(dir)?\s.*$ register: sudoers_d_includes tags: - CCE-86377-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010379 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sudoers_default_includedir - name: Remove found occurrences of file and directory includes from /etc/sudoers.d/* files lineinfile: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[#@]include(dir)?\s.*$ state: absent with_items: '{{ sudoers_d_includes.files }}' tags: - CCE-86377-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010379 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sudoers_default_includedir sudoers_config_file="/etc/sudoers" sudoers_config_dir="/etc/sudoers.d" sudoers_includedir_count=$(grep -c "#includedir" "$sudoers_config_file") if [ "$sudoers_includedir_count" -gt 1 ]; then sed -i "/#includedir/d" "$sudoers_config_file" echo "#includedir /etc/sudoers.d" >> "$sudoers_config_file" elif [ "$sudoers_includedir_count" -eq 0 ]; then echo "#includedir /etc/sudoers.d" >> "$sudoers_config_file" else if ! grep -q "^#includedir /etc/sudoers.d" "$sudoers_config_file"; then sed -i "s|^#includedir.*|#includedir /etc/sudoers.d|g" "$sudoers_config_file" fi fi sed -Ei "/^#include\s/d; /^@includedir\s/d" "$sudoers_config_file" if grep -Pr "^[#@]include(dir)?\s" "$sudoers_config_dir" ; then sed -Ei "/^[#@]include(dir)?\s/d" "$sudoers_config_dir"/* fi Explicit arguments in sudo specifications All commands in the sudoers file must strictly specify the arguments allowed to be used for a given user. If the command is supposed to be executed only without arguments, pass "" as an argument in the corresponding user specification. This rule doesn't come with a remediation, as absence of arguments in the user spec doesn't mean that the command is intended to be executed with no arguments. The rule can produce false findings when an argument contains a comma - sudoers syntax allows comma escaping using backslash, but the check doesn't support that. For example, root ALL=(ALL) echo 1\,2 allows root to execute echo 1,2, but the check would interpret it as two commands echo 1\ and 2. BP28(R63) Any argument can modify quite significantly the behavior of a program, whether regarding the realized operation (read, write, delete, etc.) or accessed resources (path in a file system tree). To avoid any possibility of misuse of a command by a user, the ambiguities must be removed at the level of its specification. For example, on some systems, the kernel messages are only accessible by root. If a user nevertheless must have the privileges to read them, the argument of the dmesg command has to be restricted in order to prevent the user from flushing the buffer through the -c option: user ALL = dmesg "" CCE-83632-0 Don't define allowed commands in sudoers by means of exclusion Policies applied by sudo through the sudoers file should not involve negation. Each user specification in the sudoers file contains a comma-delimited list of command specifications. The definition can make use glob patterns, as well as of negations. Indirect definition of those commands by means of exclusion of a set of commands is trivial to bypass, so it is not allowed to use such constructs. This rule doesn't come with a remediation, as negations indicate design issues with the sudoers user specifications design. Just removing negations doesn't increase the security - you typically have to rethink the definition of allowed commands to fix the issue. BP28(R61) Specifying access right using negation is inefficient and can be easily circumvented. For example, it is expected that a specification like # To avoid absolutely , this rule can be easily circumvented! user ALL = ALL ,!/ bin/sh prevents the execution of the shell but that’s not the case: just copy the binary /bin/sh to a different name to make it executable again through the rule keyword ALL. CCE-83518-1 Don't target root user in the sudoers file The targeted users of a user specification should be, as much as possible, non privileged users (i.e.: non-root). User specifications have to explicitly list the runas spec (i.e. the list of target users that can be impersonated), and ALL or root should not be used. This rule doesn't come with a remediation, as the exact requirement allows exceptions, and removing lines from the sudoers file can make the system non-administrable. It is common that the command to be executed does not require superuser rights (editing a file whose the owner is not root, sending a signal to an unprivileged process,etc.). In order to limit any attempt of privilege escalation through a command, it is better to apply normal user rights. CCE-83598-3 Ensure invoking users password for privilege escalation when using sudo The sudoers security policy requires that users authenticate themselves before they can use sudo. When sudoers requires authentication, it validates the invoking user's credentials. The expected output for: sudo cvtsudoers -f sudoers /etc/sudoers | grep -E '^Defaults !?(rootpw|targetpw|runaspw)$' Defaults !targetpw Defaults !rootpw Defaults !runaspw or if cvtsudoers not supported: sudo find /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d \( \! -name '*~' -a \! -name '*.*' \) -exec grep -E --with-filename '^[[:blank:]]*Defaults[[:blank:]](.*[[:blank:]])?!?\b(rootpw|targetpw|runaspw)' -- {} \; /etc/sudoers:Defaults !targetpw /etc/sudoers:Defaults !rootpw /etc/sudoers:Defaults !runaspw CCI-000366 CCI-002227 CM-6(b) CM-6.1(iv) SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010383 SV-237642r880727_rule If the rootpw, targetpw, or runaspw flags are defined and not disabled, by default the operating system will prompt the invoking user for the "root" user password. CCE-83422-6 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-83422-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010383 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudoers_validate_passwd - name: Find out if /etc/sudoers.d/* files contain Defaults targetpw to be deduplicated find: path: /etc/sudoers.d patterns: '*' contains: ^Defaults targetpw$ register: sudoers_d_defaults when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-83422-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010383 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudoers_validate_passwd - name: Remove found occurrences of Defaults targetpw from /etc/sudoers.d/* files lineinfile: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^Defaults targetpw$ state: absent with_items: '{{ sudoers_d_defaults.files }}' when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-83422-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010383 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudoers_validate_passwd - name: Find out if /etc/sudoers.d/* files contain Defaults rootpw to be deduplicated find: path: /etc/sudoers.d patterns: '*' contains: ^Defaults rootpw$ register: sudoers_d_defaults when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-83422-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010383 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudoers_validate_passwd - name: Remove found occurrences of Defaults rootpw from /etc/sudoers.d/* files lineinfile: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^Defaults rootpw$ state: absent with_items: '{{ sudoers_d_defaults.files }}' when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-83422-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010383 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudoers_validate_passwd - name: Find out if /etc/sudoers.d/* files contain Defaults runaspw to be deduplicated find: path: /etc/sudoers.d patterns: '*' contains: ^Defaults runaspw$ register: sudoers_d_defaults when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-83422-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010383 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudoers_validate_passwd - name: Remove found occurrences of Defaults runaspw from /etc/sudoers.d/* files lineinfile: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^Defaults runaspw$ state: absent with_items: '{{ sudoers_d_defaults.files }}' when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-83422-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010383 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudoers_validate_passwd - name: Remove any ocurrences of Defaults targetpw in /etc/sudoers lineinfile: path: /etc/sudoers regexp: ^Defaults targetpw$ validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s state: absent register: sudoers_file_defaults when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-83422-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010383 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudoers_validate_passwd - name: Remove any ocurrences of Defaults rootpw in /etc/sudoers lineinfile: path: /etc/sudoers regexp: ^Defaults rootpw$ validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s state: absent register: sudoers_file_defaults when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-83422-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010383 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudoers_validate_passwd - name: Remove any ocurrences of Defaults runaspw in /etc/sudoers lineinfile: path: /etc/sudoers regexp: ^Defaults runaspw$ validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s state: absent register: sudoers_file_defaults when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-83422-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010383 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudoers_validate_passwd - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/sudoers create: false regexp: ^Defaults !targetpw$ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-83422-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010383 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudoers_validate_passwd - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/sudoers lineinfile: path: /etc/sudoers create: false regexp: ^Defaults !targetpw$ state: absent when: - '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' - dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 tags: - CCE-83422-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010383 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudoers_validate_passwd - name: Insert correct line into /etc/sudoers lineinfile: path: /etc/sudoers create: false regexp: ^Defaults !targetpw$ line: Defaults !targetpw state: present when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-83422-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010383 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudoers_validate_passwd - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/sudoers create: false regexp: ^Defaults !rootpw$ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-83422-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010383 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudoers_validate_passwd - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/sudoers lineinfile: path: /etc/sudoers create: false regexp: ^Defaults !rootpw$ state: absent when: - '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' - dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 tags: - CCE-83422-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010383 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudoers_validate_passwd - name: Insert correct line into /etc/sudoers lineinfile: path: /etc/sudoers create: false regexp: ^Defaults !rootpw$ line: Defaults !rootpw state: present when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-83422-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010383 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudoers_validate_passwd - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/sudoers create: false regexp: ^Defaults !runaspw$ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-83422-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010383 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudoers_validate_passwd - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/sudoers lineinfile: path: /etc/sudoers create: false regexp: ^Defaults !runaspw$ state: absent when: - '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' - dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 tags: - CCE-83422-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010383 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudoers_validate_passwd - name: Insert correct line into /etc/sudoers lineinfile: path: /etc/sudoers create: false regexp: ^Defaults !runaspw$ line: Defaults !runaspw state: present when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-83422-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010383 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sudoers_validate_passwd # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q sudo; then if grep -x '^Defaults targetpw$' /etc/sudoers; then sed -i "/Defaults targetpw/d" /etc/sudoers \; fi if grep -x '^Defaults targetpw$' /etc/sudoers.d/*; then find /etc/sudoers.d/ -type f -exec sed -i "/Defaults targetpw/d" {} \; fi if grep -x '^Defaults rootpw$' /etc/sudoers; then sed -i "/Defaults rootpw/d" /etc/sudoers \; fi if grep -x '^Defaults rootpw$' /etc/sudoers.d/*; then find /etc/sudoers.d/ -type f -exec sed -i "/Defaults rootpw/d" {} \; fi if grep -x '^Defaults runaspw$' /etc/sudoers; then sed -i "/Defaults runaspw/d" /etc/sudoers \; fi if grep -x '^Defaults runaspw$' /etc/sudoers.d/*; then find /etc/sudoers.d/ -type f -exec sed -i "/Defaults runaspw/d" {} \; fi if [ -e "/etc/sudoers" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/Defaults !targetpw/d" "/etc/sudoers" else touch "/etc/sudoers" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/sudoers" cp "/etc/sudoers" "/etc/sudoers.bak" # Insert at the end of the file printf '%s\n' "Defaults !targetpw" >> "/etc/sudoers" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/sudoers.bak" if [ -e "/etc/sudoers" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/Defaults !rootpw/d" "/etc/sudoers" else touch "/etc/sudoers" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/sudoers" cp "/etc/sudoers" "/etc/sudoers.bak" # Insert at the end of the file printf '%s\n' "Defaults !rootpw" >> "/etc/sudoers" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/sudoers.bak" if [ -e "/etc/sudoers" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/Defaults !runaspw/d" "/etc/sudoers" else touch "/etc/sudoers" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/sudoers" cp "/etc/sudoers" "/etc/sudoers.bak" # Insert at the end of the file printf '%s\n' "Defaults !runaspw" >> "/etc/sudoers" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/sudoers.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi System Tooling / Utilities The following checks evaluate the system for recommended base packages -- both for installation and removal. Install binutils Package The binutils package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install binutils binutils is a collection of binary utilities required for foundational system operator activities, such as ld, nm, objcopy and readelf. CCE-82989-5 - name: Ensure binutils is installed package: name: binutils state: present tags: - CCE-82989-5 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_binutils_installed [[packages]] name = "binutils" version = "*" include install_binutils class install_binutils { package { 'binutils': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=binutils if ! rpm -q --quiet "binutils" ; then yum install -y "binutils" fi Install dnf-plugin-subscription-manager Package The dnf-plugin-subscription-manager package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install dnf-plugin-subscription-manager 0940 1144 1467 1472 1483 1493 1494 1495 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 FPT_TUD_EXT.2 SRG-OS-000366-GPOS-00153 This package provides plugins to interact with repositories and subscriptions from the Red Hat entitlement platform; contains subscription-manager and product-id plugins. CCE-82315-3 - name: Ensure dnf-plugin-subscription-manager is installed package: name: dnf-plugin-subscription-manager state: present tags: - CCE-82315-3 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_dnf-plugin-subscription-manager_installed [[packages]] name = "dnf-plugin-subscription-manager" version = "*" include install_dnf-plugin-subscription-manager class install_dnf-plugin-subscription-manager { package { 'dnf-plugin-subscription-manager': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=dnf-plugin-subscription-manager if ! rpm -q --quiet "dnf-plugin-subscription-manager" ; then yum install -y "dnf-plugin-subscription-manager" fi Ensure gnutls-utils is installed The gnutls-utils package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install gnutls-utils FIA_X509_EXT.1 FIA_X509_EXT.2 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 GnuTLS is a secure communications library implementing the SSL, TLS and DTLS protocols and technologies around them. It provides a simple C language application programming interface (API) to access the secure communications protocols as well as APIs to parse and write X.509, PKCS #12, OpenPGP and other required structures. This package contains command line TLS client and server and certificate manipulation tools. CCE-82395-5 - name: Ensure gnutls-utils is installed package: name: gnutls-utils state: present tags: - CCE-82395-5 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_gnutls-utils_installed [[packages]] name = "gnutls-utils" version = "*" include install_gnutls-utils class install_gnutls-utils { package { 'gnutls-utils': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=gnutls-utils if ! rpm -q --quiet "gnutls-utils" ; then yum install -y "gnutls-utils" fi Install libcap-ng-utils Package The libcap-ng-utils package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install libcap-ng-utils SRG-OS-000445-GPOS-00199 libcap-ng-utils contains applications to analyze the posix posix capabilities of all the programs running on a system. libcap-ng-utils also lets system operators set the file system based capabilities. CCE-82979-6 - name: Ensure libcap-ng-utils is installed package: name: libcap-ng-utils state: present tags: - CCE-82979-6 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_libcap-ng-utils_installed [[packages]] name = "libcap-ng-utils" version = "*" include install_libcap-ng-utils class install_libcap-ng-utils { package { 'libcap-ng-utils': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=libcap-ng-utils if ! rpm -q --quiet "libcap-ng-utils" ; then yum install -y "libcap-ng-utils" fi Ensure nss-tools is installed The nss-tools package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install nss-tools FMT_SMF_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 Network Security Services (NSS) is a set of libraries designed to support cross-platform development of security-enabled client and server applications. Install the nss-tools package to install command-line tools to manipulate the NSS certificate and key database. CCE-82396-3 - name: Ensure nss-tools is installed package: name: nss-tools state: present tags: - CCE-82396-3 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_nss-tools_installed [[packages]] name = "nss-tools" version = "*" include install_nss-tools class install_nss-tools { package { 'nss-tools': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=nss-tools if ! rpm -q --quiet "nss-tools" ; then yum install -y "nss-tools" fi Install openscap-scanner Package The openscap-scanner package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install openscap-scanner AGD_PRE.1 AGD_OPE.1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 SRG-OS-000191-GPOS-00080 openscap-scanner contains the oscap command line tool. This tool is a configuration and vulnerability scanner, capable of performing compliance checking using SCAP content. CCE-82220-5 - name: Ensure openscap-scanner is installed package: name: openscap-scanner state: present tags: - CCE-82220-5 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_openscap-scanner_installed [[packages]] name = "openscap-scanner" version = "*" include install_openscap-scanner class install_openscap-scanner { package { 'openscap-scanner': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=openscap-scanner if ! rpm -q --quiet "openscap-scanner" ; then yum install -y "openscap-scanner" fi Install rear Package The rear package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install rear rear contains the Relax-and-Recover (ReaR) utility. ReaR produces a bootable image of a system and restores from backup using this image. CCE-82883-0 - name: Ensure rear is installed package: name: rear state: present when: not ( ( ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" and ansible_distribution == 'OracleLinux' and ansible_distribution_version is version('9.0', '>=') ) or ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" and ansible_distribution == 'RedHat' and ansible_distribution_version is version('9.0', '>=') ) or ( ansible_distribution == 'RedHat' and ansible_distribution_version is version('8.4', '<=') and ansible_architecture == "s390x" ) ) ) tags: - CCE-82883-0 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_rear_installed [[packages]] name = "rear" version = "*" include install_rear class install_rear { package { 'rear': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=rear # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ! ( ( ( grep -q aarch64 /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease && grep -qP "^ID=[\"']?ol[\"']?$" "/etc/os-release" && { real="$(grep -P "^VERSION_ID=[\"']?[\w.]+[\"']?$" /etc/os-release | sed "s/^VERSION_ID=[\"']\?\([^\"']\+\)[\"']\?$/\1/")"; expected="9.0"; printf "%s\n%s" "$expected" "$real" | sort -VC; } ) || ( grep -q aarch64 /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease && grep -qP "^ID=[\"']?rhel[\"']?$" "/etc/os-release" && { real="$(grep -P "^VERSION_ID=[\"']?[\w.]+[\"']?$" /etc/os-release | sed "s/^VERSION_ID=[\"']\?\([^\"']\+\)[\"']\?$/\1/")"; expected="9.0"; printf "%s\n%s" "$expected" "$real" | sort -VC; } ) || ( grep -qP "^ID=[\"']?rhel[\"']?$" "/etc/os-release" && { real="$(grep -P "^VERSION_ID=[\"']?[\w.]+[\"']?$" /etc/os-release | sed "s/^VERSION_ID=[\"']\?\([^\"']\+\)[\"']\?$/\1/")"; expected="8.4"; printf "%s\n%s" "$real" "$expected" | sort -VC; } && grep -q s390x /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ) ) ); then if ! rpm -q --quiet "rear" ; then yum install -y "rear" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Install rng-tools Package The rng-tools package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install rng-tools CCI-000366 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010472 SV-244527r743830_rule rng-tools provides hardware random number generator tools, such as those used in the formation of x509/PKI certificates. CCE-82968-9 - name: Ensure rng-tools is installed package: name: rng-tools state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82968-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010472 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_rng-tools_installed [[packages]] name = "rng-tools" version = "*" include install_rng-tools class install_rng-tools { package { 'rng-tools': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=rng-tools # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "rng-tools" ; then yum install -y "rng-tools" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Install scap-security-guide Package The scap-security-guide package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install scap-security-guide AGD_PRE.1 AGD_OPE.1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 The scap-security-guide package provides a guide for configuration of the system from the final system's security point of view. The guidance is specified in the Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) format and constitutes a catalog of practical hardening advice, linked to government requirements where applicable. The SCAP Security Guide project bridges the gap between generalized policy requirements and specific implementation guidelines. A system administrator can use the oscap CLI tool from the openscap-scanner package, or the SCAP Workbench GUI tool from the scap-workbench package, to verify that the system conforms to provided guidelines. Refer to the scap-security-guide(8) manual page for futher information. CCE-82949-9 - name: Ensure scap-security-guide is installed package: name: scap-security-guide state: present tags: - CCE-82949-9 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_scap-security-guide_installed [[packages]] name = "scap-security-guide" version = "*" include install_scap-security-guide class install_scap-security-guide { package { 'scap-security-guide': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=scap-security-guide if ! rpm -q --quiet "scap-security-guide" ; then yum install -y "scap-security-guide" fi Install subscription-manager Package The subscription-manager package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install subscription-manager 0940 1144 1467 1472 1483 1493 1494 1495 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 FPT_TUD_EXT.2 SRG-OS-000366-GPOS-00153 Red Hat Subscription Manager is a local service which tracks installed products and subscriptions on a local system to help manage subscription assignments. It communicates with the backend subscription service (the Customer Portal or an on-premise server such as Subscription Asset Manager) and works with content management tools such as . CCE-82316-1 - name: Ensure subscription-manager is installed package: name: subscription-manager state: present tags: - CCE-82316-1 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_subscription-manager_installed [[packages]] name = "subscription-manager" version = "*" include install_subscription-manager class install_subscription-manager { package { 'subscription-manager': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=subscription-manager if ! rpm -q --quiet "subscription-manager" ; then yum install -y "subscription-manager" fi Install tar Package The tar package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install tar The GNU tar program saves many files together into one archive and can restore individual files (or all of the files) from the archive. tar includes multivolume support, automatic archive compression/decompression, the the ability to perform incremental and full backups. If CCE-82965-5 - name: Ensure tar is installed package: name: tar state: present tags: - CCE-82965-5 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_tar_installed [[packages]] name = "tar" version = "*" include install_tar class install_tar { package { 'tar': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=tar if ! rpm -q --quiet "tar" ; then yum install -y "tar" fi Install vim Package The vim-enhanced package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install vim-enhanced Vim (Vi IMproved) is an almost compatible version of the UNIX editor vi. CCE-82956-4 - name: Ensure vim-enhanced is installed package: name: vim-enhanced state: present tags: - CCE-82956-4 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_vim_installed [[packages]] name = "vim-enhanced" version = "*" include install_vim-enhanced class install_vim-enhanced { package { 'vim-enhanced': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=vim-enhanced if ! rpm -q --quiet "vim-enhanced" ; then yum install -y "vim-enhanced" fi Uninstall abrt-addon-ccpp Package The abrt-addon-ccpp package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase abrt-addon-ccpp CCI-000381 SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 RHEL-08-040001 SV-230488r627750_rule abrt-addon-ccpp contains hooks for C/C++ crashed programs and abrt's C/C++ analyzer plugin. CCE-82919-2 - name: Ensure abrt-addon-ccpp is removed package: name: abrt-addon-ccpp state: absent tags: - CCE-82919-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040001 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_abrt-addon-ccpp_removed include remove_abrt-addon-ccpp class remove_abrt-addon-ccpp { package { 'abrt-addon-ccpp': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=abrt-addon-ccpp # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove abrt-addon-ccpp # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on abrt-addon-ccpp. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "abrt-addon-ccpp" ; then yum remove -y "abrt-addon-ccpp" fi Uninstall abrt-addon-kerneloops Package The abrt-addon-kerneloops package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase abrt-addon-kerneloops CCI-000381 SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 RHEL-08-040001 SV-230488r627750_rule abrt-addon-kerneloops contains plugins for collecting kernel crash information and reporter plugin which sends this information to a specified server, usually to kerneloops.org. CCE-82926-7 - name: Ensure abrt-addon-kerneloops is removed package: name: abrt-addon-kerneloops state: absent tags: - CCE-82926-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040001 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_abrt-addon-kerneloops_removed include remove_abrt-addon-kerneloops class remove_abrt-addon-kerneloops { package { 'abrt-addon-kerneloops': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=abrt-addon-kerneloops # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove abrt-addon-kerneloops # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on abrt-addon-kerneloops. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "abrt-addon-kerneloops" ; then yum remove -y "abrt-addon-kerneloops" fi Uninstall abrt-cli Package The abrt-cli package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase abrt-cli CCI-000381 SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 RHEL-08-040001 SV-230488r627750_rule abrt-cli contains a command line client for controlling abrt daemon over sockets. CCE-82907-7 - name: Ensure abrt-cli is removed package: name: abrt-cli state: absent tags: - CCE-82907-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040001 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_abrt-cli_removed include remove_abrt-cli class remove_abrt-cli { package { 'abrt-cli': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=abrt-cli # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove abrt-cli # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on abrt-cli. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "abrt-cli" ; then yum remove -y "abrt-cli" fi Uninstall abrt-plugin-logger Package The abrt-plugin-logger package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase abrt-plugin-logger CCI-000381 SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 abrt-plugin-logger is an ABRT plugin which writes a report to a specified file. CCE-82913-5 - name: Ensure abrt-plugin-logger is removed package: name: abrt-plugin-logger state: absent tags: - CCE-82913-5 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_abrt-plugin-logger_removed include remove_abrt-plugin-logger class remove_abrt-plugin-logger { package { 'abrt-plugin-logger': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=abrt-plugin-logger # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove abrt-plugin-logger # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on abrt-plugin-logger. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "abrt-plugin-logger" ; then yum remove -y "abrt-plugin-logger" fi Uninstall abrt-plugin-rhtsupport Package The abrt-plugin-rhtsupport package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase abrt-plugin-rhtsupport CCI-000381 SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 abrt-plugin-rhtsupport is a ABRT plugin to report bugs into the Red Hat Support system. CCE-82916-8 - name: Ensure abrt-plugin-rhtsupport is removed package: name: abrt-plugin-rhtsupport state: absent tags: - CCE-82916-8 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_abrt-plugin-rhtsupport_removed include remove_abrt-plugin-rhtsupport class remove_abrt-plugin-rhtsupport { package { 'abrt-plugin-rhtsupport': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=abrt-plugin-rhtsupport # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove abrt-plugin-rhtsupport # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on abrt-plugin-rhtsupport. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "abrt-plugin-rhtsupport" ; then yum remove -y "abrt-plugin-rhtsupport" fi Uninstall abrt-plugin-sosreport Package The abrt-plugin-sosreport package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase abrt-plugin-sosreport CCI-000381 SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 RHEL-08-040001 SV-230488r627750_rule abrt-plugin-sosreport provides a plugin to include an sosreport in an ABRT report. CCE-82910-1 - name: Ensure abrt-plugin-sosreport is removed package: name: abrt-plugin-sosreport state: absent tags: - CCE-82910-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040001 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_abrt-plugin-sosreport_removed include remove_abrt-plugin-sosreport class remove_abrt-plugin-sosreport { package { 'abrt-plugin-sosreport': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=abrt-plugin-sosreport # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove abrt-plugin-sosreport # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on abrt-plugin-sosreport. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "abrt-plugin-sosreport" ; then yum remove -y "abrt-plugin-sosreport" fi Uninstall geolite2-city Package The geolite2-city package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase geolite2-city geolite2-city is part of the GeoLite2 database packages, offering geolocation databases and tooling. CCE-82939-0 - name: Ensure geolite2-city is removed package: name: geolite2-city state: absent tags: - CCE-82939-0 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_geolite2-city_removed include remove_geolite2-city class remove_geolite2-city { package { 'geolite2-city': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=geolite2-city # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove geolite2-city # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on geolite2-city. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "geolite2-city" ; then yum remove -y "geolite2-city" fi Uninstall geolite2-country Package The geolite2-country package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase geolite2-country geolite2-country is part of the GeoLite2 database packages, offering geolocation databases and tooling. CCE-82936-6 - name: Ensure geolite2-country is removed package: name: geolite2-country state: absent tags: - CCE-82936-6 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_geolite2-country_removed include remove_geolite2-country class remove_geolite2-country { package { 'geolite2-country': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=geolite2-country # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove geolite2-country # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on geolite2-country. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "geolite2-country" ; then yum remove -y "geolite2-country" fi Uninstall gssproxy Package The gssproxy package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase gssproxy This rule is disabled on Red Hat Virtualization Hosts and Managers, it will report not applicable. RHV uses NFS storage, which has dependency on gssproxy. CCI-000381 CCI-000366 SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040370 SV-230559r646887_rule gssproxy is a proxy for GSS API credential handling. CCE-82943-2 - name: Ensure gssproxy is removed package: name: gssproxy state: absent tags: - CCE-82943-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040370 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_gssproxy_removed include remove_gssproxy class remove_gssproxy { package { 'gssproxy': ensure => 'purged', } } # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove gssproxy # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on gssproxy. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "gssproxy" ; then yum remove -y "gssproxy" fi Uninstall iprutils Package The iprutils package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase iprutils CCI-000366 SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040380 SV-230560r627750_rule iprutils provides a suite of utlilities to manage and configure SCSI devices supported by the ipr SCSI storage device driver. CCE-82946-5 - name: Ensure iprutils is removed package: name: iprutils state: absent tags: - CCE-82946-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040380 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_iprutils_removed include remove_iprutils class remove_iprutils { package { 'iprutils': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=iprutils # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove iprutils # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on iprutils. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "iprutils" ; then yum remove -y "iprutils" fi Uninstall krb5-workstation Package The krb5-workstation package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase krb5-workstation This rule is disabled on Red Hat Virtualization Hosts and Managers, it will report not applicable. RHV hosts require ipa-client package, which has dependency on krb5-workstation. CCI-000803 SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 SRG-OS-000120-GPOS-00061 RHEL-08-010162 SV-230239r646864_rule Kerberos is a network authentication system. The krb5-workstation package contains the basic Kerberos programs (kinit, klist, kdestroy, kpasswd). CCE-82931-7 - name: Ensure krb5-workstation is removed package: name: krb5-workstation state: absent tags: - CCE-82931-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010162 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_krb5-workstation_removed include remove_krb5-workstation class remove_krb5-workstation { package { 'krb5-workstation': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=krb5-workstation # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove krb5-workstation # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on krb5-workstation. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "krb5-workstation" ; then yum remove -y "krb5-workstation" fi Uninstall libreport-plugin-logger Package The libreport-plugin-logger package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase libreport-plugin-logger CCI-000381 SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 RHEL-08-040001 SV-230488r627750_rule libreport-plugin-logger is a ABRT plugin to report bugs into the Red Hat Support system. CCE-89201-8 - name: Ensure libreport-plugin-logger is removed package: name: libreport-plugin-logger state: absent tags: - CCE-89201-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040001 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_libreport-plugin-logger_removed include remove_libreport-plugin-logger class remove_libreport-plugin-logger { package { 'libreport-plugin-logger': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=libreport-plugin-logger # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove libreport-plugin-logger # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on libreport-plugin-logger. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "libreport-plugin-logger" ; then yum remove -y "libreport-plugin-logger" fi Uninstall libreport-plugin-rhtsupport Package The libreport-plugin-rhtsupport package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase libreport-plugin-rhtsupport CCI-000381 SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 RHEL-08-040001 SV-230488r627750_rule libreport-plugin-rhtsupport is a ABRT plugin to report bugs into the Red Hat Support system. CCE-88955-0 - name: Ensure libreport-plugin-rhtsupport is removed package: name: libreport-plugin-rhtsupport state: absent tags: - CCE-88955-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040001 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_libreport-plugin-rhtsupport_removed include remove_libreport-plugin-rhtsupport class remove_libreport-plugin-rhtsupport { package { 'libreport-plugin-rhtsupport': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=libreport-plugin-rhtsupport # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove libreport-plugin-rhtsupport # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on libreport-plugin-rhtsupport. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "libreport-plugin-rhtsupport" ; then yum remove -y "libreport-plugin-rhtsupport" fi Uninstall pigz Package The pigz package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase pigz SRG-OS-000433-GPOS-00192 Binaries shipped in pigz package in Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 have not been compiled using recommended compiler flags. The binaries are compiled without sufficient stack protection and its address space layout randomization (ASLR) is weak. CCE-82397-1 - name: Ensure pigz is removed package: name: pigz state: absent tags: - CCE-82397-1 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_pigz_removed include remove_pigz class remove_pigz { package { 'pigz': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=pigz # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove pigz # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on pigz. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "pigz" ; then yum remove -y "pigz" fi Uninstall python3-abrt-addon Package The python3-abrt-addon package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase python3-abrt-addon CCI-000381 SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 RHEL-08-040001 SV-230488r627750_rule python3-abrt-addon contains python hook and python analyzer plugin for handling uncaught exceptions in python programs. CCE-86084-1 - name: Ensure python3-abrt-addon is removed package: name: python3-abrt-addon state: absent tags: - CCE-86084-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040001 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_python3-abrt-addon_removed include remove_python3-abrt-addon class remove_python3-abrt-addon { package { 'python3-abrt-addon': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=python3-abrt-addon # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove python3-abrt-addon # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on python3-abrt-addon. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "python3-abrt-addon" ; then yum remove -y "python3-abrt-addon" fi Uninstall tuned Package The tuned package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase tuned This rule is disabled on Red Hat Virtualization Hosts and Managers, it will report not applicable. RHV requires tuned package for tuning profiles that can enhance virtualization performance. CCI-000366 SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040390 SV-230561r627750_rule tuned contains a daemon that tunes the system settings dynamically. It does so by monitoring the usage of several system components periodically. Based on that information, components will then be put into lower or higher power savings modes to adapt to the current usage. CCE-82904-4 - name: Ensure tuned is removed package: name: tuned state: absent tags: - CCE-82904-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040390 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_tuned_removed include remove_tuned class remove_tuned { package { 'tuned': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=tuned # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove tuned # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on tuned. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "tuned" ; then yum remove -y "tuned" fi Updating Software The yum command line tool is used to install and update software packages. The system also provides a graphical software update tool in the System menu, in the Administration submenu, called Software Update. Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 systems contain an installed software catalog called the RPM database, which records metadata of installed packages. Consistently using yum or the graphical Software Update for all software installation allows for insight into the current inventory of installed software on the system. Install dnf-automatic Package The dnf-automatic package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install dnf-automatic BP28(R8) SRG-OS-000191-GPOS-00080 dnf-automatic is an alternative command line interface (CLI) to dnf upgrade suitable for automatic, regular execution. CCE-82985-3 - name: Ensure dnf-automatic is installed package: name: dnf-automatic state: present tags: - CCE-82985-3 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_dnf-automatic_installed [[packages]] name = "dnf-automatic" version = "*" include install_dnf-automatic class install_dnf-automatic { package { 'dnf-automatic': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=dnf-automatic if ! rpm -q --quiet "dnf-automatic" ; then yum install -y "dnf-automatic" fi Ensure yum Removes Previous Package Versions yum should be configured to remove previous software components after new versions have been installed. To configure yum to remove the previous software components after updating, set the clean_requirements_on_remove to 1 in /etc/yum.conf. 18 20 4 APO12.01 APO12.02 APO12.03 APO12.04 BAI03.10 DSS05.01 DSS05.02 3.4.8 CCI-002617 4.2.3 4.2.3.12 4.2.3.7 4.2.3.9 A.12.6.1 A.14.2.3 A.16.1.3 A.18.2.2 A.18.2.3 SI-2(6) CM-11(a) CM-11(b) CM-6(a) ID.RA-1 PR.IP-12 SRG-OS-000437-GPOS-00194 RHEL-08-010440 SV-230281r854034_rule Previous versions of software components that are not removed from the information system after updates have been installed may be exploited by some adversaries. CCE-82476-3 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-82476-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010440 - NIST-800-171-3.4.8 - NIST-800-53-CM-11(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-11(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SI-2(6) - clean_components_post_updating - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure yum Removes Previous Package Versions - Ensure YUM Removes Previous Package Versions ansible.builtin.lineinfile: dest: /etc/yum.conf regexp: ^#?clean_requirements_on_remove line: clean_requirements_on_remove=1 insertafter: \[main\] create: true when: '"yum" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-82476-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010440 - NIST-800-171-3.4.8 - NIST-800-53-CM-11(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-11(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SI-2(6) - clean_components_post_updating - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q yum; then if grep --silent ^clean_requirements_on_remove /etc/yum.conf ; then sed -i "s/^clean_requirements_on_remove.*/clean_requirements_on_remove=1/g" /etc/yum.conf else echo -e "\n# Set clean_requirements_on_remove to 1 per security requirements" >> /etc/yum.conf echo "clean_requirements_on_remove=1" >> /etc/yum.conf fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure dnf-automatic to Install Available Updates Automatically To ensure that the packages comprising the available updates will be automatically installed by dnf-automatic, set apply_updates to yes under [commands] section in /etc/dnf/automatic.conf. BP28(R8) 0940 1144 1467 1472 1483 1493 1494 1495 SI-2(5) CM-6(a) SI-2(c) FMT_SMF_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000191-GPOS-00080 Installing software updates is a fundamental mitigation against the exploitation of publicly-known vulnerabilities. If the most recent security patches and updates are not installed, unauthorized users may take advantage of weaknesses in the unpatched software. The lack of prompt attention to patching could result in a system compromise. The automated installation of updates ensures that recent security patches are applied in a timely manner. CCE-82494-6 - name: Configure dnf-automatic to Install Available Updates Automatically ini_file: dest: /etc/dnf/automatic.conf section: commands option: apply_updates value: 'yes' create: true tags: - CCE-82494-6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SI-2(5) - NIST-800-53-SI-2(c) - dnf-automatic_apply_updates - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy found=false # set value in all files if they contain section or key for f in $(echo -n "/etc/dnf/automatic.conf"); do if [ ! -e "$f" ]; then continue fi # find key in section and change value if grep -qzosP "[[:space:]]*\[commands\]([^\n\[]*\n+)+?[[:space:]]*apply_updates" "$f"; then sed -i "s/apply_updates[^(\n)]*/apply_updates = yes/" "$f" found=true # find section and add key = value to it elif grep -qs "[[:space:]]*\[commands\]" "$f"; then sed -i "/[[:space:]]*\[commands\]/a apply_updates = yes" "$f" found=true fi done # if section not in any file, append section with key = value to FIRST file in files parameter if ! $found ; then file=$(echo "/etc/dnf/automatic.conf" | cut -f1 -d ' ') mkdir -p "$(dirname "$file")" echo -e "[commands]\napply_updates = yes" >> "$file" fi Configure dnf-automatic to Install Only Security Updates To configure dnf-automatic to install only security updates automatically, set upgrade_type to security under [commands] section in /etc/dnf/automatic.conf. BP28(R8) SI-2(5) CM-6(a) SI-2(c) FMT_SMF_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000191-GPOS-00080 By default, dnf-automatic installs all available updates. Reducing the amount of updated packages only to updates that were issued as a part of a security advisory increases the system stability. CCE-82267-6 - name: Configure dnf-automatic to Install Only Security Updates ini_file: dest: /etc/dnf/automatic.conf section: commands option: upgrade_type value: security create: true tags: - CCE-82267-6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SI-2(5) - NIST-800-53-SI-2(c) - dnf-automatic_security_updates_only - low_complexity - low_severity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy found=false # set value in all files if they contain section or key for f in $(echo -n "/etc/dnf/automatic.conf"); do if [ ! -e "$f" ]; then continue fi # find key in section and change value if grep -qzosP "[[:space:]]*\[commands\]([^\n\[]*\n+)+?[[:space:]]*upgrade_type" "$f"; then sed -i "s/upgrade_type[^(\n)]*/upgrade_type = security/" "$f" found=true # find section and add key = value to it elif grep -qs "[[:space:]]*\[commands\]" "$f"; then sed -i "/[[:space:]]*\[commands\]/a upgrade_type = security" "$f" found=true fi done # if section not in any file, append section with key = value to FIRST file in files parameter if ! $found ; then file=$(echo "/etc/dnf/automatic.conf" | cut -f1 -d ' ') mkdir -p "$(dirname "$file")" echo -e "[commands]\nupgrade_type = security" >> "$file" fi Ensure gpgcheck Enabled In Main yum Configuration The gpgcheck option controls whether RPM packages' signatures are always checked prior to installation. To configure yum to check package signatures before installing them, ensure the following line appears in /etc/yum.conf in the [main] section: gpgcheck=1 BP28(R15) 11 2 3 9 5.10.4.1 APO01.06 BAI03.05 BAI06.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS06.02 3.4.8 CCI-001749 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.312(b) 164.312(c)(1) 164.312(c)(2) 164.312(e)(2)(i) 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 4.3.4.4.4 SR 3.1 SR 3.3 SR 3.4 SR 3.8 SR 7.6 A.11.2.4 A.12.1.2 A.12.2.1 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 CM-5(3) SI-7 SC-12 SC-12(3) CM-6(a) SA-12 SA-12(10) CM-11(a) CM-11(b) PR.DS-6 PR.DS-8 PR.IP-1 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Req-6.2 6.3.3 SRG-OS-000366-GPOS-00153 RHEL-08-010370 1.2.2 SV-230264r880711_rule Changes to any software components can have significant effects on the overall security of the operating system. This requirement ensures the software has not been tampered with and that it has been provided by a trusted vendor. Accordingly, patches, service packs, device drivers, or operating system components must be signed with a certificate recognized and approved by the organization. Verifying the authenticity of the software prior to installation validates the integrity of the patch or upgrade received from a vendor. This ensures the software has not been tampered with and that it has been provided by a trusted vendor. Self-signed certificates are disallowed by this requirement. Certificates used to verify the software must be from an approved Certificate Authority (CA). CCE-80790-9 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80790-9 - CJIS-5.10.4.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010370 - NIST-800-171-3.4.8 - NIST-800-53-CM-11(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-11(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(3) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SA-12 - NIST-800-53-SA-12(10) - NIST-800-53-SC-12 - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) - NIST-800-53-SI-7 - PCI-DSS-Req-6.2 - PCI-DSSv4-6.3.3 - configure_strategy - ensure_gpgcheck_globally_activated - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure GPG check is globally activated ini_file: dest: /etc/yum.conf section: main option: gpgcheck value: 1 no_extra_spaces: true create: false when: '"yum" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80790-9 - CJIS-5.10.4.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010370 - NIST-800-171-3.4.8 - NIST-800-53-CM-11(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-11(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(3) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SA-12 - NIST-800-53-SA-12(10) - NIST-800-53-SC-12 - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) - NIST-800-53-SI-7 - PCI-DSS-Req-6.2 - PCI-DSSv4-6.3.3 - configure_strategy - ensure_gpgcheck_globally_activated - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q yum; then # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^gpgcheck") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "1" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^gpgcheck\\>" "/etc/yum.conf"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^gpgcheck\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/yum.conf" else if [[ -s "/etc/yum.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/yum.conf" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/yum.conf" fi cce="CCE-80790-9" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "/etc/yum.conf" >> "/etc/yum.conf" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/yum.conf" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure gpgcheck Enabled for Local Packages yum should be configured to verify the signature(s) of local packages prior to installation. To configure yum to verify signatures of local packages, set the localpkg_gpgcheck to 1 in /etc/yum.conf. BP28(R15) 11 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 3.4.8 CCI-001749 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.312(b) 164.312(c)(1) 164.312(c)(2) 164.312(e)(2)(i) 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 CM-11(a) CM-11(b) CM-6(a) CM-5(3) SA-12 SA-12(10) PR.IP-1 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 FPT_TUD_EXT.2 SRG-OS-000366-GPOS-00153 RHEL-08-010371 SV-230265r877463_rule Changes to any software components can have significant effects to the overall security of the operating system. This requirement ensures the software has not been tampered and has been provided by a trusted vendor. Accordingly, patches, service packs, device drivers, or operating system components must be signed with a certificate recognized and approved by the organization. CCE-80791-7 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80791-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010371 - NIST-800-171-3.4.8 - NIST-800-53-CM-11(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-11(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(3) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SA-12 - NIST-800-53-SA-12(10) - ensure_gpgcheck_local_packages - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Ensure GPG check Enabled for Local Packages (yum) block: - name: Check stats of yum stat: path: /etc/yum.conf register: pkg - name: Check if config file of yum is a symlink ansible.builtin.set_fact: pkg_config_file_symlink: '{{ pkg.stat.lnk_target if pkg.stat.lnk_target is match("^/.*") else "/etc/yum.conf" | dirname ~ "/" ~ pkg.stat.lnk_target }}' when: pkg.stat.lnk_target is defined - name: Ensure GPG check Enabled for Local Packages (yum) ini_file: dest: '{{ pkg_config_file_symlink | default("/etc/yum.conf") }}' section: main option: localpkg_gpgcheck value: 1 no_extra_spaces: true create: true when: '"yum" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80791-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010371 - NIST-800-171-3.4.8 - NIST-800-53-CM-11(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-11(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(3) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SA-12 - NIST-800-53-SA-12(10) - ensure_gpgcheck_local_packages - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q yum; then # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^localpkg_gpgcheck") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "1" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^localpkg_gpgcheck\\>" "/etc/yum.conf"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^localpkg_gpgcheck\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/yum.conf" else if [[ -s "/etc/yum.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/yum.conf" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/yum.conf" fi cce="CCE-80791-7" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "/etc/yum.conf" >> "/etc/yum.conf" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/yum.conf" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure gpgcheck Enabled for All yum Package Repositories To ensure signature checking is not disabled for any repos, remove any lines from files in /etc/yum.repos.d of the form: gpgcheck=0 BP28(R15) 11 2 3 9 5.10.4.1 APO01.06 BAI03.05 BAI06.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS06.02 3.4.8 CCI-001749 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.312(b) 164.312(c)(1) 164.312(c)(2) 164.312(e)(2)(i) 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 4.3.4.4.4 SR 3.1 SR 3.3 SR 3.4 SR 3.8 SR 7.6 A.11.2.4 A.12.1.2 A.12.2.1 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 CM-5(3) SI-7 SC-12 SC-12(3) CM-6(a) SA-12 SA-12(10) CM-11(a) CM-11(b) PR.DS-6 PR.DS-8 PR.IP-1 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Req-6.2 6.3.3 SRG-OS-000366-GPOS-00153 RHEL-08-010370 SV-230264r880711_rule Verifying the authenticity of the software prior to installation validates the integrity of the patch or upgrade received from a vendor. This ensures the software has not been tampered with and that it has been provided by a trusted vendor. Self-signed certificates are disallowed by this requirement. Certificates used to verify the software must be from an approved Certificate Authority (CA)." CCE-80792-5 - name: Grep for yum repo section names shell: | set -o pipefail grep -HEr '^\[.+\]' -r /etc/yum.repos.d/ register: repo_grep_results failed_when: repo_grep_results.rc not in [0, 1] changed_when: false tags: - CCE-80792-5 - CJIS-5.10.4.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010370 - NIST-800-171-3.4.8 - NIST-800-53-CM-11(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-11(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(3) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SA-12 - NIST-800-53-SA-12(10) - NIST-800-53-SC-12 - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) - NIST-800-53-SI-7 - PCI-DSS-Req-6.2 - PCI-DSSv4-6.3.3 - enable_strategy - ensure_gpgcheck_never_disabled - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - name: Set gpgcheck=1 for each yum repo ini_file: path: '{{ item[0] }}' section: '{{ item[1] }}' option: gpgcheck value: '1' no_extra_spaces: true loop: '{{ repo_grep_results.stdout |regex_findall( ''(.+\.repo):\[(.+)\]\n?'' ) if repo_grep_results is not skipped else []}}' when: repo_grep_results is not skipped tags: - CCE-80792-5 - CJIS-5.10.4.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010370 - NIST-800-171-3.4.8 - NIST-800-53-CM-11(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-11(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(3) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SA-12 - NIST-800-53-SA-12(10) - NIST-800-53-SC-12 - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) - NIST-800-53-SI-7 - PCI-DSS-Req-6.2 - PCI-DSSv4-6.3.3 - enable_strategy - ensure_gpgcheck_never_disabled - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed sed -i 's/gpgcheck\s*=.*/gpgcheck=1/g' /etc/yum.repos.d/* Ensure gpgcheck Enabled for Repository Metadata Verify the operating system prevents the installation of patches, service packs, device drivers, or operating system components of local packages without verification of the repository metadata. Check that yum verifies the repository metadata prior to install with the following command. This should be configured by setting repo_gpgcheck to 1 in /etc/yum.conf. 11 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 CCI-001749 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.312(b) 164.312(c)(1) 164.312(c)(2) 164.312(e)(2)(i) 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 CM-5(3) SI-7 SC-12 SC-12(3) CM-6(a) SA-12 SA-12(10) CM-11(a) CM-11(b) PR.IP-1 SRG-OS-000366-GPOS-00153 Changes to any software components can have significant effects to the overall security of the operating system. This requirement ensures the software has not been tampered and has been provided by a trusted vendor. Accordingly, patches, service packs, device drivers, or operating system components must be signed with a certificate recognized and approved by the organization. Verifying the authenticity of the software prior to installation validates the integrity of the patch or upgrade received from a vendor. This ensures the software has not been tampered with and that it has been provided by a trusted vendor. Self-signed certificates are disallowed by this requirement. The operating system should not have to verify the software again. NOTE: For U.S. Military systems, this requirement does not mandate DoD certificates for this purpose; however, the certificate used to verify the software must be from an approved Certificate Authority. CCE-80793-3 Ensure Red Hat GPG Key Installed To ensure the system can cryptographically verify base software packages come from Red Hat (and to connect to the Red Hat Network to receive them), the Red Hat GPG key must properly be installed. To install the Red Hat GPG key, run: $ sudo subscription-manager register If the system is not connected to the Internet or an RHN Satellite, then install the Red Hat GPG key from trusted media such as the Red Hat installation CD-ROM or DVD. Assuming the disc is mounted in /media/cdrom, use the following command as the root user to import it into the keyring: $ sudo rpm --import /media/cdrom/RPM-GPG-KEY Alternatively, the key may be pre-loaded during the RHEL installation. In such cases, the key can be installed by running the following command: sudo rpm --import /etc/pki/rpm-gpg/RPM-GPG-KEY-redhat-release BP28(R15) 11 2 3 9 5.10.4.1 APO01.06 BAI03.05 BAI06.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS06.02 3.4.8 CCI-001749 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.312(b) 164.312(c)(1) 164.312(c)(2) 164.312(e)(2)(i) 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 4.3.4.4.4 SR 3.1 SR 3.3 SR 3.4 SR 3.8 SR 7.6 A.11.2.4 A.12.1.2 A.12.2.1 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 CIP-003-8 R4.2 CIP-003-8 R6 CIP-007-3 R4 CIP-007-3 R4.1 CIP-007-3 R4.2 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CM-5(3) SI-7 SC-12 SC-12(3) CM-6(a) PR.DS-6 PR.DS-8 PR.IP-1 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Req-6.2 6.3.3 SRG-OS-000366-GPOS-00153 RHEL-08-010019 1.2.1 SV-256973r902752_rule Changes to software components can have significant effects on the overall security of the operating system. This requirement ensures the software has not been tampered with and that it has been provided by a trusted vendor. The Red Hat GPG key is necessary to cryptographically verify packages are from Red Hat. CCE-80795-8 - name: Read permission of GPG key directory stat: path: /etc/pki/rpm-gpg/ register: gpg_key_directory_permission check_mode: false tags: - CCE-80795-8 - CJIS-5.10.4.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010019 - NIST-800-171-3.4.8 - NIST-800-53-CM-5(3) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-12 - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) - NIST-800-53-SI-7 - PCI-DSS-Req-6.2 - PCI-DSSv4-6.3.3 - ensure_redhat_gpgkey_installed - high_severity - medium_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Read signatures in GPG key command: gpg --show-keys --with-fingerprint --with-colons "/etc/pki/rpm-gpg/RPM-GPG-KEY-redhat-release" changed_when: false register: gpg_fingerprints check_mode: false tags: - CCE-80795-8 - CJIS-5.10.4.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010019 - NIST-800-171-3.4.8 - NIST-800-53-CM-5(3) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-12 - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) - NIST-800-53-SI-7 - PCI-DSS-Req-6.2 - PCI-DSSv4-6.3.3 - ensure_redhat_gpgkey_installed - high_severity - medium_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Set Fact - Installed GPG Fingerprints set_fact: gpg_installed_fingerprints: |- {{ gpg_fingerprints.stdout | regex_findall('^pub.* (?:^fpr[:]*)([0-9A-Fa-f]*)', '\1') | list }} tags: - CCE-80795-8 - CJIS-5.10.4.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010019 - NIST-800-171-3.4.8 - NIST-800-53-CM-5(3) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-12 - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) - NIST-800-53-SI-7 - PCI-DSS-Req-6.2 - PCI-DSSv4-6.3.3 - ensure_redhat_gpgkey_installed - high_severity - medium_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Set Fact - Valid fingerprints set_fact: gpg_valid_fingerprints: - 567E347AD0044ADE55BA8A5F199E2F91FD431D51 - 6A6AA7C97C8890AEC6AEBFE2F76F66C3D4082792 tags: - CCE-80795-8 - CJIS-5.10.4.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010019 - NIST-800-171-3.4.8 - NIST-800-53-CM-5(3) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-12 - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) - NIST-800-53-SI-7 - PCI-DSS-Req-6.2 - PCI-DSSv4-6.3.3 - ensure_redhat_gpgkey_installed - high_severity - medium_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Import RedHat GPG key rpm_key: state: present key: /etc/pki/rpm-gpg/RPM-GPG-KEY-redhat-release when: - gpg_key_directory_permission.stat.mode <= '0755' - (gpg_installed_fingerprints | difference(gpg_valid_fingerprints)) | length == 0 - gpg_installed_fingerprints | length > 0 - ansible_distribution == "RedHat" tags: - CCE-80795-8 - CJIS-5.10.4.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010019 - NIST-800-171-3.4.8 - NIST-800-53-CM-5(3) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-12 - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) - NIST-800-53-SI-7 - PCI-DSS-Req-6.2 - PCI-DSSv4-6.3.3 - ensure_redhat_gpgkey_installed - high_severity - medium_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # The two fingerprints below are retrieved from https://access.redhat.com/security/team/key readonly REDHAT_RELEASE_FINGERPRINT="567E347AD0044ADE55BA8A5F199E2F91FD431D51" readonly REDHAT_AUXILIARY_FINGERPRINT="6A6AA7C97C8890AEC6AEBFE2F76F66C3D4082792" # Location of the key we would like to import (once it's integrity verified) readonly REDHAT_RELEASE_KEY="/etc/pki/rpm-gpg/RPM-GPG-KEY-redhat-release" RPM_GPG_DIR_PERMS=$(stat -c %a "$(dirname "$REDHAT_RELEASE_KEY")") # Verify /etc/pki/rpm-gpg directory permissions are safe if [ "${RPM_GPG_DIR_PERMS}" -le "755" ] then # If they are safe, try to obtain fingerprints from the key file # (to ensure there won't be e.g. CRC error). readarray -t GPG_OUT < <(gpg --show-keys --with-fingerprint --with-colons "$REDHAT_RELEASE_KEY" | grep -A1 "^pub" | grep "^fpr" | cut -d ":" -f 10) GPG_RESULT=$? # No CRC error, safe to proceed if [ "${GPG_RESULT}" -eq "0" ] then echo "${GPG_OUT[*]}" | grep -vE "${REDHAT_RELEASE_FINGERPRINT}|${REDHAT_AUXILIARY_FINGERPRINT}" || { # If $REDHAT_RELEASE_KEY file doesn't contain any keys with unknown fingerprint, import it rpm --import "${REDHAT_RELEASE_KEY}" } fi fi Ensure Software Patches Installed If the system is joined to the Red Hat Network, a Red Hat Satellite Server, or a yum server, run the following command to install updates: $ sudo yum update If the system is not configured to use one of these sources, updates (in the form of RPM packages) can be manually downloaded from the Red Hat Network and installed using rpm. NOTE: U.S. Defense systems are required to be patched within 30 days or sooner as local policy dictates. The OVAL feed of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is not a XML file, which may not be understood by all scanners. BP28(R08) 18 20 4 5.10.4.1 APO12.01 APO12.02 APO12.03 APO12.04 BAI03.10 DSS05.01 DSS05.02 CCI-000366 CCI-001227 4.2.3 4.2.3.12 4.2.3.7 4.2.3.9 A.12.6.1 A.14.2.3 A.16.1.3 A.18.2.2 A.18.2.3 SI-2(5) SI-2(c) CM-6(a) ID.RA-1 PR.IP-12 FMT_MOF_EXT.1 Req-6.2 6.3.3 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010010 1.2.5 SV-230222r627750_rule Installing software updates is a fundamental mitigation against the exploitation of publicly-known vulnerabilities. If the most recent security patches and updates are not installed, unauthorized users may take advantage of weaknesses in the unpatched software. The lack of prompt attention to patching could result in a system compromise. CCE-80865-9 - name: Security patches are up to date package: name: '*' state: latest tags: - CCE-80865-9 - CJIS-5.10.4.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010010 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SI-2(5) - NIST-800-53-SI-2(c) - PCI-DSS-Req-6.2 - PCI-DSSv4-6.3.3 - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - patch_strategy - reboot_required - security_patches_up_to_date - skip_ansible_lint yum -y update Enable dnf-automatic Timer The dnf-automatic timer can be enabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl enable dnf-automatic.timer BP28(R8) SI-2(5) CM-6(a) SI-2(c) FMT_SMF_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000191-GPOS-00080 The dnf-automatic is an alternative command line interface (CLI) to dnf upgrade with specific facilities to make it suitable to be executed automatically and regularly from systemd timers, cron jobs and similar. The tool is controlled by dnf-automatic.timer SystemD timer. CCE-82360-9 - name: Enable timer dnf-automatic block: - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto - name: Enable timer dnf-automatic systemd: name: dnf-automatic.timer enabled: 'yes' state: started when: - '"dnf-automatic" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-82360-9 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SI-2(5) - NIST-800-53-SI-2(c) - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - timer_dnf-automatic_enabled SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'dnf-automatic.timer' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'dnf-automatic.timer' Account and Access Control In traditional Unix security, if an attacker gains shell access to a certain login account, they can perform any action or access any file to which that account has access. Therefore, making it more difficult for unauthorized people to gain shell access to accounts, particularly to privileged accounts, is a necessary part of securing a system. This section introduces mechanisms for restricting access to accounts under Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8. Authselect profile Specify the authselect profile to select minimal minimal sssd Enable authselect Configure user authentication setup to use the authselect tool. If authselect profile is selected, the rule will enable the profile. If the sudo authselect select command returns an error informing that the chosen profile cannot be selected, it is probably because PAM files have already been modified by the administrator. If this is the case, in order to not overwrite the desired changes made by the administrator, the current PAM settings should be investigated before forcing the selection of the chosen authselect profile. BP28(R31) CCI-000213 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) 164.308(a)(7)(i) 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) 164.310(a)(1) 164.310(a)(2)(i) 164.310(a)(2)(ii) 164.310(a)(2)(iii) 164.310(b) 164.310(c) 164.310(d)(1) 164.310(d)(2)(iii) AC-3 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_AFL.1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 1.2.3 Authselect is a successor to authconfig. It is a tool to select system authentication and identity sources from a list of supported profiles instead of letting the administrator manually build the PAM stack. That way, it avoids potential breakage of configuration, as it ships several tested profiles that are well tested and supported to solve different use-cases. CCE-88248-0 - name: XCCDF Value var_authselect_profile # promote to variable set_fact: var_authselect_profile: !!str tags: - always - name: Enable authselect - Select authselect profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect select "{{ var_authselect_profile }}" register: result_authselect_select failed_when: false tags: - CCE-88248-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-3 - configure_strategy - enable_authselect - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Enable authselect - Verify if PAM has been altered ansible.builtin.command: cmd: rpm -qV pam register: result_altered_authselect failed_when: false when: result_authselect_select.rc != 0 tags: - CCE-88248-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-3 - configure_strategy - enable_authselect - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Enable authselect - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_altered_authselect is skipped or result_altered_authselect.rc == 0 fail_msg: - Files in the 'pam' package have been altered, so the authselect configuration won't be forced. tags: - CCE-88248-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-3 - configure_strategy - enable_authselect - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Enable authselect - Force authselect profile select ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect select --force "{{ var_authselect_profile }}" when: - result_authselect_select.rc != 0 - result_altered_authselect is skipped or result_altered_authselect.rc == 0 tags: - CCE-88248-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-3 - configure_strategy - enable_authselect - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed var_authselect_profile='' authselect select "$var_authselect_profile" if test "$?" -ne 0; then if rpm --quiet --verify pam; then authselect select --force "$var_authselect_profile" else echo "Files in the 'pam' package have been altered, so the authselect configuration won't be forced" >&2 fi fi Warning Banners for System Accesses Each system should expose as little information about itself as possible. System banners, which are typically displayed just before a login prompt, give out information about the service or the host's operating system. This might include the distribution name and the system kernel version, and the particular version of a network service. This information can assist intruders in gaining access to the system as it can reveal whether the system is running vulnerable software. Most network services can be configured to limit what information is displayed. Many organizations implement security policies that require a system banner provide notice of the system's ownership, provide warning to unauthorized users, and remind authorized users of their consent to monitoring. Login Banner Verbiage Enter an appropriate login banner for your organization. Please note that new lines must be expressed by the '\n' character and special characters like parentheses and quotation marks must be escaped with '\\'. ^(Authorized[\s\n]+uses[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+activity[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+monitored[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+reported\.|^(?!.*(\\|fedora|rhel|sle|ubuntu)).*)$ ^Authorized[\s\n]+uses[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+activity[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+monitored[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+reported\.$ ^(You[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+accessing[\s\n]+a[\s\n]+U\.S\.[\s\n]+Government[\s\n]+\(USG\)[\s\n]+Information[\s\n]+System[\s\n]+\(IS\)[\s\n]+that[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+provided[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+USG\-authorized[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+By[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+\(which[\s\n]+includes[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+device[\s\n]+attached[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS\),[\s\n]+you[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+following[\s\n]+conditions\:(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-The[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+routinely[\s\n]+intercepts[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+monitors[\s\n]+communications[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+purposes[\s\n]+including,[\s\n]+but[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+limited[\s\n]+to,[\s\n]+penetration[\s\n]+testing,[\s\n]+COMSEC[\s\n]+monitoring,[\s\n]+network[\s\n]+operations[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+defense,[\s\n]+personnel[\s\n]+misconduct[\s\n]+\(PM\),[\s\n]+law[\s\n]+enforcement[\s\n]+\(LE\),[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+counterintelligence[\s\n]+\(CI\)[\s\n]+investigations\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-At[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+time,[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+inspect[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+seize[\s\n]+data[\s\n]+stored[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-Communications[\s\n]+using,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+data[\s\n]+stored[\s\n]+on,[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+private,[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+routine[\s\n]+monitoring,[\s\n]+interception,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+search,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+disclosed[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+used[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+USG\-authorized[\s\n]+purpose\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-This[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+includes[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+measures[\s\n]+\(e\.g\.,[\s\n]+authentication[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+access[\s\n]+controls\)[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+protect[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+interests\-\-not[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+your[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+benefit[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+privacy\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-Notwithstanding[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+above,[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+does[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+constitute[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+PM,[\s\n]+LE[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+CI[\s\n]+investigative[\s\n]+searching[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+content[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+privileged[\s\n]+communications,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+work[\s\n]+product,[\s\n]+related[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+representation[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+services[\s\n]+by[\s\n]+attorneys,[\s\n]+psychotherapists,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+clergy,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+their[\s\n]+assistants\.[\s\n]+Such[\s\n]+communications[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+work[\s\n]+product[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+private[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+confidential\.[\s\n]+See[\s\n]+User[\s\n]+Agreement[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+details\.|I've[\s\n]+read[\s\n]+\&[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+terms[\s\n]+in[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+user[\s\n]+agreem't\.)$ ^You[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+accessing[\s\n]+a[\s\n]+U\.S\.[\s\n]+Government[\s\n]+\(USG\)[\s\n]+Information[\s\n]+System[\s\n]+\(IS\)[\s\n]+that[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+provided[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+USG\-authorized[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+By[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+\(which[\s\n]+includes[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+device[\s\n]+attached[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS\),[\s\n]+you[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+following[\s\n]+conditions\:(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-The[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+routinely[\s\n]+intercepts[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+monitors[\s\n]+communications[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+purposes[\s\n]+including,[\s\n]+but[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+limited[\s\n]+to,[\s\n]+penetration[\s\n]+testing,[\s\n]+COMSEC[\s\n]+monitoring,[\s\n]+network[\s\n]+operations[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+defense,[\s\n]+personnel[\s\n]+misconduct[\s\n]+\(PM\),[\s\n]+law[\s\n]+enforcement[\s\n]+\(LE\),[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+counterintelligence[\s\n]+\(CI\)[\s\n]+investigations\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-At[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+time,[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+inspect[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+seize[\s\n]+data[\s\n]+stored[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-Communications[\s\n]+using,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+data[\s\n]+stored[\s\n]+on,[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+private,[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+routine[\s\n]+monitoring,[\s\n]+interception,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+search,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+disclosed[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+used[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+USG\-authorized[\s\n]+purpose\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-This[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+includes[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+measures[\s\n]+\(e\.g\.,[\s\n]+authentication[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+access[\s\n]+controls\)[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+protect[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+interests\-\-not[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+your[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+benefit[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+privacy\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-Notwithstanding[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+above,[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+does[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+constitute[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+PM,[\s\n]+LE[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+CI[\s\n]+investigative[\s\n]+searching[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+content[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+privileged[\s\n]+communications,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+work[\s\n]+product,[\s\n]+related[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+representation[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+services[\s\n]+by[\s\n]+attorneys,[\s\n]+psychotherapists,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+clergy,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+their[\s\n]+assistants\.[\s\n]+Such[\s\n]+communications[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+work[\s\n]+product[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+private[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+confidential\.[\s\n]+See[\s\n]+User[\s\n]+Agreement[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+details\.$ ^I've[\s\n]+read[\s\n]+\&[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+terms[\s\n]+in[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+user[\s\n]+agreem't\.$ ^Use[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+constitutes[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+at[\s\n]+all[\s\n]+times\.[\s\n]+This[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+a[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+related[\s\n]+equipment[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+intended[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+communication,[\s\n]+transmission,[\s\n]+processing,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+storage[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+official[\s\n]+U\.S\.[\s\n]+Government[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+authorized[\s\n]+information[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+at[\s\n]+all[\s\n]+times[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+ensure[\s\n]+proper[\s\n]+functioning[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+equipment[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+including[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+devices[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+systems,[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+prevent[\s\n]+unauthorized[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+violations[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+statutes[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+regulations,[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+deter[\s\n]+criminal[\s\n]+activity,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+similar[\s\n]+purposes\.[\s\n]+Any[\s\n]+user[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+a[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+should[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+aware[\s\n]+that[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+information[\s\n]+placed[\s\n]+in[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+expectation[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+privacy\.[\s\n]+If[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+reveals[\s\n]+possible[\s\n]+evidence[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+violation[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+criminal[\s\n]+statutes,[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+evidence[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+related[\s\n]+information,[\s\n]+including[\s\n]+identification[\s\n]+information[\s\n]+about[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+user,[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+provided[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+law[\s\n]+enforcement[\s\n]+officials\.[\s\n]+If[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+reveals[\s\n]+violations[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+regulations[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+unauthorized[\s\n]+use,[\s\n]+employees[\s\n]+who[\s\n]+violate[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+regulations[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+make[\s\n]+unauthorized[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+appropriate[\s\n]+disciplinary[\s\n]+action\.[\s\n]+Use[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+constitutes[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+at[\s\n]+all[\s\n]+times\.$ ^\-\-[\s\n]+WARNING[\s\n]+\-\-[\s\n]+This[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+authorized[\s\n]+users[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+Individuals[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+without[\s\n]+authority[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+in[\s\n]+excess[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+their[\s\n]+authority[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+having[\s\n]+all[\s\n]+their[\s\n]+activities[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+monitored[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+recorded[\s\n]+by[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+personnel\.[\s\n]+Anyone[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+expressly[\s\n]+consents[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+such[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+advised[\s\n]+that[\s\n]+if[\s\n]+such[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+reveals[\s\n]+possible[\s\n]+evidence[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+criminal[\s\n]+activity[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+provide[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+evidence[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+such[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+law[\s\n]+enforcement[\s\n]+officials\.$ ^Authorized[\s\n]+uses[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+activity[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+monitored[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+reported\.$ MotD Banner Verbiage Enter an appropriate login banner for your organization. Please note that new lines must be expressed by the '\n' character and special characters like parentheses and quotation marks must be escaped with '\\'. ^(Authorized[\s\n]+uses[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+activity[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+monitored[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+reported\.|^(?!.*(\\|fedora|rhel|sle|ubuntu)).*)$ ^Authorized[\s\n]+uses[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+activity[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+monitored[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+reported\.$ ^(You[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+accessing[\s\n]+a[\s\n]+U\.S\.[\s\n]+Government[\s\n]+\(USG\)[\s\n]+Information[\s\n]+System[\s\n]+\(IS\)[\s\n]+that[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+provided[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+USG\-authorized[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+By[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+\(which[\s\n]+includes[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+device[\s\n]+attached[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS\),[\s\n]+you[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+following[\s\n]+conditions\:(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-The[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+routinely[\s\n]+intercepts[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+monitors[\s\n]+communications[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+purposes[\s\n]+including,[\s\n]+but[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+limited[\s\n]+to,[\s\n]+penetration[\s\n]+testing,[\s\n]+COMSEC[\s\n]+monitoring,[\s\n]+network[\s\n]+operations[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+defense,[\s\n]+personnel[\s\n]+misconduct[\s\n]+\(PM\),[\s\n]+law[\s\n]+enforcement[\s\n]+\(LE\),[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+counterintelligence[\s\n]+\(CI\)[\s\n]+investigations\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-At[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+time,[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+inspect[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+seize[\s\n]+data[\s\n]+stored[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-Communications[\s\n]+using,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+data[\s\n]+stored[\s\n]+on,[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+private,[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+routine[\s\n]+monitoring,[\s\n]+interception,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+search,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+disclosed[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+used[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+USG\-authorized[\s\n]+purpose\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-This[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+includes[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+measures[\s\n]+\(e\.g\.,[\s\n]+authentication[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+access[\s\n]+controls\)[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+protect[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+interests\-\-not[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+your[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+benefit[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+privacy\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-Notwithstanding[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+above,[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+does[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+constitute[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+PM,[\s\n]+LE[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+CI[\s\n]+investigative[\s\n]+searching[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+content[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+privileged[\s\n]+communications,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+work[\s\n]+product,[\s\n]+related[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+representation[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+services[\s\n]+by[\s\n]+attorneys,[\s\n]+psychotherapists,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+clergy,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+their[\s\n]+assistants\.[\s\n]+Such[\s\n]+communications[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+work[\s\n]+product[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+private[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+confidential\.[\s\n]+See[\s\n]+User[\s\n]+Agreement[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+details\.|I've[\s\n]+read[\s\n]+\&[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+terms[\s\n]+in[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+user[\s\n]+agreem't\.)$ ^You[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+accessing[\s\n]+a[\s\n]+U\.S\.[\s\n]+Government[\s\n]+\(USG\)[\s\n]+Information[\s\n]+System[\s\n]+\(IS\)[\s\n]+that[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+provided[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+USG\-authorized[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+By[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+\(which[\s\n]+includes[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+device[\s\n]+attached[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS\),[\s\n]+you[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+following[\s\n]+conditions\:(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-The[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+routinely[\s\n]+intercepts[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+monitors[\s\n]+communications[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+purposes[\s\n]+including,[\s\n]+but[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+limited[\s\n]+to,[\s\n]+penetration[\s\n]+testing,[\s\n]+COMSEC[\s\n]+monitoring,[\s\n]+network[\s\n]+operations[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+defense,[\s\n]+personnel[\s\n]+misconduct[\s\n]+\(PM\),[\s\n]+law[\s\n]+enforcement[\s\n]+\(LE\),[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+counterintelligence[\s\n]+\(CI\)[\s\n]+investigations\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-At[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+time,[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+inspect[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+seize[\s\n]+data[\s\n]+stored[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-Communications[\s\n]+using,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+data[\s\n]+stored[\s\n]+on,[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+private,[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+routine[\s\n]+monitoring,[\s\n]+interception,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+search,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+disclosed[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+used[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+USG\-authorized[\s\n]+purpose\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-This[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+includes[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+measures[\s\n]+\(e\.g\.,[\s\n]+authentication[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+access[\s\n]+controls\)[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+protect[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+interests\-\-not[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+your[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+benefit[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+privacy\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-Notwithstanding[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+above,[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+does[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+constitute[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+PM,[\s\n]+LE[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+CI[\s\n]+investigative[\s\n]+searching[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+content[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+privileged[\s\n]+communications,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+work[\s\n]+product,[\s\n]+related[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+representation[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+services[\s\n]+by[\s\n]+attorneys,[\s\n]+psychotherapists,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+clergy,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+their[\s\n]+assistants\.[\s\n]+Such[\s\n]+communications[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+work[\s\n]+product[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+private[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+confidential\.[\s\n]+See[\s\n]+User[\s\n]+Agreement[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+details\.$ ^I've[\s\n]+read[\s\n]+\&[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+terms[\s\n]+in[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+user[\s\n]+agreem't\.$ ^Use[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+constitutes[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+at[\s\n]+all[\s\n]+times\.[\s\n]+This[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+a[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+related[\s\n]+equipment[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+intended[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+communication,[\s\n]+transmission,[\s\n]+processing,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+storage[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+official[\s\n]+U\.S\.[\s\n]+Government[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+authorized[\s\n]+information[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+at[\s\n]+all[\s\n]+times[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+ensure[\s\n]+proper[\s\n]+functioning[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+equipment[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+including[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+devices[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+systems,[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+prevent[\s\n]+unauthorized[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+violations[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+statutes[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+regulations,[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+deter[\s\n]+criminal[\s\n]+activity,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+similar[\s\n]+purposes\.[\s\n]+Any[\s\n]+user[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+a[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+should[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+aware[\s\n]+that[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+information[\s\n]+placed[\s\n]+in[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+expectation[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+privacy\.[\s\n]+If[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+reveals[\s\n]+possible[\s\n]+evidence[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+violation[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+criminal[\s\n]+statutes,[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+evidence[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+related[\s\n]+information,[\s\n]+including[\s\n]+identification[\s\n]+information[\s\n]+about[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+user,[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+provided[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+law[\s\n]+enforcement[\s\n]+officials\.[\s\n]+If[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+reveals[\s\n]+violations[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+regulations[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+unauthorized[\s\n]+use,[\s\n]+employees[\s\n]+who[\s\n]+violate[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+regulations[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+make[\s\n]+unauthorized[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+appropriate[\s\n]+disciplinary[\s\n]+action\.[\s\n]+Use[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+constitutes[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+at[\s\n]+all[\s\n]+times\.$ ^\-\-[\s\n]+WARNING[\s\n]+\-\-[\s\n]+This[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+authorized[\s\n]+users[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+Individuals[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+without[\s\n]+authority[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+in[\s\n]+excess[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+their[\s\n]+authority[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+having[\s\n]+all[\s\n]+their[\s\n]+activities[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+monitored[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+recorded[\s\n]+by[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+personnel\.[\s\n]+Anyone[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+expressly[\s\n]+consents[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+such[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+advised[\s\n]+that[\s\n]+if[\s\n]+such[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+reveals[\s\n]+possible[\s\n]+evidence[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+criminal[\s\n]+activity[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+provide[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+evidence[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+such[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+law[\s\n]+enforcement[\s\n]+officials\.$ ^Authorized[\s\n]+uses[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+activity[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+monitored[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+reported\.$ Remote Login Banner Verbiage Enter an appropriate login banner for your organization. Please note that new lines must be expressed by the '\n' character and special characters like parentheses and quotation marks must be escaped with '\\'. ^(Authorized[\s\n]+uses[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+activity[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+monitored[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+reported\.|^(?!.*(\\|fedora|rhel|sle|ubuntu)).*)$ ^Authorized[\s\n]+uses[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+activity[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+monitored[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+reported\.$ ^(You[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+accessing[\s\n]+a[\s\n]+U\.S\.[\s\n]+Government[\s\n]+\(USG\)[\s\n]+Information[\s\n]+System[\s\n]+\(IS\)[\s\n]+that[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+provided[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+USG\-authorized[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+By[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+\(which[\s\n]+includes[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+device[\s\n]+attached[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS\),[\s\n]+you[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+following[\s\n]+conditions\:(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-The[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+routinely[\s\n]+intercepts[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+monitors[\s\n]+communications[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+purposes[\s\n]+including,[\s\n]+but[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+limited[\s\n]+to,[\s\n]+penetration[\s\n]+testing,[\s\n]+COMSEC[\s\n]+monitoring,[\s\n]+network[\s\n]+operations[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+defense,[\s\n]+personnel[\s\n]+misconduct[\s\n]+\(PM\),[\s\n]+law[\s\n]+enforcement[\s\n]+\(LE\),[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+counterintelligence[\s\n]+\(CI\)[\s\n]+investigations\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-At[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+time,[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+inspect[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+seize[\s\n]+data[\s\n]+stored[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-Communications[\s\n]+using,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+data[\s\n]+stored[\s\n]+on,[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+private,[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+routine[\s\n]+monitoring,[\s\n]+interception,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+search,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+disclosed[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+used[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+USG\-authorized[\s\n]+purpose\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-This[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+includes[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+measures[\s\n]+\(e\.g\.,[\s\n]+authentication[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+access[\s\n]+controls\)[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+protect[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+interests\-\-not[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+your[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+benefit[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+privacy\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-Notwithstanding[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+above,[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+does[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+constitute[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+PM,[\s\n]+LE[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+CI[\s\n]+investigative[\s\n]+searching[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+content[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+privileged[\s\n]+communications,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+work[\s\n]+product,[\s\n]+related[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+representation[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+services[\s\n]+by[\s\n]+attorneys,[\s\n]+psychotherapists,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+clergy,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+their[\s\n]+assistants\.[\s\n]+Such[\s\n]+communications[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+work[\s\n]+product[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+private[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+confidential\.[\s\n]+See[\s\n]+User[\s\n]+Agreement[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+details\.|I've[\s\n]+read[\s\n]+\&[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+terms[\s\n]+in[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+user[\s\n]+agreem't\.)$ ^You[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+accessing[\s\n]+a[\s\n]+U\.S\.[\s\n]+Government[\s\n]+\(USG\)[\s\n]+Information[\s\n]+System[\s\n]+\(IS\)[\s\n]+that[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+provided[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+USG\-authorized[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+By[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+\(which[\s\n]+includes[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+device[\s\n]+attached[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS\),[\s\n]+you[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+following[\s\n]+conditions\:(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-The[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+routinely[\s\n]+intercepts[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+monitors[\s\n]+communications[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+purposes[\s\n]+including,[\s\n]+but[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+limited[\s\n]+to,[\s\n]+penetration[\s\n]+testing,[\s\n]+COMSEC[\s\n]+monitoring,[\s\n]+network[\s\n]+operations[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+defense,[\s\n]+personnel[\s\n]+misconduct[\s\n]+\(PM\),[\s\n]+law[\s\n]+enforcement[\s\n]+\(LE\),[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+counterintelligence[\s\n]+\(CI\)[\s\n]+investigations\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-At[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+time,[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+inspect[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+seize[\s\n]+data[\s\n]+stored[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-Communications[\s\n]+using,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+data[\s\n]+stored[\s\n]+on,[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+private,[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+routine[\s\n]+monitoring,[\s\n]+interception,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+search,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+disclosed[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+used[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+USG\-authorized[\s\n]+purpose\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-This[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+includes[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+measures[\s\n]+\(e\.g\.,[\s\n]+authentication[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+access[\s\n]+controls\)[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+protect[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+interests\-\-not[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+your[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+benefit[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+privacy\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-Notwithstanding[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+above,[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+does[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+constitute[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+PM,[\s\n]+LE[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+CI[\s\n]+investigative[\s\n]+searching[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+content[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+privileged[\s\n]+communications,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+work[\s\n]+product,[\s\n]+related[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+representation[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+services[\s\n]+by[\s\n]+attorneys,[\s\n]+psychotherapists,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+clergy,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+their[\s\n]+assistants\.[\s\n]+Such[\s\n]+communications[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+work[\s\n]+product[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+private[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+confidential\.[\s\n]+See[\s\n]+User[\s\n]+Agreement[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+details\.$ ^I've[\s\n]+read[\s\n]+\&[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+terms[\s\n]+in[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+user[\s\n]+agreem't\.$ ^Use[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+constitutes[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+at[\s\n]+all[\s\n]+times\.[\s\n]+This[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+a[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+related[\s\n]+equipment[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+intended[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+communication,[\s\n]+transmission,[\s\n]+processing,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+storage[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+official[\s\n]+U\.S\.[\s\n]+Government[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+authorized[\s\n]+information[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+at[\s\n]+all[\s\n]+times[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+ensure[\s\n]+proper[\s\n]+functioning[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+equipment[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+including[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+devices[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+systems,[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+prevent[\s\n]+unauthorized[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+violations[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+statutes[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+regulations,[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+deter[\s\n]+criminal[\s\n]+activity,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+similar[\s\n]+purposes\.[\s\n]+Any[\s\n]+user[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+a[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+should[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+aware[\s\n]+that[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+information[\s\n]+placed[\s\n]+in[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+expectation[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+privacy\.[\s\n]+If[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+reveals[\s\n]+possible[\s\n]+evidence[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+violation[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+criminal[\s\n]+statutes,[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+evidence[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+related[\s\n]+information,[\s\n]+including[\s\n]+identification[\s\n]+information[\s\n]+about[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+user,[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+provided[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+law[\s\n]+enforcement[\s\n]+officials\.[\s\n]+If[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+reveals[\s\n]+violations[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+regulations[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+unauthorized[\s\n]+use,[\s\n]+employees[\s\n]+who[\s\n]+violate[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+regulations[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+make[\s\n]+unauthorized[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+appropriate[\s\n]+disciplinary[\s\n]+action\.[\s\n]+Use[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+constitutes[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+at[\s\n]+all[\s\n]+times\.$ ^\-\-[\s\n]+WARNING[\s\n]+\-\-[\s\n]+This[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+authorized[\s\n]+users[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+Individuals[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+without[\s\n]+authority[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+in[\s\n]+excess[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+their[\s\n]+authority[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+having[\s\n]+all[\s\n]+their[\s\n]+activities[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+monitored[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+recorded[\s\n]+by[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+personnel\.[\s\n]+Anyone[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+expressly[\s\n]+consents[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+such[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+advised[\s\n]+that[\s\n]+if[\s\n]+such[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+reveals[\s\n]+possible[\s\n]+evidence[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+criminal[\s\n]+activity[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+provide[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+evidence[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+such[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+law[\s\n]+enforcement[\s\n]+officials\.$ ^Authorized[\s\n]+uses[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+activity[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+monitored[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+reported\.$ Modify the System Login Banner To configure the system login banner edit /etc/issue. Replace the default text with a message compliant with the local site policy or a legal disclaimer. The DoD required text is either: You are accessing a U.S. Government (USG) Information System (IS) that is provided for USG-authorized use only. By using this IS (which includes any device attached to this IS), you consent to the following conditions: -The USG routinely intercepts and monitors communications on this IS for purposes including, but not limited to, penetration testing, COMSEC monitoring, network operations and defense, personnel misconduct (PM), law enforcement (LE), and counterintelligence (CI) investigations. -At any time, the USG may inspect and seize data stored on this IS. -Communications using, or data stored on, this IS are not private, are subject to routine monitoring, interception, and search, and may be disclosed or used for any USG-authorized purpose. -This IS includes security measures (e.g., authentication and access controls) to protect USG interests -- not for your personal benefit or privacy. -Notwithstanding the above, using this IS does not constitute consent to PM, LE or CI investigative searching or monitoring of the content of privileged communications, or work product, related to personal representation or services by attorneys, psychotherapists, or clergy, and their assistants. Such communications and work product are private and confidential. See User Agreement for details. OR: I've read & consent to terms in IS user agreem't. 1 12 15 16 DSS05.04 DSS05.10 DSS06.10 3.1.9 CCI-000048 CCI-000050 CCI-001384 CCI-001385 CCI-001386 CCI-001387 CCI-001388 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 A.18.1.4 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.4 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 AC-8(a) AC-8(c) PR.AC-7 FMT_MOF_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000023-GPOS-00006 SRG-OS-000228-GPOS-00088 RHEL-08-010060 1.7.2 SV-230227r627750_rule Display of a standardized and approved use notification before granting access to the operating system ensures privacy and security notification verbiage used is consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. System use notifications are required only for access via login interfaces with human users and are not required when such human interfaces do not exist. CCE-80763-6 - name: XCCDF Value login_banner_text # promote to variable set_fact: login_banner_text: !!str tags: - always - name: Modify the System Login Banner - Ensure Correct Banner copy: dest: /etc/issue content: '{{ login_banner_text | regex_replace("^\^(.*)\$$", "\1") | regex_replace("^\((.*\.)\|.*\)$", "\1") | regex_replace("\[\\s\\n\]\+"," ") | regex_replace("\(\?:\[\\n\]\+\|\(\?:\\\\n\)\+\)", "\n") | regex_replace("\\", "") | wordwrap() }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80763-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010060 - NIST-800-171-3.1.9 - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c) - banner_etc_issue - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then login_banner_text='' # Multiple regexes transform the banner regex into a usable banner # 0 - Remove anchors around the banner text login_banner_text=$(echo "$login_banner_text" | sed 's/^\^\(.*\)\$$/\1/g') # 1 - Keep only the first banners if there are multiple # (dod_banners contains the long and short banner) login_banner_text=$(echo "$login_banner_text" | sed 's/^(\(.*\.\)|.*)$/\1/g') # 2 - Add spaces ' '. (Transforms regex for "space or newline" into a " ") login_banner_text=$(echo "$login_banner_text" | sed 's/\[\\s\\n\]+/ /g') # 3 - Adds newlines. (Transforms "(?:\[\\n\]+|(?:\\n)+)" into "\n") login_banner_text=$(echo "$login_banner_text" | sed 's/(?:\[\\n\]+|(?:\\\\n)+)/\n/g') # 4 - Remove any leftover backslash. (From any parethesis in the banner, for example). login_banner_text=$(echo "$login_banner_text" | sed 's/\\//g') formatted=$(echo "$login_banner_text" | fold -sw 80) cat <<EOF >/etc/issue $formatted EOF else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Modify the System Login Banner for Remote Connections To configure the system login banner edit /etc/issue.net. Replace the default text with a message compliant with the local site policy or a legal disclaimer. The DoD required text is either: You are accessing a U.S. Government (USG) Information System (IS) that is provided for USG-authorized use only. By using this IS (which includes any device attached to this IS), you consent to the following conditions: -The USG routinely intercepts and monitors communications on this IS for purposes including, but not limited to, penetration testing, COMSEC monitoring, network operations and defense, personnel misconduct (PM), law enforcement (LE), and counterintelligence (CI) investigations. -At any time, the USG may inspect and seize data stored on this IS. -Communications using, or data stored on, this IS are not private, are subject to routine monitoring, interception, and search, and may be disclosed or used for any USG-authorized purpose. -This IS includes security measures (e.g., authentication and access controls) to protect USG interests -- not for your personal benefit or privacy. -Notwithstanding the above, using this IS does not constitute consent to PM, LE or CI investigative searching or monitoring of the content of privileged communications, or work product, related to personal representation or services by attorneys, psychotherapists, or clergy, and their assistants. Such communications and work product are private and confidential. See User Agreement for details. OR: I've read & consent to terms in IS user agreem't. CCI-000048 CCI-001384 CCI-001385 CCI-001386 CCI-001387 CCI-001388 SRG-OS-000023-GPOS-00006 SRG-OS-000228-GPOS-00088 1.7.3 Display of a standardized and approved use notification before granting access to the operating system ensures privacy and security notification verbiage used is consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. System use notifications are required only for access via login interfaces with human users and are not required when such human interfaces do not exist. CCE-86147-6 - name: XCCDF Value remote_login_banner_text # promote to variable set_fact: remote_login_banner_text: !!str tags: - always - name: Modify the System Login Banner for Remote Connections - ensure correct banner copy: dest: /etc/issue.net content: '{{ remote_login_banner_text | regex_replace("^\^(.*)\$$", "\1") | regex_replace("^\((.*\.)\|.*\)$", "\1") | regex_replace("\[\\s\\n\]\+"," ") | regex_replace("\(\?:\[\\n\]\+\|\(\?:\\\\n\)\+\)", "\n") | regex_replace("\\", "") | wordwrap() }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86147-6 - banner_etc_issue_net - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then remote_login_banner_text='' # Multiple regexes transform the banner regex into a usable banner # 0 - Remove anchors around the banner text remote_login_banner_text=$(echo "$remote_login_banner_text" | sed 's/^\^\(.*\)\$$/\1/g') # 1 - Keep only the first banners if there are multiple # (dod_banners contains the long and short banner) remote_login_banner_text=$(echo "$remote_login_banner_text" | sed 's/^(\(.*\.\)|.*)$/\1/g') # 2 - Add spaces ' '. (Transforms regex for "space or newline" into a " ") remote_login_banner_text=$(echo "$remote_login_banner_text" | sed 's/\[\\s\\n\]+/ /g') # 3 - Adds newlines. (Transforms "(?:\[\\n\]+|(?:\\n)+)" into "\n") remote_login_banner_text=$(echo "$remote_login_banner_text" | sed 's/(?:\[\\n\]+|(?:\\\\n)+)/\n/g') # 4 - Remove any leftover backslash. (From any parethesis in the banner, for example). remote_login_banner_text=$(echo "$remote_login_banner_text" | sed 's/\\//g') formatted=$(echo "$remote_login_banner_text" | fold -sw 80) cat <<EOF >/etc/issue.net $formatted EOF else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Modify the System Message of the Day Banner To configure the system message banner edit /etc/motd. Replace the default text with a message compliant with the local site policy or a legal disclaimer. The DoD required text is either: You are accessing a U.S. Government (USG) Information System (IS) that is provided for USG-authorized use only. By using this IS (which includes any device attached to this IS), you consent to the following conditions: -The USG routinely intercepts and monitors communications on this IS for purposes including, but not limited to, penetration testing, COMSEC monitoring, network operations and defense, personnel misconduct (PM), law enforcement (LE), and counterintelligence (CI) investigations. -At any time, the USG may inspect and seize data stored on this IS. -Communications using, or data stored on, this IS are not private, are subject to routine monitoring, interception, and search, and may be disclosed or used for any USG-authorized purpose. -This IS includes security measures (e.g., authentication and access controls) to protect USG interests -- not for your personal benefit or privacy. -Notwithstanding the above, using this IS does not constitute consent to PM, LE or CI investigative searching or monitoring of the content of privileged communications, or work product, related to personal representation or services by attorneys, psychotherapists, or clergy, and their assistants. Such communications and work product are private and confidential. See User Agreement for details. OR: I've read & consent to terms in IS user agreem't. 1.7.1 Display of a standardized and approved use notification before granting access to the operating system ensures privacy and security notification verbiage used is consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. System use notifications are required only for access via login interfaces with human users and are not required when such human interfaces do not exist. CCE-83496-0 - name: XCCDF Value motd_banner_text # promote to variable set_fact: motd_banner_text: !!str tags: - always - name: Modify the System Message of the Day Banner - ensure correct banner copy: dest: /etc/motd content: '{{ motd_banner_text | regex_replace("^\^(.*)\$$", "\1") | regex_replace("^\((.*\.)\|.*\)$", "\1") | regex_replace("\[\\s\\n\]\+"," ") | regex_replace("\(\?:\[\\n\]\+\|\(\?:\\\\n\)\+\)", "\n") | regex_replace("\\", "") | wordwrap() }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83496-0 - banner_etc_motd - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then motd_banner_text='' # Multiple regexes transform the banner regex into a usable banner # 0 - Remove anchors around the banner text motd_banner_text=$(echo "$motd_banner_text" | sed 's/^\^\(.*\)\$$/\1/g') # 1 - Keep only the first banners if there are multiple # (dod_banners contains the long and short banner) motd_banner_text=$(echo "$motd_banner_text" | sed 's/^(\(.*\.\)|.*)$/\1/g') # 2 - Add spaces ' '. (Transforms regex for "space or newline" into a " ") motd_banner_text=$(echo "$motd_banner_text" | sed 's/\[\\s\\n\]+/ /g') # 3 - Adds newlines. (Transforms "(?:\[\\n\]+|(?:\\n)+)" into "\n") motd_banner_text=$(echo "$motd_banner_text" | sed 's/(?:\[\\n\]+|(?:\\\\n)+)/\n/g') # 4 - Remove any leftover backslash. (From any parethesis in the banner, for example). motd_banner_text=$(echo "$motd_banner_text" | sed 's/\\//g') formatted=$(echo "$motd_banner_text" | fold -sw 80) cat <<EOF >/etc/motd $formatted EOF else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify Group Ownership of System Login Banner To properly set the group owner of /etc/issue, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /etc/issue 1.7.5 Display of a standardized and approved use notification before granting access to the operating system ensures privacy and security notification verbiage used is consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. Proper group ownership will ensure that only root user can modify the banner. CCE-83708-8 - name: Test for existence /etc/issue stat: path: /etc/issue register: file_exists tags: - CCE-83708-8 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_etc_issue - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner 0 on /etc/issue file: path: /etc/issue group: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-83708-8 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_etc_issue - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chgrp 0 /etc/issue Verify Group Ownership of System Login Banner for Remote Connections To properly set the group owner of /etc/issue.net, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /etc/issue.net 1.2.8 1.7.6 Display of a standardized and approved use notification before granting access to the operating system ensures privacy and security notification verbiage used is consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. Proper group ownership will ensure that only root user can modify the banner. CCE-86051-0 - name: Test for existence /etc/issue.net stat: path: /etc/issue.net register: file_exists tags: - CCE-86051-0 - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.8 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_etc_issue_net - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner 0 on /etc/issue.net file: path: /etc/issue.net group: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86051-0 - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.8 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_etc_issue_net - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chgrp 0 /etc/issue.net Verify Group Ownership of Message of the Day Banner To properly set the group owner of /etc/motd, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /etc/motd 1.7.4 Display of a standardized and approved use notification before granting access to the operating system ensures privacy and security notification verbiage used is consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. Proper group ownership will ensure that only root user can modify the banner. CCE-83728-6 - name: Test for existence /etc/motd stat: path: /etc/motd register: file_exists tags: - CCE-83728-6 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_etc_motd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner 0 on /etc/motd file: path: /etc/motd group: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-83728-6 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_etc_motd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chgrp 0 /etc/motd Verify ownership of System Login Banner To properly set the owner of /etc/issue, run the command: $ sudo chown root /etc/issue 1.7.5 Display of a standardized and approved use notification before granting access to the operating system ensures privacy and security notification verbiage used is consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. Proper ownership will ensure that only root user can modify the banner. CCE-83718-7 - name: Test for existence /etc/issue stat: path: /etc/issue register: file_exists tags: - CCE-83718-7 - configure_strategy - file_owner_etc_issue - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner 0 on /etc/issue file: path: /etc/issue owner: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-83718-7 - configure_strategy - file_owner_etc_issue - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chown 0 /etc/issue Verify ownership of System Login Banner for Remote Connections To properly set the owner of /etc/issue.net, run the command: $ sudo chown root /etc/issue.net 1.2.8 1.7.6 Display of a standardized and approved use notification before granting access to the operating system ensures privacy and security notification verbiage used is consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. Proper ownership will ensure that only root user can modify the banner. CCE-86054-4 - name: Test for existence /etc/issue.net stat: path: /etc/issue.net register: file_exists tags: - CCE-86054-4 - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.8 - configure_strategy - file_owner_etc_issue_net - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner 0 on /etc/issue.net file: path: /etc/issue.net owner: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86054-4 - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.8 - configure_strategy - file_owner_etc_issue_net - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chown 0 /etc/issue.net Verify ownership of Message of the Day Banner To properly set the owner of /etc/motd, run the command: $ sudo chown root /etc/motd 1.7.4 Display of a standardized and approved use notification before granting access to the operating system ensures privacy and security notification verbiage used is consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. Proper ownership will ensure that only root user can modify the banner. CCE-83738-5 - name: Test for existence /etc/motd stat: path: /etc/motd register: file_exists tags: - CCE-83738-5 - configure_strategy - file_owner_etc_motd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner 0 on /etc/motd file: path: /etc/motd owner: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-83738-5 - configure_strategy - file_owner_etc_motd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chown 0 /etc/motd Verify permissions on System Login Banner To properly set the permissions of /etc/issue, run the command: $ sudo chmod 0644 /etc/issue 1.7.5 Display of a standardized and approved use notification before granting access to the operating system ensures privacy and security notification verbiage used is consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. Proper permissions will ensure that only root user can modify the banner. CCE-83348-3 - name: Test for existence /etc/issue stat: path: /etc/issue register: file_exists tags: - CCE-83348-3 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_etc_issue - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure permission u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt on /etc/issue file: path: /etc/issue mode: u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-83348-3 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_etc_issue - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chmod u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt /etc/issue Verify permissions on System Login Banner for Remote Connections To properly set the permissions of /etc/issue.net, run the command: $ sudo chmod 0644 /etc/issue.net 1.2.8 1.7.6 Display of a standardized and approved use notification before granting access to the operating system ensures privacy and security notification verbiage used is consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. Proper permissions will ensure that only root user can modify the banner. CCE-86047-8 - name: Test for existence /etc/issue.net stat: path: /etc/issue.net register: file_exists tags: - CCE-86047-8 - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.8 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_etc_issue_net - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure permission u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt on /etc/issue.net file: path: /etc/issue.net mode: u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86047-8 - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.8 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_etc_issue_net - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chmod u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt /etc/issue.net Verify permissions on Message of the Day Banner To properly set the permissions of /etc/motd, run the command: $ sudo chmod 0644 /etc/motd 1.7.4 Display of a standardized and approved use notification before granting access to the operating system ensures privacy and security notification verbiage used is consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. Proper permissions will ensure that only root user can modify the banner. CCE-83338-4 - name: Test for existence /etc/motd stat: path: /etc/motd register: file_exists tags: - CCE-83338-4 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_etc_motd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure permission u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt on /etc/motd file: path: /etc/motd mode: u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-83338-4 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_etc_motd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chmod u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt /etc/motd Implement a GUI Warning Banner In the default graphical environment, users logging directly into the system are greeted with a login screen provided by the GNOME Display Manager (GDM). The warning banner should be displayed in this graphical environment for these users. The following sections describe how to configure the GDM login banner. Enable GNOME3 Login Warning Banner In the default graphical environment, displaying a login warning banner in the GNOME Display Manager's login screen can be enabled on the login screen by setting banner-message-enable to true. To enable, add or edit banner-message-enable to /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/00-security-settings. For example: [org/gnome/login-screen] banner-message-enable=true Once the setting has been added, add a lock to /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example: /org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-enable After the settings have been set, run dconf update. The banner text must also be set. 1 12 15 16 DSS05.04 DSS05.10 DSS06.10 3.1.9 CCI-000048 CCI-000050 CCI-001384 CCI-001385 CCI-001386 CCI-001387 CCI-001388 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 A.18.1.4 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.4 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 AC-8(a) AC-8(b) AC-8(c) PR.AC-7 FMT_MOF_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000023-GPOS-00006 SRG-OS-000228-GPOS-00088 RHEL-08-010049 1.8.2 SV-244519r743806_rule Display of a standardized and approved use notification before granting access to the operating system ensures privacy and security notification verbiage used is consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. For U.S. Government systems, system use notifications are required only for access via login interfaces with human users and are not required when such human interfaces do not exist. CCE-80768-5 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80768-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010049 - NIST-800-171-3.1.9 - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-8(b) - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c) - dconf_gnome_banner_enabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Enable GNOME3 Login Warning Banner ini_file: dest: /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/00-security-settings section: org/gnome/login-screen option: banner-message-enable value: 'true' create: true no_extra_spaces: true when: '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80768-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010049 - NIST-800-171-3.1.9 - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-8(b) - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c) - dconf_gnome_banner_enabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Prevent user modification of GNOME banner-message-enabled lineinfile: path: /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock regexp: ^/org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-enable$ line: /org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-enable create: true when: '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80768-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010049 - NIST-800-171-3.1.9 - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-8(b) - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c) - dconf_gnome_banner_enabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Dconf Update command: dconf update when: '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80768-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010049 - NIST-800-171-3.1.9 - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-8(b) - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c) - dconf_gnome_banner_enabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q gdm; then # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories # If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. # The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/login-screen\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|gdm.d' | cut -d":" -f1) DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/00-security-settings" DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d" mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] then if grep -q "^\\s*banner-message-enable\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" then sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)banner-message-enable(\s*=)/#\1banner-message-enable\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" fi fi [ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/login-screen\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" then printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/login-screen]" >> ${DCONFFILE} fi escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "true")" if grep -q "^\\s*banner-message-enable\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" then sed -i "s/\\s*banner-message-enable\\s*=\\s*.*/banner-message-enable=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" else sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/login-screen\\]|a\\banner-message-enable=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" fi dconf update # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-enable$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|gdm.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks" mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] then sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-enable$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" fi if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-enable$" /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/ then echo "/org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-enable" >> "/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" fi dconf update else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Set the GNOME3 Login Warning Banner Text In the default graphical environment, configuring the login warning banner text in the GNOME Display Manager's login screen can be configured on the login screen by setting banner-message-text to 'APPROVED_BANNER' where APPROVED_BANNER is the approved banner for your environment. To enable, add or edit banner-message-text to /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/00-security-settings. For example: [org/gnome/login-screen] banner-message-text='APPROVED_BANNER' Once the setting has been added, add a lock to /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example: /org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-text After the settings have been set, run dconf update. When entering a warning banner that spans several lines, remember to begin and end the string with ' and use \n for new lines. 1 12 15 16 DSS05.04 DSS05.10 DSS06.10 3.1.9 CCI-000048 CCI-001384 CCI-001385 CCI-001386 CCI-001387 CCI-001388 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 A.18.1.4 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.4 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 AC-8(a) AC-8(c) PR.AC-7 FMT_MOF_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000023-GPOS-00006 SRG-OS-000228-GPOS-00088 RHEL-08-010050 1.8.2 SV-230226r743916_rule An appropriate warning message reinforces policy awareness during the logon process and facilitates possible legal action against attackers. CCE-80770-1 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80770-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010050 - NIST-800-171-3.1.9 - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c) - dconf_gnome_login_banner_text - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: XCCDF Value login_banner_text # promote to variable set_fact: login_banner_text: !!str tags: - always - name: Set the GNOME3 Login Warning Banner Text file: path: /etc/dconf/db/{{ item }} owner: root group: root mode: 493 state: directory with_items: - gdm.d - gdm.d/locks when: '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80770-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010050 - NIST-800-171-3.1.9 - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c) - dconf_gnome_login_banner_text - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Set the GNOME3 Login Warning Banner Text file: path: /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/{{ item }} owner: root group: root mode: 420 state: touch with_items: - 00-security-settings - locks/00-security-settings-lock when: '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80770-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010050 - NIST-800-171-3.1.9 - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c) - dconf_gnome_login_banner_text - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Set the GNOME3 Login Warning Banner Text ini_file: dest: /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/00-security-settings section: org/gnome/login-screen option: banner-message-text value: '''{{ login_banner_text | regex_replace("^\^(.*)\$$", "\1") | regex_replace("^\((.*\.)\|.*\)$", "\1") | regex_replace("\[\\s\\n\]\+"," ") | regex_replace("\(\?:\[\\n\]\+\|\(\?:\\\\n\)\+\)", "(n)*") | regex_replace("\\", "") | regex_replace("\(n\)\*", "\\n") }}''' create: true no_extra_spaces: true when: '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80770-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010050 - NIST-800-171-3.1.9 - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c) - dconf_gnome_login_banner_text - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Prevent user modification of the GNOME3 Login Warning Banner Text lineinfile: path: /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock regexp: ^/org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-text$ line: /org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-text create: true state: present when: '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80770-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010050 - NIST-800-171-3.1.9 - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c) - dconf_gnome_login_banner_text - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - name: Dconf Update command: dconf update when: '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80770-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010050 - NIST-800-171-3.1.9 - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c) - dconf_gnome_login_banner_text - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q gdm; then login_banner_text='' # Multiple regexes transform the banner regex into a usable banner # 0 - Remove anchors around the banner text login_banner_text=$(echo "$login_banner_text" | sed 's/^\^\(.*\)\$$/\1/g') # 1 - Keep only the first banners if there are multiple # (dod_banners contains the long and short banner) login_banner_text=$(echo "$login_banner_text" | sed 's/^(\(.*\.\)|.*)$/\1/g') # 2 - Add spaces ' '. (Transforms regex for "space or newline" into a " ") login_banner_text=$(echo "$login_banner_text" | sed 's/\[\\s\\n\]+/ /g') # 3 - Adds newline "tokens". (Transforms "(?:\[\\n\]+|(?:\\n)+)" into "(n)*") login_banner_text=$(echo "$login_banner_text" | sed 's/(?:\[\\n\]+|(?:\\\\n)+)/(n)*/g') # 4 - Remove any leftover backslash. (From any parethesis in the banner, for example). login_banner_text=$(echo "$login_banner_text" | sed 's/\\//g') # 5 - Removes the newline "token." (Transforms them into newline escape sequences "\n"). # ( Needs to be done after 4, otherwise the escapce sequence will become just "n". login_banner_text=$(echo "$login_banner_text" | sed 's/(n)\*/\\n/g') # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories # If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. # The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/login-screen\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|gdm.d' | cut -d":" -f1) DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/00-security-settings" DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d" mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] then if grep -q "^\\s*banner-message-text\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" then sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)banner-message-text(\s*=)/#\1banner-message-text\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" fi fi [ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/login-screen\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" then printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/login-screen]" >> ${DCONFFILE} fi escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "'${login_banner_text}'")" if grep -q "^\\s*banner-message-text\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" then sed -i "s/\\s*banner-message-text\\s*=\\s*.*/banner-message-text=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" else sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/login-screen\\]|a\\banner-message-text=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" fi dconf update # Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-text$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|gdm.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks" mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" # Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] then sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-text$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" fi if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-text$" /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/ then echo "/org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-text" >> "/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" fi dconf update else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Protect Accounts by Configuring PAM PAM, or Pluggable Authentication Modules, is a system which implements modular authentication for Linux programs. PAM provides a flexible and configurable architecture for authentication, and it should be configured to minimize exposure to unnecessary risk. This section contains guidance on how to accomplish that. PAM is implemented as a set of shared objects which are loaded and invoked whenever an application wishes to authenticate a user. Typically, the application must be running as root in order to take advantage of PAM, because PAM's modules often need to be able to access sensitive stores of account information, such as /etc/shadow. Traditional privileged network listeners (e.g. sshd) or SUID programs (e.g. sudo) already meet this requirement. An SUID root application, userhelper, is provided so that programs which are not SUID or privileged themselves can still take advantage of PAM. PAM looks in the directory /etc/pam.d for application-specific configuration information. For instance, if the program login attempts to authenticate a user, then PAM's libraries follow the instructions in the file /etc/pam.d/login to determine what actions should be taken. One very important file in /etc/pam.d is /etc/pam.d/system-auth. This file, which is included by many other PAM configuration files, defines 'default' system authentication measures. Modifying this file is a good way to make far-reaching authentication changes, for instance when implementing a centralized authentication service. Be careful when making changes to PAM's configuration files. The syntax for these files is complex, and modifications can have unexpected consequences. The default configurations shipped with applications should be sufficient for most users. Running authconfig or system-config-authentication will re-write the PAM configuration files, destroying any manually made changes and replacing them with a series of system defaults. One reference to the configuration file syntax can be found at https://fossies.org/linux/Linux-PAM-docs/doc/sag/Linux-PAM_SAG.pdf. Password Hashing algorithm Specify the system default encryption algorithm for encrypting passwords. Defines the value set as ENCRYPT_METHOD in /etc/login.defs. SHA512 SHA512 SHA256 yescrypt remember The last n passwords for each user are saved in /etc/security/opasswd in order to force password change history and keep the user from alternating between the same password too frequently. 0 10 24 2 4 5 5 Install pam_pwquality Package The libpwquality package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install libpwquality CCI-000366 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00225 4.4.2.3 Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required to compromise the password. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks. "pwquality" enforces complex password construction configuration and has the ability to limit brute-force attacks on the system. CCE-86225-0 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-86225-0 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_pam_pwquality_installed - name: Ensure libpwquality is installed package: name: libpwquality state: present when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-86225-0 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_pam_pwquality_installed [[packages]] name = "libpwquality" version = "*" include install_libpwquality class install_libpwquality { package { 'libpwquality': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=libpwquality # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q pam; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "libpwquality" ; then yum install -y "libpwquality" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disallow Configuration to Bypass Password Requirements for Privilege Escalation Verify the operating system is not configured to bypass password requirements for privilege escalation. Check the configuration of the "/etc/pam.d/sudo" file with the following command: $ sudo grep pam_succeed_if /etc/pam.d/sudo If any occurrences of "pam_succeed_if" is returned from the command, this is a finding. CCI-002038 IA-11 SRG-OS-000373-GPOS-00156 SRG-OS-000373-GPOS-00157 SRG-OS-000373-GPOS-00158 RHEL-08-010385 SV-251712r854083_rule Without re-authentication, users may access resources or perform tasks for which they do not have authorization. When operating systems provide the capability to escalate a functional capability, it is critical the user re-authenticate. CCE-86319-1 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-86319-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010385 - NIST-800-53-IA-11 - disallow_bypass_password_sudo - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Check for pam_succeed_if entry ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/pam.d/sudo create: false regexp: pam_succeed_if state: absent when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-86319-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010385 - NIST-800-53-IA-11 - disallow_bypass_password_sudo - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q pam; then sed -i '/pam_succeed_if/d' /etc/pam.d/sudo else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification To configure the system to notify users of last logon/access using pam_lastlog, add or correct the pam_lastlog settings in /etc/pam.d/postlogin to include showfailed option, such as: session [default=1] pam_lastlog.so showfailed And make sure that the silent option is not set for this specific line. If the system relies on authselect tool to manage PAM settings, the remediation will also use authselect tool. However, if any manual modification was made in PAM files, the authselect integrity check will fail and the remediation will be aborted in order to preserve intentional changes. In this case, an informative message will be shown in the remediation report. authselect contains an authselect feature to easily and properly enable Last Logon notifications with pam_lastlog.so module. If a custom profile was created and used in the system before this authselect feature was available, the new feature can't be used with this custom profile and the remediation will fail. In this case, the custom profile should be recreated or manually updated. 1 12 15 16 5.5.2 DSS05.04 DSS05.10 DSS06.10 CCI-000052 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 0582 0584 05885 0586 0846 0957 A.18.1.4 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.4 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 AC-9 AC-9(1) PR.AC-7 Req-10.2.4 10.2.1.4 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-020340 SV-230381r858726_rule Users need to be aware of activity that occurs regarding their account. Providing users with information regarding the number of unsuccessful attempts that were made to login to their account allows the user to determine if any unauthorized activity has occurred and gives them an opportunity to notify administrators. CCE-80788-3 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80788-3 - CJIS-5.5.2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020340 - NIST-800-53-AC-9 - NIST-800-53-AC-9(1) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 - configure_strategy - display_login_attempts - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Check if system relies on authselect tool ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80788-3 - CJIS-5.5.2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020340 - NIST-800-53-AC-9 - NIST-800-53-AC-9(1) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 - configure_strategy - display_login_attempts - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Collect the Available authselect Features ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect list-features minimal register: result_authselect_available_features changed_when: false when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_authselect_present.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80788-3 - CJIS-5.5.2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020340 - NIST-800-53-AC-9 - NIST-800-53-AC-9(1) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 - configure_strategy - display_login_attempts - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Configure pam_lastlog.so Using authselect Feature block: - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Get authselect Features Currently Enabled ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Ensure "with-silent-lastlog" Feature is Disabled Using authselect Tool ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect disable-feature with-silent-lastlog register: result_authselect_disable_feature_cmd when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_features.stdout is search("with-silent-lastlog") - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_disable_feature_cmd is not skipped - result_authselect_disable_feature_cmd is success when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - result_authselect_available_features.stdout is search("with-silent-lastlog") tags: - CCE-80788-3 - CJIS-5.5.2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020340 - NIST-800-53-AC-9 - NIST-800-53-AC-9(1) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 - configure_strategy - display_login_attempts - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Configure pam_lastlog.so in appropriate PAM files block: - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/postlogin - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Check if system relies on authselect tool ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present block: - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Get authselect current profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' register: result_authselect_profile changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present changed_when: false when: - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile }} when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_features is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path | basename }} when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Check if expected PAM module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^\s*session\s+{{ '[default=1]' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_lastlog.so\s*.* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_line_present - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Include or update the PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }} block: - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Check if required PAM module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }} with different control ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^\s*session\s+.*\s+pam_lastlog.so\s* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_line_other_control_present - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Ensure the correct control for the required PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.replace: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^(\s*session\s+).*(\bpam_lastlog.so.*) replace: \1[default=1] \2 register: result_pam_module_edit when: - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 1 - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Ensure the required PAM module line is included in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.lineinfile: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' insertafter: ^\s*session\s+.*pam_succeed_if\.so.* line: session [default=1] pam_lastlog.so register: result_pam_module_add when: - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 0 or result_pam_line_other_control_present.found > 1 - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present is defined - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - |- (result_pam_module_add is defined and result_pam_module_add.changed) or (result_pam_module_edit is defined and result_pam_module_edit.changed) when: - result_pam_line_present.found is defined - result_pam_line_present.found == 0 - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Check if the required PAM module option is present in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^\s*session\s+{{ '[default=1]' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_lastlog.so\s*.*\sshowfailed\b state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_module_showfailed_option_present - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Ensure the "showfailed" PAM option for "pam_lastlog.so" is included in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' backrefs: true regexp: ^(\s*session\s+{{ '[default=1]' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_lastlog.so.*) line: \1 showfailed state: present register: result_pam_showfailed_add when: - result_pam_module_showfailed_option_present.found == 0 - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Ensure the "silent" option from "pam_lastlog.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.replace: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: (.*session.*{{ '[default=1]' | regex_escape() }}.*pam_lastlog.so.*)\bsilent\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) replace: \1\2 register: result_pam_option_removal when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80788-3 - CJIS-5.5.2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020340 - NIST-800-53-AC-9 - NIST-800-53-AC-9(1) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 - configure_strategy - display_login_attempts - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q pam; then if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if authselect list-features minimal | grep -q with-silent-lastlog; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi authselect disable-feature with-silent-lastlog authselect apply-changes -b else if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do authselect enable-feature $feature; done authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile fi PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/postlogin") PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" authselect apply-changes -b if [ -e "$PAM_FILE_PATH" ] ; then PAM_FILE_PATH="$PAM_FILE_PATH" if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do authselect enable-feature $feature; done authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile fi PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "$PAM_FILE_PATH") PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" authselect apply-changes -b fi if ! grep -qP '^\s*session\s+'"\[default=1\]"'\s+pam_lastlog.so\s*.*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*session\s+.*\s+pam_lastlog.so\s*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH")" -eq 1 ]; then # The control is updated only if one single line matches. sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*session\s+).*(\bpam_lastlog.so.*)/\1'"\[default=1\]"' \2/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" else LAST_MATCH_LINE=$(grep -nP "^\s*session\s+.*pam_succeed_if\.so.*" "$PAM_FILE_PATH" | tail -n 1 | cut -d: -f 1) if [ ! -z $LAST_MATCH_LINE ]; then sed -i --follow-symlinks $LAST_MATCH_LINE' a session '"\[default=1\]"' pam_lastlog.so' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" else echo 'session '"\[default=1\]"' pam_lastlog.so' >> "$PAM_FILE_PATH" fi fi fi # Check the option if ! grep -qP '^\s*session\s+'"\[default=1\]"'\s+pam_lastlog.so\s*.*\sshowfailed\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then sed -i -E --follow-symlinks '/\s*session\s+'"\[default=1\]"'\s+pam_lastlog.so.*/ s/$/ showfailed/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" fi if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then authselect apply-changes -b fi else echo "$PAM_FILE_PATH was not found" >&2 fi if [ -e "$PAM_FILE_PATH" ] ; then PAM_FILE_PATH="$PAM_FILE_PATH" if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do authselect enable-feature $feature; done authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile fi PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "$PAM_FILE_PATH") PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" authselect apply-changes -b fi if grep -qP '^\s*session\s+'"\[default=1\]"'\s+pam_lastlog.so\s.*\bsilent\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*session.*'"\[default=1\]"'.*pam_lastlog.so.*)\ssilent=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" fi if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then authselect apply-changes -b fi else echo "$PAM_FILE_PATH was not found" >&2 fi fi else if [ -e "/etc/pam.d/postlogin" ] ; then PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/postlogin" if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do authselect enable-feature $feature; done authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile fi PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/postlogin") PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" authselect apply-changes -b fi if ! grep -qP '^\s*session\s+'"\[default=1\]"'\s+pam_lastlog.so\s*.*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*session\s+.*\s+pam_lastlog.so\s*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH")" -eq 1 ]; then # The control is updated only if one single line matches. sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*session\s+).*(\bpam_lastlog.so.*)/\1'"\[default=1\]"' \2/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" else LAST_MATCH_LINE=$(grep -nP "^\s*session\s+.*pam_succeed_if\.so.*" "$PAM_FILE_PATH" | tail -n 1 | cut -d: -f 1) if [ ! -z $LAST_MATCH_LINE ]; then sed -i --follow-symlinks $LAST_MATCH_LINE' a session '"\[default=1\]"' pam_lastlog.so' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" else echo 'session '"\[default=1\]"' pam_lastlog.so' >> "$PAM_FILE_PATH" fi fi fi # Check the option if ! grep -qP '^\s*session\s+'"\[default=1\]"'\s+pam_lastlog.so\s*.*\sshowfailed\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then sed -i -E --follow-symlinks '/\s*session\s+'"\[default=1\]"'\s+pam_lastlog.so.*/ s/$/ showfailed/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" fi if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then authselect apply-changes -b fi else echo "/etc/pam.d/postlogin was not found" >&2 fi if [ -e "/etc/pam.d/postlogin" ] ; then PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/postlogin" if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do authselect enable-feature $feature; done authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile fi PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/postlogin") PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" authselect apply-changes -b fi if grep -qP '^\s*session\s+'"\[default=1\]"'\s+pam_lastlog.so\s.*\bsilent\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*session.*'"\[default=1\]"'.*pam_lastlog.so.*)\ssilent=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" fi if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then authselect apply-changes -b fi else echo "/etc/pam.d/postlogin was not found" >&2 fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Set Up a Private Namespace in PAM Configuration To setup a private namespace add the following line to /etc/pam.d/login: session required pam_namespace.so BP28(R39) The pam_namespace PAM module sets up a private namespace for a session with polyinstantiated directories. A polyinstantiated directory provides a different instance of itself based on user name, or when using SELinux, user name, security context or both. The polyinstatied directories can be used to dedicate separate temporary directories to each account. CCE-83744-3 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-83744-3 - enable_pam_namespace - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Make changes to /etc/pam.d/login lineinfile: path: /etc/pam.d/login create: false regexp: ^\s*session\s+required\s+pam_namespace.so\s*$ line: session required pam_namespace.so state: present when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-83744-3 - enable_pam_namespace - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q pam; then if ! grep -Eq '^\s*session\s+required\s+pam_namespace.so\s*$' '/etc/pam.d/login' ; then echo "session required pam_namespace.so" >> "/etc/pam.d/login" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Set Lockouts for Failed Password Attempts The pam_faillock PAM module provides the capability to lock out user accounts after a number of failed login attempts. Its documentation is available in /usr/share/doc/pam-VERSION/txts/README.pam_faillock. Locking out user accounts presents the risk of a denial-of-service attack. The lockout policy must weigh whether the risk of such a denial-of-service attack outweighs the benefits of thwarting password guessing attacks. fail_deny Number of failed login attempts before account lockout 10 3 4 5 6 8 3 faillock directory The directory where the user files with the failure records are kept /var/log/faillock /var/log/faillock /var/run/faillock fail_interval Interval for counting failed login attempts before account lockout 100000000 1800 3600 86400 900 900 fail_unlock_time Seconds before automatic unlocking or permanently locking after excessive failed logins 1800 3600 600 604800 86400 900 0 0 tally2_unlock_time Seconds before automatic unlocking or permanently locking after excessive failed logins 1800 3600 600 604800 86400 900 0 0 faildelay_delay Delay next login attempt after a failed login 0 4000000 4000000 pwhistory_remember Prevent password re-use using password history lookup 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 24 5 PAM pwhistory remember - control flag 'Specify the control flag required for password remember requirement. If multiple values are allowed write them separated by commas as in "required,requisite", for remediations the first value will be taken' required optional requisite sufficient binding required,requisite requisite,required requisite tally2 Number of failed login attempts 1 2 3 4 5 10 3 Configure the Use of the pam_faillock.so Module in the /etc/pam.d/password-auth File. The pam_faillock.so module must be loaded in preauth in /etc/pam.d/password-auth. CCI-000044 AC-7 (a) SRG-OS-000021-GPOS-00005 RHEL-08-020026 SV-244534r743851_rule If the pam_faillock.so module is not loaded the system will not correctly lockout accounts to prevent password guessing attacks. CCE-86931-3 Configure the Use of the pam_faillock.so Module in the /etc/pam.d/system-auth File. The pam_faillock.so module must be loaded in preauth in /etc/pam.d/system-auth. CCI-000044 AC-7 (a) SRG-OS-000021-GPOS-00005 RHEL-08-020025 SV-244533r743848_rule If the pam_faillock.so module is not loaded the system will not correctly lockout accounts to prevent password guessing attacks. CCE-86916-4 An SELinux Context must be configured for the pam_faillock.so records directory The dir configuration option in PAM pam_faillock.so module defines where the lockout records is stored. The configured directory must have the correct SELinux context. CCI-000044 AC-7 (a) SRG-OS-000021-GPOS-00005 RHEL-08-020027 RHEL-08-020028 SV-250315r854079_rule SV-250316r854080_rule Not having the correct SELinux context on the pam_faillock.so records directory may lead to unauthorized access to the directory. CCE-86248-2 # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then #!/bin/bash FAILLOCK_CONF_FILES="/etc/security/faillock.conf /etc/pam.d/system-auth /etc/pam.d/password-auth" faillock_dirs=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?:auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)?dir\s*=\s*(\S+)" $FAILLOCK_CONF_FILES \ | sed -r 's/.*=\s*(\S+)/\1/') if [ -n "$faillock_dirs" ]; then for dir in $faillock_dirs; do if ! semanage fcontext -a -t faillog_t "$dir(/.*)?"; then semanage fcontext -m -t faillog_t "$dir(/.*)?" fi if [ ! -e $dir ]; then mkdir -p $dir fi restorecon -R -v $dir done else echo " The pam_faillock.so dir option is not set in the system. If this is not expected, make sure pam_faillock.so is properly configured." fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Account Lockouts Must Be Logged PAM faillock locks an account due to excessive password failures, this event must be logged. This rule is deprecated in favor of the accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_audit rule.Please consider replacing this rule in your files as it is not expected to receive updates as of version 0.1.65. CCI-000044 AC-7 (a) Without auditing of these events it may be harder or impossible to identify what an attacker did after an attack. CCE-86107-0 - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check if system relies on authselect tool ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present tags: - CCE-86107-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-7 (a) - account_passwords_pam_faillock_audit - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Remediation where authselect tool is present block: - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Get authselect current features ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure "with-faillock" feature is enabled using authselect tool ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature with-faillock register: result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_features.stdout is not search("with-faillock") - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is not skipped - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is success when: result_authselect_present.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86107-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-7 (a) - account_passwords_pam_faillock_audit - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Remediation where authselect tool is not present block: - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check if pam_faillock.so is already enabled ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth regexp: .*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail) state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_faillock_is_enabled - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Enable pam_faillock.so preauth editing PAM files ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' line: auth required pam_faillock.so preauth insertbefore: ^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.* state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Enable pam_faillock.so authfail editing PAM files ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' line: auth required pam_faillock.so authfail insertbefore: ^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.* state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Enable pam_faillock.so account section editing PAM files ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' line: account required pam_faillock.so insertbefore: ^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.* state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 when: not result_authselect_present.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86107-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-7 (a) - account_passwords_pam_faillock_audit - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check the presence of /etc/security/faillock.conf file ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/security/faillock.conf register: result_faillock_conf_check tags: - CCE-86107-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-7 (a) - account_passwords_pam_faillock_audit - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure the pam_faillock.so audit parameter in /etc/security/faillock.conf ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/security/faillock.conf regexp: ^\s*audit line: audit state: present when: result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86107-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-7 (a) - account_passwords_pam_faillock_audit - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure the pam_faillock.so audit parameter not in PAM files block: - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth file is present ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth register: result_pam_file_present - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check the proper remediation for the system block: - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check if system relies on authselect tool ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present block: - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Get authselect current profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' register: result_authselect_profile changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present changed_when: false when: - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile }} when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_features is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path | basename }} when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure the "audit" option from "pam_faillock.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.replace: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: (.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\baudit\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) replace: \1\2 register: result_pam_option_removal - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - result_pam_option_removal is changed when: - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check if /etc/pam.d/password-auth file is present ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth register: result_pam_file_present - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check the proper remediation for the system block: - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check if system relies on authselect tool ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present block: - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Get authselect current profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' register: result_authselect_profile changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present changed_when: false when: - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile }} when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_features is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path | basename }} when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure the "audit" option from "pam_faillock.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.replace: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: (.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\baudit\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) replace: \1\2 register: result_pam_option_removal - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - result_pam_option_removal is changed when: - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists when: result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86107-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-7 (a) - account_passwords_pam_faillock_audit - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure the pam_faillock.so audit parameter in PAM files block: - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check if pam_faillock.so audit parameter is already enabled in pam files ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth regexp: .*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail).*audit state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_faillock_audit_parameter_is_present - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure the inclusion of pam_faillock.so preauth audit parameter in auth section ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' backrefs: true regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so preauth.*) line: \1required\3 audit state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_audit_parameter_is_present.found == 0 when: not result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86107-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-7 (a) - account_passwords_pam_faillock_audit - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi authselect enable-feature with-faillock authselect apply-changes -b else AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" do if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth\s+required\s+pam_faillock\.so\s+(preauth silent|authfail).*$' "$pam_file" ; then sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.*/i auth required pam_faillock.so preauth silent' "$pam_file" sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.*/i auth required pam_faillock.so authfail' "$pam_file" sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.*/i account required pam_faillock.so' "$pam_file" fi sed -Ei 's/(auth.*)(\[default=die\])(.*pam_faillock\.so)/\1required \3/g' "$pam_file" done fi AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") FAILLOCK_CONF="/etc/security/faillock.conf" if [ -f $FAILLOCK_CONF ]; then regex="^\s*audit" line="audit" if ! grep -q $regex $FAILLOCK_CONF; then echo $line >> $FAILLOCK_CONF fi for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" do if [ -e "$pam_file" ] ; then PAM_FILE_PATH="$pam_file" if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do authselect enable-feature $feature; done authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile fi PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "$pam_file") PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" authselect apply-changes -b fi if grep -qP '^\s*auth\s.*\bpam_faillock.so\s.*\baudit\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\baudit\b=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" fi if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then authselect apply-changes -b fi else echo "$pam_file was not found" >&2 fi done else for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" do if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail).*audit' "$pam_file"; then sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*preauth.*silent.*/ s/$/ audit/' "$pam_file" fi done fi Account Lockouts Must Persist By setting a `dir` in the faillock configuration account lockouts will persist across reboots. This rule is deprecated in favor of the accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir rule.Please consider replacing this rule in your files as it is not expected to receive updates as of version 0.1.65. CCI-000044 AC-7 (ia) Having lockouts persist across reboots ensures that account is only unlocked by an administrator. If the lockouts did not persist across reboots an attack could simply reboot the system to continue brute force attacks against the accounts on the system. CCE-86079-1 Limit Password Reuse: password-auth Do not allow users to reuse recent passwords. This can be accomplished by using the remember option for the pam_pwhistory PAM module. On systems with newer versions of authselect, the pam_pwhistory PAM module can be enabled via authselect feature: authselect enable-feature with-pwhistory Otherwise, it should be enabled using an authselect custom profile. Newer systems also have the /etc/security/pwhistory.conf file for setting pam_pwhistory module options. This file should be used whenever available. Otherwise, the pam_pwhistory module options can be set in PAM files. The value for remember option must be equal or greater than If the system relies on authselect tool to manage PAM settings, the remediation will also use authselect tool. However, if any manual modification was made in PAM files, the authselect integrity check will fail and the remediation will be aborted in order to preserve intentional changes. In this case, an informative message will be shown in the remediation report. Newer versions of authselect contain an authselect feature to easily and properly enable pam_pwhistory.so module. If this feature is not yet available in your system, an authselect custom profile must be used to avoid integrity issues in PAM files. If a custom profile was created and used in the system before this authselect feature was available, the new feature can't be used with this custom profile and the remediation will fail. In this case, the custom profile should be recreated or manually updated. 1 12 15 16 5 5.6.2.1.1 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 3.5.8 CCI-000200 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 A.18.1.4 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 IA-5(f) IA-5(1)(e) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 Req-8.2.5 8.3.7 SRG-OS-000077-GPOS-00045 RHEL-08-020220 4.4.3.3.1 4.4.3.3.3 SV-230368r902759_rule Preventing re-use of previous passwords helps ensure that a compromised password is not re-used by a user. CCE-83478-8 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-83478-8 - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020220 - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.7 - accounts_password_pam_pwhistory_remember_password_auth - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_remember # promote to variable set_fact: var_password_pam_remember: !!str tags: - always - name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_remember_control_flag # promote to variable set_fact: var_password_pam_remember_control_flag: !!str tags: - always - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Check if system relies on authselect tool' ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-83478-8 - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020220 - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.7 - accounts_password_pam_pwhistory_remember_password_auth - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Collect the available authselect features' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect list-features minimal register: result_authselect_available_features changed_when: false when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_authselect_present.stat.exists tags: - CCE-83478-8 - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020220 - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.7 - accounts_password_pam_pwhistory_remember_password_auth - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Enable pam_pwhistory.so using authselect feature' block: - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Check integrity of authselect current profile' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result' ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Get authselect current features' ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure "with-pwhistory" feature is enabled using authselect tool' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature with-pwhistory register: result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_features.stdout is not search("with-pwhistory") - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is not skipped - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is success when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - result_authselect_available_features.stdout is search("with-pwhistory") tags: - CCE-83478-8 - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020220 - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.7 - accounts_password_pam_pwhistory_remember_password_auth - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Enable pam_pwhistory.so in appropriate PAM files' block: - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact' ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Check if system relies on authselect tool' ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present' block: - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Check integrity of authselect current profile' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result' ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Get authselect current profile' ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' register: result_authselect_profile changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact' ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact' ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile' ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created' ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present changed_when: false when: - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile }} when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_features is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile' ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path | basename }} when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Check if expected PAM module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }}' ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^\s*password\s+{{ '{{ var_password_pam_remember_control_flag.split(",")[0] }}' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_line_present - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Include or update the PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }}' block: - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Check if required PAM module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }} with different control' ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_line_other_control_present - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure the correct control for the required PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }}' ansible.builtin.replace: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwhistory.so.*) replace: \1{{ var_password_pam_remember_control_flag.split(",")[0] }} \2 register: result_pam_module_edit when: - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 1 - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure the required PAM module line is included in {{ pam_file_path }}' ansible.builtin.lineinfile: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' insertafter: ^password.*requisite.*pam_pwquality\.so line: password {{ var_password_pam_remember_control_flag.split(",")[0] }} pam_pwhistory.so register: result_pam_module_add when: - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 0 or result_pam_line_other_control_present.found > 1 - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present is defined - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - |- (result_pam_module_add is defined and result_pam_module_add.changed) or (result_pam_module_edit is defined and result_pam_module_edit.changed) when: - result_pam_line_present.found is defined - result_pam_line_present.found == 0 when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - | (result_authselect_available_features.stdout is defined and result_authselect_available_features.stdout is not search("with-pwhistory")) or result_authselect_available_features is not defined tags: - CCE-83478-8 - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020220 - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.7 - accounts_password_pam_pwhistory_remember_password_auth - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Check the presence of /etc/security/pwhistory.conf file' ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/security/pwhistory.conf register: result_pwhistory_conf_check when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-83478-8 - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020220 - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.7 - accounts_password_pam_pwhistory_remember_password_auth - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - pam_pwhistory.so parameters are configured in /etc/security/pwhistory.conf file' block: - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure the pam_pwhistory.so remember parameter in /etc/security/pwhistory.conf' ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/security/pwhistory.conf regexp: ^\s*remember\s*= line: remember = {{ var_password_pam_remember }} state: present - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure the pam_pwhistory.so remember parameter is removed from PAM files' block: - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Check if /etc/pam.d/password-auth file is present' ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth register: result_pam_file_present - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Check the proper remediation for the system' block: - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact' ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Check if system relies on authselect tool' ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present' block: - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Check integrity of authselect current profile' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result' ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Get authselect current profile' ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' register: result_authselect_profile changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact' ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact' ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile' ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created' ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present changed_when: false when: - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile }} when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_features is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile' ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path | basename }} when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure the "remember" option from "pam_pwhistory.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }}' ansible.builtin.replace: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: (.*password.*pam_pwhistory.so.*)\bremember\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) replace: \1\2 register: result_pam_option_removal - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - result_pam_option_removal is changed when: - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_pwhistory_conf_check.stat.exists tags: - CCE-83478-8 - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020220 - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.7 - accounts_password_pam_pwhistory_remember_password_auth - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - pam_pwhistory.so parameters are configured in PAM files' block: - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact' ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Check if system relies on authselect tool' ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present' block: - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Check integrity of authselect current profile' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result' ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Get authselect current profile' ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' register: result_authselect_profile changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact' ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact' ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile' ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created' ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present changed_when: false when: - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile }} when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_features is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile' ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path | basename }} when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Check if expected PAM module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }}' ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^\s*password\s+{{ 'requisite' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_line_present - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Include or update the PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }}' block: - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Check if required PAM module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }} with different control' ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_line_other_control_present - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure the correct control for the required PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }}' ansible.builtin.replace: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwhistory.so.*) replace: \1requisite \2 register: result_pam_module_edit when: - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 1 - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure the required PAM module line is included in {{ pam_file_path }}' ansible.builtin.lineinfile: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' line: password requisite pam_pwhistory.so register: result_pam_module_add when: - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 0 or result_pam_line_other_control_present.found > 1 - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present is defined - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - |- (result_pam_module_add is defined and result_pam_module_add.changed) or (result_pam_module_edit is defined and result_pam_module_edit.changed) when: - result_pam_line_present.found is defined - result_pam_line_present.found == 0 - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Check if the required PAM module option is present in {{ pam_file_path }}' ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^\s*password\s+{{ 'requisite' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.*\sremember\b state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_module_remember_option_present - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure the "remember" PAM option for "pam_pwhistory.so" is included in {{ pam_file_path }}' ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' backrefs: true regexp: ^(\s*password\s+{{ 'requisite' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_pwhistory.so.*) line: \1 remember={{ var_password_pam_remember }} state: present register: result_pam_remember_add when: - result_pam_module_remember_option_present.found == 0 - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure the required value for "remember" PAM option from "pam_pwhistory.so" in {{ pam_file_path }}' ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' backrefs: true regexp: ^(\s*password\s+{{ 'requisite' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s+.*)(remember)=[0-9a-zA-Z]+\s*(.*) line: \1\2={{ var_password_pam_remember }} \3 register: result_pam_remember_edit when: - result_pam_module_remember_option_present.found > 0 - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - (result_pam_remember_add is defined and result_pam_remember_add.changed) or (result_pam_remember_edit is defined and result_pam_remember_edit.changed) when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - not result_pwhistory_conf_check.stat.exists tags: - CCE-83478-8 - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020220 - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.7 - accounts_password_pam_pwhistory_remember_password_auth - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q pam; then var_password_pam_remember='' var_password_pam_remember_control_flag='' var_password_pam_remember_control_flag="$(echo $var_password_pam_remember_control_flag | cut -d \, -f 1)" if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if authselect list-features minimal | grep -q with-pwhistory; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi authselect enable-feature with-pwhistory authselect apply-changes -b else if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do authselect enable-feature $feature; done authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile fi PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" authselect apply-changes -b if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"$var_password_pam_remember_control_flag"'\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH")" -eq 1 ]; then # The control is updated only if one single line matches. sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwhistory.so.*)/\1'"$var_password_pam_remember_control_flag"' \2/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" else LAST_MATCH_LINE=$(grep -nP "^password.*requisite.*pam_pwquality\.so" "$PAM_FILE_PATH" | tail -n 1 | cut -d: -f 1) if [ ! -z $LAST_MATCH_LINE ]; then sed -i --follow-symlinks $LAST_MATCH_LINE' a password '"$var_password_pam_remember_control_flag"' pam_pwhistory.so' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" else echo 'password '"$var_password_pam_remember_control_flag"' pam_pwhistory.so' >> "$PAM_FILE_PATH" fi fi fi fi else if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"$var_password_pam_remember_control_flag"'\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.*' "/etc/pam.d/password-auth"; then # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*' "/etc/pam.d/password-auth")" -eq 1 ]; then # The control is updated only if one single line matches. sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwhistory.so.*)/\1'"$var_password_pam_remember_control_flag"' \2/' "/etc/pam.d/password-auth" else LAST_MATCH_LINE=$(grep -nP "^password.*requisite.*pam_pwquality\.so" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth" | tail -n 1 | cut -d: -f 1) if [ ! -z $LAST_MATCH_LINE ]; then sed -i --follow-symlinks $LAST_MATCH_LINE' a password '"$var_password_pam_remember_control_flag"' pam_pwhistory.so' "/etc/pam.d/password-auth" else echo 'password '"$var_password_pam_remember_control_flag"' pam_pwhistory.so' >> "/etc/pam.d/password-auth" fi fi fi fi PWHISTORY_CONF="/etc/security/pwhistory.conf" if [ -f $PWHISTORY_CONF ]; then regex="^\s*remember\s*=" line="remember = $var_password_pam_remember" if ! grep -q $regex $PWHISTORY_CONF; then echo $line >> $PWHISTORY_CONF else sed -i --follow-symlinks 's|^\s*\(remember\s*=\s*\)\(\S\+\)|\1'"$var_password_pam_remember"'|g' $PWHISTORY_CONF fi if [ -e "/etc/pam.d/password-auth" ] ; then PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/password-auth" if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do authselect enable-feature $feature; done authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile fi PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" authselect apply-changes -b fi if grep -qP '^\s*password\s.*\bpam_pwhistory.so\s.*\bremember\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*password.*pam_pwhistory.so.*)\bremember\b=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" fi if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then authselect apply-changes -b fi else echo "/etc/pam.d/password-auth was not found" >&2 fi else PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/password-auth" if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do authselect enable-feature $feature; done authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile fi PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" authselect apply-changes -b fi if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"requisite"'\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH")" -eq 1 ]; then # The control is updated only if one single line matches. sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwhistory.so.*)/\1'"requisite"' \2/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" else echo 'password '"requisite"' pam_pwhistory.so' >> "$PAM_FILE_PATH" fi fi # Check the option if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"requisite"'\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.*\sremember\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then sed -i -E --follow-symlinks '/\s*password\s+'"requisite"'\s+pam_pwhistory.so.*/ s/$/ remember='"$var_password_pam_remember"'/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" else sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(\s*password\s+'"requisite"'\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s+.*)('"remember"'=)[[:alnum:]]+\s*(.*)/\1\2'"$var_password_pam_remember"' \3/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" fi if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then authselect apply-changes -b fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Limit Password Reuse: system-auth Do not allow users to reuse recent passwords. This can be accomplished by using the remember option for the pam_pwhistory PAM module. On systems with newer versions of authselect, the pam_pwhistory PAM module can be enabled via authselect feature: authselect enable-feature with-pwhistory Otherwise, it should be enabled using an authselect custom profile. Newer systems also have the /etc/security/pwhistory.conf file for setting pam_pwhistory module options. This file should be used whenever available. Otherwise, the pam_pwhistory module options can be set in PAM files. The value for remember option must be equal or greater than If the system relies on authselect tool to manage PAM settings, the remediation will also use authselect tool. However, if any manual modification was made in PAM files, the authselect integrity check will fail and the remediation will be aborted in order to preserve intentional changes. In this case, an informative message will be shown in the remediation report. Newer versions of authselect contain an authselect feature to easily and properly enable pam_pwhistory.so module. If this feature is not yet available in your system, an authselect custom profile must be used to avoid integrity issues in PAM files. 1 12 15 16 5 5.6.2.1.1 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 3.5.8 CCI-000200 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 A.18.1.4 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 IA-5(f) IA-5(1)(e) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 Req-8.2.5 8.3.7 SRG-OS-000077-GPOS-00045 RHEL-08-020221 4.4.3.3.1 4.4.3.3.3 SV-251717r902749_rule Preventing re-use of previous passwords helps ensure that a compromised password is not re-used by a user. CCE-83480-4 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-83480-4 - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020221 - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.7 - accounts_password_pam_pwhistory_remember_system_auth - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_remember # promote to variable set_fact: var_password_pam_remember: !!str tags: - always - name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_remember_control_flag # promote to variable set_fact: var_password_pam_remember_control_flag: !!str tags: - always - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Check if system relies on authselect tool' ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-83480-4 - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020221 - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.7 - accounts_password_pam_pwhistory_remember_system_auth - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Collect the available authselect features' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect list-features minimal register: result_authselect_available_features changed_when: false when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_authselect_present.stat.exists tags: - CCE-83480-4 - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020221 - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.7 - accounts_password_pam_pwhistory_remember_system_auth - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Enable pam_pwhistory.so using authselect feature' block: - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Check integrity of authselect current profile' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result' ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Get authselect current features' ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure "with-pwhistory" feature is enabled using authselect tool' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature with-pwhistory register: result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_features.stdout is not search("with-pwhistory") - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is not skipped - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is success when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - result_authselect_available_features.stdout is search("with-pwhistory") tags: - CCE-83480-4 - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020221 - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.7 - accounts_password_pam_pwhistory_remember_system_auth - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Enable pam_pwhistory.so in appropriate PAM files' block: - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact' ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Check if system relies on authselect tool' ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present' block: - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Check integrity of authselect current profile' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result' ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Get authselect current profile' ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' register: result_authselect_profile changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact' ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact' ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile' ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created' ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present changed_when: false when: - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile }} when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_features is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile' ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path | basename }} when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Check if expected PAM module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }}' ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^\s*password\s+{{ '{{ var_password_pam_remember_control_flag.split(",")[0] }}' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_line_present - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Include or update the PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }}' block: - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Check if required PAM module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }} with different control' ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_line_other_control_present - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure the correct control for the required PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }}' ansible.builtin.replace: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwhistory.so.*) replace: \1{{ var_password_pam_remember_control_flag.split(",")[0] }} \2 register: result_pam_module_edit when: - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 1 - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure the required PAM module line is included in {{ pam_file_path }}' ansible.builtin.lineinfile: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' insertafter: ^password.*requisite.*pam_pwquality\.so line: password {{ var_password_pam_remember_control_flag.split(",")[0] }} pam_pwhistory.so register: result_pam_module_add when: - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 0 or result_pam_line_other_control_present.found > 1 - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present is defined - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - |- (result_pam_module_add is defined and result_pam_module_add.changed) or (result_pam_module_edit is defined and result_pam_module_edit.changed) when: - result_pam_line_present.found is defined - result_pam_line_present.found == 0 when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - | (result_authselect_available_features.stdout is defined and result_authselect_available_features.stdout is not search("with-pwhistory")) or result_authselect_available_features is not defined tags: - CCE-83480-4 - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020221 - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.7 - accounts_password_pam_pwhistory_remember_system_auth - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Check the presence of /etc/security/pwhistory.conf file' ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/security/pwhistory.conf register: result_pwhistory_conf_check when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-83480-4 - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020221 - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.7 - accounts_password_pam_pwhistory_remember_system_auth - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - pam_pwhistory.so parameters are configured in /etc/security/pwhistory.conf file' block: - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure the pam_pwhistory.so remember parameter in /etc/security/pwhistory.conf' ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/security/pwhistory.conf regexp: ^\s*remember\s*= line: remember = {{ var_password_pam_remember }} state: present - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure the pam_pwhistory.so remember parameter is removed from PAM files' block: - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth file is present' ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth register: result_pam_file_present - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Check the proper remediation for the system' block: - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact' ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Check if system relies on authselect tool' ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present' block: - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Check integrity of authselect current profile' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result' ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Get authselect current profile' ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' register: result_authselect_profile changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact' ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact' ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile' ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created' ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present changed_when: false when: - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile }} when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_features is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile' ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path | basename }} when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure the "remember" option from "pam_pwhistory.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }}' ansible.builtin.replace: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: (.*password.*pam_pwhistory.so.*)\bremember\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) replace: \1\2 register: result_pam_option_removal - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - result_pam_option_removal is changed when: - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_pwhistory_conf_check.stat.exists tags: - CCE-83480-4 - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020221 - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.7 - accounts_password_pam_pwhistory_remember_system_auth - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - pam_pwhistory.so parameters are configured in PAM files' block: - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact' ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Check if system relies on authselect tool' ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present' block: - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Check integrity of authselect current profile' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result' ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Get authselect current profile' ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' register: result_authselect_profile changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact' ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact' ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile' ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created' ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present changed_when: false when: - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile }} when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_features is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile' ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path | basename }} when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Check if expected PAM module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }}' ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^\s*password\s+{{ 'requisite' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_line_present - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Include or update the PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }}' block: - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Check if required PAM module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }} with different control' ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_line_other_control_present - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure the correct control for the required PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }}' ansible.builtin.replace: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwhistory.so.*) replace: \1requisite \2 register: result_pam_module_edit when: - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 1 - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure the required PAM module line is included in {{ pam_file_path }}' ansible.builtin.lineinfile: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' line: password requisite pam_pwhistory.so register: result_pam_module_add when: - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 0 or result_pam_line_other_control_present.found > 1 - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present is defined - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - |- (result_pam_module_add is defined and result_pam_module_add.changed) or (result_pam_module_edit is defined and result_pam_module_edit.changed) when: - result_pam_line_present.found is defined - result_pam_line_present.found == 0 - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Check if the required PAM module option is present in {{ pam_file_path }}' ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^\s*password\s+{{ 'requisite' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.*\sremember\b state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_module_remember_option_present - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure the "remember" PAM option for "pam_pwhistory.so" is included in {{ pam_file_path }}' ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' backrefs: true regexp: ^(\s*password\s+{{ 'requisite' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_pwhistory.so.*) line: \1 remember={{ var_password_pam_remember }} state: present register: result_pam_remember_add when: - result_pam_module_remember_option_present.found == 0 - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure the required value for "remember" PAM option from "pam_pwhistory.so" in {{ pam_file_path }}' ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' backrefs: true regexp: ^(\s*password\s+{{ 'requisite' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s+.*)(remember)=[0-9a-zA-Z]+\s*(.*) line: \1\2={{ var_password_pam_remember }} \3 register: result_pam_remember_edit when: - result_pam_module_remember_option_present.found > 0 - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied' ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - (result_pam_remember_add is defined and result_pam_remember_add.changed) or (result_pam_remember_edit is defined and result_pam_remember_edit.changed) when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - not result_pwhistory_conf_check.stat.exists tags: - CCE-83480-4 - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020221 - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.7 - accounts_password_pam_pwhistory_remember_system_auth - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q pam; then var_password_pam_remember='' var_password_pam_remember_control_flag='' var_password_pam_remember_control_flag="$(echo $var_password_pam_remember_control_flag | cut -d \, -f 1)" if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if authselect list-features minimal | grep -q with-pwhistory; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi authselect enable-feature with-pwhistory authselect apply-changes -b else if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do authselect enable-feature $feature; done authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile fi PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/system-auth") PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" authselect apply-changes -b if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"$var_password_pam_remember_control_flag"'\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH")" -eq 1 ]; then # The control is updated only if one single line matches. sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwhistory.so.*)/\1'"$var_password_pam_remember_control_flag"' \2/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" else LAST_MATCH_LINE=$(grep -nP "^password.*requisite.*pam_pwquality\.so" "$PAM_FILE_PATH" | tail -n 1 | cut -d: -f 1) if [ ! -z $LAST_MATCH_LINE ]; then sed -i --follow-symlinks $LAST_MATCH_LINE' a password '"$var_password_pam_remember_control_flag"' pam_pwhistory.so' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" else echo 'password '"$var_password_pam_remember_control_flag"' pam_pwhistory.so' >> "$PAM_FILE_PATH" fi fi fi fi else if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"$var_password_pam_remember_control_flag"'\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.*' "/etc/pam.d/system-auth"; then # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*' "/etc/pam.d/system-auth")" -eq 1 ]; then # The control is updated only if one single line matches. sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwhistory.so.*)/\1'"$var_password_pam_remember_control_flag"' \2/' "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" else LAST_MATCH_LINE=$(grep -nP "^password.*requisite.*pam_pwquality\.so" "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" | tail -n 1 | cut -d: -f 1) if [ ! -z $LAST_MATCH_LINE ]; then sed -i --follow-symlinks $LAST_MATCH_LINE' a password '"$var_password_pam_remember_control_flag"' pam_pwhistory.so' "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" else echo 'password '"$var_password_pam_remember_control_flag"' pam_pwhistory.so' >> "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" fi fi fi fi PWHISTORY_CONF="/etc/security/pwhistory.conf" if [ -f $PWHISTORY_CONF ]; then regex="^\s*remember\s*=" line="remember = $var_password_pam_remember" if ! grep -q $regex $PWHISTORY_CONF; then echo $line >> $PWHISTORY_CONF else sed -i --follow-symlinks 's|^\s*\(remember\s*=\s*\)\(\S\+\)|\1'"$var_password_pam_remember"'|g' $PWHISTORY_CONF fi if [ -e "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" ] ; then PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/system-auth" if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do authselect enable-feature $feature; done authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile fi PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/system-auth") PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" authselect apply-changes -b fi if grep -qP '^\s*password\s.*\bpam_pwhistory.so\s.*\bremember\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*password.*pam_pwhistory.so.*)\bremember\b=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" fi if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then authselect apply-changes -b fi else echo "/etc/pam.d/system-auth was not found" >&2 fi else PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/system-auth" if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do authselect enable-feature $feature; done authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile fi PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/system-auth") PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" authselect apply-changes -b fi if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"requisite"'\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH")" -eq 1 ]; then # The control is updated only if one single line matches. sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwhistory.so.*)/\1'"requisite"' \2/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" else echo 'password '"requisite"' pam_pwhistory.so' >> "$PAM_FILE_PATH" fi fi # Check the option if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"requisite"'\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.*\sremember\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then sed -i -E --follow-symlinks '/\s*password\s+'"requisite"'\s+pam_pwhistory.so.*/ s/$/ remember='"$var_password_pam_remember"'/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" else sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(\s*password\s+'"requisite"'\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s+.*)('"remember"'=)[[:alnum:]]+\s*(.*)/\1\2'"$var_password_pam_remember"' \3/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" fi if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then authselect apply-changes -b fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Limit Password Reuse Do not allow users to reuse recent passwords. This can be accomplished by using the remember option for the pam_unix or pam_pwhistory PAM modules. If the system relies on authselect tool to manage PAM settings, the remediation will also use authselect tool. However, if any manual modification was made in PAM files, the authselect integrity check will fail and the remediation will be aborted in order to preserve intentional changes. In this case, an informative message will be shown in the remediation report. Newer versions of authselect contain an authselect feature to easily and properly enable pam_pwhistory.so module. If this feature is not yet available in your system, an authselect custom profile must be used to avoid integrity issues in PAM files. BP28(R18) 1 12 15 16 5 5.6.2.1.1 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 3.5.8 CCI-000200 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 A.18.1.4 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 IA-5(f) IA-5(1)(e) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 Req-8.2.5 8.3.7 SRG-OS-000077-GPOS-00045 5.4.3 Preventing re-use of previous passwords helps ensure that a compromised password is not re-used by a user. CCE-80666-1 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80666-1 - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.7 - accounts_password_pam_unix_remember - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_unix_remember # promote to variable set_fact: var_password_pam_unix_remember: !!str tags: - always - name: Limit Password Reuse - Check if system relies on authselect tool ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80666-1 - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.7 - accounts_password_pam_unix_remember - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Limit Password Reuse - Collect the available authselect features ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect list-features minimal register: result_authselect_available_features changed_when: false when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_authselect_present.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80666-1 - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.7 - accounts_password_pam_unix_remember - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Limit Password Reuse - Enable pam_pwhistory.so using authselect feature block: - name: Limit Password Reuse - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Limit Password Reuse - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Limit Password Reuse - Get authselect current features ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure "with-pwhistory" feature is enabled using authselect tool ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature with-pwhistory register: result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_features.stdout is not search("with-pwhistory") - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is not skipped - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is success when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - result_authselect_available_features.stdout is search("with-pwhistory") tags: - CCE-80666-1 - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.7 - accounts_password_pam_unix_remember - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Limit Password Reuse - Enable pam_pwhistory.so in appropriate PAM files block: - name: Limit Password Reuse - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth - name: Limit Password Reuse - Check if system relies on authselect tool ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present block: - name: Limit Password Reuse - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Limit Password Reuse - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Limit Password Reuse - Get authselect current profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' register: result_authselect_profile changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Limit Password Reuse - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") - name: Limit Password Reuse - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") - name: Limit Password Reuse - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Limit Password Reuse - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present changed_when: false when: - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Limit Password Reuse - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile }} when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Limit Password Reuse - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_features is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped - name: Limit Password Reuse - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path | basename }} when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - name: Limit Password Reuse - Check if expected PAM module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^\s*password\s+{{ 'requisite' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_line_present - name: Limit Password Reuse - Include or update the PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }} block: - name: Limit Password Reuse - Check if required PAM module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }} with different control ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_line_other_control_present - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure the correct control for the required PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.replace: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwhistory.so.*) replace: \1requisite \2 register: result_pam_module_edit when: - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 1 - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure the required PAM module line is included in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.lineinfile: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' insertafter: ^password.*requisite.*pam_pwquality\.so line: password requisite pam_pwhistory.so register: result_pam_module_add when: - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 0 or result_pam_line_other_control_present.found > 1 - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present is defined - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - |- (result_pam_module_add is defined and result_pam_module_add.changed) or (result_pam_module_edit is defined and result_pam_module_edit.changed) when: - result_pam_line_present.found is defined - result_pam_line_present.found == 0 when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - | (result_authselect_available_features.stdout is defined and result_authselect_available_features.stdout is not search("with-pwhistory")) or result_authselect_available_features is not defined tags: - CCE-80666-1 - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.7 - accounts_password_pam_unix_remember - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Limit Password Reuse - Check the presence of /etc/security/pwhistory.conf file ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/security/pwhistory.conf register: result_pwhistory_conf_check when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80666-1 - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.7 - accounts_password_pam_unix_remember - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Limit Password Reuse - pam_pwhistory.so parameters are configured in /etc/security/pwhistory.conf file block: - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure the pam_pwhistory.so remember parameter in /etc/security/pwhistory.conf ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/security/pwhistory.conf regexp: ^\s*remember\s*= line: remember = {{ var_password_pam_unix_remember }} state: present - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure the pam_pwhistory.so remember parameter is removed from PAM files block: - name: Limit Password Reuse - Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth file is present ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth register: result_pam_file_present - name: Limit Password Reuse - Check the proper remediation for the system block: - name: Limit Password Reuse - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth - name: Limit Password Reuse - Check if system relies on authselect tool ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present block: - name: Limit Password Reuse - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Limit Password Reuse - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Limit Password Reuse - Get authselect current profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' register: result_authselect_profile changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Limit Password Reuse - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") - name: Limit Password Reuse - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") - name: Limit Password Reuse - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Limit Password Reuse - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present changed_when: false when: - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Limit Password Reuse - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile }} when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Limit Password Reuse - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_features is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped - name: Limit Password Reuse - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path | basename }} when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure the "remember" option from "pam_pwhistory.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.replace: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: (.*password.*pam_pwhistory.so.*)\bremember\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) replace: \1\2 register: result_pam_option_removal - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - result_pam_option_removal is changed when: - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_pwhistory_conf_check.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80666-1 - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.7 - accounts_password_pam_unix_remember - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Limit Password Reuse - pam_pwhistory.so parameters are configured in PAM files block: - name: Limit Password Reuse - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth - name: Limit Password Reuse - Check if system relies on authselect tool ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present block: - name: Limit Password Reuse - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Limit Password Reuse - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Limit Password Reuse - Get authselect current profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' register: result_authselect_profile changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Limit Password Reuse - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") - name: Limit Password Reuse - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") - name: Limit Password Reuse - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Limit Password Reuse - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present changed_when: false when: - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Limit Password Reuse - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile }} when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Limit Password Reuse - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_features is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped - name: Limit Password Reuse - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path | basename }} when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - name: Limit Password Reuse - Check if expected PAM module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^\s*password\s+{{ 'requisite' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_line_present - name: Limit Password Reuse - Include or update the PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }} block: - name: Limit Password Reuse - Check if required PAM module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }} with different control ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_line_other_control_present - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure the correct control for the required PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.replace: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwhistory.so.*) replace: \1requisite \2 register: result_pam_module_edit when: - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 1 - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure the required PAM module line is included in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.lineinfile: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' line: password requisite pam_pwhistory.so register: result_pam_module_add when: - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 0 or result_pam_line_other_control_present.found > 1 - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present is defined - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - |- (result_pam_module_add is defined and result_pam_module_add.changed) or (result_pam_module_edit is defined and result_pam_module_edit.changed) when: - result_pam_line_present.found is defined - result_pam_line_present.found == 0 - name: Limit Password Reuse - Check if the required PAM module option is present in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^\s*password\s+{{ 'requisite' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.*\sremember\b state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_module_remember_option_present - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure the "remember" PAM option for "pam_pwhistory.so" is included in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' backrefs: true regexp: ^(\s*password\s+{{ 'requisite' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_pwhistory.so.*) line: \1 remember={{ var_password_pam_unix_remember }} state: present register: result_pam_remember_add when: - result_pam_module_remember_option_present.found == 0 - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure the required value for "remember" PAM option from "pam_pwhistory.so" in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' backrefs: true regexp: ^(\s*password\s+{{ 'requisite' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s+.*)(remember)=[0-9a-zA-Z]+\s*(.*) line: \1\2={{ var_password_pam_unix_remember }} \3 register: result_pam_remember_edit when: - result_pam_module_remember_option_present.found > 0 - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - (result_pam_remember_add is defined and result_pam_remember_add.changed) or (result_pam_remember_edit is defined and result_pam_remember_edit.changed) when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - not result_pwhistory_conf_check.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80666-1 - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.7 - accounts_password_pam_unix_remember - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q pam; then var_password_pam_unix_remember='' if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if authselect list-features minimal | grep -q with-pwhistory; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi authselect enable-feature with-pwhistory authselect apply-changes -b else if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do authselect enable-feature $feature; done authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile fi PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/system-auth") PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" authselect apply-changes -b if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"requisite"'\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH")" -eq 1 ]; then # The control is updated only if one single line matches. sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwhistory.so.*)/\1'"requisite"' \2/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" else LAST_MATCH_LINE=$(grep -nP "^password.*requisite.*pam_pwquality\.so" "$PAM_FILE_PATH" | tail -n 1 | cut -d: -f 1) if [ ! -z $LAST_MATCH_LINE ]; then sed -i --follow-symlinks $LAST_MATCH_LINE' a password '"requisite"' pam_pwhistory.so' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" else echo 'password '"requisite"' pam_pwhistory.so' >> "$PAM_FILE_PATH" fi fi fi fi else if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"requisite"'\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.*' "/etc/pam.d/system-auth"; then # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*' "/etc/pam.d/system-auth")" -eq 1 ]; then # The control is updated only if one single line matches. sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwhistory.so.*)/\1'"requisite"' \2/' "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" else LAST_MATCH_LINE=$(grep -nP "^password.*requisite.*pam_pwquality\.so" "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" | tail -n 1 | cut -d: -f 1) if [ ! -z $LAST_MATCH_LINE ]; then sed -i --follow-symlinks $LAST_MATCH_LINE' a password '"requisite"' pam_pwhistory.so' "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" else echo 'password '"requisite"' pam_pwhistory.so' >> "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" fi fi fi fi PWHISTORY_CONF="/etc/security/pwhistory.conf" if [ -f $PWHISTORY_CONF ]; then regex="^\s*remember\s*=" line="remember = $var_password_pam_unix_remember" if ! grep -q $regex $PWHISTORY_CONF; then echo $line >> $PWHISTORY_CONF else sed -i --follow-symlinks 's|^\s*\(remember\s*=\s*\)\(\S\+\)|\1'"$var_password_pam_unix_remember"'|g' $PWHISTORY_CONF fi if [ -e "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" ] ; then PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/system-auth" if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do authselect enable-feature $feature; done authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile fi PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/system-auth") PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" authselect apply-changes -b fi if grep -qP '^\s*password\s.*\bpam_pwhistory.so\s.*\bremember\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*password.*pam_pwhistory.so.*)\bremember\b=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" fi if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then authselect apply-changes -b fi else echo "/etc/pam.d/system-auth was not found" >&2 fi else PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/system-auth" if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do authselect enable-feature $feature; done authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile fi PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/system-auth") PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" authselect apply-changes -b fi if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"requisite"'\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH")" -eq 1 ]; then # The control is updated only if one single line matches. sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwhistory.so.*)/\1'"requisite"' \2/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" else echo 'password '"requisite"' pam_pwhistory.so' >> "$PAM_FILE_PATH" fi fi # Check the option if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"requisite"'\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.*\sremember\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then sed -i -E --follow-symlinks '/\s*password\s+'"requisite"'\s+pam_pwhistory.so.*/ s/$/ remember='"$var_password_pam_unix_remember"'/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" else sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(\s*password\s+'"requisite"'\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s+.*)('"remember"'=)[[:alnum:]]+\s*(.*)/\1\2'"$var_password_pam_unix_remember"' \3/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" fi if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then authselect apply-changes -b fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Account Lockouts Must Be Logged PAM faillock locks an account due to excessive password failures, this event must be logged. CCI-000044 AC-7 (a) SRG-OS-000021-GPOS-00005 RHEL-08-020021 SV-230343r743981_rule Without auditing of these events it may be harder or impossible to identify what an attacker did after an attack. CCE-86099-9 - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check if system relies on authselect tool ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present when: ansible_distribution == 'RedHat' and ansible_distribution_version is version('8.2', '>=') tags: - CCE-86099-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020021 - NIST-800-53-AC-7 (a) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_audit - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Remediation where authselect tool is present block: - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Get authselect current features ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure "with-faillock" feature is enabled using authselect tool ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature with-faillock register: result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_features.stdout is not search("with-faillock") - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is not skipped - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is success when: - ansible_distribution == 'RedHat' and ansible_distribution_version is version('8.2', '>=') - result_authselect_present.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86099-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020021 - NIST-800-53-AC-7 (a) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_audit - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Remediation where authselect tool is not present block: - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check if pam_faillock.so is already enabled ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth regexp: .*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail) state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_faillock_is_enabled - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Enable pam_faillock.so preauth editing PAM files ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' line: auth required pam_faillock.so preauth insertbefore: ^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.* state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Enable pam_faillock.so authfail editing PAM files ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' line: auth required pam_faillock.so authfail insertbefore: ^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.* state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Enable pam_faillock.so account section editing PAM files ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' line: account required pam_faillock.so insertbefore: ^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.* state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 when: - ansible_distribution == 'RedHat' and ansible_distribution_version is version('8.2', '>=') - not result_authselect_present.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86099-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020021 - NIST-800-53-AC-7 (a) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_audit - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check the presence of /etc/security/faillock.conf file ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/security/faillock.conf register: result_faillock_conf_check when: ansible_distribution == 'RedHat' and ansible_distribution_version is version('8.2', '>=') tags: - CCE-86099-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020021 - NIST-800-53-AC-7 (a) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_audit - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure the pam_faillock.so audit parameter in /etc/security/faillock.conf ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/security/faillock.conf regexp: ^\s*audit line: audit state: present when: - ansible_distribution == 'RedHat' and ansible_distribution_version is version('8.2', '>=') - result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86099-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020021 - NIST-800-53-AC-7 (a) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_audit - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure the pam_faillock.so audit parameter not in PAM files block: - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth file is present ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth register: result_pam_file_present - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check the proper remediation for the system block: - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check if system relies on authselect tool ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present block: - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Get authselect current profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' register: result_authselect_profile changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present changed_when: false when: - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile }} when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_features is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path | basename }} when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure the "audit" option from "pam_faillock.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.replace: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: (.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\baudit\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) replace: \1\2 register: result_pam_option_removal - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - result_pam_option_removal is changed when: - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check if /etc/pam.d/password-auth file is present ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth register: result_pam_file_present - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check the proper remediation for the system block: - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check if system relies on authselect tool ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present block: - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Get authselect current profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' register: result_authselect_profile changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present changed_when: false when: - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile }} when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_features is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path | basename }} when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure the "audit" option from "pam_faillock.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.replace: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: (.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\baudit\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) replace: \1\2 register: result_pam_option_removal - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - result_pam_option_removal is changed when: - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists when: - ansible_distribution == 'RedHat' and ansible_distribution_version is version('8.2', '>=') - result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86099-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020021 - NIST-800-53-AC-7 (a) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_audit - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure the pam_faillock.so audit parameter in PAM files block: - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check if pam_faillock.so audit parameter is already enabled in pam files ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth regexp: .*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail).*audit state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_faillock_audit_parameter_is_present - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure the inclusion of pam_faillock.so preauth audit parameter in auth section ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' backrefs: true regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so preauth.*) line: \1required\3 audit state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_audit_parameter_is_present.found == 0 when: - ansible_distribution == 'RedHat' and ansible_distribution_version is version('8.2', '>=') - not result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86099-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020021 - NIST-800-53-AC-7 (a) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_audit - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if grep -qP "^ID=[\"']?rhel[\"']?$" "/etc/os-release" && { real="$(grep -P "^VERSION_ID=[\"']?[\w.]+[\"']?$" /etc/os-release | sed "s/^VERSION_ID=[\"']\?\([^\"']\+\)[\"']\?$/\1/")"; expected="8.2"; printf "%s\n%s" "$expected" "$real" | sort -VC; }; then if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi authselect enable-feature with-faillock authselect apply-changes -b else AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" do if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth\s+required\s+pam_faillock\.so\s+(preauth silent|authfail).*$' "$pam_file" ; then sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.*/i auth required pam_faillock.so preauth silent' "$pam_file" sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.*/i auth required pam_faillock.so authfail' "$pam_file" sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.*/i account required pam_faillock.so' "$pam_file" fi sed -Ei 's/(auth.*)(\[default=die\])(.*pam_faillock\.so)/\1required \3/g' "$pam_file" done fi AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") FAILLOCK_CONF="/etc/security/faillock.conf" if [ -f $FAILLOCK_CONF ]; then regex="^\s*audit" line="audit" if ! grep -q $regex $FAILLOCK_CONF; then echo $line >> $FAILLOCK_CONF fi for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" do if [ -e "$pam_file" ] ; then PAM_FILE_PATH="$pam_file" if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do authselect enable-feature $feature; done authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile fi PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "$pam_file") PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" authselect apply-changes -b fi if grep -qP '^\s*auth\s.*\bpam_faillock.so\s.*\baudit\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\baudit\b=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" fi if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then authselect apply-changes -b fi else echo "$pam_file was not found" >&2 fi done else for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" do if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail).*audit' "$pam_file"; then sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*preauth.*silent.*/ s/$/ audit/' "$pam_file" fi done fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts This rule configures the system to lock out accounts after a number of incorrect login attempts using pam_faillock.so. pam_faillock.so module requires multiple entries in pam files. These entries must be carefully defined to work as expected. Ensure that the file /etc/security/faillock.conf contains the following entry: deny = <count> Where count should be less than or equal to and greater than 0. In order to avoid errors when manually editing these files, it is recommended to use the appropriate tools, such as authselect or authconfig, depending on the OS version. If the system relies on authselect tool to manage PAM settings, the remediation will also use authselect tool. However, if any manual modification was made in PAM files, the authselect integrity check will fail and the remediation will be aborted in order to preserve intentional changes. In this case, an informative message will be shown in the remediation report. If the system supports the /etc/security/faillock.conf file, the pam_faillock parameters should be defined in faillock.conf file. BP28(R18) 1 12 15 16 5.5.3 DSS05.04 DSS05.10 DSS06.10 3.1.8 CCI-000044 CCI-002236 CCI-002237 CCI-002238 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 0421 0422 0431 0974 1173 1401 1504 1505 1546 1557 1558 1559 1560 1561 A.18.1.4 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.4 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 CM-6(a) AC-7(a) PR.AC-7 FIA_AFL.1 Req-8.1.6 8.3.4 SRG-OS-000329-GPOS-00128 SRG-OS-000021-GPOS-00005 RHEL-08-020011 4.4.3.1.1 SV-230333r743966_rule By limiting the number of failed logon attempts, the risk of unauthorized system access via user password guessing, also known as brute-forcing, is reduced. Limits are imposed by locking the account. CCE-80667-9 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80667-9 - CJIS-5.5.3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020011 - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.6 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.4 - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check if system relies on authselect tool ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80667-9 - CJIS-5.5.3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020011 - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.6 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.4 - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Remediation where authselect tool is present block: - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current features ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure "with-faillock" feature is enabled using authselect tool ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature with-faillock register: result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_features.stdout is not search("with-faillock") - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is not skipped - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is success when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_authselect_present.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80667-9 - CJIS-5.5.3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020011 - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.6 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.4 - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Remediation where authselect tool is not present block: - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check if pam_faillock.so is already enabled ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth regexp: .*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail) state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_faillock_is_enabled - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Enable pam_faillock.so preauth editing PAM files ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' line: auth required pam_faillock.so preauth insertbefore: ^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.* state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Enable pam_faillock.so authfail editing PAM files ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' line: auth required pam_faillock.so authfail insertbefore: ^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.* state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Enable pam_faillock.so account section editing PAM files ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' line: account required pam_faillock.so insertbefore: ^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.* state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - not result_authselect_present.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80667-9 - CJIS-5.5.3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020011 - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.6 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.4 - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny # promote to variable set_fact: var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny: !!str tags: - always - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check the presence of /etc/security/faillock.conf file ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/security/faillock.conf register: result_faillock_conf_check when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80667-9 - CJIS-5.5.3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020011 - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.6 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.4 - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the pam_faillock.so deny parameter in /etc/security/faillock.conf ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/security/faillock.conf regexp: ^\s*deny\s*= line: deny = {{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny }} state: present when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80667-9 - CJIS-5.5.3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020011 - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.6 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.4 - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the pam_faillock.so deny parameter not in PAM files block: - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth file is present ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth register: result_pam_file_present - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check the proper remediation for the system block: - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check if system relies on authselect tool ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present block: - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' register: result_authselect_profile changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present changed_when: false when: - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile }} when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_features is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path | basename }} when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the "deny" option from "pam_faillock.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.replace: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: (.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\bdeny\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) replace: \1\2 register: result_pam_option_removal - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - result_pam_option_removal is changed when: - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check if /etc/pam.d/password-auth file is present ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth register: result_pam_file_present - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check the proper remediation for the system block: - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check if system relies on authselect tool ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present block: - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' register: result_authselect_profile changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present changed_when: false when: - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile }} when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_features is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path | basename }} when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the "deny" option from "pam_faillock.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.replace: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: (.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\bdeny\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) replace: \1\2 register: result_pam_option_removal - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - result_pam_option_removal is changed when: - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80667-9 - CJIS-5.5.3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020011 - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.6 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.4 - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the pam_faillock.so deny parameter in PAM files block: - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check if pam_faillock.so deny parameter is already enabled in pam files ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth regexp: .*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail).*deny state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_faillock_deny_parameter_is_present - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the inclusion of pam_faillock.so preauth deny parameter in auth section ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' backrefs: true regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so preauth.*) line: \1required\3 deny={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny }} state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_deny_parameter_is_present.found == 0 - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the inclusion of pam_faillock.so authfail deny parameter in auth section ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' backrefs: true regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so authfail.*) line: \1required\3 deny={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny }} state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_deny_parameter_is_present.found == 0 - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the desired value for pam_faillock.so preauth deny parameter in auth section ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' backrefs: true regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so preauth.*)(deny)=[0-9]+(.*) line: \1required\3\4={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny }}\5 state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_deny_parameter_is_present.found > 0 - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the desired value for pam_faillock.so authfail deny parameter in auth section ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' backrefs: true regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so authfail.*)(deny)=[0-9]+(.*) line: \1required\3\4={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny }}\5 state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_deny_parameter_is_present.found > 0 when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - not result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80667-9 - CJIS-5.5.3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020011 - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.6 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.4 - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q pam; then var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny='' if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi authselect enable-feature with-faillock authselect apply-changes -b else AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" do if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth\s+required\s+pam_faillock\.so\s+(preauth silent|authfail).*$' "$pam_file" ; then sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.*/i auth required pam_faillock.so preauth silent' "$pam_file" sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.*/i auth required pam_faillock.so authfail' "$pam_file" sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.*/i account required pam_faillock.so' "$pam_file" fi sed -Ei 's/(auth.*)(\[default=die\])(.*pam_faillock\.so)/\1required \3/g' "$pam_file" done fi AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") FAILLOCK_CONF="/etc/security/faillock.conf" if [ -f $FAILLOCK_CONF ]; then regex="^\s*deny\s*=" line="deny = $var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny" if ! grep -q $regex $FAILLOCK_CONF; then echo $line >> $FAILLOCK_CONF else sed -i --follow-symlinks 's|^\s*\(deny\s*=\s*\)\(\S\+\)|\1'"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny"'|g' $FAILLOCK_CONF fi for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" do if [ -e "$pam_file" ] ; then PAM_FILE_PATH="$pam_file" if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do authselect enable-feature $feature; done authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile fi PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "$pam_file") PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" authselect apply-changes -b fi if grep -qP '^\s*auth\s.*\bpam_faillock.so\s.*\bdeny\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\bdeny\b=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" fi if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then authselect apply-changes -b fi else echo "$pam_file was not found" >&2 fi done else for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" do if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail).*deny' "$pam_file"; then sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*preauth.*silent.*/ s/$/ deny='"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny"'/' "$pam_file" sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*authfail.*/ s/$/ deny='"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny"'/' "$pam_file" else sed -i --follow-symlinks 's/\(^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*preauth.*silent.*\)\('"deny"'=\)[0-9]\+\(.*\)/\1\2'"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny"'\3/' "$pam_file" sed -i --follow-symlinks 's/\(^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*authfail.*\)\('"deny"'=\)[0-9]\+\(.*\)/\1\2'"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny"'\3/' "$pam_file" fi done fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts This rule configures the system to lock out the root account after a number of incorrect login attempts using pam_faillock.so. pam_faillock.so module requires multiple entries in pam files. These entries must be carefully defined to work as expected. In order to avoid errors when manually editing these files, it is recommended to use the appropriate tools, such as authselect or authconfig, depending on the OS version. If the system relies on authselect tool to manage PAM settings, the remediation will also use authselect tool. However, if any manual modification was made in PAM files, the authselect integrity check will fail and the remediation will be aborted in order to preserve intentional changes. In this case, an informative message will be shown in the remediation report. If the system supports the /etc/security/faillock.conf file, the pam_faillock parameters should be defined in faillock.conf file. BP28(R18) 1 12 15 16 DSS05.04 DSS05.10 DSS06.10 CCI-002238 CCI-000044 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 0421 0422 0431 0974 1173 1401 1504 1505 1546 1557 1558 1559 1560 1561 A.18.1.4 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.4 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 CM-6(a) AC-7(b) IA-5(c) PR.AC-7 FMT_MOF_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000329-GPOS-00128 SRG-OS-000021-GPOS-00005 RHEL-08-020023 4.4.3.1.3 SV-230345r743984_rule By limiting the number of failed logon attempts, the risk of unauthorized system access via user password guessing, also known as brute-forcing, is reduced. Limits are imposed by locking the account. CCE-80668-7 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80668-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020023 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny_root - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check if system relies on authselect tool ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80668-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020023 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny_root - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Remediation where authselect tool is present block: - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current features ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure "with-faillock" feature is enabled using authselect tool ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature with-faillock register: result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_features.stdout is not search("with-faillock") - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is not skipped - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is success when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_authselect_present.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80668-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020023 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny_root - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Remediation where authselect tool is not present block: - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check if pam_faillock.so is already enabled ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth regexp: .*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail) state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_faillock_is_enabled - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Enable pam_faillock.so preauth editing PAM files ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' line: auth required pam_faillock.so preauth insertbefore: ^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.* state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Enable pam_faillock.so authfail editing PAM files ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' line: auth required pam_faillock.so authfail insertbefore: ^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.* state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Enable pam_faillock.so account section editing PAM files ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' line: account required pam_faillock.so insertbefore: ^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.* state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - not result_authselect_present.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80668-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020023 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny_root - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check the presence of /etc/security/faillock.conf file ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/security/faillock.conf register: result_faillock_conf_check when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80668-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020023 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny_root - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the pam_faillock.so even_deny_root parameter in /etc/security/faillock.conf ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/security/faillock.conf regexp: ^\s*even_deny_root line: even_deny_root state: present when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80668-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020023 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny_root - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the pam_faillock.so even_deny_root parameter not in PAM files block: - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth file is present ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth register: result_pam_file_present - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check the proper remediation for the system block: - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check if system relies on authselect tool ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present block: - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' register: result_authselect_profile changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present changed_when: false when: - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile }} when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_features is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path | basename }} when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the "even_deny_root" option from "pam_faillock.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.replace: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: (.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\beven_deny_root\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) replace: \1\2 register: result_pam_option_removal - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - result_pam_option_removal is changed when: - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check if /etc/pam.d/password-auth file is present ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth register: result_pam_file_present - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check the proper remediation for the system block: - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check if system relies on authselect tool ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present block: - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' register: result_authselect_profile changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present changed_when: false when: - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile }} when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_features is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path | basename }} when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the "even_deny_root" option from "pam_faillock.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.replace: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: (.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\beven_deny_root\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) replace: \1\2 register: result_pam_option_removal - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - result_pam_option_removal is changed when: - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80668-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020023 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny_root - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the pam_faillock.so even_deny_root parameter in PAM files block: - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check if pam_faillock.so even_deny_root parameter is already enabled in pam files ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth regexp: .*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail).*even_deny_root state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_faillock_even_deny_root_parameter_is_present - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the inclusion of pam_faillock.so preauth even_deny_root parameter in auth section ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' backrefs: true regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so preauth.*) line: \1required\3 even_deny_root state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_even_deny_root_parameter_is_present.found == 0 - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the inclusion of pam_faillock.so authfail even_deny_root parameter in auth section ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' backrefs: true regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so authfail.*) line: \1required\3 even_deny_root state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_even_deny_root_parameter_is_present.found == 0 when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - not result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80668-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020023 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny_root - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q pam; then if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi authselect enable-feature with-faillock authselect apply-changes -b else AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" do if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth\s+required\s+pam_faillock\.so\s+(preauth silent|authfail).*$' "$pam_file" ; then sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.*/i auth required pam_faillock.so preauth silent' "$pam_file" sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.*/i auth required pam_faillock.so authfail' "$pam_file" sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.*/i account required pam_faillock.so' "$pam_file" fi sed -Ei 's/(auth.*)(\[default=die\])(.*pam_faillock\.so)/\1required \3/g' "$pam_file" done fi AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") FAILLOCK_CONF="/etc/security/faillock.conf" if [ -f $FAILLOCK_CONF ]; then regex="^\s*even_deny_root" line="even_deny_root" if ! grep -q $regex $FAILLOCK_CONF; then echo $line >> $FAILLOCK_CONF fi for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" do if [ -e "$pam_file" ] ; then PAM_FILE_PATH="$pam_file" if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do authselect enable-feature $feature; done authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile fi PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "$pam_file") PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" authselect apply-changes -b fi if grep -qP '^\s*auth\s.*\bpam_faillock.so\s.*\beven_deny_root\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\beven_deny_root\b=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" fi if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then authselect apply-changes -b fi else echo "$pam_file was not found" >&2 fi done else for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" do if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail).*even_deny_root' "$pam_file"; then sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*preauth.*silent.*/ s/$/ even_deny_root/' "$pam_file" sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*authfail.*/ s/$/ even_deny_root/' "$pam_file" fi done fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Lock Accounts Must Persist This rule ensures that the system lock out accounts using pam_faillock.so persist after system reboot. From "pam_faillock" man pages: Note that the default directory that "pam_faillock" uses is usually cleared on system boot so the access will be reenabled after system reboot. If that is undesirable, a different tally directory must be set with the "dir" option. pam_faillock.so module requires multiple entries in pam files. These entries must be carefully defined to work as expected. In order to avoid errors when manually editing these files, it is recommended to use the appropriate tools, such as authselect or authconfig, depending on the OS version. The chosen profile expects the directory to be . If the system relies on authselect tool to manage PAM settings, the remediation will also use authselect tool. However, if any manual modification was made in PAM files, the authselect integrity check will fail and the remediation will be aborted in order to preserve intentional changes. In this case, an informative message will be shown in the remediation report. If the system supports the /etc/security/faillock.conf file, the pam_faillock parameters should be defined in faillock.conf file. CCI-000044 CCI-002238 AC-7(b) AC-7(a) AC-7.1(ii) SRG-OS-000021-GPOS-00005 SRG-OS-000329-GPOS-00128 RHEL-08-020016 RHEL-08-020017 SV-230338r627750_rule SV-230339r743975_rule Locking out user accounts after a number of incorrect attempts prevents direct password guessing attacks. In combination with the silent option, user enumeration attacks are also mitigated. CCE-86067-6 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-86067-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020016 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020017 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) - NIST-800-53-AC-7.1(ii) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Check if system relies on authselect tool ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-86067-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020016 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020017 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) - NIST-800-53-AC-7.1(ii) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Remediation where authselect tool is present block: - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Get authselect current features ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure "with-faillock" feature is enabled using authselect tool ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature with-faillock register: result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_features.stdout is not search("with-faillock") - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is not skipped - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is success when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_authselect_present.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86067-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020016 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020017 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) - NIST-800-53-AC-7.1(ii) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Remediation where authselect tool is not present block: - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Check if pam_faillock.so is already enabled ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth regexp: .*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail) state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_faillock_is_enabled - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Enable pam_faillock.so preauth editing PAM files ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' line: auth required pam_faillock.so preauth insertbefore: ^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.* state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Enable pam_faillock.so authfail editing PAM files ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' line: auth required pam_faillock.so authfail insertbefore: ^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.* state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Enable pam_faillock.so account section editing PAM files ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' line: account required pam_faillock.so insertbefore: ^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.* state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - not result_authselect_present.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86067-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020016 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020017 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) - NIST-800-53-AC-7.1(ii) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir # promote to variable set_fact: var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir: !!str tags: - always - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Check the presence of /etc/security/faillock.conf file ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/security/faillock.conf register: result_faillock_conf_check when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-86067-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020016 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020017 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) - NIST-800-53-AC-7.1(ii) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure the pam_faillock.so dir parameter in /etc/security/faillock.conf ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/security/faillock.conf regexp: ^\s*dir\s*= line: dir = {{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir }} state: present when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86067-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020016 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020017 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) - NIST-800-53-AC-7.1(ii) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure the pam_faillock.so dir parameter not in PAM files block: - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth file is present ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth register: result_pam_file_present - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Check the proper remediation for the system block: - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Check if system relies on authselect tool ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present block: - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Get authselect current profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' register: result_authselect_profile changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present changed_when: false when: - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile }} when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_features is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path | basename }} when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure the "dir" option from "pam_faillock.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.replace: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: (.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\bdir\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) replace: \1\2 register: result_pam_option_removal - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - result_pam_option_removal is changed when: - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Check if /etc/pam.d/password-auth file is present ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth register: result_pam_file_present - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Check the proper remediation for the system block: - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Check if system relies on authselect tool ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present block: - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Get authselect current profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' register: result_authselect_profile changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present changed_when: false when: - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile }} when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_features is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path | basename }} when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure the "dir" option from "pam_faillock.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.replace: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: (.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\bdir\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) replace: \1\2 register: result_pam_option_removal - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - result_pam_option_removal is changed when: - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86067-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020016 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020017 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) - NIST-800-53-AC-7.1(ii) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure the pam_faillock.so dir parameter in PAM files block: - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Check if pam_faillock.so dir parameter is already enabled in pam files ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth regexp: .*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail).*dir state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_faillock_dir_parameter_is_present - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure the inclusion of pam_faillock.so preauth dir parameter in auth section ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' backrefs: true regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so preauth.*) line: \1required\3 dir={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir }} state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_dir_parameter_is_present.found == 0 - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure the inclusion of pam_faillock.so authfail dir parameter in auth section ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' backrefs: true regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so authfail.*) line: \1required\3 dir={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir }} state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_dir_parameter_is_present.found == 0 - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure the desired value for pam_faillock.so preauth dir parameter in auth section ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' backrefs: true regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so preauth.*)(dir)=[0-9]+(.*) line: \1required\3\4={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir }}\5 state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_dir_parameter_is_present.found > 0 - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure the desired value for pam_faillock.so authfail dir parameter in auth section ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' backrefs: true regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so authfail.*)(dir)=[0-9]+(.*) line: \1required\3\4={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir }}\5 state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_dir_parameter_is_present.found > 0 when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - not result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86067-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020016 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020017 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) - NIST-800-53-AC-7.1(ii) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure necessary SELinux packages are installed ansible.builtin.package: name: '{{ item }}' state: present with_items: - python3-libselinux - python3-policycoreutils - policycoreutils-python-utils when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-86067-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020016 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020017 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) - NIST-800-53-AC-7.1(ii) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Create the tally directory if it does not exist ansible.builtin.file: path: '{{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir }}' state: directory setype: faillog_t when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-86067-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020016 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020017 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) - NIST-800-53-AC-7.1(ii) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure SELinux file context is permanently set ansible.builtin.command: cmd: semanage fcontext -a -t faillog_t "{{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir }}(/.*)?" register: result_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir_semanage ignore_errors: true changed_when: - result_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir_semanage.rc == 0 when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-86067-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020016 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020017 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) - NIST-800-53-AC-7.1(ii) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure SELinux file context is applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: restorecon -R "{{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir }}" register: result_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir_restorecon when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-86067-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020016 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020017 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) - NIST-800-53-AC-7.1(ii) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q pam; then var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir='' if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi authselect enable-feature with-faillock authselect apply-changes -b else AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" do if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth\s+required\s+pam_faillock\.so\s+(preauth silent|authfail).*$' "$pam_file" ; then sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.*/i auth required pam_faillock.so preauth silent' "$pam_file" sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.*/i auth required pam_faillock.so authfail' "$pam_file" sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.*/i account required pam_faillock.so' "$pam_file" fi sed -Ei 's/(auth.*)(\[default=die\])(.*pam_faillock\.so)/\1required \3/g' "$pam_file" done fi AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") FAILLOCK_CONF="/etc/security/faillock.conf" if [ -f $FAILLOCK_CONF ]; then regex="^\s*dir\s*=" line="dir = $var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir" if ! grep -q $regex $FAILLOCK_CONF; then echo $line >> $FAILLOCK_CONF else sed -i --follow-symlinks 's|^\s*\(dir\s*=\s*\)\(\S\+\)|\1'"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir"'|g' $FAILLOCK_CONF fi for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" do if [ -e "$pam_file" ] ; then PAM_FILE_PATH="$pam_file" if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do authselect enable-feature $feature; done authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile fi PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "$pam_file") PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" authselect apply-changes -b fi if grep -qP '^\s*auth\s.*\bpam_faillock.so\s.*\bdir\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\bdir\b=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" fi if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then authselect apply-changes -b fi else echo "$pam_file was not found" >&2 fi done else for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" do if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail).*dir' "$pam_file"; then sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*preauth.*silent.*/ s/$/ dir='"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir"'/' "$pam_file" sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*authfail.*/ s/$/ dir='"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir"'/' "$pam_file" else sed -i --follow-symlinks 's/\(^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*preauth.*silent.*\)\('"dir"'=\)[0-9]\+\(.*\)/\1\2'"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir"'\3/' "$pam_file" sed -i --follow-symlinks 's/\(^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*authfail.*\)\('"dir"'=\)[0-9]\+\(.*\)/\1\2'"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir"'\3/' "$pam_file" fi done fi if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libselinux" ; then yum install -y "python3-libselinux" fi if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-policycoreutils" ; then yum install -y "python3-policycoreutils" fi if ! rpm -q --quiet "policycoreutils-python-utils" ; then yum install -y "policycoreutils-python-utils" fi mkdir -p "$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir" semanage fcontext -a -t faillog_t "$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir(/.*)?" restorecon -R -v "$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only The pam_faillock module's local_users_only parameter controls requirements for enforcing failed lockout attempts only for local user accounts and ignoring centralized user account management failed attempt configurations. If the system relies on authselect tool to manage PAM settings, the remediation will also use authselect tool. However, if any manual modification was made in PAM files, the authselect integrity check will fail and the remediation will be aborted in order to preserve intentional changes. In this case, an informative message will be shown in the remediation report. If the system supports the /etc/security/faillock.conf file, the pam_faillock parameters should be defined in faillock.conf file. Using this rule bypasses pam_faillock's functionality and should be used in cases where centralized management such as LDAP or Active Directory is in use. CCI-000015 AC-2(1) SRG-OS-000001-GPOS-00001 The operating system must provide automated mechanisms for supporting account management functions. Enterprise environments make application account management challenging and complex. A manual process for account management functions adds the risk of a potential oversight or other error. Locking out remote accounts may cause unintentional DoS. CCE-83401-0 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-83401-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(1) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_enforce_local - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Check if system relies on authselect tool ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-83401-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(1) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_enforce_local - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Remediation where authselect tool is present block: - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Get authselect current features ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Ensure "with-faillock" feature is enabled using authselect tool ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature with-faillock register: result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_features.stdout is not search("with-faillock") - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is not skipped - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is success when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_authselect_present.stat.exists tags: - CCE-83401-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(1) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_enforce_local - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Remediation where authselect tool is not present block: - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Check if pam_faillock.so is already enabled ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth regexp: .*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail) state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_faillock_is_enabled - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Enable pam_faillock.so preauth editing PAM files ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' line: auth required pam_faillock.so preauth insertbefore: ^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.* state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Enable pam_faillock.so authfail editing PAM files ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' line: auth required pam_faillock.so authfail insertbefore: ^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.* state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Enable pam_faillock.so account section editing PAM files ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' line: account required pam_faillock.so insertbefore: ^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.* state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - not result_authselect_present.stat.exists tags: - CCE-83401-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(1) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_enforce_local - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Check the presence of /etc/security/faillock.conf file ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/security/faillock.conf register: result_faillock_conf_check when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-83401-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(1) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_enforce_local - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Ensure the pam_faillock.so local_users_only parameter in /etc/security/faillock.conf ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/security/faillock.conf regexp: ^\s*local_users_only line: local_users_only state: present when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists tags: - CCE-83401-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(1) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_enforce_local - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Ensure the pam_faillock.so local_users_only parameter not in PAM files block: - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth file is present ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth register: result_pam_file_present - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Check the proper remediation for the system block: - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Check if system relies on authselect tool ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present block: - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Get authselect current profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' register: result_authselect_profile changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present changed_when: false when: - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile }} when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_features is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path | basename }} when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Ensure the "local_users_only" option from "pam_faillock.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.replace: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: (.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\blocal_users_only\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) replace: \1\2 register: result_pam_option_removal - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - result_pam_option_removal is changed when: - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Check if /etc/pam.d/password-auth file is present ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth register: result_pam_file_present - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Check the proper remediation for the system block: - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Check if system relies on authselect tool ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present block: - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Get authselect current profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' register: result_authselect_profile changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present changed_when: false when: - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile }} when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_features is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path | basename }} when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Ensure the "local_users_only" option from "pam_faillock.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.replace: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: (.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\blocal_users_only\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) replace: \1\2 register: result_pam_option_removal - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - result_pam_option_removal is changed when: - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists tags: - CCE-83401-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(1) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_enforce_local - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Ensure the pam_faillock.so local_users_only parameter in PAM files block: - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Check if pam_faillock.so local_users_only parameter is already enabled in pam files ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth regexp: .*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail).*local_users_only state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_faillock_local_users_only_parameter_is_present - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Ensure the inclusion of pam_faillock.so preauth local_users_only parameter in auth section ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' backrefs: true regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so preauth.*) line: \1required\3 local_users_only state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_local_users_only_parameter_is_present.found == 0 - name: Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only - Ensure the inclusion of pam_faillock.so authfail local_users_only parameter in auth section ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' backrefs: true regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so authfail.*) line: \1required\3 local_users_only state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_local_users_only_parameter_is_present.found == 0 when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - not result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists tags: - CCE-83401-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(1) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_enforce_local - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q pam; then if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi authselect enable-feature with-faillock authselect apply-changes -b else AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" do if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth\s+required\s+pam_faillock\.so\s+(preauth silent|authfail).*$' "$pam_file" ; then sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.*/i auth required pam_faillock.so preauth silent' "$pam_file" sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.*/i auth required pam_faillock.so authfail' "$pam_file" sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.*/i account required pam_faillock.so' "$pam_file" fi sed -Ei 's/(auth.*)(\[default=die\])(.*pam_faillock\.so)/\1required \3/g' "$pam_file" done fi AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") FAILLOCK_CONF="/etc/security/faillock.conf" if [ -f $FAILLOCK_CONF ]; then regex="^\s*local_users_only" line="local_users_only" if ! grep -q $regex $FAILLOCK_CONF; then echo $line >> $FAILLOCK_CONF fi for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" do if [ -e "$pam_file" ] ; then PAM_FILE_PATH="$pam_file" if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do authselect enable-feature $feature; done authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile fi PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "$pam_file") PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" authselect apply-changes -b fi if grep -qP '^\s*auth\s.*\bpam_faillock.so\s.*\blocal_users_only\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\blocal_users_only\b=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" fi if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then authselect apply-changes -b fi else echo "$pam_file was not found" >&2 fi done else for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" do if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail).*local_users_only' "$pam_file"; then sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*preauth.*silent.*/ s/$/ local_users_only/' "$pam_file" sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*authfail.*/ s/$/ local_users_only/' "$pam_file" fi done fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts Utilizing pam_faillock.so, the fail_interval directive configures the system to lock out an account after a number of incorrect login attempts within a specified time period. Ensure that the file /etc/security/faillock.conf contains the following entry: fail_interval = <interval-in-seconds> where interval-in-seconds is or greater. In order to avoid errors when manually editing these files, it is recommended to use the appropriate tools, such as authselect or authconfig, depending on the OS version. If the system relies on authselect tool to manage PAM settings, the remediation will also use authselect tool. However, if any manual modification was made in PAM files, the authselect integrity check will fail and the remediation will be aborted in order to preserve intentional changes. In this case, an informative message will be shown in the remediation report. If the system supports the /etc/security/faillock.conf file, the pam_faillock parameters should be defined in faillock.conf file. BP28(R18) 1 12 15 16 DSS05.04 DSS05.10 DSS06.10 CCI-000044 CCI-002236 CCI-002237 CCI-002238 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 0421 0422 0431 0974 1173 1401 1504 1505 1546 1557 1558 1559 1560 1561 A.18.1.4 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.4 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 CM-6(a) AC-7(a) PR.AC-7 FIA_AFL.1 SRG-OS-000329-GPOS-00128 SRG-OS-000021-GPOS-00005 RHEL-08-020012 RHEL-08-020013 SV-230334r627750_rule SV-230335r743969_rule By limiting the number of failed logon attempts the risk of unauthorized system access via user password guessing, otherwise known as brute-forcing, is reduced. Limits are imposed by locking the account. CCE-80669-5 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80669-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020012 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020013 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_interval - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check if system relies on authselect tool ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80669-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020012 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020013 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_interval - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Remediation where authselect tool is present block: - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current features ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure "with-faillock" feature is enabled using authselect tool ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature with-faillock register: result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_features.stdout is not search("with-faillock") - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is not skipped - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is success when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_authselect_present.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80669-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020012 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020013 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_interval - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Remediation where authselect tool is not present block: - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check if pam_faillock.so is already enabled ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth regexp: .*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail) state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_faillock_is_enabled - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Enable pam_faillock.so preauth editing PAM files ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' line: auth required pam_faillock.so preauth insertbefore: ^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.* state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Enable pam_faillock.so authfail editing PAM files ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' line: auth required pam_faillock.so authfail insertbefore: ^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.* state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Enable pam_faillock.so account section editing PAM files ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' line: account required pam_faillock.so insertbefore: ^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.* state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - not result_authselect_present.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80669-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020012 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020013 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_interval - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval # promote to variable set_fact: var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval: !!str tags: - always - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check the presence of /etc/security/faillock.conf file ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/security/faillock.conf register: result_faillock_conf_check when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80669-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020012 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020013 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_interval - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the pam_faillock.so fail_interval parameter in /etc/security/faillock.conf ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/security/faillock.conf regexp: ^\s*fail_interval\s*= line: fail_interval = {{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval }} state: present when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80669-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020012 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020013 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_interval - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the pam_faillock.so fail_interval parameter not in PAM files block: - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth file is present ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth register: result_pam_file_present - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check the proper remediation for the system block: - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check if system relies on authselect tool ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present block: - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' register: result_authselect_profile changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present changed_when: false when: - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile }} when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_features is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path | basename }} when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the "fail_interval" option from "pam_faillock.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.replace: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: (.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\bfail_interval\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) replace: \1\2 register: result_pam_option_removal - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - result_pam_option_removal is changed when: - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check if /etc/pam.d/password-auth file is present ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth register: result_pam_file_present - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check the proper remediation for the system block: - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check if system relies on authselect tool ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present block: - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' register: result_authselect_profile changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present changed_when: false when: - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile }} when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_features is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path | basename }} when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the "fail_interval" option from "pam_faillock.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.replace: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: (.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\bfail_interval\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) replace: \1\2 register: result_pam_option_removal - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - result_pam_option_removal is changed when: - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80669-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020012 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020013 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_interval - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the pam_faillock.so fail_interval parameter in PAM files block: - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check if pam_faillock.so fail_interval parameter is already enabled in pam files ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth regexp: .*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail).*fail_interval state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_faillock_fail_interval_parameter_is_present - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the inclusion of pam_faillock.so preauth fail_interval parameter in auth section ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' backrefs: true regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so preauth.*) line: \1required\3 fail_interval={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval }} state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_fail_interval_parameter_is_present.found == 0 - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the inclusion of pam_faillock.so authfail fail_interval parameter in auth section ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' backrefs: true regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so authfail.*) line: \1required\3 fail_interval={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval }} state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_fail_interval_parameter_is_present.found == 0 - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the desired value for pam_faillock.so preauth fail_interval parameter in auth section ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' backrefs: true regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so preauth.*)(fail_interval)=[0-9]+(.*) line: \1required\3\4={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval }}\5 state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_fail_interval_parameter_is_present.found > 0 - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the desired value for pam_faillock.so authfail fail_interval parameter in auth section ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' backrefs: true regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so authfail.*)(fail_interval)=[0-9]+(.*) line: \1required\3\4={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval }}\5 state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_fail_interval_parameter_is_present.found > 0 when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - not result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80669-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020012 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020013 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_interval - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q pam; then var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval='' if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi authselect enable-feature with-faillock authselect apply-changes -b else AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" do if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth\s+required\s+pam_faillock\.so\s+(preauth silent|authfail).*$' "$pam_file" ; then sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.*/i auth required pam_faillock.so preauth silent' "$pam_file" sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.*/i auth required pam_faillock.so authfail' "$pam_file" sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.*/i account required pam_faillock.so' "$pam_file" fi sed -Ei 's/(auth.*)(\[default=die\])(.*pam_faillock\.so)/\1required \3/g' "$pam_file" done fi AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") FAILLOCK_CONF="/etc/security/faillock.conf" if [ -f $FAILLOCK_CONF ]; then regex="^\s*fail_interval\s*=" line="fail_interval = $var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval" if ! grep -q $regex $FAILLOCK_CONF; then echo $line >> $FAILLOCK_CONF else sed -i --follow-symlinks 's|^\s*\(fail_interval\s*=\s*\)\(\S\+\)|\1'"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval"'|g' $FAILLOCK_CONF fi for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" do if [ -e "$pam_file" ] ; then PAM_FILE_PATH="$pam_file" if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do authselect enable-feature $feature; done authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile fi PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "$pam_file") PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" authselect apply-changes -b fi if grep -qP '^\s*auth\s.*\bpam_faillock.so\s.*\bfail_interval\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\bfail_interval\b=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" fi if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then authselect apply-changes -b fi else echo "$pam_file was not found" >&2 fi done else for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" do if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail).*fail_interval' "$pam_file"; then sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*preauth.*silent.*/ s/$/ fail_interval='"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval"'/' "$pam_file" sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*authfail.*/ s/$/ fail_interval='"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval"'/' "$pam_file" else sed -i --follow-symlinks 's/\(^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*preauth.*silent.*\)\('"fail_interval"'=\)[0-9]\+\(.*\)/\1\2'"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval"'\3/' "$pam_file" sed -i --follow-symlinks 's/\(^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*authfail.*\)\('"fail_interval"'=\)[0-9]\+\(.*\)/\1\2'"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval"'\3/' "$pam_file" fi done fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Do Not Show System Messages When Unsuccessful Logon Attempts Occur This rule ensures the system prevents informative messages from being presented to the user pertaining to logon information after a number of incorrect login attempts using pam_faillock.so. pam_faillock.so module requires multiple entries in pam files. These entries must be carefully defined to work as expected. In order to avoid errors when manually editing these files, it is recommended to use the appropriate tools, such as authselect or authconfig, depending on the OS version. If the system relies on authselect tool to manage PAM settings, the remediation will also use authselect tool. However, if any manual modification was made in PAM files, the authselect integrity check will fail and the remediation will be aborted in order to preserve intentional changes. In this case, an informative message will be shown in the remediation report. If the system supports the /etc/security/faillock.conf file, the pam_faillock parameters should be defined in faillock.conf file. CCI-002238 CCI-000044 SRG-OS-000329-GPOS-00128 SRG-OS-000021-GPOS-00005 RHEL-08-020018 RHEL-08-020019 SV-230340r627750_rule SV-230341r743978_rule The pam_faillock module without the silent option will leak information about the existence or non-existence of a user account in the system because the failures are not recorded for unknown users. The message about the user account being locked is never displayed for non-existing user accounts allowing the adversary to infer that a particular account exists or not on the system. CCE-87096-4 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-87096-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020018 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020019 - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_silent - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Do Not Show System Messages When Unsuccessful Logon Attempts Occur - Check if system relies on authselect tool ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-87096-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020018 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020019 - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_silent - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Do Not Show System Messages When Unsuccessful Logon Attempts Occur - Remediation where authselect tool is present block: - name: Do Not Show System Messages When Unsuccessful Logon Attempts Occur - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Do Not Show System Messages When Unsuccessful Logon Attempts Occur - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Do Not Show System Messages When Unsuccessful Logon Attempts Occur - Get authselect current features ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Do Not Show System Messages When Unsuccessful Logon Attempts Occur - Ensure "with-faillock" feature is enabled using authselect tool ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature with-faillock register: result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_features.stdout is not search("with-faillock") - name: Do Not Show System Messages When Unsuccessful Logon Attempts Occur - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is not skipped - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is success when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_authselect_present.stat.exists tags: - CCE-87096-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020018 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020019 - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_silent - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Do Not Show System Messages When Unsuccessful Logon Attempts Occur - Remediation where authselect tool is not present block: - name: Do Not Show System Messages When Unsuccessful Logon Attempts Occur - Check if pam_faillock.so is already enabled ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth regexp: .*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail) state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_faillock_is_enabled - name: Do Not Show System Messages When Unsuccessful Logon Attempts Occur - Enable pam_faillock.so preauth editing PAM files ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' line: auth required pam_faillock.so preauth insertbefore: ^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.* state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 - name: Do Not Show System Messages When Unsuccessful Logon Attempts Occur - Enable pam_faillock.so authfail editing PAM files ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' line: auth required pam_faillock.so authfail insertbefore: ^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.* state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 - name: Do Not Show System Messages When Unsuccessful Logon Attempts Occur - Enable pam_faillock.so account section editing PAM files ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' line: account required pam_faillock.so insertbefore: ^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.* state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - not result_authselect_present.stat.exists tags: - CCE-87096-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020018 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020019 - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_silent - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Do Not Show System Messages When Unsuccessful Logon Attempts Occur - Check the presence of /etc/security/faillock.conf file ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/security/faillock.conf register: result_faillock_conf_check when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-87096-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020018 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020019 - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_silent - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Do Not Show System Messages When Unsuccessful Logon Attempts Occur - Ensure the pam_faillock.so silent parameter in /etc/security/faillock.conf ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/security/faillock.conf regexp: ^\s*silent line: silent state: present when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists tags: - CCE-87096-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020018 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020019 - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_silent - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Do Not Show System Messages When Unsuccessful Logon Attempts Occur - Ensure the pam_faillock.so silent parameter in PAM files block: - name: Do Not Show System Messages When Unsuccessful Logon Attempts Occur - Ensure the inclusion of pam_faillock.so preauth silent parameter in auth section ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' backrefs: true regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so preauth(:?(?!silent).)*) line: \1required\3 silent state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - not result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists tags: - CCE-87096-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020018 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020019 - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_silent - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q pam; then if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi authselect enable-feature with-faillock authselect apply-changes -b else AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" do if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth\s+required\s+pam_faillock\.so\s+(preauth silent|authfail).*$' "$pam_file" ; then sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.*/i auth required pam_faillock.so preauth silent' "$pam_file" sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.*/i auth required pam_faillock.so authfail' "$pam_file" sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.*/i account required pam_faillock.so' "$pam_file" fi sed -Ei 's/(auth.*)(\[default=die\])(.*pam_faillock\.so)/\1required \3/g' "$pam_file" done fi AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") FAILLOCK_CONF="/etc/security/faillock.conf" if [ -f $FAILLOCK_CONF ]; then regex="^\s*silent" line="silent" if ! grep -q $regex $FAILLOCK_CONF; then echo $line >> $FAILLOCK_CONF fi else for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" do if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth.*pam_faillock\.so\s*preauth.*silent' "$pam_file"; then sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^\s*auth.*pam_faillock\.so.*preauth/ s/$/ silent/' "$pam_file" fi done fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts This rule configures the system to lock out accounts during a specified time period after a number of incorrect login attempts using pam_faillock.so. Ensure that the file /etc/security/faillock.conf contains the following entry: unlock_time=<interval-in-seconds> where interval-in-seconds is or greater. pam_faillock.so module requires multiple entries in pam files. These entries must be carefully defined to work as expected. In order to avoid any errors when manually editing these files, it is recommended to use the appropriate tools, such as authselect or authconfig, depending on the OS version. If unlock_time is set to 0, manual intervention by an administrator is required to unlock a user. This should be done using the faillock tool. If the system supports the new /etc/security/faillock.conf file but the pam_faillock.so parameters are defined directly in /etc/pam.d/system-auth and /etc/pam.d/password-auth, the remediation will migrate the unlock_time parameter to /etc/security/faillock.conf to ensure compatibility with authselect tool. The parameters deny and fail_interval, if used, also have to be migrated by their respective remediation. If the system relies on authselect tool to manage PAM settings, the remediation will also use authselect tool. However, if any manual modification was made in PAM files, the authselect integrity check will fail and the remediation will be aborted in order to preserve intentional changes. In this case, an informative message will be shown in the remediation report. If the system supports the /etc/security/faillock.conf file, the pam_faillock parameters should be defined in faillock.conf file. BP28(R18) 1 12 15 16 5.5.3 DSS05.04 DSS05.10 DSS06.10 3.1.8 CCI-000044 CCI-002236 CCI-002237 CCI-002238 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 0421 0422 0431 0974 1173 1401 1504 1505 1546 1557 1558 1559 1560 1561 A.18.1.4 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.4 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 CM-6(a) AC-7(b) PR.AC-7 FIA_AFL.1 Req-8.1.7 8.3.4 SRG-OS-000329-GPOS-00128 SRG-OS-000021-GPOS-00005 RHEL-08-020014 RHEL-08-020015 4.4.3.1.2 SV-230336r627750_rule SV-230337r743972_rule By limiting the number of failed logon attempts the risk of unauthorized system access via user password guessing, otherwise known as brute-forcing, is reduced. Limits are imposed by locking the account. CCE-80670-3 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80670-3 - CJIS-5.5.3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020014 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020015 - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.7 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.4 - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check if system relies on authselect tool ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80670-3 - CJIS-5.5.3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020014 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020015 - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.7 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.4 - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Remediation where authselect tool is present block: - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current features ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure "with-faillock" feature is enabled using authselect tool ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature with-faillock register: result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_features.stdout is not search("with-faillock") - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is not skipped - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is success when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_authselect_present.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80670-3 - CJIS-5.5.3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020014 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020015 - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.7 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.4 - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Remediation where authselect tool is not present block: - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check if pam_faillock.so is already enabled ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth regexp: .*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail) state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_faillock_is_enabled - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Enable pam_faillock.so preauth editing PAM files ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' line: auth required pam_faillock.so preauth insertbefore: ^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.* state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Enable pam_faillock.so authfail editing PAM files ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' line: auth required pam_faillock.so authfail insertbefore: ^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.* state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Enable pam_faillock.so account section editing PAM files ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' line: account required pam_faillock.so insertbefore: ^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.* state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - not result_authselect_present.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80670-3 - CJIS-5.5.3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020014 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020015 - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.7 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.4 - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time # promote to variable set_fact: var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time: !!str tags: - always - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check the presence of /etc/security/faillock.conf file ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/security/faillock.conf register: result_faillock_conf_check when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80670-3 - CJIS-5.5.3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020014 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020015 - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.7 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.4 - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the pam_faillock.so unlock_time parameter in /etc/security/faillock.conf ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/security/faillock.conf regexp: ^\s*unlock_time\s*= line: unlock_time = {{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time }} state: present when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80670-3 - CJIS-5.5.3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020014 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020015 - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.7 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.4 - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the pam_faillock.so unlock_time parameter not in PAM files block: - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth file is present ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth register: result_pam_file_present - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check the proper remediation for the system block: - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check if system relies on authselect tool ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present block: - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' register: result_authselect_profile changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present changed_when: false when: - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile }} when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_features is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path | basename }} when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the "unlock_time" option from "pam_faillock.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.replace: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: (.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\bunlock_time\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) replace: \1\2 register: result_pam_option_removal - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - result_pam_option_removal is changed when: - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check if /etc/pam.d/password-auth file is present ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth register: result_pam_file_present - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check the proper remediation for the system block: - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check if system relies on authselect tool ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present block: - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' register: result_authselect_profile changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present changed_when: false when: - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile }} when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_features is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path | basename }} when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the "unlock_time" option from "pam_faillock.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.replace: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: (.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\bunlock_time\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) replace: \1\2 register: result_pam_option_removal - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - result_pam_option_removal is changed when: - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80670-3 - CJIS-5.5.3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020014 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020015 - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.7 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.4 - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the pam_faillock.so unlock_time parameter in PAM files block: - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check if pam_faillock.so unlock_time parameter is already enabled in pam files ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth regexp: .*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail).*unlock_time state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_faillock_unlock_time_parameter_is_present - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the inclusion of pam_faillock.so preauth unlock_time parameter in auth section ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' backrefs: true regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so preauth.*) line: \1required\3 unlock_time={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time }} state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_unlock_time_parameter_is_present.found == 0 - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the inclusion of pam_faillock.so authfail unlock_time parameter in auth section ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' backrefs: true regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so authfail.*) line: \1required\3 unlock_time={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time }} state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_unlock_time_parameter_is_present.found == 0 - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the desired value for pam_faillock.so preauth unlock_time parameter in auth section ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' backrefs: true regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so preauth.*)(unlock_time)=[0-9]+(.*) line: \1required\3\4={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time }}\5 state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_unlock_time_parameter_is_present.found > 0 - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the desired value for pam_faillock.so authfail unlock_time parameter in auth section ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' backrefs: true regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so authfail.*)(unlock_time)=[0-9]+(.*) line: \1required\3\4={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time }}\5 state: present loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - result_pam_faillock_unlock_time_parameter_is_present.found > 0 when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - not result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80670-3 - CJIS-5.5.3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020014 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020015 - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.7 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.4 - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q pam; then var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time='' if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi authselect enable-feature with-faillock authselect apply-changes -b else AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" do if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth\s+required\s+pam_faillock\.so\s+(preauth silent|authfail).*$' "$pam_file" ; then sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.*/i auth required pam_faillock.so preauth silent' "$pam_file" sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.*/i auth required pam_faillock.so authfail' "$pam_file" sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.*/i account required pam_faillock.so' "$pam_file" fi sed -Ei 's/(auth.*)(\[default=die\])(.*pam_faillock\.so)/\1required \3/g' "$pam_file" done fi AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") FAILLOCK_CONF="/etc/security/faillock.conf" if [ -f $FAILLOCK_CONF ]; then regex="^\s*unlock_time\s*=" line="unlock_time = $var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time" if ! grep -q $regex $FAILLOCK_CONF; then echo $line >> $FAILLOCK_CONF else sed -i --follow-symlinks 's|^\s*\(unlock_time\s*=\s*\)\(\S\+\)|\1'"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time"'|g' $FAILLOCK_CONF fi for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" do if [ -e "$pam_file" ] ; then PAM_FILE_PATH="$pam_file" if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do authselect enable-feature $feature; done authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile fi PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "$pam_file") PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" authselect apply-changes -b fi if grep -qP '^\s*auth\s.*\bpam_faillock.so\s.*\bunlock_time\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\bunlock_time\b=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" fi if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then authselect apply-changes -b fi else echo "$pam_file was not found" >&2 fi done else for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" do if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail).*unlock_time' "$pam_file"; then sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*preauth.*silent.*/ s/$/ unlock_time='"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time"'/' "$pam_file" sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*authfail.*/ s/$/ unlock_time='"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time"'/' "$pam_file" else sed -i --follow-symlinks 's/\(^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*preauth.*silent.*\)\('"unlock_time"'=\)[0-9]\+\(.*\)/\1\2'"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time"'\3/' "$pam_file" sed -i --follow-symlinks 's/\(^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*authfail.*\)\('"unlock_time"'=\)[0-9]\+\(.*\)/\1\2'"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time"'\3/' "$pam_file" fi done fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Set Password Quality Requirements The default pam_pwquality PAM module provides strength checking for passwords. It performs a number of checks, such as making sure passwords are not similar to dictionary words, are of at least a certain length, are not the previous password reversed, and are not simply a change of case from the previous password. It can also require passwords to be in certain character classes. The pam_pwquality module is the preferred way of configuring password requirements. The man pages pam_pwquality(8) provide information on the capabilities and configuration of each. Set Password Quality Requirements, if using pam_cracklib The pam_cracklib PAM module can be configured to meet requirements for a variety of policies. For example, to configure pam_cracklib to require at least one uppercase character, lowercase character, digit, and other (special) character, locate the following line in /etc/pam.d/system-auth: password requisite pam_cracklib.so try_first_pass retry=3 and then alter it to read: password required pam_cracklib.so try_first_pass retry=3 maxrepeat=3 minlen=14 dcredit=-1 ucredit=-1 ocredit=-1 lcredit=-1 difok=4 If no such line exists, add one as the first line of the password section in /etc/pam.d/system-auth. The arguments can be modified to ensure compliance with your organization's security policy. Discussion of each parameter follows. Note that the password quality requirements are not enforced for the root account for some reason. Set Password Quality Requirements with pam_pwquality The pam_pwquality PAM module can be configured to meet requirements for a variety of policies. For example, to configure pam_pwquality to require at least one uppercase character, lowercase character, digit, and other (special) character, make sure that pam_pwquality exists in /etc/pam.d/system-auth: password requisite pam_pwquality.so try_first_pass local_users_only retry=3 authtok_type= If no such line exists, add one as the first line of the password section in /etc/pam.d/system-auth. Next, modify the settings in /etc/security/pwquality.conf to match the following: difok = 4 minlen = 14 dcredit = -1 ucredit = -1 lcredit = -1 ocredit = -1 maxrepeat = 3 The arguments can be modified to ensure compliance with your organization's security policy. Discussion of each parameter follows. dcredit Minimum number of digits in password 0 -1 -2 -1 dictcheck Prevent the use of dictionary words for passwords. 1 1 difok Minimum number of characters not present in old password 15 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 8 lcredit Minimum number of lower case in password 0 -1 -2 -1 maxclassrepeat Maximum Number of Consecutive Repeating Characters in a Password From the Same Character Class 1 2 3 4 4 maxrepeat Maximum Number of Consecutive Repeating Characters in a Password 1 2 3 3 minclass Minimum number of categories of characters that must exist in a password 1 2 3 4 3 minlen Minimum number of characters in password 10 12 14 15 18 20 6 7 8 15 ocredit Minimum number of other (special characters) in password 0 -1 -2 -1 retry Number of retry attempts before erroring out 1 2 3 4 5 3 ucredit Minimum number of upper case in password 0 -1 -2 -1 Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Digit Characters The pam_pwquality module's dcredit parameter controls requirements for usage of digits in a password. When set to a negative number, any password will be required to contain that many digits. When set to a positive number, pam_pwquality will grant +1 additional length credit for each digit. Modify the dcredit setting in /etc/security/pwquality.conf to require the use of a digit in passwords. BP28(R18) 1 12 15 16 5 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 CCI-000194 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 0421 0422 0431 0974 1173 1401 1504 1505 1546 1557 1558 1559 1560 1561 A.18.1.4 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 IA-5(c) IA-5(1)(a) CM-6(a) IA-5(4) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 FMT_SMF_EXT.1 Req-8.2.3 8.3.6 SRG-OS-000071-GPOS-00039 RHEL-08-020130 4.4.3.2.3 SV-230359r858775_rule Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required to compromise the password. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks. Password complexity is one factor of several that determines how long it takes to crack a password. The more complex the password, the greater the number of possible combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised. Requiring digits makes password guessing attacks more difficult by ensuring a larger search space. CCE-80653-9 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80653-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020130 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.6 - accounts_password_pam_dcredit - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_dcredit # promote to variable set_fact: var_password_pam_dcredit: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Digit Characters - Ensure PAM variable dcredit is set accordingly ansible.builtin.lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/security/pwquality.conf regexp: ^#?\s*dcredit line: dcredit = {{ var_password_pam_dcredit }} when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80653-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020130 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.6 - accounts_password_pam_dcredit - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q pam; then var_password_pam_dcredit='' # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^dcredit") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_password_pam_dcredit" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^dcredit\\>" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^dcredit\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" else if [[ -s "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" fi cce="CCE-80653-9" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Prevent the Use of Dictionary Words The pam_pwquality module's dictcheck check if passwords contains dictionary words. When dictcheck is set to 1 passwords will be checked for dictionary words. CCI-000366 IA-5(c) IA-5(1)(a) CM-6(a) IA-5(4) SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00225 RHEL-08-020300 4.4.3.2.6 SV-230377r858789_rule Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required to compromise the password. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks. Password complexity is one factor of several that determines how long it takes to crack a password. The more complex the password, the greater the number of possible combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised. Passwords with dictionary words may be more vulnerable to password-guessing attacks. CCE-86233-4 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-86233-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020300 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - accounts_password_pam_dictcheck - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_dictcheck # promote to variable set_fact: var_password_pam_dictcheck: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Prevent the Use of Dictionary Words - Ensure PAM variable dictcheck is set accordingly ansible.builtin.lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/security/pwquality.conf regexp: ^#?\s*dictcheck line: dictcheck = {{ var_password_pam_dictcheck }} when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-86233-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020300 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - accounts_password_pam_dictcheck - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q pam; then var_password_pam_dictcheck='' # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^dictcheck") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_password_pam_dictcheck" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^dictcheck\\>" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^dictcheck\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" else if [[ -s "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" fi cce="CCE-86233-4" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Characters The pam_pwquality module's difok parameter sets the number of characters in a password that must not be present in and old password during a password change. Modify the difok setting in /etc/security/pwquality.conf to equal to require differing characters when changing passwords. 1 12 15 16 5 5.6.2.1.1 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 CCI-000195 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 A.18.1.4 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 IA-5(c) IA-5(1)(b) CM-6(a) IA-5(4) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 SRG-OS-000072-GPOS-00040 RHEL-08-020170 4.4.3.2.1 SV-230363r858783_rule Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required to compromise the password. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute–force attacks. Password complexity is one factor of several that determines how long it takes to crack a password. The more complex the password, the greater the number of possible combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised. Requiring a minimum number of different characters during password changes ensures that newly changed passwords should not resemble previously compromised ones. Note that passwords which are changed on compromised systems will still be compromised, however. CCE-80654-7 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80654-7 - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020170 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(b) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - accounts_password_pam_difok - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_difok # promote to variable set_fact: var_password_pam_difok: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Characters - Ensure PAM variable difok is set accordingly ansible.builtin.lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/security/pwquality.conf regexp: ^#?\s*difok line: difok = {{ var_password_pam_difok }} when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80654-7 - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020170 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(b) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - accounts_password_pam_difok - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q pam; then var_password_pam_difok='' # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^difok") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_password_pam_difok" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^difok\\>" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^difok\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" else if [[ -s "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" fi cce="CCE-80654-7" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Enforce for Local Accounts Only The pam_pwquality module's local_users_only parameter controls requirements for enforcing password complexity by pam_pwquality only for local user accounts and ignoring centralized user account management password complexity configurations. Enable the local_users_only setting in /etc/security/pwquality.conf to require password complexity enforcement for only local user accounts. Using this rule bypasses pam_faillock's functionality and should be used in cases where centralized management such as LDAP or Active Directory is in use. CCI-000015 AC-2(1) SRG-OS-000001-GPOS-00001 The operating system must provide automated mechanisms for supporting account management functions. Enterprise environments make application account management challenging and complex. A manual process for account management functions adds the risk of a potential oversight or other error. CCE-83364-0 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-83364-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(1) - accounts_password_pam_enforce_local - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Enforce for Local Accounts Only lineinfile: path: /etc/security/pwquality.conf create: true line: local_users_only state: present when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-83364-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(1) - accounts_password_pam_enforce_local - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q pam; then if [ -e "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*local_users_only/Id" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" else touch "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" cp "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf.bak" # Insert at the end of the file printf '%s\n' "local_users_only" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/security/pwquality.conf.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Enforce for root User The pam_pwquality module's enforce_for_root parameter controls requirements for enforcing password complexity for the root user. Enable the enforce_for_root setting in /etc/security/pwquality.conf to require the root user to use complex passwords. CCI-000194 CCI-000193 CCI-001619 CCI-000205 CCI-000195 CCI-000192 CCI-000366 IA-5(c) IA-5(1)(a) CM-6(a) IA-5(4) SRG-OS-000072-GPOS-00040 SRG-OS-000071-GPOS-00039 SRG-OS-000070-GPOS-00038 SRG-OS-000266-GPOS-00101 SRG-OS-000078-GPOS-00046 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00225 SRG-OS-000069-GPOS-00037 4.4.3.2.7 Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required to compromise the password. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks. Password complexity is one factor of several that determines how long it takes to crack a password. The more complex the password, the greater the number of possible combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised. CCE-83377-2 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-83377-2 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - accounts_password_pam_enforce_root - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Enforce for root User lineinfile: path: /etc/security/pwquality.conf create: true line: enforce_for_root state: present when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-83377-2 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - accounts_password_pam_enforce_root - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q pam; then if [ -e "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*enforce_for_root/Id" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" else touch "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" cp "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf.bak" # Insert at the end of the file printf '%s\n' "enforce_for_root" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/security/pwquality.conf.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Lowercase Characters The pam_pwquality module's lcredit parameter controls requirements for usage of lowercase letters in a password. When set to a negative number, any password will be required to contain that many lowercase characters. When set to a positive number, pam_pwquality will grant +1 additional length credit for each lowercase character. Modify the lcredit setting in /etc/security/pwquality.conf to require the use of a lowercase character in passwords. BP28(R18) 1 12 15 16 5 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 CCI-000193 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 0421 0422 0431 0974 1173 1401 1504 1505 1546 1557 1558 1559 1560 1561 A.18.1.4 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 IA-5(c) IA-5(1)(a) CM-6(a) IA-5(4) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 FMT_SMF_EXT.1 Req-8.2.3 8.3.6 SRG-OS-000070-GPOS-00038 RHEL-08-020120 4.4.3.2.3 SV-230358r858773_rule Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required to compromise the password. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks. Password complexity is one factor of several that determines how long it takes to crack a password. The more complex the password, the greater the number of possble combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised. Requiring a minimum number of lowercase characters makes password guessing attacks more difficult by ensuring a larger search space. CCE-80655-4 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80655-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020120 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.6 - accounts_password_pam_lcredit - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_lcredit # promote to variable set_fact: var_password_pam_lcredit: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Lowercase Characters - Ensure PAM variable lcredit is set accordingly ansible.builtin.lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/security/pwquality.conf regexp: ^#?\s*lcredit line: lcredit = {{ var_password_pam_lcredit }} when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80655-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020120 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.6 - accounts_password_pam_lcredit - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q pam; then var_password_pam_lcredit='' # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^lcredit") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_password_pam_lcredit" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^lcredit\\>" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^lcredit\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" else if [[ -s "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" fi cce="CCE-80655-4" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Maximum Consecutive Repeating Characters from Same Character Class The pam_pwquality module's maxclassrepeat parameter controls requirements for consecutive repeating characters from the same character class. When set to a positive number, it will reject passwords which contain more than that number of consecutive characters from the same character class. Modify the maxclassrepeat setting in /etc/security/pwquality.conf to equal to prevent a run of ( + 1) or more identical characters. 1 12 15 16 5 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 CCI-000195 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 A.18.1.4 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 IA-5(c) IA-5(1)(a) CM-6(a) IA-5(4) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 SRG-OS-000072-GPOS-00040 RHEL-08-020140 SV-230360r858777_rule Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required to compromise the password. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks. Password complexity is one factor of several that determines how long it takes to crack a password. The more complex a password, the greater the number of possible combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised. CCE-81034-1 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-81034-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020140 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - accounts_password_pam_maxclassrepeat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_maxclassrepeat # promote to variable set_fact: var_password_pam_maxclassrepeat: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Maximum Consecutive Repeating Characters from Same Character Class - Ensure PAM variable maxclassrepeat is set accordingly ansible.builtin.lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/security/pwquality.conf regexp: ^#?\s*maxclassrepeat line: maxclassrepeat = {{ var_password_pam_maxclassrepeat }} when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-81034-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020140 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - accounts_password_pam_maxclassrepeat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q pam; then var_password_pam_maxclassrepeat='' # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^maxclassrepeat") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_password_pam_maxclassrepeat" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^maxclassrepeat\\>" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^maxclassrepeat\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" else if [[ -s "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" fi cce="CCE-81034-1" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Set Password Maximum Consecutive Repeating Characters The pam_pwquality module's maxrepeat parameter controls requirements for consecutive repeating characters. When set to a positive number, it will reject passwords which contain more than that number of consecutive characters. Modify the maxrepeat setting in /etc/security/pwquality.conf to equal to prevent a run of ( + 1) or more identical characters. 1 12 15 16 5 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 CCI-000195 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 A.18.1.4 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 IA-5(c) CM-6(a) IA-5(4) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 SRG-OS-000072-GPOS-00040 RHEL-08-020150 4.4.3.2.4 SV-230361r858779_rule Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required to compromise the password. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks. Password complexity is one factor of several that determines how long it takes to crack a password. The more complex the password, the greater the number of possible combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised. Passwords with excessive repeating characters may be more vulnerable to password-guessing attacks. CCE-82066-2 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-82066-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020150 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - accounts_password_pam_maxrepeat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_maxrepeat # promote to variable set_fact: var_password_pam_maxrepeat: !!str tags: - always - name: Set Password Maximum Consecutive Repeating Characters - Ensure PAM variable maxrepeat is set accordingly ansible.builtin.lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/security/pwquality.conf regexp: ^#?\s*maxrepeat line: maxrepeat = {{ var_password_pam_maxrepeat }} when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-82066-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020150 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - accounts_password_pam_maxrepeat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q pam; then var_password_pam_maxrepeat='' # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^maxrepeat") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_password_pam_maxrepeat" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^maxrepeat\\>" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^maxrepeat\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" else if [[ -s "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" fi cce="CCE-82066-2" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Categories The pam_pwquality module's minclass parameter controls requirements for usage of different character classes, or types, of character that must exist in a password before it is considered valid. For example, setting this value to three (3) requires that any password must have characters from at least three different categories in order to be approved. The default value is zero (0), meaning there are no required classes. There are four categories available: * Upper-case characters * Lower-case characters * Digits * Special characters (for example, punctuation) Modify the minclass setting in /etc/security/pwquality.conf entry to require differing categories of characters when changing passwords. 1 12 15 16 5 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 CCI-000195 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 0421 0422 0431 0974 1173 1401 1504 1505 1546 1557 1558 1559 1560 1561 A.18.1.4 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 IA-5(c) IA-5(1)(a) CM-6(a) IA-5(4) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 SRG-OS-000072-GPOS-00040 RHEL-08-020160 4.4.3.2.3 SV-230362r858781_rule Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required to compromise the password. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks. Password complexity is one factor of several that determines how long it takes to crack a password. The more complex the password, the greater the number of possible combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised. Requiring a minimum number of character categories makes password guessing attacks more difficult by ensuring a larger search space. CCE-82046-4 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-82046-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020160 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - accounts_password_pam_minclass - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_minclass # promote to variable set_fact: var_password_pam_minclass: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Categories - Ensure PAM variable minclass is set accordingly ansible.builtin.lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/security/pwquality.conf regexp: ^#?\s*minclass line: minclass = {{ var_password_pam_minclass }} when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-82046-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020160 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - accounts_password_pam_minclass - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q pam; then var_password_pam_minclass='' # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^minclass") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_password_pam_minclass" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^minclass\\>" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^minclass\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" else if [[ -s "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" fi cce="CCE-82046-4" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Length The pam_pwquality module's minlen parameter controls requirements for minimum characters required in a password. Add minlen= after pam_pwquality to set minimum password length requirements. BP28(R18) 1 12 15 16 5 5.6.2.1.1 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 CCI-000205 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 0421 0422 0431 0974 1173 1401 1504 1505 1546 1557 1558 1559 1560 1561 A.18.1.4 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 IA-5(c) IA-5(1)(a) CM-6(a) IA-5(4) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 FMT_SMF_EXT.1 Req-8.2.3 8.3.6 SRG-OS-000078-GPOS-00046 RHEL-08-020230 4.4.3.2.2 SV-230369r858785_rule The shorter the password, the lower the number of possible combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks. Password length is one factor of several that helps to determine strength and how long it takes to crack a password. Use of more characters in a password helps to exponentially increase the time and/or resources required to compromise the password. CCE-80656-2 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80656-2 - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020230 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.6 - accounts_password_pam_minlen - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_minlen # promote to variable set_fact: var_password_pam_minlen: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Length - Ensure PAM variable minlen is set accordingly ansible.builtin.lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/security/pwquality.conf regexp: ^#?\s*minlen line: minlen = {{ var_password_pam_minlen }} when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80656-2 - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020230 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.6 - accounts_password_pam_minlen - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q pam; then var_password_pam_minlen='' # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^minlen") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_password_pam_minlen" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^minlen\\>" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^minlen\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" else if [[ -s "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" fi cce="CCE-80656-2" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Special Characters The pam_pwquality module's ocredit= parameter controls requirements for usage of special (or "other") characters in a password. When set to a negative number, any password will be required to contain that many special characters. When set to a positive number, pam_pwquality will grant +1 additional length credit for each special character. Modify the ocredit setting in /etc/security/pwquality.conf to equal to require use of a special character in passwords. BP28(R18) 1 12 15 16 5 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 CCI-001619 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 0421 0422 0431 0974 1173 1401 1504 1505 1546 1557 1558 1559 1560 1561 A.18.1.4 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 IA-5(c) IA-5(1)(a) CM-6(a) IA-5(4) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 FMT_SMF_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000266-GPOS-00101 RHEL-08-020280 4.4.3.2.3 SV-230375r858787_rule Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required to compromise the password. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks. Password complexity is one factor of several that determines how long it takes to crack a password. The more complex the password, the greater the number of possible combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised. Requiring a minimum number of special characters makes password guessing attacks more difficult by ensuring a larger search space. CCE-80663-8 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80663-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020280 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - accounts_password_pam_ocredit - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_ocredit # promote to variable set_fact: var_password_pam_ocredit: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Special Characters - Ensure PAM variable ocredit is set accordingly ansible.builtin.lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/security/pwquality.conf regexp: ^#?\s*ocredit line: ocredit = {{ var_password_pam_ocredit }} when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80663-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020280 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - accounts_password_pam_ocredit - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q pam; then var_password_pam_ocredit='' # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^ocredit") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_password_pam_ocredit" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^ocredit\\>" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^ocredit\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" else if [[ -s "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" fi cce="CCE-80663-8" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth To enable PAM password complexity in password-auth file: Edit the password section in /etc/pam.d/password-auth to show password requisite pam_pwquality.so. CCI-000366 SRG-OS-000069-GPOS-00037 SRG-OS-000070-GPOS-00038 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-020100 SV-230356r902728_rule Enabling PAM password complexity permits to enforce strong passwords and consequently makes the system less prone to dictionary attacks. CCE-85877-9 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-85877-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020100 - accounts_password_pam_pwquality_password_auth - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Check if /etc/pam.d/password-auth file is present ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth register: result_pam_file_present when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-85877-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020100 - accounts_password_pam_pwquality_password_auth - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Check the proper remediation for the system block: - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Check if system relies on authselect tool ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present block: - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Get authselect current profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' register: result_authselect_profile changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present changed_when: false when: - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile }} when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_features is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path | basename }} when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Check if expected PAM module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^\s*password\s+{{ 'requisite' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_pwquality.so\s*.* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_line_present - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Include or update the PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }} block: - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Check if required PAM module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }} with different control ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwquality.so\s* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_line_other_control_present - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Ensure the correct control for the required PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.replace: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwquality.so.*) replace: \1requisite \2 register: result_pam_module_edit when: - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 1 - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Ensure the required PAM module line is included in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.lineinfile: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' insertafter: ^account.*required.*pam_permit\.so line: password requisite pam_pwquality.so register: result_pam_module_add when: - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 0 or result_pam_line_other_control_present.found > 1 - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present is defined - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - |- (result_pam_module_add is defined and result_pam_module_add.changed) or (result_pam_module_edit is defined and result_pam_module_edit.changed) when: - result_pam_line_present.found is defined - result_pam_line_present.found == 0 - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - |- (result_pam__add is defined and result_pam__add.changed) or (result_pam__edit is defined and result_pam__edit.changed) when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists tags: - CCE-85877-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020100 - accounts_password_pam_pwquality_password_auth - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q pam; then if [ -e "/etc/pam.d/password-auth" ] ; then PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/password-auth" if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do authselect enable-feature $feature; done authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile fi PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" authselect apply-changes -b fi if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"requisite"'\s+pam_pwquality.so\s*.*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwquality.so\s*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH")" -eq 1 ]; then # The control is updated only if one single line matches. sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwquality.so.*)/\1'"requisite"' \2/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" else LAST_MATCH_LINE=$(grep -nP "^account.*required.*pam_permit\.so" "$PAM_FILE_PATH" | tail -n 1 | cut -d: -f 1) if [ ! -z $LAST_MATCH_LINE ]; then sed -i --follow-symlinks $LAST_MATCH_LINE' a password '"requisite"' pam_pwquality.so' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" else echo 'password '"requisite"' pam_pwquality.so' >> "$PAM_FILE_PATH" fi fi fi if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then authselect apply-changes -b fi else echo "/etc/pam.d/password-auth was not found" >&2 fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth To enable PAM password complexity in system-auth file: Edit the password section in /etc/pam.d/system-auth to show password requisite pam_pwquality.so. CCI-000366 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-020101 SV-251713r902740_rule Enabling PAM password complexity permits to enforce strong passwords and consequently makes the system less prone to dictionary attacks. CCE-85872-0 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-85872-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020101 - accounts_password_pam_pwquality_system_auth - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth file is present ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth register: result_pam_file_present when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-85872-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020101 - accounts_password_pam_pwquality_system_auth - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Check the proper remediation for the system block: - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Check if system relies on authselect tool ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present block: - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Get authselect current profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' register: result_authselect_profile changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present changed_when: false when: - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile }} when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_features is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path | basename }} when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Check if expected PAM module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^\s*password\s+{{ 'requisite' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_pwquality.so\s*.* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_line_present - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Include or update the PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }} block: - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Check if required PAM module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }} with different control ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwquality.so\s* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_line_other_control_present - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Ensure the correct control for the required PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.replace: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwquality.so.*) replace: \1requisite \2 register: result_pam_module_edit when: - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 1 - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Ensure the required PAM module line is included in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.lineinfile: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' insertafter: ^account.*required.*pam_permit\.so line: password requisite pam_pwquality.so register: result_pam_module_add when: - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 0 or result_pam_line_other_control_present.found > 1 - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present is defined - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - |- (result_pam_module_add is defined and result_pam_module_add.changed) or (result_pam_module_edit is defined and result_pam_module_edit.changed) when: - result_pam_line_present.found is defined - result_pam_line_present.found == 0 - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - |- (result_pam__add is defined and result_pam__add.changed) or (result_pam__edit is defined and result_pam__edit.changed) when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists tags: - CCE-85872-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020101 - accounts_password_pam_pwquality_system_auth - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q pam; then if [ -e "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" ] ; then PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/system-auth" if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do authselect enable-feature $feature; done authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile fi PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/system-auth") PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" authselect apply-changes -b fi if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"requisite"'\s+pam_pwquality.so\s*.*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwquality.so\s*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH")" -eq 1 ]; then # The control is updated only if one single line matches. sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwquality.so.*)/\1'"requisite"' \2/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" else LAST_MATCH_LINE=$(grep -nP "^account.*required.*pam_permit\.so" "$PAM_FILE_PATH" | tail -n 1 | cut -d: -f 1) if [ ! -z $LAST_MATCH_LINE ]; then sed -i --follow-symlinks $LAST_MATCH_LINE' a password '"requisite"' pam_pwquality.so' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" else echo 'password '"requisite"' pam_pwquality.so' >> "$PAM_FILE_PATH" fi fi fi if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then authselect apply-changes -b fi else echo "/etc/pam.d/system-auth was not found" >&2 fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session To configure the number of retry prompts that are permitted per-session: Edit the /etc/security/pwquality.conf to include retry=, or a lower value if site policy is more restrictive. The DoD requirement is a maximum of 3 prompts per session. 1 11 12 15 16 3 5 9 5.5.3 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 CCI-000192 CCI-000366 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.18.1.4 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 CM-6(a) AC-7(a) IA-5(4) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 PR.IP-1 FMT_MOF_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000069-GPOS-00037 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-020104 4.4.3.3.1 SV-251716r858737_rule Setting the password retry prompts that are permitted on a per-session basis to a low value requires some software, such as SSH, to re-connect. This can slow down and draw additional attention to some types of password-guessing attacks. Note that this is different from account lockout, which is provided by the pam_faillock module. CCE-80664-6 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80664-6 - CJIS-5.5.3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020104 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) - accounts_password_pam_retry - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_retry # promote to variable set_fact: var_password_pam_retry: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure PAM variable retry is set accordingly ansible.builtin.lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/security/pwquality.conf regexp: ^\s*retry line: retry = {{ var_password_pam_retry }} when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80664-6 - CJIS-5.5.3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020104 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) - accounts_password_pam_retry - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Check if /etc/pam.d/password-auth file is present ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth register: result_pam_file_present when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80664-6 - CJIS-5.5.3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020104 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) - accounts_password_pam_retry - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Check the proper remediation for the system block: - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Check if system relies on authselect tool ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present block: - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Get authselect current profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' register: result_authselect_profile changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present changed_when: false when: - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile }} when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_features is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path | basename }} when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Ensure the "retry" option from "pam_pwquality.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.replace: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: (.*password.*{{ '.*' | regex_escape() }}.*pam_pwquality.so.*)\bretry\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) replace: \1\2 register: result_pam_option_removal - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - result_pam_option_removal is changed when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80664-6 - CJIS-5.5.3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020104 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) - accounts_password_pam_retry - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth file is present ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth register: result_pam_file_present when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80664-6 - CJIS-5.5.3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020104 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) - accounts_password_pam_retry - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Check the proper remediation for the system block: - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Check if system relies on authselect tool ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present block: - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Get authselect current profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' register: result_authselect_profile changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present changed_when: false when: - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile }} when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_features is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path | basename }} when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Ensure the "retry" option from "pam_pwquality.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.replace: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: (.*password.*{{ '.*' | regex_escape() }}.*pam_pwquality.so.*)\bretry\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) replace: \1\2 register: result_pam_option_removal - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - result_pam_option_removal is changed when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80664-6 - CJIS-5.5.3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020104 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) - accounts_password_pam_retry - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q pam; then var_password_pam_retry='' # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^retry") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_password_pam_retry" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^retry\\>" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^retry\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" else if [[ -s "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" fi cce="CCE-80664-6" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" fi if [ -e "/etc/pam.d/password-auth" ] ; then PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/password-auth" if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do authselect enable-feature $feature; done authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile fi PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" authselect apply-changes -b fi if grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'".*"'\s+pam_pwquality.so\s.*\bretry\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*password.*'".*"'.*pam_pwquality.so.*)\sretry=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" fi if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then authselect apply-changes -b fi else echo "/etc/pam.d/password-auth was not found" >&2 fi if [ -e "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" ] ; then PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/system-auth" if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do authselect enable-feature $feature; done authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile fi PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/system-auth") PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" authselect apply-changes -b fi if grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'".*"'\s+pam_pwquality.so\s.*\bretry\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*password.*'".*"'.*pam_pwquality.so.*)\sretry=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" fi if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then authselect apply-changes -b fi else echo "/etc/pam.d/system-auth was not found" >&2 fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Uppercase Characters The pam_pwquality module's ucredit= parameter controls requirements for usage of uppercase letters in a password. When set to a negative number, any password will be required to contain that many uppercase characters. When set to a positive number, pam_pwquality will grant +1 additional length credit for each uppercase character. Modify the ucredit setting in /etc/security/pwquality.conf to require the use of an uppercase character in passwords. BP28(R18) 1 12 15 16 5 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 CCI-000192 CCI-000193 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 0421 0422 0431 0974 1173 1401 1504 1505 1546 1557 1558 1559 1560 1561 A.18.1.4 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 IA-5(c) IA-5(1)(a) CM-6(a) IA-5(4) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 FMT_SMF_EXT.1 Req-8.2.3 SRG-OS-000069-GPOS-00037 SRG-OS-000070-GPOS-00038 RHEL-08-020110 4.4.3.2.3 SV-230357r858771_rule Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required to compromise the password. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks. Password complexity is one factor of several that determines how long it takes to crack a password. The more complex the password, the greater the number of possible combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised. CCE-80665-3 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80665-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020110 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3 - accounts_password_pam_ucredit - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_ucredit # promote to variable set_fact: var_password_pam_ucredit: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Uppercase Characters - Ensure PAM variable ucredit is set accordingly ansible.builtin.lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/security/pwquality.conf regexp: ^#?\s*ucredit line: ucredit = {{ var_password_pam_ucredit }} when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80665-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020110 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3 - accounts_password_pam_ucredit - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q pam; then var_password_pam_ucredit='' # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^ucredit") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_password_pam_ucredit" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^ucredit\\>" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^ucredit\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" else if [[ -s "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" fi cce="CCE-80665-3" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Set Password Hashing Algorithm The system's default algorithm for storing password hashes in /etc/shadow is SHA-512. This can be configured in several locations. Set Password Hashing Algorithm in /etc/libuser.conf In /etc/libuser.conf, add or correct the following line in its [defaults] section to ensure the system will use the SHA-512 algorithm for password hashing: crypt_style = sha512 1 12 15 16 5 5.6.2.2 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 3.13.11 CCI-000196 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 0418 1055 1402 A.18.1.4 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 IA-5(c) IA-5(1)(c) CM-6(a) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 Req-8.2.1 8.3.2 SRG-OS-000073-GPOS-00041 4.5.1.1 Passwords need to be protected at all times, and encryption is the standard method for protecting passwords. If passwords are not encrypted, they can be plainly read (i.e., clear text) and easily compromised. Passwords that are encrypted with a weak algorithm are no more protected than if they are kepy in plain text. This setting ensures user and group account administration utilities are configured to store only encrypted representations of passwords. Additionally, the crypt_style configuration option ensures the use of a strong hashing algorithm that makes password cracking attacks more difficult. CCE-80891-5 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80891-5 - CJIS-5.6.2.2 - NIST-800-171-3.13.11 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.1 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.2 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - set_password_hashing_algorithm_libuserconf - name: Set Password Hashing Algorithm in /etc/libuser.conf lineinfile: dest: /etc/libuser.conf insertafter: ^\s*\[defaults] regexp: ^#?crypt_style line: crypt_style = sha512 state: present create: true when: '"libuser" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80891-5 - CJIS-5.6.2.2 - NIST-800-171-3.13.11 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.1 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.2 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - set_password_hashing_algorithm_libuserconf # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q libuser; then LIBUSER_CONF="/etc/libuser.conf" CRYPT_STYLE_REGEX='[[:space:]]*\[defaults](.*(\n)+)+?[[:space:]]*crypt_style[[:space:]]*' # Try find crypt_style in [defaults] section. If it is here, then change algorithm to sha512. # If it isn't here, then add it to [defaults] section. if grep -qzosP $CRYPT_STYLE_REGEX $LIBUSER_CONF ; then sed -i "s/\(crypt_style[[:space:]]*=[[:space:]]*\).*/\1sha512/g" $LIBUSER_CONF elif grep -qs "\[defaults]" $LIBUSER_CONF ; then sed -i "/[[:space:]]*\[defaults]/a crypt_style = sha512" $LIBUSER_CONF else echo -e "[defaults]\ncrypt_style = sha512" >> $LIBUSER_CONF fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Set Password Hashing Algorithm in /etc/login.defs In /etc/login.defs, add or correct the following line to ensure the system will use as the hashing algorithm: ENCRYPT_METHOD BP28(R32) 1 12 15 16 5 5.6.2.2 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 3.13.11 CCI-000196 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 0418 1055 1402 A.18.1.4 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 IA-5(c) IA-5(1)(c) CM-6(a) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 Req-8.2.1 8.3.2 SRG-OS-000073-GPOS-00041 RHEL-08-010110 4.5.1.1 SV-230231r877397_rule Passwords need to be protected at all times, and encryption is the standard method for protecting passwords. If passwords are not encrypted, they can be plainly read (i.e., clear text) and easily compromised. Passwords that are encrypted with a weak algorithm are no more protected than if they are kept in plain text. Using a stronger hashing algorithm makes password cracking attacks more difficult. CCE-80892-3 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80892-3 - CJIS-5.6.2.2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010110 - NIST-800-171-3.13.11 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.1 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.2 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - set_password_hashing_algorithm_logindefs - name: XCCDF Value var_password_hashing_algorithm # promote to variable set_fact: var_password_hashing_algorithm: !!str tags: - always - name: Set Password Hashing Algorithm in /etc/login.defs lineinfile: dest: /etc/login.defs regexp: ^#?ENCRYPT_METHOD line: ENCRYPT_METHOD {{ var_password_hashing_algorithm }} state: present create: true when: '"shadow-utils" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80892-3 - CJIS-5.6.2.2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010110 - NIST-800-171-3.13.11 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.1 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.2 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - set_password_hashing_algorithm_logindefs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q shadow-utils; then var_password_hashing_algorithm='' # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^ENCRYPT_METHOD") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_password_hashing_algorithm" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^ENCRYPT_METHOD\\>" "/etc/login.defs"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^ENCRYPT_METHOD\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/login.defs" else if [[ -s "/etc/login.defs" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/login.defs" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/login.defs" fi cce="CCE-80892-3" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "/etc/login.defs" >> "/etc/login.defs" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/login.defs" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Set PAM''s Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth The PAM system service can be configured to only store encrypted representations of passwords. In /etc/pam.d/password-auth, the password section of the file controls which PAM modules execute during a password change. Set the pam_unix.so module in the password section to include the argument sha512, as shown below: password sufficient pam_unix.so sha512 other arguments... This will help ensure when local users change their passwords, hashes for the new passwords will be generated using the SHA-512 algorithm. This is the default. BP28(R32) 1 12 15 16 5 5.6.2.2 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 3.13.11 CCI-000196 CCI-000803 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 0418 1055 1402 A.18.1.4 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 IA-5(c) IA-5(1)(c) CM-6(a) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 Req-8.2.1 SRG-OS-000073-GPOS-00041 SRG-OS-000120-GPOS-00061 RHEL-08-010160 4.4.3.4.3 SV-230237r809276_rule Passwords need to be protected at all times, and encryption is the standard method for protecting passwords. If passwords are not encrypted, they can be plainly read (i.e., clear text) and easily compromised. Passwords that are encrypted with a weak algorithm are no more protected than if they are kepy in plain text. This setting ensures user and group account administration utilities are configured to store only encrypted representations of passwords. Additionally, the crypt_style configuration option ensures the use of a strong hashing algorithm that makes password cracking attacks more difficult. CCE-85945-4 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-85945-4 - CJIS-5.6.2.2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010160 - NIST-800-171-3.13.11 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.1 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - set_password_hashing_algorithm_passwordauth - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Check if /etc/pam.d/password-auth file is present ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth register: result_pam_file_present when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-85945-4 - CJIS-5.6.2.2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010160 - NIST-800-171-3.13.11 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.1 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - set_password_hashing_algorithm_passwordauth - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Check the proper remediation for the system block: - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Check if system relies on authselect tool ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present block: - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Get authselect current profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' register: result_authselect_profile changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present changed_when: false when: - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile }} when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_features is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path | basename }} when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Check if expected PAM module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^\s*password\s+{{ 'sufficient' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_unix.so\s*.* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_line_present - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Include or update the PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }} block: - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Check if required PAM module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }} with different control ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_unix.so\s* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_line_other_control_present - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Ensure the correct control for the required PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.replace: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_unix.so.*) replace: \1sufficient \2 register: result_pam_module_edit when: - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 1 - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Ensure the required PAM module line is included in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.lineinfile: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' line: password sufficient pam_unix.so register: result_pam_module_add when: - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 0 or result_pam_line_other_control_present.found > 1 - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present is defined - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - |- (result_pam_module_add is defined and result_pam_module_add.changed) or (result_pam_module_edit is defined and result_pam_module_edit.changed) when: - result_pam_line_present.found is defined - result_pam_line_present.found == 0 - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Check if the required PAM module option is present in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^\s*password\s+{{ 'sufficient' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_unix.so\s*.*\ssha512\b state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_module_sha512_option_present - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Ensure the "sha512" PAM option for "pam_unix.so" is included in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' backrefs: true regexp: ^(\s*password\s+{{ 'sufficient' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_unix.so.*) line: \1 sha512 state: present register: result_pam_sha512_add when: - result_pam_module_sha512_option_present.found == 0 - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - |- (result_pam_sha512_add is defined and result_pam_sha512_add.changed) or (result_pam_sha512_edit is defined and result_pam_sha512_edit.changed) when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists tags: - CCE-85945-4 - CJIS-5.6.2.2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010160 - NIST-800-171-3.13.11 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.1 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - set_password_hashing_algorithm_passwordauth # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q pam; then if [ -e "/etc/pam.d/password-auth" ] ; then PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/password-auth" if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do authselect enable-feature $feature; done authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile fi PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" authselect apply-changes -b fi if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so\s*.*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_unix.so\s*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH")" -eq 1 ]; then # The control is updated only if one single line matches. sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_unix.so.*)/\1'"sufficient"' \2/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" else echo 'password '"sufficient"' pam_unix.so' >> "$PAM_FILE_PATH" fi fi # Check the option if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so\s*.*\ssha512\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then sed -i -E --follow-symlinks '/\s*password\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so.*/ s/$/ sha512/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" fi if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then authselect apply-changes -b fi else echo "/etc/pam.d/password-auth was not found" >&2 fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Set PAM''s Password Hashing Algorithm The PAM system service can be configured to only store encrypted representations of passwords. In "/etc/pam.d/system-auth", the password section of the file controls which PAM modules execute during a password change. Set the pam_unix.so module in the password section to include the argument sha512, as shown below: password sufficient pam_unix.so sha512 other arguments... This will help ensure when local users change their passwords, hashes for the new passwords will be generated using the SHA-512 algorithm. This is the default. BP28(R32) 1 12 15 16 5 5.6.2.2 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 3.13.11 CCI-000196 CCI-000803 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 0418 1055 1402 A.18.1.4 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 IA-5(c) IA-5(1)(c) CM-6(a) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 Req-8.2.1 8.3.2 SRG-OS-000073-GPOS-00041 SRG-OS-000120-GPOS-00061 RHEL-08-010159 4.4.3.4.3 SV-244524r809331_rule Passwords need to be protected at all times, and encryption is the standard method for protecting passwords. If passwords are not encrypted, they can be plainly read (i.e., clear text) and easily compromised. Passwords that are encrypted with a weak algorithm are no more protected than if they are kepy in plain text. This setting ensures user and group account administration utilities are configured to store only encrypted representations of passwords. Additionally, the crypt_style configuration option ensures the use of a strong hashing algorithm that makes password cracking attacks more difficult. CCE-80893-1 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80893-1 - CJIS-5.6.2.2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010159 - NIST-800-171-3.13.11 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.1 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.2 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - set_password_hashing_algorithm_systemauth - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth file is present ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth register: result_pam_file_present when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80893-1 - CJIS-5.6.2.2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010159 - NIST-800-171-3.13.11 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.1 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.2 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - set_password_hashing_algorithm_systemauth - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Check the proper remediation for the system block: - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Check if system relies on authselect tool ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present block: - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Get authselect current profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' register: result_authselect_profile changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present changed_when: false when: - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile }} when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_features is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path | basename }} when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Check if expected PAM module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^\s*password\s+{{ 'sufficient' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_unix.so\s*.* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_line_present - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Include or update the PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }} block: - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Check if required PAM module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }} with different control ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_unix.so\s* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_line_other_control_present - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Ensure the correct control for the required PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.replace: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_unix.so.*) replace: \1sufficient \2 register: result_pam_module_edit when: - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 1 - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Ensure the required PAM module line is included in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.lineinfile: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' line: password sufficient pam_unix.so register: result_pam_module_add when: - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 0 or result_pam_line_other_control_present.found > 1 - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present is defined - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - |- (result_pam_module_add is defined and result_pam_module_add.changed) or (result_pam_module_edit is defined and result_pam_module_edit.changed) when: - result_pam_line_present.found is defined - result_pam_line_present.found == 0 - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Check if the required PAM module option is present in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^\s*password\s+{{ 'sufficient' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_unix.so\s*.*\ssha512\b state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_module_sha512_option_present - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Ensure the "sha512" PAM option for "pam_unix.so" is included in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' backrefs: true regexp: ^(\s*password\s+{{ 'sufficient' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_unix.so.*) line: \1 sha512 state: present register: result_pam_sha512_add when: - result_pam_module_sha512_option_present.found == 0 - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - |- (result_pam_sha512_add is defined and result_pam_sha512_add.changed) or (result_pam_sha512_edit is defined and result_pam_sha512_edit.changed) when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80893-1 - CJIS-5.6.2.2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010159 - NIST-800-171-3.13.11 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.1 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.2 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - set_password_hashing_algorithm_systemauth # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q pam; then if [ -e "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" ] ; then PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/system-auth" if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do authselect enable-feature $feature; done authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile fi PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/system-auth") PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" authselect apply-changes -b fi if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so\s*.*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_unix.so\s*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH")" -eq 1 ]; then # The control is updated only if one single line matches. sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_unix.so.*)/\1'"sufficient"' \2/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" else echo 'password '"sufficient"' pam_unix.so' >> "$PAM_FILE_PATH" fi fi # Check the option if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so\s*.*\ssha512\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then sed -i -E --follow-symlinks '/\s*password\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so.*/ s/$/ sha512/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" fi if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then authselect apply-changes -b fi else echo "/etc/pam.d/system-auth was not found" >&2 fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Set Password Hashing Rounds in /etc/login.defs In /etc/login.defs, ensure SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS and SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS has the minimum value of 5000. For example: SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS 5000 SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS 5000 Notice that if neither are set, they already have the default value of 5000. If either is set, they must have the minimum value of 5000. BP28(R68) CCI-000196 CCI-000803 SRG-OS-000073-GPOS-00041 SRG-OS-000120-GPOS-00061 RHEL-08-010130 SV-230233r880705_rule Passwords need to be protected at all times, and encryption is the standard method for protecting passwords. If passwords are not encrypted, they can be plainly read (i.e., clear text) and easily compromised. Passwords that are encrypted with a weak algorithm are no more protected than if they are kept in plain text. Using more hashing rounds makes password cracking attacks more difficult. CCE-89707-4 - name: Set Password Hashing Rounds in /etc/login.defs - Ensure SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS has Minimum Value of 5000 ansible.builtin.replace: path: /etc/login.defs regexp: (^\s*SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS\s+)(?!(?:[5-9]\d{3,}|\d{5,}))\S*(\s*$) replace: \g<1>5000\g<2> backup: false tags: - CCE-89707-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010130 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - set_password_hashing_min_rounds_logindefs - name: Set Password Hashing Rounds in /etc/login.defs - Ensure SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS has Minimum Value of 5000 ansible.builtin.replace: path: /etc/login.defs regexp: (^\s*SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS\s+)(?!(?:[5-9]\d{3,}|\d{5,}))\S*(\s*$) replace: \g<1>5000\g<2> backup: false tags: - CCE-89707-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010130 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - set_password_hashing_min_rounds_logindefs if [ -e "/etc/login.defs" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS\s*/Id" "/etc/login.defs" else printf '%s\n' "Path '/etc/login.defs' wasn't found on this system. Refusing to continue." >&2 return 1 fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/login.defs" cp "/etc/login.defs" "/etc/login.defs.bak" # Insert at the end of the file printf '%s\n' "SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS 5000" >> "/etc/login.defs" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/login.defs.bak" Protect Physical Console Access It is impossible to fully protect a system from an attacker with physical access, so securing the space in which the system is located should be considered a necessary step. However, there are some steps which, if taken, make it more difficult for an attacker to quickly or undetectably modify a system from its console. Login timeout for idle sessions Specify duration of allowed idle time. 600 7200 840 900 1800 300 3600 300 Disable debug-shell SystemD Service SystemD's debug-shell service is intended to diagnose SystemD related boot issues with various systemctl commands. Once enabled and following a system reboot, the root shell will be available on tty9 which is access by pressing CTRL-ALT-F9. The debug-shell service should only be used for SystemD related issues and should otherwise be disabled. By default, the debug-shell SystemD service is already disabled. The debug-shell service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now debug-shell.service 3.4.5 CCI-000366 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) 164.308(a)(7)(i) 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) 164.310(a)(1) 164.310(a)(2)(i) 164.310(a)(2)(ii) 164.310(a)(2)(iii) 164.310(b) 164.310(c) 164.310(d)(1) 164.310(d)(2)(iii) CM-6 FIA_UAU.1 SRG-OS-000324-GPOS-00125 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040180 SV-230532r627750_rule This prevents attackers with physical access from trivially bypassing security on the machine through valid troubleshooting configurations and gaining root access when the system is rebooted. CCE-80876-6 - name: Block Disable service debug-shell block: - name: Disable service debug-shell block: - name: Disable service debug-shell systemd: name: debug-shell.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service debug-shell' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80876-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040180 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-CM-6 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_debug-shell_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - debug-shell.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files debug-shell.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80876-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040180 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-CM-6 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_debug-shell_disabled - name: Disable socket debug-shell systemd: name: debug-shell.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("debug-shell.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-80876-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040180 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-CM-6 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_debug-shell_disabled --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - enabled: false name: debug-shell.service [customizations.services] disabled = ["debug-shell"] include disable_debug-shell class disable_debug-shell { service {'debug-shell': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'debug-shell.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'debug-shell.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'debug-shell.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files debug-shell.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'debug-shell.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'debug-shell.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'debug-shell.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Ctrl-Alt-Del Burst Action By default, SystemD will reboot the system if the Ctrl-Alt-Del key sequence is pressed Ctrl-Alt-Delete more than 7 times in 2 seconds. To configure the system to ignore the CtrlAltDelBurstAction setting, add or modify the following to /etc/systemd/system.conf: CtrlAltDelBurstAction=none Disabling the Ctrl-Alt-Del key sequence in /etc/init/control-alt-delete.conf DOES NOT disable the Ctrl-Alt-Del key sequence if running in runlevel 6 (e.g. in GNOME, KDE, etc.)! The Ctrl-Alt-Del key sequence will only be disabled if running in the non-graphical runlevel 3. 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 3.4.5 CCI-000366 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) 164.308(a)(7)(i) 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) 164.310(a)(1) 164.310(a)(2)(i) 164.310(a)(2)(ii) 164.310(a)(2)(iii) 164.310(b) 164.310(c) 164.310(d)(1) 164.310(d)(2)(iii) 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) CM-6(a) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 FAU_GEN.1.2 SRG-OS-000324-GPOS-00125 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040172 SV-230531r627750_rule A locally logged-in user who presses Ctrl-Alt-Del, when at the console, can reboot the system. If accidentally pressed, as could happen in the case of mixed OS environment, this can create the risk of short-term loss of availability of systems due to unintentional reboot. CCE-80784-2 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80784-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040172 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - disable_ctrlaltdel_burstaction - disable_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - name: Disable Ctrl-Alt-Del Burst Action lineinfile: dest: /etc/systemd/system.conf state: present regexp: ^CtrlAltDelBurstAction line: CtrlAltDelBurstAction=none create: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"systemd" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80784-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040172 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - disable_ctrlaltdel_burstaction - disable_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,CtrlAltDelBurstAction%3Dnone mode: 0644 path: /etc/systemd/system.conf.d/disable_ctrlaltdelete_burstaction.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { rpm --quiet -q systemd; }; then # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^CtrlAltDelBurstAction=") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s=%s" "$stripped_key" "none" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^CtrlAltDelBurstAction=\\>" "/etc/systemd/system.conf"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^CtrlAltDelBurstAction=\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/systemd/system.conf" else if [[ -s "/etc/systemd/system.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/systemd/system.conf" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/systemd/system.conf" fi cce="CCE-80784-2" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "/etc/systemd/system.conf" >> "/etc/systemd/system.conf" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/systemd/system.conf" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Ctrl-Alt-Del Reboot Activation By default, SystemD will reboot the system if the Ctrl-Alt-Del key sequence is pressed. To configure the system to ignore the Ctrl-Alt-Del key sequence from the command line instead of rebooting the system, do either of the following: ln -sf /dev/null /etc/systemd/system/ctrl-alt-del.target or systemctl mask ctrl-alt-del.target Do not simply delete the /usr/lib/systemd/system/ctrl-alt-del.service file, as this file may be restored during future system updates. 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 3.4.5 CCI-000366 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) 164.308(a)(7)(i) 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) 164.310(a)(1) 164.310(a)(2)(i) 164.310(a)(2)(ii) 164.310(a)(2)(iii) 164.310(b) 164.310(c) 164.310(d)(1) 164.310(d)(2)(iii) 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 FAU_GEN.1.2 SRG-OS-000324-GPOS-00125 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040170 SV-230529r833338_rule A locally logged-in user who presses Ctrl-Alt-Del, when at the console, can reboot the system. If accidentally pressed, as could happen in the case of mixed OS environment, this can create the risk of short-term loss of availability of systems due to unintentional reboot. CCE-80785-9 - name: Disable Ctrl-Alt-Del Reboot Activation systemd: name: ctrl-alt-del.target force: true masked: true state: stopped when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80785-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040170 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - disable_ctrlaltdel_reboot - disable_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: ctrl-alt-del.target mask: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then systemctl disable --now ctrl-alt-del.target systemctl mask --now ctrl-alt-del.target else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify that Interactive Boot is Disabled Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 systems support an "interactive boot" option that can be used to prevent services from being started. On a Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 system, interactive boot can be enabled by providing a 1, yes, true, or on value to the systemd.confirm_spawn kernel argument in /etc/default/grub. Remove any instance of systemd.confirm_spawn=(1|yes|true|on) from the kernel arguments in that file to disable interactive boot. Recovery booting must also be disabled. Confirm that GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=true is set in /etc/default/grub. It is also required to change the runtime configuration, run: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --remove-args="systemd.confirm_spawn" grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg 11 12 14 15 16 18 3 5 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.03 DSS06.06 3.1.2 3.4.5 CCI-000213 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) 164.308(a)(7)(i) 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) 164.310(a)(1) 164.310(a)(2)(i) 164.310(a)(2)(ii) 164.310(a)(2)(iii) 164.310(b) 164.310(c) 164.310(d)(1) 164.310(d)(2)(iii) 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 SC-2(1) CM-6(a) PR.AC-4 PR.AC-6 PR.PT-3 FIA_UAU.1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 Using interactive or recovery boot, the console user could disable auditing, firewalls, or other services, weakening system security. CCE-80826-1 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80826-1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-2(1) - grub2_disable_interactive_boot - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Verify GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=true lineinfile: path: /etc/default/grub regexp: ^GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=.* line: GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=true state: present when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80826-1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-2(1) - grub2_disable_interactive_boot - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Verify that Interactive Boot is Disabled in /etc/default/grub replace: dest: /etc/default/grub regexp: systemd.confirm_spawn(=(1|yes|true|on)|\b) replace: systemd.confirm_spawn=no when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80826-1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-2(1) - grub2_disable_interactive_boot - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Verify that Interactive Boot is Disabled (runtime) command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --remove-args="systemd.confirm_spawn" when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80826-1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-2(1) - grub2_disable_interactive_boot - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Regen grub.cfg handle updated GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY and confirm_spawn command: grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80826-1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-2(1) - grub2_disable_interactive_boot - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { rpm --quiet -q grub2-common; }; then # Verify that Interactive Boot is Disabled in /etc/default/grub CONFIRM_SPAWN_YES="systemd.confirm_spawn\(=\(1\|yes\|true\|on\)\|\b\)" CONFIRM_SPAWN_NO="systemd.confirm_spawn=no" if grep -q "\(GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX\|GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT\)" /etc/default/grub then sed -i "s/${CONFIRM_SPAWN_YES}/${CONFIRM_SPAWN_NO}/" /etc/default/grub fi # make sure GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=true if grep -q '^GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=.*' '/etc/default/grub' ; then # modify the GRUB command-line if an GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY= arg already exists sed -i 's/GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=.*/GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=true/' /etc/default/grub else # no GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=arg is present, append it to file echo "GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=true" >> '/etc/default/grub' fi # Remove 'systemd.confirm_spawn' kernel argument also from runtime settings /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --remove-args="systemd.confirm_spawn" #Regen grub.cfg handle updated GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY and confirm_spawn grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure Logind to terminate idle sessions after certain time of inactivity To configure logind service to terminate inactive user sessions after seconds, edit the file /etc/systemd/logind.conf. Ensure that there is a section [Login] which contains the configuration StopIdleSessionSec=. BP28(R29) 1 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 7 8 5.5.6 APO13.01 BAI03.01 BAI03.02 BAI03.03 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 3.1.11 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 6.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.3 A.14.1.1 A.14.2.1 A.14.2.5 A.18.1.4 A.6.1.2 A.6.1.5 A.7.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 CM-6(a) AC-17(a) AC-2(5) AC-12 AC-17(a) SC-10 CM-6(a) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 PR.AC-1 PR.AC-4 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 PR.IP-2 FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1 Req-8.1.8 SRG-OS-000163-GPOS-00072 RHEL-08-020035 SV-257258r942953_rule Terminating an idle session within a short time period reduces the window of opportunity for unauthorized personnel to take control of a management session enabled on the console or console port that has been let unattended. CCE-90784-0 - name: XCCDF Value var_logind_session_timeout # promote to variable set_fact: var_logind_session_timeout: !!str tags: - always - name: Set 'StopIdleSessionSec' to '{{ var_logind_session_timeout }}' in the [Login] section of '/etc/systemd/logind.conf' ini_file: path: /etc/systemd/logind.conf section: Login option: StopIdleSessionSec value: '{{ var_logind_session_timeout }}' create: true mode: 420 when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ( ansible_distribution == 'RedHat' and ansible_distribution_version is version('8.7', '>=') and ansible_distribution == 'RedHat' and ansible_distribution_version is version('9.0', '!=') ) or ansible_distribution == 'OracleLinux' and ansible_distribution_version is version('8.7', '>=') tags: - CCE-90784-0 - CJIS-5.5.6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020035 - NIST-800-171-3.1.11 - NIST-800-53-AC-12 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-2(5) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-10 - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 - logind_session_timeout - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { ( grep -qP "^ID=[\"']?rhel[\"']?$" "/etc/os-release" && { real="$(grep -P "^VERSION_ID=[\"']?[\w.]+[\"']?$" /etc/os-release | sed "s/^VERSION_ID=[\"']\?\([^\"']\+\)[\"']\?$/\1/")"; expected="8.7"; printf "%s\n%s" "$expected" "$real" | sort -VC; } && grep -qP "^ID=[\"']?rhel[\"']?$" "/etc/os-release" && { real="$(grep -P "^VERSION_ID=[\"']?[\w.]+[\"']?$" /etc/os-release | sed "s/^VERSION_ID=[\"']\?\([^\"']\+\)[\"']\?$/\1/")"; expected="9.0"; [[ "$real" != "$expected" ]]; } ) || grep -qP "^ID=[\"']?ol[\"']?$" "/etc/os-release" && { real="$(grep -P "^VERSION_ID=[\"']?[\w.]+[\"']?$" /etc/os-release | sed "s/^VERSION_ID=[\"']\?\([^\"']\+\)[\"']\?$/\1/")"; expected="8.7"; printf "%s\n%s" "$expected" "$real" | sort -VC; }; }; then var_logind_session_timeout='' # Try find '[Login]' and 'StopIdleSessionSec' in '/etc/systemd/logind.conf', if it exists, set # to '$var_logind_session_timeout', if it isn't here, add it, if '[Login]' doesn't exist, add it there if grep -qzosP '[[:space:]]*\[Login]([^\n\[]*\n+)+?[[:space:]]*StopIdleSessionSec' '/etc/systemd/logind.conf'; then sed -i "s/StopIdleSessionSec[^(\n)]*/StopIdleSessionSec=$var_logind_session_timeout/" '/etc/systemd/logind.conf' elif grep -qs '[[:space:]]*\[Login]' '/etc/systemd/logind.conf'; then sed -i "/[[:space:]]*\[Login]/a StopIdleSessionSec=$var_logind_session_timeout" '/etc/systemd/logind.conf' else if test -d "/etc/systemd"; then printf '%s\n' '[Login]' "StopIdleSessionSec=$var_logind_session_timeout" >> '/etc/systemd/logind.conf' else echo "Config file directory '/etc/systemd' doesnt exist, not remediating, assuming non-applicability." >&2 fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Require Authentication for Emergency Systemd Target Emergency mode is intended as a system recovery method, providing a single user root access to the system during a failed boot sequence. By default, Emergency mode is protected by requiring a password and is set in /usr/lib/systemd/system/emergency.service. 1 11 12 14 15 16 18 3 5 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.06 DSS06.10 3.1.1 3.4.5 CCI-000213 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) 164.308(a)(7)(i) 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) 164.310(a)(1) 164.310(a)(2)(i) 164.310(a)(2)(ii) 164.310(a)(2)(iii) 164.310(b) 164.310(c) 164.310(d)(1) 164.310(d)(2)(iii) 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 0421 0422 0431 0974 1173 1401 1504 1505 1546 1557 1558 1559 1560 1561 A.18.1.4 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 IA-2 AC-3 CM-6(a) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-4 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 PR.PT-3 FIA_UAU.1 SRG-OS-000080-GPOS-00048 RHEL-08-010152 SV-244523r743818_rule This prevents attackers with physical access from trivially bypassing security on the machine and gaining root access. Such accesses are further prevented by configuring the bootloader password. CCE-82186-8 - name: Require emergency mode password lineinfile: create: true dest: /usr/lib/systemd/system/emergency.service regexp: ^#?ExecStart= line: ExecStart=-/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sulogin-shell emergency when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82186-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010152 - NIST-800-171-3.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-3 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-2 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - require_emergency_target_auth - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then service_file="/usr/lib/systemd/system/emergency.service" sulogin="/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sulogin-shell emergency" if grep "^ExecStart=.*" "$service_file" ; then sed -i "s%^ExecStart=.*%ExecStart=-$sulogin%" "$service_file" else echo "ExecStart=-$sulogin" >> "$service_file" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Require Authentication for Single User Mode Single-user mode is intended as a system recovery method, providing a single user root access to the system by providing a boot option at startup. By default, single-user mode is protected by requiring a password and is set in /usr/lib/systemd/system/rescue.service. 1 11 12 14 15 16 18 3 5 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.06 DSS06.10 3.1.1 3.4.5 CCI-000213 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) 164.308(a)(7)(i) 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) 164.310(a)(1) 164.310(a)(2)(i) 164.310(a)(2)(ii) 164.310(a)(2)(iii) 164.310(b) 164.310(c) 164.310(d)(1) 164.310(d)(2)(iii) 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 0421 0422 0431 0974 1173 1401 1504 1505 1546 1557 1558 1559 1560 1561 A.18.1.4 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CIP-007-3 R5.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 IA-2 AC-3 CM-6(a) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-4 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 PR.PT-3 FIA_UAU.1 SRG-OS-000080-GPOS-00048 RHEL-08-010151 SV-230236r743928_rule This prevents attackers with physical access from trivially bypassing security on the machine and gaining root access. Such accesses are further prevented by configuring the bootloader password. CCE-80855-0 - name: Require single user mode password lineinfile: create: true dest: /usr/lib/systemd/system/rescue.service regexp: ^#?ExecStart= line: ExecStart=-/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sulogin-shell rescue when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80855-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010151 - NIST-800-171-3.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-3 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-2 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - require_singleuser_auth - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then service_file="/usr/lib/systemd/system/rescue.service" sulogin="/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sulogin-shell rescue" if grep "^ExecStart=.*" "$service_file" ; then sed -i "s%^ExecStart=.*%ExecStart=-$sulogin%" "$service_file" else echo "ExecStart=-$sulogin" >> "$service_file" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure Screen Locking When a user must temporarily leave an account logged-in, screen locking should be employed to prevent passersby from abusing the account. User education and training is particularly important for screen locking to be effective, and policies can be implemented to reinforce this. Automatic screen locking is only meant as a safeguard for those cases where a user forgot to lock the screen. Configure Console Screen Locking A console screen locking mechanism is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from the immediate physical vicinity of the information system but does not logout because of the temporary nature of the absence. Rather than relying on the user to manually lock their operation system session prior to vacating the vicinity, operating systems need to be able to identify when a user's session has idled and take action to initiate the session lock. Install the tmux Package To enable console screen locking, install the tmux package. A session lock is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from the immediate physical vicinity of the information system but does not want to log out because of the temporary nature of the absence. The session lock is implemented at the point where session activity can be determined. Rather than be forced to wait for a period of time to expire before the user session can be locked, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 needs to provide users with the ability to manually invoke a session lock so users can secure their session if it is necessary to temporarily vacate the immediate physical vicinity. Instruct users to begin new terminal sessions with the following command: $ tmux The console can now be locked with the following key combination: ctrl+b :lock-session 1 12 15 16 DSS05.04 DSS05.10 DSS06.10 3.1.10 CCI-000058 CCI-000056 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 A.18.1.4 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.4 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 CM-6(a) PR.AC-7 FMT_SMF_EXT.1 FMT_MOF_EXT.1 FTA_SSL.1 SRG-OS-000030-GPOS-00011 SRG-OS-000028-GPOS-00009 RHEL-08-020039 SV-244537r743860_rule A session time-out lock is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from the immediate physical vicinity of the information system but does not logout because of the temporary nature of the absence. Rather than relying on the user to manually lock their operation system session prior to vacating the vicinity, operating systems need to be able to identify when a user's session has idled and take action to initiate the session lock. The tmux package allows for a session lock to be implemented and configured. CCE-80644-8 - name: Ensure tmux is installed package: name: tmux state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80644-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020039 - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_tmux_installed [[packages]] name = "tmux" version = "*" include install_tmux class install_tmux { package { 'tmux': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=tmux # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "tmux" ; then yum install -y "tmux" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Support session locking with tmux The tmux terminal multiplexer is used to implement automatic session locking. It should be started from /etc/bashrc or drop-in files within /etc/profile.d/. CCI-000056 CCI-000058 FMT_SMF_EXT.1 FMT_MOF_EXT.1 FTA_SSL.1 SRG-OS-000031-GPOS-00012 SRG-OS-000028-GPOS-00009 SRG-OS-000030-GPOS-00011 Unlike bash itself, the tmux terminal multiplexer provides a mechanism to lock sessions after period of inactivity. A session lock is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from the immediate physical vicinity of the information system but does not want to log out because of the temporary nature of the absence. CCE-82266-8 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-82266-8 - configure_bashrc_exec_tmux - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Support session locking with tmux: Determine If the Tmux Launch Script Is Present in /etc/bashrc' ansible.builtin.find: paths: /etc patterns: bashrc contains: .*case "$name" in sshd|login\) exec tmux ;; esac.* register: tmux_in_bashrc when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"tmux" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-82266-8 - configure_bashrc_exec_tmux - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Support session locking with tmux: Determine If the Tmux Launch Script Is Present in /etc/profile.d/*.sh' ansible.builtin.find: paths: /etc/profile.d patterns: '*.sh' contains: .*case "$name" in sshd|login\) exec tmux ;; esac.* register: tmux_in_profile_d when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"tmux" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-82266-8 - configure_bashrc_exec_tmux - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Support session locking with tmux: Insert the Correct Script into /etc/profile.d/tmux.sh' ansible.builtin.blockinfile: path: /etc/profile.d/tmux.sh block: | if [ "$PS1" ]; then parent=$(ps -o ppid= -p $$) name=$(ps -o comm= -p $parent) case "$name" in sshd|login) exec tmux ;; esac fi create: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"tmux" in ansible_facts.packages' - tmux_in_bashrc is defined and tmux_in_bashrc.matched == 0 - tmux_in_profile_d is defined and tmux_in_profile_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-82266-8 - configure_bashrc_exec_tmux - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { rpm --quiet -q tmux; }; then if ! grep -x ' case "$name" in sshd|login) exec tmux ;; esac' /etc/bashrc; then cat >> /etc/profile.d/tmux.sh <<'EOF' if [ "$PS1" ]; then parent=$(ps -o ppid= -p $$) name=$(ps -o comm= -p $parent) case "$name" in sshd|login) exec tmux ;; esac fi EOF chmod 0644 /etc/profile.d/tmux.sh fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Support session locking with tmux (not enforcing) The tmux terminal multiplexer is used to implement automatic session locking. It should be started from /etc/bashrc or drop-in files within /etc/profile.d/. This rule configures Tmux to be executed in a way that exiting Tmux drops the user into a regular shell instead of logging them out, therefore the session locking mechanism is not enforced on the user. CCI-000056 CCI-000058 SRG-OS-000031-GPOS-00012 SRG-OS-000028-GPOS-00009 SRG-OS-000030-GPOS-00011 RHEL-08-020041 SV-230349r917920_rule Unlike bash itself, the tmux terminal multiplexer provides a mechanism to lock sessions after period of inactivity. A session lock is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from the immediate physical vicinity of the information system but does not want to log out because of the temporary nature of the absence. CCE-90782-4 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-90782-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020041 - configure_bashrc_tmux - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Support session locking with tmux (not enforcing): Determine if the Tmux launch script is present in /etc/bashrc' ansible.builtin.find: paths: /etc patterns: bashrc contains: .*case "$name" in \(sshd|login\) tmux ;; esac.* register: tmux_in_bashrc when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"tmux" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-90782-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020041 - configure_bashrc_tmux - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Support session locking with tmux (not enforcing): Determine if the Tmux launch script is present in /etc/profile.d/*.sh' ansible.builtin.find: paths: /etc/profile.d patterns: '*.sh' contains: .*case "$name" in \(sshd|login\) tmux ;; esac.* register: tmux_in_profile_d when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"tmux" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-90782-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020041 - configure_bashrc_tmux - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Support session locking with tmux (not enforcing): Insert the correct script into /etc/profile.d/tmux.sh' ansible.builtin.blockinfile: path: /etc/profile.d/tmux.sh block: | if [ "$PS1" ]; then parent=$(ps -o ppid= -p $$) name=$(ps -o comm= -p $parent) case "$name" in (sshd|login) tmux ;; esac fi create: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"tmux" in ansible_facts.packages' - tmux_in_bashrc is defined and tmux_in_bashrc.matched == 0 - tmux_in_profile_d is defined and tmux_in_profile_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-90782-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020041 - configure_bashrc_tmux - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { rpm --quiet -q tmux; }; then if ! grep -x ' case "$name" in (sshd|login) tmux ;; esac' /etc/bashrc /etc/profile.d/*.sh; then cat >> /etc/profile.d/tmux.sh <<'EOF' if [ "$PS1" ]; then parent=$(ps -o ppid= -p $$) name=$(ps -o comm= -p $parent) case "$name" in (sshd|login) tmux ;; esac fi EOF chmod 0644 /etc/profile.d/tmux.sh fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure tmux to lock session after inactivity To enable console screen locking in tmux terminal multiplexer after a period of inactivity, the lock-after-time option has to be set to a value greater than 0 and less than or equal to 900 in /etc/tmux.conf. CCI-000057 CCI-000060 FMT_SMF_EXT.1 FMT_MOF_EXT.1 FTA_SSL.1 SRG-OS-000029-GPOS-00010 SRG-OS-000031-GPOS-00012 RHEL-08-020070 SV-230353r627750_rule Locking the session after a period of inactivity limits the potential exposure if the session is left unattended. CCE-82199-1 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-82199-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020070 - configure_tmux_lock_after_time - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Configure tmux to lock session after inactivity block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/tmux.conf create: true regexp: ^\s*set -g lock-after-time\s+ mode: '0644' state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/tmux.conf lineinfile: path: /etc/tmux.conf create: true regexp: ^\s*set -g lock-after-time\s+ mode: '0644' state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/tmux.conf lineinfile: path: /etc/tmux.conf create: true regexp: ^\s*set -g lock-after-time\s+ mode: '0644' line: set -g lock-after-time 900 state: present when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"tmux" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-82199-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020070 - configure_tmux_lock_after_time - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { rpm --quiet -q tmux; }; then tmux_conf="/etc/tmux.conf" if grep -qP '^\s*set\s+-g\s+lock-after-time' "$tmux_conf" ; then sed -i 's/^\s*set\s\+-g\s\+lock-after-time.*$/set -g lock-after-time 900/' "$tmux_conf" else echo "set -g lock-after-time 900" >> "$tmux_conf" fi chmod 0644 "$tmux_conf" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure the tmux Lock Command To enable console screen locking in tmux terminal multiplexer, the vlock command must be configured to be used as a locking mechanism. Add the following line to /etc/tmux.conf: set -g lock-command vlock. The console can now be locked with the following key combination: ctrl+b :lock-session CCI-000056 CCI-000058 AC-11(a) AC-11(b) CM-6(a) FMT_SMF_EXT.1 FMT_MOF_EXT.1 FTA_SSL.1 SRG-OS-000028-GPOS-00009 SRG-OS-000030-GPOS-00011 RHEL-08-020040 SV-230348r902725_rule The tmux package allows for a session lock to be implemented and configured. However, the session lock is implemented by an external command. The tmux default configuration does not contain an effective session lock. CCE-80940-0 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80940-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020040 - NIST-800-53-AC-11(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-11(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_tmux_lock_command - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Configure the tmux Lock Command block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/tmux.conf create: true regexp: ^\s*set -g lock-command\s+ mode: '0644' state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/tmux.conf lineinfile: path: /etc/tmux.conf create: true regexp: ^\s*set -g lock-command\s+ mode: '0644' state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/tmux.conf lineinfile: path: /etc/tmux.conf create: true regexp: ^\s*set -g lock-command\s+ mode: '0644' line: set -g lock-command vlock state: present when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"tmux" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80940-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020040 - NIST-800-53-AC-11(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-11(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_tmux_lock_command - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { rpm --quiet -q tmux; }; then tmux_conf="/etc/tmux.conf" if grep -qP '^\s*set\s+-g\s+lock-command' "$tmux_conf" ; then sed -i 's/^\s*set\s\+-g\s\+lock-command.*$/set -g lock-command vlock/' "$tmux_conf" else echo "set -g lock-command vlock" >> "$tmux_conf" fi chmod 0644 "$tmux_conf" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure the tmux lock session key binding To set a key binding for the screen locking in tmux terminal multiplexer, the session-lock command must be bound to a key. Add the following line to /etc/tmux.conf: bind X lock-session. The console can now be locked with the following key combination: Ctrl+b Shift+x CCI-000056 SRG-OS-000028-GPOS-00009 SRG-OS-000030-GPOS-00011 RHEL-08-020040 SV-230348r902725_rule The tmux package allows for a session lock to be implemented and configured. However, the session lock is implemented by an external command. The tmux default configuration does not contain an effective session lock. CCE-86135-1 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-86135-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020040 - configure_strategy - configure_tmux_lock_keybinding - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/tmux.conf create: true regexp: \s*bind\s+\w\s+lock-session.*$ mode: '0644' state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"tmux" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-86135-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020040 - configure_strategy - configure_tmux_lock_keybinding - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/tmux.conf lineinfile: path: /etc/tmux.conf create: true regexp: \s*bind\s+\w\s+lock-session.*$ mode: '0644' state: absent when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"tmux" in ansible_facts.packages' - dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 tags: - CCE-86135-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020040 - configure_strategy - configure_tmux_lock_keybinding - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Insert correct line into /etc/tmux.conf lineinfile: path: /etc/tmux.conf create: true regexp: \s*bind\s+\w\s+lock-session.*$ mode: '0644' line: bind X lock-session state: present when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"tmux" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-86135-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020040 - configure_strategy - configure_tmux_lock_keybinding - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { rpm --quiet -q tmux; }; then tmux_conf="/etc/tmux.conf" if ! grep -qP '^\s*bind\s+\w\s+lock-session' "$tmux_conf" ; then echo "bind X lock-session" >> "$tmux_conf" fi chmod 0644 "$tmux_conf" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Prevent user from disabling the screen lock The tmux terminal multiplexer is used to implement automatic session locking. It should not be listed in /etc/shells. CCI-000056 CCI-000058 CM-6 FMT_SMF_EXT.1 FMT_MOF_EXT.1 FTA_SSL.1 SRG-OS-000324-GPOS-00125 SRG-OS-000028-GPOS-00009 SRG-OS-000030-GPOS-00011 RHEL-08-020042 SV-230350r627750_rule Not listing tmux among permitted shells prevents malicious program running as user from lowering security by disabling the screen lock. CCE-82361-7 --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,/bin/sh%0A/bin/bash%0A/usr/bin/sh%0A/usr/bin/bash%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/shells overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if grep -q 'tmux\s*$' /etc/shells ; then sed -i '/tmux\s*$/d' /etc/shells fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Hardware Tokens for Authentication The use of hardware tokens such as smart cards for system login provides stronger, two-factor authentication than using a username and password. In Red Hat Enterprise Linux servers and workstations, hardware token login is not enabled by default and must be enabled in the system settings. OpenSC Smart Card Drivers Choose the Smart Card Driver in use by your organization. For DoD, choose the cac driver. If your driver is not listed and you don't want to use the default driver, use the other option and manually specify your driver. default acos5 akis asepcos atrust-acos authentic belpic cac cardos coolkey cyberflex dnie entersafe epass2003 flex gemsafeV1 gids gpk iasecc incrypto34 isoApplet itacns jpki MaskTech mcrd muscle myeid npa oberthur openpgp None PIV-II rutoken_ecp rutoken sc-hsm setcos starcos tcos westcos Install the opensc Package For Multifactor Authentication The opensc package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install opensc CCI-001954 CCI-001953 1382 1384 1386 CM-6(a) SRG-OS-000375-GPOS-00160 SRG-OS-000376-GPOS-00161 RHEL-08-010410 SV-230275r854030_rule Using an authentication device, such as a CAC or token that is separate from the information system, ensures that even if the information system is compromised, that compromise will not affect credentials stored on the authentication device. Multifactor solutions that require devices separate from information systems gaining access include, for example, hardware tokens providing time-based or challenge-response authenticators and smart cards such as the U.S. Government Personal Identity Verification card and the DoD Common Access Card. CCE-80846-9 - name: Ensure opensc is installed package: name: opensc state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80846-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010410 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_opensc_installed [[packages]] name = "opensc" version = "*" include install_opensc class install_opensc { package { 'opensc': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=opensc # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "opensc" ; then yum install -y "opensc" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Install the pcsc-lite package The pcsc-lite package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install pcsc-lite CCI-001954 1382 1384 1386 CM-6(a) SRG-OS-000375-GPOS-00160 The pcsc-lite package must be installed if it is to be available for multifactor authentication using smartcards. CCE-80993-9 - name: Ensure pcsc-lite is installed package: name: pcsc-lite state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80993-9 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_pcsc-lite_installed [[packages]] name = "pcsc-lite" version = "*" include install_pcsc-lite class install_pcsc-lite { package { 'pcsc-lite': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=pcsc-lite # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "pcsc-lite" ; then yum install -y "pcsc-lite" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Install Smart Card Packages For Multifactor Authentication Configure the operating system to implement multifactor authentication by installing the required package with the following command: The openssl-pkcs11 package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install openssl-pkcs11 CCI-000765 CCI-001948 CCI-001953 CCI-001954 CM-6(a) Req-8.3 SRG-OS-000105-GPOS-00052 SRG-OS-000375-GPOS-00160 SRG-OS-000375-GPOS-00161 SRG-OS-000377-GPOS-00162 RHEL-08-010390 SV-230273r854028_rule Using an authentication device, such as a CAC or token that is separate from the information system, ensures that even if the information system is compromised, that compromise will not affect credentials stored on the authentication device. Multifactor solutions that require devices separate from information systems gaining access include, for example, hardware tokens providing time-based or challenge-response authenticators and smart cards such as the U.S. Government Personal Identity Verification card and the DoD Common Access Card. CCE-84029-8 - name: Ensure openssl-pkcs11 is installed package: name: openssl-pkcs11 state: present when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture != "s390x" tags: - CCE-84029-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010390 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.3 - enable_strategy - install_smartcard_packages - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed [[packages]] name = "openssl-pkcs11" version = "*" include install_openssl-pkcs11 class install_openssl-pkcs11 { package { 'openssl-pkcs11': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=openssl-pkcs11 # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { ! grep -q s390x /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease; }; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "openssl-pkcs11" ; then yum install -y "openssl-pkcs11" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the pcscd Service The pcscd service can be enabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl enable pcscd.service CCI-001954 1382 1384 1386 IA-2(1) IA-2(2) IA-2(3) IA-2(4) IA-2(6) IA-2(7) IA-2(11) CM-6(a) Req-8.3 SRG-OS-000375-GPOS-00160 Using an authentication device, such as a CAC or token that is separate from the information system, ensures that even if the information system is compromised, that compromise will not affect credentials stored on the authentication device. Multifactor solutions that require devices separate from information systems gaining access include, for example, hardware tokens providing time-based or challenge-response authenticators and smart cards such as the U.S. Government Personal Identity Verification card and the DoD Common Access Card. CCE-80881-6 - name: Enable service pcscd block: - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto - name: Start service pcscd systemd: name: pcscd state: started masked: 'no' when: - '"pcsc-lite" in ansible_facts.packages' - name: Enable service pcscd ansible.builtin.command: cmd: systemctl enable pcscd when: - '"pcsc-lite" in ansible_facts.packages' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80881-6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(1) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(11) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(2) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(3) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(4) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(6) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(7) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.3 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_pcscd_enabled [customizations.services] enabled = ["pcscd"] include enable_pcscd class enable_pcscd { service {'pcscd': enable => true, ensure => 'running', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'pcscd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'pcscd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'pcscd.service' else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure opensc Smart Card Drivers The OpenSC smart card tool can auto-detect smart card drivers; however, setting the smart card drivers in use by your organization helps to prevent users from using unauthorized smart cards. The default smart card driver for this profile is . To configure the OpenSC driver, edit the /etc/opensc.conf and add the following line into the file in the app default block, so it will look like: app default { ... card_drivers = ; } 1 12 15 16 5 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 CCI-000765 CCI-000766 CCI-000767 CCI-000768 CCI-000771 CCI-000772 CCI-000884 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 1382 1384 1386 A.18.1.4 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 IA-2(1) IA-2(2) IA-2(3) IA-2(4) IA-2(6) IA-2(7) IA-2(11) CM-6(a) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 Req-8.3 SRG-OS-000104-GPOS-00051 SRG-OS-000106-GPOS-00053 SRG-OS-000107-GPOS-00054 SRG-OS-000109-GPOS-00056 SRG-OS-000108-GPOS-00055 SRG-OS-000108-GPOS-00057 SRG-OS-000108-GPOS-00058 Smart card login provides two-factor authentication stronger than that provided by a username and password combination. Smart cards leverage PKI (public key infrastructure) in order to provide and verify credentials. Configuring the smart card driver in use by your organization helps to prevent users from using unauthorized smart cards. CCE-80766-9 - name: XCCDF Value var_smartcard_drivers # promote to variable set_fact: var_smartcard_drivers: !!str tags: - always - name: Check existence of opensc conf stat: path: /etc/opensc-{{ ansible_architecture }}.conf register: opensc_conf_cd when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80766-9 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(1) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(11) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(2) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(3) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(4) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(6) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(7) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.3 - configure_opensc_card_drivers - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Configure smartcard driver block block: - name: Check if card_drivers is defined command: /usr/bin/opensc-tool -G app:default:card_drivers changed_when: false register: card_drivers - name: Configure opensc Smart Card Drivers command: | /usr/bin/opensc-tool -S app:default:card_drivers:{{ var_smartcard_drivers }} when: - card_drivers.stdout != var_smartcard_drivers when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - opensc_conf_cd.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80766-9 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(1) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(11) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(2) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(3) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(4) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(6) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(7) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.3 - configure_opensc_card_drivers - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then var_smartcard_drivers='' OPENSC_TOOL="/usr/bin/opensc-tool" if [ -f "${OPENSC_TOOL}" ]; then ${OPENSC_TOOL} -S app:default:card_drivers:$var_smartcard_drivers fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Force opensc To Use Defined Smart Card Driver The OpenSC smart card middleware can auto-detect smart card drivers; however by forcing the smart card driver in use by your organization, opensc will no longer autodetect or use other drivers unless specified. This helps to prevent users from using unauthorized smart cards. The default smart card driver for this profile is . To force the OpenSC driver, edit the /etc/opensc.conf. Look for a line similar to: # force_card_driver = customcos; and change it to: force_card_driver = ; 1 12 15 16 5 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 CCI-000765 CCI-000766 CCI-000767 CCI-000768 CCI-000771 CCI-000772 CCI-000884 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 1382 1384 1386 A.18.1.4 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 IA-2(1) IA-2(2) IA-2(3) IA-2(4) IA-2(6) IA-2(7) IA-2(11) CM-6(a) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 Req-8.3 SRG-OS-000104-GPOS-00051 SRG-OS-000106-GPOS-00053 SRG-OS-000107-GPOS-00054 SRG-OS-000109-GPOS-00056 SRG-OS-000108-GPOS-00055 SRG-OS-000108-GPOS-00057 SRG-OS-000108-GPOS-00058 Smart card login provides two-factor authentication stronger than that provided by a username and password combination. Smart cards leverage PKI (public key infrastructure) in order to provide and verify credentials. Forcing the smart card driver in use by your organization helps to prevent users from using unauthorized smart cards. CCE-80821-2 - name: XCCDF Value var_smartcard_drivers # promote to variable set_fact: var_smartcard_drivers: !!str tags: - always - name: Check existence of opensc conf stat: path: /etc/opensc-{{ ansible_architecture }}.conf register: opensc_conf_fcd when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80821-2 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(1) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(11) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(2) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(3) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(4) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(6) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(7) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.3 - configure_strategy - force_opensc_card_drivers - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Force smartcard driver block block: - name: Check if force_card_driver is defined command: /usr/bin/opensc-tool -G app:default:force_card_driver changed_when: false register: force_card_driver - name: Force opensc To Use Defined Smart Card Driver command: | /usr/bin/opensc-tool -S app:default:force_card_driver:{{ var_smartcard_drivers }} when: - force_card_driver.stdout != var_smartcard_drivers when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - opensc_conf_fcd.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80821-2 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(1) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(11) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(2) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(3) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(4) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(6) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(7) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.3 - configure_strategy - force_opensc_card_drivers - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then var_smartcard_drivers='' OPENSC_TOOL="/usr/bin/opensc-tool" if [ -f "${OPENSC_TOOL}" ]; then ${OPENSC_TOOL} -S app:default:force_card_driver:$var_smartcard_drivers fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Protect Accounts by Restricting Password-Based Login Conventionally, Unix shell accounts are accessed by providing a username and password to a login program, which tests these values for correctness using the /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow files. Password-based login is vulnerable to guessing of weak passwords, and to sniffing and man-in-the-middle attacks against passwords entered over a network or at an insecure console. Therefore, mechanisms for accessing accounts by entering usernames and passwords should be restricted to those which are operationally necessary. Accounts Authorized Local Users on the Operating System List the user accounts that are authorized locally on the operating system. This list includes both users requried by the operating system and by the installed applications. Depending on the Operating System distribution, version, software groups and applications, the user list is different and can be customized with scap-workbench. OVAL regular expression is used for the user list. The list starts with '^' and ends with '$' so that it matches exactly the username, not any string that includes the username. Users are separated with '|'. For example, three users: bin, oracle and sapadm are allowed, then the list is ^(bin|oracle|sapadm)$. The user root is the only user that is hard coded in OVAL that is always allowed on the operating system. ^(abrt|adm|avahi|bin|chrony|clevis|cockpit-ws|cockpit-wsinstance|colord|daemon|dbus|dnsmasq|flatpak|ftp|games|gdm|geoclue|gluster|gnome-initial-setup|halt|libstoragemgmt|lp|mail|nfsnobody|nobody|ntp|operator|oprofile|oracle|pcp|pegasus|pipewire|polkitd|postfix|pulse|qemu|radvd|rngd|root|rpc|rpcuser|rtkit|saned|saslauth|setroubleshoot|shutdown|sshd|sssd|sync|systemd-bus-proxy|systemd-coredump|systemd-network|systemd-resolve|tcpdump|tss|unbound|usbmuxd$|uuidd)$ ^(abrt|adm|avahi|bin|chrony|clevis|cockpit-ws|cockpit-wsinstance|colord|daemon|dbus|dnsmasq|flatpak|ftp|games|gdm|geoclue|gluster|gnome-initial-setup|halt|libstoragemgmt|lp|mail|nfsnobody|nobody|ntp|operator|oprofile|oracle|pcp|pegasus|pipewire|polkitd|postfix|pulse|qemu|radvd|rngd|root|rpc|rpcuser|rtkit|saned|saslauth|setroubleshoot|shutdown|sshd|sssd|sync|systemd-bus-proxy|systemd-coredump|systemd-network|systemd-resolve|tcpdump|tss|unbound|usbmuxd$|uuidd)$ ^(root|bin|daemon|adm|lp|sync|shutdown|halt|mail|operator|games|ftp|nobody|pegasus|systemd-bus-proxy|systemd-network|dbus|polkitd|abrt|unbound|tss|libstoragemgmt|rpc|colord|usbmuxd$|pcp|saslauth|geoclue|setroubleshoot|rtkit|chrony|qemu|radvd|rpcuser|nfsnobody|pulse|gdm|gnome-initial-setup|postfix|avahi|ntp|sshd|tcpdump|oprofile|uuidd)$ ^(root|bin|daemon|adm|lp|sync|shutdown|halt|mail|operator|games|ftp|nobody|pegasus|systemd-bus-proxy|systemd-network|dbus|polkitd|abrt|unbound|tss|libstoragemgmt|rpc|colord|usbmuxd$|pcp|saslauth|geoclue|setroubleshoot|rtkit|chrony|qemu|radvd|rpcuser|nfsnobody|pulse|gdm|gnome-initial-setup|postfix|avahi|ntp|sshd|tcpdump|oprofile|uuidd|systemd-resolve|systemd-coredump|sssd|rngd)$ ^(root|bin|daemon|adm|lp|sync|shutdown|halt|mail|operator|games|ftp|nobody|pegasus|systemd-bus-proxy|systemd-network|dbus|polkitd|abrt|unbound|tss|libstoragemgmt|rpc|colord|usbmuxd$|pcp|saslauth|geoclue|setroubleshoot|rtkit|chrony|qemu|radvd|rpcuser|nfsnobody|pulse|gdm|gnome-initial-setup|postfix|avahi|ntp|sshd|tcpdump|oprofile|uuidd|systemd-resolve|systemd-coredump|sssd|rngd)$ ^(root|bin|daemon|adm|lp|sync|shutdown|halt|mail|operator|games|ftp|nobody|tss|systemd-coredump|dbus|polkitd|avahi|colord|rtkit|pipewire|clevis|sssd|geoclue|flatpak|setroubleshoot|libstoragemgmt|systemd-oom|gdm|cockpit-ws|cockpit-wsinstance|gnome-initial-setup|sshd|chrony|dnsmasq|tcpdump|admin)$ ^(root|bin|daemon|adm|lp|sync|shutdown|halt|mail|operator|games|ftp|nobody|pegasus|systemd-bus-proxy|systemd-network|dbus|polkitd|abrt|unbound|tss|libstoragemgmt|rpc|colord|usbmuxd$|pcp|saslauth|geoclue|setroubleshoot|rtkit|chrony|qemu|radvd|rpcuser|nfsnobody|pulse|gdm|gnome-initial-setup|postfix|avahi|ntp|sshd|tcpdump|oprofile|uuidd|systemd-resolve|systemd-coredump|sssd|rngd|man|systemd-timesync|scard|hacluster|statd|at|dockremap|vnc)$ ^(root|bin|daemon|adm|lp|sync|shutdown|halt|mail|operator|games|ftp|nobody|pegasus|systemd-bus-proxy|systemd-network|dbus|polkitd|abrt|unbound|tss|libstoragemgmt|rpc|colord|usbmuxd$|pcp|saslauth|geoclue|setroubleshoot|rtkit|chrony|qemu|radvd|rpcuser|nfsnobody|pulse|gdm|gnome-initial-setup|postfix|avahi|ntp|sshd|tcpdump|oprofile|uuidd|systemd-resolve|systemd-coredump|sssd|rngd|man|systemd-timesync|scard|hacluster|statd|at|dockremap|vnc|messagebus|nscd)$ Ensure All Accounts on the System Have Unique User IDs Change user IDs (UIDs), or delete accounts, so each has a unique name. Automatic remediation of this control is not available due to unique requirements of each system. CCI-000135 CCI-000764 CCI-000804 Req-8.1.1 8.2.1 SRG-OS-000104-GPOS-00051 SRG-OS-000121-GPOS-00062 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 RHEL-08-020240 6.2.4 SV-230371r627750_rule To assure accountability and prevent unauthenticated access, interactive users must be identified and authenticated to prevent potential misuse and compromise of the system. CCE-89903-9 Only Authorized Local User Accounts Exist on Operating System Enterprise Application tends to use the server or virtual machine exclusively. Besides the default operating system user, there should be only authorized local users required by the installed software groups and applications that exist on the operating system. The authorized user list can be customized in the refine value variable var_accounts_authorized_local_users_regex. OVAL regular expression is used for the user list. Configure the system so all accounts on the system are assigned to an active system, application, or user account. Remove accounts that do not support approved system activities or that allow for a normal user to perform administrative-level actions. To remove unauthorized system accounts, use the following command: $ sudo userdel unauthorized_user Automatic remediation of this control is not available due to the unique requirements of each system. CCI-000366 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-020320 SV-230379r627750_rule Accounts providing no operational purpose provide additional opportunities for system compromise. Unnecessary accounts include user accounts for individuals not requiring access to the system and application accounts for applications not installed on the system. CCE-85987-6 Ensure All Groups on the System Have Unique Group ID Change the group name or delete groups, so each has a unique id. Automatic remediation of this control is not available due to the unique requirements of each system. CCI-000764 8.2.1 SRG-OS-000104-GPOS-00051 6.2.5 To assure accountability and prevent unauthenticated access, groups must be identified uniquely to prevent potential misuse and compromise of the system. CCE-86201-1 Ensure All Groups on the System Have Unique Group Names Change the group name or delete groups, so each has a unique name. Automatic remediation of this control is not available due to the unique requirements of each system. 8.2.1 6.2.7 To assure accountability and prevent unauthenticated access, groups must be identified uniquely to prevent potential misuse and compromise of the system. CCE-86328-2 Set Account Expiration Parameters Accounts can be configured to be automatically disabled after a certain time period, meaning that they will require administrator interaction to become usable again. Expiration of accounts after inactivity can be set for all accounts by default and also on a per-account basis, such as for accounts that are known to be temporary. To configure automatic expiration of an account following the expiration of its password (that is, after the password has expired and not been changed), run the following command, substituting NUM_DAYS and USER appropriately: $ sudo chage -I NUM_DAYS USER Accounts, such as temporary accounts, can also be configured to expire on an explicitly-set date with the -E option. The file /etc/default/useradd controls default settings for all newly-created accounts created with the system's normal command line utilities. This will only apply to newly created accounts number of days after the last login of the user when the user will be locked out 'This option is specific for the auth or account phase. It specifies the number of days after the last login of the user when the user will be locked out by the pam_lastlog module.' 0 180 30 35 40 60 90 35 number of days after a password expires until the account is permanently disabled The number of days to wait after a password expires, until the account will be permanently disabled. 0 180 30 35 40 60 90 35 Set Account Expiration Following Inactivity To specify the number of days after a password expires (which signifies inactivity) until an account is permanently disabled, add or correct the following line in /etc/default/useradd: INACTIVE= If a password is currently on the verge of expiration, then day(s) remain(s) until the account is automatically disabled. However, if the password will not expire for another 60 days, then 60 days plus day(s) could elapse until the account would be automatically disabled. See the useradd man page for more information. 1 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 7 8 5.6.2.1.1 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 3.5.6 CCI-000017 CCI-000795 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 6.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.3 A.18.1.4 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-007-3 R.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 IA-4(e) AC-2(3) CM-6(a) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 PR.AC-1 PR.AC-4 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 Req-8.1.4 8.2.6 SRG-OS-000118-GPOS-00060 RHEL-08-020260 4.5.1.4 SV-230373r627750_rule Inactive identifiers pose a risk to systems and applications because attackers may exploit an inactive identifier and potentially obtain undetected access to the system. Disabling inactive accounts ensures that accounts which may not have been responsibly removed are not available to attackers who may have compromised their credentials. Owners of inactive accounts will not notice if unauthorized access to their user account has been obtained. CCE-80954-1 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80954-1 - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020260 - NIST-800-171-3.5.6 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(3) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-4(e) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.4 - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.6 - account_disable_post_pw_expiration - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_account_disable_post_pw_expiration # promote to variable set_fact: var_account_disable_post_pw_expiration: !!str tags: - always - name: Set Account Expiration Following Inactivity lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/default/useradd regexp: ^INACTIVE line: INACTIVE={{ var_account_disable_post_pw_expiration }} when: '"shadow-utils" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80954-1 - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020260 - NIST-800-171-3.5.6 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(3) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-4(e) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.4 - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.6 - account_disable_post_pw_expiration - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q shadow-utils; then var_account_disable_post_pw_expiration='' # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^INACTIVE") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s=%s" "$stripped_key" "$var_account_disable_post_pw_expiration" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^INACTIVE\\>" "/etc/default/useradd"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^INACTIVE\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/default/useradd" else if [[ -s "/etc/default/useradd" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/default/useradd" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/default/useradd" fi cce="CCE-80954-1" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "/etc/default/useradd" >> "/etc/default/useradd" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/default/useradd" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Assign Expiration Date to Emergency Accounts Emergency accounts are privileged accounts established in response to crisis situations where the need for rapid account activation is required. In the event emergency accounts are required, configure the system to terminate them after a documented time period. For every emergency account, run the following command to set an expiration date on it, substituting ACCOUNT_NAME and YYYY-MM-DD appropriately: $ sudo chage -E YYYY-MM-DD ACCOUNT_NAME YYYY-MM-DD indicates the documented expiration date for the account. For U.S. Government systems, the operating system must be configured to automatically terminate these types of accounts after a period of 72 hours. Due to the unique requirements of each system, automated remediation is not available for this configuration check. This rule is deprecated in favor of the account_temp_expire_date rule.Please consider replacing this rule in your files as it is not expected to receive updates as of version 0.1.69. 1 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 7 8 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.03 CCI-000016 CCI-001682 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 6.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 AC-2(2) AC-2(3) CM-6(a) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 PR.AC-1 PR.AC-4 PR.AC-6 SRG-OS-000123-GPOS-00064 SRG-OS-000002-GPOS-00002 If emergency user accounts remain active when no longer needed or for an excessive period, these accounts may be used to gain unauthorized access. To mitigate this risk, automated termination of all emergency accounts must be set upon account creation. CCE-85910-8 Assign Expiration Date to Temporary Accounts Temporary accounts are established as part of normal account activation procedures when there is a need for short-term accounts. In the event temporary accounts are required, configure the system to terminate them after a documented time period. For every temporary account, run the following command to set an expiration date on it, substituting USER and YYYY-MM-DD appropriately: $ sudo chage -E YYYY-MM-DD USER YYYY-MM-DD indicates the documented expiration date for the account. For U.S. Government systems, the operating system must be configured to automatically terminate these types of accounts after a period of 72 hours. 1 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 7 8 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.03 CCI-000016 CCI-001682 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 6.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 AC-2(2) AC-2(3) CM-6(a) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 PR.AC-1 PR.AC-4 PR.AC-6 SRG-OS-000123-GPOS-00064 SRG-OS-000002-GPOS-00002 RHEL-08-020000 RHEL-08-020270 SV-230331r627750_rule SV-230374r903129_rule If temporary user accounts remain active when no longer needed or for an excessive period, these accounts may be used to gain unauthorized access. To mitigate this risk, automated termination of all temporary accounts must be set upon account creation. CCE-82474-8 Ensure All Accounts on the System Have Unique Names Ensure accounts on the system have unique names. To ensure all accounts have unique names, run the following command: $ sudo getent passwd | awk -F: '{ print $1}' | uniq -d If a username is returned, change or delete the username. 5.5.2 CCI-000770 CCI-000804 Req-8.1.1 8.2.1 6.2.6 Unique usernames allow for accountability on the system. CCE-80674-5 Use Centralized and Automated Authentication Implement an automated system for managing user accounts that minimizes the risk of errors, either intentional or deliberate. This system should integrate with an existing enterprise user management system, such as one based on Identity Management tools such as Active Directory, Kerberos, Directory Server, etc. A comprehensive account management process that includes automation helps to ensure the accounts designated as requiring attention are consistently and promptly addressed. Enterprise environments make user account management challenging and complex. A user management process requiring administrators to manually address account management functions adds risk of potential oversight. Set Password Expiration Parameters The file /etc/login.defs controls several password-related settings. Programs such as passwd, su, and login consult /etc/login.defs to determine behavior with regard to password aging, expiration warnings, and length. See the man page login.defs(5) for more information. Users should be forced to change their passwords, in order to decrease the utility of compromised passwords. However, the need to change passwords often should be balanced against the risk that users will reuse or write down passwords if forced to change them too often. Forcing password changes every 90-360 days, depending on the environment, is recommended. Set the appropriate value as PASS_MAX_DAYS and apply it to existing accounts with the -M flag. The PASS_MIN_DAYS (-m) setting prevents password changes for 7 days after the first change, to discourage password cycling. If you use this setting, train users to contact an administrator for an emergency password change in case a new password becomes compromised. The PASS_WARN_AGE (-W) setting gives users 7 days of warnings at login time that their passwords are about to expire. For example, for each existing human user USER, expiration parameters could be adjusted to a 180 day maximum password age, 7 day minimum password age, and 7 day warning period with the following command: $ sudo chage -M 180 -m 7 -W 7 USER maximum password age Maximum age of password in days 365 120 180 90 60 45 60 minimum password age Minimum age of password in days 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 7 minimum password length Minimum number of characters in password This will only check new passwords 10 12 14 15 18 20 6 8 15 warning days before password expires The number of days' warning given before a password expires. This will only apply to newly created accounts 0 14 10 7 7 Set Password Maximum Age To specify password maximum age for new accounts, edit the file /etc/login.defs and add or correct the following line: PASS_MAX_DAYS A value of 180 days is sufficient for many environments. The DoD requirement is 60. The profile requirement is . BP28(R18) 1 12 15 16 5 5.6.2.1 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 3.5.6 CCI-000199 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 0418 1055 1402 A.18.1.4 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 IA-5(f) IA-5(1)(d) CM-6(a) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 Req-8.2.4 8.3.9 SRG-OS-000076-GPOS-00044 RHEL-08-020200 4.5.1.2 SV-230366r646878_rule Any password, no matter how complex, can eventually be cracked. Therefore, passwords need to be changed periodically. If the operating system does not limit the lifetime of passwords and force users to change their passwords, there is the risk that the operating system passwords could be compromised. Setting the password maximum age ensures users are required to periodically change their passwords. Requiring shorter password lifetimes increases the risk of users writing down the password in a convenient location subject to physical compromise. CCE-80647-1 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80647-1 - CJIS-5.6.2.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020200 - NIST-800-171-3.5.6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(d) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.4 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.9 - accounts_maximum_age_login_defs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_maximum_age_login_defs # promote to variable set_fact: var_accounts_maximum_age_login_defs: !!str tags: - always - name: Set Password Maximum Age lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/login.defs regexp: ^#?PASS_MAX_DAYS line: PASS_MAX_DAYS {{ var_accounts_maximum_age_login_defs }} when: '"shadow-utils" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80647-1 - CJIS-5.6.2.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020200 - NIST-800-171-3.5.6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(d) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.4 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.9 - accounts_maximum_age_login_defs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q shadow-utils; then var_accounts_maximum_age_login_defs='' # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^PASS_MAX_DAYS") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_accounts_maximum_age_login_defs" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^PASS_MAX_DAYS\\>" "/etc/login.defs"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^PASS_MAX_DAYS\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/login.defs" else if [[ -s "/etc/login.defs" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/login.defs" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/login.defs" fi cce="CCE-80647-1" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "/etc/login.defs" >> "/etc/login.defs" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/login.defs" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Set Password Minimum Age To specify password minimum age for new accounts, edit the file /etc/login.defs and add or correct the following line: PASS_MIN_DAYS A value of 1 day is considered sufficient for many environments. The DoD requirement is 1. The profile requirement is . 1 12 15 16 5 5.6.2.1.1 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 3.5.8 CCI-000198 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 0418 1055 1402 A.18.1.4 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 IA-5(f) IA-5(1)(d) CM-6(a) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 SRG-OS-000075-GPOS-00043 RHEL-08-020190 SV-230365r858727_rule Enforcing a minimum password lifetime helps to prevent repeated password changes to defeat the password reuse or history enforcement requirement. If users are allowed to immediately and continually change their password, then the password could be repeatedly changed in a short period of time to defeat the organization's policy regarding password reuse. Setting the minimum password age protects against users cycling back to a favorite password after satisfying the password reuse requirement. CCE-80648-9 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80648-9 - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020190 - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(d) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) - accounts_minimum_age_login_defs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_minimum_age_login_defs # promote to variable set_fact: var_accounts_minimum_age_login_defs: !!str tags: - always - name: Set Password Minimum Age lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/login.defs regexp: ^#?PASS_MIN_DAYS line: PASS_MIN_DAYS {{ var_accounts_minimum_age_login_defs }} when: '"shadow-utils" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80648-9 - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020190 - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(d) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) - accounts_minimum_age_login_defs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q shadow-utils; then var_accounts_minimum_age_login_defs='' # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^PASS_MIN_DAYS") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_accounts_minimum_age_login_defs" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^PASS_MIN_DAYS\\>" "/etc/login.defs"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^PASS_MIN_DAYS\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/login.defs" else if [[ -s "/etc/login.defs" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/login.defs" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/login.defs" fi cce="CCE-80648-9" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "/etc/login.defs" >> "/etc/login.defs" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/login.defs" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Set Password Minimum Length in login.defs To specify password length requirements for new accounts, edit the file /etc/login.defs and add or correct the following line: PASS_MIN_LEN The DoD requirement is 15. The FISMA requirement is 12. The profile requirement is . If a program consults /etc/login.defs and also another PAM module (such as pam_pwquality) during a password change operation, then the most restrictive must be satisfied. See PAM section for more information about enforcing password quality requirements. BP28(R18) 1 12 15 16 5 5.6.2.1 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 3.5.7 CCI-000205 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 0421 0422 0431 0974 1173 1401 1504 1505 1546 1557 1558 1559 1560 1561 A.18.1.4 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 IA-5(f) IA-5(1)(a) CM-6(a) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 SRG-OS-000078-GPOS-00046 RHEL-08-020231 SV-230370r627750_rule Requiring a minimum password length makes password cracking attacks more difficult by ensuring a larger search space. However, any security benefit from an onerous requirement must be carefully weighed against usability problems, support costs, or counterproductive behavior that may result. CCE-80652-1 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80652-1 - CJIS-5.6.2.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020231 - NIST-800-171-3.5.7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) - accounts_password_minlen_login_defs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_password_minlen_login_defs # promote to variable set_fact: var_accounts_password_minlen_login_defs: !!str tags: - always - name: Set Password Minimum Length in login.defs lineinfile: dest: /etc/login.defs regexp: ^PASS_MIN_LEN *[0-9]* state: present line: PASS_MIN_LEN {{ var_accounts_password_minlen_login_defs }} create: true when: '"shadow-utils" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80652-1 - CJIS-5.6.2.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020231 - NIST-800-171-3.5.7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) - accounts_password_minlen_login_defs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q shadow-utils; then var_accounts_password_minlen_login_defs='' # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^PASS_MIN_LEN") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_accounts_password_minlen_login_defs" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^PASS_MIN_LEN\\>" "/etc/login.defs"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^PASS_MIN_LEN\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/login.defs" else if [[ -s "/etc/login.defs" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/login.defs" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/login.defs" fi cce="CCE-80652-1" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "/etc/login.defs" >> "/etc/login.defs" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/login.defs" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Set Existing Passwords Maximum Age Configure non-compliant accounts to enforce a -day maximum password lifetime restriction by running the following command: $ sudo chage -M USER CCI-000199 IA-5(f) IA-5(1)(d) CM-6(a) 8.3.9 SRG-OS-000076-GPOS-00044 RHEL-08-020210 4.5.1.2 SV-230367r627750_rule Any password, no matter how complex, can eventually be cracked. Therefore, passwords need to be changed periodically. If the operating system does not limit the lifetime of passwords and force users to change their passwords, there is the risk that the operating system passwords could be compromised. CCE-82473-0 - name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_maximum_age_login_defs # promote to variable set_fact: var_accounts_maximum_age_login_defs: !!str tags: - always - name: Collect users with not correct maximum time period between password changes ansible.builtin.command: cmd: awk -F':' '(/^[^:]+:[^!*]/ && ($5 > {{ var_accounts_maximum_age_login_defs }} || $5 == "")) {print $1}' /etc/shadow register: user_names tags: - CCE-82473-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020210 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(d) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.9 - accounts_password_set_max_life_existing - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Change the maximum time period between password changes ansible.builtin.user: user: '{{ item }}' password_expire_max: '{{ var_accounts_maximum_age_login_defs }}' with_items: '{{ user_names.stdout_lines }}' when: user_names.stdout_lines | length > 0 tags: - CCE-82473-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020210 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(d) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.9 - accounts_password_set_max_life_existing - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy var_accounts_maximum_age_login_defs='' while IFS= read -r i; do chage -M $var_accounts_maximum_age_login_defs $i done < <(awk -v var="$var_accounts_maximum_age_login_defs" -F: '(/^[^:]+:[^!*]/ && ($5 > var || $5 == "")) {print $1}' /etc/shadow) Set Existing Passwords Minimum Age Configure non-compliant accounts to enforce a 24 hours/1 day minimum password lifetime by running the following command: $ sudo chage -m 1 USER CCI-000198 IA-5(f) IA-5(1)(d) CM-6(a) SRG-OS-000075-GPOS-00043 RHEL-08-020180 SV-230364r627750_rule Enforcing a minimum password lifetime helps to prevent repeated password changes to defeat the password reuse or history enforcement requirement. If users are allowed to immediately and continually change their password, the password could be repeatedly changed in a short period of time to defeat the organization's policy regarding password reuse. CCE-82472-2 - name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_minimum_age_login_defs # promote to variable set_fact: var_accounts_minimum_age_login_defs: !!str tags: - always - name: Collect users with not correct minimum time period between password changes command: | awk -F':' '(/^[^:]+:[^!*]/ && ($4 < {{ var_accounts_minimum_age_login_defs }} || $4 == "")) {print $1}' /etc/shadow register: user_names tags: - CCE-82472-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020180 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(d) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) - accounts_password_set_min_life_existing - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Change the minimum time period between password changes command: | chage -m {{ var_accounts_minimum_age_login_defs }} {{ item }} with_items: '{{ user_names.stdout_lines }}' when: user_names.stdout_lines | length > 0 tags: - CCE-82472-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020180 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(d) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) - accounts_password_set_min_life_existing - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy var_accounts_minimum_age_login_defs='' while IFS= read -r i; do chage -m $var_accounts_minimum_age_login_defs $i done < <(awk -v var="$var_accounts_minimum_age_login_defs" -F: '(/^[^:]+:[^!*]/ && ($4 < var || $4 == "")) {print $1}' /etc/shadow) Set Existing Passwords Warning Age To configure how many days prior to password expiration that a warning will be issued to users, run the command: $ sudo chage --warndays USER The DoD requirement is 7, and CIS recommendation is no less than 7 days. This profile requirement is . CCI-000198 IA-5(f) IA-5(1)(d) CM-6(a) 8.3.9 4.5.1.3 Providing an advance warning that a password will be expiring gives users time to think of a secure password. Users caught unaware may choose a simple password or write it down where it may be discovered. CCE-86914-9 - name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_password_warn_age_login_defs # promote to variable set_fact: var_accounts_password_warn_age_login_defs: !!str tags: - always - name: Set Existing Passwords Warning Age - Collect Users With Incorrect Number of Days of Warning Before Password Expires ansible.builtin.command: cmd: awk -F':' '(($6 < {{ var_accounts_password_warn_age_login_defs }} || $6 == "") && $2 ~ /^\$/) {print $1}' /etc/shadow register: result_pass_warn_age_user_names changed_when: false tags: - CCE-86914-9 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(d) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.9 - accounts_password_set_warn_age_existing - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Set Existing Passwords Warning Age - Ensure the Number of Days of Warning Before Password Expires ansible.builtin.command: cmd: chage --warndays {{ var_accounts_password_warn_age_login_defs }} {{ item }} with_items: '{{ result_pass_warn_age_user_names.stdout_lines }}' when: result_pass_warn_age_user_names is not skipped and result_pass_warn_age_user_names.stdout_lines | length > 0 tags: - CCE-86914-9 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(d) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.9 - accounts_password_set_warn_age_existing - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed var_accounts_password_warn_age_login_defs='' while IFS= read -r i; do chage --warndays $var_accounts_password_warn_age_login_defs $i done < <(awk -v var="$var_accounts_password_warn_age_login_defs" -F: '(($6 < var || $6 == "") && $2 ~ /^\$/) {print $1}' /etc/shadow) Set Password Warning Age To specify how many days prior to password expiration that a warning will be issued to users, edit the file /etc/login.defs and add or correct the following line: PASS_WARN_AGE The DoD requirement is 7. The profile requirement is . 1 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 7 8 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 3.5.8 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 6.2 0418 1055 1402 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.3 A.18.1.4 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 IA-5(f) IA-5(1)(d) CM-6(a) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 PR.AC-1 PR.AC-4 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 Req-8.2.4 8.3.9 4.5.1.3 Setting the password warning age enables users to make the change at a practical time. CCE-80671-1 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80671-1 - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(d) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.4 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.9 - accounts_password_warn_age_login_defs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_password_warn_age_login_defs # promote to variable set_fact: var_accounts_password_warn_age_login_defs: !!str tags: - always - name: Set Password Warning Age lineinfile: dest: /etc/login.defs regexp: ^PASS_WARN_AGE *[0-9]* state: present line: PASS_WARN_AGE {{ var_accounts_password_warn_age_login_defs }} create: true when: '"shadow-utils" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80671-1 - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(d) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.4 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.9 - accounts_password_warn_age_login_defs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q shadow-utils; then var_accounts_password_warn_age_login_defs='' # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^PASS_WARN_AGE") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_accounts_password_warn_age_login_defs" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^PASS_WARN_AGE\\>" "/etc/login.defs"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^PASS_WARN_AGE\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/login.defs" else if [[ -s "/etc/login.defs" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/login.defs" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/login.defs" fi cce="CCE-80671-1" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "/etc/login.defs" >> "/etc/login.defs" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/login.defs" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Set existing passwords a period of inactivity before they been locked Configure user accounts that have been inactive for over a given period of time to be automatically disabled by running the following command: $ sudo chage --inactive 30USER DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 3.5.6 CCI-000017 CCI-000795 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 6.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.3 A.18.1.4 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-007-3 R.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 IA-4(e) AC-2(3) CM-6(a) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 PR.AC-1 PR.AC-4 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 Req-8.1.4 8.2.6 SRG-OS-000118-GPOS-00060 4.5.1.4 Inactive accounts pose a threat to system security since the users are not logging in to notice failed login attempts or other anomalies. CCE-86758-0 - name: XCCDF Value var_account_disable_post_pw_expiration # promote to variable set_fact: var_account_disable_post_pw_expiration: !!str tags: - always - name: Collect users with not correct INACTIVE parameter set ansible.builtin.command: cmd: awk -F':' '(($7 > {{ var_account_disable_post_pw_expiration }} || $7 == "") && $2 ~ /^\$/) {print $1}' /etc/shadow register: user_names changed_when: false tags: - CCE-86758-0 - NIST-800-171-3.5.6 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(3) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-4(e) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.4 - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.6 - accounts_set_post_pw_existing - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Change the period of inactivity ansible.builtin.command: cmd: chage --inactive {{ var_account_disable_post_pw_expiration }} {{ item }} with_items: '{{ user_names.stdout_lines }}' when: user_names is not skipped and user_names.stdout_lines | length > 0 tags: - CCE-86758-0 - NIST-800-171-3.5.6 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(3) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-4(e) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.4 - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.6 - accounts_set_post_pw_existing - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy var_account_disable_post_pw_expiration='' while IFS= read -r i; do chage --inactive $var_account_disable_post_pw_expiration $i done < <(awk -v var="$var_account_disable_post_pw_expiration" -F: '(($7 > var || $7 == "") && $2 ~ /^\$/) {print $1}' /etc/shadow) Verify Proper Storage and Existence of Password Hashes By default, password hashes for local accounts are stored in the second field (colon-separated) in /etc/shadow. This file should be readable only by processes running with root credentials, preventing users from casually accessing others' password hashes and attempting to crack them. However, it remains possible to misconfigure the system and store password hashes in world-readable files such as /etc/passwd, or to even store passwords themselves in plaintext on the system. Using system-provided tools for password change/creation should allow administrators to avoid such misconfiguration. Password Hashing algorithm Specify the number of SHA rounds for the system password encryption algorithm. Defines the value set in /etc/pam.d/system-auth and /etc/pam.d/password-auth 5000 5000 65536 Verify All Account Password Hashes are Shadowed If any password hashes are stored in /etc/passwd (in the second field, instead of an x or *), the cause of this misconfiguration should be investigated. The account should have its password reset and the hash should be properly stored, or the account should be deleted entirely. 1 12 15 16 5 5.5.2 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 3.5.10 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 1410 A.18.1.4 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 IA-5(h) CM-6(a) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 Req-8.2.1 8.3.2 6.2.1 The hashes for all user account passwords should be stored in the file /etc/shadow and never in /etc/passwd, which is readable by all users. CCE-80651-3 Verify All Account Password Hashes are Shadowed with SHA512 Verify the operating system requires the shadow password suite configuration be set to encrypt interactive user passwords using a strong cryptographic hash. Check that the interactive user account passwords are using a strong password hash with the following command: $ sudo cut -d: -f2 /etc/shadow $6$kcOnRq/5$NUEYPuyL.wghQwWssXRcLRFiiru7f5JPV6GaJhNC2aK5F3PZpE/BCCtwrxRc/AInKMNX3CdMw11m9STiql12f/ Password hashes ! or * indicate inactive accounts not available for logon and are not evaluated. If any interactive user password hash does not begin with $6, this is a finding. CCI-000196 CCI-000803 IA-5(1)(c) IA-5(1).1(v) IA-7 IA-7.1 SRG-OS-000073-GPOS-00041 SRG-OS-000120-GPOS-00061 RHEL-08-010120 SV-230232r877397_rule Passwords need to be protected at all times, and encryption is the standard method for protecting passwords. If passwords are not encrypted, they can be plainly read (i.e., clear text) and easily compromised. CCE-83484-6 Ensure all users last password change date is in the past All users should have a password change date in the past. Automatic remediation is not available, in order to avoid any system disruption. 8.3.5 4.5.1.5 If a user recorded password change date is in the future then they could bypass any set password expiration. CCE-86525-3 Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth Configure the number or rounds for the password hashing algorithm. This can be accomplished by using the rounds option for the pam_unix PAM module. In file /etc/pam.d/password-auth append rounds= to the pam_unix.so entry, as shown below: password sufficient pam_unix.so ...existing_options... rounds= The system's default number of rounds is 5000. Setting a high number of hashing rounds makes it more difficult to brute force the password, but requires more CPU resources to authenticate users. BP28(R68) CCI-000196 SRG-OS-000073-GPOS-00041 Using a higher number of rounds makes password cracking attacks more difficult. CCE-83403-6 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-83403-6 - accounts_password_pam_unix_rounds_password_auth - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_unix_rounds # promote to variable set_fact: var_password_pam_unix_rounds: !!str tags: - always - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Check if /etc/pam.d/password-auth file is present ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth register: result_pam_file_present when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-83403-6 - accounts_password_pam_unix_rounds_password_auth - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Check the proper remediation for the system block: - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Check if system relies on authselect tool ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present block: - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Get authselect current profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' register: result_authselect_profile changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present changed_when: false when: - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile }} when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_features is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path | basename }} when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Check if expected PAM module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^\s*password\s+{{ 'sufficient' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_unix.so\s*.* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_line_present - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Include or update the PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }} block: - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Check if required PAM module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }} with different control ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_unix.so\s* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_line_other_control_present - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Ensure the correct control for the required PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.replace: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_unix.so.*) replace: \1sufficient \2 register: result_pam_module_edit when: - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 1 - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Ensure the required PAM module line is included in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.lineinfile: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' line: password sufficient pam_unix.so register: result_pam_module_add when: - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 0 or result_pam_line_other_control_present.found > 1 - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present is defined - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - |- (result_pam_module_add is defined and result_pam_module_add.changed) or (result_pam_module_edit is defined and result_pam_module_edit.changed) when: - result_pam_line_present.found is defined - result_pam_line_present.found == 0 - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Check if the required PAM module option is present in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^\s*password\s+{{ 'sufficient' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_unix.so\s*.*\srounds\b state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_module_rounds_option_present - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Ensure the "rounds" PAM option for "pam_unix.so" is included in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' backrefs: true regexp: ^(\s*password\s+{{ 'sufficient' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_unix.so.*) line: \1 rounds={{ var_password_pam_unix_rounds }} state: present register: result_pam_rounds_add when: - result_pam_module_rounds_option_present.found == 0 - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Ensure the required value for "rounds" PAM option from "pam_unix.so" in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' backrefs: true regexp: ^(\s*password\s+{{ 'sufficient' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_unix.so\s+.*)(rounds)=[0-9a-zA-Z]+\s*(.*) line: \1\2={{ var_password_pam_unix_rounds }} \3 register: result_pam_rounds_edit when: - result_pam_module_rounds_option_present.found > 0 - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - |- (result_pam_rounds_add is defined and result_pam_rounds_add.changed) or (result_pam_rounds_edit is defined and result_pam_rounds_edit.changed) when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists tags: - CCE-83403-6 - accounts_password_pam_unix_rounds_password_auth - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q pam; then var_password_pam_unix_rounds='' if [ -e "/etc/pam.d/password-auth" ] ; then PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/password-auth" if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do authselect enable-feature $feature; done authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile fi PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" authselect apply-changes -b fi if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so\s*.*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_unix.so\s*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH")" -eq 1 ]; then # The control is updated only if one single line matches. sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_unix.so.*)/\1'"sufficient"' \2/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" else echo 'password '"sufficient"' pam_unix.so' >> "$PAM_FILE_PATH" fi fi # Check the option if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so\s*.*\srounds\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then sed -i -E --follow-symlinks '/\s*password\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so.*/ s/$/ rounds='"$var_password_pam_unix_rounds"'/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" else sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(\s*password\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so\s+.*)('"rounds"'=)[[:alnum:]]+\s*(.*)/\1\2'"$var_password_pam_unix_rounds"' \3/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" fi if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then authselect apply-changes -b fi else echo "/etc/pam.d/password-auth was not found" >&2 fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth Configure the number or rounds for the password hashing algorithm. This can be accomplished by using the rounds option for the pam_unix PAM module. In file /etc/pam.d/system-auth append rounds= to the pam_unix.so entry, as shown below: password sufficient pam_unix.so ...existing_options... rounds= The system's default number of rounds is 5000. Setting a high number of hashing rounds makes it more difficult to brute force the password, but requires more CPU resources to authenticate users. BP28(R68) CCI-000196 SRG-OS-000073-GPOS-00041 Using a higher number of rounds makes password cracking attacks more difficult. CCE-83386-3 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-83386-3 - accounts_password_pam_unix_rounds_system_auth - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_unix_rounds # promote to variable set_fact: var_password_pam_unix_rounds: !!str tags: - always - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth file is present ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth register: result_pam_file_present when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-83386-3 - accounts_password_pam_unix_rounds_system_auth - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Check the proper remediation for the system block: - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Check if system relies on authselect tool ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present block: - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Get authselect current profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' register: result_authselect_profile changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present changed_when: false when: - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile }} when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features when: - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_authselect_features is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_profile is not skipped - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile ansible.builtin.set_fact: pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path | basename }} when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Check if expected PAM module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^\s*password\s+{{ 'sufficient' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_unix.so\s*.* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_line_present - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Include or update the PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }} block: - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Check if required PAM module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }} with different control ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_unix.so\s* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_line_other_control_present - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Ensure the correct control for the required PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.replace: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_unix.so.*) replace: \1sufficient \2 register: result_pam_module_edit when: - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 1 - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Ensure the required PAM module line is included in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.lineinfile: dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' line: password sufficient pam_unix.so register: result_pam_module_add when: - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 0 or result_pam_line_other_control_present.found > 1 - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present is defined - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - |- (result_pam_module_add is defined and result_pam_module_add.changed) or (result_pam_module_edit is defined and result_pam_module_edit.changed) when: - result_pam_line_present.found is defined - result_pam_line_present.found == 0 - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Check if the required PAM module option is present in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' regexp: ^\s*password\s+{{ 'sufficient' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_unix.so\s*.*\srounds\b state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_module_rounds_option_present - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Ensure the "rounds" PAM option for "pam_unix.so" is included in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' backrefs: true regexp: ^(\s*password\s+{{ 'sufficient' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_unix.so.*) line: \1 rounds={{ var_password_pam_unix_rounds }} state: present register: result_pam_rounds_add when: - result_pam_module_rounds_option_present.found == 0 - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Ensure the required value for "rounds" PAM option from "pam_unix.so" in {{ pam_file_path }} ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' backrefs: true regexp: ^(\s*password\s+{{ 'sufficient' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_unix.so\s+.*)(rounds)=[0-9a-zA-Z]+\s*(.*) line: \1\2={{ var_password_pam_unix_rounds }} \3 register: result_pam_rounds_edit when: - result_pam_module_rounds_option_present.found > 0 - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - |- (result_pam_rounds_add is defined and result_pam_rounds_add.changed) or (result_pam_rounds_edit is defined and result_pam_rounds_edit.changed) when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists tags: - CCE-83386-3 - accounts_password_pam_unix_rounds_system_auth - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q pam; then var_password_pam_unix_rounds='' if [ -e "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" ] ; then PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/system-auth" if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do authselect enable-feature $feature; done authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile fi PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/system-auth") PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" authselect apply-changes -b fi if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so\s*.*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_unix.so\s*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH")" -eq 1 ]; then # The control is updated only if one single line matches. sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_unix.so.*)/\1'"sufficient"' \2/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" else echo 'password '"sufficient"' pam_unix.so' >> "$PAM_FILE_PATH" fi fi # Check the option if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so\s*.*\srounds\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then sed -i -E --follow-symlinks '/\s*password\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so.*/ s/$/ rounds='"$var_password_pam_unix_rounds"'/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" else sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(\s*password\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so\s+.*)('"rounds"'=)[[:alnum:]]+\s*(.*)/\1\2'"$var_password_pam_unix_rounds"' \3/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" fi if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then authselect apply-changes -b fi else echo "/etc/pam.d/system-auth was not found" >&2 fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi All GIDs referenced in /etc/passwd must be defined in /etc/group Add a group to the system for each GID referenced without a corresponding group. 1 12 15 16 5 5.5.2 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 CCI-000764 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 A.18.1.4 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CIP-007-3 R5.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 IA-2 CM-6(a) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 Req-8.5.a 8.2.2 SRG-OS-000104-GPOS-00051 6.2.3 If a user is assigned the Group Identifier (GID) of a group not existing on the system, and a group with the Group Identifier (GID) is subsequently created, the user may have unintended rights to any files associated with the group. CCE-80822-0 Prevent Login to Accounts With Empty Password If an account is configured for password authentication but does not have an assigned password, it may be possible to log into the account without authentication. Remove any instances of the nullok in /etc/pam.d/system-auth and /etc/pam.d/password-auth to prevent logins with empty passwords. If the system relies on authselect tool to manage PAM settings, the remediation will also use authselect tool. However, if any manual modification was made in PAM files, the authselect integrity check will fail and the remediation will be aborted in order to preserve intentional changes. In this case, an informative message will be shown in the remediation report. Note that this rule is not applicable for systems running within a container. Having user with empty password within a container is not considered a risk, because it should not be possible to directly login into a container anyway. 1 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 5.5.2 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.02 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 3.1.1 3.1.5 CCI-000366 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) 164.308(a)(7)(i) 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) 164.310(a)(1) 164.310(a)(2)(i) 164.310(a)(2)(ii) 164.310(a)(2)(iii) 164.310(b) 164.310(c) 164.310(d)(1) 164.310(d)(2)(iii) 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.18.1.4 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 IA-5(1)(a) IA-5(c) CM-6(a) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-4 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 PR.DS-5 FIA_UAU.1 Req-8.2.3 8.3.1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-020331 RHEL-08-020332 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.5 4.4.3.4.1 SV-244540r743869_rule SV-244541r743872_rule If an account has an empty password, anyone could log in and run commands with the privileges of that account. Accounts with empty passwords should never be used in operational environments. CCE-80841-0 - name: Prevent Login to Accounts With Empty Password - Check if system relies on authselect ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80841-0 - CJIS-5.5.2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020331 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020332 - NIST-800-171-3.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.5 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.1 - configure_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_empty_passwords - no_reboot_needed - name: Prevent Login to Accounts With Empty Password - Remediate using authselect block: - name: Prevent Login to Accounts With Empty Password - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Prevent Login to Accounts With Empty Password - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Prevent Login to Accounts With Empty Password - Get authselect current features ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Prevent Login to Accounts With Empty Password - Ensure "without-nullok" feature is enabled using authselect tool ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature without-nullok register: result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_features.stdout is not search("without-nullok") - name: Prevent Login to Accounts With Empty Password - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is not skipped - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is success when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - result_authselect_present.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80841-0 - CJIS-5.5.2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020331 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020332 - NIST-800-171-3.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.5 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.1 - configure_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_empty_passwords - no_reboot_needed - name: Prevent Login to Accounts With Empty Password - Remediate directly editing PAM files ansible.builtin.replace: dest: '{{ item }}' regexp: nullok loop: - /etc/pam.d/system-auth - /etc/pam.d/password-auth when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not result_authselect_present.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80841-0 - CJIS-5.5.2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020331 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020332 - NIST-800-171-3.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.5 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.1 - configure_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_empty_passwords - no_reboot_needed --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,%23%20Generated%20by%20authselect%20on%20Sat%20Oct%2027%2014%3A59%3A36%202018%0A%23%20Do%20not%20modify%20this%20file%20manually.%0A%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_env.so%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_faildelay.so%20delay%3D2000000%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_fprintd.so%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%5Bdefault%3D1%20ignore%3Dignore%20success%3Dok%5D%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_succeed_if.so%20uid%20%3E%3D%201000%20quiet%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%5Bdefault%3D1%20ignore%3Dignore%20success%3Dok%5D%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_localuser.so%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_unix.so%20try_first_pass%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20requisite%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_succeed_if.so%20uid%20%3E%3D%201000%20quiet_success%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_sss.so%20forward_pass%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_deny.so%0A%0Aaccount%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_unix.so%0Aaccount%20%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_localuser.so%0Aaccount%20%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_succeed_if.so%20uid%20%3C%201000%20quiet%0Aaccount%20%20%20%20%20%5Bdefault%3Dbad%20success%3Dok%20user_unknown%3Dignore%5D%20pam_sss.so%0Aaccount%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_permit.so%0A%0Apassword%20%20%20%20requisite%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_pwquality.so%20try_first_pass%20local_users_only%0Apassword%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_unix.so%20sha512%20shadow%20try_first_pass%20use_authtok%0Apassword%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_sss.so%20use_authtok%0Apassword%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_deny.so%0A%0Asession%20%20%20%20%20optional%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_keyinit.so%20revoke%0Asession%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_limits.so%0A-session%20%20%20%20optional%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_systemd.so%0Asession%20%20%20%20%20%5Bsuccess%3D1%20default%3Dignore%5D%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_succeed_if.so%20service%20in%20crond%20quiet%20use_uid%0Asession%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_unix.so%0Asession%20%20%20%20%20optional%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_sss.so%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth overwrite: true - contents: source: data:,%23%20Generated%20by%20authselect%20on%20Sat%20Oct%2027%2014%3A59%3A36%202018%0A%23%20Do%20not%20modify%20this%20file%20manually.%0A%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_env.so%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_faildelay.so%20delay%3D2000000%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_fprintd.so%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%5Bdefault%3D1%20ignore%3Dignore%20success%3Dok%5D%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_succeed_if.so%20uid%20%3E%3D%201000%20quiet%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%5Bdefault%3D1%20ignore%3Dignore%20success%3Dok%5D%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_localuser.so%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_unix.so%20try_first_pass%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20requisite%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_succeed_if.so%20uid%20%3E%3D%201000%20quiet_success%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_sss.so%20forward_pass%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_deny.so%0A%0Aaccount%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_unix.so%0Aaccount%20%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_localuser.so%0Aaccount%20%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_succeed_if.so%20uid%20%3C%201000%20quiet%0Aaccount%20%20%20%20%20%5Bdefault%3Dbad%20success%3Dok%20user_unknown%3Dignore%5D%20pam_sss.so%0Aaccount%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_permit.so%0A%0Apassword%20%20%20%20requisite%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_pwquality.so%20try_first_pass%20local_users_only%0Apassword%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_unix.so%20sha512%20shadow%20try_first_pass%20use_authtok%0Apassword%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_sss.so%20use_authtok%0Apassword%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_deny.so%0A%0Asession%20%20%20%20%20optional%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_keyinit.so%20revoke%0Asession%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_limits.so%0A-session%20%20%20%20optional%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_systemd.so%0Asession%20%20%20%20%20%5Bsuccess%3D1%20default%3Dignore%5D%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_succeed_if.so%20service%20in%20crond%20quiet%20use_uid%0Asession%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_unix.so%0Asession%20%20%20%20%20optional%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_sss.so%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi authselect enable-feature without-nullok authselect apply-changes -b else if grep -qP '^\s*auth\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so\s.*\bnullok\b' "/etc/pam.d/system-auth"; then sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*auth.*'"sufficient"'.*pam_unix.so.*)\snullok=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" fi if grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so\s.*\bnullok\b' "/etc/pam.d/system-auth"; then sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*password.*'"sufficient"'.*pam_unix.so.*)\snullok=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" fi if grep -qP '^\s*auth\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so\s.*\bnullok\b' "/etc/pam.d/password-auth"; then sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*auth.*'"sufficient"'.*pam_unix.so.*)\snullok=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "/etc/pam.d/password-auth" fi if grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so\s.*\bnullok\b' "/etc/pam.d/password-auth"; then sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*password.*'"sufficient"'.*pam_unix.so.*)\snullok=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "/etc/pam.d/password-auth" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure There Are No Accounts With Blank or Null Passwords Check the "/etc/shadow" file for blank passwords with the following command: $ sudo awk -F: '!$2 {print $1}' /etc/shadow If the command returns any results, this is a finding. Configure all accounts on the system to have a password or lock the account with the following commands: Perform a password reset: $ sudo passwd [username] Lock an account: $ sudo passwd -l [username] Note that this rule is not applicable for systems running within a container. Having user with empty password within a container is not considered a risk, because it should not be possible to directly login into a container anyway. CCI-000366 CM-6(b) CM-6.1(iv) 2.2.2 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010121 6.2.2 SV-251706r809342_rule If an account has an empty password, anyone could log in and run commands with the privileges of that account. Accounts with empty passwords should never be used in operational environments. CCE-85953-8 - name: Collect users with no password command: | awk -F: '!$2 {print $1}' /etc/shadow register: users_nopasswd when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-85953-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010121 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.2 - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_empty_passwords_etc_shadow - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Lock users with no password command: | passwd -l {{ item }} with_items: '{{ users_nopasswd.stdout_lines }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - users_nopasswd.stdout_lines | length > 0 tags: - CCE-85953-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010121 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.2 - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_empty_passwords_etc_shadow - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then readarray -t users_with_empty_pass < <(sudo awk -F: '!$2 {print $1}' /etc/shadow) for user_with_empty_pass in "${users_with_empty_pass[@]}" do passwd -l $user_with_empty_pass done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify No .forward Files Exist The .forward file specifies an email address to forward the user's mail to. 6.2.11 Use of the .forward file poses a security risk in that sensitive data may be inadvertently transferred outside the organization. The .forward file also poses a risk as it can be used to execute commands that may perform unintended actions. CCE-86755-6 Ensure there are no legacy + NIS entries in /etc/group The + character in /etc/group file marks a place where entries from a network information service (NIS) should be directly inserted. Using this method to include entries into /etc/group is considered legacy and should be avoided. These entries may provide a way for an attacker to gain access to the system. CCE-83389-7 - name: Ensure there are no legacy + NIS entries in /etc/group - Backup the Old /etc/group File ansible.builtin.copy: src: /etc/group dest: /etc/group- remote_src: true tags: - CCE-83389-7 - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_legacy_plus_entries_etc_group - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure there are no legacy + NIS entries in /etc/group - Remove Lines Starting with + From /etc/group ansible.builtin.lineinfile: regexp: ^\+.*$ state: absent path: /etc/group tags: - CCE-83389-7 - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_legacy_plus_entries_etc_group - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy if grep -q '^\+' /etc/group; then # backup old file to /etc/group- cp /etc/group /etc/group- sed -i '/^\+.*$/d' /etc/group fi Ensure there are no legacy + NIS entries in /etc/passwd The + character in /etc/passwd file marks a place where entries from a network information service (NIS) should be directly inserted. Using this method to include entries into /etc/passwd is considered legacy and should be avoided. These entries may provide a way for an attacker to gain access to the system. CCE-82890-5 - name: Ensure there are no legacy + NIS entries in /etc/passwd - Backup the Old /etc/passwd File ansible.builtin.copy: src: /etc/passwd dest: /etc/passwd- remote_src: true tags: - CCE-82890-5 - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_legacy_plus_entries_etc_passwd - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure there are no legacy + NIS entries in /etc/passwd - Remove Lines Starting with + From /etc/passwd ansible.builtin.lineinfile: regexp: ^\+.*$ state: absent path: /etc/passwd tags: - CCE-82890-5 - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_legacy_plus_entries_etc_passwd - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy if grep -q '^\+' /etc/passwd; then # backup old file to /etc/passwd- cp /etc/passwd /etc/passwd- sed -i '/^\+.*$/d' /etc/passwd fi Ensure there are no legacy + NIS entries in /etc/shadow The + character in /etc/shadow file marks a place where entries from a network information service (NIS) should be directly inserted. Using this method to include entries into /etc/shadow is considered legacy and should be avoided. These entries may provide a way for an attacker to gain access to the system. CCE-84290-6 - name: Ensure there are no legacy + NIS entries in /etc/shadow - Backup the Old /etc/shadow File ansible.builtin.copy: src: /etc/shadow dest: /etc/shadow- remote_src: true tags: - CCE-84290-6 - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_legacy_plus_entries_etc_shadow - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure there are no legacy + NIS entries in /etc/shadow - Remove Lines Starting with + From /etc/shadow ansible.builtin.lineinfile: regexp: ^\+.*$ state: absent path: /etc/shadow tags: - CCE-84290-6 - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_legacy_plus_entries_etc_shadow - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy if grep -q '^\+' /etc/shadow; then # backup old file to /etc/shadow- cp /etc/shadow /etc/shadow- sed -i '/^\+.*$/d' /etc/shadow fi Verify No netrc Files Exist The .netrc files contain login information used to auto-login into FTP servers and reside in the user's home directory. These files may contain unencrypted passwords to remote FTP servers making them susceptible to access by unauthorized users and should not be used. Any .netrc files should be removed. 1 11 12 14 15 16 18 3 5 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.06 DSS06.10 CCI-000196 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 A.18.1.4 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R1.3 CIP-003-8 R3 CIP-003-8 R3.1 CIP-003-8 R3.2 CIP-003-8 R3.3 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CIP-007-3 R5.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 IA-5(h) IA-5(1)(c) CM-6(a) IA-5(7) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-4 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 PR.PT-3 6.2.13 6.2.15 Unencrypted passwords for remote FTP servers may be stored in .netrc files. CCE-83444-0 Restrict Root Logins Direct root logins should be allowed only for emergency use. In normal situations, the administrator should access the system via a unique unprivileged account, and then use su or sudo to execute privileged commands. Discouraging administrators from accessing the root account directly ensures an audit trail in organizations with multiple administrators. Locking down the channels through which root can connect directly also reduces opportunities for password-guessing against the root account. The login program uses the file /etc/securetty to determine which interfaces should allow root logins. The virtual devices /dev/console and /dev/tty* represent the system consoles (accessible via the Ctrl-Alt-F1 through Ctrl-Alt-F6 keyboard sequences on a default installation). The default securetty file also contains /dev/vc/*. These are likely to be deprecated in most environments, but may be retained for compatibility. Root should also be prohibited from connecting via network protocols. Other sections of this document include guidance describing how to prevent root from logging in via SSH. Group Name Used by pam_wheel Group Parameter pam_wheel module has a parameter called group, which controls which groups can access the su command. This variable holds the valid value for the parameter. sugroup sugroup Verify Only Root Has UID 0 If any account other than root has a UID of 0, this misconfiguration should be investigated and the accounts other than root should be removed or have their UID changed. If the account is associated with system commands or applications the UID should be changed to one greater than "0" but less than "1000." Otherwise assign a UID greater than "1000" that has not already been assigned. 1 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.02 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 3.1.1 3.1.5 CCI-000366 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.18.1.4 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CIP-007-3 R5.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 IA-2 AC-6(5) IA-4(b) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-4 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 PR.DS-5 Req-8.5 8.2.1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040200 6.2.9 SV-230534r627750_rule An account has root authority if it has a UID of 0. Multiple accounts with a UID of 0 afford more opportunity for potential intruders to guess a password for a privileged account. Proper configuration of sudo is recommended to afford multiple system administrators access to root privileges in an accountable manner. CCE-80649-7 - name: Get all /etc/passwd file entries getent: database: passwd split: ':' tags: - CCE-80649-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040200 - NIST-800-171-3.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(5) - NIST-800-53-IA-2 - NIST-800-53-IA-4(b) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.5 - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.1 - accounts_no_uid_except_zero - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Lock the password of the user accounts other than root with uid 0 command: passwd -l {{ item.key }} loop: '{{ getent_passwd | dict2items | rejectattr(''key'', ''search'', ''root'') | list }}' when: item.value.1 == '0' tags: - CCE-80649-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040200 - NIST-800-171-3.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(5) - NIST-800-53-IA-2 - NIST-800-53-IA-4(b) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.5 - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.1 - accounts_no_uid_except_zero - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy awk -F: '$3 == 0 && $1 != "root" { print $1 }' /etc/passwd | xargs --no-run-if-empty --max-lines=1 passwd -l Verify Root Has A Primary GID 0 The root user should have a primary group of 0. Req-8.1.1 8.2.1 4.5.2.1 To help ensure that root-owned files are not inadvertently exposed to other users. CCE-86297-9 Ensure the Group Used by pam_wheel.so Module Exists on System and is Empty Ensure that the group referenced by var_pam_wheel_group_for_su variable and used as value for the pam_wheel.so group option exists and has no members. This empty group used by pam_wheel.so in /etc/pam.d/su ensures that no user can run commands with altered privileges through the su command. Note that this rule just ensures the group exists and has no members. This rule does not configure pam_wheel.so module. The pam_wheel.so module configuration is accomplished by use_pam_wheel_group_for_su rule. 2.2.6 4.3.7 The su program allows to run commands with a substitute user and group ID. It is commonly used to run commands as the root user. Limiting access to such command is considered a good security practice. CCE-86071-8 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-86071-8 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - ensure_pam_wheel_group_empty - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_pam_wheel_group_for_su # promote to variable set_fact: var_pam_wheel_group_for_su: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure the Group Used by pam_wheel.so Module Exists on System and is Empty - Ensure {{ var_pam_wheel_group_for_su }} Group Exists ansible.builtin.group: name: '{{ var_pam_wheel_group_for_su }}' state: present when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-86071-8 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - ensure_pam_wheel_group_empty - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure the Group Used by pam_wheel.so Module Exists on System and is Empty - Ensure {{ var_pam_wheel_group_for_su }} Group is Empty ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/group regexp: ^({{ var_pam_wheel_group_for_su }}:[^:]+:[0-9]+:).*$ line: \1 backrefs: true when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-86071-8 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - ensure_pam_wheel_group_empty - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q pam; then var_pam_wheel_group_for_su='' if ! grep -q "^${var_pam_wheel_group_for_su}:[^:]*:[^:]*:[^:]*" /etc/group; then groupadd ${var_pam_wheel_group_for_su} fi # group must be empty gpasswd -M '' ${var_pam_wheel_group_for_su} else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure Authentication Required for Single User Mode Single user mode is used for recovery when the system detects an issue during boot or by manual selection from the bootloader. 2.2.2 4.5.2.4 Requiring authentication in single user mode prevents an unauthorized user from rebooting the system into single user to gain root privileges without credentials. CCE-86517-0 Direct root Logins Not Allowed To further limit access to the root account, administrators can disable root logins at the console by editing the /etc/securetty file. This file lists all devices the root user is allowed to login to. If the file does not exist at all, the root user can login through any communication device on the system, whether via the console or via a raw network interface. This is dangerous as user can login to the system as root via Telnet, which sends the password in plain text over the network. By default, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8's /etc/securetty file only allows the root user to login at the console physically attached to the system. To prevent root from logging in, remove the contents of this file. To prevent direct root logins, remove the contents of this file by typing the following command: $ sudo echo > /etc/securetty This rule only checks the /etc/securetty file existence and its content. If you need to restrict user access using the /etc/securetty file, make sure the pam_securetty.so PAM module is properly enabled in relevant PAM files. BP28(R19) 1 12 15 16 5 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 3.1.1 3.1.6 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) 164.308(a)(7)(i) 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) 164.310(a)(1) 164.310(a)(2)(i) 164.310(a)(2)(ii) 164.310(a)(2)(iii) 164.310(b) 164.310(c) 164.310(d)(1) 164.310(d)(2)(iii) 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 A.18.1.4 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CIP-007-3 R5.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 IA-2 CM-6(a) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 8.6.1 Disabling direct root logins ensures proper accountability and multifactor authentication to privileged accounts. Users will first login, then escalate to privileged (root) access via su / sudo. This is required for FISMA Low and FISMA Moderate systems. CCE-80840-2 - name: Direct root Logins Not Allowed copy: dest: /etc/securetty content: '' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80840-2 - NIST-800-171-3.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-2 - PCI-DSSv4-8.6.1 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_direct_root_logins - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:, mode: 0600 path: /etc/securetty overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then echo > /etc/securetty else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure that System Accounts Are Locked Some accounts are not associated with a human user of the system, and exist to perform some administrative functions. An attacker should not be able to log into these accounts. System accounts are those user accounts with a user ID less than 1000. If any system account other than root, halt, sync, shutdown and nfsnobody has an unlocked password, disable it with the command: $ sudo usermod -L account CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 AC-6 CM-6(a) 8.2.2 4.5.2.3 Disabling authentication for default system accounts makes it more difficult for attackers to make use of them to compromise a system. CCE-86112-0 - name: Ensure that System Accounts Are Locked - Get All Local Users From /etc/passwd ansible.builtin.getent: database: passwd split: ':' tags: - CCE-86112-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.2 - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_password_auth_for_systemaccounts - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure that System Accounts Are Locked - Create local_users Variable From getent_passwd Facts ansible.builtin.set_fact: local_users: '{{ ansible_facts.getent_passwd | dict2items }}' tags: - CCE-86112-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.2 - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_password_auth_for_systemaccounts - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure that System Accounts Are Locked - Lock System Accounts ansible.builtin.user: name: '{{ item.key }}' password_lock: true loop: '{{ local_users }}' when: - item.value[1]|int < 1000 - item.key not in ['root', 'halt', 'sync', 'shutdown', 'nfsnobody'] tags: - CCE-86112-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.2 - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_password_auth_for_systemaccounts - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy readarray -t systemaccounts < <(awk -F: \ '($3 < 1000 && $3 != root && $3 != halt && $3 != sync && $3 != shutdown \ && $3 != nfsnobody) { print $1 }' /etc/passwd) for systemaccount in "${systemaccounts[@]}"; do usermod -L "$systemaccount" done Restrict Web Browser Use for Administrative Accounts Enforce policy requiring administrative accounts use web browsers only for local service administration. If a browser vulnerability is exploited while running with administrative privileges, the entire system could be compromised. Specific exceptions for local service administration should be documented in site-defined policy. Ensure that System Accounts Do Not Run a Shell Upon Login Some accounts are not associated with a human user of the system, and exist to perform some administrative functions. Should an attacker be able to log into these accounts, they should not be granted access to a shell. The login shell for each local account is stored in the last field of each line in /etc/passwd. System accounts are those user accounts with a user ID less than 1000. The user ID is stored in the third field. If any system account other than root has a login shell, disable it with the command: $ sudo usermod -s /sbin/nologin account Do not perform the steps in this section on the root account. Doing so might cause the system to become inaccessible. 1 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 7 8 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.03 CCI-000366 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 6.2 1491 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 AC-6 CM-6(a) CM-6(b) CM-6.1(iv) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 PR.AC-1 PR.AC-4 PR.AC-6 8.2.2 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 4.5.2.3 Ensuring shells are not given to system accounts upon login makes it more difficult for attackers to make use of system accounts. CCE-80843-6 - name: Ensure that System Accounts Do Not Run a Shell Upon Login - Get All Local Users From /etc/passwd ansible.builtin.getent: database: passwd split: ':' tags: - CCE-80843-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.2 - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - no_shelllogin_for_systemaccounts - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure that System Accounts Do Not Run a Shell Upon Login - Create local_users Variable From getent_passwd Facts ansible.builtin.set_fact: local_users: '{{ ansible_facts.getent_passwd | dict2items }}' tags: - CCE-80843-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.2 - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - no_shelllogin_for_systemaccounts - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure that System Accounts Do Not Run a Shell Upon Login - Disable Login Shell for System Accounts ansible.builtin.user: name: '{{ item.key }}' shell: /sbin/nologin loop: '{{ local_users }}' when: - item.key not in ['root'] - item.value[1]|int < 1000 - item.value[5] not in ['/sbin/shutdown', '/sbin/halt', '/bin/sync'] tags: - CCE-80843-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.2 - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - no_shelllogin_for_systemaccounts - restrict_strategy readarray -t systemaccounts < <(awk -F: '($3 < 1000 && $3 != root \ && $7 != "\/sbin\/shutdown" && $7 != "\/sbin\/halt" && $7 != "\/bin\/sync") \ { print $1 }' /etc/passwd) for systemaccount in "${systemaccounts[@]}"; do usermod -s /sbin/nologin "$systemaccount" done Restrict Serial Port Root Logins To restrict root logins on serial ports, ensure lines of this form do not appear in /etc/securetty: ttyS0 ttyS1 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 3.1.1 3.1.5 CCI-000770 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) 164.308(a)(7)(i) 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) 164.310(a)(1) 164.310(a)(2)(i) 164.310(a)(2)(ii) 164.310(a)(2)(iii) 164.310(b) 164.310(c) 164.310(d)(1) 164.310(d)(2)(iii) 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 AC-6 CM-6(a) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 Preventing direct root login to serial port interfaces helps ensure accountability for actions taken on the systems using the root account. CCE-80856-8 - name: Restrict Serial Port Root Logins lineinfile: dest: /etc/securetty regexp: ttyS[0-9] state: absent tags: - CCE-80856-8 - NIST-800-171-3.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_serial_port_logins - restrict_strategy sed -i '/ttyS/d' /etc/securetty Root Path Must Be Vendor Default Assuming root shell is bash, edit the following files: ~/.profile ~/.bashrc Change any PATH variables to the vendor default for root and remove any empty PATH entries or references to relative paths. 18 APO13.01 BAI03.01 BAI03.02 BAI03.03 4.3.4.3.3 A.14.1.1 A.14.2.1 A.14.2.5 A.6.1.5 CM-6(a) PR.IP-2 The root account's executable search path must be the vendor default, and must contain only absolute paths. Restrict Virtual Console Root Logins To restrict root logins through the (deprecated) virtual console devices, ensure lines of this form do not appear in /etc/securetty: vc/1 vc/2 vc/3 vc/4 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 3.1.1 3.1.5 CCI-000770 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) 164.308(a)(7)(i) 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) 164.310(a)(1) 164.310(a)(2)(i) 164.310(a)(2)(ii) 164.310(a)(2)(iii) 164.310(b) 164.310(c) 164.310(d)(1) 164.310(d)(2)(iii) 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 AC-6 CM-6(a) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 8.6.1 SRG-OS-000324-GPOS-00125 Preventing direct root login to virtual console devices helps ensure accountability for actions taken on the system using the root account. CCE-80864-2 - name: Restrict Virtual Console Root Logins lineinfile: dest: /etc/securetty regexp: ^vc state: absent tags: - CCE-80864-2 - NIST-800-171-3.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-8.6.1 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - securetty_root_login_console_only sed -i '/^vc\//d' /etc/securetty Enforce usage of pam_wheel for su authentication To ensure that only users who are members of the wheel group can run commands with altered privileges through the su command, make sure that the following line exists in the file /etc/pam.d/su: auth required pam_wheel.so use_uid Members of "wheel" or GID 0 groups are checked by default if the group option is not set for pam_wheel.so module. Therefore, members of these groups should be manually checked or a different group should be informed according to the site policy. FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1 SRG-OS-000373-GPOS-00156 SRG-OS-000312-GPOS-00123 The su program allows to run commands with a substitute user and group ID. It is commonly used to run commands as the root user. Limiting access to such command is considered a good security practice. CCE-83318-6 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-83318-6 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - use_pam_wheel_for_su - name: Restrict usage of su command only to members of wheel group replace: path: /etc/pam.d/su regexp: ^[\s]*#[\s]*auth[\s]+required[\s]+pam_wheel\.so[\s]+use_uid$ replace: auth required pam_wheel.so use_uid when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-83318-6 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - use_pam_wheel_for_su # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q pam; then # uncomment the option if commented sed '/^[[:space:]]*#[[:space:]]*auth[[:space:]]\+required[[:space:]]\+pam_wheel\.so[[:space:]]\+use_uid$/s/^[[:space:]]*#//' -i /etc/pam.d/su else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enforce Usage of pam_wheel with Group Parameter for su Authentication To ensure that only users who are members of the group set in the group option of pam_wheel.so module can run commands with altered privileges through the su command, make sure that the following line exists in the file /etc/pam.d/su: auth required pam_wheel.so use_uid group= Note that ensure_pam_wheel_group_empty rule complements this requirement by ensuring the referenced group exists and has no members. 2.2.6 4.3.7 The su program allows to run commands with a substitute user and group ID. It is commonly used to run commands as the root user. Limiting access to such command is considered a good security practice. CCE-86064-3 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-86064-3 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - use_pam_wheel_group_for_su - name: XCCDF Value var_pam_wheel_group_for_su # promote to variable set_fact: var_pam_wheel_group_for_su: !!str tags: - always - name: Enforce Usage of pam_wheel with Group Parameter for su Authentication - Add the group to the /etc/pam.d/su file ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/pam.d/su state: present regexp: ^[\s]*#[\s]*auth[\s]+required[\s]+pam_wheel\.so[\s]+use_uid group=$ line: auth required pam_wheel.so use_uid group={{ var_pam_wheel_group_for_su }} when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-86064-3 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - use_pam_wheel_group_for_su # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q pam; then var_pam_wheel_group_for_su='' PAM_CONF=/etc/pam.d/su pamstr=$(grep -P '^auth\s+required\s+pam_wheel\.so\s+(?=[^#]*\buse_uid\b)(?=[^#]*\bgroup=)' ${PAM_CONF}) if [ -z "$pamstr" ]; then sed -Ei '/^auth\b.*\brequired\b.*\bpam_wheel\.so/d' ${PAM_CONF} # remove any remaining uncommented pam_wheel.so line sed -Ei "/^auth\s+sufficient\s+pam_rootok\.so.*$/a auth required pam_wheel.so use_uid group=${var_pam_wheel_group_for_su}" ${PAM_CONF} else group_val=$(echo -n "$pamstr" | grep -Eo '\bgroup=[_a-z][-0-9_a-z]*' | cut -d '=' -f 2) if [ -z "${group_val}" ] || [ ${group_val} != ${var_pam_wheel_group_for_su} ]; then sed -Ei "s/(^auth\s+required\s+pam_wheel.so\s+[^#]*group=)[_a-z][-0-9_a-z]*/\1${var_pam_wheel_group_for_su}/" ${PAM_CONF} fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Secure Session Configuration Files for Login Accounts When a user logs into a Unix account, the system configures the user's session by reading a number of files. Many of these files are located in the user's home directory, and may have weak permissions as a result of user error or misconfiguration. If an attacker can modify or even read certain types of account configuration information, they can often gain full access to the affected user's account. Therefore, it is important to test and correct configuration file permissions for interactive accounts, particularly those of privileged users such as root or system administrators. Maximum login attempts delay Maximum time in seconds between fail login attempts before re-prompting. 1 2 3 4 5 4 Maximum concurrent login sessions Maximum number of concurrent sessions by a user 1 10 15 20 3 5 1 Account Inactivity Timeout (seconds) In an interactive shell, the value is interpreted as the number of seconds to wait for input after issuing the primary prompt. Bash terminates after waiting for that number of seconds if input does not arrive. 1800 600 900 300 600 Interactive users initialization files 'A regular expression describing a list of file names for files that are sourced at login time for interactive users' ^(\.bashrc|\.zshrc|\.cshrc|\.profile|\.bash_login|\.bash_profile)$ ^\.[\w\- ]+$ Ensure Home Directories are Created for New Users All local interactive user accounts, upon creation, should be assigned a home directory. Configure the operating system to assign home directories to all new local interactive users by setting the CREATE_HOME parameter in /etc/login.defs to yes as follows: CREATE_HOME yes CCI-000366 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010760 SV-230324r627750_rule If local interactive users are not assigned a valid home directory, there is no place for the storage and control of files they should own. CCE-83789-8 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-83789-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010760 - accounts_have_homedir_login_defs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure new users receive home directories block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/login.defs create: true regexp: ^\s*CREATE_HOME\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/login.defs lineinfile: path: /etc/login.defs create: true regexp: ^\s*CREATE_HOME\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/login.defs lineinfile: path: /etc/login.defs create: true regexp: ^\s*CREATE_HOME\s+ line: CREATE_HOME yes state: present when: '"shadow-utils" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-83789-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010760 - accounts_have_homedir_login_defs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q shadow-utils; then if [ -e "/etc/login.defs" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*CREATE_HOME\s\+/Id" "/etc/login.defs" else touch "/etc/login.defs" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/login.defs" cp "/etc/login.defs" "/etc/login.defs.bak" # Insert before the line matching the regex '^\s*CREATE_HOME'. line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^\s*CREATE_HOME" "/etc/login.defs.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then # There was no match of '^\s*CREATE_HOME', insert at # the end of the file. printf '%s\n' "CREATE_HOME yes" >> "/etc/login.defs" else head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "/etc/login.defs.bak" > "/etc/login.defs" printf '%s\n' "CREATE_HOME yes" >> "/etc/login.defs" tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "/etc/login.defs.bak" >> "/etc/login.defs" fi # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/login.defs.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure the Logon Failure Delay is Set Correctly in login.defs To ensure the logon failure delay controlled by /etc/login.defs is set properly, add or correct the FAIL_DELAY setting in /etc/login.defs to read as follows: FAIL_DELAY 11 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 CCI-000366 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 AC-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00226 RHEL-08-020310 SV-230378r627750_rule Increasing the time between a failed authentication attempt and re-prompting to enter credentials helps to slow a single-threaded brute force attack. CCE-84037-1 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-84037-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020310 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - accounts_logon_fail_delay - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_fail_delay # promote to variable set_fact: var_accounts_fail_delay: !!str tags: - always - name: Set accounts logon fail delay lineinfile: dest: /etc/login.defs regexp: ^FAIL_DELAY line: FAIL_DELAY {{ var_accounts_fail_delay }} create: true when: '"shadow-utils" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-84037-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020310 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - accounts_logon_fail_delay - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q shadow-utils; then var_accounts_fail_delay='' # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^FAIL_DELAY") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_accounts_fail_delay" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^FAIL_DELAY\\>" "/etc/login.defs"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^FAIL_DELAY\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/login.defs" else if [[ -s "/etc/login.defs" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/login.defs" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/login.defs" fi cce="CCE-84037-1" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "/etc/login.defs" >> "/etc/login.defs" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/login.defs" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Limit the Number of Concurrent Login Sessions Allowed Per User Limiting the number of allowed users and sessions per user can limit risks related to Denial of Service attacks. This addresses concurrent sessions for a single account and does not address concurrent sessions by a single user via multiple accounts. To set the number of concurrent sessions per user add the following line in /etc/security/limits.conf or a file under /etc/security/limits.d/: * hard maxlogins 14 15 18 9 5.5.2.2 DSS01.05 DSS05.02 CCI-000054 4.3.3.4 SR 3.1 SR 3.8 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 AC-10 CM-6(a) PR.AC-5 SRG-OS-000027-GPOS-00008 RHEL-08-020024 SV-230346r877399_rule Limiting simultaneous user logins can insulate the system from denial of service problems caused by excessive logins. Automated login processes operating improperly or maliciously may result in an exceptional number of simultaneous login sessions. CCE-80955-8 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80955-8 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020024 - NIST-800-53-AC-10 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - accounts_max_concurrent_login_sessions - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_max_concurrent_login_sessions # promote to variable set_fact: var_accounts_max_concurrent_login_sessions: !!str tags: - always - name: Find /etc/security/limits.d files containing maxlogins configuration find: paths: /etc/security/limits.d contains: ^[\s]*\*[\s]+(?:(?:hard)|(?:-))[\s]+maxlogins patterns: '*.conf' register: maxlogins when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80955-8 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020024 - NIST-800-53-AC-10 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - accounts_max_concurrent_login_sessions - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Limit the Number of Concurrent Login Sessions Allowed Per User in files from limits.d replace: dest: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^#?\*.*maxlogins.* replace: '* hard maxlogins {{ var_accounts_max_concurrent_login_sessions }}' with_items: - '{{ maxlogins.files }}' when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80955-8 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020024 - NIST-800-53-AC-10 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - accounts_max_concurrent_login_sessions - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Limit the Number of Concurrent Login Sessions Allowed Per User lineinfile: state: present dest: /etc/security/limits.conf insertbefore: ^# End of file regexp: ^#?\*.*maxlogins line: '* hard maxlogins {{ var_accounts_max_concurrent_login_sessions }}' create: true when: - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' - maxlogins.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80955-8 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020024 - NIST-800-53-AC-10 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - accounts_max_concurrent_login_sessions - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q pam; then var_accounts_max_concurrent_login_sessions='' if grep -q '^[^#]*\<maxlogins\>' /etc/security/limits.d/*.conf; then sed -i "/^[^#]*\<maxlogins\>/ s/maxlogins.*/maxlogins $var_accounts_max_concurrent_login_sessions/" /etc/security/limits.d/*.conf elif grep -q '^[^#]*\<maxlogins\>' /etc/security/limits.conf; then sed -i "/^[^#]*\<maxlogins\>/ s/maxlogins.*/maxlogins $var_accounts_max_concurrent_login_sessions/" /etc/security/limits.conf else echo "* hard maxlogins $var_accounts_max_concurrent_login_sessions" >> /etc/security/limits.conf fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure Polyinstantiation of /tmp Directories To configure polyinstantiated /tmp directories, first create the parent directories which will hold the polyinstantiation child directories. Use the following command: $ sudo mkdir --mode 000 /tmp/tmp-inst Then, add the following entry to /etc/security/namespace.conf: /tmp /tmp/tmp-inst/ level root,adm BP28(R39) Polyinstantiation of temporary directories is a proactive security measure which reduces chances of attacks that are made possible by /tmp directories being world-writable. CCE-83732-8 - name: Create /tmp/tmp-inst directory file: path: /tmp/tmp-inst state: directory mode: '000' seuser: system_u serole: object_r setype: tmp_t tags: - CCE-83732-8 - accounts_polyinstantiated_tmp - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Make changes to /etc/security/namespace.conf lineinfile: path: /etc/security/namespace.conf create: false regexp: ^\s*/tmp\s+/tmp/tmp-inst/\s+level\s+root,adm$ line: /tmp /tmp/tmp-inst/ level root,adm state: present tags: - CCE-83732-8 - accounts_polyinstantiated_tmp - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # shellcheck disable=SC2174 mkdir -p --mode 000 /tmp/tmp-inst chmod 000 /tmp/tmp-inst chcon --reference=/tmp /tmp/tmp-inst if ! grep -Eq '^\s*/tmp\s+/tmp/tmp-inst/\s+level\s+root,adm$' /etc/security/namespace.conf ; then if grep -Eq '^\s*/tmp\s+' /etc/security/namespace.conf ; then sed -i '/^\s*\/tmp/d' /etc/security/namespace.conf fi echo "/tmp /tmp/tmp-inst/ level root,adm" >> /etc/security/namespace.conf fi Configure Polyinstantiation of /var/tmp Directories To configure polyinstantiated /tmp directories, first create the parent directories which will hold the polyinstantiation child directories. Use the following command: $ sudo mkdir --mode 000 /var/tmp/tmp-inst Then, add the following entry to /etc/security/namespace.conf: /var/tmp /var/tmp/tmp-inst/ level root,adm BP28(R39) Polyinstantiation of temporary directories is a proactive security measure which reduces chances of attacks that are made possible by /var/tmp directories being world-writable. CCE-83778-1 - name: Create /var/tmp/tmp-inst directory file: path: /var/tmp/tmp-inst state: directory mode: '000' seuser: system_u serole: object_r setype: tmp_t tags: - CCE-83778-1 - accounts_polyinstantiated_var_tmp - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Make changes to /etc/security/namespace.conf lineinfile: path: /etc/security/namespace.conf create: false regexp: ^\s*/var/tmp\s+/var/tmp/tmp-inst/\s+level\s+root,adm$ line: /var/tmp /var/tmp/tmp-inst/ level root,adm state: present tags: - CCE-83778-1 - accounts_polyinstantiated_var_tmp - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # shellcheck disable=SC2174 mkdir -p --mode 000 /var/tmp/tmp-inst chmod 000 /var/tmp/tmp-inst chcon --reference=/var/tmp /var/tmp/tmp-inst if ! grep -Eq '^\s*/var/tmp\s+/var/tmp/tmp-inst/\s+level\s+root,adm$' /etc/security/namespace.conf ; then if grep -Eq '^\s*/var/tmp\s+' /etc/security/namespace.conf ; then sed -i '/^\s*\/var\/tmp/d' /etc/security/namespace.conf fi echo "/var/tmp /var/tmp/tmp-inst/ level root,adm" >> /etc/security/namespace.conf fi Set Interactive Session Timeout Setting the TMOUT option in /etc/profile ensures that all user sessions will terminate based on inactivity. The value of TMOUT should be exported and read only. The TMOUT setting in a file loaded by /etc/profile, e.g. /etc/profile.d/tmout.sh should read as follows: typeset -xr TMOUT= or declare -xr TMOUT= Using the typeset keyword is preferred for wider compatibility with ksh and other shells. BP28(R29) 1 12 15 16 DSS05.04 DSS05.10 DSS06.10 3.1.11 CCI-000057 CCI-001133 CCI-002361 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 A.18.1.4 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.4 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 AC-12 SC-10 AC-2(5) CM-6(a) PR.AC-7 FMT_MOF_EXT.1 8.6.1 SRG-OS-000163-GPOS-00072 SRG-OS-000029-GPOS-00010 4.5.3.2 Terminating an idle session within a short time period reduces the window of opportunity for unauthorized personnel to take control of a management session enabled on the console or console port that has been left unattended. CCE-80673-7 - name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_tmout # promote to variable set_fact: var_accounts_tmout: !!str tags: - always - name: Correct any occurrence of TMOUT in /etc/profile replace: path: /etc/profile regexp: ^[^#].*TMOUT=.* replace: typeset -xr TMOUT={{ var_accounts_tmout }} register: profile_replaced when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80673-7 - NIST-800-171-3.1.11 - NIST-800-53-AC-12 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(5) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-10 - PCI-DSSv4-8.6.1 - accounts_tmout - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Set Interactive Session Timeout lineinfile: path: /etc/profile.d/tmout.sh create: true regexp: TMOUT= line: typeset -xr TMOUT={{ var_accounts_tmout }} state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80673-7 - NIST-800-171-3.1.11 - NIST-800-53-AC-12 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(5) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-10 - PCI-DSSv4-8.6.1 - accounts_tmout - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then var_accounts_tmout='' # if 0, no occurence of tmout found, if 1, occurence found tmout_found=0 for f in /etc/profile /etc/profile.d/*.sh; do if grep --silent '^[^#].*TMOUT' $f; then sed -i -E "s/^(.*)TMOUT\s*=\s*(\w|\$)*(.*)$/typeset -xr TMOUT=$var_accounts_tmout\3/g" $f tmout_found=1 fi done if [ $tmout_found -eq 0 ]; then echo -e "\n# Set TMOUT to $var_accounts_tmout per security requirements" >> /etc/profile.d/tmout.sh echo "typeset -xr TMOUT=$var_accounts_tmout" >> /etc/profile.d/tmout.sh fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi User Initialization Files Must Be Group-Owned By The Primary Group Change the group owner of interactive users files to the group found in /etc/passwd for the user. To change the group owner of a local interactive user home directory, use the following command: $ sudo chgrp USER_GROUP /home/USER/.INIT_FILE This rule ensures every initialization file related to an interactive user is group-owned by an interactive user. Due to OVAL limitation, this rule can report a false negative in a specific situation where two interactive users swap the group-ownership of their respective initialization files. CCI-000366 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 6.2.11 Local initialization files for interactive users are used to configure the user's shell environment upon logon. Malicious modification of these files could compromise accounts upon logon. CCE-86314-2 - name: Ensure interactive local users are the group-owners of their respective initialization files ansible.builtin.command: cmd: awk -F':' '{ if ($3 >= 1000 && $3 != 65534) system("chgrp -f " $4" "$6"/.[^\.]?*") }' /etc/passwd tags: - CCE-86314-2 - accounts_user_dot_group_ownership - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy awk -F':' '{ if ($3 >= 1000 && $3 != 65534) system("chgrp -f " $4" "$6"/.[^\.]?*") }' /etc/passwd User Initialization Files Must Not Run World-Writable Programs Set the mode on files being executed by the user initialization files with the following command: $ sudo chmod o-w FILE CCI-000366 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010660 6.2.12 SV-230309r627750_rule If user start-up files execute world-writable programs, especially in unprotected directories, they could be maliciously modified to destroy user files or otherwise compromise the system at the user level. If the system is compromised at the user level, it is easier to elevate privileges to eventually compromise the system at the root and network level. CCE-84039-7 readarray -t world_writable_files < <(find / -xdev -type f -perm -0002 2> /dev/null) readarray -t interactive_home_dirs < <(awk -F':' '{ if ($3 >= 1000 && $3 != 65534) print $6 }' /etc/passwd) for world_writable in "${world_writable_files[@]}"; do for homedir in "${interactive_home_dirs[@]}"; do if grep -q -d skip "$world_writable" "$homedir"/.*; then chmod o-w $world_writable break fi done done User Initialization Files Must Be Owned By the Primary User Set the owner of the user initialization files for interactive users to the primary owner with the following command: $ sudo chown USER /home/USER/.* This rule ensures every initialization file related to an interactive user is owned by an interactive user. Due to OVAL limitation, this rule can report a false negative in a specific situation where two interactive users swap the ownership of their respective initialization files. CCI-000366 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 6.2.11 Local initialization files are used to configure the user's shell environment upon logon. Malicious modification of these files could compromise accounts upon logon. CCE-86316-7 - name: Ensure interactive local users are the owners of their respective initialization files ansible.builtin.command: cmd: awk -F':' '{ if ($3 >= 1000 && $3 != 65534) system("chown -f " $3" "$6"/.[^\.]?*") }' /etc/passwd tags: - CCE-86316-7 - accounts_user_dot_user_ownership - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy awk -F':' '{ if ($3 >= 1000 && $3 != 65534) system("chown -f " $3" "$6"/.[^\.]?*") }' /etc/passwd Ensure that Users Path Contains Only Local Directories Ensure that all interactive user initialization files executable search path statements do not contain statements that will reference a working directory other than the users home directory. CCI-000366 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010690 SV-230317r792896_rule The executable search path (typically the PATH environment variable) contains a list of directories for the shell to search to find executables. If this path includes the current working directory (other than the users home directory), executables in these directories may be executed instead of system commands. This variable is formatted as a colon-separated list of directories. If there is an empty entry, such as a leading or trailing colon or two consecutive colons, this is interpreted as the current working directory. If deviations from the default system search path for the local interactive user are required, they must be documented with the Information System Security Officer (ISSO). CCE-84040-5 All Interactive Users Must Have A Home Directory Defined Assign home directories to all interactive users that currently do not have a home directory assigned. This rule checks if the home directory is properly defined in a folder which has at least one parent folder, like "user" in "/home/user" or "/remote/users/user". Therefore, this rule will report a finding for home directories like /users, /tmp or /. CCI-000366 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010720 SV-230320r627750_rule If local interactive users are not assigned a valid home directory, there is no place for the storage and control of files they should own. CCE-84036-3 - name: Get all local users from /etc/passwd ansible.builtin.getent: database: passwd split: ':' tags: - CCE-84036-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010720 - accounts_user_interactive_home_directory_defined - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Create local_users variable from the getent output ansible.builtin.set_fact: local_users: '{{ ansible_facts.getent_passwd|dict2items }}' tags: - CCE-84036-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010720 - accounts_user_interactive_home_directory_defined - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure interactive users have an exclusive home directory defined ansible.builtin.user: name: '{{ item.key }}' home: /home/{{ item.key }} create_home: false loop: '{{ local_users }}' when: - item.value[2]|int >= 1000 - item.value[2]|int != 65534 - not item.value[4] | regex_search('^\/\w*\/\w{1,}') tags: - CCE-84036-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010720 - accounts_user_interactive_home_directory_defined - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy for user in $(awk -F':' '{ if ($3 >= 1000 && $3 != 65534) print $1 }' /etc/passwd); do # This follows the same logic of evaluation of home directories as used in OVAL. if ! grep -q $user /etc/passwd | cut -d: -f6 | grep '^\/\w*\/\w\{1,\}'; then sed -i "s/\($user:x:[0-9]*:[0-9]*:.*:\).*\(:.*\)$/\1\/home\/$user\2/g" /etc/passwd; fi done All Interactive Users Home Directories Must Exist Create home directories to all local interactive users that currently do not have a home directory assigned. Use the following commands to create the user home directory assigned in /etc/passwd: $ sudo mkdir /home/USER CCI-000366 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010750 6.2.10 SV-230323r627750_rule If a local interactive user has a home directory defined that does not exist, the user may be given access to the / directory as the current working directory upon logon. This could create a Denial of Service because the user would not be able to access their logon configuration files, and it may give them visibility to system files they normally would not be able to access. CCE-83424-2 - name: Get all local users from /etc/passwd ansible.builtin.getent: database: passwd split: ':' tags: - CCE-83424-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010750 - accounts_user_interactive_home_directory_exists - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Create local_users variable from the getent output ansible.builtin.set_fact: local_users: '{{ ansible_facts.getent_passwd|dict2items }}' tags: - CCE-83424-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010750 - accounts_user_interactive_home_directory_exists - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure interactive users have a home directory exists ansible.builtin.user: name: '{{ item.key }}' create_home: true loop: '{{ local_users }}' when: - item.value[2]|int >= 1000 - item.value[2]|int != 65534 tags: - CCE-83424-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010750 - accounts_user_interactive_home_directory_exists - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy for user in $(awk -F':' '{ if ($3 >= 1000 && $3 != 65534) print $1}' /etc/passwd); do mkhomedir_helper $user 0077; done All User Files and Directories In The Home Directory Must Be Group-Owned By The Primary Group Change the group of a local interactive users files and directories to a group that the interactive user is a member of. To change the group owner of a local interactive users files and directories, use the following command: $ sudo chgrp USER_GROUP /home/USER/FILE_DIR This rule ensures every file or directory under the home directory related to an interactive user is group-owned by an interactive user. Due to OVAL limitation, this rule can report a false negative in a specific situation where two interactive users swap the group-ownership of folders or files in their respective home directories. CCI-000366 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010741 SV-244532r743845_rule If a local interactive users files are group-owned by a group of which the user is not a member, unintended users may be able to access them. CCE-86534-5 - name: Get all local users from /etc/passwd ansible.builtin.getent: database: passwd split: ':' tags: - CCE-86534-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010741 - accounts_users_home_files_groupownership - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Create local_users variable from the getent output ansible.builtin.set_fact: local_users: '{{ ansible_facts.getent_passwd|dict2items }}' tags: - CCE-86534-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010741 - accounts_users_home_files_groupownership - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Test for existence of home directories to avoid creating them, but only fixing ownership ansible.builtin.stat: path: '{{ item.value[4] }}' register: path_exists loop: '{{ local_users }}' when: - item.value[1]|int >= 1000 - item.value[1]|int != 65534 tags: - CCE-86534-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010741 - accounts_users_home_files_groupownership - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure interactive local users are the owners of their respective home directories ansible.builtin.file: path: '{{ item.0.value[4] }}' group: '{{ item.0.value[2] }}' recurse: true loop: '{{ local_users|zip(path_exists.results)|list }}' when: item.1.stat is defined and item.1.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86534-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010741 - accounts_users_home_files_groupownership - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy for user in $(awk -F':' '{ if ($3 >= 1000 && $3 != 65534) print $1 }' /etc/passwd); do home_dir=$(getent passwd $user | cut -d: -f6) group=$(getent passwd $user | cut -d: -f4) # Only update the group-ownership when necessary. This will avoid changing the inode timestamp # when the group is already defined as expected, therefore not impacting in possible integrity # check systems that also check inodes timestamps. find $home_dir -not -group $group -exec chgrp -f $group {} \; done All User Files and Directories In The Home Directory Must Have a Valid Owner Either remove all files and directories from the system that do not have a valid user, or assign a valid user to all unowned files and directories. To assign a valid owner to a local interactive user's files and directories, use the following command: $ sudo chown -R USER /home/USER This rule ensures every file or directory under the home directory related to an interactive user is owned by an interactive user. Due to OVAL limitation, this rule can report a false negative in a specific situation where two interactive users swap the ownership of folders or files in their respective home directories. CCI-000366 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 6.2.8 If local interactive users do not own the files in their directories, unauthorized users may be able to access them. Additionally, if files are not owned by the user, this could be an indication of system compromise. - name: Get all local users from /etc/passwd ansible.builtin.getent: database: passwd split: ':' tags: - accounts_users_home_files_ownership - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Create local_users variable from the getent output ansible.builtin.set_fact: local_users: '{{ ansible_facts.getent_passwd|dict2items }}' tags: - accounts_users_home_files_ownership - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Test for existence of home directories to avoid creating them, but only fixing ownership ansible.builtin.stat: path: '{{ item.value[4] }}' register: path_exists loop: '{{ local_users }}' when: - item.value[1]|int >= 1000 - item.value[1]|int != 65534 tags: - accounts_users_home_files_ownership - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure interactive local users are the owners of their respective home directories ansible.builtin.file: path: '{{ item.0.value[4] }}' owner: '{{ item.0.value[1] }}' recurse: true loop: '{{ local_users|zip(path_exists.results)|list }}' when: item.1.stat is defined and item.1.stat.exists tags: - accounts_users_home_files_ownership - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy for user in $(awk -F':' '{ if ($3 >= 1000 && $3 != 65534) print $1 }' /etc/passwd); do home_dir=$(getent passwd $user | cut -d: -f6) # Only update the ownership when necessary. This will avoid changing the inode timestamp # when the owner is already defined as expected, therefore not impacting in possible integrity # check systems that also check inodes timestamps. find $home_dir -not -user $user -exec chown -f $user {} \; done All User Files and Directories In The Home Directory Must Have Mode 0750 Or Less Permissive Set the mode on files and directories in the local interactive user home directory with the following command: $ sudo chmod 0750 /home/USER/FILE_DIR Files that begin with a "." are excluded from this requirement. CCI-000366 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010731 SV-244531r743842_rule If a local interactive user files have excessive permissions, unintended users may be able to access or modify them. CCE-85888-6 - name: Get all local users from /etc/passwd ansible.builtin.getent: database: passwd split: ':' tags: - CCE-85888-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010731 - accounts_users_home_files_permissions - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Create local_users variable from the getent output ansible.builtin.set_fact: local_users: '{{ ansible_facts.getent_passwd|dict2items }}' tags: - CCE-85888-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010731 - accounts_users_home_files_permissions - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Test for existence home directories to avoid creating them. ansible.builtin.stat: path: '{{ item.value[4] }}' register: path_exists loop: '{{ local_users }}' when: - item.value[1]|int >= 1000 - item.value[1]|int != 65534 tags: - CCE-85888-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010731 - accounts_users_home_files_permissions - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure interactive local users have proper permissions on their respective home directories ansible.builtin.file: path: '{{ item.0.value[4] }}' mode: u-s,g-w-s,o=- follow: false recurse: true loop: '{{ local_users|zip(path_exists.results)|list }}' when: item.1.stat is defined and item.1.stat.exists tags: - CCE-85888-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010731 - accounts_users_home_files_permissions - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy for home_dir in $(awk -F':' '{ if ($3 >= 1000 && $3 != 65534) print $6 }' /etc/passwd); do # Only update the permissions when necessary. This will avoid changing the inode timestamp when # the permission is already defined as expected, therefore not impacting in possible integrity # check systems that also check inodes timestamps. find "$home_dir" -perm /7027 -exec chmod u-s,g-w-s,o=- {} \; done Ensure users' .netrc Files are not group or world accessible While the system administrator can establish secure permissions for users' .netrc files, the users can easily override these. This rule ensures every .netrc file or directory under the home directory related to an interactive user is not group or world accessible 6.2.11 .netrc files may contain unencrypted passwords that may be used to attack other systems. Note: While the complete removal of .netrc files is recommended, if any are required on the system, secure permissions must be applied. CCE-87369-5 - name: Get all local users from /etc/passwd ansible.builtin.getent: database: passwd split: ':' tags: - CCE-87369-5 - accounts_users_netrc_file_permissions - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Create local_users variable from the getent output ansible.builtin.set_fact: local_users: '{{ ansible_facts.getent_passwd|dict2items }}' tags: - CCE-87369-5 - accounts_users_netrc_file_permissions - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Test for existence of .netrc file in home directories to avoid creating them, but only fixing permissions ansible.builtin.stat: path: '{{ item.value[4] }}/.netrc' register: path_exists loop: '{{ local_users }}' when: - item.value[1]|int >= 1000 - item.value[1]|int != 65534 tags: - CCE-87369-5 - accounts_users_netrc_file_permissions - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure group and world cannot access respective .netrc files ansible.builtin.file: path: '{{ item.item.value[4] }}/.netrc' mode: '0600' state: file loop: '{{ path_exists.results }}' when: item.stat is defined and item.stat.exists tags: - CCE-87369-5 - accounts_users_netrc_file_permissions - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy for user in $(awk -F':' '{ if ($3 >= 1000 && $3 != 65534) print $1 }' /etc/passwd); do home_dir=$(getent passwd "$user" | cut -d: -f6) find "${home_dir}/.netrc" -exec chmod 0600 {} \; done All Interactive User Home Directories Must Be Group-Owned By The Primary Group Change the group owner of interactive users home directory to the group found in /etc/passwd. To change the group owner of interactive users home directory, use the following command: $ sudo chgrp USER_GROUP /home/USER This rule ensures every home directory related to an interactive user is group-owned by an interactive user. It also ensures that interactive users are group-owners of one and only one home directory. Due to OVAL limitation, this rule can report a false negative in a specific situation where two interactive users swap the group-ownership of their respective home directories. CCI-000366 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010740 6.2.10 SV-230322r880717_rule If the Group Identifier (GID) of a local interactive users home directory is not the same as the primary GID of the user, this would allow unauthorized access to the users files, and users that share the same group may not be able to access files that they legitimately should. CCE-83434-1 - name: Get all local users from /etc/passwd ansible.builtin.getent: database: passwd split: ':' tags: - CCE-83434-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010740 - file_groupownership_home_directories - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Create local_users variable from the getent output ansible.builtin.set_fact: local_users: '{{ ansible_facts.getent_passwd|dict2items }}' tags: - CCE-83434-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010740 - file_groupownership_home_directories - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Test for existence of home directories to avoid creating them, but only fixing group ownership ansible.builtin.stat: path: '{{ item.value[4] }}' register: path_exists loop: '{{ local_users }}' when: - item.value[1]|int >= 1000 - item.value[1]|int != 65534 tags: - CCE-83434-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010740 - file_groupownership_home_directories - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure interactive local users are the group-owners of their respective home directories ansible.builtin.file: path: '{{ item.0.value[4] }}' group: '{{ item.0.value[2] }}' loop: '{{ local_users|zip(path_exists.results)|list }}' when: item.1.stat is defined and item.1.stat.exists tags: - CCE-83434-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010740 - file_groupownership_home_directories - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy awk -F':' '{ if ($3 >= 1000 && $3 != 65534) system("chgrp -f " $4" "$6) }' /etc/passwd All Interactive User Home Directories Must Be Owned By The Primary User Change the owner of interactive users home directories to that correct owner. To change the owner of a interactive users home directory, use the following command: $ sudo chown USER /home/USER This rule ensures every home directory related to an interactive user is owned by an interactive user. It also ensures that interactive users are owners of one and only one home directory. Due to OVAL limitation, this rule can report a false negative in a specific situation where two interactive users swap the ownership of their respective home directories. CCI-000366 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 6.2.10 If a local interactive user does not own their home directory, unauthorized users could access or modify the user's files, and the users may not be able to access their own files. CCE-86131-0 - name: Get all local users from /etc/passwd ansible.builtin.getent: database: passwd split: ':' tags: - CCE-86131-0 - file_ownership_home_directories - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Create local_users variable from the getent output ansible.builtin.set_fact: local_users: '{{ ansible_facts.getent_passwd|dict2items }}' tags: - CCE-86131-0 - file_ownership_home_directories - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Test for existence of home directories to avoid creating them, but only fixing ownership ansible.builtin.stat: path: '{{ item.value[4] }}' register: path_exists loop: '{{ local_users }}' when: - item.value[1]|int >= 1000 - item.value[1]|int != 65534 tags: - CCE-86131-0 - file_ownership_home_directories - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure interactive local users are the owners of their respective home directories ansible.builtin.file: path: '{{ item.0.value[4] }}' owner: '{{ item.0.value[1] }}' loop: '{{ local_users|zip(path_exists.results)|list }}' when: item.1.stat is defined and item.1.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86131-0 - file_ownership_home_directories - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy awk -F':' '{ if ($3 >= 1000 && $3 != 65534) system("chown -f " $3" "$6) }' /etc/passwd Ensure All User Initialization Files Have Mode 0740 Or Less Permissive Set the mode of the user initialization files to 0740 with the following command: $ sudo chmod 0740 /home/USER/.INIT_FILE CCI-000366 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010770 6.2.11 SV-230325r917879_rule Local initialization files are used to configure the user's shell environment upon logon. Malicious modification of these files could compromise accounts upon logon. CCE-84043-9 - name: XCCDF Value var_user_initialization_files_regex # promote to variable set_fact: var_user_initialization_files_regex: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure All User Initialization Files Have Mode 0740 Or Less Permissive - Gather User Info ansible.builtin.getent: database: passwd tags: - CCE-84043-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010770 - file_permission_user_init_files - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure All User Initialization Files Have Mode 0740 Or Less Permissive - Find Init Files ansible.builtin.find: paths: '{{ item.value[4] }}' pattern: '{{ var_user_initialization_files_regex }}' hidden: true use_regex: true with_dict: '{{ ansible_facts.getent_passwd }}' when: - item.value[4] != "/sbin/nologin" - item.key not in ["nobody", "nfsnobody"] - item.value[1] | int >= 1000 register: found_init_files tags: - CCE-84043-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010770 - file_permission_user_init_files - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure All User Initialization Files Have Mode 0740 Or Less Permissive - Fix Init Files Permissions ansible.builtin.file: path: '{{ item.1.path }}' mode: u-s,g-wxs,o= loop: '{{ q(''ansible.builtin.subelements'', found_init_files.results, ''files'', {''skip_missing'': True}) }}' tags: - CCE-84043-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010770 - file_permission_user_init_files - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy var_user_initialization_files_regex='' readarray -t interactive_users < <(awk -F: '$3>=1000 {print $1}' /etc/passwd) readarray -t interactive_users_home < <(awk -F: '$3>=1000 {print $6}' /etc/passwd) readarray -t interactive_users_shell < <(awk -F: '$3>=1000 {print $7}' /etc/passwd) USERS_IGNORED_REGEX='nobody|nfsnobody' for (( i=0; i<"${#interactive_users[@]}"; i++ )); do if ! grep -qP "$USERS_IGNORED_REGEX" <<< "${interactive_users[$i]}" && \ [ "${interactive_users_shell[$i]}" != "/sbin/nologin" ]; then readarray -t init_files < <(find "${interactive_users_home[$i]}" -maxdepth 1 \ -exec basename {} \; | grep -P "$var_user_initialization_files_regex") for file in "${init_files[@]}"; do chmod u-s,g-wxs,o= "${interactive_users_home[$i]}/$file" done fi done All Interactive User Home Directories Must Have mode 0750 Or Less Permissive Change the mode of interactive users home directories to 0750. To change the mode of interactive users home directory, use the following command: $ sudo chmod 0750 /home/USER CCI-000366 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010730 6.2.10 SV-230321r627750_rule Excessive permissions on local interactive user home directories may allow unauthorized access to user files by other users. CCE-84038-9 - name: Get all local users from /etc/passwd ansible.builtin.getent: database: passwd split: ':' tags: - CCE-84038-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010730 - file_permissions_home_directories - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Create local_users variable from the getent output ansible.builtin.set_fact: local_users: '{{ ansible_facts.getent_passwd|dict2items }}' tags: - CCE-84038-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010730 - file_permissions_home_directories - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Test for existence home directories to avoid creating them. ansible.builtin.stat: path: '{{ item.value[4] }}' register: path_exists loop: '{{ local_users }}' when: - item.value[1]|int >= 1000 - item.value[1]|int != 65534 tags: - CCE-84038-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010730 - file_permissions_home_directories - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure interactive local users have proper permissions on their respective home directories ansible.builtin.file: path: '{{ item.0.value[4] }}' mode: u-s,g-w-s,o=- follow: false recurse: false loop: '{{ local_users|zip(path_exists.results)|list }}' when: item.1.stat is defined and item.1.stat.exists tags: - CCE-84038-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010730 - file_permissions_home_directories - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy for home_dir in $(awk -F':' '{ if ($3 >= 1000 && $3 != 65534) print $6 }' /etc/passwd); do # Only update the permissions when necessary. This will avoid changing the inode timestamp when # the permission is already defined as expected, therefore not impacting in possible integrity # check systems that also check inodes timestamps. find "$home_dir" -maxdepth 0 -perm /7027 -exec chmod u-s,g-w-s,o=- {} \; done Ensure that User Home Directories are not Group-Writable or World-Readable For each human user of the system, view the permissions of the user's home directory: # ls -ld /home/USER Ensure that the directory is not group-writable and that it is not world-readable. If necessary, repair the permissions: # chmod g-w /home/USER # chmod o-rwx /home/USER This action may involve modifying user home directories. Notify your user community, and solicit input if appropriate, before making this type of change. This rule is deprecated in favor of the file_permissions_home_directories rule.Please consider replacing this rule in your files as it is not expected to receive updates as of version 0.1.62. 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 CCI-000225 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) CM-6(a) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 User home directories contain many configuration files which affect the behavior of a user's account. No user should ever have write permission to another user's home directory. Group shared directories can be configured in sub-directories or elsewhere in the filesystem if they are needed. Typically, user home directories should not be world-readable, as it would disclose file names to other users. If a subset of users need read access to one another's home directories, this can be provided using groups or ACLs. CCE-84274-0 - name: Get all local users from /etc/passwd ansible.builtin.getent: database: passwd split: ':' tags: - CCE-84274-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - file_permissions_home_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Create local_users variable from the getent output ansible.builtin.set_fact: local_users: '{{ ansible_facts.getent_passwd|dict2items }}' tags: - CCE-84274-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - file_permissions_home_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Test for existence home directories to avoid creating them. ansible.builtin.stat: path: '{{ item.value[4] }}' register: path_exists loop: '{{ local_users }}' when: - item.value[1]|int >= 1000 - item.value[1]|int != 65534 tags: - CCE-84274-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - file_permissions_home_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure interactive local users have proper permissions on their respective home directories ansible.builtin.file: path: '{{ item.0.value[4] }}' mode: u-s,g-w-s,o=- follow: false recurse: false loop: '{{ local_users|zip(path_exists.results)|list }}' when: item.1.stat is defined and item.1.stat.exists tags: - CCE-84274-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - file_permissions_home_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy for home_dir in $(awk -F':' '{ if ($3 >= 1000 && $3 != 65534) print $6 }' /etc/passwd); do # Only update the permissions when necessary. This will avoid changing the inode timestamp when # the permission is already defined as expected, therefore not impacting in possible integrity # check systems that also check inodes timestamps. find "$home_dir" -maxdepth 0 -perm /7027 -exec chmod u-s,g-w-s,o=- {} \; done Ensure that No Dangerous Directories Exist in Root's Path The active path of the root account can be obtained by starting a new root shell and running: # echo $PATH This will produce a colon-separated list of directories in the path. Certain path elements could be considered dangerous, as they could lead to root executing unknown or untrusted programs, which could contain malicious code. Since root may sometimes work inside untrusted directories, the . character, which represents the current directory, should never be in the root path, nor should any directory which can be written to by an unprivileged or semi-privileged (system) user. It is a good practice for administrators to always execute privileged commands by typing the full path to the command. Ensure that Root's Path Does Not Include World or Group-Writable Directories For each element in root's path, run: # ls -ld DIR and ensure that write permissions are disabled for group and other. 11 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 CCI-000366 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 CM-6(a) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 6.2.8 Such entries increase the risk that root could execute code provided by unprivileged users, and potentially malicious code. CCE-80672-9 - name: Get root paths which are not symbolic links stat: path: '{{ item }}' changed_when: false failed_when: false register: root_paths with_items: '{{ ansible_env.PATH.split('':'') }}' tags: - CCE-80672-9 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - accounts_root_path_dirs_no_write - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Disable writability to root directories file: path: '{{ item.item }}' mode: g-w,o-w with_items: '{{ root_paths.results }}' when: - root_paths.results is defined - item.stat.exists - not item.stat.islnk tags: - CCE-80672-9 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - accounts_root_path_dirs_no_write - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy Ensure that Root's Path Does Not Include Relative Paths or Null Directories Ensure that none of the directories in root's path is equal to a single . character, or that it contains any instances that lead to relative path traversal, such as .. or beginning a path without the slash (/) character. Also ensure that there are no "empty" elements in the path, such as in these examples: PATH=:/bin PATH=/bin: PATH=/bin::/sbin These empty elements have the same effect as a single . character. 11 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 CCI-000366 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 CM-6(a) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 6.2.8 Including these entries increases the risk that root could execute code from an untrusted location. CCE-85914-0 Ensure that Users Have Sensible Umask Values The umask setting controls the default permissions for the creation of new files. With a default umask setting of 077, files and directories created by users will not be readable by any other user on the system. Users who wish to make specific files group- or world-readable can accomplish this by using the chmod command. Additionally, users can make all their files readable to their group by default by setting a umask of 027 in their shell configuration files. If default per-user groups exist (that is, if every user has a default group whose name is the same as that user's username and whose only member is the user), then it may even be safe for users to select a umask of 007, making it very easy to intentionally share files with groups of which the user is a member. Sensible umask Enter default user umask 007 022 027 077 027 Ensure the Default Bash Umask is Set Correctly To ensure the default umask for users of the Bash shell is set properly, add or correct the umask setting in /etc/bashrc to read as follows: umask BP28(R35) 18 APO13.01 BAI03.01 BAI03.02 BAI03.03 CCI-000366 4.3.4.3.3 A.14.1.1 A.14.2.1 A.14.2.5 A.6.1.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 AC-6(1) CM-6(a) PR.IP-2 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00228 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-020353 4.5.3.3 SV-230385r792902_rule The umask value influences the permissions assigned to files when they are created. A misconfigured umask value could result in files with excessive permissions that can be read or written to by unauthorized users. CCE-81036-6 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-81036-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020353 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - accounts_umask_etc_bashrc - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_user_umask # promote to variable set_fact: var_accounts_user_umask: !!str tags: - always - name: Check if umask in /etc/bashrc is already set ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/bashrc regexp: ^(\s*)umask\s+.* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: umask_replace when: '"bash" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-81036-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020353 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - accounts_umask_etc_bashrc - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Replace user umask in /etc/bashrc ansible.builtin.replace: path: /etc/bashrc regexp: ^(\s*)umask(\s+).* replace: \g<1>umask\g<2>{{ var_accounts_user_umask }} when: - '"bash" in ansible_facts.packages' - umask_replace.found > 0 tags: - CCE-81036-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020353 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - accounts_umask_etc_bashrc - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure the Default umask is Appended Correctly ansible.builtin.lineinfile: create: true path: /etc/bashrc line: umask {{ var_accounts_user_umask }} when: - '"bash" in ansible_facts.packages' - umask_replace.found == 0 tags: - CCE-81036-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020353 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - accounts_umask_etc_bashrc - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q bash; then var_accounts_user_umask='' grep -q "^\s*umask" /etc/bashrc && \ sed -i -E -e "s/^(\s*umask).*/\1 $var_accounts_user_umask/g" /etc/bashrc if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then echo "umask $var_accounts_user_umask" >> /etc/bashrc fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure the Default C Shell Umask is Set Correctly To ensure the default umask for users of the C shell is set properly, add or correct the umask setting in /etc/csh.cshrc to read as follows: umask 18 APO13.01 BAI03.01 BAI03.02 BAI03.03 CCI-000366 4.3.4.3.3 A.14.1.1 A.14.2.1 A.14.2.5 A.6.1.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 AC-6(1) CM-6(a) PR.IP-2 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00228 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-020353 SV-230385r792902_rule The umask value influences the permissions assigned to files when they are created. A misconfigured umask value could result in files with excessive permissions that can be read or written to by unauthorized users. CCE-81037-4 - name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_user_umask # promote to variable set_fact: var_accounts_user_umask: !!str tags: - always - name: Check if umask in /etc/csh.cshrc is already set ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/csh.cshrc regexp: ^(\s*)umask\s+.* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: umask_replace tags: - CCE-81037-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020353 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - accounts_umask_etc_csh_cshrc - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Replace user umask in /etc/csh.cshrc ansible.builtin.replace: path: /etc/csh.cshrc regexp: ^(\s*)umask(\s+).* replace: \g<1>umask\g<2>{{ var_accounts_user_umask }} when: umask_replace.found > 0 tags: - CCE-81037-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020353 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - accounts_umask_etc_csh_cshrc - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure the Default umask is Appended Correctly ansible.builtin.lineinfile: create: true path: /etc/csh.cshrc line: umask {{ var_accounts_user_umask }} when: umask_replace.found == 0 tags: - CCE-81037-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020353 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - accounts_umask_etc_csh_cshrc - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy var_accounts_user_umask='' grep -q "^\s*umask" /etc/csh.cshrc && \ sed -i -E -e "s/^(\s*umask).*/\1 $var_accounts_user_umask/g" /etc/csh.cshrc if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then echo "umask $var_accounts_user_umask" >> /etc/csh.cshrc fi Ensure the Default Umask is Set Correctly in login.defs To ensure the default umask controlled by /etc/login.defs is set properly, add or correct the UMASK setting in /etc/login.defs to read as follows: UMASK BP28(R35) 11 18 3 9 APO13.01 BAI03.01 BAI03.02 BAI03.03 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 CCI-000366 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.1.1 A.14.2.1 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.14.2.5 A.6.1.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 AC-6(1) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.IP-2 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00228 RHEL-08-020351 4.5.3.3 SV-230383r627750_rule The umask value influences the permissions assigned to files when they are created. A misconfigured umask value could result in files with excessive permissions that can be read and written to by unauthorized users. CCE-82888-9 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-82888-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020351 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - accounts_umask_etc_login_defs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_user_umask # promote to variable set_fact: var_accounts_user_umask: !!str tags: - always - name: Check if UMASK is already set ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/login.defs regexp: ^(\s*)UMASK\s+.* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_umask_is_set when: '"shadow-utils" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-82888-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020351 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - accounts_umask_etc_login_defs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Replace user UMASK in /etc/login.defs ansible.builtin.replace: path: /etc/login.defs regexp: ^(\s*)UMASK(\s+).* replace: \g<1>UMASK\g<2>{{ var_accounts_user_umask }} when: - '"shadow-utils" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_umask_is_set.found > 0 tags: - CCE-82888-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020351 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - accounts_umask_etc_login_defs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure the Default UMASK is Appended Correctly ansible.builtin.lineinfile: create: true path: /etc/login.defs line: UMASK {{ var_accounts_user_umask }} when: - '"shadow-utils" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_umask_is_set.found == 0 tags: - CCE-82888-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020351 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - accounts_umask_etc_login_defs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q shadow-utils; then var_accounts_user_umask='' # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^UMASK") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_accounts_user_umask" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^UMASK\\>" "/etc/login.defs"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^UMASK\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/login.defs" else if [[ -s "/etc/login.defs" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/login.defs" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/login.defs" fi cce="CCE-82888-9" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "/etc/login.defs" >> "/etc/login.defs" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/login.defs" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure the Default Umask is Set Correctly in /etc/profile To ensure the default umask controlled by /etc/profile is set properly, add or correct the umask setting in /etc/profile to read as follows: umask Note that /etc/profile also reads scrips within /etc/profile.d directory. These scripts are also valid files to set umask value. Therefore, they should also be considered during the check and properly remediated, if necessary. BP28(R35) 18 APO13.01 BAI03.01 BAI03.02 BAI03.03 CCI-000366 4.3.4.3.3 A.14.1.1 A.14.2.1 A.14.2.5 A.6.1.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 AC-6(1) CM-6(a) PR.IP-2 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00228 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-020353 4.5.3.3 SV-230385r792902_rule The umask value influences the permissions assigned to files when they are created. A misconfigured umask value could result in files with excessive permissions that can be read or written to by unauthorized users. CCE-81035-8 - name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_user_umask # promote to variable set_fact: var_accounts_user_umask: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure the Default Umask is Set Correctly in /etc/profile - Locate Profile Configuration Files Where umask Is Defined ansible.builtin.find: paths: - /etc/profile.d patterns: - sh.local - '*.sh' contains: ^[\s]*umask\s+\d+ register: result_profile_d_files tags: - CCE-81035-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020353 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - accounts_umask_etc_profile - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure the Default Umask is Set Correctly in /etc/profile - Replace Existing umask Value in Files From /etc/profile.d ansible.builtin.replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^(\s*)umask\s+\d+ replace: \1umask {{ var_accounts_user_umask }} loop: '{{ result_profile_d_files.files }}' register: result_umask_replaced_profile_d when: result_profile_d_files.matched tags: - CCE-81035-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020353 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - accounts_umask_etc_profile - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure the Default Umask is Set Correctly in /etc/profile - Ensure umask Is Set in /etc/profile if Not Already Set Elsewhere ansible.builtin.lineinfile: create: true mode: 420 path: /etc/profile line: umask {{ var_accounts_user_umask }} when: not result_profile_d_files.matched tags: - CCE-81035-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020353 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - accounts_umask_etc_profile - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure the Default Umask is Set Correctly in /etc/profile - Ensure umask Value For All Existing umask Definition in /etc/profile ansible.builtin.replace: path: /etc/profile regexp: ^(\s*)umask\s+\d+ replace: \1umask {{ var_accounts_user_umask }} register: result_umask_replaced_profile tags: - CCE-81035-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020353 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - accounts_umask_etc_profile - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy var_accounts_user_umask='' readarray -t profile_files < <(find /etc/profile.d/ -type f -name '*.sh' -or -name 'sh.local') for file in "${profile_files[@]}" /etc/profile; do grep -qE '^[^#]*umask' "$file" && sed -i -E "s/^(\s*umask\s*)[0-7]+/\1$var_accounts_user_umask/g" "$file" done if ! grep -qrE '^[^#]*umask' /etc/profile*; then echo "umask $var_accounts_user_umask" >> /etc/profile fi Ensure the Default Umask is Set Correctly For Interactive Users Remove the UMASK environment variable from all interactive users initialization files. CCI-000366 CCI-001814 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00228 RHEL-08-020352 4.5.3.3 SV-230384r858732_rule The umask controls the default access mode assigned to newly created files. A umask of 077 limits new files to mode 700 or less permissive. Although umask can be represented as a four-digit number, the first digit representing special access modes is typically ignored or required to be 0. This requirement applies to the globally configured system defaults and the local interactive user defaults for each account on the system. CCE-84044-7 - name: Ensure interactive local users are the owners of their respective initialization files ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: |- for dir in $(awk -F':' '{ if ($3 >= 1000 && $3 != 65534) print $6}' /etc/passwd); do for file in $(find $dir -maxdepth 1 -type f -name ".*"); do if [ "$(basename $file)" != ".bash_history" ]; then sed -i 's/^\(\s*umask\s*\)/#\1/g' $file fi done done tags: - CCE-84044-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020352 - accounts_umask_interactive_users - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy while IFS= read -r dir; do while IFS= read -r -d '' file; do if [ "$(basename $file)" != ".bash_history" ]; then sed -i 's/^\(\s*umask\s*\)/#\1/g' "$file" fi done < <(find $dir -maxdepth 1 -type f -name ".*" -print0) done < <(awk -F':' '{ if ($3 >= 1000 && $3 != 65534) print $6}' /etc/passwd) System Accounting with auditd The audit service provides substantial capabilities for recording system activities. By default, the service audits about SELinux AVC denials and certain types of security-relevant events such as system logins, account modifications, and authentication events performed by programs such as sudo. Under its default configuration, auditd has modest disk space requirements, and should not noticeably impact system performance. NOTE: The Linux Audit daemon auditd can be configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules files (*.rules) located in /etc/audit/rules.d location and compile them to create the resulting form of the /etc/audit/audit.rules configuration file during the daemon startup (default configuration). Alternatively, the auditd daemon can use the auditctl utility to read audit rules from the /etc/audit/audit.rules configuration file during daemon startup, and load them into the kernel. The expected behavior is configured via the appropriate ExecStartPost directive setting in the /usr/lib/systemd/system/auditd.service configuration file. To instruct the auditd daemon to use the augenrules program to read audit rules (default configuration), use the following setting: ExecStartPost=-/sbin/augenrules --load in the /usr/lib/systemd/system/auditd.service configuration file. In order to instruct the auditd daemon to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules, use the following setting: ExecStartPost=-/sbin/auditctl -R /etc/audit/audit.rules in the /usr/lib/systemd/system/auditd.service configuration file. Refer to [Service] section of the /usr/lib/systemd/system/auditd.service configuration file for further details. Government networks often have substantial auditing requirements and auditd can be configured to meet these requirements. Examining some example audit records demonstrates how the Linux audit system satisfies common requirements. The following example from Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Documentation available at https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/7/html-single/selinux_users_and_administrators_guide/index#sect-Security-Enhanced_Linux-Fixing_Problems-Raw_Audit_Messages shows the substantial amount of information captured in a two typical "raw" audit messages, followed by a breakdown of the most important fields. In this example the message is SELinux-related and reports an AVC denial (and the associated system call) that occurred when the Apache HTTP Server attempted to access the /var/www/html/file1 file (labeled with the samba_share_t type): type=AVC msg=audit(1226874073.147:96): avc: denied { getattr } for pid=2465 comm="httpd" path="/var/www/html/file1" dev=dm-0 ino=284133 scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0 tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:samba_share_t:s0 tclass=file type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1226874073.147:96): arch=40000003 syscall=196 success=no exit=-13 a0=b98df198 a1=bfec85dc a2=54dff4 a3=2008171 items=0 ppid=2463 pid=2465 auid=502 uid=48 gid=48 euid=48 suid=48 fsuid=48 egid=48 sgid=48 fsgid=48 tty=(none) ses=6 comm="httpd" exe="/usr/sbin/httpd" subj=unconfined_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0 key=(null) msg=audit(1226874073.147:96)The number in parentheses is the unformatted time stamp (Epoch time) for the event, which can be converted to standard time by using the date command. { getattr }The item in braces indicates the permission that was denied. getattr indicates the source process was trying to read the target file's status information. This occurs before reading files. This action is denied due to the file being accessed having the wrong label. Commonly seen permissions include getattr, read, and write.comm="httpd"The executable that launched the process. The full path of the executable is found in the exe= section of the system call (SYSCALL) message, which in this case, is exe="/usr/sbin/httpd". path="/var/www/html/file1"The path to the object (target) the process attempted to access. scontext="unconfined_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0"The SELinux context of the process that attempted the denied action. In this case, it is the SELinux context of the Apache HTTP Server, which is running in the httpd_t domain. tcontext="unconfined_u:object_r:samba_share_t:s0"The SELinux context of the object (target) the process attempted to access. In this case, it is the SELinux context of file1. Note: the samba_share_t type is not accessible to processes running in the httpd_t domain. From the system call (SYSCALL) message, two items are of interest: success=no: indicates whether the denial (AVC) was enforced or not. success=no indicates the system call was not successful (SELinux denied access). success=yes indicates the system call was successful - this can be seen for permissive domains or unconfined domains, such as initrc_t and kernel_t. exe="/usr/sbin/httpd": the full path to the executable that launched the process, which in this case, is exe="/usr/sbin/httpd". Install audispd-plugins Package The audispd-plugins package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install audispd-plugins FMT_SMF_EXT.1 10.3.3 SRG-OS-000342-GPOS-00133 audispd-plugins provides plugins for the real-time interface to the audit subsystem, audispd. These plugins can do things like relay events to remote machines or analyze events for suspicious behavior. CCE-82953-1 - name: Ensure audispd-plugins is installed package: name: audispd-plugins state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82953-1 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.3 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_audispd-plugins_installed [[packages]] name = "audispd-plugins" version = "*" include install_audispd-plugins class install_audispd-plugins { package { 'audispd-plugins': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=audispd-plugins # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "audispd-plugins" ; then yum install -y "audispd-plugins" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure the default plugins for the audit dispatcher are Installed The audit-audispd-plugins package should be installed. CCI-001851 Req-10.5.3 10.3.3 SRG-OS-000342-GPOS-00133 Information stored in one location is vulnerable to accidental or incidental deletion or alteration. Off-loading is a common process in information systems with limited audit storage capacity. - name: Ensure audit-audispd-plugins is installed package: name: audit-audispd-plugins state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.3 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_audit-audispd-plugins_installed [[packages]] name = "audit-audispd-plugins" version = "*" include install_audit-audispd-plugins class install_audit-audispd-plugins { package { 'audit-audispd-plugins': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=audit-audispd-plugins # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "audit-audispd-plugins" ; then yum install -y "audit-audispd-plugins" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure the audit Subsystem is Installed The audit package should be installed. BP28(R33) BP28(R73) CCI-000130 CCI-000131 CCI-000132 CCI-000133 CCI-000134 CCI-000135 CCI-000154 CCI-000158 CCI-000172 CCI-001464 CCI-001487 CCI-001814 CCI-001875 CCI-001876 CCI-001877 CCI-001878 CCI-001879 CCI-001880 CCI-001881 CCI-001882 CCI-001889 CCI-001914 CCI-002884 CCI-000169 CIP-004-6 R3.3 CIP-007-3 R6.5 AC-7(a) AU-7(1) AU-7(2) AU-14 AU-12(2) AU-2(a) CM-6(a) FAU_GEN.1 Req-10.1 10.2.1 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000038-GPOS-00016 SRG-OS-000039-GPOS-00017 SRG-OS-000040-GPOS-00018 SRG-OS-000041-GPOS-00019 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00021 SRG-OS-000051-GPOS-00024 SRG-OS-000054-GPOS-00025 SRG-OS-000122-GPOS-00063 SRG-OS-000254-GPOS-00095 SRG-OS-000255-GPOS-00096 SRG-OS-000337-GPOS-00129 SRG-OS-000348-GPOS-00136 SRG-OS-000349-GPOS-00137 SRG-OS-000350-GPOS-00138 SRG-OS-000351-GPOS-00139 SRG-OS-000352-GPOS-00140 SRG-OS-000353-GPOS-00141 SRG-OS-000354-GPOS-00142 SRG-OS-000358-GPOS-00145 SRG-OS-000365-GPOS-00152 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000475-GPOS-00220 RHEL-08-030180 5.2.1.1 SV-230411r744000_rule The auditd service is an access monitoring and accounting daemon, watching system calls to audit any access, in comparison with potential local access control policy such as SELinux policy. CCE-81043-2 - name: Ensure audit is installed package: name: audit state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81043-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030180 - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(2) - NIST-800-53-AU-14 - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) - NIST-800-53-AU-7(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-7(2) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.1 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_audit_installed [[packages]] name = "audit" version = "*" include install_audit class install_audit { package { 'audit': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=audit # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "audit" ; then yum install -y "audit" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable auditd Service The auditd service is an essential userspace component of the Linux Auditing System, as it is responsible for writing audit records to disk. The auditd service can be enabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl enable auditd.service BP28(R33) BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 5.4.1.1 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.3.1 3.3.2 3.3.6 CCI-000126 CCI-000130 CCI-000131 CCI-000132 CCI-000133 CCI-000134 CCI-000135 CCI-000154 CCI-000158 CCI-000172 CCI-000366 CCI-001464 CCI-001487 CCI-001814 CCI-001875 CCI-001876 CCI-001877 CCI-002884 CCI-001878 CCI-001879 CCI-001880 CCI-001881 CCI-001882 CCI-001889 CCI-001914 CCI-000169 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.310(a)(2)(iv) 164.310(d)(2)(iii) 164.312(b) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 CIP-004-6 R3.3 CIP-007-3 R6.5 AC-2(g) AU-3 AU-10 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AU-14(1) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) SI-4(23) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1 Req-10.1 10.2.1 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000038-GPOS-00016 SRG-OS-000039-GPOS-00017 SRG-OS-000040-GPOS-00018 SRG-OS-000041-GPOS-00019 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00021 SRG-OS-000051-GPOS-00024 SRG-OS-000054-GPOS-00025 SRG-OS-000122-GPOS-00063 SRG-OS-000254-GPOS-00095 SRG-OS-000255-GPOS-00096 SRG-OS-000337-GPOS-00129 SRG-OS-000348-GPOS-00136 SRG-OS-000349-GPOS-00137 SRG-OS-000350-GPOS-00138 SRG-OS-000351-GPOS-00139 SRG-OS-000352-GPOS-00140 SRG-OS-000353-GPOS-00141 SRG-OS-000354-GPOS-00142 SRG-OS-000358-GPOS-00145 SRG-OS-000365-GPOS-00152 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000475-GPOS-00220 SRG-APP-000095-CTR-000170 SRG-APP-000409-CTR-000990 SRG-APP-000508-CTR-001300 SRG-APP-000510-CTR-001310 RHEL-08-030181 5.2.1.4 SV-244542r818838_rule Without establishing what type of events occurred, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events leading up to an outage or attack. Ensuring the auditd service is active ensures audit records generated by the kernel are appropriately recorded. Additionally, a properly configured audit subsystem ensures that actions of individual system users can be uniquely traced to those users so they can be held accountable for their actions. CCE-80872-5 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80872-5 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030181 - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 - NIST-800-171-3.3.2 - NIST-800-171-3.3.6 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(g) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-10 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-14(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-AU-3 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SI-4(23) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.1 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_auditd_enabled - name: Enable service auditd block: - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto - name: Enable service auditd systemd: name: auditd enabled: 'yes' state: started masked: 'no' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80872-5 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030181 - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 - NIST-800-171-3.3.2 - NIST-800-171-3.3.6 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(g) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-10 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-14(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-AU-3 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SI-4(23) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.1 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_auditd_enabled --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: auditd.service enabled: true [customizations.services] enabled = ["auditd"] include enable_auditd class enable_auditd { service {'auditd': enable => true, ensure => 'running', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { rpm --quiet -q audit; }; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'auditd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'auditd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'auditd.service' else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable Auditing for Processes Which Start Prior to the Audit Daemon To ensure all processes can be audited, even those which start prior to the audit daemon, add the argument audit=1 to the default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system. To ensure that audit=1 is added as a kernel command line argument to newly installed kernels, add audit=1 to the default Grub2 command line for Linux operating systems. Modify the line within /etc/default/grub as shown below: GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="... audit=1 ..." Run the following command to update command line for already installed kernels:# grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="audit=1" 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 3 4 5 6 7 8 5.4.1.1 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.3.1 CCI-001464 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.310(a)(2)(iv) 164.310(d)(2)(iii) 164.312(b) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AC-17(1) AU-14(1) AU-10 CM-6(a) IR-5(1) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1 Req-10.3 10.7.3 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000473-GPOS-00218 SRG-OS-000254-GPOS-00095 RHEL-08-030601 5.2.1.2 SV-230468r792904_rule Each process on the system carries an "auditable" flag which indicates whether its activities can be audited. Although auditd takes care of enabling this for all processes which launch after it does, adding the kernel argument ensures it is set for every process during boot. CCE-80825-3 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80825-3 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030601 - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-10 - NIST-800-53-AU-14(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IR-5(1) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.7.3 - grub2_audit_argument - low_disruption - low_severity - medium_complexity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Update grub defaults and the bootloader menu command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="audit=1" when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80825-3 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030601 - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-10 - NIST-800-53-AU-14(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IR-5(1) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.7.3 - grub2_audit_argument - low_disruption - low_severity - medium_complexity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy [customizations.kernel] append = "audit=1" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { rpm --quiet -q grub2-common; }; then grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args=audit=1 --env=/boot/grub2/grubenv else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Extend Audit Backlog Limit for the Audit Daemon To improve the kernel capacity to queue all log events, even those which occurred prior to the audit daemon, add the argument audit_backlog_limit=8192 to the default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system. To ensure that audit_backlog_limit=8192 is added as a kernel command line argument to newly installed kernels, add audit_backlog_limit=8192 to the default Grub2 command line for Linux operating systems. Modify the line within /etc/default/grub as shown below: GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="... audit_backlog_limit=8192 ..." Run the following command to update command line for already installed kernels:# grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="audit_backlog_limit=8192" CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-001849 CCI-002884 CM-6(a) FAU_STG.1 FAU_STG.3 10.7.2 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000254-GPOS-00095 SRG-OS-000341-GPOS-00132 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 RHEL-08-030602 5.2.1.3 SV-230469r877391_rule audit_backlog_limit sets the queue length for audit events awaiting transfer to the audit daemon. Until the audit daemon is up and running, all log messages are stored in this queue. If the queue is overrun during boot process, the action defined by audit failure flag is taken. CCE-80943-4 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80943-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030602 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-10.7.2 - grub2_audit_backlog_limit_argument - low_disruption - low_severity - medium_complexity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Update grub defaults and the bootloader menu command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="audit_backlog_limit=8192" when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80943-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030602 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-10.7.2 - grub2_audit_backlog_limit_argument - low_disruption - low_severity - medium_complexity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy [customizations.kernel] append = "audit_backlog_limit=8192" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { rpm --quiet -q grub2-common; }; then grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args=audit_backlog_limit=8192 --env=/boot/grub2/grubenv else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure auditd Rules for Comprehensive Auditing The auditd program can perform comprehensive monitoring of system activity. This section describes recommended configuration settings for comprehensive auditing, but a full description of the auditing system's capabilities is beyond the scope of this guide. The mailing list linux-audit@redhat.com exists to facilitate community discussion of the auditing system. The audit subsystem supports extensive collection of events, including: Tracing of arbitrary system calls (identified by name or number) on entry or exit.Filtering by PID, UID, call success, system call argument (with some limitations), etc.Monitoring of specific files for modifications to the file's contents or metadata. Auditing rules at startup are controlled by the file /etc/audit/audit.rules. Add rules to it to meet the auditing requirements for your organization. Each line in /etc/audit/audit.rules represents a series of arguments that can be passed to auditctl and can be individually tested during runtime. See documentation in /usr/share/doc/audit-VERSION and in the related man pages for more details. If copying any example audit rulesets from /usr/share/doc/audit-VERSION, be sure to comment out the lines containing arch= which are not appropriate for your system's architecture. Then review and understand the following rules, ensuring rules are activated as needed for the appropriate architecture. After reviewing all the rules, reading the following sections, and editing as needed, the new rules can be activated as follows: $ sudo service auditd restart Audit failure mode This variable is the setting for the -f option in Audit configuration which sets the failure mode of audit. This option lets you determine how you want the kernel to handle critical errors. Possible values are: 0=silent, 1=printk, 2=panic. If the value is set to "2", the system is configured to panic (shut down) in the event of an auditing failure. If the value is set to "1", the system is configured to only send information to the kernel log regarding the failure. 2 0 1 2 Record Events that Modify User/Group Information via open syscall - /etc/group The audit system should collect write events to /etc/group file for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-007-3 R.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 AC-2(4) AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) FAU_GEN.1.1.c Creation of groups through direct edition of /etc/group could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80927-7 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80927-7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_group_open - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit open tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80927-7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_group_open - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for open for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of open in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of open in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) tags: - CCE-80927-7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_group_open - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for open for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of open in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of open in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80927-7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_group_open - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit && { ! ( grep -q aarch64 /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ); }; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F a1&03 -F path=/etc/group" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="open" KEY="user-modify" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Events that Modify User/Group Information via open_by_handle_at syscall - /etc/group The audit system should collect write events to /etc/group file for all group and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-007-3 R.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 AC-2(4) AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) FAU_GEN.1.1.c Creation of groups through direct edition of /etc/group could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80929-3 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80929-3 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_group_open_by_handle_at - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit open_by_handle_at tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80929-3 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_group_open_by_handle_at - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for open_by_handle_at for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open_by_handle_at syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of open_by_handle_at in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open_by_handle_at syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of open_by_handle_at in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80929-3 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_group_open_by_handle_at - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for open_by_handle_at for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open_by_handle_at syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of open_by_handle_at in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open_by_handle_at syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of open_by_handle_at in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80929-3 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_group_open_by_handle_at - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F a2&03 -F path=/etc/group" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="open_by_handle_at" KEY="user-modify" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Events that Modify User/Group Information via openat syscall - /etc/group The audit system should collect write events to /etc/group file for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-007-3 R.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 AC-2(4) AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) FAU_GEN.1.1.c Creation of groups through direct edition of /etc/group could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80928-5 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80928-5 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_group_openat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit openat tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80928-5 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_group_openat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for openat for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - openat syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of openat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - openat syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of openat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80928-5 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_group_openat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for openat for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - openat syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of openat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - openat syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of openat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80928-5 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_group_openat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F a2&03 -F path=/etc/group" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="openat" KEY="user-modify" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Events that Modify User/Group Information via open syscall - /etc/gshadow The audit system should collect write events to /etc/gshadow file for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-007-3 R.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 AC-2(4) AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) FAU_GEN.1.1.c Creation of users through direct edition of /etc/gshadow could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80959-0 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80959-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_gshadow_open - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit open tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80959-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_gshadow_open - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for open for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of open in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of open in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) tags: - CCE-80959-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_gshadow_open - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for open for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of open in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of open in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80959-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_gshadow_open - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit && { ! ( grep -q aarch64 /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ); }; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F a1&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="open" KEY="user-modify" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Events that Modify User/Group Information via open_by_handle_at syscall - /etc/gshadow The audit system should collect write events to /etc/gshadow file for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-007-3 R.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 AC-2(4) AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) FAU_GEN.1.1.c Creation of users through direct edition of /etc/gshadow could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80960-8 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80960-8 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_gshadow_open_by_handle_at - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit open_by_handle_at tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80960-8 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_gshadow_open_by_handle_at - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for open_by_handle_at for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open_by_handle_at syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of open_by_handle_at in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open_by_handle_at syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of open_by_handle_at in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80960-8 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_gshadow_open_by_handle_at - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for open_by_handle_at for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open_by_handle_at syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of open_by_handle_at in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open_by_handle_at syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of open_by_handle_at in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80960-8 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_gshadow_open_by_handle_at - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F a2&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="open_by_handle_at" KEY="user-modify" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Events that Modify User/Group Information via openat syscall - /etc/gshadow The audit system should collect write events to /etc/gshadow file for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-007-3 R.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 AC-2(4) AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) FAU_GEN.1.1.c Creation of users through direct edition of /etc/gshadow could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80961-6 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80961-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_gshadow_openat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit openat tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80961-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_gshadow_openat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for openat for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - openat syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of openat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - openat syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of openat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80961-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_gshadow_openat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for openat for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - openat syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of openat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - openat syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of openat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80961-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_gshadow_openat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F a2&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="openat" KEY="user-modify" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Events that Modify User/Group Information via open syscall - /etc/passwd The audit system should collect write events to /etc/passwd file for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-007-3 R.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 AC-2(4) AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) FAU_GEN.1.1.c Creation of users through direct edition of /etc/passwd could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80930-1 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80930-1 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_passwd_open - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit open tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80930-1 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_passwd_open - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for open for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of open in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of open in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) tags: - CCE-80930-1 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_passwd_open - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for open for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of open in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of open in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80930-1 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_passwd_open - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit && { ! ( grep -q aarch64 /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ); }; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="open" KEY="user-modify" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Events that Modify User/Group Information via open_by_handle_at syscall - /etc/passwd The audit system should collect write events to /etc/passwd file for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-007-3 R.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 AC-2(4) AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) FAU_GEN.1.1.c Creation of users through direct edition of /etc/passwd could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80932-7 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80932-7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_passwd_open_by_handle_at - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit open_by_handle_at tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80932-7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_passwd_open_by_handle_at - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for open_by_handle_at for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open_by_handle_at syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of open_by_handle_at in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open_by_handle_at syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of open_by_handle_at in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80932-7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_passwd_open_by_handle_at - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for open_by_handle_at for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open_by_handle_at syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of open_by_handle_at in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open_by_handle_at syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of open_by_handle_at in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80932-7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_passwd_open_by_handle_at - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="open_by_handle_at" KEY="user-modify" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Events that Modify User/Group Information via openat syscall - /etc/passwd The audit system should collect write events to /etc/passwd file for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-007-3 R.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 AC-2(4) AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) FAU_GEN.1.1.c Creation of users through direct edition of /etc/passwd could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80931-9 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80931-9 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_passwd_openat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit openat tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80931-9 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_passwd_openat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for openat for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - openat syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of openat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - openat syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of openat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80931-9 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_passwd_openat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for openat for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - openat syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of openat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - openat syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of openat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80931-9 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_passwd_openat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="openat" KEY="user-modify" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Events that Modify User/Group Information via open syscall - /etc/shadow The audit system should collect write events to /etc/shadow file for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,open_by_handle_at -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-007-3 R.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 AC-2(4) AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) FAU_GEN.1.1.c Creation of users through direct edition of /etc/shadow could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80956-6 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80956-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_shadow_open - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit open tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80956-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_shadow_open - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for open for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of open in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of open in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) tags: - CCE-80956-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_shadow_open - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for open for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of open in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of open in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80956-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_shadow_open - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit && { ! ( grep -q aarch64 /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ); }; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="open" KEY="user-modify" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Events that Modify User/Group Information via open_by_handle_at syscall - /etc/shadow The audit system should collect write events to /etc/shadow file for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-007-3 R.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 AC-2(4) AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) FAU_GEN.1.1.c Creation of users through direct edition of /etc/shadow could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80957-4 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80957-4 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_shadow_open_by_handle_at - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit open_by_handle_at tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80957-4 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_shadow_open_by_handle_at - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for open_by_handle_at for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open_by_handle_at syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of open_by_handle_at in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open_by_handle_at syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of open_by_handle_at in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80957-4 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_shadow_open_by_handle_at - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for open_by_handle_at for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open_by_handle_at syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of open_by_handle_at in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open_by_handle_at syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of open_by_handle_at in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80957-4 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_shadow_open_by_handle_at - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="open_by_handle_at" KEY="user-modify" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Events that Modify User/Group Information via openat syscall - /etc/shadow The audit system should collect write events to /etc/shadow file for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-007-3 R.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 AC-2(4) AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) FAU_GEN.1.1.c Creation of users through direct edition of /etc/shadow could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80958-2 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80958-2 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_shadow_openat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit openat tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80958-2 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_shadow_openat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for openat for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - openat syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of openat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - openat syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of openat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80958-2 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_shadow_openat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for openat for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - openat syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of openat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/modify.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - openat syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of openat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modify create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80958-2 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_etc_shadow_openat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="openat" KEY="user-modify" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Make the auditd Configuration Immutable If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d in order to make the auditd configuration immutable: -e 2 If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file in order to make the auditd configuration immutable: -e 2 With this setting, a reboot will be required to change any audit rules. BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 19 3 4 5 6 7 8 5.4.1.1 APO01.06 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.3.1 3.4.3 CCI-000162 CCI-000163 CCI-000164 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.310(a)(2)(iv) 164.312(d) 164.310(d)(2)(iii) 164.312(b) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.1 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 5.2 SR 6.1 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 PR.PT-1 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 Req-10.5.2 10.3.2 SRG-OS-000057-GPOS-00027 SRG-OS-000058-GPOS-00028 SRG-OS-000059-GPOS-00029 SRG-APP-000119-CTR-000245 SRG-APP-000120-CTR-000250 RHEL-08-030121 5.2.3.20 SV-230402r627750_rule Making the audit configuration immutable prevents accidental as well as malicious modification of the audit rules, although it may be problematic if legitimate changes are needed during system operation. CCE-80708-1 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80708-1 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030121 - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 - NIST-800-171-3.4.3 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 - audit_rules_immutable - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Collect all files from /etc/audit/rules.d with .rules extension find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d/ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_rules_d when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80708-1 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030121 - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 - NIST-800-171-3.4.3 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 - audit_rules_immutable - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Remove the -e option from all Audit config files lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' regexp: ^\s*(?:-e)\s+.*$ state: absent loop: '{{ find_rules_d.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list + [''/etc/audit/audit.rules''] }}' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80708-1 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030121 - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 - NIST-800-171-3.4.3 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 - audit_rules_immutable - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Add Audit -e option into /etc/audit/rules.d/immutable.rules and /etc/audit/audit.rules lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' create: true line: -e 2 mode: o-rwx loop: - /etc/audit/audit.rules - /etc/audit/rules.d/immutable.rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80708-1 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030121 - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 - NIST-800-171-3.4.3 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 - audit_rules_immutable - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,-e%202%0A mode: 0600 path: /etc/audit/rules.d/90-immutable.rules overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # Traverse all of: # # /etc/audit/audit.rules, (for auditctl case) # /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules (for augenrules case) # # files to check if '-e .*' setting is present in that '*.rules' file already. # If found, delete such occurrence since auditctl(8) manual page instructs the # '-e 2' rule should be placed as the last rule in the configuration find /etc/audit /etc/audit/rules.d -maxdepth 1 -type f -name '*.rules' -exec sed -i '/-e[[:space:]]\+.*/d' {} ';' # Append '-e 2' requirement at the end of both: # * /etc/audit/audit.rules file (for auditctl case) # * /etc/audit/rules.d/immutable.rules (for augenrules case) for AUDIT_FILE in "/etc/audit/audit.rules" "/etc/audit/rules.d/immutable.rules" do echo '' >> $AUDIT_FILE echo '# Set the audit.rules configuration immutable per security requirements' >> $AUDIT_FILE echo '# Reboot is required to change audit rules once this setting is applied' >> $AUDIT_FILE echo '-e 2' >> $AUDIT_FILE chmod o-rwx $AUDIT_FILE done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure immutable Audit login UIDs Configure kernel to prevent modification of login UIDs once they are set. Changing login UIDs while this configuration is enforced requires special capabilities which are not available to unprivileged users. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d in order to make login UIDs immutable: --loginuid-immutable If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file in order to make login UIDs immutable: --loginuid-immutable CCI-000162 CCI-000163 CCI-000164 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000475-GPOS-00220 SRG-OS-000057-GPOS-00027 SRG-OS-000058-GPOS-00028 SRG-OS-000059-GPOS-00029 RHEL-08-030122 SV-230403r627750_rule If modification of login UIDs is not prevented, they can be changed by unprivileged users and make auditing complicated or impossible. CCE-90783-2 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-90783-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030122 - audit_rules_immutable_login_uids - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: 'Configure immutable Audit login UIDs: Determine if rules are loaded by auditctl' ansible.builtin.find: paths: /usr/lib/systemd/system patterns: auditd.service contains: ^\s*ExecStartPost=-/sbin/auditctl register: auditctl_used when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-90783-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030122 - audit_rules_immutable_login_uids - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: 'Configure immutable Audit login UIDs: Configure immutable login UIDs in /etc/audit/audit.rules' ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/audit/audit.rules line: --loginuid-immutable regexp: ^\s*--loginuid-immutable\s*$ create: true when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - auditctl_used is defined and auditctl_used.matched >= 1 tags: - CCE-90783-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030122 - audit_rules_immutable_login_uids - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: 'Configure immutable Audit login UIDs: In case Augen-rules is used' block: - name: 'Configure immutable Audit login UIDs: Detect if immutable login UIDs are already defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' ansible.builtin.find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d patterns: '*.rules' contains: ^\s*--loginuid-immutable\s*$ register: immutable_found_in_rules_d - name: 'Configure immutable Audit login UIDs: set immutable login UIDS in /etc/audit/rules.d/immutable.rules' ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/audit/rules.d/immutable.rules line: --loginuid-immutable regexp: ^\s*--loginuid-immutable\s*$ create: true when: immutable_found_in_rules_d is defined and immutable_found_in_rules_d.matched == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - auditctl_used is defined and auditctl_used.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-90783-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030122 - audit_rules_immutable_login_uids - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # in case auditctl is used if grep -q '^\s*ExecStartPost=-/sbin/auditctl' /usr/lib/systemd/system/auditd.service; then if ! grep -q '^\s*--loginuid-immutable\s*$' /etc/audit/audit.rules; then echo "--loginuid-immutable" >> /etc/audit/audit.rules fi else immutable_found=0 while IFS= read -r -d '' f; do if grep -q '^\s*--loginuid-immutable\s*$' "$f"; then immutable_found=1 fi done < <(find /etc/audit/rules.d -maxdepth 1 -name '*.rules' -print0) if [ $immutable_found -eq 0 ]; then echo "--loginuid-immutable" >> /etc/audit/rules.d/immutable.rules fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Events that Modify the System's Mandatory Access Controls If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -w /etc/selinux/ -p wa -k MAC-policy If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -w /etc/selinux/ -p wa -k MAC-policy BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 5.4.1.1 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.8 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.5.5 10.3.4 5.2.3.14 The system's mandatory access policy (SELinux) should not be arbitrarily changed by anything other than administrator action. All changes to MAC policy should be audited. CCE-80721-4 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80721-4 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_mac_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /etc/selinux/ already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/selinux/\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_existing_watch_rules_d when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80721-4 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_mac_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key MAC-policy find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)MAC-policy$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_watch_key when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80721-4 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_mac_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/MAC-policy.rules as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - /etc/audit/rules.d/MAC-policy.rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80721-4 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_mac_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80721-4 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_mac_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /etc/selinux/ in /etc/audit/rules.d/ lineinfile: path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' line: -w /etc/selinux/ -p wa -k MAC-policy create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80721-4 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_mac_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /etc/selinux/ already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit/ contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/selinux/\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: audit.rules register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80721-4 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_mac_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /etc/selinux/ in /etc/audit/audit.rules lineinfile: line: -w /etc/selinux/ -p wa -k MAC-policy state: present dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80721-4 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_mac_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,{{ -w%20/etc/selinux/%20-p%20wa%20-k%20MAC-policy%0A }} mode: 0600 path: /etc/audit/rules.d/75-etcselinux-wa-MAC-policy.rules overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # into the list of files to be inspected files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/selinux/" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/selinux/ $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/selinux/$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/selinux/ -p wa -k MAC-policy" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. # If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/MAC-policy.rules' to list of files for inspection. readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/selinux/" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # For each of the matched entries for match in "${matches[@]}" do # Extract filepath from the match rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') # Append that path into list of files for inspection files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") done # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] then # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/MAC-policy.rules' into list of files for inspection key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/MAC-policy.rules" # If the MAC-policy.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] then touch "$key_rule_file" chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" fi files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") fi # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/selinux/" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/selinux/ $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/selinux/$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/selinux/ -p wa -k MAC-policy" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Events that Modify the System's Mandatory Access Controls in usr/share If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -w /usr/share/selinux/ -p wa -k MAC-policy If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -w /usr/share/selinux/ -p wa -k MAC-policy APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.8 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.5.5 5.2.3.14 The system's mandatory access policy (SELinux) should not be arbitrarily changed by anything other than administrator action. All changes to MAC policy should be audited. CCE-86342-3 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-86342-3 - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - audit_rules_mac_modification_usr_share - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /usr/share/selinux/ already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^\s*-w\s+/usr/share/selinux/\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_existing_watch_rules_d when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86342-3 - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - audit_rules_mac_modification_usr_share - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key MAC-policy find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)MAC-policy$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_watch_key when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-86342-3 - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - audit_rules_mac_modification_usr_share - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/MAC-policy.rules as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - /etc/audit/rules.d/MAC-policy.rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-86342-3 - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - audit_rules_mac_modification_usr_share - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-86342-3 - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - audit_rules_mac_modification_usr_share - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /usr/share/selinux/ in /etc/audit/rules.d/ lineinfile: path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' line: -w /usr/share/selinux/ -p wa -k MAC-policy create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-86342-3 - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - audit_rules_mac_modification_usr_share - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /usr/share/selinux/ already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit/ contains: ^\s*-w\s+/usr/share/selinux/\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: audit.rules register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86342-3 - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - audit_rules_mac_modification_usr_share - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /usr/share/selinux/ in /etc/audit/audit.rules lineinfile: line: -w /usr/share/selinux/ -p wa -k MAC-policy state: present dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-86342-3 - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - audit_rules_mac_modification_usr_share - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # into the list of files to be inspected files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/usr/share/selinux/" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/usr/share/selinux/ $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/usr/share/selinux/$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /usr/share/selinux/ -p wa -k MAC-policy" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. # If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/MAC-policy.rules' to list of files for inspection. readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/usr/share/selinux/" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # For each of the matched entries for match in "${matches[@]}" do # Extract filepath from the match rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') # Append that path into list of files for inspection files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") done # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] then # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/MAC-policy.rules' into list of files for inspection key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/MAC-policy.rules" # If the MAC-policy.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] then touch "$key_rule_file" chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" fi files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") fi # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/usr/share/selinux/" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/usr/share/selinux/ $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/usr/share/selinux/$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /usr/share/selinux/ -p wa -k MAC-policy" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects Information on Exporting to Media (successful) At a minimum, the audit system should collect media exportation events for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system: -a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S mount -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=export If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system: -a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S mount -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=export BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 5.4.1.1 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 Req-10.2.7 10.2.1.7 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 RHEL-08-030302 5.2.3.10 SV-230425r627750_rule The unauthorized exportation of data to external media could result in an information leak where classified information, Privacy Act information, and intellectual property could be lost. An audit trail should be created each time a filesystem is mounted to help identify and guard against information loss. CCE-80722-2 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80722-2 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030302 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 - audit_rules_media_export - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit mount tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80722-2 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030302 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 - audit_rules_media_export - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for mount for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - mount syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of mount in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - mount syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of mount in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80722-2 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030302 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 - audit_rules_media_export - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for mount for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - mount syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of mount in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - mount syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of mount in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80722-2 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030302 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 - audit_rules_media_export - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="mount" KEY="perm_mod" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Events that Modify the System's Network Environment If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system: -a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S sethostname,setdomainname -F key=audit_rules_networkconfig_modification -w /etc/issue -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification -w /etc/issue.net -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification -w /etc/hosts -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification -w /etc/sysconfig/network -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system: -a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S sethostname,setdomainname -F key=audit_rules_networkconfig_modification -w /etc/issue -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification -w /etc/issue.net -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification -w /etc/hosts -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification -w /etc/sysconfig/network -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 5.4.1.1 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 Req-10.5.5 10.3.4 5.2.3.5 The network environment should not be modified by anything other than administrator action. Any change to network parameters should be audited. CCE-80723-0 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80723-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80723-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Remediate audit rules for network configuration for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - sethostname - setdomainname syscall_grouping: - sethostname - setdomainname - name: Check existence of sethostname, setdomainname in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F key=audit_rules_networkconfig_modification create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - sethostname - setdomainname syscall_grouping: - sethostname - setdomainname - name: Check existence of sethostname, setdomainname in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F key=audit_rules_networkconfig_modification create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80723-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Remediate audit rules for network configuration for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - sethostname - setdomainname syscall_grouping: - sethostname - setdomainname - name: Check existence of sethostname, setdomainname in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F key=audit_rules_networkconfig_modification create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - sethostname - setdomainname syscall_grouping: - sethostname - setdomainname - name: Check existence of sethostname, setdomainname in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F key=audit_rules_networkconfig_modification create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80723-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /etc/issue already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/issue\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_existing_watch_rules_d when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80723-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key audit_rules_networkconfig_modification find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)audit_rules_networkconfig_modification$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_watch_key when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80723-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80723-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80723-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /etc/issue in /etc/audit/rules.d/ lineinfile: path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' line: -w /etc/issue -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80723-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /etc/issue already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit/ contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/issue\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: audit.rules register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80723-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /etc/issue in /etc/audit/audit.rules lineinfile: line: -w /etc/issue -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification state: present dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80723-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /etc/issue.net already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/issue.net\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_existing_watch_rules_d when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80723-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key audit_rules_networkconfig_modification find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)audit_rules_networkconfig_modification$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_watch_key when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80723-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80723-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80723-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /etc/issue.net in /etc/audit/rules.d/ lineinfile: path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' line: -w /etc/issue.net -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80723-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /etc/issue.net already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit/ contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/issue.net\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: audit.rules register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80723-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /etc/issue.net in /etc/audit/audit.rules lineinfile: line: -w /etc/issue.net -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification state: present dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80723-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /etc/hosts already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/hosts\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_existing_watch_rules_d when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80723-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key audit_rules_networkconfig_modification find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)audit_rules_networkconfig_modification$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_watch_key when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80723-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80723-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80723-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /etc/hosts in /etc/audit/rules.d/ lineinfile: path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' line: -w /etc/hosts -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80723-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /etc/hosts already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit/ contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/hosts\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: audit.rules register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80723-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /etc/hosts in /etc/audit/audit.rules lineinfile: line: -w /etc/hosts -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification state: present dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80723-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /etc/sysconfig/network already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/sysconfig/network\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_existing_watch_rules_d when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80723-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key audit_rules_networkconfig_modification find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)audit_rules_networkconfig_modification$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_watch_key when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80723-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80723-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80723-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /etc/sysconfig/network in /etc/audit/rules.d/ lineinfile: path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' line: -w /etc/sysconfig/network -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80723-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /etc/sysconfig/network already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit/ contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/sysconfig/network\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: audit.rules register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80723-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /etc/sysconfig/network in /etc/audit/audit.rules lineinfile: line: -w /etc/sysconfig/network -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification state: present dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80723-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="" AUID_FILTERS="" SYSCALL="sethostname setdomainname" KEY="audit_rules_networkconfig_modification" SYSCALL_GROUPING="sethostname setdomainname" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done # Then perform the remediations for the watch rules # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # into the list of files to be inspected files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/issue" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/issue $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/issue$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/issue -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. # If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules' to list of files for inspection. readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/issue" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # For each of the matched entries for match in "${matches[@]}" do # Extract filepath from the match rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') # Append that path into list of files for inspection files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") done # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] then # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules' into list of files for inspection key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules" # If the audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] then touch "$key_rule_file" chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" fi files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") fi # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/issue" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/issue $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/issue$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/issue -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # into the list of files to be inspected files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/issue.net" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/issue.net $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/issue.net$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/issue.net -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. # If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules' to list of files for inspection. readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/issue.net" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # For each of the matched entries for match in "${matches[@]}" do # Extract filepath from the match rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') # Append that path into list of files for inspection files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") done # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] then # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules' into list of files for inspection key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules" # If the audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] then touch "$key_rule_file" chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" fi files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") fi # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/issue.net" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/issue.net $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/issue.net$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/issue.net -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # into the list of files to be inspected files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/hosts" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/hosts $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/hosts$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/hosts -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. # If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules' to list of files for inspection. readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/hosts" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # For each of the matched entries for match in "${matches[@]}" do # Extract filepath from the match rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') # Append that path into list of files for inspection files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") done # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] then # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules' into list of files for inspection key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules" # If the audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] then touch "$key_rule_file" chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" fi files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") fi # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/hosts" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/hosts $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/hosts$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/hosts -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # into the list of files to be inspected files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/sysconfig/network" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sysconfig/network $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sysconfig/network$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/sysconfig/network -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. # If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules' to list of files for inspection. readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/sysconfig/network" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # For each of the matched entries for match in "${matches[@]}" do # Extract filepath from the match rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') # Append that path into list of files for inspection files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") done # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] then # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules' into list of files for inspection key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules" # If the audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] then touch "$key_rule_file" chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" fi files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") fi # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/sysconfig/network" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sysconfig/network $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sysconfig/network$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/sysconfig/network -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Attempts to Alter Process and Session Initiation Information The audit system already collects process information for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d in order to watch for attempted manual edits of files involved in storing such process information: -w /var/run/utmp -p wa -k session -w /var/log/btmp -p wa -k session -w /var/log/wtmp -p wa -k session If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file in order to watch for attempted manual edits of files involved in storing such process information: -w /var/run/utmp -p wa -k session -w /var/log/btmp -p wa -k session -w /var/log/wtmp -p wa -k session BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 5.4.1.1 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 0582 0584 05885 0586 0846 0957 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.2.3 10.2.1.3 SRG-APP-000505-CTR-001285 5.2.3.11 Manual editing of these files may indicate nefarious activity, such as an attacker attempting to remove evidence of an intrusion. CCE-80742-0 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80742-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_session_events - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /var/run/utmp already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^\s*-w\s+/var/run/utmp\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_existing_watch_rules_d when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80742-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_session_events - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key session find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)session$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_watch_key when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80742-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_session_events - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - /etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80742-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_session_events - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80742-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_session_events - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /var/run/utmp in /etc/audit/rules.d/ lineinfile: path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' line: -w /var/run/utmp -p wa -k session create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80742-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_session_events - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /var/run/utmp already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit/ contains: ^\s*-w\s+/var/run/utmp\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: audit.rules register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80742-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_session_events - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /var/run/utmp in /etc/audit/audit.rules lineinfile: line: -w /var/run/utmp -p wa -k session state: present dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80742-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_session_events - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /var/log/btmp already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^\s*-w\s+/var/log/btmp\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_existing_watch_rules_d when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80742-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_session_events - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key session find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)session$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_watch_key when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80742-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_session_events - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - /etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80742-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_session_events - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80742-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_session_events - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /var/log/btmp in /etc/audit/rules.d/ lineinfile: path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' line: -w /var/log/btmp -p wa -k session create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80742-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_session_events - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /var/log/btmp already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit/ contains: ^\s*-w\s+/var/log/btmp\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: audit.rules register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80742-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_session_events - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /var/log/btmp in /etc/audit/audit.rules lineinfile: line: -w /var/log/btmp -p wa -k session state: present dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80742-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_session_events - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /var/log/wtmp already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^\s*-w\s+/var/log/wtmp\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_existing_watch_rules_d when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80742-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_session_events - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key session find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)session$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_watch_key when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80742-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_session_events - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - /etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80742-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_session_events - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80742-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_session_events - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /var/log/wtmp in /etc/audit/rules.d/ lineinfile: path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' line: -w /var/log/wtmp -p wa -k session create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80742-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_session_events - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /var/log/wtmp already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit/ contains: ^\s*-w\s+/var/log/wtmp\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: audit.rules register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80742-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_session_events - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /var/log/wtmp in /etc/audit/audit.rules lineinfile: line: -w /var/log/wtmp -p wa -k session state: present dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80742-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_session_events - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,{{ %0A-w%20/var/run/utmp%20-p%20wa%20-k%20session%0A-w%20/var/log/btmp%20-p%20wa%20-k%20session%0A-w%20/var/log/wtmp%20-p%20wa%20-k%20session%0A }} mode: 0600 path: /etc/audit/rules.d/75-audit-session-events.rules overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # into the list of files to be inspected files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/run/utmp" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/run/utmp $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/run/utmp$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /var/run/utmp -p wa -k session" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. # If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules' to list of files for inspection. readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/run/utmp" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # For each of the matched entries for match in "${matches[@]}" do # Extract filepath from the match rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') # Append that path into list of files for inspection files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") done # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] then # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules' into list of files for inspection key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules" # If the session.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] then touch "$key_rule_file" chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" fi files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") fi # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/run/utmp" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/run/utmp $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/run/utmp$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /var/run/utmp -p wa -k session" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # into the list of files to be inspected files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/btmp" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/btmp $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/btmp$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /var/log/btmp -p wa -k session" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. # If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules' to list of files for inspection. readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/btmp" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # For each of the matched entries for match in "${matches[@]}" do # Extract filepath from the match rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') # Append that path into list of files for inspection files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") done # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] then # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules' into list of files for inspection key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules" # If the session.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] then touch "$key_rule_file" chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" fi files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") fi # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/btmp" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/btmp $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/btmp$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /var/log/btmp -p wa -k session" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # into the list of files to be inspected files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/wtmp" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/wtmp $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/wtmp$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /var/log/wtmp -p wa -k session" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. # If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules' to list of files for inspection. readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/wtmp" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # For each of the matched entries for match in "${matches[@]}" do # Extract filepath from the match rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') # Append that path into list of files for inspection files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") done # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] then # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules' into list of files for inspection key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules" # If the session.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] then touch "$key_rule_file" chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" fi files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") fi # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/wtmp" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/wtmp $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/wtmp$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /var/log/wtmp -p wa -k session" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects System Administrator Actions - /etc/sudoers At a minimum, the audit system should collect administrator actions for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k actions If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k actions CCI-000018 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-001403 CCI-001404 CCI-002130 CCI-002132 CCI-002884 SRG-OS-000004-GPOS-00004 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000304-GPOS-00121 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000470-GPOS-00214 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000239-GPOS-00089 SRG-OS-000240-GPOS-00090 SRG-OS-000241-GPOS-00091 SRG-OS-000303-GPOS-00120 SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 SRG-OS-000476-GPOS-00221 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 SRG-APP-000499-CTR-001255 SRG-APP-000503-CTR-001275 RHEL-08-030171 SV-230409r627750_rule The actions taken by system administrators should be audited to keep a record of what was executed on the system, as well as, for accountability purposes. Editing the sudoers file may be sign of an attacker trying to establish persistent methods to a system, auditing the editing of the sudoers files mitigates this risk. CCE-90175-1 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-90175-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030171 - audit_rules_sudoers - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /etc/sudoers already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/sudoers\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_existing_watch_rules_d when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-90175-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030171 - audit_rules_sudoers - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key actions find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)actions$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_watch_key when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-90175-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030171 - audit_rules_sudoers - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - /etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-90175-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030171 - audit_rules_sudoers - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-90175-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030171 - audit_rules_sudoers - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /etc/sudoers in /etc/audit/rules.d/ lineinfile: path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' line: -w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k actions create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-90175-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030171 - audit_rules_sudoers - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /etc/sudoers already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit/ contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/sudoers\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: audit.rules register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-90175-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030171 - audit_rules_sudoers - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /etc/sudoers in /etc/audit/audit.rules lineinfile: line: -w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k actions state: present dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-90175-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030171 - audit_rules_sudoers - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # into the list of files to be inspected files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k actions" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. # If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules' to list of files for inspection. readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # For each of the matched entries for match in "${matches[@]}" do # Extract filepath from the match rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') # Append that path into list of files for inspection files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") done # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] then # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules' into list of files for inspection key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules" # If the actions.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] then touch "$key_rule_file" chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" fi files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") fi # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k actions" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects System Administrator Actions - /etc/sudoers.d/ At a minimum, the audit system should collect administrator actions for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -w /etc/sudoers.d/ -p wa -k actions If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -w /etc/sudoers.d/ -p wa -k actions CCI-000018 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-001403 CCI-001404 CCI-002130 CCI-002132 CCI-002884 SRG-OS-000004-GPOS-00004 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000304-GPOS-00121 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000470-GPOS-00214 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000239-GPOS-00089 SRG-OS-000240-GPOS-00090 SRG-OS-000241-GPOS-00091 SRG-OS-000303-GPOS-00120 SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 SRG-OS-000476-GPOS-00221 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 SRG-APP-000499-CTR-001255 SRG-APP-000503-CTR-001275 RHEL-08-030172 SV-230410r627750_rule The actions taken by system administrators should be audited to keep a record of what was executed on the system, as well as, for accountability purposes. Editing the sudoers file may be sign of an attacker trying to establish persistent methods to a system, auditing the editing of the sudoers files mitigates this risk. CCE-89497-2 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-89497-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030172 - audit_rules_sudoers_d - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /etc/sudoers.d/ already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/sudoers.d/\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_existing_watch_rules_d when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-89497-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030172 - audit_rules_sudoers_d - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key actions find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)actions$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_watch_key when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-89497-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030172 - audit_rules_sudoers_d - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - /etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-89497-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030172 - audit_rules_sudoers_d - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-89497-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030172 - audit_rules_sudoers_d - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /etc/sudoers.d/ in /etc/audit/rules.d/ lineinfile: path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' line: -w /etc/sudoers.d/ -p wa -k actions create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-89497-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030172 - audit_rules_sudoers_d - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /etc/sudoers.d/ already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit/ contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/sudoers.d/\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: audit.rules register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-89497-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030172 - audit_rules_sudoers_d - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /etc/sudoers.d/ in /etc/audit/audit.rules lineinfile: line: -w /etc/sudoers.d/ -p wa -k actions state: present dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-89497-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030172 - audit_rules_sudoers_d - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # into the list of files to be inspected files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers.d/" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers.d/ $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers.d/$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/sudoers.d/ -p wa -k actions" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. # If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules' to list of files for inspection. readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers.d/" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # For each of the matched entries for match in "${matches[@]}" do # Extract filepath from the match rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') # Append that path into list of files for inspection files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") done # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] then # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules' into list of files for inspection key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules" # If the actions.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] then touch "$key_rule_file" chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" fi files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") fi # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers.d/" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers.d/ $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers.d/$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/sudoers.d/ -p wa -k actions" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Events When Executables Are Run As Another User Verify the system generates an audit record when actions are run as another user. sudo provides users with temporary elevated privileges to perform operations, either as the superuser or another user. If audit is using the "auditctl" tool to load the rules, run the following command: $ sudo grep execve /etc/audit/audit.rules If audit is using the "augenrules" tool to load the rules, run the following command: $ sudo grep -r execve /etc/audit/rules.d -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S execve -C euid!=uid -F auid!=unset -k user_emulation -a always,exit -F arch=b64 S execve -C euid!=uid -F auid!=unset -k user_emulation If both the "b32" and "b64" audit rules for "SUID" files are not defined, this is a finding. Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. 5.2.3.2 Creating an audit log of users with temporary elevated privileges and the operation(s) they performed is essential to reporting. Administrators will want to correlate the events written to the audit trail with the records written to sudo's logfile to verify if unauthorized commands have been executed. Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised information system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify the risk from insider threats and the advanced persistent threat. CCE-90209-8 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-90209-8 - audit_rules_suid_auid_privilege_function - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Service facts ansible.builtin.service_facts: null when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-90209-8 - audit_rules_suid_auid_privilege_function - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Check the rules script being used ansible.builtin.command: grep '^ExecStartPost' /usr/lib/systemd/system/auditd.service register: check_rules_scripts_result changed_when: false failed_when: false when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-90209-8 - audit_rules_suid_auid_privilege_function - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Set suid_audit_rules fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: suid_audit_rules: - rule: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S execve -C euid!=uid -F auid!=unset -k user_emulation regex: ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+-C[\s]+euid!=uid[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=unset[\s]+-S[\s]+execve[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ - rule: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -C euid!=uid -F auid!=unset -k user_emulation regex: ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+-C[\s]+euid!=uid[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=unset[\s]+-S[\s]+execve[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-90209-8 - audit_rules_suid_auid_privilege_function - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Update /etc/audit/rules.d/user_emulation.rules to audit privileged functions ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/audit/rules.d/user_emulation.rules line: '{{ item.rule }}' regexp: '{{ item.regex }}' create: true when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"auditd.service" in ansible_facts.services' - '"augenrules" in check_rules_scripts_result.stdout' register: augenrules_audit_rules_privilege_function_update_result with_items: '{{ suid_audit_rules }}' tags: - CCE-90209-8 - audit_rules_suid_auid_privilege_function - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Update Update /etc/audit/audit.rules to audit privileged functions ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/audit/audit.rules line: '{{ item.rule }}' regexp: '{{ item.regex }}' create: true when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"auditd.service" in ansible_facts.services' - '"auditctl" in check_rules_scripts_result.stdout' register: auditctl_audit_rules_privilege_function_update_result with_items: '{{ suid_audit_rules }}' tags: - CCE-90209-8 - audit_rules_suid_auid_privilege_function - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Restart Auditd ansible.builtin.command: /usr/sbin/service auditd restart when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - (augenrules_audit_rules_privilege_function_update_result.changed or auditctl_audit_rules_privilege_function_update_result.changed) - ansible_facts.services["auditd.service"].state == "running" tags: - CCE-90209-8 - audit_rules_suid_auid_privilege_function - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-C euid!=uid" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="execve" KEY="user_emulation" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Events When Privileged Executables Are Run Verify the system generates an audit record when privileged functions are executed. If audit is using the "auditctl" tool to load the rules, run the following command: $ sudo grep execve /etc/audit/audit.rules If audit is using the "augenrules" tool to load the rules, run the following command: $ sudo grep -r execve /etc/audit/rules.d -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S execve -C uid!=euid -F euid=0 -k setuid -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -C uid!=euid -F euid=0 -k setuid -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S execve -C gid!=egid -F egid=0 -k setgid -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -C gid!=egid -F egid=0 -k setgid If both the "b32" and "b64" audit rules for "SUID" files are not defined, this is a finding. If both the "b32" and "b64" audit rules for "SGID" files are not defined, this is a finding. Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. CCI-001814 CCI-001882 CCI-001889 CCI-001880 CCI-001881 CCI-001878 CCI-001879 CCI-001875 CCI-001877 CCI-001914 CCI-002233 CCI-002234 CM-5(1) AU-7(a) AU-7(b) AU-8(b) AU-12(3) AC-6(9) 10.2.1.2 SRG-OS-000326-GPOS-00126 SRG-OS-000327-GPOS-00127 SRG-APP-000343-CTR-000780 SRG-APP-000381-CTR-000905 RHEL-08-030000 SV-230386r854037_rule Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised information system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify the risk from insider threats and the advanced persistent threat. CCE-83556-1 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-83556-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030000 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(3) - NIST-800-53-AU-7(a) - NIST-800-53-AU-7(b) - NIST-800-53-AU-8(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(1) - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.2 - audit_rules_suid_privilege_function - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Service facts ansible.builtin.service_facts: null when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83556-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030000 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(3) - NIST-800-53-AU-7(a) - NIST-800-53-AU-7(b) - NIST-800-53-AU-8(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(1) - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.2 - audit_rules_suid_privilege_function - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Set suid_audit_rules fact ansible.builtin.set_fact: suid_audit_rules: - rule: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S execve -C gid!=egid -F egid=0 -k setgid regex: ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+-S[\s]+execve[\s]+-C[\s]+gid!=egid[\s]+-F[\s]+egid=0[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ - rule: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -C gid!=egid -F egid=0 -k setgid regex: ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+-S[\s]+execve[\s]+-C[\s]+gid!=egid[\s]+-F[\s]+egid=0[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ - rule: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S execve -C uid!=euid -F euid=0 -k setuid regex: ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+-S[\s]+execve[\s]+-C[\s]+uid!=euid[\s]+-F[\s]+euid=0[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ - rule: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -C uid!=euid -F euid=0 -k setuid regex: ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+-S[\s]+execve[\s]+-C[\s]+uid!=euid[\s]+-F[\s]+euid=0[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83556-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030000 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(3) - NIST-800-53-AU-7(a) - NIST-800-53-AU-7(b) - NIST-800-53-AU-8(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(1) - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.2 - audit_rules_suid_privilege_function - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Update /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules to audit privileged functions ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules line: '{{ item.rule }}' regexp: '{{ item.regex }}' create: true when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ('"auditd.service" in ansible_facts.services' or '"augenrules.service" in ansible_facts.services') register: augenrules_audit_rules_privilege_function_update_result with_items: '{{ suid_audit_rules }}' tags: - CCE-83556-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030000 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(3) - NIST-800-53-AU-7(a) - NIST-800-53-AU-7(b) - NIST-800-53-AU-8(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(1) - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.2 - audit_rules_suid_privilege_function - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Update Update /etc/audit/audit.rules to audit privileged functions ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/audit/audit.rules line: '{{ item.rule }}' regexp: '{{ item.regex }}' create: true when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ('"auditd.service" in ansible_facts.services' or '"augenrules.service" in ansible_facts.services') register: auditctl_audit_rules_privilege_function_update_result with_items: '{{ suid_audit_rules }}' tags: - CCE-83556-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030000 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(3) - NIST-800-53-AU-7(a) - NIST-800-53-AU-7(b) - NIST-800-53-AU-8(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(1) - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.2 - audit_rules_suid_privilege_function - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Restart Auditd ansible.builtin.command: /usr/sbin/service auditd restart when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - (augenrules_audit_rules_privilege_function_update_result.changed or auditctl_audit_rules_privilege_function_update_result.changed) - ansible_facts.services["auditd.service"].state == "running" tags: - CCE-83556-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030000 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(3) - NIST-800-53-AU-7(a) - NIST-800-53-AU-7(b) - NIST-800-53-AU-8(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(1) - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.2 - audit_rules_suid_privilege_function - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,{{ -a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db32%20-S%20execve%20-C%20uid%21%3Deuid%20-F%20euid%3D0%20-k%20execpriv%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db64%20-S%20execve%20-C%20uid%21%3Deuid%20-F%20euid%3D0%20-k%20execpriv%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db32%20-S%20execve%20-C%20gid%21%3Degid%20-F%20egid%3D0%20-k%20execpriv%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db64%20-S%20execve%20-C%20gid%21%3Degid%20-F%20egid%3D0%20-k%20execpriv%0A }} mode: 0600 path: /etc/audit/rules.d/75-audit-suid-privilege-function.rules overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-C uid!=euid -F euid=0" AUID_FILTERS="" SYSCALL="execve" KEY="setuid" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-C gid!=egid -F egid=0" AUID_FILTERS="" SYSCALL="execve" KEY="setgid" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects System Administrator Actions At a minimum, the audit system should collect administrator actions for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k actions -w /etc/sudoers.d/ -p wa -k actions If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k actions -w /etc/sudoers.d/ -p wa -k actions BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 5.4.1.1 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.03 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000126 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.1.2 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.7.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 AC-2(7)(b) AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-1 PR.AC-3 PR.AC-4 PR.AC-6 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.2.2 Req-10.2.5.b 10.2.1.5 SRG-OS-000004-GPOS-00004 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000304-GPOS-00121 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000470-GPOS-00214 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000239-GPOS-00089 SRG-OS-000240-GPOS-00090 SRG-OS-000241-GPOS-00091 SRG-OS-000303-GPOS-00120 SRG-OS-000304-GPOS-00121 SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 SRG-OS-000476-GPOS-00221 SRG-APP-000026-CTR-000070 SRG-APP-000027-CTR-000075 SRG-APP-000028-CTR-000080 SRG-APP-000291-CTR-000675 SRG-APP-000292-CTR-000680 SRG-APP-000293-CTR-000685 SRG-APP-000294-CTR-000690 SRG-APP-000319-CTR-000745 SRG-APP-000320-CTR-000750 SRG-APP-000509-CTR-001305 5.2.3.1 The actions taken by system administrators should be audited to keep a record of what was executed on the system, as well as, for accountability purposes. CCE-80743-8 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80743-8 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /etc/sudoers already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit/ contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/sudoers\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: audit.rules register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80743-8 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /etc/sudoers in /etc/audit/audit.rules lineinfile: line: -w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k actions state: present dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80743-8 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /etc/sudoers already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/sudoers\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_existing_watch_rules_d when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80743-8 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key actions find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)actions$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_watch_key when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80743-8 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - /etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80743-8 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80743-8 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /etc/sudoers in /etc/audit/rules.d/ lineinfile: path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' line: -w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k actions create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80743-8 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /etc/sudoers.d/ already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit/ contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/sudoers.d/\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: audit.rules register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80743-8 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /etc/sudoers.d/ in /etc/audit/audit.rules lineinfile: line: -w /etc/sudoers.d/ -p wa -k actions state: present dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80743-8 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /etc/sudoers.d/ already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/sudoers.d/\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_existing_watch_rules_d when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80743-8 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key actions find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)actions$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_watch_key when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80743-8 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - /etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80743-8 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80743-8 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /etc/sudoers.d/ in /etc/audit/rules.d/ lineinfile: path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' line: -w /etc/sudoers.d/ -p wa -k actions create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80743-8 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,{{ -w%20/etc/sudoers.d/%20-p%20wa%20-k%20actions%0A-w%20/etc/sudoers%20-p%20wa%20-k%20actions%0A }} mode: 0600 path: /etc/audit/rules.d/75-audit-sysadmin-actions.rules overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # into the list of files to be inspected files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k actions" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. # If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules' to list of files for inspection. readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # For each of the matched entries for match in "${matches[@]}" do # Extract filepath from the match rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') # Append that path into list of files for inspection files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") done # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] then # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules' into list of files for inspection key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules" # If the actions.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] then touch "$key_rule_file" chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" fi files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") fi # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k actions" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # into the list of files to be inspected files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers.d/" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers.d/ $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers.d/$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/sudoers.d/ -p wa -k actions" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. # If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules' to list of files for inspection. readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers.d/" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # For each of the matched entries for match in "${matches[@]}" do # Extract filepath from the match rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') # Append that path into list of files for inspection files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") done # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] then # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules' into list of files for inspection key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules" # If the actions.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] then touch "$key_rule_file" chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" fi files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") fi # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers.d/" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers.d/ $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers.d/$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/sudoers.d/ -p wa -k actions" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Shutdown System When Auditing Failures Occur If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to to the bottom of a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -f If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to the bottom of the /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -f 1 14 15 16 3 5 6 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 MEA02.01 3.3.1 3.3.4 CCI-000139 CCI-000140 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 AU-5(b) SC-24 CM-6(a) PR.PT-1 SRG-OS-000046-GPOS-00022 SRG-OS-000047-GPOS-00023 It is critical for the appropriate personnel to be aware if a system is at risk of failing to process audit logs as required. Without this notification, the security personnel may be unaware of an impending failure of the audit capability, and system operation may be adversely affected. Audit processing failures include software/hardware errors, failures in the audit capturing mechanisms, and audit storage capacity being reached or exceeded. CCE-80744-6 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80744-6 - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 - NIST-800-171-3.3.4 - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-24 - audit_rules_system_shutdown - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_audit_failure_mode # promote to variable set_fact: var_audit_failure_mode: !!str tags: - always - name: Collect all files from /etc/audit/rules.d with .rules extension find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d/ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_rules_d when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80744-6 - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 - NIST-800-171-3.3.4 - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-24 - audit_rules_system_shutdown - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Remove the -f option from all Audit config files lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' regexp: ^\s*(?:-f)\s+.*$ state: absent loop: '{{ find_rules_d.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list + [''/etc/audit/audit.rules''] }}' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80744-6 - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 - NIST-800-171-3.3.4 - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-24 - audit_rules_system_shutdown - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Add Audit -f option into /etc/audit/rules.d/immutable.rules and /etc/audit/audit.rules lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' create: true line: -f {{ var_audit_failure_mode }} loop: - /etc/audit/audit.rules - /etc/audit/rules.d/immutable.rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80744-6 - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 - NIST-800-171-3.3.4 - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-24 - audit_rules_system_shutdown - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then var_audit_failure_mode='' # Traverse all of: # # /etc/audit/audit.rules, (for auditctl case) # /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules (for augenrules case) find /etc/audit /etc/audit/rules.d -maxdepth 1 -type f -name '*.rules' -exec sed -i '/-f[[:space:]]\+.*/d' {} ';' for AUDIT_FILE in "/etc/audit/audit.rules" "/etc/audit/rules.d/immutable.rules" do echo '' >> $AUDIT_FILE echo '# Set the audit.rules configuration to halt system upon audit failure per security requirements' >> $AUDIT_FILE echo "-f $var_audit_failure_mode" >> $AUDIT_FILE done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Events that Modify User/Group Information If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d, in order to capture events that modify account changes: -w /etc/group -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification -w /etc/passwd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification -w /etc/gshadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification -w /etc/shadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification -w /etc/security/opasswd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file, in order to capture events that modify account changes: -w /etc/group -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification -w /etc/passwd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification -w /etc/gshadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification -w /etc/shadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification -w /etc/security/opasswd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification This rule checks for multiple syscalls related to account changes; it was written with DISA STIG in mind. Other policies should use a separate rule for each syscall that needs to be checked. For example: audit_rules_usergroup_modification_groupaudit_rules_usergroup_modification_gshadowaudit_rules_usergroup_modification_passwd 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 5.4.1.1 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.03 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000018 CCI-000130 CCI-000172 CCI-001403 CCI-002130 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.1.2 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.7.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-007-3 R.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 AC-2(4) AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-1 PR.AC-3 PR.AC-4 PR.AC-6 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 Req-10.2.5 SRG-OS-000004-GPOS-00004 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000239-GPOS-00089 SRG-OS-000241-GPOS-00090 SRG-OS-000241-GPOS-00091 SRG-OS-000303-GPOS-00120 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000476-GPOS-00221 SRG-APP-000026-CTR-000070 SRG-APP-000027-CTR-000075 SRG-APP-000028-CTR-000080 SRG-APP-000291-CTR-000675 SRG-APP-000292-CTR-000680 SRG-APP-000293-CTR-000685 SRG-APP-000294-CTR-000690 SRG-APP-000319-CTR-000745 SRG-APP-000320-CTR-000750 SRG-APP-000509-CTR-001305 In addition to auditing new user and group accounts, these watches will alert the system administrator(s) to any modifications. Any unexpected users, groups, or modifications should be investigated for legitimacy. CCE-80757-8 # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # into the list of files to be inspected files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/group" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/group $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/group$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/group -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. # If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' to list of files for inspection. readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/group" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # For each of the matched entries for match in "${matches[@]}" do # Extract filepath from the match rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') # Append that path into list of files for inspection files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") done # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] then # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' into list of files for inspection key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules" # If the audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] then touch "$key_rule_file" chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" fi files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") fi # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/group" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/group $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/group$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/group -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # into the list of files to be inspected files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/passwd" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/passwd $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/passwd$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/passwd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. # If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' to list of files for inspection. readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/passwd" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # For each of the matched entries for match in "${matches[@]}" do # Extract filepath from the match rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') # Append that path into list of files for inspection files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") done # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] then # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' into list of files for inspection key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules" # If the audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] then touch "$key_rule_file" chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" fi files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") fi # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/passwd" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/passwd $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/passwd$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/passwd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # into the list of files to be inspected files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/gshadow" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/gshadow $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/gshadow$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/gshadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. # If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' to list of files for inspection. readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/gshadow" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # For each of the matched entries for match in "${matches[@]}" do # Extract filepath from the match rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') # Append that path into list of files for inspection files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") done # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] then # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' into list of files for inspection key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules" # If the audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] then touch "$key_rule_file" chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" fi files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") fi # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/gshadow" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/gshadow $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/gshadow$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/gshadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # into the list of files to be inspected files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/shadow" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/shadow $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/shadow$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/shadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. # If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' to list of files for inspection. readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/shadow" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # For each of the matched entries for match in "${matches[@]}" do # Extract filepath from the match rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') # Append that path into list of files for inspection files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") done # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] then # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' into list of files for inspection key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules" # If the audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] then touch "$key_rule_file" chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" fi files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") fi # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/shadow" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/shadow $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/shadow$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/shadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # into the list of files to be inspected files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/security/opasswd" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/security/opasswd $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/security/opasswd$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/security/opasswd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. # If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' to list of files for inspection. readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/security/opasswd" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # For each of the matched entries for match in "${matches[@]}" do # Extract filepath from the match rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') # Append that path into list of files for inspection files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") done # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] then # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' into list of files for inspection key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules" # If the audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] then touch "$key_rule_file" chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" fi files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") fi # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/security/opasswd" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/security/opasswd $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/security/opasswd$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/security/opasswd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Events that Modify User/Group Information - /etc/group If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d, in order to capture events that modify account changes: -w /etc/group -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file, in order to capture events that modify account changes: -w /etc/group -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 5.4.1.1 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.03 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000018 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-001403 CCI-001404 CCI-001405 CCI-001683 CCI-001684 CCI-001685 CCI-001686 CCI-002130 CCI-002132 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.1.2 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.7.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-007-3 R.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 AC-2(4) AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-1 PR.AC-3 PR.AC-4 PR.AC-6 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.2.5 10.2.1.5 SRG-OS-000004-GPOS-00004 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000304-GPOS-00121 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000470-GPOS-00214 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000239-GPOS-00089 SRG-OS-000240-GPOS-00090 SRG-OS-000241-GPOS-00091 SRG-OS-000303-GPOS-00120 SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 SRG-OS-000476-GPOS-00221 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 SRG-APP-000499-CTR-001255 SRG-APP-000503-CTR-001275 RHEL-08-030170 5.2.3.8 SV-230408r627750_rule In addition to auditing new user and group accounts, these watches will alert the system administrator(s) to any modifications. Any unexpected users, groups, or modifications should be investigated for legitimacy. CCE-80758-6 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80758-6 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030170 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_group - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /etc/group already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/group\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_existing_watch_rules_d when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80758-6 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030170 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_group - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key audit_rules_usergroup_modification find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)audit_rules_usergroup_modification$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_watch_key when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80758-6 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030170 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_group - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80758-6 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030170 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_group - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80758-6 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030170 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_group - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /etc/group in /etc/audit/rules.d/ lineinfile: path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' line: -w /etc/group -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80758-6 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030170 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_group - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /etc/group already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit/ contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/group\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: audit.rules register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80758-6 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030170 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_group - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /etc/group in /etc/audit/audit.rules lineinfile: line: -w /etc/group -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification state: present dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80758-6 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030170 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_group - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # into the list of files to be inspected files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/group" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/group $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/group$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/group -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. # If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' to list of files for inspection. readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/group" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # For each of the matched entries for match in "${matches[@]}" do # Extract filepath from the match rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') # Append that path into list of files for inspection files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") done # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] then # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' into list of files for inspection key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules" # If the audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] then touch "$key_rule_file" chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" fi files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") fi # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/group" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/group $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/group$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/group -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Events that Modify User/Group Information - /etc/gshadow If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d, in order to capture events that modify account changes: -w /etc/gshadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file, in order to capture events that modify account changes: -w /etc/gshadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 5.4.1.1 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.03 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000018 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-001403 CCI-001404 CCI-001405 CCI-001683 CCI-001684 CCI-001685 CCI-001686 CCI-002130 CCI-002132 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.1.2 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.7.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-007-3 R.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 AC-2(4) AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-1 PR.AC-3 PR.AC-4 PR.AC-6 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.2.5 10.2.1.5 SRG-OS-000004-GPOS-00004 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000304-GPOS-00121 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000470-GPOS-00214 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000239-GPOS-00089 SRG-OS-000240-GPOS-00090 SRG-OS-000241-GPOS-00091 SRG-OS-000303-GPOS-00120 SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 SRG-OS-000476-GPOS-00221 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 SRG-APP-000499-CTR-001255 SRG-APP-000503-CTR-001275 RHEL-08-030160 5.2.3.8 SV-230407r627750_rule In addition to auditing new user and group accounts, these watches will alert the system administrator(s) to any modifications. Any unexpected users, groups, or modifications should be investigated for legitimacy. CCE-80759-4 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80759-4 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030160 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_gshadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /etc/gshadow already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/gshadow\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_existing_watch_rules_d when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80759-4 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030160 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_gshadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key audit_rules_usergroup_modification find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)audit_rules_usergroup_modification$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_watch_key when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80759-4 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030160 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_gshadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80759-4 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030160 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_gshadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80759-4 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030160 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_gshadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /etc/gshadow in /etc/audit/rules.d/ lineinfile: path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' line: -w /etc/gshadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80759-4 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030160 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_gshadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /etc/gshadow already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit/ contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/gshadow\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: audit.rules register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80759-4 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030160 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_gshadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /etc/gshadow in /etc/audit/audit.rules lineinfile: line: -w /etc/gshadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification state: present dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80759-4 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030160 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_gshadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # into the list of files to be inspected files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/gshadow" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/gshadow $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/gshadow$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/gshadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. # If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' to list of files for inspection. readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/gshadow" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # For each of the matched entries for match in "${matches[@]}" do # Extract filepath from the match rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') # Append that path into list of files for inspection files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") done # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] then # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' into list of files for inspection key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules" # If the audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] then touch "$key_rule_file" chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" fi files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") fi # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/gshadow" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/gshadow $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/gshadow$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/gshadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Events that Modify User/Group Information - /etc/security/opasswd If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d, in order to capture events that modify account changes: -w /etc/security/opasswd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file, in order to capture events that modify account changes: -w /etc/security/opasswd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 5.4.1.1 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.03 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000018 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-001403 CCI-001404 CCI-001405 CCI-001683 CCI-001684 CCI-001685 CCI-001686 CCI-002130 CCI-002132 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.1.2 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.7.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-007-3 R.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 AC-2(4) AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-1 PR.AC-3 PR.AC-4 PR.AC-6 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.2.5 10.2.1.5 SRG-OS-000004-GPOS-00004 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000304-GPOS-00121 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000470-GPOS-00214 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000239-GPOS-00089 SRG-OS-000240-GPOS-00090 SRG-OS-000241-GPOS-00091 SRG-OS-000303-GPOS-00120 SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 SRG-OS-000476-GPOS-00221 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 SRG-APP-000496-CTR-001240 SRG-APP-000497-CTR-001245 SRG-APP-000498-CTR-001250 SRG-APP-000503-CTR-001275 RHEL-08-030140 5.2.3.8 SV-230405r627750_rule In addition to auditing new user and group accounts, these watches will alert the system administrator(s) to any modifications. Any unexpected users, groups, or modifications should be investigated for legitimacy. CCE-80760-2 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80760-2 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030140 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_opasswd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /etc/security/opasswd already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/security/opasswd\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_existing_watch_rules_d when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80760-2 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030140 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_opasswd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key audit_rules_usergroup_modification find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)audit_rules_usergroup_modification$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_watch_key when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80760-2 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030140 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_opasswd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80760-2 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030140 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_opasswd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80760-2 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030140 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_opasswd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /etc/security/opasswd in /etc/audit/rules.d/ lineinfile: path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' line: -w /etc/security/opasswd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80760-2 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030140 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_opasswd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /etc/security/opasswd already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit/ contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/security/opasswd\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: audit.rules register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80760-2 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030140 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_opasswd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /etc/security/opasswd in /etc/audit/audit.rules lineinfile: line: -w /etc/security/opasswd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification state: present dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80760-2 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030140 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_opasswd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # into the list of files to be inspected files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/security/opasswd" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/security/opasswd $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/security/opasswd$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/security/opasswd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. # If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' to list of files for inspection. readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/security/opasswd" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # For each of the matched entries for match in "${matches[@]}" do # Extract filepath from the match rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') # Append that path into list of files for inspection files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") done # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] then # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' into list of files for inspection key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules" # If the audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] then touch "$key_rule_file" chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" fi files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") fi # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/security/opasswd" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/security/opasswd $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/security/opasswd$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/security/opasswd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Events that Modify User/Group Information - /etc/passwd If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d, in order to capture events that modify account changes: -w /etc/passwd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file, in order to capture events that modify account changes: -w /etc/passwd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 5.4.1.1 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.03 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000018 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-001403 CCI-001404 CCI-001405 CCI-001683 CCI-001684 CCI-001685 CCI-001686 CCI-002130 CCI-002132 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.1.2 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.7.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-007-3 R.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 AC-2(4) AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-1 PR.AC-3 PR.AC-4 PR.AC-6 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.2.5 10.2.1.5 SRG-OS-000004-GPOS-00004 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000304-GPOS-00121 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000470-GPOS-00214 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000239-GPOS-00089 SRG-OS-000240-GPOS-00090 SRG-OS-000241-GPOS-00091 SRG-OS-000303-GPOS-00120 SRG-OS-000304-GPOS-00121 SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 SRG-OS-000476-GPOS-00221 SRG-OS-000274-GPOS-00104 SRG-OS-000275-GPOS-00105 SRG-OS-000276-GPOS-00106 SRG-OS-000277-GPOS-00107 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 SRG-APP-000499-CTR-001255 SRG-APP-000503-CTR-001275 RHEL-08-030150 5.2.3.8 SV-230406r627750_rule In addition to auditing new user and group accounts, these watches will alert the system administrator(s) to any modifications. Any unexpected users, groups, or modifications should be investigated for legitimacy. CCE-80761-0 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80761-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030150 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_passwd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /etc/passwd already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/passwd\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_existing_watch_rules_d when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80761-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030150 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_passwd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key audit_rules_usergroup_modification find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)audit_rules_usergroup_modification$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_watch_key when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80761-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030150 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_passwd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80761-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030150 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_passwd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80761-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030150 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_passwd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /etc/passwd in /etc/audit/rules.d/ lineinfile: path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' line: -w /etc/passwd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80761-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030150 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_passwd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /etc/passwd already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit/ contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/passwd\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: audit.rules register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80761-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030150 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_passwd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /etc/passwd in /etc/audit/audit.rules lineinfile: line: -w /etc/passwd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification state: present dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80761-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030150 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_passwd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # into the list of files to be inspected files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/passwd" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/passwd $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/passwd$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/passwd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. # If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' to list of files for inspection. readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/passwd" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # For each of the matched entries for match in "${matches[@]}" do # Extract filepath from the match rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') # Append that path into list of files for inspection files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") done # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] then # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' into list of files for inspection key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules" # If the audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] then touch "$key_rule_file" chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" fi files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") fi # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/passwd" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/passwd $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/passwd$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/passwd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Events that Modify User/Group Information - /etc/shadow If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d, in order to capture events that modify account changes: -w /etc/shadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file, in order to capture events that modify account changes: -w /etc/shadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 5.4.1.1 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.03 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000018 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-001403 CCI-001404 CCI-001405 CCI-001683 CCI-001684 CCI-001685 CCI-001686 CCI-002130 CCI-002132 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.1.2 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.7.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-007-3 R.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 AC-2(4) AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-1 PR.AC-3 PR.AC-4 PR.AC-6 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.2.5 10.2.1.5 SRG-OS-000004-GPOS-00004 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000304-GPOS-00121 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000470-GPOS-00214 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000239-GPOS-00089 SRG-OS-000240-GPOS-00090 SRG-OS-000241-GPOS-00091 SRG-OS-000303-GPOS-00120 SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 SRG-OS-000476-GPOS-00221 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 SRG-APP-000499-CTR-001255 SRG-APP-000503-CTR-001275 RHEL-08-030130 5.2.3.8 SV-230404r627750_rule In addition to auditing new user and group accounts, these watches will alert the system administrator(s) to any modifications. Any unexpected users, groups, or modifications should be investigated for legitimacy. CCE-80762-8 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80762-8 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030130 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_shadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /etc/shadow already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/shadow\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_existing_watch_rules_d when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80762-8 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030130 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_shadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key audit_rules_usergroup_modification find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)audit_rules_usergroup_modification$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_watch_key when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80762-8 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030130 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_shadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80762-8 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030130 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_shadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80762-8 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030130 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_shadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /etc/shadow in /etc/audit/rules.d/ lineinfile: path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' line: -w /etc/shadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80762-8 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030130 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_shadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /etc/shadow already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit/ contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/shadow\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: audit.rules register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80762-8 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030130 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_shadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /etc/shadow in /etc/audit/audit.rules lineinfile: line: -w /etc/shadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification state: present dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80762-8 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030130 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_shadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # into the list of files to be inspected files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/shadow" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/shadow $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/shadow$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/shadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. # If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' to list of files for inspection. readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/shadow" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # For each of the matched entries for match in "${matches[@]}" do # Extract filepath from the match rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') # Append that path into list of files for inspection files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") done # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] then # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' into list of files for inspection key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules" # If the audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] then touch "$key_rule_file" chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" fi files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") fi # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/shadow" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/shadow $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/shadow$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/shadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Attempts to perform maintenance activities The Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 operating system must generate audit records for privileged activities, nonlocal maintenance, diagnostic sessions and other system-level access. Verify the operating system audits activities performed during nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic sessions. Run the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep sudo.log -w /var/log/sudo.log -p wa -k maintenance BP28(R73) CCI-000172 CCI-002884 Req-10.2.2 Req-10.2.5.b 10.2.1.4 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 5.2.3.3 If events associated with nonlocal administrative access or diagnostic sessions are not logged, a major tool for assessing and investigating attacks would not be available. This requirement addresses auditing-related issues associated with maintenance tools used specifically for diagnostic and repair actions on organizational information systems. Nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities are those activities conducted by individuals communicating through a network, either an external network (e.g., the internet) or an internal network. Local maintenance and diagnostic activities are those activities carried out by individuals physically present at the information system or information system component and not communicating across a network connection. This requirement applies to hardware/software diagnostic test equipment or tools. This requirement does not cover hardware/software components that may support information system maintenance, yet are a part of the system, for example, the software implementing "ping," "ls," "ipconfig," or the hardware and software implementing the monitoring port of an Ethernet switch. CCE-86432-2 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-86432-2 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 - audit_sudo_log_events - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /var/log/sudo.log already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^\s*-w\s+/var/log/sudo.log\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_existing_watch_rules_d when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86432-2 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 - audit_sudo_log_events - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key logins find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)logins$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_watch_key when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-86432-2 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 - audit_sudo_log_events - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - /etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-86432-2 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 - audit_sudo_log_events - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-86432-2 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 - audit_sudo_log_events - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /var/log/sudo.log in /etc/audit/rules.d/ lineinfile: path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' line: -w /var/log/sudo.log -p wa -k logins create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-86432-2 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 - audit_sudo_log_events - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /var/log/sudo.log already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit/ contains: ^\s*-w\s+/var/log/sudo.log\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: audit.rules register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86432-2 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 - audit_sudo_log_events - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /var/log/sudo.log in /etc/audit/audit.rules lineinfile: line: -w /var/log/sudo.log -p wa -k logins state: present dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-86432-2 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 - audit_sudo_log_events - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # into the list of files to be inspected files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/sudo.log" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/sudo.log $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/sudo.log$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /var/log/sudo.log -p wa -k logins" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. # If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules' to list of files for inspection. readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/sudo.log" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # For each of the matched entries for match in "${matches[@]}" do # Extract filepath from the match rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') # Append that path into list of files for inspection files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") done # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] then # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules' into list of files for inspection key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules" # If the logins.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] then touch "$key_rule_file" chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" fi files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") fi # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/sudo.log" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/sudo.log $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/sudo.log$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /var/log/sudo.log -p wa -k logins" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Access Events to Audit Log Directory The audit system should collect access events to read audit log directory. The following audit rule will assure that access to audit log directory are collected. -a always,exit -F dir=/var/log/audit/ -F perm=r -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access-audit-trail If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the rule to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the rule to /etc/audit/audit.rules file. AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) FAU_GEN.1.1.c 10.3.1 Attempts to read the logs should be recorded, suspicious access to audit log files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise.' CCE-80941-8 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80941-8 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 - directory_access_var_log_audit - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /var/log/audit block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F dir=/var/log/audit/ -F perm=r -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access-audit-trail.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access-audit-trail.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F dir=/var/log/audit/ -F perm=r -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F dir=/var/log/audit/ -F perm=r -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access-audit-trail create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F dir=/var/log/audit/ -F perm=r -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F dir=/var/log/audit/ -F perm=r -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F dir=/var/log/audit/ -F perm=r -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access-audit-trail create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80941-8 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 - directory_access_var_log_audit - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" OTHER_FILTERS="-F dir=/var/log/audit/ -F perm=r" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="access-audit-trail" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi System Audit Directories Must Be Group Owned By Root All audit directories must be group owned by root user. By default, the path for audit log is /var/log/audit/. To properly set the group owner of /var/log/audit, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /var/log/audit If log_group in /etc/audit/auditd.conf is set to a group other than the root group account, change the group ownership of the audit directories to this specific group. 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 19 3 4 5 6 7 8 5.4.1.1 APO01.06 APO11.04 APO12.06 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 MEA02.01 3.3.1 CCI-000162 CCI-000163 CCI-000164 CCI-001314 4.2.3.10 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.1 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 5.2 SR 6.1 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) AU-9(4) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 PR.PT-1 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 Req-10.5.1 SRG-OS-000057-GPOS-00027 SRG-OS-000058-GPOS-00028 SRG-OS-000059-GPOS-00029 SRG-OS-000206-GPOS-00084 RHEL-08-030110 SV-230400r627750_rule Unauthorized disclosure of audit records can reveal system and configuration data to attackers, thus compromising its confidentiality. CCE-88225-8 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-88225-8 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030110 - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-9(4) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 - configure_strategy - directory_group_ownership_var_log_audit - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: System Audit Directories Must Be Group Owned By Root - Register Audit Configuration Text ansible.builtin.slurp: src: /etc/audit/auditd.conf register: auditd_config_slurp when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-88225-8 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030110 - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-9(4) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 - configure_strategy - directory_group_ownership_var_log_audit - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: System Audit Directories Must Be Group Owned By Root - Set Permissions Custom Location ansible.builtin.file: group: |- {{ auditd_config_slurp['content'] | b64decode | regex_findall(' log_group\s*=\s*(.+)') | default(['root',], boolean=True) | first }} path: |- {{ auditd_config_slurp['content'] | b64decode | regex_findall(' log_file\s*=\s*(.+)') | default(['/var/log/audit/audit.log',], boolean=True) | first | dirname }} when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-88225-8 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030110 - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-9(4) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 - configure_strategy - directory_group_ownership_var_log_audit - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then if LC_ALL=C grep -m 1 -q ^log_group /etc/audit/auditd.conf; then GROUP=$(awk -F "=" '/log_group/ {print $2}' /etc/audit/auditd.conf | tr -d ' ') else GROUP=root fi if LC_ALL=C grep -iw ^log_file /etc/audit/auditd.conf; then DIR=$(awk -F "=" '/^log_file/ {print $2}' /etc/audit/auditd.conf | tr -d ' ' | rev | cut -d"/" -f2- | rev) else DIR="/var/log/audit" fi find ${DIR} -type d -exec chgrp ${GROUP} {} \; else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi System Audit Directories Must Be Owned By Root All audit directories must be owned by root user. By default, the path for audit log is /var/log/audit/. To properly set the owner of /var/log/audit, run the command: $ sudo chown root /var/log/audit 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 19 3 4 5 6 7 8 5.4.1.1 APO01.06 APO11.04 APO12.06 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 MEA02.01 3.3.1 CCI-000162 CCI-000163 CCI-000164 CCI-001314 4.2.3.10 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.1 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 5.2 SR 6.1 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) AU-9(4) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 PR.PT-1 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 Req-10.5.1 SRG-OS-000057-GPOS-00027 SRG-OS-000058-GPOS-00028 SRG-OS-000059-GPOS-00029 SRG-OS-000206-GPOS-00084 RHEL-08-030100 SV-230399r627750_rule Unauthorized disclosure of audit records can reveal system and configuration data to attackers, thus compromising its confidentiality. CCE-88226-6 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-88226-6 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030100 - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-9(4) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 - configure_strategy - directory_ownership_var_log_audit - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: System Audit Directories Must Be Owned By Root - Register Audit Configuration Text ansible.builtin.slurp: src: /etc/audit/auditd.conf register: auditd_config_slurp when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-88226-6 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030100 - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-9(4) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 - configure_strategy - directory_ownership_var_log_audit - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: System Audit Directories Must Be Owned By Root - Set Permissions Custom Location ansible.builtin.file: owner: root path: |- {{ auditd_config_slurp['content'] | b64decode | regex_findall(' log_file\s*=\s*(.+)') | default(['/var/log/audit/audit.log',], boolean=True) | first | dirname }} when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-88226-6 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030100 - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-9(4) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 - configure_strategy - directory_ownership_var_log_audit - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then if LC_ALL=C grep -iw ^log_file /etc/audit/auditd.conf; then FILE=$(awk -F "=" '/^log_file/ {print $2}' /etc/audit/auditd.conf | tr -d ' ') LOGPATH="$(dirname "$FILE")" chown root $LOGPATH else chown root /var/log/audit fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi System Audit Logs Must Have Mode 0750 or Less Permissive Verify the audit log directories have a mode of "0700" or less permissive by first determining where the audit logs are stored with the following command: $ sudo grep -iw log_file /etc/audit/auditd.conf log_file = /var/log/audit/audit.log Configure the audit log directory to be protected from unauthorized read access by setting the correct permissive mode with the following command: $ sudo chmod 0700 audit_log_directory By default, audit_log_directory is "/var/log/audit". 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 19 3 4 5 6 7 8 APO01.06 APO11.04 APO12.06 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 MEA02.01 CCI-000162 CCI-000163 CCI-000164 4.2.3.10 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.1 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 5.2 SR 6.1 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.2 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-004-6 R3.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CIP-007-3 R6.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) AU-9 DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 PR.PT-1 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 SRG-OS-000057-GPOS-00027 SRG-OS-000058-GPOS-00028 SRG-OS-000059-GPOS-00029 RHEL-08-030120 5.2.4.1 SV-230401r627750_rule If users can write to audit logs, audit trails can be modified or destroyed. CCE-84048-8 # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then if LC_ALL=C grep -iw ^log_file /etc/audit/auditd.conf; then DIR=$(awk -F "=" '/^log_file/ {print $2}' /etc/audit/auditd.conf | tr -d ' ' | rev | cut -d"/" -f2- | rev) else DIR="/var/log/audit" fi chmod 0700 $DIR else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi System Audit Logs Must Be Group Owned By Root All audit logs must be group owned by root user. The path for audit log can be configured via log_file parameter in /etc/audit/auditd.conf or, by default, the path for audit log is /var/log/audit/. To properly set the group owner of /var/log/audit/*, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /var/log/audit/* If log_group in /etc/audit/auditd.conf is set to a group other than the root group account, change the group ownership of the audit logs to this specific group. 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 19 3 4 5 6 7 8 5.4.1.1 APO01.06 APO11.04 APO12.06 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 MEA02.01 3.3.1 CCI-000162 CCI-000163 CCI-000164 CCI-001314 4.2.3.10 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.1 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 5.2 SR 6.1 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) AU-9(4) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 PR.PT-1 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 Req-10.5.1 10.3.2 SRG-OS-000057-GPOS-00027 SRG-OS-000058-GPOS-00028 SRG-OS-000059-GPOS-00029 SRG-OS-000206-GPOS-00084 RHEL-08-030090 5.2.4.4 SV-230398r627750_rule Unauthorized disclosure of audit records can reveal system and configuration data to attackers, thus compromising its confidentiality. CCE-88227-4 # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then if LC_ALL=C grep -iw log_file /etc/audit/auditd.conf; then FILE=$(awk -F "=" '/^log_file/ {print $2}' /etc/audit/auditd.conf | tr -d ' ') else FILE="/var/log/audit/audit.log" fi if LC_ALL=C grep -m 1 -q ^log_group /etc/audit/auditd.conf; then GROUP=$(awk -F "=" '/log_group/ {print $2}' /etc/audit/auditd.conf | tr -d ' ') if ! [ "${GROUP}" == 'root' ]; then chgrp ${GROUP} $FILE* else chgrp root $FILE* fi else chgrp root $FILE* fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Audit Configuration Files Must Be Owned By Group root All audit configuration files must be owned by group root. chown :root /etc/audit/audit*.{rules,conf} /etc/audit/rules.d/* CCI-000171 SRG-OS-000063-GPOS-00032 5.2.4.7 Without the capability to restrict which roles and individuals can select which events are audited, unauthorized personnel may be able to prevent the auditing of critical events. Misconfigured audits may degrade the system's performance by overwhelming the audit log. Misconfigured audits may also make it more difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident or identify those responsible for one. CCE-86405-8 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-86405-8 - configure_strategy - file_groupownership_audit_configuration - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Find /etc/audit/ file(s) matching ^audit(\.rules|d\.conf)$ command: find -H /etc/audit/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -group 0 -regex "^audit(\.rules|d\.conf)$" register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86405-8 - configure_strategy - file_groupownership_audit_configuration - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner on /etc/audit/ file(s) matching ^audit(\.rules|d\.conf)$ file: path: '{{ item }}' group: '0' state: file with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86405-8 - configure_strategy - file_groupownership_audit_configuration - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Find /etc/audit/rules.d/ file(s) matching ^.*\.rules$ command: find -H /etc/audit/rules.d/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -group 0 -regex "^.*\.rules$" register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86405-8 - configure_strategy - file_groupownership_audit_configuration - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner on /etc/audit/rules.d/ file(s) matching ^.*\.rules$ file: path: '{{ item }}' group: '0' state: file with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86405-8 - configure_strategy - file_groupownership_audit_configuration - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then find /etc/audit/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -group 0 -regex '^audit(\.rules|d\.conf)$' -exec chgrp 0 {} \; find /etc/audit/rules.d/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -group 0 -regex '^.*\.rules$' -exec chgrp 0 {} \; else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Audit Configuration Files Must Be Owned By Root All audit configuration files must be owned by root user. To properly set the owner of /etc/audit/, run the command: $ sudo chown root /etc/audit/ To properly set the owner of /etc/audit/rules.d/, run the command: $ sudo chown root /etc/audit/rules.d/ CCI-000171 SRG-OS-000063-GPOS-00032 5.2.4.6 Without the capability to restrict which roles and individuals can select which events are audited, unauthorized personnel may be able to prevent the auditing of critical events. Misconfigured audits may degrade the system's performance by overwhelming the audit log. Misconfigured audits may also make it more difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident or identify those responsible for one. CCE-86406-6 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-86406-6 - configure_strategy - file_ownership_audit_configuration - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Find /etc/audit/ file(s) matching ^audit(\.rules|d\.conf)$ command: find -H /etc/audit/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -uid 0 -regex "^audit(\.rules|d\.conf)$" register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86406-6 - configure_strategy - file_ownership_audit_configuration - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner on /etc/audit/ file(s) matching ^audit(\.rules|d\.conf)$ file: path: '{{ item }}' owner: '0' state: file with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86406-6 - configure_strategy - file_ownership_audit_configuration - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Find /etc/audit/rules.d/ file(s) matching ^.*\.rules$ command: find -H /etc/audit/rules.d/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -uid 0 -regex "^.*\.rules$" register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86406-6 - configure_strategy - file_ownership_audit_configuration - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner on /etc/audit/rules.d/ file(s) matching ^.*\.rules$ file: path: '{{ item }}' owner: '0' state: file with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86406-6 - configure_strategy - file_ownership_audit_configuration - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then find /etc/audit/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -uid 0 -regex '^audit(\.rules|d\.conf)$' -exec chown 0 {} \; find /etc/audit/rules.d/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -uid 0 -regex '^.*\.rules$' -exec chown 0 {} \; else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi System Audit Logs Must Be Owned By Root All audit logs must be owned by root user and group. By default, the path for audit log is /var/log/audit/. To properly set the owner of /var/log/audit, run the command: $ sudo chown root /var/log/audit To properly set the owner of /var/log/audit/*, run the command: $ sudo chown root /var/log/audit/* 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 19 3 4 5 6 7 8 5.4.1.1 APO01.06 APO11.04 APO12.06 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 MEA02.01 3.3.1 CCI-000162 CCI-000163 CCI-000164 CCI-001314 4.2.3.10 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.1 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 5.2 SR 6.1 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) AU-9(4) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 PR.PT-1 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 Req-10.5.1 10.3.2 SRG-OS-000057-GPOS-00027 SRG-OS-000058-GPOS-00028 SRG-OS-000059-GPOS-00029 SRG-APP-000118-CTR-000240 Unauthorized disclosure of audit records can reveal system and configuration data to attackers, thus compromising its confidentiality. CCE-80808-9 # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then if LC_ALL=C grep -m 1 -q ^log_group /etc/audit/auditd.conf; then GROUP=$(awk -F "=" '/log_group/ {print $2}' /etc/audit/auditd.conf | tr -d ' ') if ! [ "${GROUP}" == 'root' ] ; then chown root:${GROUP} /var/log/audit chown root:${GROUP} /var/log/audit/audit.log* else chown root:root /var/log/audit chown root:root /var/log/audit/audit.log* fi else chown root:root /var/log/audit chown root:root /var/log/audit/audit.log* fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi System Audit Logs Must Be Owned By Root All audit logs must be owned by root user. The path for audit log can be configured via log_file parameter in /etc/audit/auditd.conf or by default, the path for audit log is /var/log/audit/. To properly set the owner of /var/log/audit/*, run the command: $ sudo chown root /var/log/audit/* 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 19 3 4 5 6 7 8 5.4.1.1 APO01.06 APO11.04 APO12.06 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 MEA02.01 3.3.1 CCI-000162 CCI-000163 CCI-000164 CCI-001314 4.2.3.10 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.1 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 5.2 SR 6.1 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) AU-9(4) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 PR.PT-1 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 Req-10.5.1 SRG-OS-000057-GPOS-00027 SRG-OS-000058-GPOS-00028 SRG-OS-000059-GPOS-00029 SRG-OS-000206-GPOS-00084 RHEL-08-030080 5.2.4.3 SV-230397r627750_rule Unauthorized disclosure of audit records can reveal system and configuration data to attackers, thus compromising its confidentiality. CCE-88228-2 # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then if LC_ALL=C grep -iw log_file /etc/audit/auditd.conf; then FILE=$(awk -F "=" '/^log_file/ {print $2}' /etc/audit/auditd.conf | tr -d ' ') chown root $FILE* else chown root /var/log/audit/audit.log* fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Audit Configuration Files Permissions are 640 or More Restrictive All audit configuration files permissions must be 640 or more restrictive. chmod 0640 /etc/audit/audit*.{rules,conf} /etc/audit/rules.d/* 5.2.4.5 Without the capability to restrict which roles and individuals can select which events are audited, unauthorized personnel may be able to prevent the auditing of critical events. Misconfigured audits may degrade the system's performance by overwhelming the audit log. Misconfigured audits may also make it more difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident or identify those responsible for one. CCE-86407-4 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-86407-4 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_audit_configuration - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Find /etc/audit/ file(s) command: find -H /etc/audit/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+xs,g+xws,o+xwrt -type f -regex ".*audit\(\.rules\|d\.conf\)$" register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86407-4 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_audit_configuration - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Set permissions for /etc/audit/ file(s) file: path: '{{ item }}' mode: u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt state: file with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86407-4 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_audit_configuration - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Find /etc/audit/rules.d/ file(s) command: find -H /etc/audit/rules.d/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+xs,g+xws,o+xwrt -type f -regex ".*\.rules$" register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86407-4 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_audit_configuration - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Set permissions for /etc/audit/rules.d/ file(s) file: path: '{{ item }}' mode: u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt state: file with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86407-4 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_audit_configuration - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then find -H /etc/audit/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+xs,g+xws,o+xwrt -type f -regex '.*audit\(\.rules\|d\.conf\)$' -exec chmod u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt {} \; find -H /etc/audit/rules.d/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+xs,g+xws,o+xwrt -type f -regex '.*\.rules$' -exec chmod u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt {} \; else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi System Audit Logs Must Have Mode 0640 or Less Permissive Determine where the audit logs are stored with the following command: $ sudo grep -iw log_file /etc/audit/auditd.conf log_file = /var/log/audit/audit.log Configure the audit log to be protected from unauthorized read access by setting the correct permissive mode with the following command: $ sudo chmod 0600 audit_log_file By default, audit_log_file is "/var/log/audit/audit.log". 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 19 3 4 5 6 7 8 5.4.1.1 APO01.06 APO11.04 APO12.06 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 MEA02.01 3.3.1 CCI-000162 CCI-000163 CCI-000164 CCI-001314 4.2.3.10 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.1 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 5.2 SR 6.1 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) AU-9(4) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 PR.PT-1 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 Req-10.5 10.3.1 SRG-OS-000057-GPOS-00027 SRG-OS-000058-GPOS-00028 SRG-OS-000059-GPOS-00029 SRG-OS-000206-GPOS-00084 SRG-APP-000118-CTR-000240 RHEL-08-030070 5.2.4.2 SV-230396r902733_rule If users can write to audit logs, audit trails can be modified or destroyed. CCE-80819-6 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80819-6 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030070 - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-9(4) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 - file_permissions_var_log_audit - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Get audit log files command: grep -iw ^log_file /etc/audit/auditd.conf failed_when: false register: log_file_exists when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80819-6 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030070 - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-9(4) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 - file_permissions_var_log_audit - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Parse log file line command: awk -F '=' '/^log_file/ {print $2}' /etc/audit/auditd.conf register: log_file_line when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - log_file_exists is not skipped and (log_file_exists.stdout | length > 0) tags: - CCE-80819-6 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030070 - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-9(4) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 - file_permissions_var_log_audit - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Set default log_file if not set set_fact: log_file: /var/log/audit/audit.log when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - (log_file_exists is skipped) or (log_file_exists is undefined) or (log_file_exists.stdout | length == 0) tags: - CCE-80819-6 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030070 - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-9(4) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 - file_permissions_var_log_audit - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Set log_file from log_file_line if not set already set_fact: log_file: '{{ log_file_line.stdout | trim }}' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - (log_file_exists is not skipped) and (log_file_line.stdout is defined) and (log_file_line.stdout | length > 0) tags: - CCE-80819-6 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030070 - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-9(4) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 - file_permissions_var_log_audit - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Apply mode to log file file: path: '{{ log_file }}' mode: 384 failed_when: false when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80819-6 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030070 - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-9(4) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 - file_permissions_var_log_audit - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then if LC_ALL=C grep -iw ^log_file /etc/audit/auditd.conf; then FILE=$(awk -F "=" '/^log_file/ {print $2}' /etc/audit/auditd.conf | tr -d ' ') else FILE="/var/log/audit/audit.log" fi chmod 0600 $FILE else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. Note that the "-F arch=b32" lines should be present even on a 64 bit system. These commands identify system calls for auditing. Even if the system is 64 bit it can still execute 32 bit system calls. Additionally, these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. An example of this is that the "-S" calls could be split up and placed on separate lines, however, this is less efficient. Add the following to /etc/audit/audit.rules: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chown,fchown,fchownat,lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod If your system is 64 bit then these lines should be duplicated and the arch=b32 replaced with arch=b64 as follows: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chown,fchown,fchownat,lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - chmod At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 5.4.1.1 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000126 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.5.5 10.3.4 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-APP-000091-CTR-000160 SRG-APP-000492-CTR-001220 SRG-APP-000493-CTR-001225 SRG-APP-000494-CTR-001230 SRG-APP-000500-CTR-001260 SRG-APP-000507-CTR-001295 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 SRG-APP-000499-CTR-001255 RHEL-08-030490 5.2.3.9 SV-230456r810462_rule The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users. CCE-80685-1 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80685-1 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030490 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_chmod - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit chmod tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80685-1 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030490 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_chmod - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for chmod for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - chmod syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - name: Check existence of chmod in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - chmod syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - name: Check existence of chmod in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) tags: - CCE-80685-1 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030490 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_chmod - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for chmod for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - chmod syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - name: Check existence of chmod in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - chmod syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - name: Check existence of chmod in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80685-1 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030490 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_chmod - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit && { ! ( grep -q aarch64 /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ); }; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="chmod" KEY="perm_mod" SYSCALL_GROUPING="chmod fchmod fchmodat" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - chown At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 5.4.1.1 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000126 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.5.5 10.3.4 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 SRG-APP-000091-CTR-000160 SRG-APP-000492-CTR-001220 SRG-APP-000493-CTR-001225 SRG-APP-000494-CTR-001230 SRG-APP-000500-CTR-001260 SRG-APP-000507-CTR-001295 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 SRG-APP-000499-CTR-001255 RHEL-08-030480 5.2.3.9 SV-230455r810459_rule The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users. CCE-80686-9 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80686-9 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030480 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_chown - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit chown tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80686-9 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030480 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_chown - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for chown for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - chown syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of chown in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - chown syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of chown in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) tags: - CCE-80686-9 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030480 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_chown - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for chown for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - chown syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of chown in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - chown syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of chown in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80686-9 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030480 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_chown - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit && { ! ( grep -q aarch64 /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ); }; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="chown" KEY="perm_mod" SYSCALL_GROUPING="chown fchown fchownat lchown" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fchmod At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 5.4.1.1 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000126 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.5.5 10.3.4 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-APP-000091-CTR-000160 SRG-APP-000492-CTR-001220 SRG-APP-000493-CTR-001225 SRG-APP-000494-CTR-001230 SRG-APP-000500-CTR-001260 SRG-APP-000507-CTR-001295 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 SRG-APP-000499-CTR-001255 RHEL-08-030490 5.2.3.9 SV-230456r810462_rule The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users. CCE-80687-7 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80687-7 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030490 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmod - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit fchmod tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80687-7 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030490 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmod - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchmod for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchmod syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - name: Check existence of fchmod in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchmod syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - name: Check existence of fchmod in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80687-7 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030490 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmod - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchmod for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchmod syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - name: Check existence of fchmod in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchmod syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - name: Check existence of fchmod in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80687-7 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030490 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmod - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="fchmod" KEY="perm_mod" SYSCALL_GROUPING="chmod fchmod fchmodat" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fchmodat At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 5.4.1.1 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000126 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.5.5 10.3.4 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-APP-000091-CTR-000160 SRG-APP-000492-CTR-001220 SRG-APP-000493-CTR-001225 SRG-APP-000494-CTR-001230 SRG-APP-000500-CTR-001260 SRG-APP-000507-CTR-001295 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 SRG-APP-000499-CTR-001255 RHEL-08-030490 5.2.3.9 SV-230456r810462_rule The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users. CCE-80688-5 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80688-5 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030490 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmodat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit fchmodat tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80688-5 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030490 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmodat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchmodat for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchmodat syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - name: Check existence of fchmodat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchmodat syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - name: Check existence of fchmodat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80688-5 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030490 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmodat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchmodat for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchmodat syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - name: Check existence of fchmodat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchmodat syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - name: Check existence of fchmodat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80688-5 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030490 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmodat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="fchmodat" KEY="perm_mod" SYSCALL_GROUPING="chmod fchmod fchmodat" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fchown At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 5.4.1.1 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000126 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.5.5 10.3.4 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 SRG-APP-000091-CTR-000160 SRG-APP-000492-CTR-001220 SRG-APP-000493-CTR-001225 SRG-APP-000494-CTR-001230 SRG-APP-000500-CTR-001260 SRG-APP-000507-CTR-001295 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 SRG-APP-000499-CTR-001255 RHEL-08-030480 5.2.3.9 SV-230455r810459_rule The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users. CCE-80689-3 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80689-3 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030480 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchown - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit fchown tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80689-3 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030480 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchown - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchown for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchown syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of fchown in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchown syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of fchown in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80689-3 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030480 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchown - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchown for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchown syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of fchown in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchown syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of fchown in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80689-3 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030480 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchown - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="fchown" KEY="perm_mod" SYSCALL_GROUPING="chown fchown fchownat lchown" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fchownat At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchownat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchownat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchownat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchownat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 5.4.1.1 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000126 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.5.5 10.3.4 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 SRG-APP-000091-CTR-000160 SRG-APP-000492-CTR-001220 SRG-APP-000493-CTR-001225 SRG-APP-000494-CTR-001230 SRG-APP-000500-CTR-001260 SRG-APP-000507-CTR-001295 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 SRG-APP-000499-CTR-001255 RHEL-08-030480 5.2.3.9 SV-230455r810459_rule The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users. CCE-80690-1 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80690-1 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030480 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchownat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit fchownat tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80690-1 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030480 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchownat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchownat for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchownat syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of fchownat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchownat syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of fchownat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80690-1 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030480 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchownat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchownat for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchownat syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of fchownat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchownat syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of fchownat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80690-1 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030480 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchownat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="fchownat" KEY="perm_mod" SYSCALL_GROUPING="chown fchown fchownat lchown" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fremovexattr At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fremovexattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fremovexattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fremovexattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fremovexattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 5.4.1.1 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.5.5 10.3.4 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212 SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 SRG-APP-000091-CTR-000160 SRG-APP-000492-CTR-001220 SRG-APP-000493-CTR-001225 SRG-APP-000494-CTR-001230 SRG-APP-000500-CTR-001260 SRG-APP-000507-CTR-001295 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 SRG-APP-000496-CTR-001240 SRG-APP-000497-CTR-001245 SRG-APP-000498-CTR-001250 SRG-APP-000499-CTR-001255 RHEL-08-030200 5.2.3.9 SV-230413r810463_rule The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users. CCE-80691-9 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80691-9 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030200 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_fremovexattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit fremovexattr tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80691-9 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030200 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_fremovexattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fremovexattr for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fremovexattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fremovexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fremovexattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fremovexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fremovexattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fremovexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fremovexattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fremovexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80691-9 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030200 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_fremovexattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fremovexattr for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fremovexattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fremovexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fremovexattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fremovexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fremovexattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fremovexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fremovexattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fremovexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80691-9 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030200 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_fremovexattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="fremovexattr" KEY="perm_mod" SYSCALL_GROUPING="fremovexattr lremovexattr removexattr fsetxattr lsetxattr setxattr" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid=0" SYSCALL="fremovexattr" KEY="perm_mod" SYSCALL_GROUPING="fremovexattr lremovexattr removexattr fsetxattr lsetxattr setxattr" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fsetxattr At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fsetxattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fsetxattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fsetxattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fsetxattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 5.4.1.1 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000126 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.5.5 10.3.4 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 SRG-APP-000091-CTR-000160 SRG-APP-000492-CTR-001220 SRG-APP-000493-CTR-001225 SRG-APP-000494-CTR-001230 SRG-APP-000500-CTR-001260 SRG-APP-000507-CTR-001295 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 SRG-APP-000496-CTR-001240 SRG-APP-000497-CTR-001245 SRG-APP-000498-CTR-001250 SRG-APP-000501-CTR-001265 SRG-APP-000502-CTR-001270 RHEL-08-030200 5.2.3.9 SV-230413r810463_rule The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users. CCE-80692-7 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80692-7 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030200 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_fsetxattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit fsetxattr tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80692-7 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030200 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_fsetxattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fsetxattr for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fsetxattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fsetxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fsetxattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fsetxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fsetxattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fsetxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fsetxattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fsetxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80692-7 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030200 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_fsetxattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fsetxattr for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fsetxattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fsetxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fsetxattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fsetxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fsetxattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fsetxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fsetxattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fsetxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80692-7 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030200 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_fsetxattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="fsetxattr" KEY="perm_mod" SYSCALL_GROUPING="fremovexattr lremovexattr removexattr fsetxattr lsetxattr setxattr" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid=0" SYSCALL="fsetxattr" KEY="perm_mod" SYSCALL_GROUPING="fremovexattr lremovexattr removexattr fsetxattr lsetxattr setxattr" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - lchown At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 5.4.1.1 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000126 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.5.5 10.3.4 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 SRG-APP-000091-CTR-000160 SRG-APP-000492-CTR-001220 SRG-APP-000493-CTR-001225 SRG-APP-000494-CTR-001230 SRG-APP-000500-CTR-001260 SRG-APP-000507-CTR-001295 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 SRG-APP-000499-CTR-001255 RHEL-08-030480 5.2.3.9 SV-230455r810459_rule The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users. CCE-80693-5 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80693-5 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030480 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_lchown - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit lchown tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80693-5 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030480 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_lchown - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for lchown for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lchown syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of lchown in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lchown syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of lchown in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) tags: - CCE-80693-5 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030480 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_lchown - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for lchown for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lchown syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of lchown in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lchown syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of lchown in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80693-5 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030480 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_lchown - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit && { ! ( grep -q aarch64 /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ); }; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="lchown" KEY="perm_mod" SYSCALL_GROUPING="chown fchown fchownat lchown" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - lremovexattr At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lremovexattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lremovexattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lremovexattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lremovexattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 5.4.1.1 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.5.5 10.3.4 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 SRG-APP-000091-CTR-000160 SRG-APP-000492-CTR-001220 SRG-APP-000493-CTR-001225 SRG-APP-000494-CTR-001230 SRG-APP-000500-CTR-001260 SRG-APP-000507-CTR-001295 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 SRG-APP-000496-CTR-001240 SRG-APP-000497-CTR-001245 SRG-APP-000498-CTR-001250 SRG-APP-000499-CTR-001255 SRG-APP-000501-CTR-001265 SRG-APP-000502-CTR-001270 RHEL-08-030200 5.2.3.9 SV-230413r810463_rule The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users. CCE-80694-3 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80694-3 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030200 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_lremovexattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit lremovexattr tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80694-3 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030200 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_lremovexattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for lremovexattr for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lremovexattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of lremovexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lremovexattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of lremovexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lremovexattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of lremovexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lremovexattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of lremovexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80694-3 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030200 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_lremovexattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for lremovexattr for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lremovexattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of lremovexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lremovexattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of lremovexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lremovexattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of lremovexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lremovexattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of lremovexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80694-3 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030200 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_lremovexattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="lremovexattr" KEY="perm_mod" SYSCALL_GROUPING="fremovexattr lremovexattr removexattr fsetxattr lsetxattr setxattr" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid=0" SYSCALL="lremovexattr" KEY="perm_mod" SYSCALL_GROUPING="fremovexattr lremovexattr removexattr fsetxattr lsetxattr setxattr" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - lsetxattr At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lsetxattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lsetxattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lsetxattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lsetxattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 5.4.1.1 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000126 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.5.5 10.3.4 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 SRG-APP-000091-CTR-000160 SRG-APP-000492-CTR-001220 SRG-APP-000493-CTR-001225 SRG-APP-000494-CTR-001230 SRG-APP-000500-CTR-001260 SRG-APP-000507-CTR-001295 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 SRG-APP-000496-CTR-001240 SRG-APP-000497-CTR-001245 SRG-APP-000498-CTR-001250 SRG-APP-000501-CTR-001265 SRG-APP-000502-CTR-001270 RHEL-08-030200 5.2.3.9 SV-230413r810463_rule The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users. CCE-80695-0 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80695-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030200 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_lsetxattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit lsetxattr tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80695-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030200 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_lsetxattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for lsetxattr for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lsetxattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of lsetxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lsetxattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of lsetxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lsetxattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of lsetxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lsetxattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of lsetxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80695-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030200 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_lsetxattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for lsetxattr for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lsetxattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of lsetxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lsetxattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of lsetxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lsetxattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of lsetxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lsetxattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of lsetxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80695-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030200 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_lsetxattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="lsetxattr" KEY="perm_mod" SYSCALL_GROUPING="fremovexattr lremovexattr removexattr fsetxattr lsetxattr setxattr" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid=0" SYSCALL="lsetxattr" KEY="perm_mod" SYSCALL_GROUPING="fremovexattr lremovexattr removexattr fsetxattr lsetxattr setxattr" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - removexattr At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S removexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S removexattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S removexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S removexattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S removexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S removexattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S removexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S removexattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 5.4.1.1 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.5.5 10.3.4 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 SRG-APP-000091-CTR-000160 SRG-APP-000492-CTR-001220 SRG-APP-000493-CTR-001225 SRG-APP-000494-CTR-001230 SRG-APP-000500-CTR-001260 SRG-APP-000507-CTR-001295 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 SRG-APP-000496-CTR-001240 SRG-APP-000497-CTR-001245 SRG-APP-000498-CTR-001250 SRG-APP-000499-CTR-001255 SRG-APP-000501-CTR-001265 SRG-APP-000502-CTR-001270 RHEL-08-030200 5.2.3.9 SV-230413r810463_rule The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users. CCE-80696-8 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80696-8 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030200 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_removexattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit removexattr tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80696-8 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030200 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_removexattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for removexattr for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - removexattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of removexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - removexattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of removexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - removexattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of removexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - removexattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of removexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80696-8 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030200 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_removexattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for removexattr for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - removexattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of removexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - removexattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of removexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - removexattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of removexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - removexattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of removexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80696-8 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030200 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_removexattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="removexattr" KEY="perm_mod" SYSCALL_GROUPING="fremovexattr lremovexattr removexattr fsetxattr lsetxattr setxattr" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid=0" SYSCALL="removexattr" KEY="perm_mod" SYSCALL_GROUPING="fremovexattr lremovexattr removexattr fsetxattr lsetxattr setxattr" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - setxattr At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S setxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S setxattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setxattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S setxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S setxattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setxattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 5.4.1.1 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000126 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.5.5 10.3.4 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-APP-000091-CTR-000160 SRG-APP-000492-CTR-001220 SRG-APP-000493-CTR-001225 SRG-APP-000494-CTR-001230 SRG-APP-000500-CTR-001260 SRG-APP-000507-CTR-001295 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 RHEL-08-030200 5.2.3.9 SV-230413r810463_rule The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users. CCE-80697-6 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80697-6 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030200 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_setxattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit setxattr tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80697-6 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030200 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_setxattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for setxattr for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - setxattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of setxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - setxattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of setxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - setxattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of setxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - setxattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of setxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80697-6 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030200 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_setxattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for setxattr for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - setxattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of setxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - setxattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of setxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - setxattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of setxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - setxattr syscall_grouping: - fremovexattr - lremovexattr - removexattr - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of setxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80697-6 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030200 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 - audit_rules_dac_modification_setxattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="setxattr" KEY="perm_mod" SYSCALL_GROUPING="fremovexattr lremovexattr removexattr fsetxattr lsetxattr setxattr" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid=0" SYSCALL="setxattr" KEY="perm_mod" SYSCALL_GROUPING="fremovexattr lremovexattr removexattr fsetxattr lsetxattr setxattr" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - umount At a minimum, the audit system should collect file system umount changes. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S umount -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S umount -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. CCI-000130 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users. - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - audit_rules_dac_modification_umount - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for umount for x86 platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - umount syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of umount in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - umount syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of umount in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) tags: - audit_rules_dac_modification_umount - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit && { ! ( grep -q aarch64 /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ); }; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=b32" OTHER_FILTERS="" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="umount" KEY="perm_mod" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - umount2 At a minimum, the audit system should collect file system umount2 changes. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S umount2 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S umount2 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S umount2 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S umount2 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. BP28(R73) CCI-000130 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users. CCE-90776-6 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-90776-6 - audit_rules_dac_modification_umount2 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit umount2 tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-90776-6 - audit_rules_dac_modification_umount2 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for umount2 for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - umount2 syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of umount2 in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - umount2 syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of umount2 in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-90776-6 - audit_rules_dac_modification_umount2 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for umount2 for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - umount2 syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of umount2 in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - umount2 syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of umount2 in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-90776-6 - audit_rules_dac_modification_umount2 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="umount2" KEY="perm_mod" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Execution Attempts to Run ACL Privileged Commands At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of ACL privileged commands for all users and root. Record Any Attempts to Run chacl At a minimum, the audit system should collect any execution attempt of the chacl command for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chacl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chacl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 SRG-APP-000499-CTR-001255 RHEL-08-030570 5.2.3.17 SV-230464r627750_rule Without generating audit records that are specific to the security and mission needs of the organization, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident or identify those responsible for one. Audit records can be generated from various components within the information system (e.g., module or policy filter). CCE-89446-9 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-89446-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030570 - audit_rules_execution_chacl - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/bin/chacl block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/bin/chacl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/chacl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/chacl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/bin/chacl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/chacl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/chacl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-89446-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030570 - audit_rules_execution_chacl - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/bin/chacl -F perm=x" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="privileged" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Any Attempts to Run setfacl At a minimum, the audit system should collect any execution attempt of the setfacl command for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/setfacl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/setfacl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 RHEL-08-030330 5.2.3.16 SV-230435r627750_rule Without generating audit records that are specific to the security and mission needs of the organization, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident or identify those responsible for one. Audit records can be generated from various components within the information system (e.g., module or policy filter). CCE-88437-9 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-88437-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030330 - audit_rules_execution_setfacl - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/bin/setfacl block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/bin/setfacl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/setfacl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/setfacl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/bin/setfacl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/setfacl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/setfacl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-88437-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030330 - audit_rules_execution_setfacl - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/bin/setfacl -F perm=x" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="privileged" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Execution Attempts to Run SELinux Privileged Commands At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of SELinux privileged commands for all users and root. Record Any Attempts to Run chcon At a minimum, the audit system should collect any execution attempt of the chcon command for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chcon -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chcon -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged 1 12 13 14 15 16 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.PT-1 FAU_GEN.1.1.c SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 SRG-OS-000465-GPOS-00209 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 SRG-APP-000496-CTR-001240 SRG-APP-000497-CTR-001245 SRG-APP-000498-CTR-001250 SRG-APP-000501-CTR-001265 SRG-APP-000502-CTR-001270 RHEL-08-030260 5.2.3.15 SV-230419r627750_rule Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for unusual activity. CCE-80698-4 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80698-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030260 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_execution_chcon - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/bin/chcon block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/bin/chcon -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/chcon -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/chcon -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/bin/chcon -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/chcon -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/chcon -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80698-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030260 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_execution_chcon - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/bin/chcon -F perm=x" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="privileged" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Any Attempts to Run restorecon At a minimum, the audit system should collect any execution attempt of the restorecon command for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/restorecon -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/restorecon -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged 1 12 13 14 15 16 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.PT-1 FAU_GEN.1.1.c SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 SRG-OS-000465-GPOS-00209 Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for unusual activity. CCE-80699-2 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80699-2 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_execution_restorecon - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/sbin/restorecon block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/sbin/restorecon -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/restorecon -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/restorecon -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/sbin/restorecon -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/restorecon -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/restorecon -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80699-2 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_execution_restorecon - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/sbin/restorecon -F perm=x" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="privileged" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Any Attempts to Run semanage At a minimum, the audit system should collect any execution attempt of the semanage command for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/semanage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/semanage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged 1 12 13 14 15 16 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-007-3 R.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 AC-2(4) AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.PT-1 FAU_GEN.1.1.c SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 SRG-OS-000465-GPOS-00209 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 SRG-APP-000496-CTR-001240 SRG-APP-000497-CTR-001245 SRG-APP-000498-CTR-001250 RHEL-08-030313 SV-230429r627750_rule Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for unusual activity. CCE-80700-8 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80700-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030313 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_execution_semanage - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/sbin/semanage block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/sbin/semanage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/semanage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/semanage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/sbin/semanage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/semanage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/semanage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80700-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030313 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_execution_semanage - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/sbin/semanage -F perm=x" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="privileged" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Any Attempts to Run setfiles At a minimum, the audit system should collect any execution attempt of the setfiles command for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/setfiles -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/setfiles -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 SRG-OS-000465-GPOS-00209 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 SRG-APP-000496-CTR-001240 SRG-APP-000497-CTR-001245 SRG-APP-000498-CTR-001250 RHEL-08-030314 SV-230430r627750_rule Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for unusual activity. CCE-82280-9 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-82280-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030314 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_execution_setfiles - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/sbin/setfiles block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/sbin/setfiles -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/setfiles -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/setfiles -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/sbin/setfiles -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/setfiles -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/setfiles -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82280-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030314 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_execution_setfiles - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/sbin/setfiles -F perm=x" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="privileged" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Any Attempts to Run setsebool At a minimum, the audit system should collect any execution attempt of the setsebool command for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/setsebool -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/setsebool -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged 1 12 13 14 15 16 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.PT-1 FAU_GEN.1.1.c SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 SRG-OS-000465-GPOS-00209 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 SRG-APP-000496-CTR-001240 SRG-APP-000497-CTR-001245 SRG-APP-000498-CTR-001250 RHEL-08-030316 SV-230432r627750_rule Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for unusual activity. CCE-80701-6 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80701-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030316 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_execution_setsebool - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/sbin/setsebool block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/sbin/setsebool -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/setsebool -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/setsebool -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/sbin/setsebool -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/setsebool -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/setsebool -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80701-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030316 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_execution_setsebool - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/sbin/setsebool -F perm=x" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="privileged" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Any Attempts to Run seunshare At a minimum, the audit system should collect any execution attempt of the seunshare command for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/seunshare -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/seunshare -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged CCI-000172 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) FAU_GEN.1.1.c Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for unusual activity. CCE-80933-5 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80933-5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_execution_seunshare - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/sbin/seunshare block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/sbin/seunshare -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/seunshare -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/seunshare -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/sbin/seunshare -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/seunshare -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/seunshare -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80933-5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_execution_seunshare - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/sbin/seunshare -F perm=x" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="privileged" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record File Deletion Events by User At a minimum, the audit system should collect file deletion events for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system: -a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S rmdir,unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system: -a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S rmdir,unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete Ensure auditd Collects File Deletion Events by User At a minimum the audit system should collect file deletion events for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system: -a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S rmdir,unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system: -a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S rmdir,unlink,unlinkat,rename -S renameat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete This rule checks for multiple syscalls related to file deletion; it was written with DISA STIG in mind. Other policies should use a separate rule for each syscall that needs to be checked. For example: audit_rules_file_deletion_events_rmdiraudit_rules_file_deletion_events_unlinkaudit_rules_file_deletion_events_unlinkat 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 5.4.1.1 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000366 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.2.7 4.1.14 Auditing file deletions will create an audit trail for files that are removed from the system. The audit trail could aid in system troubleshooting, as well as, detecting malicious processes that attempt to delete log files to conceal their presence. CCE-80702-4 # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # Perform the remediation for the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="rmdir unlink unlinkat rename renameat" KEY="delete" SYSCALL_GROUPING="rmdir unlink unlinkat rename renameat" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects File Deletion Events by User - rename At a minimum, the audit system should collect file deletion events for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system: -a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S rename -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system: -a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S rename -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-000366 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.4 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.1.1 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.MA-2 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.2.7 10.2.1.7 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 SRG-OS-000467-GPOS-00211 SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 SRG-APP-000499-CTR-001255 SRG-APP-000501-CTR-001265 SRG-APP-000502-CTR-001270 RHEL-08-030361 5.2.3.13 SV-230439r810465_rule Auditing file deletions will create an audit trail for files that are removed from the system. The audit trail could aid in system troubleshooting, as well as, detecting malicious processes that attempt to delete log files to conceal their presence. CCE-80703-2 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80703-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030361 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_rename - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit rename tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80703-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030361 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_rename - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for rename for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - rename syscall_grouping: - unlink - unlinkat - rename - renameat - rmdir - name: Check existence of rename in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - rename syscall_grouping: - unlink - unlinkat - rename - renameat - rmdir - name: Check existence of rename in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) tags: - CCE-80703-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030361 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_rename - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for rename for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - rename syscall_grouping: - unlink - unlinkat - rename - renameat - rmdir - name: Check existence of rename in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - rename syscall_grouping: - unlink - unlinkat - rename - renameat - rmdir - name: Check existence of rename in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80703-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030361 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_rename - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit && { ! ( grep -q aarch64 /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ); }; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="rename" KEY="delete" SYSCALL_GROUPING="unlink unlinkat rename renameat rmdir" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects File Deletion Events by User - renameat At a minimum, the audit system should collect file deletion events for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system: -a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S renameat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system: -a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S renameat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-000366 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.4 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.1.1 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.MA-2 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.2.7 10.2.1.7 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 SRG-OS-000467-GPOS-00211 SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 SRG-APP-000499-CTR-001255 SRG-APP-000501-CTR-001265 SRG-APP-000502-CTR-001270 RHEL-08-030361 5.2.3.13 SV-230439r810465_rule Auditing file deletions will create an audit trail for files that are removed from the system. The audit trail could aid in system troubleshooting, as well as, detecting malicious processes that attempt to delete log files to conceal their presence. CCE-80704-0 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80704-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030361 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_renameat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit renameat tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80704-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030361 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_renameat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for renameat for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - renameat syscall_grouping: - unlink - unlinkat - rename - renameat - rmdir - name: Check existence of renameat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - renameat syscall_grouping: - unlink - unlinkat - rename - renameat - rmdir - name: Check existence of renameat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80704-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030361 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_renameat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for renameat for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - renameat syscall_grouping: - unlink - unlinkat - rename - renameat - rmdir - name: Check existence of renameat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - renameat syscall_grouping: - unlink - unlinkat - rename - renameat - rmdir - name: Check existence of renameat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80704-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030361 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_renameat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="renameat" KEY="delete" SYSCALL_GROUPING="unlink unlinkat rename renameat rmdir" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects File Deletion Events by User - rmdir At a minimum, the audit system should collect file deletion events for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system: -a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S rmdir -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system: -a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S rmdir -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-000366 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.4 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.1.1 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.MA-2 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.2.7 10.2.1.7 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 SRG-OS-000467-GPOS-00211 SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 SRG-APP-000499-CTR-001255 SRG-APP-000501-CTR-001265 SRG-APP-000502-CTR-001270 RHEL-08-030361 4.1.14 SV-230439r810465_rule Auditing file deletions will create an audit trail for files that are removed from the system. The audit trail could aid in system troubleshooting, as well as, detecting malicious processes that attempt to delete log files to conceal their presence. CCE-80705-7 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80705-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030361 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_rmdir - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit rmdir tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80705-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030361 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_rmdir - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for rmdir for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - rmdir syscall_grouping: - unlink - unlinkat - rename - renameat - rmdir - name: Check existence of rmdir in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - rmdir syscall_grouping: - unlink - unlinkat - rename - renameat - rmdir - name: Check existence of rmdir in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) tags: - CCE-80705-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030361 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_rmdir - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for rmdir for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - rmdir syscall_grouping: - unlink - unlinkat - rename - renameat - rmdir - name: Check existence of rmdir in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - rmdir syscall_grouping: - unlink - unlinkat - rename - renameat - rmdir - name: Check existence of rmdir in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80705-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030361 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_rmdir - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit && { ! ( grep -q aarch64 /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ); }; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="rmdir" KEY="delete" SYSCALL_GROUPING="unlink unlinkat rename renameat rmdir" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects File Deletion Events by User - unlink At a minimum, the audit system should collect file deletion events for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system: -a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S unlink -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system: -a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S unlink -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-000366 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.4 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.1.1 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.MA-2 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.2.7 10.2.1.7 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 SRG-OS-000467-GPOS-00211 SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 SRG-APP-000499-CTR-001255 SRG-APP-000501-CTR-001265 SRG-APP-000502-CTR-001270 RHEL-08-030361 5.2.3.13 SV-230439r810465_rule Auditing file deletions will create an audit trail for files that are removed from the system. The audit trail could aid in system troubleshooting, as well as, detecting malicious processes that attempt to delete log files to conceal their presence. CCE-80706-5 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80706-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030361 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_unlink - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit unlink tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80706-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030361 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_unlink - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for unlink for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - unlink syscall_grouping: - unlink - unlinkat - rename - renameat - rmdir - name: Check existence of unlink in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - unlink syscall_grouping: - unlink - unlinkat - rename - renameat - rmdir - name: Check existence of unlink in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) tags: - CCE-80706-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030361 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_unlink - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for unlink for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - unlink syscall_grouping: - unlink - unlinkat - rename - renameat - rmdir - name: Check existence of unlink in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - unlink syscall_grouping: - unlink - unlinkat - rename - renameat - rmdir - name: Check existence of unlink in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80706-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030361 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_unlink - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit && { ! ( grep -q aarch64 /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ); }; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="unlink" KEY="delete" SYSCALL_GROUPING="unlink unlinkat rename renameat rmdir" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects File Deletion Events by User - unlinkat At a minimum, the audit system should collect file deletion events for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system: -a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S unlinkat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system: -a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S unlinkat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-000366 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.4 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.1.1 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.MA-2 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.2.7 10.2.1.7 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 SRG-OS-000467-GPOS-00211 SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 SRG-APP-000499-CTR-001255 SRG-APP-000501-CTR-001265 SRG-APP-000502-CTR-001270 RHEL-08-030361 5.2.3.13 SV-230439r810465_rule Auditing file deletions will create an audit trail for files that are removed from the system. The audit trail could aid in system troubleshooting, as well as, detecting malicious processes that attempt to delete log files to conceal their presence. CCE-80707-3 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80707-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030361 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_unlinkat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit unlinkat tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80707-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030361 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_unlinkat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for unlinkat for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - unlinkat syscall_grouping: - unlink - unlinkat - rename - renameat - rmdir - name: Check existence of unlinkat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - unlinkat syscall_grouping: - unlink - unlinkat - rename - renameat - rmdir - name: Check existence of unlinkat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80707-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030361 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_unlinkat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for unlinkat for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - unlinkat syscall_grouping: - unlink - unlinkat - rename - renameat - rmdir - name: Check existence of unlinkat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - unlinkat syscall_grouping: - unlink - unlinkat - rename - renameat - rmdir - name: Check existence of unlinkat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80707-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030361 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_unlinkat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="unlinkat" KEY="delete" SYSCALL_GROUPING="unlink unlinkat rename renameat rmdir" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Unauthorized Access Attempts Events to Files (unsuccessful) At a minimum, the audit system should collect unauthorized file accesses for all users and root. Note that the "-F arch=b32" lines should be present even on a 64 bit system. These commands identify system calls for auditing. Even if the system is 64 bit it can still execute 32 bit system calls. Additionally, these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. An example of this is that the "-S" calls could be split up and placed on separate lines, however, this is less efficient. Add the following to /etc/audit/audit.rules: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat,open,openat,open_by_handle_at,truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat,open,openat,open_by_handle_at,truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access If your system is 64 bit then these lines should be duplicated and the arch=b32 replaced with arch=b64 as follows: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat,open,openat,open_by_handle_at,truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat,open,openat,open_by_handle_at,truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access Record Successful Permission Changes to Files - chmod At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. File permission changes could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-82098-5 Record Successful Ownership Changes to Files - chown At a minimum, the audit system should collect file ownership changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chown -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chown -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chown -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chown -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. File ownership attempts could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-82131-4 Record Successful Access Attempts to Files - creat At a minimum, the audit system should collect unauthorized file accesses for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. File access attempts could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-81150-5 Record Successful Permission Changes to Files - fchmod At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchmod -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchmod -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchmod -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchmod -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. File permission changes could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-82101-7 Record Successful Permission Changes to Files - fchmodat At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchmodat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchmodat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchmodat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchmodat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. File permission changes could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-82104-1 Record Successful Ownership Changes to Files - fchown At a minimum, the audit system should collect file ownership changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchown -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchown -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchown -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchown -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. File ownership attempts could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-82128-0 Record Successful Ownership Changes to Files - fchownat At a minimum, the audit system should collect file ownership changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchownat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchownat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchownat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchownat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. File ownership attempts could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-82134-8 Record Successful Permission Changes to Files - fremovexattr At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fremovexattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fremovexattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fremovexattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fremovexattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. File permission changes could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-82122-3 Record Successful Permission Changes to Files - fsetxattr At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fsetxattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fsetxattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fsetxattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fsetxattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. File permission changes could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-82113-2 Record Successful Access Attempts to Files - ftruncate At a minimum, the audit system should collect unauthorized file accesses for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S ftruncate -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ftruncate -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S ftruncate -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ftruncate -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. File access attempts could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-82006-8 Record Successful Ownership Changes to Files - lchown At a minimum, the audit system should collect file ownership changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. File ownership attempts could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-82125-6 Record Successful Permission Changes to Files - lremovexattr At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lremovexattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lremovexattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lremovexattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lremovexattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. File permission changes could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-82119-9 Record Successful Permission Changes to Files - lsetxattr At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lsetxattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lsetxattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lsetxattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lsetxattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. File permission changes could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-82110-8 Record Successful Access Attempts to Files - open At a minimum, the audit system should collect unauthorized file accesses for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. File access attempts could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-81147-1 Record Successful Access Attempts to Files - open_by_handle_at At a minimum, the audit system should collect unauthorized file accesses for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. File access attempts could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-82013-4 Record Successful Creation Attempts to Files - open_by_handle_at O_CREAT The open_by_handle_at syscall can be used to create new files when O_CREAT flag is specified. The following audit rules will assure that successful attempts to create a file via open_by_handle_at syscall are collected. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the rules below to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the rules below to /etc/audit/audit.rules file. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create Successful attempts to access files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-81132-3 Record Successful Creation Attempts to Files - open_by_handle_at O_TRUNC_WRITE The audit system should collect detailed file access records for all users and root. The open_by_handle_at syscall can be used to modify files if called for write operation with the O_TRUNC_WRITE flag. The following audit rules will assure that successful attempts to create a file via open_by_handle_at syscall are collected. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the rules below to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the rules below to /etc/audit/audit.rules file. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification Successful attempts to access files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-81141-4 Record Successful Creation Attempts to Files - open O_CREAT The open syscall can be used to create new files when O_CREAT flag is specified. The following audit rules will assure that successful attempts to create a file via open syscall are collected. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the rules below to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the rules below to /etc/audit/audit.rules file. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a2&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a2&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,open -F a2&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create Successful attempts to access files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-81135-6 Record Successful Creation Attempts to Files - open O_TRUNC_WRITE The audit system should collect detailed file access records for all users and root. The open syscall can be used to modify files if called for write operation with the O_TRUNC_WRITE flag. The following audit rules will assure that successful attempts to create a file via open syscall are collected. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the rules below to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the rules below to /etc/audit/audit.rules file. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a2&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a2&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat -F a2&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification Successful attempts to access files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-81144-8 Record Successful Access Attempts to Files - openat At a minimum, the audit system should collect unauthorized file accesses for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. File access attempts could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-82010-0 Record Successful Creation Attempts to Files - openat O_CREAT The openat syscall can be used to create new files when O_CREAT flag is specified. The following audit rules will assure that successful attempts to create a file via openat syscall are collected. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the rules below to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the rules below to /etc/audit/audit.rules file. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F a2&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F a2&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create Successful attempts to access files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-81128-1 Record Successful Creation Attempts to Files - openat O_TRUNC_WRITE The audit system should collect detailed file access records for all users and root. The openat syscall can be used to modify files if called for write operation with the O_TRUNC_WRITE flag. The following audit rules will assure that successful attempts to create a file via openat syscall are collected. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the rules below to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the rules below to /etc/audit/audit.rules file. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F a2&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F a2&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat -F a2&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification Successful attempts to access files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-81138-0 Record Successful Permission Changes to Files - removexattr At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S removexattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S removexattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S removexattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S removexattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. File permission changes could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-82116-5 Record Successful Delete Attempts to Files - rename At a minimum, the audit system should collect file deletion for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S rename -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S rename -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S rename -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S rename -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. File deletion attempts could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-82092-8 Record Successful Delete Attempts to Files - renameat At a minimum, the audit system should collect file deletion for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S renameat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S renameat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S renameat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S renameat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. File deletion attempts could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-82095-1 Record Successful Permission Changes to Files - setxattr At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S setxattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setxattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S setxattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setxattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. File deletion attempts could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-82107-4 Record Successful Access Attempts to Files - truncate At a minimum, the audit system should collect unauthorized file accesses for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. File access attempts could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-82002-7 Record Successful Delete Attempts to Files - unlink At a minimum, the audit system should collect file deletion for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. File deletion attempts could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-82086-0 Record Successful Delete Attempts to Files - unlinkat At a minimum, the audit system should collect file deletion for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlinkat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlinkat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlinkat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlinkat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. File deletion attempts could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-82089-4 Ensure auditd Collects Unauthorized Access Attempts to Files (unsuccessful) At a minimum the audit system should collect unauthorized file accesses for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat,open,openat,open_by_handle_at,truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat,open,openat,open_by_handle_at,truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat,open,openat,open_by_handle_at,truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat,open,openat,open_by_handle_at,truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat,open,openat,open_by_handle_at,truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat,open,openat,open_by_handle_at,truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat,open,openat,open_by_handle_at,truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat,open,openat,open_by_handle_at,truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access This rule checks for multiple syscalls related to unsuccessful file modification; it was written with DISA STIG in mind. Other policies should use a separate rule for each syscall that needs to be checked. For example: audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_openaudit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_ftruncateaudit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_creat 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 5.4.1.1 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 0582 0584 05885 0586 0846 0957 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 Req-10.2.4 Req-10.2.1 Unsuccessful attempts to access files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80750-3 # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit && { ! ( grep -q aarch64 /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ); }; then # Perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do # First fix the -EACCES requirement ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EACCES" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="creat open openat open_by_handle_at truncate ftruncate" KEY="access" SYSCALL_GROUPING="creat open openat open_by_handle_at truncate ftruncate" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi # Then fix the -EPERM requirement # No need to change content of $GROUP variable - it's the same as for -EACCES case above ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EPERM" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="creat open openat open_by_handle_at truncate ftruncate" KEY="access" SYSCALL_GROUPING="creat open openat open_by_handle_at truncate ftruncate" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Unsuccessful Permission Changes to Files - chmod The audit system should collect unsuccessful file permission change attempts for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the audit rule checks a system call independently of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change CCI-000172 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) Unsuccessful attempts to change permissions of files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80975-6 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80975-6 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_chmod - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit chmod tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80975-6 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_chmod - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for chmod EACCES for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - chmod syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of chmod in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - chmod syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of chmod in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) tags: - CCE-80975-6 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_chmod - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for chmod EACCES for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - chmod syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of chmod in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - chmod syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of chmod in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80975-6 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_chmod - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for chmod EPERM for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - chmod syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of chmod in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - chmod syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of chmod in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) tags: - CCE-80975-6 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_chmod - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for chmod EPERM for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - chmod syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of chmod in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - chmod syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of chmod in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80975-6 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_chmod - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit && { ! ( grep -q aarch64 /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ); }; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="chmod" KEY="access" SYSCALL_GROUPING="chmod fchmod fchmodat fsetxattr lsetxattr setxattr" for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EACCES" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EPERM" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Unsuccessful Ownership Changes to Files - chown The audit system should collect unsuccessful file ownership change attempts for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chown -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chown -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chown -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chown -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the audit rule checks a system call independently of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change CCI-000172 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) Unsuccessful attempts to change ownership of files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80984-8 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80984-8 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_chown - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit chown tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80984-8 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_chown - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for chown EACCES for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - chown syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of chown in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - chown syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of chown in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) tags: - CCE-80984-8 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_chown - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for chown EACCES for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - chown syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of chown in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - chown syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of chown in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80984-8 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_chown - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for chown EPERM for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - chown syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of chown in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - chown syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of chown in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) tags: - CCE-80984-8 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_chown - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for chown EPERM for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - chown syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of chown in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - chown syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of chown in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80984-8 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_chown - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit && { ! ( grep -q aarch64 /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ); }; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="chown" KEY="access" SYSCALL_GROUPING="chown fchown fchownat lchown" for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EACCES" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EPERM" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Unsuccessful Access Attempts to Files - creat At a minimum, the audit system should collect unauthorized file accesses for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.2.4 Req-10.2.1 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 RHEL-08-030420 5.2.3.7 SV-230449r810455_rule Unsuccessful attempts to access files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80751-1 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80751-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030420 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_creat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit creat tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80751-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030420 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_creat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for creat EACCES for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - creat syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of creat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - creat syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of creat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) tags: - CCE-80751-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030420 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_creat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for creat EACCES for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - creat syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of creat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - creat syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of creat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80751-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030420 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_creat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for creat EPERM for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - creat syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of creat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - creat syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of creat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) tags: - CCE-80751-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030420 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_creat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for creat EPERM for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - creat syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of creat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - creat syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of creat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80751-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030420 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_creat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit && { ! ( grep -q aarch64 /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ); }; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="creat" KEY="access" SYSCALL_GROUPING="creat ftruncate truncate open openat open_by_handle_at" for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EACCES" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EPERM" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Unsuccessful Permission Changes to Files - fchmod The audit system should collect unsuccessful file permission change attempts for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchmod -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchmod -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchmod -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchmod -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the audit rule checks a system call independently of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change CCI-000172 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) Unsuccessful attempts to change permissions of files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80977-2 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80977-2 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fchmod - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit fchmod tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80977-2 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fchmod - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchmod EACCES for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchmod syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fchmod in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchmod syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fchmod in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80977-2 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fchmod - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchmod EACCES for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchmod syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fchmod in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchmod syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fchmod in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80977-2 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fchmod - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchmod EPERM for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchmod syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fchmod in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchmod syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fchmod in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80977-2 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fchmod - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchmod EPERM for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchmod syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fchmod in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchmod syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fchmod in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80977-2 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fchmod - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="fchmod" KEY="access" SYSCALL_GROUPING="chmod fchmod fchmodat fsetxattr lsetxattr setxattr" for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EACCES" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EPERM" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Unsuccessful Permission Changes to Files - fchmodat The audit system should collect unsuccessful file permission change attempts for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchmodat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchmodat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchmodat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchmodat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the audit rule checks a system call independently of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change CCI-000172 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) Unsuccessful attempts to change permissions of files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80976-4 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80976-4 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fchmodat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit fchmodat tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80976-4 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fchmodat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchmodat EACCES for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchmodat syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fchmodat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchmodat syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fchmodat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80976-4 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fchmodat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchmodat EACCES for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchmodat syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fchmodat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchmodat syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fchmodat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80976-4 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fchmodat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchmodat EPERM for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchmodat syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fchmodat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchmodat syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fchmodat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80976-4 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fchmodat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchmodat EPERM for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchmodat syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fchmodat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchmodat syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fchmodat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80976-4 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fchmodat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="fchmodat" KEY="access" SYSCALL_GROUPING="chmod fchmod fchmodat fsetxattr lsetxattr setxattr" for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EACCES" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EPERM" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Unsuccessful Ownership Changes to Files - fchown The audit system should collect unsuccessful file ownership change attempts for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchown -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchown -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchown -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchown -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the audit rule checks a system call independently of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change CCI-000172 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) Unsuccessful attempts to change ownership of files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80986-3 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80986-3 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fchown - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit fchown tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80986-3 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fchown - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchown EACCES for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchown syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of fchown in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchown syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of fchown in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80986-3 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fchown - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchown EACCES for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchown syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of fchown in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchown syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of fchown in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80986-3 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fchown - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchown EPERM for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchown syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of fchown in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchown syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of fchown in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80986-3 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fchown - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchown EPERM for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchown syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of fchown in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchown syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of fchown in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80986-3 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fchown - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="fchown" KEY="access" SYSCALL_GROUPING="chown fchown fchownat lchown" for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EACCES" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EPERM" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Unsuccessful Ownership Changes to Files - fchownat The audit system should collect unsuccessful file ownership change attempts for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchownat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchownat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchownat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchownat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the audit rule checks a system call independently of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change CCI-000172 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) Unsuccessful attempts to change ownership of files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80985-5 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80985-5 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fchownat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit fchownat tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80985-5 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fchownat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchownat EACCES for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchownat syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of fchownat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchownat syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of fchownat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80985-5 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fchownat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchownat EACCES for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchownat syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of fchownat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchownat syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of fchownat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80985-5 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fchownat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchownat EPERM for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchownat syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of fchownat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchownat syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of fchownat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80985-5 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fchownat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchownat EPERM for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchownat syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of fchownat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fchownat syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of fchownat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80985-5 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fchownat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="fchownat" KEY="access" SYSCALL_GROUPING="chown fchown fchownat lchown" for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EACCES" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EPERM" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Unsuccessful Permission Changes to Files - fremovexattr The audit system should collect unsuccessful file permission change attempts for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fremovexattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fremovexattr -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fremovexattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fremovexattr -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the audit rule checks a system call independently of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change CCI-000172 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) Unsuccessful attempts to change permissions of files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80978-0 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80978-0 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fremovexattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit fremovexattr tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80978-0 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fremovexattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fremovexattr EACCES for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fremovexattr syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of fremovexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fremovexattr syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of fremovexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80978-0 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fremovexattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fremovexattr EACCES for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fremovexattr syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of fremovexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fremovexattr syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of fremovexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80978-0 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fremovexattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fremovexattr EPERM for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fremovexattr syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of fremovexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fremovexattr syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of fremovexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80978-0 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fremovexattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fremovexattr EPERM for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fremovexattr syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of fremovexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fremovexattr syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of fremovexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80978-0 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fremovexattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="fremovexattr" KEY="access" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EACCES" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EPERM" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Unsuccessful Permission Changes to Files - fsetxattr The audit system should collect unsuccessful file permission change attempts for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fsetxattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fsetxattr -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fsetxattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fsetxattr -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the audit rule checks a system call independently of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change CCI-000172 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) Unsuccessful attempts to change permissions of files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80979-8 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80979-8 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fsetxattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit fsetxattr tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80979-8 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fsetxattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fsetxattr EACCES for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fsetxattr syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fsetxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fsetxattr syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fsetxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80979-8 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fsetxattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fsetxattr EACCES for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fsetxattr syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fsetxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fsetxattr syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fsetxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80979-8 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fsetxattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fsetxattr EPERM for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fsetxattr syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fsetxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fsetxattr syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fsetxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80979-8 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fsetxattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fsetxattr EPERM for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fsetxattr syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fsetxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - fsetxattr syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of fsetxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80979-8 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fsetxattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="fsetxattr" KEY="access" SYSCALL_GROUPING="chmod fchmod fchmodat fsetxattr lsetxattr setxattr" for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EACCES" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EPERM" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Unsuccessful Access Attempts to Files - ftruncate At a minimum, the audit system should collect unauthorized file accesses for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.2.4 Req-10.2.1 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 RHEL-08-030420 5.2.3.7 SV-230449r810455_rule Unsuccessful attempts to access files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80752-9 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80752-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030420 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_ftruncate - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit ftruncate tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80752-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030420 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_ftruncate - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for ftruncate EACCES for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - ftruncate syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of ftruncate in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - ftruncate syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of ftruncate in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80752-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030420 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_ftruncate - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for ftruncate EACCES for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - ftruncate syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of ftruncate in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - ftruncate syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of ftruncate in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80752-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030420 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_ftruncate - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for ftruncate EPERM for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - ftruncate syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of ftruncate in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - ftruncate syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of ftruncate in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80752-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030420 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_ftruncate - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for ftruncate EPERM for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - ftruncate syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of ftruncate in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - ftruncate syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of ftruncate in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80752-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030420 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_ftruncate - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="ftruncate" KEY="access" SYSCALL_GROUPING="creat ftruncate truncate open openat open_by_handle_at" for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EACCES" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EPERM" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Unsuccessful Ownership Changes to Files - lchown The audit system should collect unsuccessful file ownership change attempts for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the audit rule checks a system call independently of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change CCI-000172 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) Unsuccessful attempts to change ownership of files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80987-1 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80987-1 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_lchown - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit lchown tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80987-1 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_lchown - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for lchown EACCES for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lchown syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of lchown in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lchown syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of lchown in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) tags: - CCE-80987-1 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_lchown - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for lchown EACCES for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lchown syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of lchown in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lchown syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of lchown in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80987-1 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_lchown - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for lchown EPERM for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lchown syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of lchown in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lchown syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of lchown in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) tags: - CCE-80987-1 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_lchown - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for lchown EPERM for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lchown syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of lchown in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lchown syscall_grouping: - chown - fchown - fchownat - lchown - name: Check existence of lchown in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80987-1 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_lchown - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit && { ! ( grep -q aarch64 /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ); }; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="lchown" KEY="access" SYSCALL_GROUPING="chown fchown fchownat lchown" for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EACCES" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EPERM" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Unsuccessful Permission Changes to Files - lremovexattr The audit system should collect unsuccessful file permission change attempts for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lremovexattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lremovexattr -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lremovexattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lremovexattr -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the audit rule checks a system call independently of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change CCI-000172 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) Unsuccessful attempts to change permissions of files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80980-6 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80980-6 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_lremovexattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit lremovexattr tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80980-6 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_lremovexattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for lremovexattr EACCES for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lremovexattr syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of lremovexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lremovexattr syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of lremovexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80980-6 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_lremovexattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for lremovexattr EACCES for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lremovexattr syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of lremovexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lremovexattr syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of lremovexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80980-6 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_lremovexattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for lremovexattr EPERM for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lremovexattr syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of lremovexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lremovexattr syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of lremovexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80980-6 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_lremovexattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for lremovexattr EPERM for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lremovexattr syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of lremovexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lremovexattr syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of lremovexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80980-6 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_lremovexattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="lremovexattr" KEY="access" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EACCES" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EPERM" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Unsuccessful Permission Changes to Files - lsetxattr The audit system should collect unsuccessful file permission change attempts for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lsetxattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lsetxattr -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lsetxattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lsetxattr -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the audit rule checks a system call independently of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change CCI-000172 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) Unsuccessful attempts to change permissions of files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80981-4 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80981-4 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_lsetxattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit lsetxattr tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80981-4 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_lsetxattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for lsetxattr EACCES for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lsetxattr syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of lsetxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lsetxattr syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of lsetxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80981-4 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_lsetxattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for lsetxattr EACCES for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lsetxattr syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of lsetxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lsetxattr syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of lsetxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80981-4 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_lsetxattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for lsetxattr EPERM for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lsetxattr syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of lsetxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lsetxattr syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of lsetxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80981-4 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_lsetxattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for lsetxattr EPERM for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lsetxattr syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of lsetxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - lsetxattr syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of lsetxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80981-4 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_lsetxattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="lsetxattr" KEY="access" SYSCALL_GROUPING="chmod fchmod fchmodat fsetxattr lsetxattr setxattr" for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EACCES" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EPERM" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Unsuccessful Access Attempts to Files - open At a minimum, the audit system should collect unauthorized file accesses for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.2.4 Req-10.2.1 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 RHEL-08-030420 5.2.3.7 SV-230449r810455_rule Unsuccessful attempts to access files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80753-7 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80753-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030420 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit open tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80753-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030420 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for open EACCES for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of open in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of open in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) tags: - CCE-80753-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030420 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for open EACCES for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of open in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of open in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80753-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030420 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for open EPERM for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of open in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of open in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) tags: - CCE-80753-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030420 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for open EPERM for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of open in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of open in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80753-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030420 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit && { ! ( grep -q aarch64 /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ); }; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="open" KEY="access" SYSCALL_GROUPING="creat ftruncate truncate open openat open_by_handle_at" for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EACCES" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EPERM" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Unsuccessful Access Attempts to Files - open_by_handle_at At a minimum, the audit system should collect unauthorized file accesses for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at,truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at,truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at,truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at,truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.2.4 Req-10.2.1 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 RHEL-08-030420 4.1.10 SV-230449r810455_rule Unsuccessful attempts to access files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80755-2 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80755-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030420 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open_by_handle_at - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit open_by_handle_at tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80755-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030420 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open_by_handle_at - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for open_by_handle_at EACCES for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open_by_handle_at syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of open_by_handle_at in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open_by_handle_at syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of open_by_handle_at in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80755-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030420 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open_by_handle_at - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for open_by_handle_at EACCES for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open_by_handle_at syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of open_by_handle_at in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open_by_handle_at syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of open_by_handle_at in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80755-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030420 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open_by_handle_at - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for open_by_handle_at EPERM for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open_by_handle_at syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of open_by_handle_at in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open_by_handle_at syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of open_by_handle_at in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80755-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030420 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open_by_handle_at - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for open_by_handle_at EPERM for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open_by_handle_at syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of open_by_handle_at in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - open_by_handle_at syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of open_by_handle_at in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80755-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030420 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open_by_handle_at - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="open_by_handle_at" KEY="access" SYSCALL_GROUPING="creat ftruncate truncate open openat open_by_handle_at" for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EACCES" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EPERM" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Unsuccessful Creation Attempts to Files - open_by_handle_at O_CREAT The audit system should collect unauthorized file accesses for all users and root. The open_by_handle_at syscall can be used to create new files when O_CREAT flag is specified. The following auidt rules will asure that unsuccessful attempts to create a file via open_by_handle_at syscall are collected. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the rules below to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the rules below to /etc/audit/audit.rules file. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.2.4 Req-10.2.1 SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 Unsuccessful attempts to access files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80965-7 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80965-7 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open_by_handle_at_o_creat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Add unsuccessful file operations audit rules blockinfile: path: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-remediation.rules create: true block: |- ## This content is a section of an Audit config snapshot recommended for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 systems that target OSPP compliance. ## The following content has been retreived on 2019-03-11 from: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/blob/master/rules/30-ospp-v42.rules ## The purpose of these rules is to meet the requirements for Operating ## System Protection Profile (OSPP)v4.2. These rules depends on having ## 10-base-config.rules, 11-loginuid.rules, and 43-module-load.rules installed. ## Unsuccessful file creation (open with O_CREAT) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create ## Unsuccessful file modifications (open for write or truncate) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification ## Unsuccessful file access (any other opens) This has to go last. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80965-7 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open_by_handle_at_o_creat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then mkdir -p "$(dirname '/etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-remediation.rules')" cat <<EOF > "/etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-remediation.rules" ## This content is a section of an Audit config snapshot recommended for linux systems that target OSPP compliance. ## The following content has been retreived on 2019-03-11 from: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/blob/master/rules/30-ospp-v42.rules ## The purpose of these rules is to meet the requirements for Operating ## System Protection Profile (OSPP)v4.2. These rules depends on having ## 10-base-config.rules, 11-loginuid.rules, and 43-module-load.rules installed. ## Unsuccessful file creation (open with O_CREAT) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create ## Unsuccessful file modifications (open for write or truncate) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification ## Unsuccessful file access (any other opens) This has to go last. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access EOF else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Unsuccessful Modification Attempts to Files - open_by_handle_at O_TRUNC_WRITE The audit system should collect detailed unauthorized file accesses for all users and root. The open_by_handle_at syscall can be used to modify files if called for write operation of with O_TRUNC_WRITE flag. The following auidt rules will asure that unsuccessful attempts to modify a file via open_by_handle_at syscall are collected. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the rules below to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the rules below to /etc/audit/audit.rules file. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.2.4 Req-10.2.1 SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 Unsuccessful attempts to access files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80966-5 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80966-5 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open_by_handle_at_o_trunc_write - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Add unsuccessful file operations audit rules blockinfile: path: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-remediation.rules create: true block: |- ## This content is a section of an Audit config snapshot recommended for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 systems that target OSPP compliance. ## The following content has been retreived on 2019-03-11 from: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/blob/master/rules/30-ospp-v42.rules ## The purpose of these rules is to meet the requirements for Operating ## System Protection Profile (OSPP)v4.2. These rules depends on having ## 10-base-config.rules, 11-loginuid.rules, and 43-module-load.rules installed. ## Unsuccessful file creation (open with O_CREAT) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create ## Unsuccessful file modifications (open for write or truncate) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification ## Unsuccessful file access (any other opens) This has to go last. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80966-5 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open_by_handle_at_o_trunc_write - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then mkdir -p "$(dirname '/etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-remediation.rules')" cat <<EOF > "/etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-remediation.rules" ## This content is a section of an Audit config snapshot recommended for linux systems that target OSPP compliance. ## The following content has been retreived on 2019-03-11 from: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/blob/master/rules/30-ospp-v42.rules ## The purpose of these rules is to meet the requirements for Operating ## System Protection Profile (OSPP)v4.2. These rules depends on having ## 10-base-config.rules, 11-loginuid.rules, and 43-module-load.rules installed. ## Unsuccessful file creation (open with O_CREAT) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create ## Unsuccessful file modifications (open for write or truncate) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification ## Unsuccessful file access (any other opens) This has to go last. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access EOF else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Unauthorized Access Attempts To open_by_handle_at Are Ordered Correctly The audit system should collect detailed unauthorized file accesses for all users and root. To correctly identify unsuccessful creation, unsuccessful modification and unsuccessful access of files via open_by_handle_at syscall the audit rules collecting these events need to be in certain order. The more specific rules need to come before the less specific rules. The reason for that is that more specific rules cover a subset of events covered in the less specific rules, thus, they need to come before to not be overshadowed by less specific rules, which match a bigger set of events. Make sure that rules for unsuccessful calls of open_by_handle_at syscall are in the order shown below. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), check the order of rules below in a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, check the order of rules below in /etc/audit/audit.rules file. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.2.4 Req-10.2.1 SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 The more specific rules cover a subset of events covered by the less specific rules. By ordering them from more specific to less specific, it is assured that the less specific rule will not catch events better recorded by the more specific rule. CCE-80967-3 # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then mkdir -p "$(dirname '/etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-remediation.rules')" cat <<EOF > "/etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-remediation.rules" ## This content is a section of an Audit config snapshot recommended for linux systems that target OSPP compliance. ## The following content has been retreived on 2019-03-11 from: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/blob/master/rules/30-ospp-v42.rules ## The purpose of these rules is to meet the requirements for Operating ## System Protection Profile (OSPP)v4.2. These rules depends on having ## 10-base-config.rules, 11-loginuid.rules, and 43-module-load.rules installed. ## Unsuccessful file creation (open with O_CREAT) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create ## Unsuccessful file modifications (open for write or truncate) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification ## Unsuccessful file access (any other opens) This has to go last. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access EOF else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Unsuccessful Creation Attempts to Files - open O_CREAT The audit system should collect unauthorized file accesses for all users and root. The open syscall can be used to create new files when O_CREAT flag is specified. The following auidt rules will asure that unsuccessful attempts to create a file via open syscall are collected. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the rules below to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the rules below to /etc/audit/audit.rules file. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.2.4 Req-10.2.1 SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 Unsuccessful attempts to access files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80968-1 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80968-1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open_o_creat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Add unsuccessful file operations audit rules blockinfile: path: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-remediation.rules create: true block: |- ## This content is a section of an Audit config snapshot recommended for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 systems that target OSPP compliance. ## The following content has been retreived on 2019-03-11 from: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/blob/master/rules/30-ospp-v42.rules ## The purpose of these rules is to meet the requirements for Operating ## System Protection Profile (OSPP)v4.2. These rules depends on having ## 10-base-config.rules, 11-loginuid.rules, and 43-module-load.rules installed. ## Unsuccessful file creation (open with O_CREAT) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create ## Unsuccessful file modifications (open for write or truncate) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification ## Unsuccessful file access (any other opens) This has to go last. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) tags: - CCE-80968-1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open_o_creat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit && { ! ( grep -q aarch64 /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ); }; then mkdir -p "$(dirname '/etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-remediation.rules')" cat <<EOF > "/etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-remediation.rules" ## This content is a section of an Audit config snapshot recommended for linux systems that target OSPP compliance. ## The following content has been retreived on 2019-03-11 from: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/blob/master/rules/30-ospp-v42.rules ## The purpose of these rules is to meet the requirements for Operating ## System Protection Profile (OSPP)v4.2. These rules depends on having ## 10-base-config.rules, 11-loginuid.rules, and 43-module-load.rules installed. ## Unsuccessful file creation (open with O_CREAT) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create ## Unsuccessful file modifications (open for write or truncate) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification ## Unsuccessful file access (any other opens) This has to go last. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access EOF else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Unsuccessful Modification Attempts to Files - open O_TRUNC_WRITE The audit system should collect detailed unauthorized file accesses for all users and root. The open syscall can be used to modify files if called for write operation of with O_TRUNC_WRITE flag. The following auidt rules will asure that unsuccessful attempts to modify a file via open syscall are collected. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the rules below to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the rules below to /etc/audit/audit.rules file. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.2.4 Req-10.2.1 SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 Unsuccessful attempts to access files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80969-9 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80969-9 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open_o_trunc_write - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Add unsuccessful file operations audit rules blockinfile: path: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-remediation.rules create: true block: |- ## This content is a section of an Audit config snapshot recommended for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 systems that target OSPP compliance. ## The following content has been retreived on 2019-03-11 from: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/blob/master/rules/30-ospp-v42.rules ## The purpose of these rules is to meet the requirements for Operating ## System Protection Profile (OSPP)v4.2. These rules depends on having ## 10-base-config.rules, 11-loginuid.rules, and 43-module-load.rules installed. ## Unsuccessful file creation (open with O_CREAT) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create ## Unsuccessful file modifications (open for write or truncate) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification ## Unsuccessful file access (any other opens) This has to go last. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) tags: - CCE-80969-9 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open_o_trunc_write - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit && { ! ( grep -q aarch64 /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ); }; then mkdir -p "$(dirname '/etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-remediation.rules')" cat <<EOF > "/etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-remediation.rules" ## This content is a section of an Audit config snapshot recommended for linux systems that target OSPP compliance. ## The following content has been retreived on 2019-03-11 from: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/blob/master/rules/30-ospp-v42.rules ## The purpose of these rules is to meet the requirements for Operating ## System Protection Profile (OSPP)v4.2. These rules depends on having ## 10-base-config.rules, 11-loginuid.rules, and 43-module-load.rules installed. ## Unsuccessful file creation (open with O_CREAT) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create ## Unsuccessful file modifications (open for write or truncate) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification ## Unsuccessful file access (any other opens) This has to go last. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access EOF else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Rules For Unauthorized Attempts To open Are Ordered Correctly The audit system should collect detailed unauthorized file accesses for all users and root. To correctly identify unsuccessful creation, unsuccessful modification and unsuccessful access of files via open syscall the audit rules collecting these events need to be in certain order. The more specific rules need to come before the less specific rules. The reason for that is that more specific rules cover a subset of events covered in the less specific rules, thus, they need to come before to not be overshadowed by less specific rules, which match a bigger set of events. Make sure that rules for unsuccessful calls of open syscall are in the order shown below. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), check the order of rules below in a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, check the order of rules below in /etc/audit/audit.rules file. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.2.4 Req-10.2.1 SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 The more specific rules cover a subset of events covered by the less specific rules. By ordering them from more specific to less specific, it is assured that the less specific rule will not catch events better recorded by the more specific rule. CCE-80970-7 # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit && { ! ( grep -q aarch64 /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ); }; then mkdir -p "$(dirname '/etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-remediation.rules')" cat <<EOF > "/etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-remediation.rules" ## This content is a section of an Audit config snapshot recommended for linux systems that target OSPP compliance. ## The following content has been retreived on 2019-03-11 from: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/blob/master/rules/30-ospp-v42.rules ## The purpose of these rules is to meet the requirements for Operating ## System Protection Profile (OSPP)v4.2. These rules depends on having ## 10-base-config.rules, 11-loginuid.rules, and 43-module-load.rules installed. ## Unsuccessful file creation (open with O_CREAT) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create ## Unsuccessful file modifications (open for write or truncate) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification ## Unsuccessful file access (any other opens) This has to go last. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access EOF else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Unsuccessful Access Attempts to Files - openat At a minimum, the audit system should collect unauthorized file accesses for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.2.4 Req-10.2.1 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 RHEL-08-030420 5.2.3.7 SV-230449r810455_rule Unsuccessful attempts to access files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80754-5 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80754-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030420 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_openat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit openat tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80754-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030420 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_openat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for openat EACCES for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - openat syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of openat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - openat syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of openat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80754-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030420 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_openat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for openat EACCES for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - openat syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of openat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - openat syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of openat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80754-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030420 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_openat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for openat EPERM for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - openat syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of openat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - openat syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of openat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80754-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030420 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_openat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for openat EPERM for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - openat syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of openat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - openat syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of openat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80754-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030420 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_openat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="openat" KEY="access" SYSCALL_GROUPING="creat ftruncate truncate open openat open_by_handle_at" for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EACCES" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EPERM" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Unsuccessful Creation Attempts to Files - openat O_CREAT The audit system should collect unauthorized file accesses for all users and root. The openat syscall can be used to create new files when O_CREAT flag is specified. The following auidt rules will asure that unsuccessful attempts to create a file via openat syscall are collected. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the rules below to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the rules below to /etc/audit/audit.rules file. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.2.4 Req-10.2.1 SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 Unsuccessful attempts to access files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80962-4 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80962-4 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_openat_o_creat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Add unsuccessful file operations audit rules blockinfile: path: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-remediation.rules create: true block: |- ## This content is a section of an Audit config snapshot recommended for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 systems that target OSPP compliance. ## The following content has been retreived on 2019-03-11 from: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/blob/master/rules/30-ospp-v42.rules ## The purpose of these rules is to meet the requirements for Operating ## System Protection Profile (OSPP)v4.2. These rules depends on having ## 10-base-config.rules, 11-loginuid.rules, and 43-module-load.rules installed. ## Unsuccessful file creation (open with O_CREAT) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create ## Unsuccessful file modifications (open for write or truncate) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification ## Unsuccessful file access (any other opens) This has to go last. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80962-4 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_openat_o_creat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then mkdir -p "$(dirname '/etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-remediation.rules')" cat <<EOF > "/etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-remediation.rules" ## This content is a section of an Audit config snapshot recommended for linux systems that target OSPP compliance. ## The following content has been retreived on 2019-03-11 from: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/blob/master/rules/30-ospp-v42.rules ## The purpose of these rules is to meet the requirements for Operating ## System Protection Profile (OSPP)v4.2. These rules depends on having ## 10-base-config.rules, 11-loginuid.rules, and 43-module-load.rules installed. ## Unsuccessful file creation (open with O_CREAT) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create ## Unsuccessful file modifications (open for write or truncate) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification ## Unsuccessful file access (any other opens) This has to go last. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access EOF else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Unsuccessful Modification Attempts to Files - openat O_TRUNC_WRITE The audit system should collect detailed unauthorized file accesses for all users and root. The openat syscall can be used to modify files if called for write operation of with O_TRUNC_WRITE flag. The following auidt rules will asure that unsuccessful attempts to modify a file via openat syscall are collected. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the rules below to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the rules below to /etc/audit/audit.rules file. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.2.4 Req-10.2.1 SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 Unsuccessful attempts to access files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80963-2 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80963-2 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_openat_o_trunc_write - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Add unsuccessful file operations audit rules blockinfile: path: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-remediation.rules create: true block: |- ## This content is a section of an Audit config snapshot recommended for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 systems that target OSPP compliance. ## The following content has been retreived on 2019-03-11 from: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/blob/master/rules/30-ospp-v42.rules ## The purpose of these rules is to meet the requirements for Operating ## System Protection Profile (OSPP)v4.2. These rules depends on having ## 10-base-config.rules, 11-loginuid.rules, and 43-module-load.rules installed. ## Unsuccessful file creation (open with O_CREAT) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create ## Unsuccessful file modifications (open for write or truncate) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification ## Unsuccessful file access (any other opens) This has to go last. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80963-2 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_openat_o_trunc_write - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then mkdir -p "$(dirname '/etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-remediation.rules')" cat <<EOF > "/etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-remediation.rules" ## This content is a section of an Audit config snapshot recommended for linux systems that target OSPP compliance. ## The following content has been retreived on 2019-03-11 from: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/blob/master/rules/30-ospp-v42.rules ## The purpose of these rules is to meet the requirements for Operating ## System Protection Profile (OSPP)v4.2. These rules depends on having ## 10-base-config.rules, 11-loginuid.rules, and 43-module-load.rules installed. ## Unsuccessful file creation (open with O_CREAT) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create ## Unsuccessful file modifications (open for write or truncate) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification ## Unsuccessful file access (any other opens) This has to go last. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access EOF else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Rules For Unauthorized Attempts To openat Are Ordered Correctly The audit system should collect detailed unauthorized file accesses for all users and root. To correctly identify unsuccessful creation, unsuccessful modification and unsuccessful access of files via openat syscall the audit rules collecting these events need to be in certain order. The more specific rules need to come before the less specific rules. The reason for that is that more specific rules cover a subset of events covered in the less specific rules, thus, they need to come before to not be overshadowed by less specific rules, which match a bigger set of events. Make sure that rules for unsuccessful calls of openat syscall are in the order shown below. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), check the order of rules below in a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, check the order of rules below in /etc/audit/audit.rules file. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.2.4 Req-10.2.1 SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 The more specific rules cover a subset of events covered by the less specific rules. By ordering them from more specific to less specific, it is assured that the less specific rule will not catch events better recorded by the more specific rule. CCE-80964-0 # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then mkdir -p "$(dirname '/etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-remediation.rules')" cat <<EOF > "/etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-remediation.rules" ## This content is a section of an Audit config snapshot recommended for linux systems that target OSPP compliance. ## The following content has been retreived on 2019-03-11 from: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/blob/master/rules/30-ospp-v42.rules ## The purpose of these rules is to meet the requirements for Operating ## System Protection Profile (OSPP)v4.2. These rules depends on having ## 10-base-config.rules, 11-loginuid.rules, and 43-module-load.rules installed. ## Unsuccessful file creation (open with O_CREAT) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create ## Unsuccessful file modifications (open for write or truncate) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification ## Unsuccessful file access (any other opens) This has to go last. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access EOF else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Unsuccessful Permission Changes to Files - removexattr The audit system should collect unsuccessful file permission change attempts for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S removexattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S removexattr -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S removexattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S removexattr -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the audit rule checks a system call independently of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change CCI-000172 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) Unsuccessful attempts to change permissions of files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80982-2 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80982-2 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_removexattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit removexattr tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80982-2 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_removexattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for removexattr EACCES for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - removexattr syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of removexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - removexattr syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of removexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80982-2 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_removexattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for removexattr EACCES for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - removexattr syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of removexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - removexattr syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of removexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80982-2 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_removexattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for removexattr EPERM for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - removexattr syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of removexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - removexattr syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of removexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80982-2 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_removexattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for removexattr EPERM for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - removexattr syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of removexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - removexattr syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of removexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80982-2 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_removexattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="removexattr" KEY="access" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EACCES" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EPERM" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Unsuccessful Delete Attempts to Files - rename The audit system should collect unsuccessful file deletion attempts for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S rename -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S rename -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S rename -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S rename -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-delete 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.2.4 Req-10.2.1 SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212 Unsuccessful attempts to delete files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80973-1 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80973-1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_rename - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit rename tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80973-1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_rename - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for rename EACCES for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - rename syscall_grouping: - rename - renameat - unlink - unlinkat - name: Check existence of rename in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - rename syscall_grouping: - rename - renameat - unlink - unlinkat - name: Check existence of rename in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) tags: - CCE-80973-1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_rename - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for rename EACCES for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - rename syscall_grouping: - rename - renameat - unlink - unlinkat - name: Check existence of rename in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - rename syscall_grouping: - rename - renameat - unlink - unlinkat - name: Check existence of rename in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80973-1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_rename - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for rename EPERM for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - rename syscall_grouping: - rename - renameat - unlink - unlinkat - name: Check existence of rename in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - rename syscall_grouping: - rename - renameat - unlink - unlinkat - name: Check existence of rename in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) tags: - CCE-80973-1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_rename - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for rename EPERM for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - rename syscall_grouping: - rename - renameat - unlink - unlinkat - name: Check existence of rename in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - rename syscall_grouping: - rename - renameat - unlink - unlinkat - name: Check existence of rename in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80973-1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_rename - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit && { ! ( grep -q aarch64 /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ); }; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="rename" KEY="access" SYSCALL_GROUPING="rename renameat unlink unlinkat" for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EACCES" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EPERM" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Unsuccessful Delete Attempts to Files - renameat The audit system should collect unsuccessful file deletion attempts for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S renameat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S renameat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-delete 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.2.4 Req-10.2.1 SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212 Unsuccessful attempts to delete files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80974-9 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80974-9 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_renameat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit renameat tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80974-9 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_renameat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for renameat EACCES for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - renameat syscall_grouping: - rename - renameat - unlink - unlinkat - name: Check existence of renameat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - renameat syscall_grouping: - rename - renameat - unlink - unlinkat - name: Check existence of renameat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80974-9 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_renameat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for renameat EACCES for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - renameat syscall_grouping: - rename - renameat - unlink - unlinkat - name: Check existence of renameat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - renameat syscall_grouping: - rename - renameat - unlink - unlinkat - name: Check existence of renameat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80974-9 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_renameat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for renameat EPERM for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - renameat syscall_grouping: - rename - renameat - unlink - unlinkat - name: Check existence of renameat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - renameat syscall_grouping: - rename - renameat - unlink - unlinkat - name: Check existence of renameat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80974-9 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_renameat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for renameat EPERM for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - renameat syscall_grouping: - rename - renameat - unlink - unlinkat - name: Check existence of renameat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - renameat syscall_grouping: - rename - renameat - unlink - unlinkat - name: Check existence of renameat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80974-9 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_renameat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="renameat" KEY="access" SYSCALL_GROUPING="rename renameat unlink unlinkat" for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EACCES" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EPERM" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Unsuccessful Permission Changes to Files - setxattr The audit system should collect unsuccessful file permission change attempts for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S setxattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S setxattr -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setxattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setxattr -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the audit rule checks a system call independently of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change CCI-000172 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) Unsuccessful attempts to change permissions of files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80983-0 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80983-0 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_setxattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit setxattr tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80983-0 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_setxattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for setxattr EACCES for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - setxattr syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of setxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - setxattr syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of setxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80983-0 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_setxattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for setxattr EACCES for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - setxattr syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of setxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - setxattr syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of setxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80983-0 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_setxattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for setxattr EPERM for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - setxattr syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of setxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - setxattr syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of setxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80983-0 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_setxattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for setxattr EPERM for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - setxattr syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of setxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - setxattr syscall_grouping: - chmod - fchmod - fchmodat - fsetxattr - lsetxattr - setxattr - name: Check existence of setxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80983-0 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_setxattr - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="setxattr" KEY="access" SYSCALL_GROUPING="chmod fchmod fchmodat fsetxattr lsetxattr setxattr" for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EACCES" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EPERM" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Unsuccessful Access Attempts to Files - truncate At a minimum, the audit system should collect unauthorized file accesses for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.2.4 Req-10.2.1 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 RHEL-08-030420 5.2.3.7 SV-230449r810455_rule Unsuccessful attempts to access files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80756-0 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80756-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030420 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_truncate - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit truncate tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80756-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030420 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_truncate - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for truncate EACCES for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - truncate syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of truncate in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - truncate syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of truncate in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80756-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030420 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_truncate - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for truncate EACCES for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - truncate syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of truncate in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - truncate syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of truncate in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80756-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030420 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_truncate - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for truncate EPERM for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - truncate syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of truncate in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - truncate syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of truncate in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80756-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030420 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_truncate - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for truncate EPERM for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - truncate syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of truncate in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - truncate syscall_grouping: - creat - ftruncate - truncate - open - openat - open_by_handle_at - name: Check existence of truncate in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80756-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030420 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_truncate - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="truncate" KEY="access" SYSCALL_GROUPING="creat ftruncate truncate open openat open_by_handle_at" for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EACCES" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EPERM" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Unsuccessful Delete Attempts to Files - unlink The audit system should collect unsuccessful file deletion attempts for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-delete 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.2.4 Req-10.2.1 SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212 Unsuccessful attempts to delete files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80971-5 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80971-5 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_unlink - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit unlink tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80971-5 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_unlink - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for unlink EACCES for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - unlink syscall_grouping: - rename - renameat - unlink - unlinkat - name: Check existence of unlink in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - unlink syscall_grouping: - rename - renameat - unlink - unlinkat - name: Check existence of unlink in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) tags: - CCE-80971-5 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_unlink - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for unlink EACCES for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - unlink syscall_grouping: - rename - renameat - unlink - unlinkat - name: Check existence of unlink in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - unlink syscall_grouping: - rename - renameat - unlink - unlinkat - name: Check existence of unlink in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80971-5 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_unlink - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for unlink EPERM for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - unlink syscall_grouping: - rename - renameat - unlink - unlinkat - name: Check existence of unlink in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - unlink syscall_grouping: - rename - renameat - unlink - unlinkat - name: Check existence of unlink in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) tags: - CCE-80971-5 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_unlink - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for unlink EPERM for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - unlink syscall_grouping: - rename - renameat - unlink - unlinkat - name: Check existence of unlink in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - unlink syscall_grouping: - rename - renameat - unlink - unlinkat - name: Check existence of unlink in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80971-5 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_unlink - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit && { ! ( grep -q aarch64 /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ); }; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="unlink" KEY="access" SYSCALL_GROUPING="rename renameat unlink unlinkat" for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EACCES" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EPERM" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Unsuccessful Delete Attempts to Files - unlinkat The audit system should collect unsuccessful file deletion attempts for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlinkat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlinkat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlinkat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlinkat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping system calls related to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-delete 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.2.4 Req-10.2.1 SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212 Unsuccessful attempts to delete files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. CCE-80972-3 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80972-3 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_unlinkat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit unlinkat tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80972-3 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_unlinkat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for unlinkat EACCES for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - unlinkat syscall_grouping: - rename - renameat - unlink - unlinkat - name: Check existence of unlinkat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - unlinkat syscall_grouping: - rename - renameat - unlink - unlinkat - name: Check existence of unlinkat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80972-3 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_unlinkat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for unlinkat EACCES for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - unlinkat syscall_grouping: - rename - renameat - unlink - unlinkat - name: Check existence of unlinkat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - unlinkat syscall_grouping: - rename - renameat - unlink - unlinkat - name: Check existence of unlinkat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80972-3 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_unlinkat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for unlinkat EPERM for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - unlinkat syscall_grouping: - rename - renameat - unlink - unlinkat - name: Check existence of unlinkat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - unlinkat syscall_grouping: - rename - renameat - unlink - unlinkat - name: Check existence of unlinkat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80972-3 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_unlinkat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for unlinkat EPERM for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - unlinkat syscall_grouping: - rename - renameat - unlink - unlinkat - name: Check existence of unlinkat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - unlinkat syscall_grouping: - rename - renameat - unlink - unlinkat - name: Check existence of unlinkat in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80972-3 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_unlinkat - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="unlinkat" KEY="access" SYSCALL_GROUPING="rename renameat unlink unlinkat" for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EACCES" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EPERM" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Information on Kernel Modules Loading and Unloading To capture kernel module loading and unloading events, use following lines, setting ARCH to either b32 for 32-bit system, or having two lines for both b32 and b64 in case your system is 64-bit: -a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S init_module,delete_module -F key=modules Place to add the lines depends on a way auditd daemon is configured. If it is configured to use the augenrules program (the default), add the lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility, add the lines to file /etc/audit/audit.rules. Ensure auditd Collects Information on Kernel Module Loading and Unloading To capture kernel module loading and unloading events, use following lines, setting ARCH to either b32 for 32-bit system, or having two lines for both b32 and b64 in case your system is 64-bit: -a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S init_module,finit_module,delete_module -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modules The place to add the lines depends on a way auditd daemon is configured. If it is configured to use the augenrules program (the default), add the lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility, add the lines to file /etc/audit/audit.rules. 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 5.4.1.1 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000172 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 Req-10.2.7 4.1.15 The addition/removal of kernel modules can be used to alter the behavior of the kernel and potentially introduce malicious code into kernel space. It is important to have an audit trail of modules that have been introduced into the kernel. CCE-80709-9 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80709-9 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80709-9 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for kernel module loading for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - init_module - delete_module - finit_module syscall_grouping: - init_module - delete_module - finit_module - name: Check existence of init_module, delete_module, finit_module in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/modules.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/modules.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modules create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - init_module - delete_module - finit_module syscall_grouping: - init_module - delete_module - finit_module - name: Check existence of init_module, delete_module, finit_module in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modules create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80709-9 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for kernel module loading for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - init_module - delete_module - finit_module syscall_grouping: - init_module - delete_module - finit_module - name: Check existence of init_module, delete_module, finit_module in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/modules.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/modules.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modules create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - init_module - delete_module - finit_module syscall_grouping: - init_module - delete_module - finit_module - name: Check existence of init_module, delete_module, finit_module in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modules create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80709-9 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system # Note: 32-bit and 64-bit kernel syscall numbers not always line up => # it's required on a 64-bit system to check also for the presence # of 32-bit's equivalent of the corresponding rule. # (See `man 7 audit.rules` for details ) [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="init_module finit_module delete_module" KEY="modules" SYSCALL_GROUPING="init_module finit_module delete_module" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects Information on Kernel Module Unloading - create_module To capture kernel module unloading events, use following line, setting ARCH to either b32 for 32-bit system, or having two lines for both b32 and b64 in case your system is 64-bit: -a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S create_module -F key=module-change Place to add the line depends on a way auditd daemon is configured. If it is configured to use the augenrules program (the default), add the line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility, add the line to file /etc/audit/audit.rules. CCI-000172 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00216 SRG-OS-000477-GPOS-00222 5.2.3.19 The removal of kernel modules can be used to alter the behavior of the kernel and potentially introduce malicious code into kernel space. It is important to have an audit trail of modules that have been introduced into the kernel. CCE-88435-3 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-88435-3 - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_create - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Set architecture for audit finit_module tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-88435-3 - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_create - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for finit_module for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - create_module syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of create_module in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/module-change.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/module-change.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F key=module-change create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - create_module syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of create_module in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F key=module-change create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) tags: - CCE-88435-3 - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_create - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for finit_module for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - create_module syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of create_module in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/module-change.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/module-change.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F key=module-change create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - create_module syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of create_module in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F key=module-change create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-88435-3 - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_create - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db32%20-S%20create_module%20-k%20module-change%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db64%20-S%20create_module%20-k%20module-change%0A mode: 0600 path: /etc/audit/rules.d/75-kernel-module-loading-create.rules overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit && { ! ( grep -q aarch64 /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ); }; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system # Note: 32-bit and 64-bit kernel syscall numbers not always line up => # it's required on a 64-bit system to check also for the presence # of 32-bit's equivalent of the corresponding rule. # (See `man 7 audit.rules` for details ) [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="" AUID_FILTERS="" SYSCALL="create_module" KEY="module-change" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects Information on Kernel Module Unloading - delete_module To capture kernel module unloading events, use following line, setting ARCH to either b32 for 32-bit system, or having two lines for both b32 and b64 in case your system is 64-bit: -a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S delete_module -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modules Place to add the line depends on a way auditd daemon is configured. If it is configured to use the augenrules program (the default), add the line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility, add the line to file /etc/audit/audit.rules. BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.2.7 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00216 SRG-OS-000477-GPOS-00222 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 SRG-APP-000504-CTR-001280 RHEL-08-030390 5.2.3.19 SV-230446r627750_rule The removal of kernel modules can be used to alter the behavior of the kernel and potentially introduce malicious code into kernel space. It is important to have an audit trail of modules that have been introduced into the kernel. CCE-80711-5 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80711-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030390 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_delete - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Set architecture for audit delete_module tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80711-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030390 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_delete - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for delete_module for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - delete_module syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of delete_module in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/module-change.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/module-change.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=module-change create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - delete_module syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of delete_module in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=module-change create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80711-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030390 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_delete - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for delete_module for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - delete_module syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of delete_module in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/module-change.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/module-change.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=module-change create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - delete_module syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of delete_module in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=module-change create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80711-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030390 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_delete - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db32%20-S%20delete_module%20-k%20module-change%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db64%20-S%20delete_module%20-k%20module-change%0A mode: 0600 path: /etc/audit/rules.d/75-kernel-module-loading-delete.rules overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system # Note: 32-bit and 64-bit kernel syscall numbers not always line up => # it's required on a 64-bit system to check also for the presence # of 32-bit's equivalent of the corresponding rule. # (See `man 7 audit.rules` for details ) [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="delete_module" KEY="modules" SYSCALL_GROUPING="delete_module" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects Information on Kernel Module Loading and Unloading - finit_module If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d to capture kernel module loading and unloading events, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system: -a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S finit_module -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modules If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file in order to capture kernel module loading and unloading events, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system: -a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S finit_module -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modules BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.2.7 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00216 SRG-OS-000477-GPOS-00222 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 SRG-APP-000504-CTR-001280 RHEL-08-030360 5.2.3.19 SV-230438r810464_rule The addition/removal of kernel modules can be used to alter the behavior of the kernel and potentially introduce malicious code into kernel space. It is important to have an audit trail of modules that have been introduced into the kernel. CCE-80712-3 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80712-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030360 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_finit - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Set architecture for audit finit_module tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80712-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030360 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_finit - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for finit_module for x86 platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - finit_module syscall_grouping: - init_module - finit_module - name: Check existence of finit_module in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/module-change.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/module-change.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=module-change create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - finit_module syscall_grouping: - init_module - finit_module - name: Check existence of finit_module in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=module-change create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80712-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030360 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_finit - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for finit_module for x86_64 platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - finit_module syscall_grouping: - init_module - finit_module - name: Check existence of finit_module in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/module-change.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/module-change.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=module-change create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - finit_module syscall_grouping: - init_module - finit_module - name: Check existence of finit_module in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=module-change create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80712-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030360 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_finit - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db32%20-S%20finit_module%20-k%20module-change%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db64%20-S%20finit_module%20-k%20module-change%0A mode: 0600 path: /etc/audit/rules.d/75-kernel-module-loading-finit.rules overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system # Note: 32-bit and 64-bit kernel syscall numbers not always line up => # it's required on a 64-bit system to check also for the presence # of 32-bit's equivalent of the corresponding rule. # (See `man 7 audit.rules` for details ) [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="finit_module" KEY="modules" SYSCALL_GROUPING="init_module finit_module" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects Information on Kernel Module Loading - init_module To capture kernel module loading events, use following line, setting ARCH to either b32 for 32-bit system, or having two lines for both b32 and b64 in case your system is 64-bit: -a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S init_module -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modules Place to add the line depends on a way auditd daemon is configured. If it is configured to use the augenrules program (the default), add the line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility, add the line to file /etc/audit/audit.rules. BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.2.7 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00216 SRG-OS-000477-GPOS-00222 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 SRG-APP-000504-CTR-001280 RHEL-08-030360 5.2.3.19 SV-230438r810464_rule The addition of kernel modules can be used to alter the behavior of the kernel and potentially introduce malicious code into kernel space. It is important to have an audit trail of modules that have been introduced into the kernel. CCE-80713-1 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80713-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030360 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_init - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Set architecture for audit init_module tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80713-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030360 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_init - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for init_module for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - init_module syscall_grouping: - init_module - finit_module - name: Check existence of init_module in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/module-change.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/module-change.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=module-change create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - init_module syscall_grouping: - init_module - finit_module - name: Check existence of init_module in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=module-change create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80713-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030360 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_init - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for init_module for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - init_module syscall_grouping: - init_module - finit_module - name: Check existence of init_module in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/module-change.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/module-change.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=module-change create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - init_module syscall_grouping: - init_module - finit_module - name: Check existence of init_module in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=module-change create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80713-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030360 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_init - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db32%20-S%20init_module%20-k%20module-change%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db64%20-S%20init_module%20-k%20module-change%0A mode: 0600 path: /etc/audit/rules.d/75-kernel-module-loading-init.rules overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system # Note: 32-bit and 64-bit kernel syscall numbers not always line up => # it's required on a 64-bit system to check also for the presence # of 32-bit's equivalent of the corresponding rule. # (See `man 7 audit.rules` for details ) [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="init_module" KEY="modules" SYSCALL_GROUPING="init_module finit_module" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects Information on Kernel Module Loading and Unloading - query_module If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d to capture kernel module loading and unloading events, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system: -a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S query_module -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modules If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file in order to capture kernel module loading and unloading events, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system: -a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S query_module -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modules 5.2.3.19 The addition/removal of kernel modules can be used to alter the behavior of the kernel and potentially introduce malicious code into kernel space. It is important to have an audit trail of modules that have been introduced into the kernel. CCE-88748-9 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-88748-9 - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_query - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Set architecture for audit query_module tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-88748-9 - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_query - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for query_module for x86 platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - query_module syscall_grouping: - init_module - query_module - name: Check existence of query_module in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/module-change.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/module-change.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=module-change create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - query_module syscall_grouping: - init_module - query_module - name: Check existence of query_module in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=module-change create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) tags: - CCE-88748-9 - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_query - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for query_module for x86_64 platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - query_module syscall_grouping: - init_module - query_module - name: Check existence of query_module in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/module-change.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/module-change.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=module-change create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - query_module syscall_grouping: - init_module - query_module - name: Check existence of query_module in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=module-change create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-88748-9 - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_query - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit && { ! ( grep -q aarch64 /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ); }; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system # Note: 32-bit and 64-bit kernel syscall numbers not always line up => # it's required on a 64-bit system to check also for the presence # of 32-bit's equivalent of the corresponding rule. # (See `man 7 audit.rules` for details ) [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="query_module" KEY="modules" SYSCALL_GROUPING="init_module query_module" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Attempts to Alter Logon and Logout Events The audit system already collects login information for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d in order to watch for attempted manual edits of files involved in storing logon events: -w /var/log/tallylog -p wa -k logins -w -p wa -k logins -w /var/log/lastlog -p wa -k logins If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file in order to watch for unattempted manual edits of files involved in storing logon events: -w /var/log/tallylog -p wa -k logins -w -p wa -k logins -w /var/log/lastlog -p wa -k logins Record Attempts to Alter Logon and Logout Events The audit system already collects login information for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d in order to watch for attempted manual edits of files involved in storing logon events: -w /var/log/tallylog -p wa -k logins -w -p wa -k logins -w /var/log/lastlog -p wa -k logins If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file in order to watch for unattempted manual edits of files involved in storing logon events: -w /var/log/tallylog -p wa -k logins -w -p wa -k logins -w /var/log/lastlog -p wa -k logins This rule checks for multiple syscalls related to login events; it was written with DISA STIG in mind. Other policies should use a separate rule for each syscall that needs to be checked. For example: audit_rules_login_events_tallylogaudit_rules_login_events_faillockaudit_rules_login_events_lastlog 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 5.4.1.1 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 Req-10.2.3 Manual editing of these files may indicate nefarious activity, such as an attacker attempting to remove evidence of an intrusion. CCE-80717-2 # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir='' # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # into the list of files to be inspected files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/tallylog" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/tallylog $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/tallylog$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /var/log/tallylog -p wa -k logins" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. # If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules' to list of files for inspection. readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/tallylog" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # For each of the matched entries for match in "${matches[@]}" do # Extract filepath from the match rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') # Append that path into list of files for inspection files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") done # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] then # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules' into list of files for inspection key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules" # If the logins.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] then touch "$key_rule_file" chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" fi files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") fi # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/tallylog" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/tallylog $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/tallylog$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /var/log/tallylog -p wa -k logins" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # into the list of files to be inspected files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+${var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir}" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+${var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir} $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+${var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir}$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w ${var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir} -p wa -k logins" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. # If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules' to list of files for inspection. readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+${var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir}" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # For each of the matched entries for match in "${matches[@]}" do # Extract filepath from the match rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') # Append that path into list of files for inspection files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") done # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] then # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules' into list of files for inspection key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules" # If the logins.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] then touch "$key_rule_file" chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" fi files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") fi # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+${var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir}" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+${var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir} $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+${var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir}$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w ${var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir} -p wa -k logins" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # into the list of files to be inspected files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/lastlog" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/lastlog $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/lastlog$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /var/log/lastlog -p wa -k logins" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. # If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules' to list of files for inspection. readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/lastlog" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # For each of the matched entries for match in "${matches[@]}" do # Extract filepath from the match rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') # Append that path into list of files for inspection files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") done # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] then # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules' into list of files for inspection key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules" # If the logins.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] then touch "$key_rule_file" chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" fi files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") fi # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/lastlog" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/lastlog $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/lastlog$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /var/log/lastlog -p wa -k logins" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Attempts to Alter Logon and Logout Events - faillock The audit system already collects login information for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d in order to watch for attempted manual edits of files involved in storing logon events: -w -p wa -k logins If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file in order to watch for unattempted manual edits of files involved in storing logon events: -w -p wa -k logins BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000126 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.2.3 10.2.1.3 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000470-GPOS-00214 SRG-OS-000473-GPOS-00218 SRG-APP-000503-CTR-001275 SRG-APP-000506-CTR-001290 RHEL-08-030590 5.2.3.12 SV-230466r627750_rule Manual editing of these files may indicate nefarious activity, such as an attacker attempting to remove evidence of an intrusion. CCE-80718-0 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80718-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030590 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_login_events_faillock - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir # promote to variable set_fact: var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir: !!str tags: - always - name: Check if watch rule for {{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir }} already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^\s*-w\s+{{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir }}\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_existing_watch_rules_d when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80718-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030590 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_login_events_faillock - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key logins find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)logins$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_watch_key when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80718-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030590 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_login_events_faillock - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - /etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80718-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030590 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_login_events_faillock - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80718-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030590 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_login_events_faillock - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for {{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir }} in /etc/audit/rules.d/ lineinfile: path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' line: -w {{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir }} -p wa -k logins create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80718-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030590 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_login_events_faillock - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for {{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir }} already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit/ contains: ^\s*-w\s+{{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir }}\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: audit.rules register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80718-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030590 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_login_events_faillock - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for {{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir }} in /etc/audit/audit.rules lineinfile: line: -w {{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir }} -p wa -k logins state: present dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80718-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030590 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_login_events_faillock - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir='' # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # into the list of files to be inspected files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+${var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir}" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+${var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir} $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+${var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir}$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w ${var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir} -p wa -k logins" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. # If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules' to list of files for inspection. readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+${var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir}" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # For each of the matched entries for match in "${matches[@]}" do # Extract filepath from the match rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') # Append that path into list of files for inspection files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") done # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] then # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules' into list of files for inspection key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules" # If the logins.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] then touch "$key_rule_file" chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" fi files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") fi # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+${var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir}" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+${var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir} $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+${var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir}$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w ${var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir} -p wa -k logins" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Attempts to Alter Logon and Logout Events - lastlog The audit system already collects login information for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d in order to watch for attempted manual edits of files involved in storing logon events: -w /var/log/lastlog -p wa -k logins If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file in order to watch for unattempted manual edits of files involved in storing logon events: -w /var/log/lastlog -p wa -k logins BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000126 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.2.3 10.2.1.3 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000473-GPOS-00218 SRG-OS-000470-GPOS-00214 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 SRG-APP-000503-CTR-001275 SRG-APP-000506-CTR-001290 RHEL-08-030600 5.2.3.12 SV-230467r627750_rule Manual editing of these files may indicate nefarious activity, such as an attacker attempting to remove evidence of an intrusion. CCE-80719-8 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80719-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030600 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_login_events_lastlog - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /var/log/lastlog already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^\s*-w\s+/var/log/lastlog\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_existing_watch_rules_d when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80719-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030600 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_login_events_lastlog - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key logins find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)logins$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_watch_key when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80719-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030600 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_login_events_lastlog - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - /etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80719-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030600 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_login_events_lastlog - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80719-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030600 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_login_events_lastlog - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /var/log/lastlog in /etc/audit/rules.d/ lineinfile: path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' line: -w /var/log/lastlog -p wa -k logins create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80719-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030600 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_login_events_lastlog - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /var/log/lastlog already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit/ contains: ^\s*-w\s+/var/log/lastlog\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: audit.rules register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80719-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030600 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_login_events_lastlog - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /var/log/lastlog in /etc/audit/audit.rules lineinfile: line: -w /var/log/lastlog -p wa -k logins state: present dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80719-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030600 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_login_events_lastlog - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # into the list of files to be inspected files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/lastlog" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/lastlog $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/lastlog$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /var/log/lastlog -p wa -k logins" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. # If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules' to list of files for inspection. readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/lastlog" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # For each of the matched entries for match in "${matches[@]}" do # Extract filepath from the match rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') # Append that path into list of files for inspection files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") done # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] then # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules' into list of files for inspection key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules" # If the logins.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] then touch "$key_rule_file" chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" fi files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") fi # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/lastlog" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/lastlog $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/lastlog$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /var/log/lastlog -p wa -k logins" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Attempts to Alter Logon and Logout Events - tallylog The audit system already collects login information for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d in order to watch for attempted manual edits of files involved in storing logon events: -w /var/log/tallylog -p wa -k logins If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file in order to watch for unattempted manual edits of files involved in storing logon events: -w /var/log/tallylog -p wa -k logins 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 CCI-000126 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.2.3 10.2.1.3 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000470-GPOS-00214 SRG-OS-000473-GPOS-00218 SRG-APP-000503-CTR-001275 Manual editing of these files may indicate nefarious activity, such as an attacker attempting to remove evidence of an intrusion. CCE-80720-6 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80720-6 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_login_events_tallylog - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /var/log/tallylog already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^\s*-w\s+/var/log/tallylog\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_existing_watch_rules_d when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80720-6 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_login_events_tallylog - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key logins find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)logins$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_watch_key when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80720-6 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_login_events_tallylog - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - /etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80720-6 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_login_events_tallylog - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80720-6 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_login_events_tallylog - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /var/log/tallylog in /etc/audit/rules.d/ lineinfile: path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' line: -w /var/log/tallylog -p wa -k logins create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80720-6 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_login_events_tallylog - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /var/log/tallylog already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit/ contains: ^\s*-w\s+/var/log/tallylog\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: audit.rules register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80720-6 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_login_events_tallylog - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /var/log/tallylog in /etc/audit/audit.rules lineinfile: line: -w /var/log/tallylog -p wa -k logins state: present dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80720-6 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 - audit_rules_login_events_tallylog - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # into the list of files to be inspected files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/tallylog" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/tallylog $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/tallylog$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /var/log/tallylog -p wa -k logins" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. # If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules' to list of files for inspection. readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/tallylog" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # For each of the matched entries for match in "${matches[@]}" do # Extract filepath from the match rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') # Append that path into list of files for inspection files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") done # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] then # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules' into list of files for inspection key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules" # If the logins.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] then touch "$key_rule_file" chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" fi files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") fi # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/tallylog" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/tallylog $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/tallylog$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /var/log/tallylog -p wa -k logins" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Information on the Use of Privileged Commands At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of privileged commands for all users and root. Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - init At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/init -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/init -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged CCI-000172 AU-12(c) SRG-OS-000477-GPOS-00222 Misuse of the init command may cause availability issues for the system. - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - audit_privileged_commands_init - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/sbin/init block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/sbin/init -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/init -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/init -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/sbin/init -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/init -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/init -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - audit_privileged_commands_init - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/sbin/init -F perm=x" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="privileged" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - poweroff At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/poweroff -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/poweroff -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged CCI-000172 AU-12(c) SRG-OS-000477-GPOS-00222 Misuse of the poweroff command may cause availability issues for the system. - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - audit_privileged_commands_poweroff - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/sbin/poweroff block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/sbin/poweroff -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/poweroff -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/poweroff -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/sbin/poweroff -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/poweroff -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/poweroff -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - audit_privileged_commands_poweroff - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/sbin/poweroff -F perm=x" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="privileged" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - reboot At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/reboot -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/reboot -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged CCI-000172 AU-12(c) SRG-OS-000477-GPOS-00222 Misuse of the reboot command may cause availability issues for the system. - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - audit_privileged_commands_reboot - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/sbin/reboot block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/sbin/reboot -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/reboot -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/reboot -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/sbin/reboot -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/reboot -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/reboot -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - audit_privileged_commands_reboot - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/sbin/reboot -F perm=x" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="privileged" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - shutdown At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/shutdown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/shutdown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged CCI-000172 AU-12(c) SRG-OS-000477-GPOS-00222 Misuse of the shutdown command may cause availability issues for the system. - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - audit_privileged_commands_shutdown - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/sbin/shutdown block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/sbin/shutdown -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/shutdown -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/shutdown -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/sbin/shutdown -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/shutdown -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/shutdown -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - audit_privileged_commands_shutdown - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/sbin/shutdown -F perm=x" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="privileged" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands The audit system should collect information about usage of privileged commands for all users. These are commands with suid or sgid bits on and they are specially risky in local block device partitions not mounted with noexec and nosuid options. Therefore, these partitions should be first identified by the following command: findmnt -n -l -k -it $(awk '/nodev/ { print $2 }' /proc/filesystems | paste -sd,) | grep -Pv "noexec|nosuid" For all partitions listed by the previous command, it is necessary to search for setuid / setgid programs using the following command: $ sudo find PARTITION -xdev -perm /6000 -type f 2>/dev/null For each setuid / setgid program identified by the previous command, an audit rule must be present in the appropriate place using the following line structure: -a always,exit -F path=PROG_PATH -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the line to a file with suffix .rules in the /etc/audit/rules.d directory, replacing the PROG_PATH part with the full path of that setuid / setgid identified program. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility instead, add the line to the /etc/audit/audit.rules file, also replacing the PROG_PATH part with the full path of that setuid / setgid identified program. This rule checks for multiple syscalls related to privileged commands. If needed to check specific privileged commands, other more specific rules should be considered. For example: audit_rules_privileged_commands_suaudit_rules_privileged_commands_umountaudit_rules_privileged_commands_passwd Note that OVAL check and Bash / Ansible remediation of this rule explicitly excludes file systems mounted at /proc directory and its subdirectories. It is a virtual file system and it doesn't contain executable applications. At the same time, interacting with this file system during check or remediation caused undesirable errors. BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 5.4.1.1 APO08.04 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.05 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-002234 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.5 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.3.4.5.9 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 3.9 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 0582 0584 05885 0586 0846 0957 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.1 A.16.1.2 A.16.1.3 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.1.3 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-007-3 R.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 AC-2(4) AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.AE-2 DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 DE.DP-4 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 RS.CO-2 Req-10.2.2 SRG-OS-000327-GPOS-00127 5.2.3.6 Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern that can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for unusual activity. CCE-80724-8 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80724-8 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 - audit_rules_privileged_commands - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - Set List of Mount Points Which Permits Execution of Privileged Commands ansible.builtin.set_fact: privileged_mount_points: '{{(ansible_facts.mounts | rejectattr(''options'', ''search'', ''noexec|nosuid'') | rejectattr(''mount'', ''match'', ''/proc($|/.*$)'') | map(attribute=''mount'') | list ) }}' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80724-8 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 - audit_rules_privileged_commands - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - Search for Privileged Commands in Eligible Mount Points ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: find {{ item }} -xdev -perm /6000 -type f 2>/dev/null register: result_privileged_commands_search changed_when: false failed_when: false with_items: '{{ privileged_mount_points }}' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80724-8 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 - audit_rules_privileged_commands - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - Set List of Privileged Commands Found in Eligible Mount Points ansible.builtin.set_fact: privileged_commands: '{{ privileged_commands | default([]) + item.stdout_lines }}' loop: '{{ result_privileged_commands_search.results }}' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - item is not skipped tags: - CCE-80724-8 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 - audit_rules_privileged_commands - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - Privileged Commands are Present in the System block: - name: Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - Ensure Rules for All Privileged Commands in augenrules Format ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules line: -a always,exit -F path={{ item }} -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged regexp: ^.*path={{ item | regex_escape() }} .*$ create: true with_items: - '{{ privileged_commands }}' - name: Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - Ensure Rules for All Privileged Commands in auditctl Format ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/audit/audit.rules line: -a always,exit -F path={{ item }} -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged regexp: ^.*path={{ item | regex_escape() }} .*$ create: true with_items: - '{{ privileged_commands }}' - name: Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - Search for Duplicated Rules in Other Files ansible.builtin.find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d recurse: false contains: ^-a always,exit -F path={{ item }} .*$ patterns: '*.rules' with_items: - '{{ privileged_commands }}' register: result_augenrules_files - name: Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - Ensure Rules for Privileged Commands are Defined Only in One File ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item.1.path }}' regexp: ^-a always,exit -F path={{ item.0.item }} .*$ state: absent with_subelements: - '{{ result_augenrules_files.results }}' - files when: - item.1.path != '/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - privileged_commands is defined tags: - CCE-80724-8 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 - audit_rules_privileged_commands - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="privileged" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" FILTER_NODEV=$(awk '/nodev/ { print $2 }' /proc/filesystems | paste -sd,) PARTITIONS=$(findmnt -n -l -k -it $FILTER_NODEV | grep -Pv "noexec|nosuid|/proc($|/.*$)" | awk '{ print $1 }') for PARTITION in $PARTITIONS; do PRIV_CMDS=$(find "${PARTITION}" -xdev -perm /6000 -type f 2>/dev/null) for PRIV_CMD in $PRIV_CMDS; do OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=$PRIV_CMD -F perm=x" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - at At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/at -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/at -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged CCI-000172 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) FAU_GEN.1.1.c Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for unusual activity. CCE-80988-9 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80988-9 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_at - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/bin/at block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/bin/at -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/at -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/at -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/bin/at -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/at -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/at -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80988-9 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_at - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/bin/at -F perm=x" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="privileged" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - chage At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged 1 12 13 14 15 16 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-007-3 R.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 AC-2(4) AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.PT-1 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-APP-000029-CTR-000085 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 SRG-APP-000501-CTR-001265 SRG-APP-000502-CTR-001270 RHEL-08-030250 SV-230418r627750_rule Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for unusual activity. CCE-80725-5 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80725-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030250 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_chage - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/bin/chage block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80725-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030250 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_chage - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="privileged" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - chsh At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chsh -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chsh -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged 1 12 13 14 15 16 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-007-3 R.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 AC-2(4) AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.PT-1 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 RHEL-08-030410 SV-230448r627750_rule Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for unusual activity. CCE-80726-3 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80726-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030410 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_chsh - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/bin/chsh block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/bin/chsh -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/chsh -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/chsh -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/bin/chsh -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/chsh -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/chsh -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80726-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030410 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_chsh - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/bin/chsh -F perm=x" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="privileged" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - crontab At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/crontab -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/crontab -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged 1 12 13 14 15 16 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.PT-1 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 RHEL-08-030400 SV-230447r627750_rule Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for unusual activity. CCE-80727-1 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80727-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030400 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_crontab - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/bin/crontab block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/bin/crontab -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/crontab -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/crontab -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/bin/crontab -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/crontab -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/crontab -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80727-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030400 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_crontab - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/bin/crontab -F perm=x" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="privileged" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - gpasswd At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/gpasswd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/gpasswd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged 1 12 13 14 15 16 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-007-3 R.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 AC-2(4) AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.PT-1 FAU_GEN.1.1.c SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-APP-000029-CTR-000085 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 RHEL-08-030370 SV-230444r627750_rule Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for unusual activity. CCE-80728-9 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80728-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030370 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_gpasswd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/bin/gpasswd block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/bin/gpasswd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/gpasswd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/gpasswd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/bin/gpasswd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/gpasswd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/gpasswd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80728-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030370 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_gpasswd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/bin/gpasswd -F perm=x" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="privileged" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - kmod At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/kmod -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/kmod -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged BP28(R73) CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 AU-3 AU-3.1 AU-12(a) AU-12.1(ii) AU-12.1(iv)AU-12(c) MA-4(1)(a) SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00216 SRG-OS-000477-GPOS-00222 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 SRG-APP-000504-CTR-001280 RHEL-08-030580 5.2.3.19 SV-230465r627750_rule Without generating audit records that are specific to the security and mission needs of the organization, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident or identify those responsible for one. Audit records can be generated from various components within the information system (e.g., module or policy filter). CCE-89455-0 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-89455-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030580 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(a) - NIST-800-53-AU-12.1(ii) - NIST-800-53-AU-12.1(iv)AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-3 - NIST-800-53-AU-3.1 - NIST-800-53-MA-4(1)(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_kmod - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/bin/kmod block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/bin/kmod -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/kmod -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/kmod -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/bin/kmod -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/kmod -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/kmod -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-89455-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030580 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(a) - NIST-800-53-AU-12.1(ii) - NIST-800-53-AU-12.1(iv)AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-3 - NIST-800-53-AU-3.1 - NIST-800-53-MA-4(1)(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_kmod - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/bin/kmod -F perm=x" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="privileged" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - mount At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/mount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/mount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) FAU_GEN.1.1.c SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-APP-000029-CTR-000085 RHEL-08-030300 SV-230423r627750_rule Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for unusual activity. CCE-80989-7 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80989-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030300 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_mount - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/bin/mount block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/bin/mount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/mount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/mount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/bin/mount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/mount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/mount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80989-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030300 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_mount - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/bin/mount -F perm=x" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="privileged" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - newgidmap At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newgidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newgidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged CCI-000172 CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-007-3 R.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 AC-2(4) AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) FAU_GEN.1.1.c Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for unusual activity. CCE-80991-3 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80991-3 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_newgidmap - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/bin/newgidmap block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/bin/newgidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/newgidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/newgidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/bin/newgidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/newgidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/newgidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80991-3 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_newgidmap - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/bin/newgidmap -F perm=x" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="privileged" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - newgrp At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newgrp -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newgrp -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged 1 12 13 14 15 16 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000130 CCI-000169 CCI-000135 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-007-3 R.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 AC-2(4) AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.PT-1 FAU_GEN.1.1.c SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-APP-000029-CTR-000085 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 RHEL-08-030350 SV-230437r627750_rule Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for unusual activity. CCE-80729-7 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80729-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030350 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_newgrp - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/bin/newgrp block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/bin/newgrp -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/newgrp -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/newgrp -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/bin/newgrp -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/newgrp -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/newgrp -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80729-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030350 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_newgrp - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/bin/newgrp -F perm=x" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="privileged" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - newuidmap At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newuidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newuidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged CCI-000172 CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-007-3 R.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 AC-2(4) AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) FAU_GEN.1.1.c Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for unusual activity. CCE-80992-1 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80992-1 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_newuidmap - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/bin/newuidmap block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/bin/newuidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/newuidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/newuidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/bin/newuidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/newuidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/newuidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80992-1 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_newuidmap - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/bin/newuidmap -F perm=x" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="privileged" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - pam_timestamp_check At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/pam_timestamp_check -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/pam_timestamp_check -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged 1 12 13 14 15 16 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.PT-1 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-APP-000029-CTR-000085 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 RHEL-08-030340 SV-230436r627750_rule Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for unusual activity. CCE-80730-5 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80730-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030340 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_pam_timestamp_check - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/sbin/pam_timestamp_check block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/sbin/pam_timestamp_check -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/pam_timestamp_check -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/pam_timestamp_check -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/sbin/pam_timestamp_check -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/pam_timestamp_check -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/pam_timestamp_check -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80730-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030340 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_pam_timestamp_check - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/sbin/pam_timestamp_check -F perm=x" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="privileged" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - passwd At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/passwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/passwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged 1 12 13 14 15 16 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-007-3 R.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 AC-2(4) AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.PT-1 FAU_GEN.1.1.c SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-APP-000029-CTR-000085 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 RHEL-08-030290 SV-230422r627750_rule Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for unusual activity. CCE-80731-3 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80731-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030290 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_passwd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/bin/passwd block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/bin/passwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/passwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/passwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/bin/passwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/passwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/passwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80731-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030290 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_passwd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/bin/passwd -F perm=x" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="privileged" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - postdrop At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/postdrop -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/postdrop -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged 1 12 13 14 15 16 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.PT-1 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 RHEL-08-030311 SV-230427r627750_rule Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for unusual activity. CCE-80732-1 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80732-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030311 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_postdrop - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/sbin/postdrop block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/sbin/postdrop -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/postdrop -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/postdrop -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/sbin/postdrop -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/postdrop -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/postdrop -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80732-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030311 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_postdrop - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/sbin/postdrop -F perm=x" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="privileged" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - postqueue At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/postqueue -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/postqueue -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged 1 12 13 14 15 16 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.PT-1 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 RHEL-08-030312 SV-230428r627750_rule Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for unusual activity. CCE-80733-9 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80733-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030312 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_postqueue - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/sbin/postqueue block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/sbin/postqueue -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/postqueue -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/postqueue -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/sbin/postqueue -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/postqueue -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/postqueue -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80733-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030312 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_postqueue - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/sbin/postqueue -F perm=x" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="privileged" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - pt_chown At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/libexec/pt_chown -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/libexec/pt_chown -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged 1 12 13 14 15 16 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000135 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.PT-1 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for unusual activity. CCE-80734-7 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80734-7 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_pt_chown - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/libexec/pt_chown block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/libexec/pt_chown -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/libexec/pt_chown -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/libexec/pt_chown -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/libexec/pt_chown -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/libexec/pt_chown -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/libexec/pt_chown -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80734-7 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_pt_chown - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/libexec/pt_chown -F perm=x" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="privileged" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Any Attempts to Run ssh-agent At a minimum, the audit system should collect any execution attempt of the ssh-agent command for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/ssh-agent -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-ssh-agent If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/ssh-agent -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-ssh-agent CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 RHEL-08-030280 SV-230421r627750_rule Without generating audit records that are specific to the security and mission needs of the organization, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident or identify those responsible for one. Audit records can be generated from various components within the information system (e.g., module or policy filter). CCE-85944-7 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-85944-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030280 - audit_rules_privileged_commands_ssh_agent - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/bin/ssh-agent block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/bin/ssh-agent -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/ssh-agent -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/ssh-agent -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/bin/ssh-agent -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/ssh-agent -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/ssh-agent -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-85944-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030280 - audit_rules_privileged_commands_ssh_agent - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/bin/ssh-agent -F perm=x" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="privileged" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - ssh-keysign At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged 1 12 13 14 15 16 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.PT-1 FAU_GEN.1.1.c SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-APP-000029-CTR-000085 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 RHEL-08-030320 SV-230434r744002_rule Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for unusual activity. CCE-80735-4 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80735-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030320 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_ssh_keysign - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80735-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030320 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_ssh_keysign - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign -F perm=x" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="privileged" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - su At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/su -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/su -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged 1 12 13 14 15 16 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.PT-1 FAU_GEN.1.1.c SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-0003 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 SRG-APP-000029-CTR-000085 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 SRG-APP-000499-CTR-001255 RHEL-08-030190 SV-230412r627750_rule Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for unusual activity. CCE-80736-2 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80736-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030190 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_su - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/bin/su block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/bin/su -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/su -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/su -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/bin/su -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/su -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/su -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80736-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030190 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_su - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/bin/su -F perm=x" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="privileged" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - sudo At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/sudo -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/sudo -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged BP28(R19) 1 12 13 14 15 16 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.PT-1 FAU_GEN.1.1.c SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 SRG-APP-000029-CTR-000085 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 SRG-APP-000499-CTR-001255 RHEL-08-030550 SV-230462r627750_rule Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for unusual activity. CCE-80737-0 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80737-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030550 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_sudo - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/bin/sudo block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/bin/sudo -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/sudo -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/sudo -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/bin/sudo -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/sudo -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/sudo -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80737-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030550 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_sudo - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/bin/sudo -F perm=x" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="privileged" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - sudoedit At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/sudoedit -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/sudoedit -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged 1 12 13 14 15 16 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.PT-1 FAU_GEN.1.1.c SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for unusual activity. CCE-80738-8 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80738-8 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_sudoedit - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/bin/sudoedit block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/bin/sudoedit -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/sudoedit -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/sudoedit -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/bin/sudoedit -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/sudoedit -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/sudoedit -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80738-8 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_sudoedit - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/bin/sudoedit -F perm=x" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="privileged" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - umount At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/umount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/umount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged 1 12 13 14 15 16 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000130 CCI-000169 CCI-000135 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.PT-1 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-APP-000029-CTR-000085 RHEL-08-030301 SV-230424r627750_rule Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for unusual activity. CCE-80739-6 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80739-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030301 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_umount - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/bin/umount block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/bin/umount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/umount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/umount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/bin/umount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/umount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/umount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80739-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030301 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_umount - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/bin/umount -F perm=x" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="privileged" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - unix_chkpwd At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged 1 12 13 14 15 16 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-007-3 R.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 CIP-007-3 R6.5 AC-2(4) AU-2(d) AU-3 AU-3.1 AU-12(a) AU-12(c) AU-12.1(ii) AU-12.1(iv) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) MA-4(1)(a) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.PT-1 FAU_GEN.1.1.c SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-APP-000029-CTR-000085 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 RHEL-08-030317 SV-230433r627750_rule Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for unusual activity. CCE-80740-4 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80740-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030317 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(a) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-12.1(ii) - NIST-800-53-AU-12.1(iv) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-AU-3 - NIST-800-53-AU-3.1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-MA-4(1)(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_unix_chkpwd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80740-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030317 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(a) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-12.1(ii) - NIST-800-53-AU-12.1(iv) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-AU-3 - NIST-800-53-AU-3.1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-MA-4(1)(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_unix_chkpwd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd -F perm=x" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="privileged" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - unix_update At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_update -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_update -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 RHEL-08-030310 SV-230426r627750_rule Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for unusual activity. CCE-89480-8 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-89480-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030310 - audit_rules_privileged_commands_unix_update - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/sbin/unix_update block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_update -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_update -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_update -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_update -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_update -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_update -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-89480-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030310 - audit_rules_privileged_commands_unix_update - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/sbin/unix_update -F perm=x" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="privileged" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - userhelper At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/userhelper -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/userhelper -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged 1 12 13 14 15 16 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.PT-1 FAU_GEN.1.1.c SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 RHEL-08-030315 SV-230431r627750_rule Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for unusual activity. CCE-80741-2 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80741-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030315 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_userhelper - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/sbin/userhelper block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/sbin/userhelper -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/userhelper -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/userhelper -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/sbin/userhelper -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/userhelper -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/userhelper -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80741-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030315 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_userhelper - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/sbin/userhelper -F perm=x" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="privileged" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - usermod At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/usermod -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/usermod -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged CCI-000130 CCI-000135 CCI-000169 CCI-000172 CCI-002884 SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 SRG-APP-000499-CTR-001255 RHEL-08-030560 5.2.3.18 SV-230463r627750_rule Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for unusual activity. CCE-86027-0 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-86027-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030560 - audit_rules_privileged_commands_usermod - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/sbin/usermod block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/sbin/usermod -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/usermod -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/usermod -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/sbin/usermod -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/usermod -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/usermod -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86027-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030560 - audit_rules_privileged_commands_usermod - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/sbin/usermod -F perm=x" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="privileged" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - usernetctl At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/usernetctl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/usernetctl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged CCI-000172 CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-007-3 R.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 AC-2(4) AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) FAU_GEN.1.1.c Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for unusual activity. CCE-80990-5 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80990-5 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_usernetctl - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/sbin/usernetctl block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/sbin/usernetctl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/usernetctl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/usernetctl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: [] syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F path=/usr/sbin/usernetctl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/usernetctl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/usernetctl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80990-5 - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - audit_rules_privileged_commands_usernetctl - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/sbin/usernetctl -F perm=x" AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" SYSCALL="" KEY="privileged" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Records Events that Modify Date and Time Information Arbitrary changes to the system time can be used to obfuscate nefarious activities in log files, as well as to confuse network services that are highly dependent upon an accurate system time. All changes to the system time should be audited. Record attempts to alter time through adjtimex If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S adjtimex -F key=audit_time_rules If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S adjtimex -F key=audit_time_rules If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S adjtimex -F key=audit_time_rules If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S adjtimex -F key=audit_time_rules The -k option allows for the specification of a key in string form that can be used for better reporting capability through ausearch and aureport. Multiple system calls can be defined on the same line to save space if desired, but is not required. See an example of multiple combined syscalls: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S adjtimex,settimeofday -F key=audit_time_rules BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 5.4.1.1 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-001487 CCI-000169 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 Req-10.4.2.b 10.6.3 5.2.3.4 Arbitrary changes to the system time can be used to obfuscate nefarious activities in log files, as well as to confuse network services that are highly dependent upon an accurate system time (such as sshd). All changes to the system time should be audited. CCE-80745-3 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80745-3 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 - audit_rules_time_adjtimex - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80745-3 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 - audit_rules_time_adjtimex - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for adjtimex for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - adjtimex syscall_grouping: - adjtimex - settimeofday - stime - name: Check existence of adjtimex in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_time_rules.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_time_rules.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F key=audit_time_rules create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - adjtimex syscall_grouping: - adjtimex - settimeofday - stime - name: Check existence of adjtimex in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F key=audit_time_rules create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80745-3 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 - audit_rules_time_adjtimex - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for adjtimex for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - adjtimex syscall_grouping: - adjtimex - settimeofday - name: Check existence of adjtimex in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_time_rules.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_time_rules.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F key=audit_time_rules create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - adjtimex syscall_grouping: - adjtimex - settimeofday - stime - name: Check existence of adjtimex in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F key=audit_time_rules create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80745-3 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 - audit_rules_time_adjtimex - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,{{ -a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db64%20-S%20adjtimex%20-k%20audit_time_rules%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db32%20-S%20adjtimex%20-k%20audit_time_rules%0A }} mode: 0600 path: /etc/audit/rules.d/75-syscall-adjtimex.rules overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do # Create expected audit group and audit rule form for particular system call & architecture if [ ${ARCH} = "b32" ] then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" # stime system call is known at 32-bit arch (see e.g "$ ausyscall i386 stime" 's output) # so append it to the list of time group system calls to be audited SYSCALL="adjtimex settimeofday stime" SYSCALL_GROUPING="adjtimex settimeofday stime" elif [ ${ARCH} = "b64" ] then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" # stime system call isn't known at 64-bit arch (see "$ ausyscall x86_64 stime" 's output) # therefore don't add it to the list of time group system calls to be audited SYSCALL="adjtimex settimeofday" SYSCALL_GROUPING="adjtimex settimeofday" fi OTHER_FILTERS="" AUID_FILTERS="" KEY="audit_time_rules" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Attempts to Alter Time Through clock_settime If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S clock_settime -F a0=0x0 -F key=time-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S clock_settime -F a0=0x0 -F key=time-change If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S clock_settime -F a0=0x0 -F key=time-change If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S clock_settime -F a0=0x0 -F key=time-change The -k option allows for the specification of a key in string form that can be used for better reporting capability through ausearch and aureport. Multiple system calls can be defined on the same line to save space if desired, but is not required. See an example of multiple combined syscalls: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S adjtimex,settimeofday -F key=audit_time_rules BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 5.4.1.1 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-001487 CCI-000169 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 Req-10.4.2.b 10.6.3 5.2.3.4 Arbitrary changes to the system time can be used to obfuscate nefarious activities in log files, as well as to confuse network services that are highly dependent upon an accurate system time (such as sshd). All changes to the system time should be audited. CCE-80746-1 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80746-1 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 - audit_rules_time_clock_settime - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80746-1 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 - audit_rules_time_clock_settime - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for clock_settime for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - clock_settime syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of clock_settime in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a0=0x0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/time-change.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/time-change.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a0=0x0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a0=0x0 -F key=time-change create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - clock_settime syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of clock_settime in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a0=0x0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a0=0x0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a0=0x0 -F key=time-change create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80746-1 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 - audit_rules_time_clock_settime - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for clock_settime for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - clock_settime syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of clock_settime in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a0=0x0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/time-change.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/time-change.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a0=0x0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a0=0x0 -F key=time-change create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - clock_settime syscall_grouping: [] - name: Check existence of clock_settime in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F a0=0x0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a0=0x0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a0=0x0 -F key=time-change create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80746-1 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 - audit_rules_time_clock_settime - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,{{ -a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db64%20-S%20clock_settime%20-F%20a0%3D0x0%20-k%20time-change%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db32%20-S%20clock_settime%20-F%20a0%3D0x0%20-k%20time-change%0A }} mode: 0600 path: /etc/audit/rules.d/75-syscall-clock-settime.rules overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # First perform the remediation of the syscall rule # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" OTHER_FILTERS="-F a0=0x0" AUID_FILTERS="" SYSCALL="clock_settime" KEY="time-change" SYSCALL_GROUPING="" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record attempts to alter time through settimeofday If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S settimeofday -F key=audit_time_rules If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S settimeofday -F key=audit_time_rules If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S settimeofday -F key=audit_time_rules If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S settimeofday -F key=audit_time_rules The -k option allows for the specification of a key in string form that can be used for better reporting capability through ausearch and aureport. Multiple system calls can be defined on the same line to save space if desired, but is not required. See an example of multiple combined syscalls: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S adjtimex,settimeofday -F key=audit_time_rules 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 5.4.1.1 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-001487 CCI-000169 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 Req-10.4.2.b 10.6.3 5.2.3.4 Arbitrary changes to the system time can be used to obfuscate nefarious activities in log files, as well as to confuse network services that are highly dependent upon an accurate system time (such as sshd). All changes to the system time should be audited. CCE-80747-9 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80747-9 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 - audit_rules_time_settimeofday - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Set architecture for audit tasks set_fact: audit_arch: b64 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" tags: - CCE-80747-9 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 - audit_rules_time_settimeofday - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for settimeofday for 32bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - settimeofday syscall_grouping: - adjtimex - settimeofday - stime - name: Check existence of settimeofday in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_time_rules.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_time_rules.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F key=audit_time_rules create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - settimeofday syscall_grouping: - adjtimex - settimeofday - stime - name: Check existence of settimeofday in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F key=audit_time_rules create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80747-9 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 - audit_rules_time_settimeofday - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for settimeofday for 64bit platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - settimeofday syscall_grouping: - adjtimex - settimeofday - stime - name: Check existence of settimeofday in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_time_rules.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_time_rules.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F key=audit_time_rules create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - settimeofday syscall_grouping: - adjtimex - settimeofday - stime - name: Check existence of settimeofday in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F key=audit_time_rules create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - audit_arch == "b64" tags: - CCE-80747-9 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 - audit_rules_time_settimeofday - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,{{ -a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db64%20-S%20settimeofday%20-k%20audit_time_rules%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db32%20-S%20settimeofday%20-k%20audit_time_rules%0A }} mode: 0600 path: /etc/audit/rules.d/75-syscall-settimeofday.rules overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do # Create expected audit group and audit rule form for particular system call & architecture if [ ${ARCH} = "b32" ] then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" # stime system call is known at 32-bit arch (see e.g "$ ausyscall i386 stime" 's output) # so append it to the list of time group system calls to be audited SYSCALL="adjtimex settimeofday stime" SYSCALL_GROUPING="adjtimex settimeofday stime" elif [ ${ARCH} = "b64" ] then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" # stime system call isn't known at 64-bit arch (see "$ ausyscall x86_64 stime" 's output) # therefore don't add it to the list of time group system calls to be audited SYSCALL="adjtimex settimeofday" SYSCALL_GROUPING="adjtimex settimeofday" fi OTHER_FILTERS="" AUID_FILTERS="" KEY="audit_time_rules" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Attempts to Alter Time Through stime If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d for both 32 bit and 64 bit systems: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S stime -F key=audit_time_rules Since the 64 bit version of the "stime" system call is not defined in the audit lookup table, the corresponding "-F arch=b64" form of this rule is not expected to be defined on 64 bit systems (the aforementioned "-F arch=b32" stime rule form itself is sufficient for both 32 bit and 64 bit systems). If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file for both 32 bit and 64 bit systems: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S stime -F key=audit_time_rules Since the 64 bit version of the "stime" system call is not defined in the audit lookup table, the corresponding "-F arch=b64" form of this rule is not expected to be defined on 64 bit systems (the aforementioned "-F arch=b32" stime rule form itself is sufficient for both 32 bit and 64 bit systems). The -k option allows for the specification of a key in string form that can be used for better reporting capability through ausearch and aureport. Multiple system calls can be defined on the same line to save space if desired, but is not required. See an example of multiple combined system calls: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S adjtimex,settimeofday -F key=audit_time_rules BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 5.4.1.1 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-001487 CCI-000169 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 Req-10.4.2.b 10.6.3 5.2.3.4 Arbitrary changes to the system time can be used to obfuscate nefarious activities in log files, as well as to confuse network services that are highly dependent upon an accurate system time (such as sshd). All changes to the system time should be audited. CCE-80748-7 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80748-7 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 - audit_rules_time_stime - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for stime syscall for x86 platform block: - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - stime syscall_grouping: - adjtimex - settimeofday - stime - name: Check existence of stime in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Reset syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file: {} found_paths_dict: {} - name: Declare syscalls found per file set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' - name: Declare files where syscalls were found set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten | map(attribute='path') | list }}" - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, 0) }) }}" loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' - name: Get path with most syscalls set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') | last).key }}" when: found_paths | length >= 1 - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_time_rules.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_time_rules.rules" when: found_paths | length == 0 - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F key=audit_time_rules create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 - name: Declare list of syscalls set_fact: syscalls: - stime syscall_grouping: - adjtimex - settimeofday - stime - name: Check existence of stime in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ patterns: audit.rules register: find_command loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" - name: Declare found syscalls set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') | list }}" - name: Declare missing syscalls set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 backrefs: true state: present when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} lineinfile: path: '{{ audit_file }}' line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F key=audit_time_rules create: true mode: o-rwx state: present when: syscalls_found | length == 0 when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ( not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" ) and not ( ansible_architecture == "s390x" ) ) tags: - CCE-80748-7 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 - audit_rules_time_stime - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,{{ -a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db64%20-S%20stime%20-k%20audit_time_rules%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db32%20-S%20stime%20-k%20audit_time_rules%0A }} mode: 0600 path: /etc/audit/rules.d/75-syscall-stime.rules overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit && { ( ! ( grep -q aarch64 /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ) && ! ( grep -q s390x /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ) ); }; then # Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system [ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" do # Create expected audit group and audit rule form for particular system call & architecture if [ ${ARCH} = "b32" ] then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" # stime system call is known at 32-bit arch (see e.g "$ ausyscall i386 stime" 's output) # so append it to the list of time group system calls to be audited SYSCALL="adjtimex settimeofday stime" SYSCALL_GROUPING="adjtimex settimeofday stime" elif [ ${ARCH} = "b64" ] then ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" # stime system call isn't known at 64-bit arch (see "$ ausyscall x86_64 stime" 's output) # therefore don't add it to the list of time group system calls to be audited SYSCALL="adjtimex settimeofday" SYSCALL_GROUPING="adjtimex settimeofday" fi OTHER_FILTERS="" AUID_FILTERS="" KEY="audit_time_rules" # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] then file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] then touch "$file_to_inspect" chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" fi fi # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi unset syscall_a unset syscall_grouping unset syscall_string unset syscall unset file_to_edit unset rule_to_edit unset rule_syscalls_to_edit unset other_string unset auid_string unset full_rule # Load macro arguments into arrays read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # files_to_inspect=() # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # file to the list of files to be inspected default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead skip=1 for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, # i.e, collect rules that match: # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") candidate_rules=() # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" do # Strip all the options and fields we know of, # than check if there was any field left over extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") done if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] then # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" do rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) all_syscalls_found=0 for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule all_syscalls_found=1 } done if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] then # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro skip=0 break fi # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" do if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" then file_to_edit=${audit_file} rule_to_edit=${rule} rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} fi done done else # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] then skip=0 fi fi if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then break fi done if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group # the syscall together with an exsiting rule # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] then # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] then syscall_string="" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" done fi other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" chmod o-rwx ${default_file} else # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or # as multiple -S parameters if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" then delimiter="," else delimiter=" -S " fi new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" do grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" } done # Group the syscall in the rule sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Record Attempts to Alter the localtime File If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: -w /etc/localtime -p wa -k audit_time_rules If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: -w /etc/localtime -p wa -k audit_time_rules The -k option allows for the specification of a key in string form that can be used for better reporting capability through ausearch and aureport and should always be used. BP28(R73) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 5.4.1.1 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.1.7 CCI-001487 CCI-000169 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.10 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.13 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.6 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 AU-2(d) AU-12(c) AC-6(9) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.AC-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 Req-10.4.2.b 10.6.3 10.6.3 5.2.3.4 Arbitrary changes to the system time can be used to obfuscate nefarious activities in log files, as well as to confuse network services that are highly dependent upon an accurate system time (such as sshd). All changes to the system time should be audited. CCE-80749-5 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80749-5 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 - audit_rules_time_watch_localtime - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /etc/localtime already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/localtime\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_existing_watch_rules_d when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80749-5 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 - audit_rules_time_watch_localtime - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key audit_time_rules find: paths: /etc/audit/rules.d contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)audit_time_rules$ patterns: '*.rules' register: find_watch_key when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80749-5 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 - audit_rules_time_watch_localtime - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_time_rules.rules as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_time_rules.rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80749-5 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 - audit_rules_time_watch_localtime - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule set_fact: all_files: - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80749-5 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 - audit_rules_time_watch_localtime - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /etc/localtime in /etc/audit/rules.d/ lineinfile: path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' line: -w /etc/localtime -p wa -k audit_time_rules create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80749-5 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 - audit_rules_time_watch_localtime - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Check if watch rule for /etc/localtime already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules find: paths: /etc/audit/ contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/localtime\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ patterns: audit.rules register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80749-5 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 - audit_rules_time_watch_localtime - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Add watch rule for /etc/localtime in /etc/audit/audit.rules lineinfile: line: -w /etc/localtime -p wa -k audit_time_rules state: present dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules create: true mode: '0640' when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-80749-5 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 - audit_rules_time_watch_localtime - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,{{ -w%20/etc/localtime%20-p%20wa%20-k%20audit_time_rules%0A }} mode: 0600 path: /etc/audit/rules.d/75-etclocaltime-wa-audit_time_rules.rules overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' # into the list of files to be inspected files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/localtime" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/localtime $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/localtime$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/localtime -p wa -k audit_time_rules" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- files_to_inspect=() # If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. # If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_time_rules.rules' to list of files for inspection. readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/localtime" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) # For each of the matched entries for match in "${matches[@]}" do # Extract filepath from the match rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') # Append that path into list of files for inspection files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") done # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] then # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_time_rules.rules' into list of files for inspection key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_time_rules.rules" # If the audit_time_rules.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] then touch "$key_rule_file" chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" fi files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") fi # Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule # correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" do # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/localtime" "$audit_rules_file" then # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains # all of the required access type bits # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut sp="[[:space:]]" # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/localtime $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") # Split required access bits string into characters array # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) do # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. # If not, append that bit at the end if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" then # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" fi done # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/localtime$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" else # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file # with proper key echo "-w /etc/localtime -p wa -k audit_time_rules" >> "$audit_rules_file" fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure auditd Data Retention The audit system writes data to /var/log/audit/audit.log. By default, auditd rotates 5 logs by size (6MB), retaining a maximum of 30MB of data in total, and refuses to write entries when the disk is too full. This minimizes the risk of audit data filling its partition and impacting other services. This also minimizes the risk of the audit daemon temporarily disabling the system if it cannot write audit log (which it can be configured to do). For a busy system or a system which is thoroughly auditing system activity, the default settings for data retention may be insufficient. The log file size needed will depend heavily on what types of events are being audited. First configure auditing to log all the events of interest. Then monitor the log size manually for awhile to determine what file size will allow you to keep the required data for the correct time period. Using a dedicated partition for /var/log/audit prevents the auditd logs from disrupting system functionality if they fill, and, more importantly, prevents other activity in /var from filling the partition and stopping the audit trail. (The audit logs are size-limited and therefore unlikely to grow without bound unless configured to do so.) Some machines may have requirements that no actions occur which cannot be audited. If this is the case, then auditd can be configured to halt the machine if it runs out of space. Note: Since older logs are rotated, configuring auditd this way does not prevent older logs from being rotated away before they can be viewed. If your system is configured to halt when logging cannot be performed, make sure this can never happen under normal circumstances! Ensure that /var/log/audit is on its own partition, and that this partition is larger than the maximum amount of data auditd will retain normally. Action for audispd to take when disk is full The setting for disk_full_action in /etc/audisp/audisp-remote.conf single exec halt single suspend syslog warn_once stop Action for audispd to take when network fails The setting for network_failure_action in /etc/audisp/audisp-remote.conf single exec halt single suspend syslog warn_once stop ignore Remote server for audispd to send audit records The setting for remote_server in /etc/audit/audisp-remote.conf logcollector Account for auditd to send email when actions occurs The setting for action_mail_acct in /etc/audit/auditd.conf admin root root Action for auditd to take when disk space is low The setting for admin_space_left_action in /etc/audit/auditd.conf single email exec halt single suspend syslog rotate ignore single|halt The percentage remaining in disk space before prompting admin_space_left_action The setting for admin_space_left as a percentage in /etc/audit/auditd.conf 5 25 50 75 5 Action for auditd to take when disk errors 'The setting for disk_error_action in /etc/audit/auditd.conf, if multiple values are allowed write them separated by pipes as in "syslog|single|halt", for remediations the first value will be taken' single exec halt single suspend syslog ignore syslog|single|halt syslog|single|halt syslog|single|halt Action for auditd to take when disk is full 'The setting for disk_full_action in /etc/audit/auditd.conf, if multiple values are allowed write them separated by pipes as in "syslog|single|halt", for remediations the first value will be taken' single exec halt single suspend syslog ignore rotate syslog|single|halt syslog|single|halt halt|single Auditd priority for flushing data to disk The setting for flush in /etc/audit/auditd.conf data data incremental incremental_async none sync Number of Record to Retain Before Flushing to Disk The setting for freq in /etc/audit/auditd.conf 50 100 50 Maximum audit log file size for auditd The setting for max_log_file in /etc/audit/auditd.conf 1 10 20 5 6 6 Action for auditd to take when log files reach their maximum size The setting for max_log_file_action in /etc/audit/auditd.conf. The following options are available: ignore - audit daemon does nothing. syslog - audit daemon will issue a warning to syslog. suspend - audit daemon will stop writing records to the disk. rotate - audit daemon will rotate logs in the same convention used by logrotate. keep_logs - similar to rotate but prevents audit logs to be overwritten. May trigger space_left_action if volume is full. rotate keep_logs rotate suspend syslog ignore Type of hostname to record the audit event Type of hostname to record the audit event hostname hostname fqd numeric user none hostname|fqd|numeric Number of log files for auditd to retain The setting for num_logs in /etc/audit/auditd.conf 0 1 2 3 4 5 10 20 50 100 5 Size remaining in disk space before prompting space_left_action The setting for space_left (MB) in /etc/audit/auditd.conf 1000 100 250 500 750 100 Action for auditd to take when disk space just starts to run low The setting for space_left_action in /etc/audit/auditd.conf email email exec halt single suspend syslog rotate ignore email|exec|single|halt The percentage remaining in disk space before prompting space_left_action The setting for space_left as a percentage in /etc/audit/auditd.conf 25 50 75 25 Configure audispd Plugin To Send Logs To Remote Server Configure the audispd plugin to off-load audit records onto a different system or media from the system being audited. Set the remote_server option in /etc/audit/audisp-remote.conf with an IP address or hostname of the system that the audispd plugin should send audit records to. For example remote_server = CCI-001851 FAU_GEN.1.1.c SRG-OS-000342-GPOS-00133 SRG-OS-000479-GPOS-00224 Information stored in one location is vulnerable to accidental or incidental deletion or alteration.Off-loading is a common process in information systems with limited audit storage capacity. CCE-80925-1 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80925-1 - auditd_audispd_configure_remote_server - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: XCCDF Value var_audispd_remote_server # promote to variable set_fact: var_audispd_remote_server: !!str tags: - always - name: Make sure that a remote server is configured for Audispd lineinfile: path: /etc/audit/audisp-remote.conf line: remote_server = {{ var_audispd_remote_server }} regexp: ^\s*remote_server\s*=.*$ create: true state: present when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80925-1 - auditd_audispd_configure_remote_server - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then var_audispd_remote_server='' AUDITCONFIG=/etc/audit/audisp-remote.conf # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^remote_server") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_audispd_remote_server" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^remote_server\\>" "$AUDITCONFIG"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^remote_server\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "$AUDITCONFIG" else if [[ -s "$AUDITCONFIG" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "$AUDITCONFIG" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "$AUDITCONFIG" fi cce="CCE-80925-1" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "$AUDITCONFIG" >> "$AUDITCONFIG" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "$AUDITCONFIG" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure a Sufficiently Large Partition for Audit Logs The Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 operating system must allocate audit record storage capacity to store at least one weeks worth of audit records when audit records are not immediately sent to a central audit record storage facility. The partition size needed to capture a week's worth of audit records is based on the activity level of the system and the total storage capacity available. In normal circumstances, 10.0 GB of storage space for audit records will be sufficient. Determine which partition the audit records are being written to with the following command: $ sudo grep log_file /etc/audit/auditd.conf log_file = /var/log/audit/audit.log Check the size of the partition that audit records are written to with the following command: $ sudo df -h /var/log/audit/ /dev/sda2 24G 10.4G 13.6G 43% /var/log/audit CCI-001849 SRG-OS-000341-GPOS-00132 SRG-OS-000342-GPOS-00133 RHEL-08-030660 SV-230476r877391_rule Information stored in one location is vulnerable to accidental or incidental deletion or alteration. Off-loading is a common process in information systems with limited audit storage capacity. CCE-84005-8 Configure audispd's Plugin disk_full_action When Disk Is Full Configure the action the operating system takes if the disk the audit records are written to becomes full. Edit the file /etc/audit/audisp-remote.conf. Add or modify the following line, substituting ACTION appropriately: disk_full_action = ACTION Set this value to single to cause the system to switch to single user mode for corrective action. Acceptable values also include syslog and halt. For certain systems, the need for availability outweighs the need to log all actions, and a different setting should be determined. CCI-001851 AU-5(b) AU-5(2) AU-5(1) AU-5(4) CM-6(a) SRG-OS-000342-GPOS-00133 SRG-OS-000479-GPOS-00224 Taking appropriate action in case of a filled audit storage volume will minimize the possibility of losing audit records. - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - auditd_audispd_disk_full_action - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: XCCDF Value var_audispd_disk_full_action # promote to variable set_fact: var_audispd_disk_full_action: !!str tags: - always - name: Make sure that disk full action is configured for Audispd lineinfile: path: /etc/audit/audisp-remote.conf line: disk_full_action = {{ var_audispd_disk_full_action }} regexp: ^\s*disk_full_action\s*=.*$ create: true state: present when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - auditd_audispd_disk_full_action - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then var_audispd_disk_full_action='' AUDITCONFIG=/etc/audit/audisp-remote.conf # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^disk_full_action") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_audispd_disk_full_action" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^disk_full_action\\>" "$AUDITCONFIG"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^disk_full_action\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "$AUDITCONFIG" else if [[ -s "$AUDITCONFIG" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "$AUDITCONFIG" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "$AUDITCONFIG" fi printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "$AUDITCONFIG" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Encrypt Audit Records Sent With audispd Plugin Configure the operating system to encrypt the transfer of off-loaded audit records onto a different system or media from the system being audited. Set the transport option in /etc/audit/audisp-remote.conf to KRB5. CCI-001851 AU-9(3) CM-6(a) FAU_GEN.1.1.c SRG-OS-000342-GPOS-00133 SRG-OS-000479-GPOS-00224 Information stored in one location is vulnerable to accidental or incidental deletion or alteration. Off-loading is a common process in information systems with limited audit storage capacity. CCE-80926-9 # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then AUDISP_REMOTE_CONFIG="/etc/audit/audisp-remote.conf" option="^transport" value="KRB5" # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "$option") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "$option\\>" "$AUDISP_REMOTE_CONFIG"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/$option\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "$AUDISP_REMOTE_CONFIG" else if [[ -s "$AUDISP_REMOTE_CONFIG" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "$AUDISP_REMOTE_CONFIG" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "$AUDISP_REMOTE_CONFIG" fi cce="CCE-80926-9" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "$AUDISP_REMOTE_CONFIG" >> "$AUDISP_REMOTE_CONFIG" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "$AUDISP_REMOTE_CONFIG" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure audispd's Plugin network_failure_action On Network Failure Configure the action the operating system takes if there is an error sending audit records to a remote system. Edit the file /etc/audit/audisp-remote.conf. Add or modify the following line, substituting ACTION appropriately: network_failure_action = ACTION Set this value to single to cause the system to switch to single user mode for corrective action. Acceptable values also include syslog and halt. For certain systems, the need for availability outweighs the need to log all actions, and a different setting should be determined. This profile configures the action to be . CCI-001851 AU-5(b) AU-5(2) AU-5(1) AU-5(4) CM-6(a) SRG-OS-000342-GPOS-00133 SRG-OS-000479-GPOS-00224 Taking appropriate action when there is an error sending audit records to a remote system will minimize the possibility of losing audit records. - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - auditd_audispd_network_failure_action - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: XCCDF Value var_audispd_network_failure_action # promote to variable set_fact: var_audispd_network_failure_action: !!str tags: - always - name: Make sure that network failure action is configured for Audispd lineinfile: path: /etc/audit/audisp-remote.conf line: network_failure_action = {{ var_audispd_network_failure_action }} regexp: ^\s*network_failure_action\s*=.*$ create: true state: present when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - auditd_audispd_network_failure_action - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then var_audispd_network_failure_action='' AUDITCONFIG=/etc/audit/audisp-remote.conf # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^network_failure_action") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_audispd_network_failure_action" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^network_failure_action\\>" "$AUDITCONFIG"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^network_failure_action\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "$AUDITCONFIG" else if [[ -s "$AUDITCONFIG" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "$AUDITCONFIG" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "$AUDITCONFIG" fi printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "$AUDITCONFIG" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure auditd to use audispd's syslog plugin To configure the auditd service to use the syslog plug-in of the audispd audit event multiplexor, set the active line in /etc/audit/plugins.d/syslog.conf to yes. Restart the auditd service: $ sudo service auditd restart 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 3 4 5 6 7 8 5.4.1.1 APO11.04 APO12.06 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 MEA02.01 3.3.1 CCI-000136 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(B) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.308(a)(6)(ii) 164.308(a)(8) 164.310(d)(2)(iii) 164.312(b) 164.314(a)(2)(i)(C) 164.314(a)(2)(iii) 4.2.3.10 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 AU-4(1) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 PR.PT-1 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 FAU_GEN.1.1.c Req-10.5.3 10.3.3 SRG-OS-000479-GPOS-00224 SRG-OS-000342-GPOS-00133 The auditd service does not include the ability to send audit records to a centralized server for management directly. It does, however, include a plug-in for audit event multiplexor (audispd) to pass audit records to the local syslog server. CCE-80677-8 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80677-8 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 - NIST-800-53-AU-4(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.3 - auditd_audispd_syslog_plugin_activated - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Enable syslog plugin lineinfile: dest: /etc/audit/plugins.d/syslog.conf regexp: ^active line: active = yes create: true when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80677-8 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 - NIST-800-53-AU-4(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.3 - auditd_audispd_syslog_plugin_activated - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then var_syslog_active="yes" AUDISP_SYSLOGCONFIG=/etc/audit/plugins.d/syslog.conf # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^active") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_syslog_active" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^active\\>" "$AUDISP_SYSLOGCONFIG"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^active\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "$AUDISP_SYSLOGCONFIG" else if [[ -s "$AUDISP_SYSLOGCONFIG" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "$AUDISP_SYSLOGCONFIG" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "$AUDISP_SYSLOGCONFIG" fi cce="CCE-80677-8" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "$AUDISP_SYSLOGCONFIG" >> "$AUDISP_SYSLOGCONFIG" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "$AUDISP_SYSLOGCONFIG" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure auditd Disk Error Action on Disk Error The auditd service can be configured to take an action when there is a disk error. Edit the file /etc/audit/auditd.conf. Add or modify the following line, substituting ACTION appropriately: disk_error_action = ACTION Set this value to single to cause the system to switch to single-user mode for corrective action. Acceptable values also include syslog, exec, single, and halt. For certain systems, the need for availability outweighs the need to log all actions, and a different setting should be determined. Details regarding all possible values for ACTION are described in the auditd.conf man page. 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI04.04 BAI08.02 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 MEA02.01 CCI-000140 4.2.3.10 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 SR 7.1 SR 7.2 A.12.1.3 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.17.2.1 AU-5(b) AU-5(2) AU-5(1) AU-5(4) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 PR.DS-4 PR.PT-1 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 SRG-OS-000047-GPOS-00023 SRG-APP-000098-CTR-000185 SRG-APP-000099-CTR-000190 SRG-APP-000100-CTR-000195 SRG-APP-000100-CTR-000200 SRG-APP-000109-CTR-000215 SRG-APP-000290-CTR-000670 SRG-APP-000357-CTR-000800 RHEL-08-030040 5.2.2.3 SV-230390r627750_rule Taking appropriate action in case of disk errors will minimize the possibility of losing audit records. CCE-84046-2 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-84046-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030040 - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - auditd_data_disk_error_action - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_auditd_disk_error_action # promote to variable set_fact: var_auditd_disk_error_action: !!str tags: - always - name: Configure auditd Disk Error Action on Disk Error lineinfile: dest: /etc/audit/auditd.conf line: disk_error_action = {{ var_auditd_disk_error_action.split('|')[0] }} regexp: ^\s*disk_error_action\s*=\s*.*$ state: present create: true when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84046-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030040 - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - auditd_data_disk_error_action - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,{{ %23%0A%23%20This%20file%20controls%20the%20configuration%20of%20the%20audit%20daemon%0A%23%0A%0Alocal_events%20%3D%20yes%0Awrite_logs%20%3D%20yes%0Alog_file%20%3D%20/var/log/audit/audit.log%0Alog_group%20%3D%20root%0Alog_format%20%3D%20ENRICHED%0Aflush%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_flush%7D%7D%0Afreq%20%3D%2050%0Amax_log_file%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_max_log_file%7D%7D%0Anum_logs%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_num_logs%7D%7D%0Apriority_boost%20%3D%204%0Aname_format%20%3D%20hostname%0A%23%23name%20%3D%20mydomain%0Amax_log_file_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_max_log_file_action%7D%7D%0Aspace_left%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_space_left%7D%7D%0Aspace_left_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_space_left_action%7D%7D%0Averify_email%20%3D%20yes%0Aaction_mail_acct%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_action_mail_acct%7D%7D%0Aadmin_space_left%20%3D%2050%0Aadmin_space_left_action%20%3D%20syslog%0Adisk_full_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_disk_full_action%7D%7D%0Adisk_error_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_disk_error_action%7D%7D%0Ause_libwrap%20%3D%20yes%0A%23%23tcp_listen_port%20%3D%2060%0Atcp_listen_queue%20%3D%205%0Atcp_max_per_addr%20%3D%201%0A%23%23tcp_client_ports%20%3D%201024-65535%0Atcp_client_max_idle%20%3D%200%0Atransport%20%3D%20TCP%0Akrb5_principal%20%3D%20auditd%0A%23%23krb5_key_file%20%3D%20/etc/audit/audit.key%0Adistribute_network%20%3D%20no%0Aq_depth%20%3D%20400%0Aoverflow_action%20%3D%20syslog%0Amax_restarts%20%3D%2010%0Aplugin_dir%20%3D%20/etc/audit/plugins.d }} mode: 0640 path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then var_auditd_disk_error_action='' # # If disk_error_action present in /etc/audit/auditd.conf, change value # to var_auditd_disk_error_action, else # add "disk_error_action = $var_auditd_disk_error_action" to /etc/audit/auditd.conf # var_auditd_disk_error_action="$(echo $var_auditd_disk_error_action | cut -d \| -f 1)" # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^disk_error_action") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_auditd_disk_error_action" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^disk_error_action\\>" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^disk_error_action\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" else if [[ -s "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" fi cce="CCE-84046-2" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" >> "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure auditd Disk Error Action on Disk Error The auditd service can be configured to take an action when there is a disk error. Edit the file /etc/audit/auditd.conf. Add or modify the following line, substituting ACTION appropriately: disk_error_action = ACTION Set this value to single to cause the system to switch to single-user mode for corrective action. Acceptable values also include syslog, exec, single, and halt. For certain systems, the need for availability outweighs the need to log all actions, and a different setting should be determined. Details regarding all possible values for ACTION are described in the auditd.conf man page. 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI04.04 BAI08.02 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 MEA02.01 CCI-000140 4.2.3.10 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 SR 7.1 SR 7.2 A.12.1.3 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.17.2.1 AU-5(b) AU-5(2) AU-5(1) AU-5(4) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 PR.DS-4 PR.PT-1 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 SRG-OS-000047-GPOS-00023 Taking appropriate action in case of disk errors will minimize the possibility of losing audit records. - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - auditd_data_disk_error_action_stig - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_auditd_disk_error_action # promote to variable set_fact: var_auditd_disk_error_action: !!str tags: - always - name: Configure auditd Disk Error Action on Disk Error lineinfile: dest: /etc/audit/auditd.conf line: disk_error_action = {{ var_auditd_disk_error_action }} regexp: ^\s*disk_error_action\s*=\s*.*$ state: present create: true when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - auditd_data_disk_error_action_stig - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,{{ %23%0A%23%20This%20file%20controls%20the%20configuration%20of%20the%20audit%20daemon%0A%23%0A%0Alocal_events%20%3D%20yes%0Awrite_logs%20%3D%20yes%0Alog_file%20%3D%20/var/log/audit/audit.log%0Alog_group%20%3D%20root%0Alog_format%20%3D%20ENRICHED%0Aflush%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_flush%7D%7D%0Afreq%20%3D%2050%0Amax_log_file%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_max_log_file%7D%7D%0Anum_logs%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_num_logs%7D%7D%0Apriority_boost%20%3D%204%0Aname_format%20%3D%20hostname%0A%23%23name%20%3D%20mydomain%0Amax_log_file_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_max_log_file_action%7D%7D%0Aspace_left%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_space_left%7D%7D%0Aspace_left_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_space_left_action%7D%7D%0Averify_email%20%3D%20yes%0Aaction_mail_acct%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_action_mail_acct%7D%7D%0Aadmin_space_left%20%3D%2050%0Aadmin_space_left_action%20%3D%20syslog%0Adisk_full_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_disk_full_action%7D%7D%0Adisk_error_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_disk_error_action%7D%7D%0Ause_libwrap%20%3D%20yes%0A%23%23tcp_listen_port%20%3D%2060%0Atcp_listen_queue%20%3D%205%0Atcp_max_per_addr%20%3D%201%0A%23%23tcp_client_ports%20%3D%201024-65535%0Atcp_client_max_idle%20%3D%200%0Atransport%20%3D%20TCP%0Akrb5_principal%20%3D%20auditd%0A%23%23krb5_key_file%20%3D%20/etc/audit/audit.key%0Adistribute_network%20%3D%20no%0Aq_depth%20%3D%20400%0Aoverflow_action%20%3D%20syslog%0Amax_restarts%20%3D%2010%0Aplugin_dir%20%3D%20/etc/audit/plugins.d }} mode: 0640 path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then var_auditd_disk_error_action='' # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^disk_error_action") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_auditd_disk_error_action" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^disk_error_action\\>" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^disk_error_action\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" else if [[ -s "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" fi printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure auditd Disk Full Action when Disk Space Is Full The auditd service can be configured to take an action when disk space is running low but prior to running out of space completely. Edit the file /etc/audit/auditd.conf. Add or modify the following line, substituting ACTION appropriately: disk_full_action = ACTION Set this value to single to cause the system to switch to single-user mode for corrective action. Acceptable values also include syslog, exec, single, and halt. For certain systems, the need for availability outweighs the need to log all actions, and a different setting should be determined. Details regarding all possible values for ACTION are described in the auditd.conf man page. 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI04.04 BAI08.02 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 MEA02.01 CCI-000140 4.2.3.10 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 SR 7.1 SR 7.2 A.12.1.3 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.17.2.1 AU-5(b) AU-5(2) AU-5(1) AU-5(4) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 PR.DS-4 PR.PT-1 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 SRG-OS-000047-GPOS-00023 RHEL-08-030060 5.2.2.3 SV-230392r627750_rule Taking appropriate action in case of a filled audit storage volume will minimize the possibility of losing audit records. CCE-84045-4 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-84045-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030060 - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - auditd_data_disk_full_action - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_auditd_disk_full_action # promote to variable set_fact: var_auditd_disk_full_action: !!str tags: - always - name: Configure auditd Disk Full Action when Disk Space Is Full lineinfile: dest: /etc/audit/auditd.conf line: disk_full_action = {{ var_auditd_disk_full_action.split('|')[0] }} regexp: ^\s*disk_full_action\s*=\s*.*$ state: present create: true when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84045-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030060 - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - auditd_data_disk_full_action - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,{{ %23%0A%23%20This%20file%20controls%20the%20configuration%20of%20the%20audit%20daemon%0A%23%0A%0Alocal_events%20%3D%20yes%0Awrite_logs%20%3D%20yes%0Alog_file%20%3D%20/var/log/audit/audit.log%0Alog_group%20%3D%20root%0Alog_format%20%3D%20ENRICHED%0Aflush%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_flush%7D%7D%0Afreq%20%3D%2050%0Amax_log_file%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_max_log_file%7D%7D%0Anum_logs%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_num_logs%7D%7D%0Apriority_boost%20%3D%204%0Aname_format%20%3D%20hostname%0A%23%23name%20%3D%20mydomain%0Amax_log_file_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_max_log_file_action%7D%7D%0Aspace_left%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_space_left%7D%7D%0Aspace_left_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_space_left_action%7D%7D%0Averify_email%20%3D%20yes%0Aaction_mail_acct%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_action_mail_acct%7D%7D%0Aadmin_space_left%20%3D%2050%0Aadmin_space_left_action%20%3D%20syslog%0Adisk_full_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_disk_full_action%7D%7D%0Adisk_error_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_disk_error_action%7D%7D%0Ause_libwrap%20%3D%20yes%0A%23%23tcp_listen_port%20%3D%2060%0Atcp_listen_queue%20%3D%205%0Atcp_max_per_addr%20%3D%201%0A%23%23tcp_client_ports%20%3D%201024-65535%0Atcp_client_max_idle%20%3D%200%0Atransport%20%3D%20TCP%0Akrb5_principal%20%3D%20auditd%0A%23%23krb5_key_file%20%3D%20/etc/audit/audit.key%0Adistribute_network%20%3D%20no%0Aq_depth%20%3D%20400%0Aoverflow_action%20%3D%20syslog%0Amax_restarts%20%3D%2010%0Aplugin_dir%20%3D%20/etc/audit/plugins.d }} mode: 0640 path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then var_auditd_disk_full_action='' var_auditd_disk_full_action="$(echo $var_auditd_disk_full_action | cut -d \| -f 1)" # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^disk_full_action") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_auditd_disk_full_action" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^disk_full_action\\>" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^disk_full_action\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" else if [[ -s "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" fi cce="CCE-84045-4" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" >> "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure auditd Disk Full Action when Disk Space Is Full The auditd service can be configured to take an action when disk space is running low but prior to running out of space completely. Edit the file /etc/audit/auditd.conf. Add or modify the following line, substituting ACTION appropriately: disk_full_action = ACTION Set this value to single to cause the system to switch to single-user mode for corrective action. Acceptable values also include syslog, single, and halt. For certain systems, the need for availability outweighs the need to log all actions, and a different setting should be determined. Details regarding all possible values for ACTION are described in the auditd.conf man page. 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI04.04 BAI08.02 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 MEA02.01 CCI-000140 4.2.3.10 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 SR 7.1 SR 7.2 A.12.1.3 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.17.2.1 AU-5(b) AU-5(2) AU-5(1) AU-5(4) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 PR.DS-4 PR.PT-1 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 SRG-OS-000047-GPOS-00023 Taking appropriate action in case of a filled audit storage volume will minimize the possibility of losing audit records. - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - auditd_data_disk_full_action_stig - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_auditd_disk_full_action # promote to variable set_fact: var_auditd_disk_full_action: !!str tags: - always - name: Configure auditd Disk Full Action when Disk Space Is Full lineinfile: dest: /etc/audit/auditd.conf line: disk_full_action = {{ var_auditd_disk_full_action }} regexp: ^\s*disk_full_action\s*=\s*.*$ state: present create: true when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - auditd_data_disk_full_action_stig - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,{{ %23%0A%23%20This%20file%20controls%20the%20configuration%20of%20the%20audit%20daemon%0A%23%0A%0Alocal_events%20%3D%20yes%0Awrite_logs%20%3D%20yes%0Alog_file%20%3D%20/var/log/audit/audit.log%0Alog_group%20%3D%20root%0Alog_format%20%3D%20ENRICHED%0Aflush%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_flush%7D%7D%0Afreq%20%3D%2050%0Amax_log_file%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_max_log_file%7D%7D%0Anum_logs%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_num_logs%7D%7D%0Apriority_boost%20%3D%204%0Aname_format%20%3D%20hostname%0A%23%23name%20%3D%20mydomain%0Amax_log_file_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_max_log_file_action%7D%7D%0Aspace_left%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_space_left%7D%7D%0Aspace_left_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_space_left_action%7D%7D%0Averify_email%20%3D%20yes%0Aaction_mail_acct%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_action_mail_acct%7D%7D%0Aadmin_space_left%20%3D%2050%0Aadmin_space_left_action%20%3D%20syslog%0Adisk_full_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_disk_full_action%7D%7D%0Adisk_error_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_disk_error_action%7D%7D%0Ause_libwrap%20%3D%20yes%0A%23%23tcp_listen_port%20%3D%2060%0Atcp_listen_queue%20%3D%205%0Atcp_max_per_addr%20%3D%201%0A%23%23tcp_client_ports%20%3D%201024-65535%0Atcp_client_max_idle%20%3D%200%0Atransport%20%3D%20TCP%0Akrb5_principal%20%3D%20auditd%0A%23%23krb5_key_file%20%3D%20/etc/audit/audit.key%0Adistribute_network%20%3D%20no%0Aq_depth%20%3D%20400%0Aoverflow_action%20%3D%20syslog%0Amax_restarts%20%3D%2010%0Aplugin_dir%20%3D%20/etc/audit/plugins.d }} mode: 0640 path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then var_auditd_disk_full_action='' # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^disk_full_action") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_auditd_disk_full_action" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^disk_full_action\\>" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^disk_full_action\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" else if [[ -s "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" fi printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure auditd mail_acct Action on Low Disk Space The auditd service can be configured to send email to a designated account in certain situations. Add or correct the following line in /etc/audit/auditd.conf to ensure that administrators are notified via email for those situations: action_mail_acct = 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 5.4.1.1 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI04.04 BAI08.02 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 MEA02.01 3.3.1 CCI-000139 CCI-001855 164.312(a)(2)(ii) 4.2.3.10 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 SR 7.1 SR 7.2 A.12.1.3 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.17.2.1 CIP-003-8 R1.3 CIP-003-8 R3 CIP-003-8 R3.1 CIP-003-8 R3.2 CIP-003-8 R3.3 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CIP-007-3 R5.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 IA-5(1) AU-5(a) AU-5(2) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 PR.DS-4 PR.PT-1 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 Req-10.7.a SRG-OS-000046-GPOS-00022 SRG-OS-000343-GPOS-00134 RHEL-08-030020 5.2.2.4 SV-230388r627750_rule Email sent to the root account is typically aliased to the administrators of the system, who can take appropriate action. CCE-80678-6 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80678-6 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030020 - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7.a - auditd_data_retention_action_mail_acct - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_auditd_action_mail_acct # promote to variable set_fact: var_auditd_action_mail_acct: !!str tags: - always - name: Configure auditd mail_acct Action on Low Disk Space lineinfile: dest: /etc/audit/auditd.conf line: action_mail_acct = {{ var_auditd_action_mail_acct }} state: present create: true when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80678-6 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030020 - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7.a - auditd_data_retention_action_mail_acct - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then var_auditd_action_mail_acct='' AUDITCONFIG=/etc/audit/auditd.conf # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^action_mail_acct") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_auditd_action_mail_acct" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^action_mail_acct\\>" "$AUDITCONFIG"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^action_mail_acct\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "$AUDITCONFIG" else if [[ -s "$AUDITCONFIG" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "$AUDITCONFIG" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "$AUDITCONFIG" fi cce="CCE-80678-6" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "$AUDITCONFIG" >> "$AUDITCONFIG" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "$AUDITCONFIG" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure auditd admin_space_left Action on Low Disk Space The auditd service can be configured to take an action when disk space is running low but prior to running out of space completely. Edit the file /etc/audit/auditd.conf. Add or modify the following line, substituting ACTION appropriately: admin_space_left_action = ACTION Set this value to single to cause the system to switch to single user mode for corrective action. Acceptable values also include suspend and halt. For certain systems, the need for availability outweighs the need to log all actions, and a different setting should be determined. Details regarding all possible values for ACTION are described in the auditd.conf man page. 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 5.4.1.1 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI04.04 BAI08.02 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 MEA02.01 3.3.1 CCI-000140 CCI-001343 CCI-001855 164.312(a)(2)(ii) 4.2.3.10 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 SR 7.1 SR 7.2 A.12.1.3 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.17.2.1 AU-5(b) AU-5(2) AU-5(1) AU-5(4) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 PR.DS-4 PR.PT-1 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 Req-10.7 10.5.1 SRG-OS-000343-GPOS-00134 5.2.2.4 Administrators should be made aware of an inability to record audit records. If a separate partition or logical volume of adequate size is used, running low on space for audit records should never occur. CCE-80679-4 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80679-4 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 - PCI-DSSv4-10.5.1 - auditd_data_retention_admin_space_left_action - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_auditd_admin_space_left_action # promote to variable set_fact: var_auditd_admin_space_left_action: !!str tags: - always - name: Configure auditd admin_space_left Action on Low Disk Space lineinfile: dest: /etc/audit/auditd.conf line: admin_space_left_action = {{ var_auditd_admin_space_left_action }} regexp: ^\s*admin_space_left_action\s*=\s*.*$ state: present create: true when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80679-4 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 - PCI-DSSv4-10.5.1 - auditd_data_retention_admin_space_left_action - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,{{ %23%0A%23%20This%20file%20controls%20the%20configuration%20of%20the%20audit%20daemon%0A%23%0A%0Alocal_events%20%3D%20yes%0Awrite_logs%20%3D%20yes%0Alog_file%20%3D%20/var/log/audit/audit.log%0Alog_group%20%3D%20root%0Alog_format%20%3D%20ENRICHED%0Aflush%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_flush%7D%7D%0Afreq%20%3D%2050%0Amax_log_file%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_max_log_file%7D%7D%0Anum_logs%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_num_logs%7D%7D%0Apriority_boost%20%3D%204%0Aname_format%20%3D%20hostname%0A%23%23name%20%3D%20mydomain%0Amax_log_file_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_max_log_file_action%7D%7D%0Aspace_left%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_space_left%7D%7D%0Aspace_left_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_space_left_action%7D%7D%0Averify_email%20%3D%20yes%0Aaction_mail_acct%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_action_mail_acct%7D%7D%0Aadmin_space_left%20%3D%2050%0Aadmin_space_left_action%20%3D%20syslog%0Adisk_full_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_disk_full_action%7D%7D%0Adisk_error_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_disk_error_action%7D%7D%0Ause_libwrap%20%3D%20yes%0A%23%23tcp_listen_port%20%3D%2060%0Atcp_listen_queue%20%3D%205%0Atcp_max_per_addr%20%3D%201%0A%23%23tcp_client_ports%20%3D%201024-65535%0Atcp_client_max_idle%20%3D%200%0Atransport%20%3D%20TCP%0Akrb5_principal%20%3D%20auditd%0A%23%23krb5_key_file%20%3D%20/etc/audit/audit.key%0Adistribute_network%20%3D%20no%0Aq_depth%20%3D%20400%0Aoverflow_action%20%3D%20syslog%0Amax_restarts%20%3D%2010%0Aplugin_dir%20%3D%20/etc/audit/plugins.d }} mode: 0640 path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then var_auditd_admin_space_left_action='' AUDITCONFIG=/etc/audit/auditd.conf # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^admin_space_left_action") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_auditd_admin_space_left_action" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^admin_space_left_action\\>" "$AUDITCONFIG"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^admin_space_left_action\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "$AUDITCONFIG" else if [[ -s "$AUDITCONFIG" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "$AUDITCONFIG" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "$AUDITCONFIG" fi cce="CCE-80679-4" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "$AUDITCONFIG" >> "$AUDITCONFIG" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "$AUDITCONFIG" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure auditd admin_space_left on Low Disk Space The auditd service can be configured to take an action when disk space is running low but prior to running out of space completely. Edit the file /etc/audit/auditd.conf. Add or modify the following line, substituting PERCENTAGE appropriately: admin_space_left = PERCENTAGE% Set this value to to cause the system to perform an action. 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI04.04 BAI08.02 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 MEA02.01 CCI-001855 4.2.3.10 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 SR 7.1 SR 7.2 A.12.1.3 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.17.2.1 AU-5(b) AU-5(2) AU-5(1) AU-5(4) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 PR.DS-4 PR.PT-1 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 Req-10.7 SRG-OS-000343-GPOS-00134 Notifying administrators of an impending disk space problem may allow them to take corrective action prior to any disruption. - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 - auditd_data_retention_admin_space_left_percentage - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_auditd_admin_space_left_percentage # promote to variable set_fact: var_auditd_admin_space_left_percentage: !!str tags: - always - name: Configure auditd admin_space_left on Low Disk Space lineinfile: dest: /etc/audit/auditd.conf line: admin_space_left = {{ var_auditd_admin_space_left_percentage }}% regexp: ^\s*admin_space_left\s*=\s*.*$ state: present create: true when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 - auditd_data_retention_admin_space_left_percentage - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then var_auditd_admin_space_left_percentage='' grep -q "^admin_space_left[[:space:]]*=.*$" /etc/audit/auditd.conf && \ sed -i "s/^admin_space_left[[:space:]]*=.*$/admin_space_left = $var_auditd_admin_space_left_percentage%/g" /etc/audit/auditd.conf || \ echo "admin_space_left = $var_auditd_admin_space_left_percentage%" >> /etc/audit/auditd.conf else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure auditd flush priority The auditd service can be configured to synchronously write audit event data to disk. Add or correct the following line in /etc/audit/auditd.conf to ensure that audit event data is fully synchronized with the log files on the disk: flush = 1 12 13 14 15 16 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 3.3.1 CCI-001576 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.312(a)(2)(i) 164.312(b) 164.312(d) 164.312(e) 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-004-6 R3.3 CIP-007-3 R5.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 CIP-007-3 R6.5 AU-11 CM-6(a) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.PT-1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 Audit data should be synchronously written to disk to ensure log integrity. These parameters assure that all audit event data is fully synchronized with the log files on the disk. CCE-80680-2 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80680-2 - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 - NIST-800-53-AU-11 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - auditd_data_retention_flush - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_auditd_flush # promote to variable set_fact: var_auditd_flush: !!str tags: - always - name: Configure auditd Flush Priority lineinfile: dest: /etc/audit/auditd.conf regexp: ^\s*flush\s*=\s*.*$ line: flush = {{ var_auditd_flush }} state: present create: true when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80680-2 - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 - NIST-800-53-AU-11 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - auditd_data_retention_flush - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,{{ %23%0A%23%20This%20file%20controls%20the%20configuration%20of%20the%20audit%20daemon%0A%23%0A%0Alocal_events%20%3D%20yes%0Awrite_logs%20%3D%20yes%0Alog_file%20%3D%20/var/log/audit/audit.log%0Alog_group%20%3D%20root%0Alog_format%20%3D%20ENRICHED%0Aflush%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_flush%7D%7D%0Afreq%20%3D%2050%0Amax_log_file%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_max_log_file%7D%7D%0Anum_logs%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_num_logs%7D%7D%0Apriority_boost%20%3D%204%0Aname_format%20%3D%20hostname%0A%23%23name%20%3D%20mydomain%0Amax_log_file_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_max_log_file_action%7D%7D%0Aspace_left%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_space_left%7D%7D%0Aspace_left_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_space_left_action%7D%7D%0Averify_email%20%3D%20yes%0Aaction_mail_acct%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_action_mail_acct%7D%7D%0Aadmin_space_left%20%3D%2050%0Aadmin_space_left_action%20%3D%20syslog%0Adisk_full_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_disk_full_action%7D%7D%0Adisk_error_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_disk_error_action%7D%7D%0Ause_libwrap%20%3D%20yes%0A%23%23tcp_listen_port%20%3D%2060%0Atcp_listen_queue%20%3D%205%0Atcp_max_per_addr%20%3D%201%0A%23%23tcp_client_ports%20%3D%201024-65535%0Atcp_client_max_idle%20%3D%200%0Atransport%20%3D%20TCP%0Akrb5_principal%20%3D%20auditd%0A%23%23krb5_key_file%20%3D%20/etc/audit/audit.key%0Adistribute_network%20%3D%20no%0Aq_depth%20%3D%20400%0Aoverflow_action%20%3D%20syslog%0Amax_restarts%20%3D%2010%0Aplugin_dir%20%3D%20/etc/audit/plugins.d }} mode: 0640 path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then var_auditd_flush='' AUDITCONFIG=/etc/audit/auditd.conf # if flush is present, flush param edited to var_auditd_flush # else flush param is defined by var_auditd_flush # # the freq param is only used for values 'incremental' and 'incremental_async' and will be # commented out if flush != incremental or flush != incremental_async # # if flush == incremental or flush == incremental_async && freq param is not defined, it # will be defined as the package-default value of 20 grep -q ^flush $AUDITCONFIG && \ sed -i 's/^flush.*/flush = '"$var_auditd_flush"'/g' $AUDITCONFIG if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then echo "flush = $var_auditd_flush" >> $AUDITCONFIG fi if ! [ "$var_auditd_flush" == "incremental" ] && ! [ "$var_auditd_flush" == "incremental_async" ]; then sed -i 's/^freq/##freq/g' $AUDITCONFIG elif [ "$var_auditd_flush" == "incremental" ] || [ "$var_auditd_flush" == "incremental_async" ]; then grep -q freq $AUDITCONFIG && \ sed -i 's/^#\+freq/freq/g' $AUDITCONFIG if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then echo "freq = 20" >> $AUDITCONFIG fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure auditd Max Log File Size Determine the amount of audit data (in megabytes) which should be retained in each log file. Edit the file /etc/audit/auditd.conf. Add or modify the following line, substituting the correct value of for STOREMB: max_log_file = STOREMB Set the value to 6 (MB) or higher for general-purpose systems. Larger values, of course, support retention of even more audit data. 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 3 4 5 6 7 8 5.4.1.1 APO11.04 APO12.06 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 MEA02.01 4.2.3.10 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-004-6 R3.3 CIP-007-3 R5.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 CIP-007-3 R6.5 AU-11 CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 PR.PT-1 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 Req-10.7 5.2.2.1 The total storage for audit log files must be large enough to retain log information over the period required. This is a function of the maximum log file size and the number of logs retained. CCE-80681-0 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80681-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-53-AU-11 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 - auditd_data_retention_max_log_file - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_auditd_max_log_file # promote to variable set_fact: var_auditd_max_log_file: !!str tags: - always - name: Configure auditd Max Log File Size lineinfile: dest: /etc/audit/auditd.conf regexp: ^\s*max_log_file\s*=\s*.*$ line: max_log_file = {{ var_auditd_max_log_file }} state: present create: true when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80681-0 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-53-AU-11 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 - auditd_data_retention_max_log_file - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,{{ %23%0A%23%20This%20file%20controls%20the%20configuration%20of%20the%20audit%20daemon%0A%23%0A%0Alocal_events%20%3D%20yes%0Awrite_logs%20%3D%20yes%0Alog_file%20%3D%20/var/log/audit/audit.log%0Alog_group%20%3D%20root%0Alog_format%20%3D%20ENRICHED%0Aflush%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_flush%7D%7D%0Afreq%20%3D%2050%0Amax_log_file%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_max_log_file%7D%7D%0Anum_logs%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_num_logs%7D%7D%0Apriority_boost%20%3D%204%0Aname_format%20%3D%20hostname%0A%23%23name%20%3D%20mydomain%0Amax_log_file_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_max_log_file_action%7D%7D%0Aspace_left%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_space_left%7D%7D%0Aspace_left_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_space_left_action%7D%7D%0Averify_email%20%3D%20yes%0Aaction_mail_acct%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_action_mail_acct%7D%7D%0Aadmin_space_left%20%3D%2050%0Aadmin_space_left_action%20%3D%20syslog%0Adisk_full_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_disk_full_action%7D%7D%0Adisk_error_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_disk_error_action%7D%7D%0Ause_libwrap%20%3D%20yes%0A%23%23tcp_listen_port%20%3D%2060%0Atcp_listen_queue%20%3D%205%0Atcp_max_per_addr%20%3D%201%0A%23%23tcp_client_ports%20%3D%201024-65535%0Atcp_client_max_idle%20%3D%200%0Atransport%20%3D%20TCP%0Akrb5_principal%20%3D%20auditd%0A%23%23krb5_key_file%20%3D%20/etc/audit/audit.key%0Adistribute_network%20%3D%20no%0Aq_depth%20%3D%20400%0Aoverflow_action%20%3D%20syslog%0Amax_restarts%20%3D%2010%0Aplugin_dir%20%3D%20/etc/audit/plugins.d }} mode: 0640 path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then var_auditd_max_log_file='' AUDITCONFIG=/etc/audit/auditd.conf # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^max_log_file") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_auditd_max_log_file" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^max_log_file\\>" "$AUDITCONFIG"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^max_log_file\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "$AUDITCONFIG" else if [[ -s "$AUDITCONFIG" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "$AUDITCONFIG" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "$AUDITCONFIG" fi cce="CCE-80681-0" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "$AUDITCONFIG" >> "$AUDITCONFIG" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "$AUDITCONFIG" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure auditd max_log_file_action Upon Reaching Maximum Log Size The default action to take when the logs reach their maximum size is to rotate the log files, discarding the oldest one. To configure the action taken by auditd, add or correct the line in /etc/audit/auditd.conf: max_log_file_action = ACTION Possible values for ACTION are described in the auditd.conf man page. These include: ignoresyslogsuspendrotatekeep_logs Set the ACTION to rotate to ensure log rotation occurs. This is the default. The setting is case-insensitive. 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 5.4.1.1 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI04.04 BAI08.02 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 MEA02.01 CCI-000140 164.312(a)(2)(ii) 4.2.3.10 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 SR 7.1 SR 7.2 A.12.1.3 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.17.2.1 AU-5(b) AU-5(2) AU-5(1) AU-5(4) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 PR.DS-4 PR.PT-1 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 Req-10.7 SRG-OS-000047-GPOS-00023 5.2.2.2 Automatically rotating logs (by setting this to rotate) minimizes the chances of the system unexpectedly running out of disk space by being overwhelmed with log data. However, for systems that must never discard log data, or which use external processes to transfer it and reclaim space, keep_logs can be employed. CCE-80682-8 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80682-8 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 - auditd_data_retention_max_log_file_action - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_auditd_max_log_file_action # promote to variable set_fact: var_auditd_max_log_file_action: !!str tags: - always - name: Configure auditd max_log_file_action Upon Reaching Maximum Log Size lineinfile: dest: /etc/audit/auditd.conf line: max_log_file_action = {{ var_auditd_max_log_file_action }} regexp: ^\s*max_log_file_action\s*=\s*.*$ state: present create: true when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80682-8 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 - auditd_data_retention_max_log_file_action - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,{{ %23%0A%23%20This%20file%20controls%20the%20configuration%20of%20the%20audit%20daemon%0A%23%0A%0Alocal_events%20%3D%20yes%0Awrite_logs%20%3D%20yes%0Alog_file%20%3D%20/var/log/audit/audit.log%0Alog_group%20%3D%20root%0Alog_format%20%3D%20ENRICHED%0Aflush%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_flush%7D%7D%0Afreq%20%3D%2050%0Amax_log_file%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_max_log_file%7D%7D%0Anum_logs%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_num_logs%7D%7D%0Apriority_boost%20%3D%204%0Aname_format%20%3D%20hostname%0A%23%23name%20%3D%20mydomain%0Amax_log_file_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_max_log_file_action%7D%7D%0Aspace_left%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_space_left%7D%7D%0Aspace_left_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_space_left_action%7D%7D%0Averify_email%20%3D%20yes%0Aaction_mail_acct%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_action_mail_acct%7D%7D%0Aadmin_space_left%20%3D%2050%0Aadmin_space_left_action%20%3D%20syslog%0Adisk_full_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_disk_full_action%7D%7D%0Adisk_error_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_disk_error_action%7D%7D%0Ause_libwrap%20%3D%20yes%0A%23%23tcp_listen_port%20%3D%2060%0Atcp_listen_queue%20%3D%205%0Atcp_max_per_addr%20%3D%201%0A%23%23tcp_client_ports%20%3D%201024-65535%0Atcp_client_max_idle%20%3D%200%0Atransport%20%3D%20TCP%0Akrb5_principal%20%3D%20auditd%0A%23%23krb5_key_file%20%3D%20/etc/audit/audit.key%0Adistribute_network%20%3D%20no%0Aq_depth%20%3D%20400%0Aoverflow_action%20%3D%20syslog%0Amax_restarts%20%3D%2010%0Aplugin_dir%20%3D%20/etc/audit/plugins.d }} mode: 0640 path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then var_auditd_max_log_file_action='' AUDITCONFIG=/etc/audit/auditd.conf # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^max_log_file_action") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_auditd_max_log_file_action" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^max_log_file_action\\>" "$AUDITCONFIG"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^max_log_file_action\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "$AUDITCONFIG" else if [[ -s "$AUDITCONFIG" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "$AUDITCONFIG" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "$AUDITCONFIG" fi cce="CCE-80682-8" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "$AUDITCONFIG" >> "$AUDITCONFIG" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "$AUDITCONFIG" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure auditd max_log_file_action Upon Reaching Maximum Log Size The default action to take when the logs reach their maximum size is to rotate the log files, discarding the oldest one. To configure the action taken by auditd, add or correct the line in /etc/audit/auditd.conf: max_log_file_action = ACTION Possible values for ACTION are described in the auditd.conf man page. These include: ignoresyslogsuspendrotatekeep_logs Set the ACTION to rotate to ensure log rotation occurs. This is the default. The setting is case-insensitive. 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI04.04 BAI08.02 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 MEA02.01 CCI-000140 164.312(a)(2)(ii) 4.2.3.10 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 SR 7.1 SR 7.2 A.12.1.3 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.17.2.1 AU-5(b) AU-5(2) AU-5(1) AU-5(4) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 PR.DS-4 PR.PT-1 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 Req-10.7 SRG-OS-000047-GPOS-00023 SRG-APP-000098-CTR-000185 SRG-APP-000099-CTR-000190 SRG-APP-000100-CTR-000195 SRG-APP-000100-CTR-000200 SRG-APP-000109-CTR-000215 SRG-APP-000290-CTR-000670 SRG-APP-000357-CTR-000800 Automatically rotating logs (by setting this to rotate) minimizes the chances of the system unexpectedly running out of disk space by being overwhelmed with log data. However, for systems that must never discard log data, or which use external processes to transfer it and reclaim space, keep_logs can be employed. - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 - auditd_data_retention_max_log_file_action_stig - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_auditd_max_log_file_action # promote to variable set_fact: var_auditd_max_log_file_action: !!str tags: - always - name: Configure auditd max_log_file_action Upon Reaching Maximum Log Size lineinfile: dest: /etc/audit/auditd.conf line: max_log_file_action = {{ var_auditd_max_log_file_action }} regexp: ^\s*max_log_file_action\s*=\s*.*$ state: present create: true when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 - auditd_data_retention_max_log_file_action_stig - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,{{ %23%0A%23%20This%20file%20controls%20the%20configuration%20of%20the%20audit%20daemon%0A%23%0A%0Alocal_events%20%3D%20yes%0Awrite_logs%20%3D%20yes%0Alog_file%20%3D%20/var/log/audit/audit.log%0Alog_group%20%3D%20root%0Alog_format%20%3D%20ENRICHED%0Aflush%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_flush%7D%7D%0Afreq%20%3D%2050%0Amax_log_file%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_max_log_file%7D%7D%0Anum_logs%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_num_logs%7D%7D%0Apriority_boost%20%3D%204%0Aname_format%20%3D%20hostname%0A%23%23name%20%3D%20mydomain%0Amax_log_file_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_max_log_file_action%7D%7D%0Aspace_left%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_space_left%7D%7D%0Aspace_left_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_space_left_action%7D%7D%0Averify_email%20%3D%20yes%0Aaction_mail_acct%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_action_mail_acct%7D%7D%0Aadmin_space_left%20%3D%2050%0Aadmin_space_left_action%20%3D%20syslog%0Adisk_full_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_disk_full_action%7D%7D%0Adisk_error_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_disk_error_action%7D%7D%0Ause_libwrap%20%3D%20yes%0A%23%23tcp_listen_port%20%3D%2060%0Atcp_listen_queue%20%3D%205%0Atcp_max_per_addr%20%3D%201%0A%23%23tcp_client_ports%20%3D%201024-65535%0Atcp_client_max_idle%20%3D%200%0Atransport%20%3D%20TCP%0Akrb5_principal%20%3D%20auditd%0A%23%23krb5_key_file%20%3D%20/etc/audit/audit.key%0Adistribute_network%20%3D%20no%0Aq_depth%20%3D%20400%0Aoverflow_action%20%3D%20syslog%0Amax_restarts%20%3D%2010%0Aplugin_dir%20%3D%20/etc/audit/plugins.d }} mode: 0640 path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then var_auditd_max_log_file_action='' # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^max_log_file_action") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_auditd_max_log_file_action" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^max_log_file_action\\>" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^max_log_file_action\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" else if [[ -s "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" fi printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure auditd Number of Logs Retained Determine how many log files auditd should retain when it rotates logs. Edit the file /etc/audit/auditd.conf. Add or modify the following line, substituting NUMLOGS with the correct value of : num_logs = NUMLOGS Set the value to 5 for general-purpose systems. Note that values less than 2 result in no log rotation. 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 3 4 5 6 7 8 5.4.1.1 APO11.04 APO12.06 BAI03.05 BAI08.02 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 MEA02.01 3.3.1 4.2.3.10 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-004-6 R3.3 CIP-007-3 R5.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 CIP-007-3 R6.5 AU-11 CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 PR.PT-1 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 Req-10.7 The total storage for audit log files must be large enough to retain log information over the period required. This is a function of the maximum log file size and the number of logs retained. CCE-80683-6 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80683-6 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 - NIST-800-53-AU-11 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 - auditd_data_retention_num_logs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_auditd_num_logs # promote to variable set_fact: var_auditd_num_logs: !!str tags: - always - name: Configure auditd Number of Logs Retained lineinfile: dest: /etc/audit/auditd.conf line: num_logs = {{ var_auditd_num_logs }} regexp: ^\s*num_logs\s*=\s*.*$ state: present create: true when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80683-6 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 - NIST-800-53-AU-11 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 - auditd_data_retention_num_logs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,{{ %23%0A%23%20This%20file%20controls%20the%20configuration%20of%20the%20audit%20daemon%0A%23%0A%0Alocal_events%20%3D%20yes%0Awrite_logs%20%3D%20yes%0Alog_file%20%3D%20/var/log/audit/audit.log%0Alog_group%20%3D%20root%0Alog_format%20%3D%20ENRICHED%0Aflush%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_flush%7D%7D%0Afreq%20%3D%2050%0Amax_log_file%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_max_log_file%7D%7D%0Anum_logs%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_num_logs%7D%7D%0Apriority_boost%20%3D%204%0Aname_format%20%3D%20hostname%0A%23%23name%20%3D%20mydomain%0Amax_log_file_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_max_log_file_action%7D%7D%0Aspace_left%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_space_left%7D%7D%0Aspace_left_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_space_left_action%7D%7D%0Averify_email%20%3D%20yes%0Aaction_mail_acct%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_action_mail_acct%7D%7D%0Aadmin_space_left%20%3D%2050%0Aadmin_space_left_action%20%3D%20syslog%0Adisk_full_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_disk_full_action%7D%7D%0Adisk_error_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_disk_error_action%7D%7D%0Ause_libwrap%20%3D%20yes%0A%23%23tcp_listen_port%20%3D%2060%0Atcp_listen_queue%20%3D%205%0Atcp_max_per_addr%20%3D%201%0A%23%23tcp_client_ports%20%3D%201024-65535%0Atcp_client_max_idle%20%3D%200%0Atransport%20%3D%20TCP%0Akrb5_principal%20%3D%20auditd%0A%23%23krb5_key_file%20%3D%20/etc/audit/audit.key%0Adistribute_network%20%3D%20no%0Aq_depth%20%3D%20400%0Aoverflow_action%20%3D%20syslog%0Amax_restarts%20%3D%2010%0Aplugin_dir%20%3D%20/etc/audit/plugins.d }} mode: 0640 path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then var_auditd_num_logs='' AUDITCONFIG=/etc/audit/auditd.conf # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^num_logs") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_auditd_num_logs" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^num_logs\\>" "$AUDITCONFIG"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^num_logs\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "$AUDITCONFIG" else if [[ -s "$AUDITCONFIG" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "$AUDITCONFIG" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "$AUDITCONFIG" fi cce="CCE-80683-6" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "$AUDITCONFIG" >> "$AUDITCONFIG" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "$AUDITCONFIG" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure auditd space_left on Low Disk Space The auditd service can be configured to take an action when disk space is running low but prior to running out of space completely. Edit the file /etc/audit/auditd.conf. Add or modify the following line, substituting SIZE_in_MB appropriately: space_left = SIZE_in_MB Set this value to the appropriate size in Megabytes cause the system to notify the user of an issue. 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI04.04 BAI08.02 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 MEA02.01 CCI-001855 4.2.3.10 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 SR 7.1 SR 7.2 A.12.1.3 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.17.2.1 AU-5(b) AU-5(2) AU-5(1) AU-5(4) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 PR.DS-4 PR.PT-1 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 Req-10.7 10.5.1 SRG-OS-000343-GPOS-00134 Notifying administrators of an impending disk space problem may allow them to take corrective action prior to any disruption. CCE-83619-7 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-83619-7 - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 - PCI-DSSv4-10.5.1 - auditd_data_retention_space_left - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_auditd_space_left # promote to variable set_fact: var_auditd_space_left: !!str tags: - always - name: Configure auditd space_left on Low Disk Space lineinfile: dest: /etc/audit/auditd.conf line: space_left = {{ var_auditd_space_left }} regexp: ^\s*space_left\s*=\s*.*$ state: present create: true when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83619-7 - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 - PCI-DSSv4-10.5.1 - auditd_data_retention_space_left - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,{{ %23%0A%23%20This%20file%20controls%20the%20configuration%20of%20the%20audit%20daemon%0A%23%0A%0Alocal_events%20%3D%20yes%0Awrite_logs%20%3D%20yes%0Alog_file%20%3D%20/var/log/audit/audit.log%0Alog_group%20%3D%20root%0Alog_format%20%3D%20ENRICHED%0Aflush%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_flush%7D%7D%0Afreq%20%3D%2050%0Amax_log_file%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_max_log_file%7D%7D%0Anum_logs%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_num_logs%7D%7D%0Apriority_boost%20%3D%204%0Aname_format%20%3D%20hostname%0A%23%23name%20%3D%20mydomain%0Amax_log_file_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_max_log_file_action%7D%7D%0Aspace_left%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_space_left%7D%7D%0Aspace_left_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_space_left_action%7D%7D%0Averify_email%20%3D%20yes%0Aaction_mail_acct%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_action_mail_acct%7D%7D%0Aadmin_space_left%20%3D%2050%0Aadmin_space_left_action%20%3D%20syslog%0Adisk_full_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_disk_full_action%7D%7D%0Adisk_error_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_disk_error_action%7D%7D%0Ause_libwrap%20%3D%20yes%0A%23%23tcp_listen_port%20%3D%2060%0Atcp_listen_queue%20%3D%205%0Atcp_max_per_addr%20%3D%201%0A%23%23tcp_client_ports%20%3D%201024-65535%0Atcp_client_max_idle%20%3D%200%0Atransport%20%3D%20TCP%0Akrb5_principal%20%3D%20auditd%0A%23%23krb5_key_file%20%3D%20/etc/audit/audit.key%0Adistribute_network%20%3D%20no%0Aq_depth%20%3D%20400%0Aoverflow_action%20%3D%20syslog%0Amax_restarts%20%3D%2010%0Aplugin_dir%20%3D%20/etc/audit/plugins.d }} mode: 0640 path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then var_auditd_space_left='' grep -q "^space_left[[:space:]]*=.*$" /etc/audit/auditd.conf && \ sed -i "s/^space_left[[:space:]]*=.*$/space_left = $var_auditd_space_left/g" /etc/audit/auditd.conf || \ echo "space_left = $var_auditd_space_left" >> /etc/audit/auditd.conf else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure auditd space_left Action on Low Disk Space The auditd service can be configured to take an action when disk space starts to run low. Edit the file /etc/audit/auditd.conf. Modify the following line, substituting ACTION appropriately: space_left_action = ACTION Possible values for ACTION are described in the auditd.conf man page. These include: syslogemailexecsuspendsinglehalt Set this to email (instead of the default, which is suspend) as it is more likely to get prompt attention. Acceptable values also include suspend, single, and halt. 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 5.4.1.1 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI04.04 BAI08.02 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 MEA02.01 3.3.1 CCI-001855 164.312(a)(2)(ii) 4.2.3.10 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 SR 7.1 SR 7.2 A.12.1.3 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.17.2.1 AU-5(b) AU-5(2) AU-5(1) AU-5(4) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 PR.DS-4 PR.PT-1 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 Req-10.7 10.5.1 SRG-OS-000343-GPOS-00134 RHEL-08-030731 5.2.2.4 SV-244543r877389_rule Notifying administrators of an impending disk space problem may allow them to take corrective action prior to any disruption. CCE-80684-4 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80684-4 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030731 - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 - PCI-DSSv4-10.5.1 - auditd_data_retention_space_left_action - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_auditd_space_left_action # promote to variable set_fact: var_auditd_space_left_action: !!str tags: - always - name: Configure auditd space_left Action on Low Disk Space lineinfile: dest: /etc/audit/auditd.conf line: space_left_action = {{ var_auditd_space_left_action.split('|')[0] }} regexp: ^\s*space_left_action\s*=\s*.*$ state: present create: true when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80684-4 - CJIS-5.4.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030731 - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 - PCI-DSSv4-10.5.1 - auditd_data_retention_space_left_action - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,{{ %23%0A%23%20This%20file%20controls%20the%20configuration%20of%20the%20audit%20daemon%0A%23%0A%0Alocal_events%20%3D%20yes%0Awrite_logs%20%3D%20yes%0Alog_file%20%3D%20/var/log/audit/audit.log%0Alog_group%20%3D%20root%0Alog_format%20%3D%20ENRICHED%0Aflush%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_flush%7D%7D%0Afreq%20%3D%2050%0Amax_log_file%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_max_log_file%7D%7D%0Anum_logs%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_num_logs%7D%7D%0Apriority_boost%20%3D%204%0Aname_format%20%3D%20hostname%0A%23%23name%20%3D%20mydomain%0Amax_log_file_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_max_log_file_action%7D%7D%0Aspace_left%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_space_left%7D%7D%0Aspace_left_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_space_left_action%7D%7D%0Averify_email%20%3D%20yes%0Aaction_mail_acct%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_action_mail_acct%7D%7D%0Aadmin_space_left%20%3D%2050%0Aadmin_space_left_action%20%3D%20syslog%0Adisk_full_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_disk_full_action%7D%7D%0Adisk_error_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_disk_error_action%7D%7D%0Ause_libwrap%20%3D%20yes%0A%23%23tcp_listen_port%20%3D%2060%0Atcp_listen_queue%20%3D%205%0Atcp_max_per_addr%20%3D%201%0A%23%23tcp_client_ports%20%3D%201024-65535%0Atcp_client_max_idle%20%3D%200%0Atransport%20%3D%20TCP%0Akrb5_principal%20%3D%20auditd%0A%23%23krb5_key_file%20%3D%20/etc/audit/audit.key%0Adistribute_network%20%3D%20no%0Aq_depth%20%3D%20400%0Aoverflow_action%20%3D%20syslog%0Amax_restarts%20%3D%2010%0Aplugin_dir%20%3D%20/etc/audit/plugins.d }} mode: 0640 path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then var_auditd_space_left_action='' var_auditd_space_left_action="$(echo $var_auditd_space_left_action | cut -d \| -f 1)" # # If space_left_action present in /etc/audit/auditd.conf, change value # to var_auditd_space_left_action, else # add "space_left_action = $var_auditd_space_left_action" to /etc/audit/auditd.conf # AUDITCONFIG=/etc/audit/auditd.conf # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^space_left_action") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_auditd_space_left_action" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^space_left_action\\>" "$AUDITCONFIG"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^space_left_action\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "$AUDITCONFIG" else if [[ -s "$AUDITCONFIG" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "$AUDITCONFIG" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "$AUDITCONFIG" fi cce="CCE-80684-4" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "$AUDITCONFIG" >> "$AUDITCONFIG" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "$AUDITCONFIG" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure auditd space_left on Low Disk Space The auditd service can be configured to take an action when disk space is running low but prior to running out of space completely. Edit the file /etc/audit/auditd.conf. Add or modify the following line, substituting PERCENTAGE appropriately: space_left = PERCENTAGE% Set this value to at least 25 to cause the system to notify the user of an issue. 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 APO11.04 APO12.06 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI04.04 BAI08.02 DSS02.02 DSS02.04 DSS02.07 DSS03.01 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 MEA02.01 CCI-001855 4.2.3.10 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.3.4.5.6 4.3.4.5.7 4.3.4.5.8 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 SR 7.1 SR 7.2 A.12.1.3 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.16.1.4 A.16.1.5 A.16.1.7 A.17.2.1 AU-5(b) AU-5(2) AU-5(1) AU-5(4) CM-6(a) DE.AE-3 DE.AE-5 PR.DS-4 PR.PT-1 RS.AN-1 RS.AN-4 Req-10.7 SRG-OS-000343-GPOS-00134 RHEL-08-030730 SV-230483r877389_rule Notifying administrators of an impending disk space problem may allow them to take corrective action prior to any disruption. CCE-86055-1 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-86055-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030730 - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 - auditd_data_retention_space_left_percentage - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_auditd_space_left_percentage # promote to variable set_fact: var_auditd_space_left_percentage: !!str tags: - always - name: Configure auditd space_left on Low Disk Space lineinfile: dest: /etc/audit/auditd.conf line: space_left = {{ var_auditd_space_left_percentage }}% regexp: ^\s*space_left\s*=\s*.*$ state: present create: true when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86055-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030730 - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 - auditd_data_retention_space_left_percentage - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then var_auditd_space_left_percentage='' grep -q "^space_left[[:space:]]*=.*$" /etc/audit/auditd.conf && \ sed -i "s/^space_left[[:space:]]*=.*$/space_left = $var_auditd_space_left_percentage%/g" /etc/audit/auditd.conf || \ echo "space_left = $var_auditd_space_left_percentage%" >> /etc/audit/auditd.conf else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Set number of records to cause an explicit flush to audit logs To configure Audit daemon to issue an explicit flush to disk command after writing records, set freq to in /etc/audit/auditd.conf. CM-6 FAU_GEN.1 SRG-OS-000051-GPOS-00024 If option freq isn't set to , the flush to disk may happen after higher number of records, increasing the danger of audit loss. CCE-82258-5 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-82258-5 - NIST-800-53-CM-6 - auditd_freq - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Set number of records to cause an explicit flush to audit logs block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*freq\s*=\s* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/audit/auditd.conf lineinfile: path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*freq\s*=\s* state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/audit/auditd.conf lineinfile: path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*freq\s*=\s* line: freq = 50 state: present when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82258-5 - NIST-800-53-CM-6 - auditd_freq - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,{{ %23%0A%23%20This%20file%20controls%20the%20configuration%20of%20the%20audit%20daemon%0A%23%0A%0Alocal_events%20%3D%20yes%0Awrite_logs%20%3D%20yes%0Alog_file%20%3D%20/var/log/audit/audit.log%0Alog_group%20%3D%20root%0Alog_format%20%3D%20ENRICHED%0Aflush%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_flush%7D%7D%0Afreq%20%3D%2050%0Amax_log_file%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_max_log_file%7D%7D%0Anum_logs%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_num_logs%7D%7D%0Apriority_boost%20%3D%204%0Aname_format%20%3D%20hostname%0A%23%23name%20%3D%20mydomain%0Amax_log_file_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_max_log_file_action%7D%7D%0Aspace_left%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_space_left%7D%7D%0Aspace_left_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_space_left_action%7D%7D%0Averify_email%20%3D%20yes%0Aaction_mail_acct%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_action_mail_acct%7D%7D%0Aadmin_space_left%20%3D%2050%0Aadmin_space_left_action%20%3D%20syslog%0Adisk_full_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_disk_full_action%7D%7D%0Adisk_error_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_disk_error_action%7D%7D%0Ause_libwrap%20%3D%20yes%0A%23%23tcp_listen_port%20%3D%2060%0Atcp_listen_queue%20%3D%205%0Atcp_max_per_addr%20%3D%201%0A%23%23tcp_client_ports%20%3D%201024-65535%0Atcp_client_max_idle%20%3D%200%0Atransport%20%3D%20TCP%0Akrb5_principal%20%3D%20auditd%0A%23%23krb5_key_file%20%3D%20/etc/audit/audit.key%0Adistribute_network%20%3D%20no%0Aq_depth%20%3D%20400%0Aoverflow_action%20%3D%20syslog%0Amax_restarts%20%3D%2010%0Aplugin_dir%20%3D%20/etc/audit/plugins.d }} mode: 0640 path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then if [ -e "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*freq\s*=\s*/Id" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" else touch "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" cp "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf.bak" # Insert at the end of the file printf '%s\n' "freq = 50" >> "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/audit/auditd.conf.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Include Local Events in Audit Logs To configure Audit daemon to include local events in Audit logs, set local_events to yes in /etc/audit/auditd.conf. This is the default setting. CCI-000366 CM-6 FAU_GEN.1 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-030061 SV-230393r627750_rule If option local_events isn't set to yes only events from network will be aggregated. CCE-82233-8 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-82233-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030061 - NIST-800-53-CM-6 - auditd_local_events - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Include Local Events in Audit Logs block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*local_events\s*=\s* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/audit/auditd.conf lineinfile: path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*local_events\s*=\s* state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/audit/auditd.conf lineinfile: path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*local_events\s*=\s* line: local_events = yes state: present when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82233-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030061 - NIST-800-53-CM-6 - auditd_local_events - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,{{ %23%0A%23%20This%20file%20controls%20the%20configuration%20of%20the%20audit%20daemon%0A%23%0A%0Alocal_events%20%3D%20yes%0Awrite_logs%20%3D%20yes%0Alog_file%20%3D%20/var/log/audit/audit.log%0Alog_group%20%3D%20root%0Alog_format%20%3D%20ENRICHED%0Aflush%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_flush%7D%7D%0Afreq%20%3D%2050%0Amax_log_file%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_max_log_file%7D%7D%0Anum_logs%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_num_logs%7D%7D%0Apriority_boost%20%3D%204%0Aname_format%20%3D%20hostname%0A%23%23name%20%3D%20mydomain%0Amax_log_file_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_max_log_file_action%7D%7D%0Aspace_left%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_space_left%7D%7D%0Aspace_left_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_space_left_action%7D%7D%0Averify_email%20%3D%20yes%0Aaction_mail_acct%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_action_mail_acct%7D%7D%0Aadmin_space_left%20%3D%2050%0Aadmin_space_left_action%20%3D%20syslog%0Adisk_full_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_disk_full_action%7D%7D%0Adisk_error_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_disk_error_action%7D%7D%0Ause_libwrap%20%3D%20yes%0A%23%23tcp_listen_port%20%3D%2060%0Atcp_listen_queue%20%3D%205%0Atcp_max_per_addr%20%3D%201%0A%23%23tcp_client_ports%20%3D%201024-65535%0Atcp_client_max_idle%20%3D%200%0Atransport%20%3D%20TCP%0Akrb5_principal%20%3D%20auditd%0A%23%23krb5_key_file%20%3D%20/etc/audit/audit.key%0Adistribute_network%20%3D%20no%0Aq_depth%20%3D%20400%0Aoverflow_action%20%3D%20syslog%0Amax_restarts%20%3D%2010%0Aplugin_dir%20%3D%20/etc/audit/plugins.d }} mode: 0640 path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then if [ -e "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*local_events\s*=\s*/Id" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" else touch "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" cp "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf.bak" # Insert at the end of the file printf '%s\n' "local_events = yes" >> "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/audit/auditd.conf.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Resolve information before writing to audit logs To configure Audit daemon to resolve all uid, gid, syscall, architecture, and socket address information before writing the events to disk, set log_format to ENRICHED in /etc/audit/auditd.conf. CCI-000366 CM-6 AU-3 FAU_GEN.1.2 SRG-OS-000255-GPOS-00096 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 SRG-APP-000096-CTR-000175 SRG-APP-000097-CTR-000180 SRG-APP-000098-CTR-000185 SRG-APP-000099-CTR-000190 SRG-APP-000100-CTR-000195 SRG-APP-000100-CTR-000200 SRG-APP-000109-CTR-000215 SRG-APP-000290-CTR-000670 SRG-APP-000357-CTR-000800 RHEL-08-030063 SV-230395r627750_rule If option log_format isn't set to ENRICHED, the audit records will be stored in a format exactly as the kernel sends them. CCE-82201-5 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-82201-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030063 - NIST-800-53-AU-3 - NIST-800-53-CM-6 - auditd_log_format - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Resolve information before writing to audit logs block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*log_format\s*=\s* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/audit/auditd.conf lineinfile: path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*log_format\s*=\s* state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/audit/auditd.conf lineinfile: path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*log_format\s*=\s* line: log_format = ENRICHED state: present when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82201-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030063 - NIST-800-53-AU-3 - NIST-800-53-CM-6 - auditd_log_format - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,{{ %23%0A%23%20This%20file%20controls%20the%20configuration%20of%20the%20audit%20daemon%0A%23%0A%0Alocal_events%20%3D%20yes%0Awrite_logs%20%3D%20yes%0Alog_file%20%3D%20/var/log/audit/audit.log%0Alog_group%20%3D%20root%0Alog_format%20%3D%20ENRICHED%0Aflush%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_flush%7D%7D%0Afreq%20%3D%2050%0Amax_log_file%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_max_log_file%7D%7D%0Anum_logs%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_num_logs%7D%7D%0Apriority_boost%20%3D%204%0Aname_format%20%3D%20hostname%0A%23%23name%20%3D%20mydomain%0Amax_log_file_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_max_log_file_action%7D%7D%0Aspace_left%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_space_left%7D%7D%0Aspace_left_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_space_left_action%7D%7D%0Averify_email%20%3D%20yes%0Aaction_mail_acct%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_action_mail_acct%7D%7D%0Aadmin_space_left%20%3D%2050%0Aadmin_space_left_action%20%3D%20syslog%0Adisk_full_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_disk_full_action%7D%7D%0Adisk_error_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_disk_error_action%7D%7D%0Ause_libwrap%20%3D%20yes%0A%23%23tcp_listen_port%20%3D%2060%0Atcp_listen_queue%20%3D%205%0Atcp_max_per_addr%20%3D%201%0A%23%23tcp_client_ports%20%3D%201024-65535%0Atcp_client_max_idle%20%3D%200%0Atransport%20%3D%20TCP%0Akrb5_principal%20%3D%20auditd%0A%23%23krb5_key_file%20%3D%20/etc/audit/audit.key%0Adistribute_network%20%3D%20no%0Aq_depth%20%3D%20400%0Aoverflow_action%20%3D%20syslog%0Amax_restarts%20%3D%2010%0Aplugin_dir%20%3D%20/etc/audit/plugins.d }} mode: 0640 path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then if [ -e "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*log_format\s*=\s*/Id" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" else touch "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" cp "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf.bak" # Insert at the end of the file printf '%s\n' "log_format = ENRICHED" >> "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/audit/auditd.conf.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Set type of computer node name logging in audit logs To configure Audit daemon to use a unique identifier as computer node name in the audit events, set name_format to in /etc/audit/auditd.conf. Whenever the variable var_auditd_name_format uses a multiple value option, for example A|B|C, the first value will be used when remediating this rule. CCI-001851 CM-6 AU-3 FAU_GEN.1.2 SRG-OS-000039-GPOS-00017 SRG-OS-000342-GPOS-00133 SRG-OS-000479-GPOS-00224 RHEL-08-030062 SV-230394r877390_rule If option name_format is left at its default value of none, audit events from different computers may be hard to distinguish. CCE-82897-0 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-82897-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030062 - NIST-800-53-AU-3 - NIST-800-53-CM-6 - auditd_name_format - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_auditd_name_format # promote to variable set_fact: var_auditd_name_format: !!str tags: - always - name: Set type of computer node name logging in audit logs - Define Value to Be Used in the Remediation ansible.builtin.set_fact: auditd_name_format_split="{{ var_auditd_name_format.split('|')[0] }}" when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82897-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030062 - NIST-800-53-AU-3 - NIST-800-53-CM-6 - auditd_name_format - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Set type of computer node name logging in audit logs block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*name_format\s*=\s* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/audit/auditd.conf lineinfile: path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*name_format\s*=\s* state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/audit/auditd.conf lineinfile: path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*name_format\s*=\s* line: name_format = {{ auditd_name_format_split }} state: present when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82897-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030062 - NIST-800-53-AU-3 - NIST-800-53-CM-6 - auditd_name_format - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,{{ %23%0A%23%20This%20file%20controls%20the%20configuration%20of%20the%20audit%20daemon%0A%23%0A%0Alocal_events%20%3D%20yes%0Awrite_logs%20%3D%20yes%0Alog_file%20%3D%20/var/log/audit/audit.log%0Alog_group%20%3D%20root%0Alog_format%20%3D%20ENRICHED%0Aflush%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_flush%7D%7D%0Afreq%20%3D%2050%0Amax_log_file%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_max_log_file%7D%7D%0Anum_logs%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_num_logs%7D%7D%0Apriority_boost%20%3D%204%0Aname_format%20%3D%20hostname%0A%23%23name%20%3D%20mydomain%0Amax_log_file_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_max_log_file_action%7D%7D%0Aspace_left%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_space_left%7D%7D%0Aspace_left_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_space_left_action%7D%7D%0Averify_email%20%3D%20yes%0Aaction_mail_acct%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_action_mail_acct%7D%7D%0Aadmin_space_left%20%3D%2050%0Aadmin_space_left_action%20%3D%20syslog%0Adisk_full_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_disk_full_action%7D%7D%0Adisk_error_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_disk_error_action%7D%7D%0Ause_libwrap%20%3D%20yes%0A%23%23tcp_listen_port%20%3D%2060%0Atcp_listen_queue%20%3D%205%0Atcp_max_per_addr%20%3D%201%0A%23%23tcp_client_ports%20%3D%201024-65535%0Atcp_client_max_idle%20%3D%200%0Atransport%20%3D%20TCP%0Akrb5_principal%20%3D%20auditd%0A%23%23krb5_key_file%20%3D%20/etc/audit/audit.key%0Adistribute_network%20%3D%20no%0Aq_depth%20%3D%20400%0Aoverflow_action%20%3D%20syslog%0Amax_restarts%20%3D%2010%0Aplugin_dir%20%3D%20/etc/audit/plugins.d }} mode: 0640 path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then var_auditd_name_format='' var_auditd_name_format="$(echo $var_auditd_name_format | cut -d \| -f 1)" if [ -e "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*name_format\s*=\s*/Id" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" else touch "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" cp "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf.bak" # Insert at the end of the file printf '%s\n' "name_format = $var_auditd_name_format" >> "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/audit/auditd.conf.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Appropriate Action Must be Setup When the Internal Audit Event Queue is Full The audit system should have an action setup in the event the internal event queue becomes full. To setup an overflow action edit /etc/audit/auditd.conf. Set overflow_action to one of the following values: syslog, single, halt. CCI-001851 AU-4(1) SRG-OS-000342-GPOS-00133 SRG-OS-000479-GPOS-00224 RHEL-08-030700 SV-230480r877390_rule The audit system should have an action setup in the event the internal event queue becomes full so that no data is lost. CCE-85889-4 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-85889-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030700 - NIST-800-53-AU-4(1) - auditd_overflow_action - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Appropriate Action Must be Setup When the Internal Audit Event Queue is Full block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*overflow_action\s*=\s* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/audit/auditd.conf lineinfile: path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*overflow_action\s*=\s* state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/audit/auditd.conf lineinfile: path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*overflow_action\s*=\s* line: overflow_action = syslog state: present when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-85889-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030700 - NIST-800-53-AU-4(1) - auditd_overflow_action - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then if [ -e "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*overflow_action\s*=\s*/Id" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" else touch "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" cp "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf.bak" # Insert at the end of the file printf '%s\n' "overflow_action = syslog" >> "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/audit/auditd.conf.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Write Audit Logs to the Disk To configure Audit daemon to write Audit logs to the disk, set write_logs to yes in /etc/audit/auditd.conf. This is the default setting. CM-6 FAU_STG.1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 If write_logs isn't set to yes, the Audit logs will not be written to the disk. CCE-82366-6 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-82366-6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6 - auditd_write_logs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Write Audit Logs to the Disk block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*write_logs\s*=\s* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/audit/auditd.conf lineinfile: path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*write_logs\s*=\s* state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/audit/auditd.conf lineinfile: path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*write_logs\s*=\s* line: write_logs = yes state: present when: - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82366-6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6 - auditd_write_logs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,{{ %23%0A%23%20This%20file%20controls%20the%20configuration%20of%20the%20audit%20daemon%0A%23%0A%0Alocal_events%20%3D%20yes%0Awrite_logs%20%3D%20yes%0Alog_file%20%3D%20/var/log/audit/audit.log%0Alog_group%20%3D%20root%0Alog_format%20%3D%20ENRICHED%0Aflush%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_flush%7D%7D%0Afreq%20%3D%2050%0Amax_log_file%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_max_log_file%7D%7D%0Anum_logs%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_num_logs%7D%7D%0Apriority_boost%20%3D%204%0Aname_format%20%3D%20hostname%0A%23%23name%20%3D%20mydomain%0Amax_log_file_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_max_log_file_action%7D%7D%0Aspace_left%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_space_left%7D%7D%0Aspace_left_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_space_left_action%7D%7D%0Averify_email%20%3D%20yes%0Aaction_mail_acct%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_action_mail_acct%7D%7D%0Aadmin_space_left%20%3D%2050%0Aadmin_space_left_action%20%3D%20syslog%0Adisk_full_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_disk_full_action%7D%7D%0Adisk_error_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_disk_error_action%7D%7D%0Ause_libwrap%20%3D%20yes%0A%23%23tcp_listen_port%20%3D%2060%0Atcp_listen_queue%20%3D%205%0Atcp_max_per_addr%20%3D%201%0A%23%23tcp_client_ports%20%3D%201024-65535%0Atcp_client_max_idle%20%3D%200%0Atransport%20%3D%20TCP%0Akrb5_principal%20%3D%20auditd%0A%23%23krb5_key_file%20%3D%20/etc/audit/audit.key%0Adistribute_network%20%3D%20no%0Aq_depth%20%3D%20400%0Aoverflow_action%20%3D%20syslog%0Amax_restarts%20%3D%2010%0Aplugin_dir%20%3D%20/etc/audit/plugins.d }} mode: 0640 path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then if [ -e "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*write_logs\s*=\s*/Id" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" else touch "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" cp "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf.bak" # Insert at the end of the file printf '%s\n' "write_logs = yes" >> "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/audit/auditd.conf.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi System Accounting with auditd The auditd program can perform comprehensive monitoring of system activity. This section makes use of recommended configuration settings for specific policies or use cases. The rules in this section make use of rules defined in /usr/share/doc/audit-VERSION/rules. Configure auditing of unsuccessful file accesses Ensure that unsuccessful attempts to access a file are audited. The following rules configure audit as described above: ## Unsuccessful file access (any other opens) This has to go last. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access Load new Audit rules into kernel by running: augenrules --load Note: This rule uses a special set of Audit rules to comply with OSPP 4.2.1. You may reuse this rule in different profiles. If you decide to do so, it is recommended that you inspect contents of the file closely and make sure that they are alligned with your needs. 0582 0584 05885 0586 0846 0957 AU-2(a) FAU_GEN.1.1.c SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 SRG-OS-000475-GPOS-00220 SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 SRG-OS-000465-GPOS-00209 SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 SRG-APP-000091-CTR-000160 SRG-APP-000492-CTR-001220 SRG-APP-000493-CTR-001225 SRG-APP-000494-CTR-001230 SRG-APP-000500-CTR-001260 SRG-APP-000507-CTR-001295 Unsuccessful attempts to access a file might be signs of malicious activity happening within the system. Auditing of such activities helps in their monitoring and investigation. CCE-82833-5 - name: Put contents into /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-3-access-failed.rules according to policy copy: dest: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-3-access-failed.rules content: | ## Unsuccessful file access (any other opens) This has to go last. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access force: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82833-5 - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) - audit_access_failed - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Remove any permissions from other group file: path: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-3-access-failed.rules mode: o-rwx when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82833-5 - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) - audit_access_failed - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then cat << 'EOF' > /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-3-access-failed.rules ## Unsuccessful file access (any other opens) This has to go last. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access EOF chmod o-rwx /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-3-access-failed.rules augenrules --load else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure auditing of successful file accesses Ensure that successful attempts to access a file are audited. The following rules configure audit as described above: ## Successful file access (any other opens) This has to go last. ## These next two are likely to result in a whole lot of events -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access Load new Audit rules into kernel by running: augenrules --load Note: This rule uses a special set of Audit rules to comply with OSPP 4.2.1. You may reuse this rule in different profiles. If you decide to do so, it is recommended that you inspect contents of the file closely and make sure that they are alligned with your needs. 0582 0584 05885 0586 0846 0957 AU-2(a) FAU_GEN.1.1.c SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 SRG-OS-000475-GPOS-00220 SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 SRG-OS-000465-GPOS-00209 SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 Auditing of successful attempts to access a file helps in investigation of activities performed on the system. CCE-82834-3 - name: Put contents into /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-3-access-success.rules according to policy copy: dest: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-3-access-success.rules content: | ## Successful file access (any other opens) This has to go last. ## These next two are likely to result in a whole lot of events -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access force: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82834-3 - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) - audit_access_success - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Remove any permissions from other group file: path: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-3-access-success.rules mode: o-rwx when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82834-3 - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) - audit_access_success - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,%23%23%20Successful%20file%20access%20%28any%20other%20opens%29%20This%20has%20to%20go%20last.%0A%23%23%20These%20next%20two%20are%20likely%20to%20result%20in%20a%20whole%20lot%20of%20events%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db32%20-S%20open%2Copenat%2Copen_by_handle_at%20-F%20success%3D1%20-F%20auid%26gt%3B%3D1000%20-F%20auid%21%3Dunset%20-F%20key%3Dsuccessful-access%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db64%20-S%20open%2Copenat%2Copen_by_handle_at%20-F%20success%3D1%20-F%20auid%26gt%3B%3D1000%20-F%20auid%21%3Dunset%20-F%20key%3Dsuccessful-access mode: 0600 path: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-3-access-success.rules overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then cat << 'EOF' > /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-3-access-success.rules ## Successful file access (any other opens) This has to go last. ## These next two are likely to result in a whole lot of events -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access EOF chmod o-rwx /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-3-access-success.rules augenrules --load else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure basic parameters of Audit system Perform basic configuration of Audit system. Make sure that any previously defined rules are cleared, the auditing system is configured to handle sudden bursts of events, and in cases of failure, messages are configured to be directed to system log. The following rules configure audit as described above: ## First rule - delete all -D ## Increase the buffers to survive stress events. ## Make this bigger for busy systems -b 8192 ## This determine how long to wait in burst of events --backlog_wait_time 60000 ## Set failure mode to syslog -f 1 Load new Audit rules into kernel by running: augenrules --load It might happen that Audit buffer configured by this rule is not large enough for certain use cases. If that is the case, the buffer size can be overridden by placing -b larger_buffer_size into a file within /etc/audit/rules.d directory, replacing larger_file_size with the desired value. The file name should start with a number higher than 10 and lower than 99. AU-2(a) FAU_GEN.1 SRG-OS-000365-GPOS-00152 SRG-OS-000475-GPOS-00220 Without basic configurations, audit may not perform as expected. It may not be able to correctly handle events under stressful conditions, or log events in case of failure. CCE-82827-7 - name: Put contents into /etc/audit/rules.d/10-base-config.rules according to policy copy: dest: /etc/audit/rules.d/10-base-config.rules content: |+ ## First rule - delete all -D ## Increase the buffers to survive stress events. ## Make this bigger for busy systems -b 8192 ## This determine how long to wait in burst of events --backlog_wait_time 60000 ## Set failure mode to syslog -f 1 force: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82827-7 - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) - audit_basic_configuration - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Remove any permissions from other group file: path: /etc/audit/rules.d/10-base-config.rules mode: o-rwx when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82827-7 - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) - audit_basic_configuration - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,%23%23%20First%20rule%20-%20delete%20all%0A-D%0A%0A%23%23%20Increase%20the%20buffers%20to%20survive%20stress%20events.%0A%23%23%20Make%20this%20bigger%20for%20busy%20systems%0A-b%208192%0A%0A%23%23%20This%20determine%20how%20long%20to%20wait%20in%20burst%20of%20events%0A--backlog_wait_time%2060000%0A%0A%23%23%20Set%20failure%20mode%20to%20syslog%0A-f%201%0A mode: 0600 path: /etc/audit/rules.d/10-base-config.rules overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then cat << 'EOF' > /etc/audit/rules.d/10-base-config.rules ## First rule - delete all -D ## Increase the buffers to survive stress events. ## Make this bigger for busy systems -b 8192 ## This determine how long to wait in burst of events --backlog_wait_time 60000 ## Set failure mode to syslog -f 1 EOF chmod o-rwx /etc/audit/rules.d/10-base-config.rules augenrules --load else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure auditing of unsuccessful file creations Ensure that unsuccessful attempts to create a file are audited. The following rules configure audit as described above: ## Unsuccessful file creation (open with O_CREAT) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create Load new Audit rules into kernel by running: augenrules --load Note: This rule uses a special set of Audit rules to comply with OSPP 4.2.1. You may reuse this rule in different profiles. If you decide to do so, it is recommended that you inspect contents of the file closely and make sure that they are alligned with your needs. AU-2(a) FAU_GEN.1.1.c SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 SRG-OS-000475-GPOS-00220 SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 SRG-OS-000465-GPOS-00209 SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 SRG-APP-000091-CTR-000160 SRG-APP-000492-CTR-001220 SRG-APP-000493-CTR-001225 SRG-APP-000494-CTR-001230 SRG-APP-000500-CTR-001260 SRG-APP-000507-CTR-001295 Unsuccessful file creations might be a sign of a malicious action being performed on the system. Keeping log of such events helps in monitoring and investigation of such actions. CCE-82374-0 - name: Put contents into /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-1-create-failed.rules according to policy copy: dest: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-1-create-failed.rules content: | ## Unsuccessful file creation (open with O_CREAT) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create force: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82374-0 - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) - audit_create_failed - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Remove any permissions from other group file: path: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-1-create-failed.rules mode: o-rwx when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82374-0 - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) - audit_create_failed - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then cat << 'EOF' > /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-1-create-failed.rules ## Unsuccessful file creation (open with O_CREAT) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create EOF chmod o-rwx /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-1-create-failed.rules augenrules --load else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure auditing of successful file creations Ensure that successful attempts to create a file are audited. The following rules configure audit as described above: ## Successful file creation (open with O_CREAT) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create Load new Audit rules into kernel by running: augenrules --load Note: This rule uses a special set of Audit rules to comply with OSPP 4.2.1. You may reuse this rule in different profiles. If you decide to do so, it is recommended that you inspect contents of the file closely and make sure that they are alligned with your needs. AU-2(a) FAU_GEN.1.1.c SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 SRG-OS-000475-GPOS-00220 SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 SRG-OS-000465-GPOS-00209 SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 Auditing of successful attempts to create a file helps in investigation of actions which happened on the system. CCE-82829-3 - name: Put contents into /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-1-create-success.rules according to policy copy: dest: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-1-create-success.rules content: | ## Successful file creation (open with O_CREAT) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create force: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82829-3 - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) - audit_create_success - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Remove any permissions from other group file: path: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-1-create-success.rules mode: o-rwx when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82829-3 - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) - audit_create_success - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then cat << 'EOF' > /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-1-create-success.rules ## Successful file creation (open with O_CREAT) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create EOF chmod o-rwx /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-1-create-success.rules augenrules --load else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure auditing of unsuccessful file deletions Ensure that unsuccessful attempts to delete a file are audited. The following rules configure audit as described above: ## Unsuccessful file delete -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete Load new Audit rules into kernel by running: augenrules --load Note: This rule uses a special set of Audit rules to comply with OSPP 4.2.1. You may reuse this rule in different profiles. If you decide to do so, it is recommended that you inspect contents of the file closely and make sure that they are alligned with your needs. AU-2(a) FAU_GEN.1.1.c SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 SRG-OS-000475-GPOS-00220 SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 SRG-OS-000465-GPOS-00209 SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212 Unsuccessful attempts to delete a file might be signs of malicious activities. Auditing of such events help in monitoring and investigating of such activities. CCE-82835-0 - name: Put contents into /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-4-delete-failed.rules according to policy copy: dest: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-4-delete-failed.rules content: | ## Unsuccessful file delete -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete force: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82835-0 - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) - audit_delete_failed - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Remove any permissions from other group file: path: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-4-delete-failed.rules mode: o-rwx when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82835-0 - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) - audit_delete_failed - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,%23%23%20Unsuccessful%20file%20delete%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db32%20-S%20unlink%2Cunlinkat%2Crename%2Crenameat%20-F%20exit%3D-EACCES%20-F%20auid%26gt%3B%3D1000%20-F%20auid%21%3Dunset%20-F%20key%3Dunsuccessful-delete%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db64%20-S%20unlink%2Cunlinkat%2Crename%2Crenameat%20-F%20exit%3D-EACCES%20-F%20auid%26gt%3B%3D1000%20-F%20auid%21%3Dunset%20-F%20key%3Dunsuccessful-delete%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db32%20-S%20unlink%2Cunlinkat%2Crename%2Crenameat%20-F%20exit%3D-EPERM%20-F%20auid%26gt%3B%3D1000%20-F%20auid%21%3Dunset%20-F%20key%3Dunsuccessful-delete%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db64%20-S%20unlink%2Cunlinkat%2Crename%2Crenameat%20-F%20exit%3D-EPERM%20-F%20auid%26gt%3B%3D1000%20-F%20auid%21%3Dunset%20-F%20key%3Dunsuccessful-delete mode: 0600 path: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-4-delete-failed.rules overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then cat << 'EOF' > /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-4-delete-failed.rules ## Unsuccessful file delete -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete EOF chmod o-rwx /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-4-delete-failed.rules augenrules --load else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure auditing of successful file deletions Ensure that successful attempts to delete a file are audited. The following rules configure audit as described above: ## Successful file delete -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete Load new Audit rules into kernel by running: augenrules --load Note: This rule uses a special set of Audit rules to comply with OSPP 4.2.1. You may reuse this rule in different profiles. If you decide to do so, it is recommended that you inspect contents of the file closely and make sure that they are alligned with your needs. AU-2(a) FAU_GEN.1.1.c SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 SRG-OS-000475-GPOS-00220 SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 SRG-OS-000465-GPOS-00209 SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212 Auditing of successful attempts to delete a file may help in monitoring and investigation of activities performed on the system. CCE-82836-8 - name: Put contents into /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-4-delete-success.rules according to policy copy: dest: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-4-delete-success.rules content: | ## Successful file delete -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete force: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82836-8 - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) - audit_delete_success - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Remove any permissions from other group file: path: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-4-delete-success.rules mode: o-rwx when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82836-8 - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) - audit_delete_success - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,{{ %23%23%20Successful%20file%20delete%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db32%20-S%20unlink%2Cunlinkat%2Crename%2Crenameat%20-F%20success%3D1%20-F%20auid%26gt%3B%3D1000%20-F%20auid%21%3Dunset%20-F%20key%3Dsuccessful-delete%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db64%20-S%20unlink%2Cunlinkat%2Crename%2Crenameat%20-F%20success%3D1%20-F%20auid%26gt%3B%3D1000%20-F%20auid%21%3Dunset%20-F%20key%3Dsuccessful-delete }} mode: 0600 path: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-4-delete-success.rules overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then cat << 'EOF' > /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-4-delete-success.rules ## Successful file delete -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete EOF chmod o-rwx /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-4-delete-success.rules augenrules --load else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure immutable Audit login UIDs Configure kernel to prevent modification of login UIDs once they are set. Changing login UIDs while this configuration is enforced requires special capabilities which are not available to unprivileged users. The following rules configure audit as described above: ## Make the loginuid immutable. This prevents tampering with the auid. --loginuid-immutable Load new Audit rules into kernel by running: augenrules --load CCI-000162 CCI-000163 CCI-000164 AU-2(a) FAU_GEN.1.2 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000475-GPOS-00220 SRG-OS-000057-GPOS-00027 SRG-OS-000058-GPOS-00028 SRG-OS-000059-GPOS-00029 SRG-APP-000121-CTR-000255 SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235 If modification of login UIDs is not prevented, they can be changed by unprivileged users and make auditing complicated or impossible. CCE-82828-5 - name: Put contents into /etc/audit/rules.d/11-loginuid.rules according to policy copy: dest: /etc/audit/rules.d/11-loginuid.rules content: |+ ## Make the loginuid immutable. This prevents tampering with the auid. --loginuid-immutable force: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82828-5 - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) - audit_immutable_login_uids - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Remove any permissions from other group file: path: /etc/audit/rules.d/11-loginuid.rules mode: o-rwx when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82828-5 - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) - audit_immutable_login_uids - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,%23%23%20Make%20the%20loginuid%20immutable.%20This%20prevents%20tampering%20with%20the%20auid.%0A--loginuid-immutable%0A%0A mode: 0600 path: /etc/audit/rules.d/11-loginuid.rules overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then cat << 'EOF' > /etc/audit/rules.d/11-loginuid.rules ## Make the loginuid immutable. This prevents tampering with the auid. --loginuid-immutable EOF chmod o-rwx /etc/audit/rules.d/11-loginuid.rules augenrules --load else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure auditing of unsuccessful file modifications Ensure that unsuccessful attempts to modify a file are audited. The following rules configure audit as described above: ## Unsuccessful file modifications (open for write or truncate) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification Load new Audit rules into kernel by running: augenrules --load Note: This rule uses a special set of Audit rules to comply with OSPP 4.2.1. You may reuse this rule in different profiles. If you decide to do so, it is recommended that you inspect contents of the file closely and make sure that they are alligned with your needs. AU-2(a) FAU_GEN.1.1.c SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 SRG-OS-000475-GPOS-00220 SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 SRG-OS-000465-GPOS-00209 SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 SRG-APP-000091-CTR-000160 SRG-APP-000492-CTR-001220 SRG-APP-000493-CTR-001225 SRG-APP-000494-CTR-001230 SRG-APP-000500-CTR-001260 SRG-APP-000507-CTR-001295 Unsuccessful file modifications might be a sign of a malicious action being performed on the system. Auditing of such events helps in detection and investigation of such actions. CCE-82830-1 - name: Put contents into /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-2-modify-failed.rules according to policy copy: dest: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-2-modify-failed.rules content: | ## Unsuccessful file modifications (open for write or truncate) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification force: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82830-1 - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) - audit_modify_failed - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Remove any permissions from other group file: path: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-2-modify-failed.rules mode: o-rwx when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82830-1 - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) - audit_modify_failed - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,%23%23%20Unsuccessful%20file%20modifications%20%28open%20for%20write%20or%20truncate%29%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db32%20-S%20openat%2Copen_by_handle_at%20-F%20a2%2601003%20-F%20exit%3D-EACCES%20-F%20auid%3E%3D1000%20-F%20auid%21%3Dunset%20-F%20key%3Dunsuccessful-modification%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db64%20-S%20openat%2Copen_by_handle_at%20-F%20a2%2601003%20-F%20exit%3D-EACCES%20-F%20auid%3E%3D1000%20-F%20auid%21%3Dunset%20-F%20key%3Dunsuccessful-modification%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db32%20-S%20open%20-F%20a1%2601003%20-F%20exit%3D-EACCES%20-F%20auid%3E%3D1000%20-F%20auid%21%3Dunset%20-F%20key%3Dunsuccessful-modification%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db64%20-S%20open%20-F%20a1%2601003%20-F%20exit%3D-EACCES%20-F%20auid%3E%3D1000%20-F%20auid%21%3Dunset%20-F%20key%3Dunsuccessful-modification%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db32%20-S%20truncate%2Cftruncate%20-F%20exit%3D-EACCES%20-F%20auid%3E%3D1000%20-F%20auid%21%3Dunset%20-F%20key%3Dunsuccessful-modification%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db64%20-S%20truncate%2Cftruncate%20-F%20exit%3D-EACCES%20-F%20auid%3E%3D1000%20-F%20auid%21%3Dunset%20-F%20key%3Dunsuccessful-modification%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db32%20-S%20openat%2Copen_by_handle_at%20-F%20a2%2601003%20-F%20exit%3D-EPERM%20-F%20auid%3E%3D1000%20-F%20auid%21%3Dunset%20-F%20key%3Dunsuccessful-modification%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db64%20-S%20openat%2Copen_by_handle_at%20-F%20a2%2601003%20-F%20exit%3D-EPERM%20-F%20auid%3E%3D1000%20-F%20auid%21%3Dunset%20-F%20key%3Dunsuccessful-modification%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db32%20-S%20open%20-F%20a1%2601003%20-F%20exit%3D-EPERM%20-F%20auid%3E%3D1000%20-F%20auid%21%3Dunset%20-F%20key%3Dunsuccessful-modification%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db64%20-S%20open%20-F%20a1%2601003%20-F%20exit%3D-EPERM%20-F%20auid%3E%3D1000%20-F%20auid%21%3Dunset%20-F%20key%3Dunsuccessful-modification%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db32%20-S%20truncate%2Cftruncate%20-F%20exit%3D-EPERM%20-F%20auid%3E%3D1000%20-F%20auid%21%3Dunset%20-F%20key%3Dunsuccessful-modification%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db64%20-S%20truncate%2Cftruncate%20-F%20exit%3D-EPERM%20-F%20auid%3E%3D1000%20-F%20auid%21%3Dunset%20-F%20key%3Dunsuccessful-modification%0A mode: 0600 path: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-2-modify-failed.rules overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then cat << 'EOF' > /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-2-modify-failed.rules ## Unsuccessful file modifications (open for write or truncate) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification EOF chmod o-rwx /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-2-modify-failed.rules augenrules --load else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure auditing of successful file modifications Ensure that successful attempts to modify a file are audited. The following rules configure audit as described above: ## Successful file modifications (open for write or truncate) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification Load new Audit rules into kernel by running: augenrules --load Note: This rule uses a special set of Audit rules to comply with OSPP 4.2.1. You may reuse this rule in different profiles. If you decide to do so, it is recommended that you inspect contents of the file closely and make sure that they are alligned with your needs. AU-2(a) FAU_GEN.1.1.c SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 SRG-OS-000475-GPOS-00220 SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 SRG-OS-000465-GPOS-00209 SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 Auditing of successful attempts to modify a file helps in investigation of actions which happened on the system. CCE-82832-7 - name: Put contents into /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-2-modify-success.rules according to policy copy: dest: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-2-modify-success.rules content: | ## Successful file modifications (open for write or truncate) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification force: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82832-7 - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) - audit_modify_success - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Remove any permissions from other group file: path: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-2-modify-success.rules mode: o-rwx when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82832-7 - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) - audit_modify_success - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,%23%23%20Successful%20file%20modifications%20%28open%20for%20write%20or%20truncate%29%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db32%20-S%20openat%2Copen_by_handle_at%20-F%20a2%26amp%3B01003%20-F%20success%3D1%20-F%20auid%26gt%3B%3D1000%20-F%20auid%21%3Dunset%20-F%20key%3Dsuccessful-modification%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db64%20-S%20openat%2Copen_by_handle_at%20-F%20a2%26amp%3B01003%20-F%20success%3D1%20-F%20auid%26gt%3B%3D1000%20-F%20auid%21%3Dunset%20-F%20key%3Dsuccessful-modification%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db32%20-S%20open%20-F%20a1%26amp%3B01003%20-F%20success%3D1%20-F%20auid%26gt%3B%3D1000%20-F%20auid%21%3Dunset%20-F%20key%3Dsuccessful-modification%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db64%20-S%20open%20-F%20a1%26amp%3B01003%20-F%20success%3D1%20-F%20auid%26gt%3B%3D1000%20-F%20auid%21%3Dunset%20-F%20key%3Dsuccessful-modification%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db32%20-S%20truncate%2Cftruncate%20-F%20success%3D1%20-F%20auid%26gt%3B%3D1000%20-F%20auid%21%3Dunset%20-F%20key%3Dsuccessful-modification%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db64%20-S%20truncate%2Cftruncate%20-F%20success%3D1%20-F%20auid%26gt%3B%3D1000%20-F%20auid%21%3Dunset%20-F%20key%3Dsuccessful-modification%0A mode: 0600 path: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-2-modify-success.rules overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then cat << 'EOF' > /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-2-modify-success.rules ## Successful file modifications (open for write or truncate) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification EOF chmod o-rwx /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-2-modify-success.rules augenrules --load else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure auditing of loading and unloading of kernel modules Ensure that loading and unloading of kernel modules is audited. The following rules configure audit as described above: ## These rules watch for kernel module insertion. By monitoring ## the syscall, we do not need any watches on programs. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S init_module,finit_module -F key=module-load -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S init_module,finit_module -F key=module-load -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S delete_module -F key=module-unload -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S delete_module -F key=module-unload Load new Audit rules into kernel by running: augenrules --load AU-2(a) FAU_GEN.1.1.c SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00216 SRG-OS-000477-GPOS-00222 SRG-OS-000475-GPOS-00220 Loading of a malicious kernel module introduces a risk to the system, as the module has access to sensitive data and perform actions at the operating system kernel level. Having such events audited helps in monitoring and investigating of malicious activities. CCE-82838-4 - name: Put contents into /etc/audit/rules.d/43-module-load.rules according to policy copy: dest: /etc/audit/rules.d/43-module-load.rules content: | ## These rules watch for kernel module insertion. By monitoring ## the syscall, we do not need any watches on programs. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S init_module,finit_module -F key=module-load -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S init_module,finit_module -F key=module-load -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S delete_module -F key=module-unload -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S delete_module -F key=module-unload force: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82838-4 - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) - audit_module_load - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Remove any permissions from other group file: path: /etc/audit/rules.d/43-module-load.rules mode: o-rwx when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82838-4 - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) - audit_module_load - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,%23%23%20These%20rules%20watch%20for%20kernel%20module%20insertion.%20By%20monitoring%0A%23%23%20the%20syscall%2C%20we%20do%20not%20need%20any%20watches%20on%20programs.%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db32%20-S%20init_module%2Cfinit_module%20-F%20key%3Dmodule-load%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db64%20-S%20init_module%2Cfinit_module%20-F%20key%3Dmodule-load%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db32%20-S%20delete_module%20-F%20key%3Dmodule-unload%0A-a%20always%2Cexit%20-F%20arch%3Db64%20-S%20delete_module%20-F%20key%3Dmodule-unload%0A mode: 0600 path: /etc/audit/rules.d/43-module-load.rules overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then cat << 'EOF' > /etc/audit/rules.d/43-module-load.rules ## These rules watch for kernel module insertion. By monitoring ## the syscall, we do not need any watches on programs. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S init_module,finit_module -F key=module-load -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S init_module,finit_module -F key=module-load -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S delete_module -F key=module-unload -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S delete_module -F key=module-unload EOF chmod o-rwx /etc/audit/rules.d/43-module-load.rules augenrules --load else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Perform general configuration of Audit for OSPP Configure some basic Audit parameters specific for OSPP profile. In particular, configure Audit to watch for direct modification of files storing system user and group information, and usage of applications with special rights which can change system configuration. Further audited events include access to audit log it self, attempts to Alter Process and Session Initiation Information, and attempts to modify MAC controls. The following rules configure audit as described above: ## The purpose of these rules is to meet the requirements for Operating ## System Protection Profile (OSPP)v4.2. These rules depends on having ## the following rule files copied to /etc/audit/rules.d: ## ## 10-base-config.rules, 11-loginuid.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-1-create-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-1-create-success.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-2-modify-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-2-modify-success.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-3-access-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-3-access-success.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-4-delete-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-4-delete-success.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-failed.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-success.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-failed.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-success.rules ## ## original copies may be found in /usr/share/audit/sample-rules/ ## User add delete modify. This is covered by pam. However, someone could ## open a file and directly create or modify a user, so we'll watch passwd and ## shadow for writes -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify ## User enable and disable. This is entirely handled by pam. ## Group add delete modify. This is covered by pam. However, someone could ## open a file and directly create or modify a user, so we'll watch group and ## gshadow for writes -a always,exit -F path=/etc/passwd -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F path=/etc/shadow -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F path=/etc/group -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=group-modify -a always,exit -F path=/etc/gshadow -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=group-modify ## Use of special rights for config changes. This would be use of setuid ## programs that relate to user accts. This is not all setuid apps because ## requirements are only for ones that affect system configuration. -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/usernetctl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/userhelper -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/seunshare -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/mount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newgrp -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newuidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/gpasswd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newgidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/umount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/passwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/crontab -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/at -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes ## Privilege escalation via su or sudo. This is entirely handled by pam. ## Watch for configuration changes to privilege escalation. -a always,exit -F path=/etc/sudoers -F perm=wa -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F dir=/etc/sudoers.d/ -F perm=wa -F key=special-config-changes ## Audit log access -a always,exit -F dir=/var/log/audit/ -F perm=r -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access-audit-trail ## Attempts to Alter Process and Session Initiation Information -a always,exit -F path=/var/run/utmp -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=session -a always,exit -F path=/var/log/btmp -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=session -a always,exit -F path=/var/log/wtmp -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=session ## Attempts to modify MAC controls -a always,exit -F dir=/etc/selinux/ -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=MAC-policy ## Software updates. This is entirely handled by rpm. ## System start and shutdown. This is entirely handled by systemd ## Kernel Module loading. This is handled in 43-module-load.rules ## Application invocation. The requirements list an optional requirement ## FPT_SRP_EXT.1 Software Restriction Policies. This event is intended to ## state results from that policy. This would be handled entirely by ## that daemon. Load new Audit rules into kernel by running: augenrules --load Note: This rule uses a special set of Audit rules to comply with OSPP 4.2.1. You may reuse this rule in different profiles. If you decide to do so, it is recommended that you inspect contents of the file closely and make sure that they are alligned with your needs. AU-2(a) FAU_GEN.1.1.c SRG-OS-000004-GPOS-00004 SRG-OS-000241-GPOS-00091 SRG-OS-000476-GPOS-00221 SRG-OS-000327-GPOS-00127 SRG-OS-000475-GPOS-00220 SRG-OS-000239-GPOS-00089 SRG-OS-000274-GPOS-00104 SRG-OS-000275-GPOS-00105 SRG-OS-000303-GPOS-00120 SRG-OS-000304-GPOS-00121 Auditing of events listed in the description provides data for monitoring and investigation of potentially malicious events e.g. tampering with Audit logs, malicious access to files storing information about system users and groups etc. CCE-82373-2 - name: Put contents into /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42.rules according to policy copy: dest: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42.rules content: |+ ## The purpose of these rules is to meet the requirements for Operating ## System Protection Profile (OSPP)v4.2. These rules depends on having ## the following rule files copied to /etc/audit/rules.d: ## ## 10-base-config.rules, 11-loginuid.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-1-create-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-1-create-success.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-2-modify-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-2-modify-success.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-3-access-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-3-access-success.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-4-delete-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-4-delete-success.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-failed.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-success.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-failed.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-success.rules ## ## original copies may be found in /usr/share/audit/sample-rules/ ## User add delete modify. This is covered by pam. However, someone could ## open a file and directly create or modify a user, so we'll watch passwd and ## shadow for writes -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify ## User enable and disable. This is entirely handled by pam. ## Group add delete modify. This is covered by pam. However, someone could ## open a file and directly create or modify a user, so we'll watch group and ## gshadow for writes -a always,exit -F path=/etc/passwd -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F path=/etc/shadow -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F path=/etc/group -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=group-modify -a always,exit -F path=/etc/gshadow -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=group-modify ## Use of special rights for config changes. This would be use of setuid ## programs that relate to user accts. This is not all setuid apps because ## requirements are only for ones that affect system configuration. -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/usernetctl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/userhelper -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/seunshare -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/mount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newgrp -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newuidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/gpasswd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newgidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/umount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/passwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/crontab -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/at -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes ## Privilege escalation via su or sudo. This is entirely handled by pam. ## Watch for configuration changes to privilege escalation. -a always,exit -F path=/etc/sudoers -F perm=wa -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F dir=/etc/sudoers.d/ -F perm=wa -F key=special-config-changes ## Audit log access -a always,exit -F dir=/var/log/audit/ -F perm=r -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access-audit-trail ## Attempts to Alter Process and Session Initiation Information -a always,exit -F path=/var/run/utmp -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=session -a always,exit -F path=/var/log/btmp -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=session -a always,exit -F path=/var/log/wtmp -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=session ## Attempts to modify MAC controls -a always,exit -F dir=/etc/selinux/ -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=MAC-policy ## Software updates. This is entirely handled by rpm. ## System start and shutdown. This is entirely handled by systemd ## Kernel Module loading. This is handled in 43-module-load.rules ## Application invocation. The requirements list an optional requirement ## FPT_SRP_EXT.1 Software Restriction Policies. This event is intended to ## state results from that policy. This would be handled entirely by ## that daemon. force: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82373-2 - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) - audit_ospp_general - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Remove any permissions from other group file: path: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42.rules mode: o-rwx when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82373-2 - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) - audit_ospp_general - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: 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mode: 0600 path: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42.rules overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then cat << 'EOF' > /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42.rules ## The purpose of these rules is to meet the requirements for Operating ## System Protection Profile (OSPP)v4.2. These rules depends on having ## the following rule files copied to /etc/audit/rules.d: ## ## 10-base-config.rules, 11-loginuid.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-1-create-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-1-create-success.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-2-modify-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-2-modify-success.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-3-access-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-3-access-success.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-4-delete-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-4-delete-success.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-failed.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-success.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-failed.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-success.rules ## ## original copies may be found in /usr/share/audit/sample-rules/ ## User add delete modify. This is covered by pam. However, someone could ## open a file and directly create or modify a user, so we'll watch passwd and ## shadow for writes -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify ## User enable and disable. This is entirely handled by pam. ## Group add delete modify. This is covered by pam. However, someone could ## open a file and directly create or modify a user, so we'll watch group and ## gshadow for writes -a always,exit -F path=/etc/passwd -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F path=/etc/shadow -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F path=/etc/group -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=group-modify -a always,exit -F path=/etc/gshadow -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=group-modify ## Use of special rights for config changes. This would be use of setuid ## programs that relate to user accts. This is not all setuid apps because ## requirements are only for ones that affect system configuration. -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/usernetctl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/userhelper -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/seunshare -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/mount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newgrp -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newuidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/gpasswd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newgidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/umount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/passwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/crontab -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/at -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes ## Privilege escalation via su or sudo. This is entirely handled by pam. ## Watch for configuration changes to privilege escalation. -a always,exit -F path=/etc/sudoers -F perm=wa -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F dir=/etc/sudoers.d/ -F perm=wa -F key=special-config-changes ## Audit log access -a always,exit -F dir=/var/log/audit/ -F perm=r -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access-audit-trail ## Attempts to Alter Process and Session Initiation Information -a always,exit -F path=/var/run/utmp -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=session -a always,exit -F path=/var/log/btmp -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=session -a always,exit -F path=/var/log/wtmp -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=session ## Attempts to modify MAC controls -a always,exit -F dir=/etc/selinux/ -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=MAC-policy ## Software updates. This is entirely handled by rpm. ## System start and shutdown. This is entirely handled by systemd ## Kernel Module loading. This is handled in 43-module-load.rules ## Application invocation. The requirements list an optional requirement ## FPT_SRP_EXT.1 Software Restriction Policies. This event is intended to ## state results from that policy. This would be handled entirely by ## that daemon. EOF chmod o-rwx /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42.rules augenrules --load else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure auditing of unsuccessful ownership changes Ensure that unsuccessful attempts to change an ownership of files or directories are audited. The following rules configure audit as described above: ## Unsuccessful ownership change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change Load new Audit rules into kernel by running: augenrules --load Note: This rule uses a special set of Audit rules to comply with OSPP 4.2.1. You may reuse this rule in different profiles. If you decide to do so, it is recommended that you inspect contents of the file closely and make sure that they are alligned with your needs. AU-2(a) FAU_GEN.1.1.c SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 SRG-OS-000465-GPOS-00209 SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 SRG-OS-000475-GPOS-00220 SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 Unsuccessful attempts to change an ownership of files or directories might be signs of a malicious activity. Having such events audited helps in monitoring and investigation of such activities. CCE-82384-9 - name: Put contents into /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-failed.rules according to policy copy: dest: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-failed.rules content: | ## Unsuccessful ownership change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change force: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82384-9 - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) - audit_owner_change_failed - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Remove any permissions from other group file: path: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-failed.rules mode: o-rwx when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82384-9 - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) - audit_owner_change_failed - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then cat << 'EOF' > /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-failed.rules ## Unsuccessful ownership change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change EOF chmod o-rwx /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-failed.rules augenrules --load else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure auditing of successful ownership changes Ensure that successful attempts to change an ownership of files or directories are audited. The following rules configure audit as described above: ## Successful ownership change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-owner-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-owner-change Load new Audit rules into kernel by running: augenrules --load Note: This rule uses a special set of Audit rules to comply with OSPP 4.2.1. You may reuse this rule in different profiles. If you decide to do so, it is recommended that you inspect contents of the file closely and make sure that they are alligned with your needs. AU-2(a) FAU_GEN.1.1.c SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 SRG-OS-000465-GPOS-00209 SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 SRG-OS-000475-GPOS-00220 SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 Auditing of successful ownership changes of files or directories helps in monitoring or investingating of activities performed on the system. CCE-82385-6 - name: Put contents into /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-success.rules according to policy copy: dest: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-success.rules content: | ## Successful ownership change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-owner-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-owner-change force: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82385-6 - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) - audit_owner_change_success - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Remove any permissions from other group file: path: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-success.rules mode: o-rwx when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82385-6 - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) - audit_owner_change_success - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then cat << 'EOF' > /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-success.rules ## Successful ownership change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-owner-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-owner-change EOF chmod o-rwx /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-success.rules augenrules --load else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure auditing of unsuccessful permission changes Ensure that unsuccessful attempts to change file or directory permissions are audited. The following rules configure audit as described above: ## Unsuccessful permission change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change Load new Audit rules into kernel by running: augenrules --load Note: This rule uses a special set of Audit rules to comply with OSPP 4.2.1. You may reuse this rule in different profiles. If you decide to do so, it is recommended that you inspect contents of the file closely and make sure that they are alligned with your needs. AU-2(a) FAU_GEN.1.1.c SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 SRG-OS-000465-GPOS-00209 SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 SRG-OS-000475-GPOS-00220 SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 Unsuccessful attempts to change permissions of files or directories might be signs of malicious activity. Having such events audited helps in monitoring and investigation of such activities. CCE-82837-6 - name: Put contents into /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-failed.rules according to policy copy: dest: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-failed.rules content: | ## Unsuccessful permission change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change force: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82837-6 - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) - audit_perm_change_failed - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Remove any permissions from other group file: path: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-failed.rules mode: o-rwx when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82837-6 - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) - audit_perm_change_failed - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then cat << 'EOF' > /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-failed.rules ## Unsuccessful permission change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change EOF chmod o-rwx /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-failed.rules augenrules --load else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure auditing of successful permission changes Ensure that successful attempts to modify permissions of files or directories are audited. The following rules configure audit as described above: ## Successful permission change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change Load new Audit rules into kernel by running: augenrules --load Note: This rule uses a special set of Audit rules to comply with OSPP 4.2.1. You may reuse this rule in different profiles. If you decide to do so, it is recommended that you inspect contents of the file closely and make sure that they are alligned with your needs. AU-2(a) FAU_GEN.1.1.c SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 SRG-OS-000465-GPOS-00209 SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 SRG-OS-000475-GPOS-00220 SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 Auditing successful file or directory permission changes helps in monitoring and investigating of activities performed on the system. CCE-82383-1 - name: Put contents into /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-success.rules according to policy copy: dest: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-success.rules content: | ## Successful permission change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change force: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82383-1 - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) - audit_perm_change_success - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Remove any permissions from other group file: path: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-success.rules mode: o-rwx when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82383-1 - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) - audit_perm_change_success - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then cat << 'EOF' > /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-success.rules ## Successful permission change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change EOF chmod o-rwx /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-success.rules augenrules --load else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure audit according to OSPP requirements Configure audit to meet requirements for Operating System Protection Profile (OSPP) v4.2.1. Audit defines groups of rules in /usr/share/doc/audit/rules to satisfy specific policies. To fulfill requirements for compliance with OSPP v4.2.1, the following files are necessary: /usr/share/doc/audit/rules/10-base-config.rules/usr/share/doc/audit/rules/11-loginuid.rules/usr/share/doc/audit/rules/30-ospp-v42.rules/usr/share/doc/audit/rules/43-module-load.rules Copy the files from /usr/share/doc/audit/rules to /etc/audit/rules.d: cp /usr/share/doc/audit*/rules/{10-base-config,11-loginuid,30-ospp-v42,43-module-load}.rules /etc/audit/rules.d/ It might happen that Audit buffer configured by this rule is not large enough for certain use cases. If that is the case, the buffer size can be overridden by placing -b larger_buffer_size into a file within /etc/audit/rules.d directory, replacing larger_file_size with the desired value. The file name should start with a number higher than 10 and lower than 99. NONE FAU_GEN.1.1.c SRG-OS-000004-GPOS-00004 SRG-OS-000240-GPOS-00090 SRG-OS-000241-GPOS-00091 SRG-OS-000303-GPOS-00120 SRG-OS-000476-GPOS-00221 SRG-OS-000327-GPOS-00127 SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 SRG-OS-000365-GPOS-00152 SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 SRG-OS-000465-GPOS-00209 SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212 SRG-OS-000470-GPOS-00214 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00216 SRG-OS-000472-GPOS-00217 SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 SRG-OS-000475-GPOS-00220 SRG-OS-000477-GPOS-00222 The audit rules defined in /usr/share/doc/audit/rules are the recommended way to meet compliance with OSPP v4.2.1. CCE-82309-6 # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then cp /usr/share/doc/audit*/rules/10-base-config.rules /etc/audit/rules.d cp /usr/share/doc/audit*/rules/11-loginuid.rules /etc/audit/rules.d cp /usr/share/doc/audit*/rules/30-ospp-v42.rules /etc/audit/rules.d cp /usr/share/doc/audit*/rules/43-module-load.rules /etc/audit/rules.d augenrules --load else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi AppArmor Many security vulnerabilities result from bugs in trusted programs. A trusted program runs with privileges that attackers want to possess. The program fails to keep that trust if there is a bug in the program that allows the attacker to acquire said privilege. AppArmor® is an application security solution designed specifically to apply privilege confinement to suspect programs. AppArmor allows the administrator to specify the domain of activities the program can perform by developing a security profile. A security profile is a listing of files that the program may access and the operations the program may perform. AppArmor secures applications by enforcing good application behavior without relying on attack signatures, so it can prevent attacks even if previously unknown vulnerabilities are being exploited. AppArmor profiles mode enforce - Set all AppArmor profiles to enforce mode complain - Set all AppArmor profiles to complain mode enforce complain enforce GRUB2 bootloader configuration During the boot process, the boot loader is responsible for starting the execution of the kernel and passing options to it. The boot loader allows for the selection of different kernels - possibly on different partitions or media. The default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 boot loader for x86 systems is called GRUB2. Options it can pass to the kernel include single-user mode, which provides root access without any authentication, and the ability to disable SELinux. To prevent local users from modifying the boot parameters and endangering security, protect the boot loader configuration with a password and ensure its configuration file's permissions are set properly. L1TF vulnerability mitigation Defines the L1TF vulneratility mitigations to employ. flush full full,force flush flush,nosmt flush,nowarn MDS vulnerability mitigation Defines the MDS vulneratility mitigation to employ. full full full,nosmt Confidence level on Hardware Random Number Generator Defines the level of trust on the hardware random number generators available in the system and the percentage of entropy to credit. 500 500 512 1000 Spec Store Bypass Mitigation This controls how the Speculative Store Bypass (SSB) vulnerability is mitigated. prctl on auto prctl seccomp Disable Recovery Booting Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 systems support an "recovery boot" option that can be used to prevent services from being started. The GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY configuration option in /etc/default/grub should be set to true to disable the generation of recovery mode menu entries. It is also required to change the runtime configuration, run: $ sudo grubby --update-kernel=ALL --env=/boot/grub2/grubenv FIA_UAU.1 Using recovery boot, the console user could disable auditing, firewalls, or other services, weakening system security. CCE-86006-4 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-86006-4 - grub2_disable_recovery - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Verify GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=true lineinfile: path: /etc/default/grub regexp: ^GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=.* line: GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=true state: present when: '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-86006-4 - grub2_disable_recovery - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Update grub defaults and the bootloader menu command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL when: '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-86006-4 - grub2_disable_recovery - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q grub2-common; then if grep -q '^GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=.*' '/etc/default/grub' ; then sed -i 's/GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=.*/GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=true/' "/etc/default/grub" else echo "GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=true" >> '/etc/default/grub' fi grubby --update-kernel=ALL --env=/boot/grub2/grubenv else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi IOMMU configuration directive On x86 architecture supporting VT-d, the IOMMU manages the access control policy between the hardware devices and some of the system critical units such as the memory. To ensure that iommu=force is added as a kernel command line argument to newly installed kernels, add iommu=force to the default Grub2 command line for Linux operating systems. Modify the line within /etc/default/grub as shown below: GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="... iommu=force ..." Run the following command to update command line for already installed kernels:# grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="iommu=force" Depending on the hardware, devices and operating system used, enabling IOMMU can cause hardware instabilities. Proper function and stability should be assessed before applying remediation to production systems. BP28(R11) On x86 architectures, activating the I/OMMU prevents the system from arbitrary accesses potentially made by hardware devices. CCE-83920-9 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-83920-9 - grub2_enable_iommu_force - low_disruption - medium_complexity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - unknown_severity - name: Update grub defaults and the bootloader menu command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="iommu=force" when: - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83920-9 - grub2_enable_iommu_force - low_disruption - medium_complexity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - unknown_severity [customizations.kernel] append = "iommu=force" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args=iommu=force --env=/boot/grub2/grubenv else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure kernel to trust the CPU random number generator There exist two ways how to ensure that the Linux kernel trusts the CPU hardware random number generator. If the option is configured during kernel compilation, e.g. the option CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU is set to Y, make sure that it is not overridden with the boot parameter. There must not exist the boot parameter random.trust_cpu=off. If the option is not compiled in, make sure that random.trust_cpu=on is configured as a boot parameter. To ensure that random.trust_cpu=on is added as a kernel command line argument to newly installed kernels, add random.trust_cpu=on to the default Grub2 command line for Linux operating systems. Modify the line within /etc/default/grub as shown below: GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="... random.trust_cpu=on ..." Run the following command to update command line for already installed kernels:# grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="random.trust_cpu=on" FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 The Linux kernel offers an option which signifies if the kernel should trust data provided by CPU hardware random number generator. Hardware random number generators can provide random data very quickly and are used to generate random cryptographic keys. They can be useful during boot time when other means of getting random data can be slow because there is not yet enough entropy in the system. CCE-83314-5 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-83314-5 - grub2_kernel_trust_cpu_rng - low_disruption - medium_complexity - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Update grub defaults and the bootloader menu command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="random.trust_cpu=on" when: - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83314-5 - grub2_kernel_trust_cpu_rng - low_disruption - medium_complexity - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy [customizations.kernel] append = "random.trust_cpu=on" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args=random.trust_cpu=on --env=/boot/grub2/grubenv else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure L1 Terminal Fault mitigations L1 Terminal Fault (L1TF) is a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged speculative access to data which is available in the Level 1 Data Cache when the page table entry isn't present. Select the appropriate mitigation by adding the argument l1tf= to the default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system. To ensure that l1tf= is added as a kernel command line argument to newly installed kernels, add l1tf= to the default Grub2 command line for Linux operating systems. Modify the line within /etc/default/grub as shown below: GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="... l1tf= ..." Run the following command to update command line for already installed kernels:# grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="l1tf=" Since Linux Kernel 4.19 you can check the L1TF vulnerability state with the following command: cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf Enabling L1TF mitigations may impact performance of the system. BP28(R8) The L1TF vulnerability allows an attacker to bypass memory access security controls imposed by the system or hypervisor. The L1TF vulnerability allows read access to any physical memory location that is cached in the L1 Data Cache. CCE-88123-5 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-88123-5 - grub2_l1tf_argument - high_severity - low_disruption - medium_complexity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_l1tf_options # promote to variable set_fact: var_l1tf_options: !!str tags: - always - name: Update grub defaults and the bootloader menu command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="l1tf={{ var_l1tf_options }}" when: - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-88123-5 - grub2_l1tf_argument - high_severity - low_disruption - medium_complexity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy [customizations.kernel] append = "l1tf=" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then var_l1tf_options='' grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args=l1tf=$var_l1tf_options --env=/boot/grub2/grubenv else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Force kernel panic on uncorrected MCEs A Machine Check Exception is an error generated by the CPU itdetects an error in itself, memory or I/O devices. These errors may be corrected and generate a check log entry, if an error cannot be corrected the kernel may panic or SIGBUS. To force the kernel to panic on any uncorrected error reported by Machine Check set the MCE tolerance to zero by adding mce=0 to the default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system. To ensure that mce=0 is added as a kernel command line argument to newly installed kernels, add mce=0 to the default Grub2 command line for Linux operating systems. Modify the line within /etc/default/grub as shown below: GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="... mce=0 ..." Run the following command to update command line for already installed kernels:# grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="mce=0" BP28(R8) Allowing uncorrected errors to result on a SIGBUS may allow an attacker to continue trying to exploit a vulnerability such as Rowhammer. CCE-87098-0 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-87098-0 - grub2_mce_argument - low_disruption - medium_complexity - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Update grub defaults and the bootloader menu command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="mce=0" when: - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-87098-0 - grub2_mce_argument - low_disruption - medium_complexity - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy [customizations.kernel] append = "mce=0" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args=mce=0 --env=/boot/grub2/grubenv else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure SMAP is not disabled during boot The SMAP is used to prevent the supervisor mode from unintentionally reading/writing into memory pages in the user space, it is enabled by default since Linux kernel 3.7. But it could be disabled through kernel boot parameters. Ensure that Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP) is not disabled by the nosmap boot paramenter option. Check that the line GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="..." within /etc/default/grub doesn't contain the argument nosmap. Run the following command to update command line for already installed kernels: # grubby --update-kernel=ALL --remove-args="nosmap" BP28(R1) Disabling SMAP can facilitate exploitation of vulnerabilities caused by unintended access and manipulation of data in the user space. CCE-87345-5 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-87345-5 - grub2_nosmap_argument_absent - low_disruption - medium_complexity - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Update grub defaults and the bootloader menu command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --remove-args="nosmap" when: - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-87345-5 - grub2_nosmap_argument_absent - low_disruption - medium_complexity - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then grubby --update-kernel=ALL --remove-args=nosmap --env=/boot/grub2/grubenv else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure SMEP is not disabled during boot The SMEP is used to prevent the supervisor mode from executing user space code, it is enabled by default since Linux kernel 3.0. But it could be disabled through kernel boot parameters. Ensure that Supervisor Mode Execution Prevention (SMEP) is not disabled by the nosmep boot paramenter option. Check that the line GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="..." within /etc/default/grub doesn't contain the argument nosmep. Run the following command to update command line for already installed kernels: # grubby --update-kernel=ALL --remove-args="nosmep" BP28(R1) Disabling SMEP can facilitate exploitation of certain vulnerabilities because it allows the kernel to unintentionally execute code in less privileged memory space. CCE-85989-2 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-85989-2 - grub2_nosmep_argument_absent - low_disruption - medium_complexity - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Update grub defaults and the bootloader menu command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --remove-args="nosmep" when: - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-85989-2 - grub2_nosmep_argument_absent - low_disruption - medium_complexity - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then grubby --update-kernel=ALL --remove-args=nosmep --env=/boot/grub2/grubenv else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable Kernel Page-Table Isolation (KPTI) To enable Kernel page-table isolation, add the argument pti=on to the default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system. To ensure that pti=on is added as a kernel command line argument to newly installed kernels, add pti=on to the default Grub2 command line for Linux operating systems. Modify the line within /etc/default/grub as shown below: GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="... pti=on ..." Run the following command to update command line for already installed kernels:# grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="pti=on" BP28(R8) CCI-000381 SI-16 SRG-OS-000433-GPOS-00193 SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 RHEL-08-040004 SV-230491r818842_rule Kernel page-table isolation is a kernel feature that mitigates the Meltdown security vulnerability and hardens the kernel against attempts to bypass kernel address space layout randomization (KASLR). CCE-82194-2 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-82194-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040004 - NIST-800-53-SI-16 - grub2_pti_argument - low_disruption - low_severity - medium_complexity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Update grub defaults and the bootloader menu command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="pti=on" when: - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82194-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040004 - NIST-800-53-SI-16 - grub2_pti_argument - low_disruption - low_severity - medium_complexity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy [customizations.kernel] append = "pti=on" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args=pti=on --env=/boot/grub2/grubenv else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure the confidence in TPM for entropy The TPM security chip that is available in most modern systems has a hardware RNG. It is also used to feed the entropy pool, but generally not credited entropy. Use rng_core.default_quality in the kernel command line to set the trust level on the hardware generators. The trust level defines the amount of entropy to credit. A value of 0 tells the system not to trust the hardware random number generators available, and doesn't credit any entropy to the pool. A value of 1000 assigns full confidence in the generators, and credits all the entropy it provides to the pool. Note that the value of rng_core.default_quality is global, affecting the trust on all hardware random number generators. Select the appropriate confidence by adding the argument rng_core.default_quality= to the default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system. To ensure that rng_core.default_quality= is added as a kernel command line argument to newly installed kernels, add rng_core.default_quality= to the default Grub2 command line for Linux operating systems. Modify the line within /etc/default/grub as shown below: GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="... rng_core.default_quality= ..." Run the following command to update command line for already installed kernels:# grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="rng_core.default_quality=" BP28(R8) A system may struggle to initialize its entropy pool and end up starving. Crediting entropy from the hardware number generators available in the system helps fill up the entropy pool. CCE-89567-2 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-89567-2 - grub2_rng_core_default_quality_argument - low_disruption - low_severity - medium_complexity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_rng_core_default_quality # promote to variable set_fact: var_rng_core_default_quality: !!str tags: - always - name: Update grub defaults and the bootloader menu command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="rng_core.default_quality={{ var_rng_core_default_quality }}" when: - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-89567-2 - grub2_rng_core_default_quality_argument - low_disruption - low_severity - medium_complexity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy [customizations.kernel] append = "rng_core.default_quality=" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then var_rng_core_default_quality='' grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args=rng_core.default_quality=$var_rng_core_default_quality --env=/boot/grub2/grubenv else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable merging of slabs with similar size The kernel may merge similar slabs together to reduce overhead and increase cache hotness of objects. Disabling merging of slabs keeps the slabs separate and reduces the risk of kernel heap overflows overwriting objects in merged caches. To disable merging of slabs in the Kernel add the argument slab_nomerge=yes to the default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system. To ensure that slab_nomerge=yes is added as a kernel command line argument to newly installed kernels, add slab_nomerge=yes to the default Grub2 command line for Linux operating systems. Modify the line within /etc/default/grub as shown below: GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="... slab_nomerge=yes ..." Run the following command to update command line for already installed kernels:# grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="slab_nomerge=yes" Disabling merge of slabs will slightly increase kernel memory utilization. BP28(R8) Disabling the merge of slabs of similar sizes prevents the kernel from merging a seemingly useless but vulnerable slab with a useful and valuable slab. This increase the risk that a heap overflow could overwrite objects from merged caches, with unmerged caches the heap overflow would only affect the objects in the same cache. Overall, this reduces the kernel attack surface area by isolating slabs from each other. CCE-86777-0 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-86777-0 - grub2_slab_nomerge_argument - low_disruption - medium_complexity - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Update grub defaults and the bootloader menu command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="slab_nomerge=yes" when: - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86777-0 - grub2_slab_nomerge_argument - low_disruption - medium_complexity - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy [customizations.kernel] append = "slab_nomerge=yes" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args=slab_nomerge=yes --env=/boot/grub2/grubenv else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure Speculative Store Bypass Mitigation Certain CPUs are vulnerable to an exploit against a common wide industry wide performance optimization known as Speculative Store Bypass (SSB). In such cases, recent stores to the same memory location cannot always be observed by later loads during speculative execution. However, such stores are unlikely and thus they can be detected prior to instruction retirement at the end of a particular speculation execution window. Since Linux Kernel 4.17 you can check the SSB mitigation state with the following command: cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass Select the appropriate SSB state by adding the argument spec_store_bypass_disable= to the default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system. To ensure that spec_store_bypass_disable= is added as a kernel command line argument to newly installed kernels, add spec_store_bypass_disable= to the default Grub2 command line for Linux operating systems. Modify the line within /etc/default/grub as shown below: GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="... spec_store_bypass_disable= ..." Run the following command to update command line for already installed kernels:# grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="spec_store_bypass_disable=" Disabling Speculative Store Bypass may impact performance of the system. BP28(R8) In vulnerable processsors, the speculatively forwarded store can be used in a cache side channel attack. An example of this is reading memory to which the attacker does not directly have access, for example inside the sandboxed code. CCE-89234-9 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-89234-9 - grub2_spec_store_bypass_disable_argument - low_disruption - medium_complexity - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_spec_store_bypass_disable_options # promote to variable set_fact: var_spec_store_bypass_disable_options: !!str tags: - always - name: Update grub defaults and the bootloader menu command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="spec_store_bypass_disable={{ var_spec_store_bypass_disable_options }}" when: - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-89234-9 - grub2_spec_store_bypass_disable_argument - low_disruption - medium_complexity - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy [customizations.kernel] append = "spec_store_bypass_disable=" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then var_spec_store_bypass_disable_options='' grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args=spec_store_bypass_disable=$var_spec_store_bypass_disable_options --env=/boot/grub2/grubenv else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enforce Spectre v2 mitigation Spectre V2 is an indirect branch poisoning attack that can lead to data leakage. An exploit for Spectre V2 tricks the indirect branch predictor into executing code from a future indirect branch chosen by the attacker, even if the privilege level is different. Since Linux Kernel 4.15 you can check the Spectre V2 mitigation state with the following command: cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2 Enforce the Spectre V2 mitigation by adding the argument spectre_v2=on to the default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system. To ensure that spectre_v2=on) is added as a kernel command line argument to newly installed kernels, add spectre_v2=on) to the default Grub2 command line for Linux operating systems. Modify the line within /etc/default/grub as shown below: GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="... spectre_v2=on) ..." Run the following command to update command line for already installed kernels:# grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="spectre_v2=on)" BP28(R8) The Spectre V2 vulnerability allows an attacker to read memory that he should not have access to. CCE-89345-3 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-89345-3 - grub2_spectre_v2_argument - high_severity - low_disruption - medium_complexity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Update grub defaults and the bootloader menu command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="spectre_v2=on" when: - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-89345-3 - grub2_spectre_v2_argument - high_severity - low_disruption - medium_complexity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy [customizations.kernel] append = "spectre_v2=on" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args=spectre_v2=on --env=/boot/grub2/grubenv else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure debug-shell service is not enabled during boot systemd's debug-shell service is intended to diagnose systemd related boot issues with various systemctl commands. Once enabled and following a system reboot, the root shell will be available on tty9 which is access by pressing CTRL-ALT-F9. The debug-shell service should only be used for systemd related issues and should otherwise be disabled. By default, the debug-shell systemd service is already disabled. Ensure the debug-shell is not enabled by the systemd.debug-shel=1 boot paramenter option. Check that the line GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="..." within /etc/default/grub doesn't contain the argument systemd.debug-shell=1. Run the following command to update command line for already installed kernels: # grubby --update-kernel=ALL --remove-args="systemd.debug-shell" FIA_UAU.1 This prevents attackers with physical access from trivially bypassing security on the machine through valid troubleshooting configurations and gaining root access when the system is rebooted. - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - grub2_systemd_debug-shell_argument_absent - low_disruption - medium_complexity - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Update grub defaults and the bootloader menu command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --remove-args="systemd.debug-shell" when: - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - grub2_systemd_debug-shell_argument_absent - low_disruption - medium_complexity - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then grubby --update-kernel=ALL --remove-args=systemd.debug-shell --env=/boot/grub2/grubenv else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable vsyscalls To disable use of virtual syscalls, add the argument vsyscall=none to the default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system. To ensure that vsyscall=none is added as a kernel command line argument to newly installed kernels, add vsyscall=none to the default Grub2 command line for Linux operating systems. Modify the line within /etc/default/grub as shown below: GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="... vsyscall=none ..." Run the following command to update command line for already installed kernels:# grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="vsyscall=none" CCI-001084 CM-7(a) FPT_ASLR_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 SRG-OS-000134-GPOS-00068 RHEL-08-010422 SV-230278r792886_rule Virtual Syscalls provide an opportunity of attack for a user who has control of the return instruction pointer. CCE-80946-7 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80946-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010422 - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - grub2_vsyscall_argument - low_disruption - medium_complexity - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Update grub defaults and the bootloader menu command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="vsyscall=none" when: - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80946-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010422 - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - grub2_vsyscall_argument - low_disruption - medium_complexity - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy [customizations.kernel] append = "vsyscall=none" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args=vsyscall=none --env=/boot/grub2/grubenv else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Non-UEFI GRUB2 bootloader configuration Non-UEFI GRUB2 bootloader configuration Verify /boot/grub2/grub.cfg Group Ownership The file /boot/grub2/grub.cfg should be group-owned by the root group to prevent destruction or modification of the file. To properly set the group owner of /boot/grub2/grub.cfg, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /boot/grub2/grub.cfg 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 5.5.2.2 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 3.4.5 CCI-000225 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) 164.308(a)(7)(i) 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) 164.310(a)(1) 164.310(a)(2)(i) 164.310(a)(2)(ii) 164.310(a)(2)(iii) 164.310(b) 164.310(c) 164.310(d)(1) 164.310(d)(2)(iii) 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 Req-7.1 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 1.3.2 The root group is a highly-privileged group. Furthermore, the group-owner of this file should not have any access privileges anyway. CCE-80800-6 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80800-6 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_grub2_cfg - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /boot/grub2/grub.cfg stat: path: /boot/grub2/grub.cfg register: file_exists when: - '"/boot/efi" not in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list' - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80800-6 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_grub2_cfg - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner 0 on /boot/grub2/grub.cfg file: path: /boot/grub2/grub.cfg group: '0' when: - '"/boot/efi" not in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list' - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80800-6 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_grub2_cfg - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -d /sys/firmware/efi ] && rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then chgrp 0 /boot/grub2/grub.cfg else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify /boot/grub2/user.cfg Group Ownership The file /boot/grub2/user.cfg should be group-owned by the root group to prevent reading or modification of the file. To properly set the group owner of /boot/grub2/user.cfg, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /boot/grub2/user.cfg 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 5.5.2.2 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 3.4.5 CCI-000225 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) 164.308(a)(7)(i) 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) 164.310(a)(1) 164.310(a)(2)(i) 164.310(a)(2)(ii) 164.310(a)(2)(iii) 164.310(b) 164.310(c) 164.310(d)(1) 164.310(d)(2)(iii) 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 Req-7.1 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 1.3.2 The root group is a highly-privileged group. Furthermore, the group-owner of this file should not have any access privileges anyway. Non-root users who read the boot parameters may be able to identify weaknesses in security upon boot and be able to exploit them. CCE-86009-8 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-86009-8 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_user_cfg - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /boot/grub2/user.cfg stat: path: /boot/grub2/user.cfg register: file_exists when: - '"/boot/efi" not in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list' - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86009-8 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_user_cfg - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner 0 on /boot/grub2/user.cfg file: path: /boot/grub2/user.cfg group: '0' when: - '"/boot/efi" not in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list' - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86009-8 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_user_cfg - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -d /sys/firmware/efi ] && rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then chgrp 0 /boot/grub2/user.cfg else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify /boot/grub2/grub.cfg User Ownership The file /boot/grub2/grub.cfg should be owned by the root user to prevent destruction or modification of the file. To properly set the owner of /boot/grub2/grub.cfg, run the command: $ sudo chown root /boot/grub2/grub.cfg 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 5.5.2.2 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 3.4.5 CCI-000225 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) 164.308(a)(7)(i) 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) 164.310(a)(1) 164.310(a)(2)(i) 164.310(a)(2)(ii) 164.310(a)(2)(iii) 164.310(b) 164.310(c) 164.310(d)(1) 164.310(d)(2)(iii) 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 Req-7.1 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 1.3.2 Only root should be able to modify important boot parameters. CCE-80805-5 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80805-5 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_owner_grub2_cfg - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /boot/grub2/grub.cfg stat: path: /boot/grub2/grub.cfg register: file_exists when: - '"/boot/efi" not in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list' - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80805-5 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_owner_grub2_cfg - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner 0 on /boot/grub2/grub.cfg file: path: /boot/grub2/grub.cfg owner: '0' when: - '"/boot/efi" not in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list' - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80805-5 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_owner_grub2_cfg - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -d /sys/firmware/efi ] && rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then chown 0 /boot/grub2/grub.cfg else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify /boot/grub2/user.cfg User Ownership The file /boot/grub2/user.cfg should be owned by the root user to prevent reading or modification of the file. To properly set the owner of /boot/grub2/user.cfg, run the command: $ sudo chown root /boot/grub2/user.cfg 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 5.5.2.2 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 3.4.5 CCI-000225 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) 164.308(a)(7)(i) 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) 164.310(a)(1) 164.310(a)(2)(i) 164.310(a)(2)(ii) 164.310(a)(2)(iii) 164.310(b) 164.310(c) 164.310(d)(1) 164.310(d)(2)(iii) 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 Req-7.1 2.2.6 1.3.2 Only root should be able to modify important boot parameters. Also, non-root users who read the boot parameters may be able to identify weaknesses in security upon boot and be able to exploit them. CCE-86015-5 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-86015-5 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_owner_user_cfg - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /boot/grub2/user.cfg stat: path: /boot/grub2/user.cfg register: file_exists when: - '"/boot/efi" not in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list' - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86015-5 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_owner_user_cfg - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner 0 on /boot/grub2/user.cfg file: path: /boot/grub2/user.cfg owner: '0' when: - '"/boot/efi" not in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list' - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86015-5 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_owner_user_cfg - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -d /sys/firmware/efi ] && rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then chown 0 /boot/grub2/user.cfg else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify /boot/grub2/grub.cfg Permissions File permissions for /boot/grub2/grub.cfg should be set to 600. To properly set the permissions of /boot/grub2/grub.cfg, run the command: $ sudo chmod 600 /boot/grub2/grub.cfg 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 3.4.5 CCI-000225 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) 164.308(a)(7)(i) 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) 164.310(a)(1) 164.310(a)(2)(i) 164.310(a)(2)(ii) 164.310(a)(2)(iii) 164.310(b) 164.310(c) 164.310(d)(1) 164.310(d)(2)(iii) 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 2.2.6 1.3.2 Proper permissions ensure that only the root user can modify important boot parameters. CCE-80814-7 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80814-7 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_grub2_cfg - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /boot/grub2/grub.cfg stat: path: /boot/grub2/grub.cfg register: file_exists when: - '"/boot/efi" not in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list' - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80814-7 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_grub2_cfg - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure permission u-xs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt on /boot/grub2/grub.cfg file: path: /boot/grub2/grub.cfg mode: u-xs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt when: - '"/boot/efi" not in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list' - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80814-7 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_grub2_cfg - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -d /sys/firmware/efi ] && rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then chmod u-xs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt /boot/grub2/grub.cfg else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify /boot/grub2/user.cfg Permissions File permissions for /boot/grub2/user.cfg should be set to 600. To properly set the permissions of /boot/grub2/user.cfg, run the command: $ sudo chmod 600 /boot/grub2/user.cfg 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 3.4.5 CCI-000225 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) 164.308(a)(7)(i) 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) 164.310(a)(1) 164.310(a)(2)(i) 164.310(a)(2)(ii) 164.310(a)(2)(iii) 164.310(b) 164.310(c) 164.310(d)(1) 164.310(d)(2)(iii) 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 2.2.6 1.3.2 Proper permissions ensure that only the root user can read or modify important boot parameters. CCE-86024-7 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-86024-7 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_user_cfg - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /boot/grub2/user.cfg stat: path: /boot/grub2/user.cfg register: file_exists when: - '"/boot/efi" not in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list' - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86024-7 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_user_cfg - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure permission u-xs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt on /boot/grub2/user.cfg file: path: /boot/grub2/user.cfg mode: u-xs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt when: - '"/boot/efi" not in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list' - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86024-7 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_user_cfg - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -d /sys/firmware/efi ] && rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then chmod u-xs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt /boot/grub2/user.cfg else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Set the Boot Loader Admin Username to a Non-Default Value The grub2 boot loader should have a superuser account and password protection enabled to protect boot-time settings. To maximize the protection, select a password-protected superuser account with unique name, and modify the /etc/grub.d/01_users configuration file to reflect the account name change. Do not to use common administrator account names like root, admin, or administrator for the grub2 superuser account. Change the superuser to a different username (The default is 'root'). $ sed -i 's/\(set superusers=\).*/\1"<unique user ID>"/g' /etc/grub.d/01_users Once the superuser account has been added, update the grub.cfg file by running: grubby --update-kernel=ALL --env=/boot/grub2/grubenv To prevent hard-coded admin usernames, automatic remediation of this control is not available. Remediation must be automated as a component of machine provisioning, or followed manually as outlined above. Also, do NOT manually add the superuser account and password to the grub.cfg file as the grub2-mkconfig command overwrites this file. BP28(R17) 1 11 12 14 15 16 18 3 5 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.06 DSS06.10 3.4.5 CCI-000213 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) 164.308(a)(7)(i) 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) 164.310(a)(1) 164.310(a)(2)(i) 164.310(a)(2)(ii) 164.310(a)(2)(iii) 164.310(b) 164.310(c) 164.310(d)(1) 164.310(d)(2)(iii) 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 A.18.1.4 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-4 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 PR.PT-3 FIA_UAU.1 SRG-OS-000080-GPOS-00048 RHEL-08-010149 SV-244522r792984_rule Having a non-default grub superuser username makes password-guessing attacks less effective. CCE-83561-1 Boot Loader Is Not Installed On Removeable Media The system must not allow removable media to be used as the boot loader. Remove alternate methods of booting the system from removable media. usb0, cd, fd0, etc. are some examples of removeable media which should not exist in the lines: set root='hd0,msdos1' CCI-001813 CCI-001814 SRG-OS-000364-GPOS-00151 Malicious users with removable boot media can gain access to a system configured to use removable media as the boot loader. Set Boot Loader Password in grub2 The grub2 boot loader should have a superuser account and password protection enabled to protect boot-time settings. Since plaintext passwords are a security risk, generate a hash for the password by running the following command: # grub2-setpassword When prompted, enter the password that was selected. To prevent hard-coded passwords, automatic remediation of this control is not available. Remediation must be automated as a component of machine provisioning, or followed manually as outlined above. Also, do NOT manually add the superuser account and password to the grub.cfg file as the grub2-mkconfig command overwrites this file. BP28(R17) 1 11 12 14 15 16 18 3 5 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.06 DSS06.10 3.4.5 CCI-000213 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) 164.308(a)(7)(i) 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) 164.310(a)(1) 164.310(a)(2)(i) 164.310(a)(2)(ii) 164.310(a)(2)(iii) 164.310(b) 164.310(c) 164.310(d)(1) 164.310(d)(2)(iii) 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 A.18.1.4 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-4 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 PR.PT-3 FIA_UAU.1 SRG-OS-000080-GPOS-00048 RHEL-08-010150 1.3.1 SV-230235r743925_rule Password protection on the boot loader configuration ensures users with physical access cannot trivially alter important bootloader settings. These include which kernel to use, and whether to enter single-user mode. CCE-80828-7 UEFI GRUB2 bootloader configuration UEFI GRUB2 bootloader configuration UEFI generally uses vfat file systems, which does not support Unix-style permissions managed by chmod command. In this case, in order to change file permissions for files within /boot/efi it is necessary to update the mount options in /etc/fstab file and reboot the system. Verify the UEFI Boot Loader grub.cfg Group Ownership The file /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg should be group-owned by the root group to prevent destruction or modification of the file. To properly set the group owner of /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 5.5.2.2 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 3.4.5 CCI-000225 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 Req-7.1 1.3.2 The root group is a highly-privileged group. Furthermore, the group-owner of this file should not have any access privileges anyway. CCE-85915-7 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-85915-7 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_efi_grub2_cfg - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg stat: path: /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg register: file_exists when: - '"/boot/efi" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list' - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-85915-7 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_efi_grub2_cfg - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner 0 on /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg file: path: /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg group: '0' when: - '"/boot/efi" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list' - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-85915-7 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_efi_grub2_cfg - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ -d /sys/firmware/efi ] && rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then chgrp 0 /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg Group Ownership The file /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg should be group-owned by the root group to prevent reading or modification of the file. To properly set the group owner of /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 5.5.2.2 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 3.4.5 CCI-000225 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 Req-7.1 1.3.2 The root group is a highly-privileged group. Furthermore, the group-owner of this file should not have any access privileges anyway. Non-root users who read the boot parameters may be able to identify weaknesses in security upon boot and be able to exploit them. CCE-86012-2 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-86012-2 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_efi_user_cfg - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg stat: path: /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg register: file_exists when: - '"/boot/efi" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list' - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86012-2 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_efi_user_cfg - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner 0 on /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg file: path: /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg group: '0' when: - '"/boot/efi" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list' - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86012-2 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_efi_user_cfg - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ -d /sys/firmware/efi ] && rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then chgrp 0 /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify the UEFI Boot Loader grub.cfg User Ownership The file /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg should be owned by the root user to prevent destruction or modification of the file. To properly set the owner of /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg, run the command: $ sudo chown root /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 5.5.2.2 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 3.4.5 CCI-000225 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 Req-7.1 1.3.2 Only root should be able to modify important boot parameters. CCE-85913-2 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-85913-2 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1 - configure_strategy - file_owner_efi_grub2_cfg - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg stat: path: /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg register: file_exists when: - '"/boot/efi" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list' - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-85913-2 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1 - configure_strategy - file_owner_efi_grub2_cfg - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner 0 on /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg file: path: /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg owner: '0' when: - '"/boot/efi" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list' - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-85913-2 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1 - configure_strategy - file_owner_efi_grub2_cfg - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ -d /sys/firmware/efi ] && rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then chown 0 /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg User Ownership The file /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg should be owned by the root user to prevent reading or modification of the file. To properly set the owner of /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg, run the command: $ sudo chown root /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 5.5.2.2 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 3.4.5 CCI-000225 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 Req-7.1 1.3.2 Only root should be able to modify important boot parameters. Also, non-root users who read the boot parameters may be able to identify weaknesses in security upon boot and be able to exploit them. CCE-86021-3 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-86021-3 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1 - configure_strategy - file_owner_efi_user_cfg - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg stat: path: /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg register: file_exists when: - '"/boot/efi" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list' - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86021-3 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1 - configure_strategy - file_owner_efi_user_cfg - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner 0 on /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg file: path: /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg owner: '0' when: - '"/boot/efi" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list' - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86021-3 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1 - configure_strategy - file_owner_efi_user_cfg - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ -d /sys/firmware/efi ] && rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then chown 0 /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify the UEFI Boot Loader grub.cfg Permissions File permissions for /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg should be set to 700. To properly set the permissions of /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg, run the command: $ sudo chmod 700 /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 3.4.5 CCI-000225 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 1.3.2 Proper permissions ensure that only the root user can modify important boot parameters. CCE-85912-4 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-85912-4 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - file_permissions_efi_grub2_cfg - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg stat: path: /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg register: file_exists when: - '"/boot/efi" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list' - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-85912-4 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - file_permissions_efi_grub2_cfg - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure permission u-s,g-xwrs,o-xwrt on /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg file: path: /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg mode: u-s,g-xwrs,o-xwrt when: - '"/boot/efi" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list' - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-85912-4 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - file_permissions_efi_grub2_cfg - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ -d /sys/firmware/efi ] && rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then chmod u-s,g-xwrs,o-xwrt /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg Permissions File permissions for /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg should be set to 600. To properly set the permissions of /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg, run the command: $ sudo chmod 600 /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 3.4.5 CCI-000225 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 1.3.2 Proper permissions ensure that only the root user can read or modify important boot parameters. CCE-86028-8 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-86028-8 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - file_permissions_efi_user_cfg - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg stat: path: /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg register: file_exists when: - '"/boot/efi" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list' - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86028-8 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - file_permissions_efi_user_cfg - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure permission u-s,g-xwrs,o-xwrt on /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg file: path: /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg mode: u-s,g-xwrs,o-xwrt when: - '"/boot/efi" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list' - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86028-8 - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - file_permissions_efi_user_cfg - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ -d /sys/firmware/efi ] && rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then chmod u-s,g-xwrs,o-xwrt /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Set the UEFI Boot Loader Admin Username to a Non-Default Value The grub2 boot loader should have a superuser account and password protection enabled to protect boot-time settings. To maximize the protection, select a password-protected superuser account with unique name, and modify the /etc/grub.d/01_users configuration file to reflect the account name change. It is highly suggested not to use common administrator account names like root, admin, or administrator for the grub2 superuser account. Change the superuser to a different username (The default is 'root'). $ sed -i 's/\(set superusers=\).*/\1"<unique user ID>"/g' /etc/grub.d/01_users Once the superuser account has been added, update the grub.cfg file by running: grubby --update-kernel=ALL --env=/boot/grub2/grubenv To prevent hard-coded admin usernames, automatic remediation of this control is not available. Remediation must be automated as a component of machine provisioning, or followed manually as outlined above. Also, do NOT manually add the superuser account and password to the grub.cfg file as the grub2-mkconfig command overwrites this file. BP28(R17) 11 12 14 15 16 18 3 5 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.03 DSS06.06 3.4.5 CCI-000213 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) 164.308(a)(7)(i) 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) 164.310(a)(1) 164.310(a)(2)(i) 164.310(a)(2)(ii) 164.310(a)(2)(iii) 164.310(b) 164.310(c) 164.310(d)(1) 164.310(d)(2)(iii) 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) PR.AC-4 PR.AC-6 PR.PT-3 FIA_UAU.1 SRG-OS-000080-GPOS-00048 RHEL-08-010141 SV-244521r792982_rule Having a non-default grub superuser username makes password-guessing attacks less effective. CCE-83542-1 Set the UEFI Boot Loader Password The grub2 boot loader should have a superuser account and password protection enabled to protect boot-time settings. Since plaintext passwords are a security risk, generate a hash for the password by running the following command: # grub2-setpassword When prompted, enter the password that was selected. To prevent hard-coded passwords, automatic remediation of this control is not available. Remediation must be automated as a component of machine provisioning, or followed manually as outlined above. Also, do NOT manually add the superuser account and password to the grub.cfg file as the grub2-mkconfig command overwrites this file. BP28(R17) 11 12 14 15 16 18 3 5 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.03 DSS06.06 3.4.5 CCI-000213 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) 164.308(a)(7)(i) 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) 164.310(a)(1) 164.310(a)(2)(i) 164.310(a)(2)(ii) 164.310(a)(2)(iii) 164.310(b) 164.310(c) 164.310(d)(1) 164.310(d)(2)(iii) 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) PR.AC-4 PR.AC-6 PR.PT-3 FIA_UAU.1 SRG-OS-000080-GPOS-00048 RHEL-08-010140 1.3.1 SV-230234r743922_rule Password protection on the boot loader configuration ensures users with physical access cannot trivially alter important bootloader settings. These include which kernel to use, and whether to enter single-user mode. CCE-80829-5 UEFI Boot Loader Is Not Installed On Removeable Media The system must not allow removable media to be used as the boot loader. Remove alternate methods of booting the system from removable media. usb0, cd, fd0, etc. are some examples of removeable media which should not exist in the lines: set root='hd0,msdos1' CCI-001813 CCI-001814 SRG-OS-000364-GPOS-00151 Malicious users with removable boot media can gain access to a system configured to use removable media as the boot loader. zIPL bootloader configuration During the boot process, the bootloader is responsible for starting the execution of the kernel and passing options to it. The default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 boot loader for s390x systems is called zIPL. Enable Auditing to Start Prior to the Audit Daemon in zIPL To ensure all processes can be audited, even those which start prior to the audit daemon, check that all boot entries in /boot/loader/entries/*.conf have audit=1 included in its options. To ensure that new kernels and boot entries continue to enable audit, add audit=1 to /etc/kernel/cmdline. FAU_GEN.1 Each process on the system carries an "auditable" flag which indicates whether its activities can be audited. Although auditd takes care of enabling this for all processes which launch after it does, adding the kernel argument ensures it is set for every process during boot. CCE-83321-0 - name: Ensure BLS boot entries options contain audit=1 block: - name: 'Check how many boot entries exist ' find: paths: /boot/loader/entries/ patterns: '*.conf' register: n_entries - name: Check how many boot entries set audit=1 find: paths: /boot/loader/entries/ contains: ^options .*audit=1.*$ patterns: '*.conf' register: n_entries_options - name: Update boot entries options command: grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="audit=1" when: n_entries is defined and n_entries_options is defined and n_entries.matched != n_entries_options.matched - name: Check if /etc/kernel/cmdline exists stat: path: /etc/kernel/cmdline register: cmdline_stat - name: Check if /etc/kernel/cmdline contains audit=1 find: paths: /etc/kernel/ patterns: cmdline contains: ^.*audit=1.*$ register: cmdline_find - name: Add /etc/kernel/cmdline contains audit=1 lineinfile: create: true path: /etc/kernel/cmdline line: audit=1 when: cmdline_stat is defined and not cmdline_stat.stat.exists - name: Append /etc/kernel/cmdline contains audit=1 lineinfile: path: /etc/kernel/cmdline backrefs: true regexp: ^(.*)$ line: \1 audit=1 when: cmdline_stat is defined and cmdline_stat.stat.exists and cmdline_find is defined and cmdline_find.matched == 0 when: - ansible_architecture == "s390x" - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83321-0 - configure_strategy - low_disruption - medium_complexity - medium_severity - reboot_required - zipl_audit_argument # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if grep -q s390x /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then # Correct BLS option using grubby, which is a thin wrapper around BLS operations grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="audit=1" # Ensure new kernels and boot entries retain the boot option if [ ! -f /etc/kernel/cmdline ]; then echo "audit=1" > /etc/kernel/cmdline elif ! grep -q '^(.*\s)?audit=1(\s.*)?$' /etc/kernel/cmdline; then sed -Ei 's/^(.*)$/\1 audit=1/' /etc/kernel/cmdline fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Extend Audit Backlog Limit for the Audit Daemon in zIPL To improve the kernel capacity to queue all log events, even those which start prior to the audit daemon, check that all boot entries in /boot/loader/entries/*.conf have audit_backlog_limit=8192 included in its options. To ensure that new kernels and boot entries continue to extend the audit log events queue, add audit_backlog_limit=8192 to /etc/kernel/cmdline. FAU_STG.1 FAU_STG.3 audit_backlog_limit sets the queue length for audit events awaiting transfer to the audit daemon. Until the audit daemon is up and running, all log messages are stored in this queue. If the queue is overrun during boot process, the action defined by audit failure flag is taken. CCE-83341-8 - name: Ensure BLS boot entries options contain audit_backlog_limit=8192 block: - name: 'Check how many boot entries exist ' find: paths: /boot/loader/entries/ patterns: '*.conf' register: n_entries - name: Check how many boot entries set audit_backlog_limit=8192 find: paths: /boot/loader/entries/ contains: ^options .*audit_backlog_limit=8192.*$ patterns: '*.conf' register: n_entries_options - name: Update boot entries options command: grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="audit_backlog_limit=8192" when: n_entries is defined and n_entries_options is defined and n_entries.matched != n_entries_options.matched - name: Check if /etc/kernel/cmdline exists stat: path: /etc/kernel/cmdline register: cmdline_stat - name: Check if /etc/kernel/cmdline contains audit_backlog_limit=8192 find: paths: /etc/kernel/ patterns: cmdline contains: ^.*audit_backlog_limit=8192.*$ register: cmdline_find - name: Add /etc/kernel/cmdline contains audit_backlog_limit=8192 lineinfile: create: true path: /etc/kernel/cmdline line: audit_backlog_limit=8192 when: cmdline_stat is defined and not cmdline_stat.stat.exists - name: Append /etc/kernel/cmdline contains audit_backlog_limit=8192 lineinfile: path: /etc/kernel/cmdline backrefs: true regexp: ^(.*)$ line: \1 audit_backlog_limit=8192 when: cmdline_stat is defined and cmdline_stat.stat.exists and cmdline_find is defined and cmdline_find.matched == 0 when: - ansible_architecture == "s390x" - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83341-8 - configure_strategy - low_disruption - medium_complexity - medium_severity - reboot_required - zipl_audit_backlog_limit_argument # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if grep -q s390x /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then # Correct BLS option using grubby, which is a thin wrapper around BLS operations grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="audit_backlog_limit=8192" # Ensure new kernels and boot entries retain the boot option if [ ! -f /etc/kernel/cmdline ]; then echo "audit_backlog_limit=8192" > /etc/kernel/cmdline elif ! grep -q '^(.*\s)?audit_backlog_limit=8192(\s.*)?$' /etc/kernel/cmdline; then sed -Ei 's/^(.*)$/\1 audit_backlog_limit=8192/' /etc/kernel/cmdline fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure all zIPL boot entries are BLS compliant Ensure that zIPL boot entries fully adheres to Boot Loader Specification (BLS) by checking that /etc/zipl.conf doesn't contain image = . To prevent breakage or removal of all boot entries oconfigured in /etc/zipl.conf automated remediation for this rule is not available. Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 adheres to Boot Loader Specification (BLS) and is the prefered method of configuration. CCE-83485-3 Ensure zIPL bootmap is up to date Make sure that /boot/bootmap is up to date. Every time a boot entry or zIPL configuration is changed /boot/bootmap needs to be updated to reflect the changes. Run zipl command to generate an updated /boot/bootmap. The file /boot/bootmap contains all boot data, keeping it up to date is crucial to boot correct kernel and options. CCE-83486-1 - name: Ensure zIPL bootmap is up to date block: - name: Obtain stats of /boot/bootmap stat: path: /boot/bootmap register: boot_bootmap - name: Obtain stats of /etc/zipl.conf stat: path: /etc/zipl.conf register: zipl_conf - name: Update zIPL bootmap command: /usr/sbin/zipl changed_when: true when: boot_bootmap.stat.mtime is defined and zipl_conf.stat.mtime is defined and boot_bootmap.stat.mtime < zipl_conf.stat.mtime when: - ansible_architecture == "s390x" - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83486-1 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - zipl_bootmap_is_up_to_date # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if grep -q s390x /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then /usr/sbin/zipl else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure SELinux Not Disabled in zIPL To ensure SELinux is not disabled at boot time, check that no boot entry in /boot/loader/entries/*.conf has selinux=0 included in its options. Disabling a major host protection feature, such as SELinux, at boot time prevents it from confining system services at boot time. Further, it increases the chances that it will remain off during system operation. Enable page allocator poisoning in zIPL To enable poisoning of free pages, check that all boot entries in /boot/loader/entries/*.conf have page_poison=1 included in its options. To ensure that new kernels and boot entries continue to enable page poisoning, add page_poison=1 to /etc/kernel/cmdline. Poisoning writes an arbitrary value to freed pages, so any modification or reference to that page after being freed or before being initialized will be detected and prevented. This prevents many types of use-after-free vulnerabilities at little performance cost. Also prevents leak of data and detection of corrupted memory. CCE-83351-7 - name: Ensure BLS boot entries options contain page_poison=1 block: - name: 'Check how many boot entries exist ' find: paths: /boot/loader/entries/ patterns: '*.conf' register: n_entries - name: Check how many boot entries set page_poison=1 find: paths: /boot/loader/entries/ contains: ^options .*page_poison=1.*$ patterns: '*.conf' register: n_entries_options - name: Update boot entries options command: grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="page_poison=1" when: n_entries is defined and n_entries_options is defined and n_entries.matched != n_entries_options.matched - name: Check if /etc/kernel/cmdline exists stat: path: /etc/kernel/cmdline register: cmdline_stat - name: Check if /etc/kernel/cmdline contains page_poison=1 find: paths: /etc/kernel/ patterns: cmdline contains: ^.*page_poison=1.*$ register: cmdline_find - name: Add /etc/kernel/cmdline contains page_poison=1 lineinfile: create: true path: /etc/kernel/cmdline line: page_poison=1 when: cmdline_stat is defined and not cmdline_stat.stat.exists - name: Append /etc/kernel/cmdline contains page_poison=1 lineinfile: path: /etc/kernel/cmdline backrefs: true regexp: ^(.*)$ line: \1 page_poison=1 when: cmdline_stat is defined and cmdline_stat.stat.exists and cmdline_find is defined and cmdline_find.matched == 0 when: - ansible_architecture == "s390x" - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83351-7 - configure_strategy - low_disruption - medium_complexity - medium_severity - reboot_required - zipl_page_poison_argument # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if grep -q s390x /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then # Correct BLS option using grubby, which is a thin wrapper around BLS operations grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="page_poison=1" # Ensure new kernels and boot entries retain the boot option if [ ! -f /etc/kernel/cmdline ]; then echo "page_poison=1" > /etc/kernel/cmdline elif ! grep -q '^(.*\s)?page_poison=1(\s.*)?$' /etc/kernel/cmdline; then sed -Ei 's/^(.*)$/\1 page_poison=1/' /etc/kernel/cmdline fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable SLUB/SLAB allocator poisoning in zIPL To enable poisoning of SLUB/SLAB objects, check that all boot entries in /boot/loader/entries/*.conf have slub_debug=P included in its options. To ensure that new kernels and boot entries continue to enable poisoning of SLUB/SLAB objects, add slub_debug=P to /etc/kernel/cmdline. Poisoning writes an arbitrary value to freed objects, so any modification or reference to that object after being freed or before being initialized will be detected and prevented. This prevents many types of use-after-free vulnerabilities at little performance cost. Also prevents leak of data and detection of corrupted memory. CCE-83371-5 - name: Ensure BLS boot entries options contain slub_debug=P block: - name: 'Check how many boot entries exist ' find: paths: /boot/loader/entries/ patterns: '*.conf' register: n_entries - name: Check how many boot entries set slub_debug=P find: paths: /boot/loader/entries/ contains: ^options .*slub_debug=P.*$ patterns: '*.conf' register: n_entries_options - name: Update boot entries options command: grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="slub_debug=P" when: n_entries is defined and n_entries_options is defined and n_entries.matched != n_entries_options.matched - name: Check if /etc/kernel/cmdline exists stat: path: /etc/kernel/cmdline register: cmdline_stat - name: Check if /etc/kernel/cmdline contains slub_debug=P find: paths: /etc/kernel/ patterns: cmdline contains: ^.*slub_debug=P.*$ register: cmdline_find - name: Add /etc/kernel/cmdline contains slub_debug=P lineinfile: create: true path: /etc/kernel/cmdline line: slub_debug=P when: cmdline_stat is defined and not cmdline_stat.stat.exists - name: Append /etc/kernel/cmdline contains slub_debug=P lineinfile: path: /etc/kernel/cmdline backrefs: true regexp: ^(.*)$ line: \1 slub_debug=P when: cmdline_stat is defined and cmdline_stat.stat.exists and cmdline_find is defined and cmdline_find.matched == 0 when: - ansible_architecture == "s390x" - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83371-5 - configure_strategy - low_disruption - medium_complexity - medium_severity - reboot_required - zipl_slub_debug_argument # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if grep -q s390x /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then # Correct BLS option using grubby, which is a thin wrapper around BLS operations grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="slub_debug=P" # Ensure new kernels and boot entries retain the boot option if [ ! -f /etc/kernel/cmdline ]; then echo "slub_debug=P" > /etc/kernel/cmdline elif ! grep -q '^(.*\s)?slub_debug=P(\s.*)?$' /etc/kernel/cmdline; then sed -Ei 's/^(.*)$/\1 slub_debug=P/' /etc/kernel/cmdline fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure debug-shell service is not enabled in zIPL systemd's debug-shell service is intended to diagnose systemd related boot issues with various systemctl commands. Once enabled and following a system reboot, the root shell will be available on tty9 which is access by pressing CTRL-ALT-F9. The debug-shell service should only be used for systemd related issues and should otherwise be disabled. By default, the debug-shell systemd service is already disabled. Ensure the debug-shell is not enabled by the systemd.debug-shel=1 boot paramenter option. Check that not boot entries in /boot/loader/entries/*.conf have systemd.debug-shell=1 included in its options. To ensure that new kernels and boot entries don't enable the debug-shell, check that systemd.debug-shell=1 is not present in /etc/kernel/cmdline. FIA_UAU.1 This prevents attackers with physical access from trivially bypassing security on the machine through valid troubleshooting configurations and gaining root access when the system is rebooted. - name: Ensure BLS boot entries options contain systemd.debug-shell block: - name: Check how many boot entries set systemd.debug-shell find: paths: /boot/loader/entries/ contains: ^options .*systemd\.debug-shell.*$ patterns: '*.conf' register: n_entries - name: Remove systemd.debug-shell from boot entries command: grubby --update-kernel=ALL --remove-args="systemd.debug-shell" when: n_entries is defined and n_entries.matched >= 1 - name: Check if /etc/kernel/cmdline exists stat: path: /etc/kernel/cmdline register: cmdline_stat - name: Check if /etc/kernel/cmdline contains systemd.debug-shell find: paths: /etc/kernel/ patterns: cmdline contains: ^.*systemd\.debug-shell.*$ register: cmdline_find - name: Remove systemd.debug-shell from /etc/kernel/cmdline lineinfile: path: /etc/kernel/cmdline backrefs: true regexp: ^(.*)\s*systemd.debug-shell\b\S*(.*)$ line: \1\2 when: cmdline_stat is defined and cmdline_stat.stat.exists and cmdline_find is defined and cmdline_find.matched >= 1 when: - ansible_architecture == "s390x" - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - configure_strategy - low_disruption - medium_complexity - medium_severity - reboot_required - zipl_systemd_debug-shell_argument_absent # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if grep -q s390x /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then # Correct BLS option using grubby, which is a thin wrapper around BLS operations grubby --update-kernel=ALL --remove-args="systemd.debug-shell" # Ensure new kernels and boot entries retain the boot option if grep -q '\bsystemd.debug-shell\b' /etc/kernel/cmdline; then sed -Ei 's/^(.*)\s*systemd.debug-shell\b\S*(.*)/\1\2/' /etc/kernel/cmdline fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable vsyscalls in zIPL To disable use of virtual syscalls, check that all boot entries in /boot/loader/entries/*.conf have vsyscall=none included in its options. To ensure that new kernels and boot entries continue to disable virtual syscalls, add vsyscall=none to /etc/kernel/cmdline. FPT_ASLR_EXT.1 Virtual Syscalls provide an opportunity of attack for a user who has control of the return instruction pointer. CCE-83381-4 - name: Ensure BLS boot entries options contain vsyscall=none block: - name: 'Check how many boot entries exist ' find: paths: /boot/loader/entries/ patterns: '*.conf' register: n_entries - name: Check how many boot entries set vsyscall=none find: paths: /boot/loader/entries/ contains: ^options .*vsyscall=none.*$ patterns: '*.conf' register: n_entries_options - name: Update boot entries options command: grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="vsyscall=none" when: n_entries is defined and n_entries_options is defined and n_entries.matched != n_entries_options.matched - name: Check if /etc/kernel/cmdline exists stat: path: /etc/kernel/cmdline register: cmdline_stat - name: Check if /etc/kernel/cmdline contains vsyscall=none find: paths: /etc/kernel/ patterns: cmdline contains: ^.*vsyscall=none.*$ register: cmdline_find - name: Add /etc/kernel/cmdline contains vsyscall=none lineinfile: create: true path: /etc/kernel/cmdline line: vsyscall=none when: cmdline_stat is defined and not cmdline_stat.stat.exists - name: Append /etc/kernel/cmdline contains vsyscall=none lineinfile: path: /etc/kernel/cmdline backrefs: true regexp: ^(.*)$ line: \1 vsyscall=none when: cmdline_stat is defined and cmdline_stat.stat.exists and cmdline_find is defined and cmdline_find.matched == 0 when: - ansible_architecture == "s390x" - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83381-4 - configure_strategy - low_disruption - medium_complexity - medium_severity - reboot_required - zipl_vsyscall_argument # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if grep -q s390x /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then # Correct BLS option using grubby, which is a thin wrapper around BLS operations grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="vsyscall=none" # Ensure new kernels and boot entries retain the boot option if [ ! -f /etc/kernel/cmdline ]; then echo "vsyscall=none" > /etc/kernel/cmdline elif ! grep -q '^(.*\s)?vsyscall=none(\s.*)?$' /etc/kernel/cmdline; then sed -Ei 's/^(.*)$/\1 vsyscall=none/' /etc/kernel/cmdline fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Protect Random-Number Entropy Pool The I/O operations of the Linux kernel block layer due to their inherently unpredictable execution times have been traditionally considered as a reliable source to contribute to random-number entropy pool of the Linux kernel. This has changed with introduction of solid-state storage devices (SSDs) though. Ensure Solid State Drives Do Not Contribute To Random-Number Entropy Pool For each solid-state drive on the system, run: # echo 0 > /sys/block/DRIVE/queue/add_random In contrast to traditional electromechanical magnetic disks, containing spinning disks and / or movable read / write heads, the solid-state storage devices (SSDs) do not contain moving / mechanical components. Therefore the I/O operation completion times are much more predictable for them. Kernel Configuration Contains rules that check the kernel configuration that was used to build it. Hash function for kernel module signing The hash function to use when signing modules during kernel build process. sha512 sha1 sha224 sha256 sha384 sha512 Key and certificate for kernel module signing The private key and certificate to use when signing modules during kernel build process. On systems where the OpenSSL ENGINE_pkcs11 is functional — a PKCS#11 URI as defined by RFC7512 In the latter case, the PKCS#11 URI should reference both a certificate and a private key. certs/signing_key.pem certs/signing_key.pem Kernel panic timeout The time, in seconds, to wait until a reboot occurs. If the value is 0 the system never reboots. If the value is less than 0 the system reboots immediately. 0 0 300 60 -1 Do not allow ACPI methods to be inserted/replaced at run time This debug facility allows ACPI AML methods to be inserted and/or replaced without rebooting the system. This configuration is available from kernel 3.0. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_ACPI_CUSTOM_METHOD, run the following command: grep CONFIG_ACPI_CUSTOM_METHOD /boot/config-* Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no lines should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R15) Enabling this feature allows arbitrary kernel memory to be written to by root (uid=0) users, allowing them to bypass certain security measures CCE-86778-8 Emulate Privileged Access Never (PAN) Enabling this option prevents the kernel from accessing user-space memory directly by pointing TTBR0_EL1 to a reserved zeroed area and reserved ASID. The user access routines restore the valid TTBR0_EL1 temporarily. This configuration is available from kernel 4.10, but may be available if backported by distros. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN, run the following command: grep CONFIG_ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R27) The Privileged Access Never (PAN) is the ARM equivalent of the x86 Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP), and it prevents privileged acccess to user data unless explicitly enabled. CCE-89059-0 Disable kernel support for MISC binaries Enabling CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC makes it possible to plug wrapper-driven binary formats into the kernel. This is specially useful for programs that need an interpreter to run like Java, Python and DOS emulators. Once you have registered such a binary class with the kernel, you can start one of those programs simply by typing in its name at a shell prompt. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC, run the following command: grep CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC /boot/config-* Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no lines should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R23) This disables arbitrary binary format support and helps reduce attack surface. CCE-87766-2 Enable support for BUG() Disabling this option eliminates support for BUG and WARN, reducing the size of your kernel image and potentially quietly ignoring numerous fatal conditions. You should only consider disabling this option for embedded systems with no facilities for reporting errors. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_BUG, run the following command: grep CONFIG_BUG /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R19) Not setting this variable may hide a number of critical errors. CCE-86095-7 Trigger a kernel BUG when data corruption is detected This option makes the kernel BUG when it encounters data corruption in kernel memory structures when they get checked for validity. This configuration is available from kernel 4.10. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION, run the following command: grep CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R16) This helps detect data corruptions early and stop with a BUG() error message. CCE-87304-2 Disable compatibility with brk() Enabling compatiliby with brk() allows legacy binaries to run (i.e. those linked against libc5). But this compatibility comes at the cost of not being able to randomize the heap placement (ASLR). Unless legacy binaries need to run on the system, set CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK to "n". The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK, run the following command: grep CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK /boot/config-* Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no lines should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R17) Enabling compatibility with brk() disables support for ASLR. CCE-88962-6 Disable the 32-bit vDSO Certain buggy versions of glibc (2.3.3) will crash if they are presented with a 32-bit vDSO that is not mapped at the address indicated in its segment table. Setting CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO to y turns off the 32-bit VDSO and works aroud the glibc bug. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO, run the following command: grep CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO /boot/config-* Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no lines should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R15) Enabling VDSO compatibility hurts performance and disables ASLR. CCE-87256-4 Enable checks on credential management Enable this to turn on some debug checking for credential management. The additional code keeps track of the number of pointers from task_structs to any given cred struct, and checks to see that this number never exceeds the usage count of the cred struct. Furthermore, if SELinux is enabled, this also checks that the security pointer in the cred struct is never seen to be invalid. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS, run the following command: grep CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R16) This adds sanity checks and validations to credential data structures. CCE-86656-6 Disable kernel debugfs debugfs is a virtual file system that kernel developers use to put debugging files into. Enable this option to be able to read and write to these files. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_DEBUG_FS, run the following command: grep CONFIG_DEBUG_FS /boot/config-* Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no lines should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R15) To reduce the attack surface, this file system should be disabled if not in use. CCE-88033-6 Enable checks on linked list manipulation Enable this to turn on extended checks in the linked-list walking routines. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST, run the following command: grep CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R16) This add sanity checks to manipulation of linked lists structures in the kernel and may prevent exploits such as CVE-2017-1661, where a race condition and simultaneos operations caused a list to corrupt. CCE-86986-7 Enable checks on notifier call chains Enable this to turn on sanity checking for notifier call chains. This is most useful for kernel developers to make sure that modules properly unregister themselves from notifier chains. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_DEBUG_NOTIFIERS, run the following command: grep CONFIG_DEBUG_NOTIFIERS /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R16) This provides validation of notifier chains, it checks whether the notifiers are from the kernel or a module that is still loaded prior to being invoked. CCE-86814-1 Enable checks on scatter-gather (SG) table operations Scatter-gather tables are mechanism used for high performance I/O on DMA devices. Enable this to turn on checks on scatter-gather tables. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_DEBUG_SG, run the following command: grep CONFIG_DEBUG_SG /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R16) This can help find problems with drivers that do not properly initialize their SG tables. CCE-87148-3 Warn on W+X mappings found at boot Generate a warning if any W+X mappings are found at boot. This configuration is available from kernel 5.8. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_DEBUG_WX, run the following command: grep CONFIG_DEBUG_WX /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R15) This is useful for discovering cases where the kernel is leaving W+X mappings after applying NX, as such mappings are a security risk. Note that even if the check fails, your kernel is possibly still fine, as W+X mappings are not a security hole in themselves, what they do is that they make the exploitation of other unfixed kernel bugs easier. CCE-87032-9 Configure low address space to protect from user allocation This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected from userspace allocation. This configuration is available from kernel 3.14, but may be available if backported by distros. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR, run the following command: grep CONFIG_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "65536" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R25) Keeping a user from writing to low pages can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs. CCE-88160-7 Disable /dev/kmem virtual device support Disable support for the /dev/kmem device. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_DEVKMEM, run the following command: grep CONFIG_DEVKMEM /boot/config-* Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no lines should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R15) The /dev/kmem device is rarely used, but can be used for certain kind of kernel debugging operations. CCE-86947-9 Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes. This configuration is available from kernel 4.13, but may be available if backported by distros. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE, run the following command: grep CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R15) This features helps reduce likelihood of memory corruption of kernel structures. CCE-86545-1 Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple separately allocated pages, are not on the process stack, or are part of the kernel text. This configuration is available from kernel 4.8, and may be available if backported by distros. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY, run the following command: grep CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R15) This config prevents entire classes of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures. CCE-88299-3 Do not allow usercopy whitelist violations to fallback to object size This is a temporary option that allows missing usercopy whitelists to be discovered via a WARN() to the kernel log, instead of rejecting the copy, falling back to non-whitelisted hardened usercopy that checks the slab allocation size instead of the whitelist size. This configuration is available from kernel 4.16. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK, run the following command: grep CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK /boot/config-* Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no lines should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R15) This config prevents entire classes of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures. CCE-86091-6 Disable hibernation Enable the suspend to disk (STD) functionality, which is usually called "hibernation" in user interfaces. STD checkpoints the system and powers it off; and restores that checkpoint on reboot. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_HIBERNATION, run the following command: grep CONFIG_HIBERNATION /boot/config-* Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no lines should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R23) Suspending to disk allows one to replace the running kernel. CCE-87608-6 Disable IA32 emulation Disables support for legacy 32-bit programs under a 64-bit kernel. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION, run the following command: grep CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION /boot/config-* Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no lines should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. Only disable support for 32-bit programs if you are sure you don't need any 32-bit program. BP28(R25) Disabling 32-bit backwards compatibility helps reduce the attack surface. CCE-88746-3 Disable the IPv6 protocol Disable support for IP version 6 (IPv6). The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_IPV6, run the following command: grep CONFIG_IPV6 /boot/config-* Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no lines should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R22) Any unnecessary network stacks, including IPv6, should be disabled to reduce the vulnerability to exploitation. CCE-87225-9 Disable kexec system call kexec is a system call that implements the ability to shutdown your current kernel, and to start another kernel. It is like a reboot but it is independent of the system firmware. And like a reboot you can start any kernel with it, not just Linux. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_KEXEC, run the following command: grep CONFIG_KEXEC /boot/config-* Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no lines should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R23) Prohibits the execution of a new kernel image after reboot. CCE-87488-3 Disable legacy (BSD) PTY support Disable the Linux traditional BSD-like terminal names /dev/ptyxx for masters and /dev/ttyxx for slaves of pseudo terminals, and use only the modern ptys (devpts) interface. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_LEGACY_PTYS, run the following command: grep CONFIG_LEGACY_PTYS /boot/config-* Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no lines should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R23) The legacy scheme has a number of security problems. CCE-87925-4 Disable vsyscall emulation The kernel traps and emulates calls into the fixed vsyscall address mapping. This configuration is available from kernel 5.3, but may be available if backported by distros. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_EMULATE, run the following command: grep CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_EMULATE /boot/config-* Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no lines should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R15) The mapping is non-executable, but it still contains known contents, which could be used in certain rare security vulnerability exploits. CCE-87649-0 Disable vsyscall mapping This config disables the vsyscall mapping at all. Attempts to use the vsyscalls will be reported to dmesg, so that either old or malicious userspace programs can be identified. This configuration is available from kernel 4.4. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE, run the following command: grep CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R15) This will eliminate any risk of ASLR bypass due to the vsyscall fixed address mapping. CCE-87573-2 Disable the LDT (local descriptor table) Linux can allow user programs to install a per-process x86 Local Descriptor Table (LDT) using the modify_ldt(2) system call. This is required to run 16-bit or segmented code such as DOSEMU or some Wine programs. It is also used by some very old threading libraries. This configuration is available from kernel 4.3, but may be available if backported by distros. Disable LDT if 16-bit program emulation is not necessary. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL, run the following command: grep CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL /boot/config-* Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no lines should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R25) Disabling support for unnecessary code reduces attack surface. CCE-88827-1 Enable module signature verification Check modules for valid signatures upon load. Note that this option adds the OpenSSL development packages as a kernel build dependency so that the signing tool can use its crypto library. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_MODULE_SIG, run the following command: grep CONFIG_MODULE_SIG /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R18) Loaded modules must be signed. CCE-89378-4 Enable automatic signing of all modules Sign all modules during make modules_install. Without this option, modules must be signed manually, using the scripts/sign-file tool. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_ALL, run the following command: grep CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_ALL /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R18) This ensures the modules are signed during install process. CCE-89615-9 Require modules to be validly signed Reject unsigned modules or signed modules with an unknown key. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE, run the following command: grep CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R18) Prevent loading modules that are unsigned or signed with an unknown key. CCE-89459-2 Specify the hash to use when signing modules This configures the kernel to build and sign modules using as the hash function. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH, run the following command: grep CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R18) Use of strong hash function is important to secure the module against counterfeit signatures. CCE-89843-7 Specify module signing key to use Setting this option to something other than its default of certs/signing_key.pem will disable the autogeneration of signing keys and allow the kernel modules to be signed with a key of your choosing. The string provided should identify a file containing both a private key and its corresponding X.509 certificate in PEM form, or — on systems where the OpenSSL ENGINE_pkcs11 is functional — a PKCS#11 URI as defined by RFC7512. In the latter case, the PKCS#11 URI should reference both a certificate and a private key. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY, run the following command: grep CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R18) A key and certificate is required to sign the built modules. CCE-90000-1 Sign kernel modules with SHA-512 This configures the kernel to build and sign modules using SHA512 as the hash function. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA512, run the following command: grep CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA512 /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R18) Use of strong hash function is important to secure the module against counterfeit signatures. CCE-89692-8 Enable poison of pages after freeing Fill the pages with poison patterns after free_pages() and verify the patterns before alloc_pages. This does have a potential performance impact if enabled with the "page_poison=1" kernel boot option. This configuration is available from kernel 4.6. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING, run the following command: grep CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R17) The filling of the memory helps reduce the risk of information leaks from freed data. CCE-88426-2 Enable poison without sanity check Skip the sanity checking on alloc, only fill the pages with poison on free. This reduces some of the overhead of the poisoning feature. This configuration is available from kernel 4.6. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_NO_SANITY, run the following command: grep CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_NO_SANITY /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R17) This configuration helps alleviates the performance impact of poisonining. CCE-88574-9 Use zero for poisoning instead of debugging value Instead of using the existing poison value, fill the pages with zeros. This makes it harder to detect when errors are occurring due to sanitization but the zeroing at free means that it is no longer necessary to write zeros when GFP_ZERO is used on allocation. This configuration is available from kernel 4.19. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO, run the following command: grep CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R17) This configuration helps alleviates the performance impact of poisonining. CCE-88808-1 Remove the kernel mapping in user mode This feature reduces the number of hardware side channels by ensuring that the majority of kernel addresses are not mapped into userspace. This configuration is available from kernel 4.15, but may be available if backported by distros. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION, run the following command: grep CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R25) This is a countermeasure to the Meltdown attack. CCE-88591-3 Kernel panic oops Enable the kernel to panic when it oopses. This has the same effect as setting oops=panic on the kernel command line. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_PANIC_ON_OOPS, run the following command: grep CONFIG_PANIC_ON_OOPS /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R19) This feature ensures that the kernel does not do anything erroneous after an oops which could result in data corruption or other issues. CCE-86176-5 Kernel panic timeout Set the timeout value (in seconds) until a reboot occurs when the kernel panics. A timeout of 0 configures the system to wait forever. With a timeout value greater than 0, the system will wait the specified amount of seconds before rebooting. While a timeout value less than 0 makes the system reboot immediately. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_PANIC_TIMEOUT, run the following command: grep CONFIG_PANIC_TIMEOUT /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R19) This is required to enable protection against Spectre v2. CCE-86349-8 Disable support for /proc/kkcore Provides a virtual ELF core file of the live kernel. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_PROC_KCORE, run the following command: grep CONFIG_PROC_KCORE /boot/config-* Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no lines should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R15) This feature exposes the memory to the userspace and can assist an attacker in discovering attack vectors. CCE-87105-3 Randomize the address of the kernel image (KASLR) In support of Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization (KASLR), this randomizes the physical address at which the kernel image is decompressed and the virtual address where the kernel image is mapped. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE, run the following command: grep CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R25) BP28(R27) An unpredictable kernel address makes it more difficult to succeed with exploits that rely on knowledge of the location of kernel code internals. CCE-88318-1 Randomize the kernel memory sections Randomizes the base virtual address of kernel memory sections (physical memory mapping, vmalloc & vmemmap). This configuration is available from kernel 4.8, but may be available if backported by distros. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY, run the following command: grep CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R25) This security feature makes exploits relying on predictable memory locations less reliable. CCE-88440-3 Perform full reference count validation Enabling this switches the refcounting infrastructure from a fast unchecked atomic_t implementation to a fully state checked implementation, which can have a slight impact in performance. This configuration is available from kernel 4.13, but may be available if backported by distros. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL, run the following command: grep CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R15) Refcounting provides protections against various use-after-free conditions that can be used in security flaw exploits. CCE-86422-3 Avoid speculative indirect branches in kernel Compile kernel with the retpoline compiler options to guard against kernel-to-user data leaks by avoiding speculative indirect branches. Requires a compiler with -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern support for full protection. The kernel may run slower. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_RETPOLINE, run the following command: grep CONFIG_RETPOLINE /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R15) This is required to enable protection against Spectre v2. CCE-87494-1 Detect stack corruption on calls to schedule() This option checks for a stack overrun on calls to schedule(). If the stack end location is found to be overwritten always panic as the content of the corrupted region can no longer be trusted. This configuration is available from kernel 3.18. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK, run the following command: grep CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R15) This ensures no erroneous behaviour occurs which could result in data corruption or a sporadic crash at a later stage once the region is examined. CCE-88041-9 Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in their own address space using seccomp. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_SECCOMP, run the following command: grep CONFIG_SECCOMP /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R20) seccomp enables the ability to filter system calls made by an application, effectively isolating the system's resources from it. CCE-86450-4 Enable use of Berkeley Packet Filter with seccomp Enable tasks to build secure computing environments defined in terms of Berkeley Packet Filter programs which implement task-defined system call filtering polices. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER, run the following command: grep CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R20) Use of BPF filters allows for expressive filtering of system calls using a filter program language with a long history of being exposed to userland. CCE-86490-0 Enable different security models This allows you to choose different security modules to be configured into your kernel. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_SECURITY, run the following command: grep CONFIG_SECURITY /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R20) This is enables kernel security primitives required by the LSM framework. CCE-86572-5 Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog Enforce restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel syslog via dmesg(8). The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT, run the following command: grep CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R15) Prevents unprivileged users from retrieving kernel addresses with dmesg. CCE-87339-8 Disable mutable hooks Ensure kernel structures associated with LSMs are always mapped as read-only after system boot. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS, run the following command: grep CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS /boot/config-* Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no lines should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R20) If CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS is enabled, then hooks can be loaded at runtime and being able to manipulate hooks is a way to bypass all LSMs. CCE-86884-4 Enable Yama support This enables support for LSM module Yama, which extends DAC support with additional system-wide security settings beyond regular Linux discretionary access controls. The module will limit the use of the system call ptrace(). The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA, run the following command: grep CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R20) Unrestricted usage of ptrace allows compromised binaries to run ptrace on another processes of the user. CCE-86716-8 Harden slab freelist metadata This feature protects integrity of the allocator's metadata. This configuration is available from kernel 4.14. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED, run the following command: grep CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R17) Many kernel heap attacks try to target slab cache metadata and other infrastructure. This options makes minor performance sacrifices to harden the kernel slab allocator against common freelist exploit methods. CCE-87962-7 Randomize slab freelist Randomizes the freelist order used on creating new pages. This configuration is available from kernel 5.9, but may be available if backported by distros. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM, run the following command: grep CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R17) This security feature reduces the predictability of the kernel slab allocator against heap overflows. CCE-87725-8 Disallow merge of slab caches For reduced kernel memory fragmentation, slab caches can be merged when they share the same size and other characteristics. This carries a risk of kernel heap overflows being able to overwrite objects from merged caches (and more easily control cache layout), which makes such heap attacks easier to exploit by attackers. This configuration is available from kernel 4.13. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT, run the following command: grep CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT /boot/config-* Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no lines should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R17) Disabling the merge of slabs of similar sizes prevents the kernel from merging a seemingly useless but vulnerable slab with a useful and valuable slab. This increase the risk that a heap overflow could overwrite objects from merged caches, with unmerged caches the heap overflow would only affect the objects in the same cache. Overall, this reduces the kernel attack surface area by isolating slabs from each other. CCE-88122-7 Enable SLUB debugging support SLUB has extensive debug support features and this allows the allocator validation checking to be enabled. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG, run the following command: grep CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R17) This activates the checking of the memory allocator structures and resets to zero the zones allocated when they are released. CCE-88275-3 Stack Protector buffer overlow detection This feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on the stack just before the return address, and validates the value just before actually returning. This configuration is available from kernel 4.18. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR, run the following command: grep CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R15) This halts the program when a stack overflow is detected, potentially reducing the impact of exploits. CCE-88055-9 Strong Stack Protector This features adds canary logic protection to more kinds of vulnerable functions than CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR, but not to all functions so that performance is not severily impacted. This configuration is available from kernel 4.18. This config requires gcc version 4.9 or above, or a distribution gcc with the feature backported ("-fstack-protector-strong"). The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG, run the following command: grep CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R15) This provides a mechanism that protects more vulnerable functions than CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR, balancing between security and performance. CCE-88036-9 Make the kernel text and rodata read-only When set, kernel text and rodata memory will be made read-only, and non-text memory will be made non-executable. This configuration is available from kernel 4.11. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX, run the following command: grep CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R15) This provides protection against certain security exploits (e.g. executing the heap or modifying text) CCE-85993-4 Make the module text and rodata read-only When set, module text and rodata memory will be made read-only, and non-text memory will be made non-executable. This configuration is available from kernel 4.11. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX, run the following command: grep CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R18) This provides protection against certain security exploits (e.g. executing the heap or modifying text) CCE-89227-3 Enable TCP/IP syncookie support Normal TCP/IP networking is open to an attack known as SYN flooding. It is denial-of-service attack that prevents legitimate remote users from being able to connect to your computer during an ongoing attack. When enabled the TCP/IP stack will use a cryptographic challenge protocol known as SYN cookies to enable legitimate users to continue to connect, even when your machine is under attack. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES, run the following command: grep CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R22) SYN cookies provide protection against SYN flooding attacks. CCE-87330-7 Unmap kernel when running in userspace (aka KAISER) Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors can be used to bypass MMU permission checks and leak kernel data to userspace. This can be defended against by unmapping the kernel when running in userspace, mapping it back in on exception entry via a trampoline page in the vector table. This configuration is available from kernel 4.16, but may be available if backported by distros. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0, run the following command: grep CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R27) This is a countermeasure to the Meltdown attack. CCE-89179-6 User a virtually-mapped stack Enable this to use virtually-mapped kernel stacks with guard pages. This configuration is available from kernel 4.9. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_VMAP_STACK, run the following command: grep CONFIG_VMAP_STACK /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R15) This causes kernel stack overflows to be caught immediately rather than causing difficult-to-diagnose corruption. CCE-86251-6 Disable x86 vsyscall emulation Disabling it is roughly equivalent to booting with vsyscall=none, except that it will also disable the helpful warning if a program tries to use a vsyscall. With this option set to N, offending programs will just segfault, citing addresses of the form 0xffffffffff600?00. This configuration is available from kernel 3.19. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION, run the following command: grep CONFIG_X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION /boot/config-* Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no lines should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R15) The vsyscall table is no longer required and is a potential source of ROP gadgets. CCE-87883-5 Kernel GCC plugin configuration Contains rules that check the configuration of GCC plugins used by the compiler Generate some entropy during boot and runtime Instrument some kernel code to extract some entropy from both original and artificially created program state. This will help especially embedded systems where there is little 'natural' source of entropy normally. This configuration is available from kernel 4.9, but may be available if backported by distros. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY, run the following command: grep CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. Note that entropy extracted this way is not cryptographically secure! There is a performance cost during the boot process (about 0.5%) and fork and irq processing. BP28(R21) This helps generate entropy during startup and is particularly relevant for devices with inappropriate entropy sources. CCE-87034-5 Force initialization of variables containing userspace addresses While the kernel is built with warnings enabled for any missed stack variable initializations, this warning is silenced for anything passed by reference to another function, under the occasionally misguided assumption that the function will do the initialization. As this regularly leads to exploitable flaws, this plugin is available to identify and zero-initialize such variables, depending on the chosen level of coverage. This configuration is available from kernel 4.11, but may be available if backported by distros. The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. To check the configuration value for CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK, run the following command: grep CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK /boot/config-* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. BP28(R21) Initializing structures from userspace can prevent some classes of information exposure. CCE-87046-9 Configure Syslog The syslog service has been the default Unix logging mechanism for many years. It has a number of downsides, including inconsistent log format, lack of authentication for received messages, and lack of authentication, encryption, or reliable transport for messages sent over a network. However, due to its long history, syslog is a de facto standard which is supported by almost all Unix applications. In Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, rsyslog has replaced ksyslogd as the syslog daemon of choice, and it includes some additional security features such as reliable, connection-oriented (i.e. TCP) transmission of logs, the option to log to database formats, and the encryption of log data en route to a central logging server. This section discusses how to configure rsyslog for best effect, and how to use tools provided with the system to maintain and monitor logs. Ensure rsyslog-gnutls is installed TLS protocol support for rsyslog is installed. The rsyslog-gnutls package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install rsyslog-gnutls BP28(R43) CCI-000366 FTP_ITC_EXT.1.1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 SRG-OS-000120-GPOS-00061 RHEL-08-030680 SV-230478r744011_rule The rsyslog-gnutls package provides Transport Layer Security (TLS) support for the rsyslog daemon, which enables secure remote logging. CCE-82859-0 - name: Ensure rsyslog-gnutls is installed package: name: rsyslog-gnutls state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82859-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030680 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_rsyslog-gnutls_installed [[packages]] name = "rsyslog-gnutls" version = "*" include install_rsyslog-gnutls class install_rsyslog-gnutls { package { 'rsyslog-gnutls': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=rsyslog-gnutls # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "rsyslog-gnutls" ; then yum install -y "rsyslog-gnutls" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure rsyslog is Installed Rsyslog is installed by default. The rsyslog package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install rsyslog 1 14 15 16 3 5 6 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 MEA02.01 CCI-001311 CCI-001312 CCI-000366 164.312(a)(2)(ii) 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 CM-6(a) PR.PT-1 FTP_ITC_EXT.1.1 SRG-OS-000479-GPOS-00224 SRG-OS-000051-GPOS-00024 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-030670 5.1.1.1 SV-230477r627750_rule The rsyslog package provides the rsyslog daemon, which provides system logging services. CCE-80847-7 - name: Ensure rsyslog is installed package: name: rsyslog state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80847-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030670 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_rsyslog_installed [[packages]] name = "rsyslog" version = "*" include install_rsyslog class install_rsyslog { package { 'rsyslog': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=rsyslog # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "rsyslog" ; then yum install -y "rsyslog" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable rsyslog Service The rsyslog service provides syslog-style logging by default on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8. The rsyslog service can be enabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl enable rsyslog.service 1 12 13 14 15 16 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI04.04 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 CCI-001311 CCI-001312 CCI-001557 CCI-001851 CCI-000366 164.312(a)(2)(ii) 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.2 A.12.1.3 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.17.2.1 CM-6(a) AU-4(1) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.DS-4 PR.PT-1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010561 5.1.1.2 SV-230298r627750_rule The rsyslog service must be running in order to provide logging services, which are essential to system administration. CCE-80886-5 - name: Enable service rsyslog block: - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto - name: Enable service rsyslog systemd: name: rsyslog enabled: 'yes' state: started masked: 'no' when: - '"rsyslog" in ansible_facts.packages' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80886-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010561 - NIST-800-53-AU-4(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_rsyslog_enabled [customizations.services] enabled = ["rsyslog"] include enable_rsyslog class enable_rsyslog { service {'rsyslog': enable => true, ensure => 'running', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'rsyslog.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'rsyslog.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'rsyslog.service' else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Logwatch on Clients if a Logserver Exists Does your site have a central logserver which has been configured to report on logs received from all systems? If so: $ sudo rm /etc/cron.daily/0logwatch If no logserver exists, it will be necessary for each system to run Logwatch individually. Using a central logserver provides the security and reliability benefits discussed earlier, and also makes monitoring logs easier and less time-intensive for administrators. Ensure rsyslog Default File Permissions Configured rsyslog will create logfiles that do not already exist on the system. This settings controls what permissions will be applied to these newly created files. 5.1.1.4 It is important to ensure that log files have the correct permissions to ensure that sensitive data is archived and protected. CCE-88321-5 - name: Ensure rsyslog Default File Permissions Configured - Search for $FileCreateMode Parameter in rsyslog Main Config File ansible.builtin.find: paths: /etc pattern: rsyslog.conf contains: ^\s*\$FileCreateMode\s*\d+ register: rsyslog_main_file_with_filecreatemode when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-88321-5 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_filecreatemode - name: Ensure rsyslog Default File Permissions Configured - Search for $FileCreateMode Parameter in rsyslog Include Files ansible.builtin.find: paths: /etc/rsyslog.d/ pattern: '*.conf' contains: ^\s*\$FileCreateMode\s*\d+ register: rsyslog_includes_with_filecreatemode when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-88321-5 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_filecreatemode - name: Ensure rsyslog Default File Permissions Configured - Assemble List of rsyslog Configuration Files with $FileCreateMode Parameter ansible.builtin.set_fact: rsyslog_filecreatemode_files: '{{ rsyslog_main_file_with_filecreatemode.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list + rsyslog_includes_with_filecreatemode.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-88321-5 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_filecreatemode - name: Ensure rsyslog Default File Permissions Configured - Remove $FileCreateMode Parameter from Multiple Files to Avoid Conflicts ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' regexp: \$FileCreateMode.* state: absent register: result_rsyslog_filecreatemode_removed loop: '{{ rsyslog_filecreatemode_files }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - rsyslog_filecreatemode_files | length > 1 tags: - CCE-88321-5 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_filecreatemode - name: Ensure rsyslog Default File Permissions Configured - Add $FileCreateMode Parameter and Expected Value ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/rsyslog.d/99-rsyslog_filecreatemode.conf line: $FileCreateMode 0640 mode: 416 create: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - rsyslog_filecreatemode_files | length == 0 or result_rsyslog_filecreatemode_removed is not skipped tags: - CCE-88321-5 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_filecreatemode - name: Ensure rsyslog Default File Permissions Configured - Ensure Correct Value of Existing $FileCreateMode Parameter ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' regexp: ^\$FileCreateMode line: $FileCreateMode 0640 loop: '{{ rsyslog_filecreatemode_files }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - rsyslog_filecreatemode_files | length == 1 tags: - CCE-88321-5 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_filecreatemode # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then readarray -t targets < <(grep -H '^\s*$FileCreateMode' /etc/rsyslog.conf /etc/rsyslog.d/*) # if $FileCreateMode set in multiple places if [ ${#targets[@]} -gt 1 ]; then # delete all and create new entry with expected value sed -i '/^\s*$FileCreateMode/d' /etc/rsyslog.conf /etc/rsyslog.d/* echo '$FileCreateMode 0640' > /etc/rsyslog.d/99-rsyslog_filecreatemode.conf # if $FileCreateMode set in only one place elif [ "${#targets[@]}" -eq 1 ]; then filename=$(echo "${targets[0]}" | cut -d':' -f1) value=$(echo "${targets[0]}" | cut -d' ' -f2) #convert to decimal and bitwise or operation result=$((8#$value | 416)) # if more permissive than expected, then set it to 0640 if [ $result -ne 416 ]; then # if value is wrong remove it sed -i '/^\s*$FileCreateMode/d' $filename echo '$FileCreateMode 0640' > $filename fi else echo '$FileCreateMode 0640' > /etc/rsyslog.d/99-rsyslog_filecreatemode.conf fi systemctl restart rsyslog.service else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure Logwatch on the Central Log Server Is this system the central log server? If so, edit the file /etc/logwatch/conf/logwatch.conf as shown below. Configure Logwatch HostLimit Line On a central logserver, you want Logwatch to summarize all syslog entries, including those which did not originate on the logserver itself. The HostLimit setting tells Logwatch to report on all hosts, not just the one on which it is running. HostLimit = no Configure Logwatch SplitHosts Line If SplitHosts is set, Logwatch will separate entries by hostname. This makes the report longer but significantly more usable. If it is not set, then Logwatch will not report which host generated a given log entry, and that information is almost always necessary SplitHosts = yes Ensure Proper Configuration of Log Files The file /etc/rsyslog.conf controls where log message are written. These are controlled by lines called rules, which consist of a selector and an action. These rules are often customized depending on the role of the system, the requirements of the environment, and whatever may enable the administrator to most effectively make use of log data. The default rules in Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 are: *.info;mail.none;authpriv.none;cron.none /var/log/messages authpriv.* /var/log/secure mail.* -/var/log/maillog cron.* /var/log/cron *.emerg * uucp,news.crit /var/log/spooler local7.* /var/log/boot.log See the man page rsyslog.conf(5) for more information. Note that the rsyslog daemon can be configured to use a timestamp format that some log processing programs may not understand. If this occurs, edit the file /etc/rsyslog.conf and add or edit the following line: $ ActionFileDefaultTemplate RSYSLOG_TraditionalFileFormat User who owns log files Specify user owner of all logfiles specified in /etc/rsyslog.conf. root adm root syslog Ensure cron Is Logging To Rsyslog Cron logging must be implemented to spot intrusions or trace cron job status. If cron is not logging to rsyslog, it can be implemented by adding the following to the RULES section of /etc/rsyslog.conf: cron.* /var/log/cron 1 14 15 16 3 5 6 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 CCI-000366 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 0988 1405 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 CM-6(a) ID.SC-4 PR.PT-1 FAU_GEN.1.1.c SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-030010 SV-230387r743996_rule Cron logging can be used to trace the successful or unsuccessful execution of cron jobs. It can also be used to spot intrusions into the use of the cron facility by unauthorized and malicious users. CCE-80859-2 # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! grep -s "^\s*cron\.\*\s*/var/log/cron$" /etc/rsyslog.conf /etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf; then mkdir -p /etc/rsyslog.d echo "cron.* /var/log/cron" >> /etc/rsyslog.d/cron.conf fi systemctl restart rsyslog.service else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure Rsyslog Authenticates Off-Loaded Audit Records Rsyslogd is a system utility providing support for message logging. Support for both internet and UNIX domain sockets enables this utility to support both local and remote logging. Couple this utility with gnutls (which is a secure communications library implementing the SSL, TLS and DTLS protocols), and you have a method to securely encrypt and off-load auditing. When using rsyslogd to off-load logs the remote system must be authenticated. CCI-001851 AU-4(1) SRG-OS-000342-GPOS-00133 SRG-OS-000479-GPOS-00224 RHEL-08-030720 SV-230482r877390_rule The audit records generated by Rsyslog contain valuable information regarding system configuration, user authentication, and other such information. Audit records should be protected from unauthorized access. CCE-86339-9 - name: Ensure Rsyslog Authenticates Off-Loaded Audit Records block: - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/rsyslog.conf lineinfile: path: /etc/rsyslog.conf create: false regexp: ^\s*{{ "$ActionSendStreamDriverAuthMode"| regex_escape }}\s state: absent - name: Check if /etc/rsyslog.d exists stat: path: /etc/rsyslog.d register: _etc_rsyslog_d_exists - name: Check if the parameter $ActionSendStreamDriverAuthMode is present in /etc/rsyslog.d find: paths: /etc/rsyslog.d recurse: 'yes' follow: 'no' contains: ^\s*{{ "$ActionSendStreamDriverAuthMode"| regex_escape }}\s register: _etc_rsyslog_d_has_parameter when: _etc_rsyslog_d_exists.stat.isdir is defined and _etc_rsyslog_d_exists.stat.isdir - name: Remove parameter from files in /etc/rsyslog.d lineinfile: path: '{{ item.path }}' create: false regexp: ^\s*{{ "$ActionSendStreamDriverAuthMode"| regex_escape }}\s state: absent with_items: '{{ _etc_rsyslog_d_has_parameter.files }}' when: _etc_rsyslog_d_has_parameter.matched - name: Insert correct line to /etc/rsyslog.conf lineinfile: path: /etc/rsyslog.conf create: true regexp: ^\s*{{ "$ActionSendStreamDriverAuthMode"| regex_escape }}\s line: $ActionSendStreamDriverAuthMode x509/name state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86339-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030720 - NIST-800-53-AU-4(1) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_encrypt_offload_actionsendstreamdriverauthmode # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then sed -i '/^.*\$ActionSendStreamDriverAuthMode.*/d' /etc/rsyslog.conf /etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf 2> /dev/null if [ -e "/etc/rsyslog.d/stream_driver_auth.conf" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*\$ActionSendStreamDriverAuthMode /Id" "/etc/rsyslog.d/stream_driver_auth.conf" else touch "/etc/rsyslog.d/stream_driver_auth.conf" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/rsyslog.d/stream_driver_auth.conf" cp "/etc/rsyslog.d/stream_driver_auth.conf" "/etc/rsyslog.d/stream_driver_auth.conf.bak" # Insert at the end of the file printf '%s\n' "\$ActionSendStreamDriverAuthMode x509/name" >> "/etc/rsyslog.d/stream_driver_auth.conf" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/rsyslog.d/stream_driver_auth.conf.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure Rsyslog Encrypts Off-Loaded Audit Records Rsyslogd is a system utility providing support for message logging. Support for both internet and UNIX domain sockets enables this utility to support both local and remote logging. Couple this utility with gnutls (which is a secure communications library implementing the SSL, TLS and DTLS protocols), and you have a method to securely encrypt and off-load auditing. When using rsyslogd to off-load logs off a encrpytion system must be used. CCI-001851 AU-4(1) SRG-OS-000342-GPOS-00133 SRG-OS-000479-GPOS-00224 RHEL-08-030710 SV-230481r877390_rule The audit records generated by Rsyslog contain valuable information regarding system configuration, user authentication, and other such information. Audit records should be protected from unauthorized access. CCE-86098-1 - name: Ensure Rsyslog Encrypts Off-Loaded Audit Records block: - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/rsyslog.conf lineinfile: path: /etc/rsyslog.conf create: false regexp: '^\s*{{ "$ActionSendStreamDriverMode"| regex_escape }} ' state: absent - name: Check if /etc/rsyslog.d exists stat: path: /etc/rsyslog.d register: _etc_rsyslog_d_exists - name: Check if the parameter $ActionSendStreamDriverMode is present in /etc/rsyslog.d find: paths: /etc/rsyslog.d recurse: 'yes' follow: 'no' contains: '^\s*{{ "$ActionSendStreamDriverMode"| regex_escape }} ' register: _etc_rsyslog_d_has_parameter when: _etc_rsyslog_d_exists.stat.isdir is defined and _etc_rsyslog_d_exists.stat.isdir - name: Remove parameter from files in /etc/rsyslog.d lineinfile: path: '{{ item.path }}' create: false regexp: '^\s*{{ "$ActionSendStreamDriverMode"| regex_escape }} ' state: absent with_items: '{{ _etc_rsyslog_d_has_parameter.files }}' when: _etc_rsyslog_d_has_parameter.matched - name: Insert correct line to /etc/rsyslog.conf lineinfile: path: /etc/rsyslog.conf create: true regexp: '^\s*{{ "$ActionSendStreamDriverMode"| regex_escape }} ' line: $ActionSendStreamDriverMode 1 state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86098-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030710 - NIST-800-53-AU-4(1) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_encrypt_offload_actionsendstreamdrivermode # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if [ -e "/etc/rsyslog.d/encrypt.conf" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*\$ActionSendStreamDriverMode /Id" "/etc/rsyslog.d/encrypt.conf" else touch "/etc/rsyslog.d/encrypt.conf" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/rsyslog.d/encrypt.conf" cp "/etc/rsyslog.d/encrypt.conf" "/etc/rsyslog.d/encrypt.conf.bak" # Insert at the end of the file printf '%s\n' "\$ActionSendStreamDriverMode 1" >> "/etc/rsyslog.d/encrypt.conf" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/rsyslog.d/encrypt.conf.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure Rsyslog Encrypts Off-Loaded Audit Records Rsyslogd is a system utility providing support for message logging. Support for both internet and UNIX domain sockets enables this utility to support both local and remote logging. Couple this utility with gnutls (which is a secure communications library implementing the SSL, TLS and DTLS protocols), and you have a method to securely encrypt and off-load auditing. When using rsyslogd to off-load logs off an encryption system must be used. CCI-001851 AU-4(1) SRG-OS-000342-GPOS-00133 SRG-OS-000479-GPOS-00224 RHEL-08-030710 SV-230481r877390_rule The audit records generated by Rsyslog contain valuable information regarding system configuration, user authentication, and other such information. Audit records should be protected from unauthorized access. CCE-85992-6 - name: Ensure Rsyslog Encrypts Off-Loaded Audit Records block: - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/rsyslog.conf lineinfile: path: /etc/rsyslog.conf create: false regexp: '^\s*{{ "$DefaultNetstreamDriver"| regex_escape }} ' state: absent - name: Check if /etc/rsyslog.d exists stat: path: /etc/rsyslog.d register: _etc_rsyslog_d_exists - name: Check if the parameter $DefaultNetstreamDriver is present in /etc/rsyslog.d find: paths: /etc/rsyslog.d recurse: 'yes' follow: 'no' contains: '^\s*{{ "$DefaultNetstreamDriver"| regex_escape }} ' register: _etc_rsyslog_d_has_parameter when: _etc_rsyslog_d_exists.stat.isdir is defined and _etc_rsyslog_d_exists.stat.isdir - name: Remove parameter from files in /etc/rsyslog.d lineinfile: path: '{{ item.path }}' create: false regexp: '^\s*{{ "$DefaultNetstreamDriver"| regex_escape }} ' state: absent with_items: '{{ _etc_rsyslog_d_has_parameter.files }}' when: _etc_rsyslog_d_has_parameter.matched - name: Insert correct line to /etc/rsyslog.conf lineinfile: path: /etc/rsyslog.conf create: true regexp: '^\s*{{ "$DefaultNetstreamDriver"| regex_escape }} ' line: $DefaultNetstreamDriver gtls state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-85992-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030710 - NIST-800-53-AU-4(1) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_encrypt_offload_defaultnetstreamdriver # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if [ -e "/etc/rsyslog.d/encrypt.conf" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*\$DefaultNetstreamDriver /Id" "/etc/rsyslog.d/encrypt.conf" else touch "/etc/rsyslog.d/encrypt.conf" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/rsyslog.d/encrypt.conf" cp "/etc/rsyslog.d/encrypt.conf" "/etc/rsyslog.d/encrypt.conf.bak" # Insert at the end of the file printf '%s\n' "\$DefaultNetstreamDriver gtls" >> "/etc/rsyslog.d/encrypt.conf" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/rsyslog.d/encrypt.conf.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate Group The group-owner of all log files written by rsyslog should be root. These log files are determined by the second part of each Rule line in /etc/rsyslog.conf and typically all appear in /var/log. For each log file LOGFILE referenced in /etc/rsyslog.conf, run the following command to inspect the file's group owner: $ ls -l LOGFILE If the owner is not root, run the following command to correct this: $ sudo chgrp root LOGFILE BP28(R46) BP28(R5) 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 CCI-001314 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 0988 1405 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 Req-10.5.1 Req-10.5.2 10.3.2 5.1.4 The log files generated by rsyslog contain valuable information regarding system configuration, user authentication, and other such information. Log files should be protected from unauthorized access. CCE-80860-0 - name: Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate Group - Set rsyslog logfile configuration facts ansible.builtin.set_fact: rsyslog_etc_config: /etc/rsyslog.conf when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80860-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_files_groupownership - name: Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate Group - Get IncludeConfig directive ansible.builtin.shell: | set -o pipefail grep -e '$IncludeConfig' {{ rsyslog_etc_config }} | cut -d ' ' -f 2 || true register: rsyslog_old_inc changed_when: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80860-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_files_groupownership - name: Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate Group - Get include files directives ansible.builtin.shell: | set -o pipefail awk '/)/{f=0} /include\(/{f=1} f{nf=gensub("^(include\\(|\\s*)file=\"(\\S+)\".*","\\2",1); if($0!=nf){print nf}}' {{ rsyslog_etc_config }} || true register: rsyslog_new_inc changed_when: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80860-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_files_groupownership - name: Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate Group - Aggregate rsyslog includes ansible.builtin.set_fact: include_config_output: '{{ rsyslog_old_inc.stdout_lines + rsyslog_new_inc.stdout_lines }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - rsyslog_old_inc is not skipped and rsyslog_new_inc is not skipped tags: - CCE-80860-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_files_groupownership - name: Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate Group - List all config files ansible.builtin.find: paths: '{{ item | dirname }}' patterns: '{{ item | basename }}' hidden: false follow: true loop: '{{ include_config_output | list + [rsyslog_etc_config] }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - include_config_output is defined register: rsyslog_config_files failed_when: false changed_when: false tags: - CCE-80860-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_files_groupownership - name: Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate Group - Extract log files old format ansible.builtin.shell: | set -o pipefail grep -oP '^[^(\s|#|\$)]+[\s]+.*[\s]+-?(/+[^:;\s]+);*\.*$' {{ item.1.path }} | \ awk '{print $NF}' | \ sed -e 's/^-//' || true loop: '{{ rsyslog_config_files.results | default([]) | subelements(''files'') }}' register: log_files_old changed_when: false when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - rsyslog_config_files is not skipped tags: - CCE-80860-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_files_groupownership - name: Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate Group - Extract log files new format ansible.builtin.shell: | set -o pipefail grep -ozP "action\s*\(\s*type\s*=\s*\"omfile\"[^\)]*\)" {{ item.1.path }} | \ grep -aoP "File\s*=\s*\"([/[:alnum:][:punct:]]*)\"\s*\)" | \ grep -oE "\"([/[:alnum:][:punct:]]*)\"" | \ tr -d "\""|| true loop: '{{ rsyslog_config_files.results | default([]) | subelements(''files'') }}' register: log_files_new changed_when: false when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - rsyslog_config_files is not skipped tags: - CCE-80860-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_files_groupownership - name: Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate Group - Sum all log files found ansible.builtin.set_fact: log_files: '{{ log_files_new.results | map(attribute=''stdout_lines'') | list | flatten | unique + log_files_old.results | map(attribute=''stdout_lines'') | list | flatten | unique }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80860-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_files_groupownership - name: Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate Group -Setup log files attribute ansible.builtin.file: path: '{{ item }}' group: root state: file loop: '{{ log_files | list | flatten | unique }}' failed_when: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80860-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_files_groupownership # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # List of log file paths to be inspected for correct permissions # * Primarily inspect log file paths listed in /etc/rsyslog.conf RSYSLOG_ETC_CONFIG="/etc/rsyslog.conf" # * And also the log file paths listed after rsyslog's $IncludeConfig directive # (store the result into array for the case there's shell glob used as value of IncludeConfig) readarray -t OLD_INC < <(grep -e "\$IncludeConfig[[:space:]]\+[^[:space:];]\+" /etc/rsyslog.conf | cut -d ' ' -f 2) readarray -t RSYSLOG_INCLUDE_CONFIG < <(for INCPATH in "${OLD_INC[@]}"; do eval printf '%s\\n' "${INCPATH}"; done) readarray -t NEW_INC < <(sed -n '/^\s*include(/,/)/Ip' /etc/rsyslog.conf | sed -n 's@.*file\s*=\s*"\([/[:alnum:][:punct:]]*\)".*@\1@Ip') readarray -t RSYSLOG_INCLUDE < <(for INCPATH in "${NEW_INC[@]}"; do eval printf '%s\\n' "${INCPATH}"; done) # Declare an array to hold the final list of different log file paths declare -a LOG_FILE_PATHS # Array to hold all rsyslog config entries RSYSLOG_CONFIGS=() RSYSLOG_CONFIGS=("${RSYSLOG_ETC_CONFIG}" "${RSYSLOG_INCLUDE_CONFIG[@]}" "${RSYSLOG_INCLUDE[@]}") # Get full list of files to be checked # RSYSLOG_CONFIGS may contain globs such as # /etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf /etc/rsyslog.d/*.frule # So, loop over the entries in RSYSLOG_CONFIGS and use find to get the list of included files. RSYSLOG_CONFIG_FILES=() for ENTRY in "${RSYSLOG_CONFIGS[@]}" do # If directory, rsyslog will search for config files in recursively. # However, files in hidden sub-directories or hidden files will be ignored. if [ -d "${ENTRY}" ] then readarray -t FINDOUT < <(find "${ENTRY}" -not -path '*/.*' -type f) RSYSLOG_CONFIG_FILES+=("${FINDOUT[@]}") elif [ -f "${ENTRY}" ] then RSYSLOG_CONFIG_FILES+=("${ENTRY}") else echo "Invalid include object: ${ENTRY}" fi done # Browse each file selected above as containing paths of log files # ('/etc/rsyslog.conf' and '/etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf' in the default configuration) for LOG_FILE in "${RSYSLOG_CONFIG_FILES[@]}" do # From each of these files extract just particular log file path(s), thus: # * Ignore lines starting with space (' '), comment ('#"), or variable syntax ('$') characters, # * Ignore empty lines, # * Strip quotes and closing brackets from paths. # * Ignore paths that match /dev|/etc.*\.conf, as those are paths, but likely not log files # * From the remaining valid rows select only fields constituting a log file path # Text file column is understood to represent a log file path if and only if all of the # following are met: # * it contains at least one slash '/' character, # * it is preceded by space # * it doesn't contain space (' '), colon (':'), and semicolon (';') characters # Search log file for path(s) only in case it exists! if [[ -f "${LOG_FILE}" ]] then NORMALIZED_CONFIG_FILE_LINES=$(sed -e "/^[#|$]/d" "${LOG_FILE}") LINES_WITH_PATHS=$(grep '[^/]*\s\+\S*/\S\+$' <<< "${NORMALIZED_CONFIG_FILE_LINES}") FILTERED_PATHS=$(awk '{if(NF>=2&&($NF~/^\//||$NF~/^-\//)){sub(/^-\//,"/",$NF);print $NF}}' <<< "${LINES_WITH_PATHS}") CLEANED_PATHS=$(sed -e "s/[\"')]//g; /\\/etc.*\.conf/d; /\\/dev\\//d" <<< "${FILTERED_PATHS}") MATCHED_ITEMS=$(sed -e "/^$/d" <<< "${CLEANED_PATHS}") # Since above sed command might return more than one item (delimited by newline), split # the particular matches entries into new array specific for this log file readarray -t ARRAY_FOR_LOG_FILE <<< "$MATCHED_ITEMS" # Concatenate the two arrays - previous content of $LOG_FILE_PATHS array with # items from newly created array for this log file LOG_FILE_PATHS+=("${ARRAY_FOR_LOG_FILE[@]}") # Delete the temporary array unset ARRAY_FOR_LOG_FILE fi done # Check for RainerScript action log format which might be also multiline so grep regex is a bit # curly: # extract possibly multiline action omfile expressions # extract File="logfile" expression # match only "logfile" expression for LOG_FILE in "${RSYSLOG_CONFIG_FILES[@]}" do ACTION_OMFILE_LINES=$(grep -iozP "action\s*\(\s*type\s*=\s*\"omfile\"[^\)]*\)" "${LOG_FILE}") OMFILE_LINES=$(echo "${ACTION_OMFILE_LINES}"| grep -iaoP "File\s*=\s*\"([/[:alnum:][:punct:]]*)\"\s*\)") LOG_FILE_PATHS+=("$(echo "${OMFILE_LINES}"| grep -oE "\"([/[:alnum:][:punct:]]*)\""|tr -d "\"")") done # Ensure the correct attribute if file exists FILE_CMD="chgrp" for LOG_FILE_PATH in "${LOG_FILE_PATHS[@]}" do # Sanity check - if particular $LOG_FILE_PATH is empty string, skip it from further processing if [ -z "$LOG_FILE_PATH" ] then continue fi $FILE_CMD "root" "$LOG_FILE_PATH" done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate User The owner of all log files written by rsyslog should be root. These log files are determined by the second part of each Rule line in /etc/rsyslog.conf and typically all appear in /var/log. For each log file LOGFILE referenced in /etc/rsyslog.conf, run the following command to inspect the file's owner: $ ls -l LOGFILE If the owner is not root, run the following command to correct this: $ sudo chown root LOGFILE BP28(R46) BP28(R5) 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 CCI-001314 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 0988 1405 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 Req-10.5.1 Req-10.5.2 10.3.2 5.1.4 The log files generated by rsyslog contain valuable information regarding system configuration, user authentication, and other such information. Log files should be protected from unauthorized access. CCE-80861-8 - name: Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate User - Set rsyslog logfile configuration facts ansible.builtin.set_fact: rsyslog_etc_config: /etc/rsyslog.conf when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80861-8 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_files_ownership - name: Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate User - Get IncludeConfig directive ansible.builtin.shell: | set -o pipefail grep -e '$IncludeConfig' {{ rsyslog_etc_config }} | cut -d ' ' -f 2 || true register: rsyslog_old_inc changed_when: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80861-8 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_files_ownership - name: Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate User - Get include files directives ansible.builtin.shell: | set -o pipefail awk '/)/{f=0} /include\(/{f=1} f{nf=gensub("^(include\\(|\\s*)file=\"(\\S+)\".*","\\2",1); if($0!=nf){print nf}}' {{ rsyslog_etc_config }} || true register: rsyslog_new_inc changed_when: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80861-8 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_files_ownership - name: Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate User - Aggregate rsyslog includes ansible.builtin.set_fact: include_config_output: '{{ rsyslog_old_inc.stdout_lines + rsyslog_new_inc.stdout_lines }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - rsyslog_old_inc is not skipped and rsyslog_new_inc is not skipped tags: - CCE-80861-8 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_files_ownership - name: Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate User - List all config files ansible.builtin.find: paths: '{{ item | dirname }}' patterns: '{{ item | basename }}' hidden: false follow: true loop: '{{ include_config_output | list + [rsyslog_etc_config] }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - include_config_output is defined register: rsyslog_config_files failed_when: false changed_when: false tags: - CCE-80861-8 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_files_ownership - name: Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate User - Extract log files old format ansible.builtin.shell: | set -o pipefail grep -oP '^[^(\s|#|\$)]+[\s]+.*[\s]+-?(/+[^:;\s]+);*\.*$' {{ item.1.path }} | \ awk '{print $NF}' | \ sed -e 's/^-//' || true loop: '{{ rsyslog_config_files.results | default([]) | subelements(''files'') }}' register: log_files_old changed_when: false when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - rsyslog_config_files is not skipped tags: - CCE-80861-8 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_files_ownership - name: Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate User - Extract log files new format ansible.builtin.shell: | set -o pipefail grep -ozP "action\s*\(\s*type\s*=\s*\"omfile\"[^\)]*\)" {{ item.1.path }} | \ grep -aoP "File\s*=\s*\"([/[:alnum:][:punct:]]*)\"\s*\)" | \ grep -oE "\"([/[:alnum:][:punct:]]*)\"" | \ tr -d "\""|| true loop: '{{ rsyslog_config_files.results | default([]) | subelements(''files'') }}' register: log_files_new changed_when: false when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - rsyslog_config_files is not skipped tags: - CCE-80861-8 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_files_ownership - name: Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate User - Sum all log files found ansible.builtin.set_fact: log_files: '{{ log_files_new.results | map(attribute=''stdout_lines'') | list | flatten | unique + log_files_old.results | map(attribute=''stdout_lines'') | list | flatten | unique }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80861-8 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_files_ownership - name: Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate User -Setup log files attribute ansible.builtin.file: path: '{{ item }}' owner: root state: file loop: '{{ log_files | list | flatten | unique }}' failed_when: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80861-8 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_files_ownership # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # List of log file paths to be inspected for correct permissions # * Primarily inspect log file paths listed in /etc/rsyslog.conf RSYSLOG_ETC_CONFIG="/etc/rsyslog.conf" # * And also the log file paths listed after rsyslog's $IncludeConfig directive # (store the result into array for the case there's shell glob used as value of IncludeConfig) readarray -t OLD_INC < <(grep -e "\$IncludeConfig[[:space:]]\+[^[:space:];]\+" /etc/rsyslog.conf | cut -d ' ' -f 2) readarray -t RSYSLOG_INCLUDE_CONFIG < <(for INCPATH in "${OLD_INC[@]}"; do eval printf '%s\\n' "${INCPATH}"; done) readarray -t NEW_INC < <(sed -n '/^\s*include(/,/)/Ip' /etc/rsyslog.conf | sed -n 's@.*file\s*=\s*"\([/[:alnum:][:punct:]]*\)".*@\1@Ip') readarray -t RSYSLOG_INCLUDE < <(for INCPATH in "${NEW_INC[@]}"; do eval printf '%s\\n' "${INCPATH}"; done) # Declare an array to hold the final list of different log file paths declare -a LOG_FILE_PATHS # Array to hold all rsyslog config entries RSYSLOG_CONFIGS=() RSYSLOG_CONFIGS=("${RSYSLOG_ETC_CONFIG}" "${RSYSLOG_INCLUDE_CONFIG[@]}" "${RSYSLOG_INCLUDE[@]}") # Get full list of files to be checked # RSYSLOG_CONFIGS may contain globs such as # /etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf /etc/rsyslog.d/*.frule # So, loop over the entries in RSYSLOG_CONFIGS and use find to get the list of included files. RSYSLOG_CONFIG_FILES=() for ENTRY in "${RSYSLOG_CONFIGS[@]}" do # If directory, rsyslog will search for config files in recursively. # However, files in hidden sub-directories or hidden files will be ignored. if [ -d "${ENTRY}" ] then readarray -t FINDOUT < <(find "${ENTRY}" -not -path '*/.*' -type f) RSYSLOG_CONFIG_FILES+=("${FINDOUT[@]}") elif [ -f "${ENTRY}" ] then RSYSLOG_CONFIG_FILES+=("${ENTRY}") else echo "Invalid include object: ${ENTRY}" fi done # Browse each file selected above as containing paths of log files # ('/etc/rsyslog.conf' and '/etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf' in the default configuration) for LOG_FILE in "${RSYSLOG_CONFIG_FILES[@]}" do # From each of these files extract just particular log file path(s), thus: # * Ignore lines starting with space (' '), comment ('#"), or variable syntax ('$') characters, # * Ignore empty lines, # * Strip quotes and closing brackets from paths. # * Ignore paths that match /dev|/etc.*\.conf, as those are paths, but likely not log files # * From the remaining valid rows select only fields constituting a log file path # Text file column is understood to represent a log file path if and only if all of the # following are met: # * it contains at least one slash '/' character, # * it is preceded by space # * it doesn't contain space (' '), colon (':'), and semicolon (';') characters # Search log file for path(s) only in case it exists! if [[ -f "${LOG_FILE}" ]] then NORMALIZED_CONFIG_FILE_LINES=$(sed -e "/^[#|$]/d" "${LOG_FILE}") LINES_WITH_PATHS=$(grep '[^/]*\s\+\S*/\S\+$' <<< "${NORMALIZED_CONFIG_FILE_LINES}") FILTERED_PATHS=$(awk '{if(NF>=2&&($NF~/^\//||$NF~/^-\//)){sub(/^-\//,"/",$NF);print $NF}}' <<< "${LINES_WITH_PATHS}") CLEANED_PATHS=$(sed -e "s/[\"')]//g; /\\/etc.*\.conf/d; /\\/dev\\//d" <<< "${FILTERED_PATHS}") MATCHED_ITEMS=$(sed -e "/^$/d" <<< "${CLEANED_PATHS}") # Since above sed command might return more than one item (delimited by newline), split # the particular matches entries into new array specific for this log file readarray -t ARRAY_FOR_LOG_FILE <<< "$MATCHED_ITEMS" # Concatenate the two arrays - previous content of $LOG_FILE_PATHS array with # items from newly created array for this log file LOG_FILE_PATHS+=("${ARRAY_FOR_LOG_FILE[@]}") # Delete the temporary array unset ARRAY_FOR_LOG_FILE fi done # Check for RainerScript action log format which might be also multiline so grep regex is a bit # curly: # extract possibly multiline action omfile expressions # extract File="logfile" expression # match only "logfile" expression for LOG_FILE in "${RSYSLOG_CONFIG_FILES[@]}" do ACTION_OMFILE_LINES=$(grep -iozP "action\s*\(\s*type\s*=\s*\"omfile\"[^\)]*\)" "${LOG_FILE}") OMFILE_LINES=$(echo "${ACTION_OMFILE_LINES}"| grep -iaoP "File\s*=\s*\"([/[:alnum:][:punct:]]*)\"\s*\)") LOG_FILE_PATHS+=("$(echo "${OMFILE_LINES}"| grep -oE "\"([/[:alnum:][:punct:]]*)\""|tr -d "\"")") done # Ensure the correct attribute if file exists FILE_CMD="chown" for LOG_FILE_PATH in "${LOG_FILE_PATHS[@]}" do # Sanity check - if particular $LOG_FILE_PATH is empty string, skip it from further processing if [ -z "$LOG_FILE_PATH" ] then continue fi $FILE_CMD "root" "$LOG_FILE_PATH" done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure System Log Files Have Correct Permissions The file permissions for all log files written by rsyslog should be set to 640, or more restrictive. These log files are determined by the second part of each Rule line in /etc/rsyslog.conf and typically all appear in /var/log. For each log file LOGFILE referenced in /etc/rsyslog.conf, run the following command to inspect the file's permissions: $ ls -l LOGFILE If the permissions are not 640 or more restrictive, run the following command to correct this: $ sudo chmod 640 LOGFILE" BP28(R36) CCI-001314 0988 1405 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) Req-10.5.1 Req-10.5.2 10.3.1 5.1.4 Log files can contain valuable information regarding system configuration. If the system log files are not protected unauthorized users could change the logged data, eliminating their forensic value. CCE-80862-6 - name: Ensure System Log Files Have Correct Permissions - Set rsyslog logfile configuration facts ansible.builtin.set_fact: rsyslog_etc_config: /etc/rsyslog.conf when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80862-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_files_permissions - name: Ensure System Log Files Have Correct Permissions - Get IncludeConfig directive ansible.builtin.shell: | set -o pipefail grep -e '$IncludeConfig' {{ rsyslog_etc_config }} | cut -d ' ' -f 2 || true register: rsyslog_old_inc changed_when: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80862-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_files_permissions - name: Ensure System Log Files Have Correct Permissions - Get include files directives ansible.builtin.shell: | set -o pipefail awk '/)/{f=0} /include\(/{f=1} f{nf=gensub("^(include\\(|\\s*)file=\"(\\S+)\".*","\\2",1); if($0!=nf){print nf}}' {{ rsyslog_etc_config }} || true register: rsyslog_new_inc changed_when: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80862-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_files_permissions - name: Ensure System Log Files Have Correct Permissions - Aggregate rsyslog includes ansible.builtin.set_fact: include_config_output: '{{ rsyslog_old_inc.stdout_lines + rsyslog_new_inc.stdout_lines }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - rsyslog_old_inc is not skipped and rsyslog_new_inc is not skipped tags: - CCE-80862-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_files_permissions - name: Ensure System Log Files Have Correct Permissions - List all config files ansible.builtin.find: paths: '{{ item | dirname }}' patterns: '{{ item | basename }}' hidden: false follow: true loop: '{{ include_config_output | list + [rsyslog_etc_config] }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - include_config_output is defined register: rsyslog_config_files failed_when: false changed_when: false tags: - CCE-80862-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_files_permissions - name: Ensure System Log Files Have Correct Permissions - Extract log files old format ansible.builtin.shell: | set -o pipefail grep -oP '^[^(\s|#|\$)]+[\s]+.*[\s]+-?(/+[^:;\s]+);*\.*$' {{ item.1.path }} | \ awk '{print $NF}' | \ sed -e 's/^-//' || true loop: '{{ rsyslog_config_files.results | default([]) | subelements(''files'') }}' register: log_files_old changed_when: false when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - rsyslog_config_files is not skipped tags: - CCE-80862-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_files_permissions - name: Ensure System Log Files Have Correct Permissions - Extract log files new format ansible.builtin.shell: | set -o pipefail grep -ozP "action\s*\(\s*type\s*=\s*\"omfile\"[^\)]*\)" {{ item.1.path }} | \ grep -aoP "File\s*=\s*\"([/[:alnum:][:punct:]]*)\"\s*\)" | \ grep -oE "\"([/[:alnum:][:punct:]]*)\"" | \ tr -d "\""|| true loop: '{{ rsyslog_config_files.results | default([]) | subelements(''files'') }}' register: log_files_new changed_when: false when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - rsyslog_config_files is not skipped tags: - CCE-80862-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_files_permissions - name: Ensure System Log Files Have Correct Permissions - Sum all log files found ansible.builtin.set_fact: log_files: '{{ log_files_new.results | map(attribute=''stdout_lines'') | list | flatten | unique + log_files_old.results | map(attribute=''stdout_lines'') | list | flatten | unique }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80862-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_files_permissions - name: Ensure System Log Files Have Correct Permissions -Setup log files attribute ansible.builtin.file: path: '{{ item }}' mode: '0640' state: file loop: '{{ log_files | list | flatten | unique }}' failed_when: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80862-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_files_permissions # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # List of log file paths to be inspected for correct permissions # * Primarily inspect log file paths listed in /etc/rsyslog.conf RSYSLOG_ETC_CONFIG="/etc/rsyslog.conf" # * And also the log file paths listed after rsyslog's $IncludeConfig directive # (store the result into array for the case there's shell glob used as value of IncludeConfig) readarray -t OLD_INC < <(grep -e "\$IncludeConfig[[:space:]]\+[^[:space:];]\+" /etc/rsyslog.conf | cut -d ' ' -f 2) readarray -t RSYSLOG_INCLUDE_CONFIG < <(for INCPATH in "${OLD_INC[@]}"; do eval printf '%s\\n' "${INCPATH}"; done) readarray -t NEW_INC < <(sed -n '/^\s*include(/,/)/Ip' /etc/rsyslog.conf | sed -n 's@.*file\s*=\s*"\([/[:alnum:][:punct:]]*\)".*@\1@Ip') readarray -t RSYSLOG_INCLUDE < <(for INCPATH in "${NEW_INC[@]}"; do eval printf '%s\\n' "${INCPATH}"; done) # Declare an array to hold the final list of different log file paths declare -a LOG_FILE_PATHS # Array to hold all rsyslog config entries RSYSLOG_CONFIGS=() RSYSLOG_CONFIGS=("${RSYSLOG_ETC_CONFIG}" "${RSYSLOG_INCLUDE_CONFIG[@]}" "${RSYSLOG_INCLUDE[@]}") # Get full list of files to be checked # RSYSLOG_CONFIGS may contain globs such as # /etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf /etc/rsyslog.d/*.frule # So, loop over the entries in RSYSLOG_CONFIGS and use find to get the list of included files. RSYSLOG_CONFIG_FILES=() for ENTRY in "${RSYSLOG_CONFIGS[@]}" do # If directory, rsyslog will search for config files in recursively. # However, files in hidden sub-directories or hidden files will be ignored. if [ -d "${ENTRY}" ] then readarray -t FINDOUT < <(find "${ENTRY}" -not -path '*/.*' -type f) RSYSLOG_CONFIG_FILES+=("${FINDOUT[@]}") elif [ -f "${ENTRY}" ] then RSYSLOG_CONFIG_FILES+=("${ENTRY}") else echo "Invalid include object: ${ENTRY}" fi done # Browse each file selected above as containing paths of log files # ('/etc/rsyslog.conf' and '/etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf' in the default configuration) for LOG_FILE in "${RSYSLOG_CONFIG_FILES[@]}" do # From each of these files extract just particular log file path(s), thus: # * Ignore lines starting with space (' '), comment ('#"), or variable syntax ('$') characters, # * Ignore empty lines, # * Strip quotes and closing brackets from paths. # * Ignore paths that match /dev|/etc.*\.conf, as those are paths, but likely not log files # * From the remaining valid rows select only fields constituting a log file path # Text file column is understood to represent a log file path if and only if all of the # following are met: # * it contains at least one slash '/' character, # * it is preceded by space # * it doesn't contain space (' '), colon (':'), and semicolon (';') characters # Search log file for path(s) only in case it exists! if [[ -f "${LOG_FILE}" ]] then NORMALIZED_CONFIG_FILE_LINES=$(sed -e "/^[#|$]/d" "${LOG_FILE}") LINES_WITH_PATHS=$(grep '[^/]*\s\+\S*/\S\+$' <<< "${NORMALIZED_CONFIG_FILE_LINES}") FILTERED_PATHS=$(awk '{if(NF>=2&&($NF~/^\//||$NF~/^-\//)){sub(/^-\//,"/",$NF);print $NF}}' <<< "${LINES_WITH_PATHS}") CLEANED_PATHS=$(sed -e "s/[\"')]//g; /\\/etc.*\.conf/d; /\\/dev\\//d" <<< "${FILTERED_PATHS}") MATCHED_ITEMS=$(sed -e "/^$/d" <<< "${CLEANED_PATHS}") # Since above sed command might return more than one item (delimited by newline), split # the particular matches entries into new array specific for this log file readarray -t ARRAY_FOR_LOG_FILE <<< "$MATCHED_ITEMS" # Concatenate the two arrays - previous content of $LOG_FILE_PATHS array with # items from newly created array for this log file LOG_FILE_PATHS+=("${ARRAY_FOR_LOG_FILE[@]}") # Delete the temporary array unset ARRAY_FOR_LOG_FILE fi done # Check for RainerScript action log format which might be also multiline so grep regex is a bit # curly: # extract possibly multiline action omfile expressions # extract File="logfile" expression # match only "logfile" expression for LOG_FILE in "${RSYSLOG_CONFIG_FILES[@]}" do ACTION_OMFILE_LINES=$(grep -iozP "action\s*\(\s*type\s*=\s*\"omfile\"[^\)]*\)" "${LOG_FILE}") OMFILE_LINES=$(echo "${ACTION_OMFILE_LINES}"| grep -iaoP "File\s*=\s*\"([/[:alnum:][:punct:]]*)\"\s*\)") LOG_FILE_PATHS+=("$(echo "${OMFILE_LINES}"| grep -oE "\"([/[:alnum:][:punct:]]*)\""|tr -d "\"")") done # Ensure the correct attribute if file exists FILE_CMD="chmod" for LOG_FILE_PATH in "${LOG_FILE_PATHS[@]}" do # Sanity check - if particular $LOG_FILE_PATH is empty string, skip it from further processing if [ -z "$LOG_FILE_PATH" ] then continue fi $FILE_CMD "0640" "$LOG_FILE_PATH" done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure logging is configured The /etc/rsyslog.conf and /etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf files specifies rules for logging and which files are to be used to log certain classes of messages. This rule does not come with remediation as there is no one way to solve the problem, and the requirement from CIS specification does not require one particular way, but persuades the system administrator to perform configuration suitable for the specific environment. This also means that the OVAL check is too generic, and the user most probably should perform additional manual verification. A great deal of important security-related information is sent via rsyslog (e.g., successful and failed su attempts, failed login attempts, root login attempts, etc.). Ensure remote access methods are monitored in Rsyslog Logging of remote access methods must be implemented to help identify cyber attacks and ensure ongoing compliance with remote access policies are being audited and upheld. An examples of a remote access method is the use of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) from an external, non-organization controlled network. The /etc/rsyslog.conf or /etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf file should contain a match for the following selectors: auth.*, authpriv.*, and daemon.*. If not, use the following as an example configuration: auth.*;authpriv.*;daemon.* /var/log/secure CCI-000067 AC-17(1) SRG-OS-000032-GPOS-00013 RHEL-08-010070 SV-230228r627750_rule Logging remote access methods can be used to trace the decrease the risks associated with remote user access management. It can also be used to spot cyber attacks and ensure ongoing compliance with organizational policies surrounding the use of remote access methods. CCE-83426-7 - name: 'Ensure remote access methods are monitored in Rsyslog: Set facts' set_fact: conf_files: - /etc/rsyslog.conf remote_methods: - selector: auth.* regexp: ^.*auth\.\*.*$ - selector: authpriv.* regexp: ^.*authpriv\.\*.*$ - selector: daemon.* regexp: ^.*daemon\.\*.*$ when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83426-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010070 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(1) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_remote_access_monitoring - name: 'Ensure remote access methods are monitored in Rsyslog: Ensure rsyslog.conf exists' file: path: '{{ conf_files.0 }}' state: touch when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83426-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010070 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(1) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_remote_access_monitoring - name: 'Ensure remote access methods are monitored in Rsyslog: Gather conf.d files' find: patterns: - '*.conf' paths: - /etc/rsyslog.d register: rsyslogd when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83426-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010070 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(1) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_remote_access_monitoring - name: 'Ensure remote access methods are monitored in Rsyslog: Set conf file(s)' set_fact: conf_files: '{{ conf_files + [item.path] }}' loop: '{{ rsyslogd.files }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - rsyslogd.matched > 0 tags: - CCE-83426-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010070 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(1) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_remote_access_monitoring - name: 'Ensure remote access methods are monitored in Rsyslog: Check for existing values' lineinfile: path: '{{ item.1 }}' regexp: '{{ item.0.regexp }}' state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: remote_method_values loop: '{{ remote_methods|product(conf_files)|list }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83426-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010070 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(1) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_remote_access_monitoring - name: 'Ensure remote access methods are monitored in Rsyslog: Configure' lineinfile: path: /etc/rsyslog.conf line: '{{ item.item.0.selector }} /var/log/secure' insertafter: ^.*\/var\/log\/secure.*$ create: true loop: '{{ remote_method_values.results }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - item.found == 0 tags: - CCE-83426-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010070 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(1) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_remote_access_monitoring # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then declare -A REMOTE_METHODS=( ['auth.*']='^[^#]*auth\.\*.*$' ['authpriv.*']='^[^#]*authpriv\.\*.*$' ['daemon.*']='^[^#]*daemon\.\*.*$' ) if [[ ! -f /etc/rsyslog.conf ]]; then # Something is not right, create the file touch /etc/rsyslog.conf fi APPEND_LINE=$(sed -rn '/^\S+\s+\/var\/log\/secure$/p' /etc/rsyslog.conf) # Loop through the remote methods associative array for K in "${!REMOTE_METHODS[@]}" do # Check to see if selector/value exists if ! grep -rq "${REMOTE_METHODS[$K]}" /etc/rsyslog.*; then # Make sure we have a line to insert after, otherwise append to end if [[ ! -z ${APPEND_LINE} ]]; then # Add selector to file sed -r -i "0,/^(\S+\s+\/var\/log\/secure$)/s//\1\n${K} \/var\/log\/secure/" /etc/rsyslog.conf else echo "${K} /var/log/secure" >> /etc/rsyslog.conf fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi systemd-journald systemd-journald is a system service that collects and stores logging data. It creates and maintains structured, indexed journals based on logging information that is received from a variety of sources. For more information on systemd-journald and additional systemd-journald configuration options, see https://systemd.io/. Install systemd-journal-remote Package Journald (via systemd-journal-remote ) supports the ability to send log events it gathers to a remote log host or to receive messages from remote hosts, thus enabling centralised log management. 5.1.2.1.1 Storing log data on a remote host protects log integrity from local attacks. If an attacker gains root access on the local system, they could tamper with or remove log data that is stored on the local system. CCE-86467-8 - name: Ensure systemd-journal-remote is installed package: name: systemd-journal-remote state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86467-8 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_systemd-journal-remote_installed [[packages]] name = "systemd-journal-remote" version = "*" include install_systemd-journal-remote class install_systemd-journal-remote { package { 'systemd-journal-remote': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=systemd-journal-remote # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "systemd-journal-remote" ; then yum install -y "systemd-journal-remote" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable systemd-journald Service The systemd-journald service is an essential component of systemd. The systemd-journald service can be enabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl enable systemd-journald.service CCI-001665 SC-24 SRG-OS-000269-GPOS-00103 5.1.2.2 In the event of a system failure, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 must preserve any information necessary to determine cause of failure and any information necessary to return to operations with least disruption to system processes. CCE-85921-5 - name: Enable service systemd-journald block: - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto - name: Enable service systemd-journald systemd: name: systemd-journald enabled: 'yes' state: started masked: 'no' when: - '"systemd" in ansible_facts.packages' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-85921-5 - NIST-800-53-SC-24 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_systemd-journald_enabled [customizations.services] enabled = ["systemd-journald"] include enable_systemd-journald class enable_systemd-journald { service {'systemd-journald': enable => true, ensure => 'running', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'systemd-journald.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'systemd-journald.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'systemd-journald.service' else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure journald is configured to compress large log files The journald system can compress large log files to avoid fill the system disk. 5.1.2.3 Log files that are not properly compressed run the risk of growing so large that they fill up the log partition. Valuable logging information could be lost if the log partition becomes full. CCE-85930-6 - name: Check for duplicate Compress values in master journald configuration ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/systemd/journald.conf create: false regexp: ^\s*Compress= state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes_master when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-85930-6 - journald_compress - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Deduplicate Compress values from journald master configuration ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/systemd/journald.conf create: false regexp: ^\s*Compress= state: absent when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - dupes_master.found is defined and dupes_master.found > 1 tags: - CCE-85930-6 - journald_compress - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Collect all config journald files which configure Compress ansible.builtin.find: paths: /etc/systemd/journald.conf.d contains: ^[\s]*Compress=.*$ patterns: '*.conf' register: journald_Compress_dropin_config_files when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-85930-6 - journald_compress - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Deduplicate values from journald Compress dropin configuration ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item.path }}' create: false regexp: ^\s*Compress= state: absent loop: '{{ journald_Compress_dropin_config_files.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-85930-6 - journald_compress - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Insert correct line to journald Compress configuration ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/systemd/journald.conf.d/oscap-remedy.conf create: true regexp: ^\s*Compress= line: Compress=yes state: present insertbefore: ^# Compress validate: bash -n %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-85930-6 - journald_compress - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then function remove_journald_Compress_configuration { local COMPONENT_PARAM_CONFIG mapfile -t COMPONENT_PARAM_CONFIG < <(ls /etc/systemd/journald.conf.d/*.conf) COMPONENT_PARAM_CONFIG+=("/etc/systemd/journald.conf") for f in "${COMPONENT_PARAM_CONFIG[@]}" do sed -i "/^\s*Compress\s*=\s*/d" "$f" # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "$f" done sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/systemd/journald.conf" } function journald_Compress_add_configuration { local COMPONENT_PARAM_REMEDY_CFG mkdir -p "/etc/systemd/journald.conf.d" COMPONENT_PARAM_REMEDY_CFG="/etc/systemd/journald.conf.d/oscap-remedy.conf" if [ ! -f "${COMPONENT_PARAM_REMEDY_CFG}" ] ; then touch "${COMPONENT_PARAM_REMEDY_CFG}" fi cp "${COMPONENT_PARAM_REMEDY_CFG}" "${COMPONENT_PARAM_REMEDY_CFG}.bak" # Insert before the line matching the regex '^#\s*Compress'. line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^#\s*Compress" "${COMPONENT_PARAM_REMEDY_CFG}.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then # There was no match of '^#\s*Compress', insert at # the end of the file. printf '%s\n' "Compress=yes" >> "${COMPONENT_PARAM_REMEDY_CFG}" else head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "${COMPONENT_PARAM_REMEDY_CFG}.bak" > "${COMPONENT_PARAM_REMEDY_CFG}" printf '%s\n' "Compress=yes" >> "/etc/systemd/journald.conf" tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "${COMPONENT_PARAM_REMEDY_CFG}.bak" >> "${COMPONENT_PARAM_REMEDY_CFG}" fi # Clean up after ourselves. rm "${COMPONENT_PARAM_REMEDY_CFG}.bak" } remove_journald_Compress_configuration journald_Compress_add_configuration else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure journald is configured to send logs to rsyslog Data from journald may be stored in volatile memory or persisted locally. Utilities exist to accept remote export of journald logs. 5.1.1.3 Storing log data on a remote host protects log integrity from local attacks. If an attacker gains root access on the local system, they could tamper with or remove log data that is stored on the local system. CCE-85995-9 - name: Check for duplicate ForwardToSyslog values in master journald configuration ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/systemd/journald.conf create: false regexp: ^\s*ForwardToSyslog= state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes_master when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-85995-9 - journald_forward_to_syslog - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Deduplicate ForwardToSyslog values from journald master configuration ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/systemd/journald.conf create: false regexp: ^\s*ForwardToSyslog= state: absent when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - dupes_master.found is defined and dupes_master.found > 1 tags: - CCE-85995-9 - journald_forward_to_syslog - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Collect all config journald files which configure ForwardToSyslog ansible.builtin.find: paths: /etc/systemd/journald.conf.d contains: ^[\s]*ForwardToSyslog=.*$ patterns: '*.conf' register: journald_ForwardToSyslog_dropin_config_files when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-85995-9 - journald_forward_to_syslog - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Deduplicate values from journald ForwardToSyslog dropin configuration ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item.path }}' create: false regexp: ^\s*ForwardToSyslog= state: absent loop: '{{ journald_ForwardToSyslog_dropin_config_files.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-85995-9 - journald_forward_to_syslog - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Insert correct line to journald ForwardToSyslog configuration ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/systemd/journald.conf.d/oscap-remedy.conf create: true regexp: ^\s*ForwardToSyslog= line: ForwardToSyslog=yes state: present insertbefore: ^# ForwardToSyslog validate: bash -n %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-85995-9 - journald_forward_to_syslog - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then function remove_journald_ForwardToSyslog_configuration { local COMPONENT_PARAM_CONFIG mapfile -t COMPONENT_PARAM_CONFIG < <(ls /etc/systemd/journald.conf.d/*.conf) COMPONENT_PARAM_CONFIG+=("/etc/systemd/journald.conf") for f in "${COMPONENT_PARAM_CONFIG[@]}" do sed -i "/^\s*ForwardToSyslog\s*=\s*/d" "$f" # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "$f" done sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/systemd/journald.conf" } function journald_ForwardToSyslog_add_configuration { local COMPONENT_PARAM_REMEDY_CFG mkdir -p "/etc/systemd/journald.conf.d" COMPONENT_PARAM_REMEDY_CFG="/etc/systemd/journald.conf.d/oscap-remedy.conf" if [ ! -f "${COMPONENT_PARAM_REMEDY_CFG}" ] ; then touch "${COMPONENT_PARAM_REMEDY_CFG}" fi cp "${COMPONENT_PARAM_REMEDY_CFG}" "${COMPONENT_PARAM_REMEDY_CFG}.bak" # Insert before the line matching the regex '^#\s*Compress'. line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^#\s*ForwardToSyslog" "${COMPONENT_PARAM_REMEDY_CFG}.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then # There was no match of '^#\s*ForwardToSyslog', insert at # the end of the file. printf '%s\n' "ForwardToSyslog=yes" >> "${COMPONENT_PARAM_REMEDY_CFG}" else head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "${COMPONENT_PARAM_REMEDY_CFG}.bak" > "${COMPONENT_PARAM_REMEDY_CFG}" printf '%s\n' "ForwardToSyslog=yes" >> "/etc/systemd/journald.conf" tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "${COMPONENT_PARAM_REMEDY_CFG}.bak" >> "${COMPONENT_PARAM_REMEDY_CFG}" fi # Clean up after ourselves. rm "${COMPONENT_PARAM_REMEDY_CFG}.bak" } remove_journald_ForwardToSyslog_configuration journald_ForwardToSyslog_add_configuration else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure journald is configured to write log files to persistent disk The journald system may store log files in volatile memory or locally on disk. If the logs are only stored in volatile memory they will we lost upon reboot. 5.1.2.4 Log files contain valuable data and need to be persistent to aid in possible investigations. CCE-86045-2 - name: Check for duplicate Storage values in master journald configuration ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/systemd/journald.conf create: false regexp: ^\s*Storage= state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes_master when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86045-2 - journald_storage - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Deduplicate Storage values from journald master configuration ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/systemd/journald.conf create: false regexp: ^\s*Storage= state: absent when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - dupes_master.found is defined and dupes_master.found > 1 tags: - CCE-86045-2 - journald_storage - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Collect all config journald files which configure Storage ansible.builtin.find: paths: /etc/systemd/journald.conf.d contains: ^[\s]*Storage=.*$ patterns: '*.conf' register: journald_Storage_dropin_config_files when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86045-2 - journald_storage - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Deduplicate values from journald Storage dropin configuration ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: '{{ item.path }}' create: false regexp: ^\s*Storage= state: absent loop: '{{ journald_Storage_dropin_config_files.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86045-2 - journald_storage - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Insert correct line to journald Storage configuration ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/systemd/journald.conf.d/oscap-remedy.conf create: true regexp: ^\s*Storage= line: Storage=persistent state: present insertbefore: ^# Storage validate: bash -n %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86045-2 - journald_storage - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then function remove_journald_Storage_configuration { local COMPONENT_PARAM_CONFIG mapfile -t COMPONENT_PARAM_CONFIG < <(ls /etc/systemd/journald.conf.d/*.conf) COMPONENT_PARAM_CONFIG+=("/etc/systemd/journald.conf") for f in "${COMPONENT_PARAM_CONFIG[@]}" do sed -i "/^\s*Storage\s*=\s*/d" "$f" # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "$f" done sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/systemd/journald.conf" } function journald_Storage_add_configuration { local COMPONENT_PARAM_REMEDY_CFG mkdir -p "/etc/systemd/journald.conf.d" COMPONENT_PARAM_REMEDY_CFG="/etc/systemd/journald.conf.d/oscap-remedy.conf" if [ ! -f "${COMPONENT_PARAM_REMEDY_CFG}" ] ; then touch "${COMPONENT_PARAM_REMEDY_CFG}" fi cp "${COMPONENT_PARAM_REMEDY_CFG}" "${COMPONENT_PARAM_REMEDY_CFG}.bak" # Insert before the line matching the regex '^#\s*Compress'. line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^#\s*Storage" "${COMPONENT_PARAM_REMEDY_CFG}.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then # There was no match of '^#\s*Storage', insert at # the end of the file. printf '%s\n' "Storage=persistent" >> "${COMPONENT_PARAM_REMEDY_CFG}" else head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "${COMPONENT_PARAM_REMEDY_CFG}.bak" > "${COMPONENT_PARAM_REMEDY_CFG}" printf '%s\n' "Storage=persistent" >> "/etc/systemd/journald.conf" tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "${COMPONENT_PARAM_REMEDY_CFG}.bak" >> "${COMPONENT_PARAM_REMEDY_CFG}" fi # Clean up after ourselves. rm "${COMPONENT_PARAM_REMEDY_CFG}.bak" } remove_journald_Storage_configuration journald_Storage_add_configuration else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable systemd-journal-remote Socket Journald supports the ability to receive messages from remote hosts, thus acting as a log server. Clients should not receive data from other hosts. NOTE: The same package, systemd-journal-remote , is used for both sending logs to remote hosts and receiving incoming logs. With regards to receiving logs, there are two Systemd unit files; systemd-journal-remote.socket and systemd-journal-remote.service. 5.1.2.1.4 If a client is configured to also receive data, thus turning it into a server, the client system is acting outside it's operational boundary. CCE-87605-2 - name: Disable systemd-journal-remote Socket - Collect systemd Socket Units Present in the System ansible.builtin.command: cmd: systemctl -q list-unit-files --type socket register: result_systemd_unit_files changed_when: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-87605-2 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - socket_systemd-journal-remote_disabled - name: Disable systemd-journal-remote Socket - Ensure systemd-journal-remote.socket is Masked ansible.builtin.systemd: name: systemd-journal-remote.socket state: stopped enabled: false masked: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - result_systemd_unit_files.stdout_lines is search("systemd-journal-remote.socket") tags: - CCE-87605-2 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - socket_systemd-journal-remote_disabled # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SOCKET_NAME="systemd-journal-remote.socket" SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files --type socket | grep -q "$SOCKET_NAME"; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop "$SOCKET_NAME" "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask "$SOCKET_NAME" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure All Logs are Rotated by logrotate Edit the file /etc/logrotate.d/syslog. Find the first line, which should look like this (wrapped for clarity): /var/log/messages /var/log/secure /var/log/maillog /var/log/spooler \ /var/log/boot.log /var/log/cron { Edit this line so that it contains a one-space-separated listing of each log file referenced in /etc/rsyslog.conf. All logs in use on a system must be rotated regularly, or the log files will consume disk space over time, eventually interfering with system operation. The file /etc/logrotate.d/syslog is the configuration file used by the logrotate program to maintain all log files written by syslog. By default, it rotates logs weekly and stores four archival copies of each log. These settings can be modified by editing /etc/logrotate.conf, but the defaults are sufficient for purposes of this guide. Note that logrotate is run nightly by the cron job /etc/cron.daily/logrotate. If particularly active logs need to be rotated more often than once a day, some other mechanism must be used. Ensure logrotate is Installed logrotate is installed by default. The logrotate package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install logrotate BP28(R71) NT12(R18) 1 14 15 16 3 5 6 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 MEA02.01 CCI-000366 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 CM-6(a) PR.PT-1 Req-10.7 10.5.1 5.1.3 The logrotate package provides the logrotate services. CCE-86154-2 - name: Ensure logrotate is installed package: name: logrotate state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86154-2 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 - PCI-DSSv4-10.5.1 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_logrotate_installed [[packages]] name = "logrotate" version = "*" include install_logrotate class install_logrotate { package { 'logrotate': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=logrotate # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "logrotate" ; then yum install -y "logrotate" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure Logrotate Runs Periodically The logrotate utility allows for the automatic rotation of log files. The frequency of rotation is specified in /etc/logrotate.conf, which triggers a cron task or a timer. To configure logrotate to run daily, add or correct the following line in /etc/logrotate.conf: # rotate log files frequency daily BP28(R71) NT12(R18) 1 14 15 16 3 5 6 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 MEA02.01 CCI-000366 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 CM-6(a) PR.PT-1 Req-10.7 5.1.3 Log files that are not properly rotated run the risk of growing so large that they fill up the /var/log partition. Valuable logging information could be lost if the /var/log partition becomes full. CCE-80794-1 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80794-1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 - configure_strategy - ensure_logrotate_activated - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Configure daily log rotation in /etc/logrotate.conf lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/logrotate.conf regexp: ^daily$ line: daily when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"logrotate" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80794-1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 - configure_strategy - ensure_logrotate_activated - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Make sure daily log rotation setting is not overriden in /etc/logrotate.conf lineinfile: create: false dest: /etc/logrotate.conf regexp: ^[\s]*(weekly|monthly|yearly)$ state: absent when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"logrotate" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80794-1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 - configure_strategy - ensure_logrotate_activated - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Configure cron.daily if not already block: - name: Add shebang lineinfile: path: /etc/cron.daily/logrotate line: '#!/bin/sh' insertbefore: BOF create: true - name: Add logrotate call lineinfile: path: /etc/cron.daily/logrotate line: /usr/sbin/logrotate /etc/logrotate.conf regexp: ^[\s]*/usr/sbin/logrotate[\s\S]*/etc/logrotate.conf$ when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"logrotate" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80794-1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 - configure_strategy - ensure_logrotate_activated - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,{{ %23%20see%20%22man%20logrotate%22%20for%20details%0A%23%20rotate%20log%20files%20daily%0Adaily%0A%0A%23%20keep%204%20weeks%20worth%20of%20backlogs%0Arotate%2030%0A%0A%23%20create%20new%20%28empty%29%20log%20files%20after%20rotating%20old%20ones%0Acreate%0A%0A%23%20use%20date%20as%20a%20suffix%20of%20the%20rotated%20file%0Adateext%0A%0A%23%20uncomment%20this%20if%20you%20want%20your%20log%20files%20compressed%0A%23compress%0A%0A%23%20RPM%20packages%20drop%20log%20rotation%20information%20into%20this%20directory%0Ainclude%20/etc/logrotate.d%0A%0A%23%20system-specific%20logs%20may%20be%20also%20be%20configured%20here. }} mode: 0644 path: /etc/logrotate.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { rpm --quiet -q logrotate; }; then LOGROTATE_CONF_FILE="/etc/logrotate.conf" CRON_DAILY_LOGROTATE_FILE="/etc/cron.daily/logrotate" # daily rotation is configured grep -q "^daily$" $LOGROTATE_CONF_FILE|| echo "daily" >> $LOGROTATE_CONF_FILE # remove any line configuring weekly, monthly or yearly rotation sed -i '/^\s*\(weekly\|monthly\|yearly\).*$/d' $LOGROTATE_CONF_FILE # configure cron.daily if not already if ! grep -q "^[[:space:]]*/usr/sbin/logrotate[[:alnum:][:blank:][:punct:]]*$LOGROTATE_CONF_FILE$" $CRON_DAILY_LOGROTATE_FILE; then echo '#!/bin/sh' > $CRON_DAILY_LOGROTATE_FILE echo "/usr/sbin/logrotate $LOGROTATE_CONF_FILE" >> $CRON_DAILY_LOGROTATE_FILE fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable logrotate Timer The logrotate timer can be enabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl enable logrotate.timer The Systemd unit logrotate.timer does not exist in Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8. The rule ensure_logrotate_activated is suggested instead. BP28(R71) NT12(R18) 1 14 15 16 3 5 6 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 MEA02.01 CCI-000366 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 CM-6(a) PR.PT-1 Req-10.7 10.5.1 5.1.3 Log files that are not properly rotated run the risk of growing so large that they fill up the /var/log partition. Valuable logging information could be lost if the /var/log partition becomes full. CCE-86157-5 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-86157-5 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 - PCI-DSSv4-10.5.1 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - timer_logrotate_enabled - name: Enable timer logrotate block: - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto - name: Enable timer logrotate systemd: name: logrotate.timer enabled: 'yes' state: started when: - '"logrotate" in ansible_facts.packages' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ( ansible_distribution == 'RedHat' and ansible_distribution_version is version('9', '>=') and "logrotate" in ansible_facts.packages ) tags: - CCE-86157-5 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 - PCI-DSSv4-10.5.1 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - timer_logrotate_enabled # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { ( grep -qP "^ID=[\"']?rhel[\"']?$" "/etc/os-release" && { real="$(grep -P "^VERSION_ID=[\"']?[\w.]+[\"']?$" /etc/os-release | sed "s/^VERSION_ID=[\"']\?\([^\"']\+\)[\"']\?$/\1/")"; expected="9"; printf "%s\n%s" "$expected" "$real" | sort -VC; } && rpm --quiet -q logrotate ); }; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'logrotate.timer' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'logrotate.timer' else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure rsyslogd to Accept Remote Messages If Acting as a Log Server By default, rsyslog does not listen over the network for log messages. If needed, modules can be enabled to allow the rsyslog daemon to receive messages from other systems and for the system thus to act as a log server. If the system is not a log server, then lines concerning these modules should remain commented out. Ensure syslog-ng is Installed syslog-ng can be installed in replacement of rsyslog. The syslog-ng-core package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install syslog-ng-core BP28(R46) BP28(R5) 1 14 15 16 3 5 6 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 MEA02.01 CCI-001311 CCI-001312 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 CM-6(a) PR.PT-1 The syslog-ng-core package provides the syslog-ng daemon, which provides system logging services. - name: Ensure syslog-ng is installed package: name: syslog-ng state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_syslogng_installed [[packages]] name = "syslog-ng" version = "*" include install_syslog-ng class install_syslog-ng { package { 'syslog-ng': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=syslog-ng # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "syslog-ng" ; then yum install -y "syslog-ng" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable syslog-ng Service The syslog-ng service (in replacement of rsyslog) provides syslog-style logging by default on Debian. The syslog-ng service can be enabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl enable syslog-ng.service BP28(R46) BP28(R5) 1 12 13 14 15 16 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI04.04 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 CCI-001311 CCI-001312 CCI-001557 CCI-001851 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.2 A.12.1.3 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.17.2.1 CM-6(a) AU-4(1) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.DS-4 PR.PT-1 The syslog-ng service must be running in order to provide logging services, which are essential to system administration. - name: Enable service syslog-ng block: - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto - name: Enable service syslog-ng systemd: name: syslog-ng enabled: 'yes' state: started masked: 'no' when: - '"syslog-ng" in ansible_facts.packages' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-53-AU-4(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_syslogng_enabled [customizations.services] enabled = ["syslog-ng"] include enable_syslog-ng class enable_syslog-ng { service {'syslog-ng': enable => true, ensure => 'running', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'syslog-ng.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'syslog-ng.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'syslog-ng.service' else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable rsyslog to Accept Messages via TCP, if Acting As Log Server The rsyslog daemon should not accept remote messages unless the system acts as a log server. If the system needs to act as a central log server, add the following lines to /etc/rsyslog.conf to enable reception of messages over TCP: $ModLoad imtcp $InputTCPServerRun 514 1 14 15 16 3 5 6 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 MEA02.01 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 CIP-004-6 R3.3 CIP-007-3 R.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R6.5 CM-6(a) AU-6(3) AU-6(4) PR.PT-1 If the system needs to act as a log server, this ensures that it can receive messages over a reliable TCP connection. Enable rsyslog to Accept Messages via UDP, if Acting As Log Server The rsyslog daemon should not accept remote messages unless the system acts as a log server. If the system needs to act as a central log server, add the following lines to /etc/rsyslog.conf to enable reception of messages over UDP: $ModLoad imudp $UDPServerRun 514 1 14 15 16 3 5 6 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 MEA02.01 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 CIP-004-6 R3.3 CIP-007-3 R.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R6.5 CM-6(a) AU-6(3) AU-6(4) PR.PT-1 Many devices, such as switches, routers, and other Unix-like systems, may only support the traditional syslog transmission over UDP. If the system must act as a log server, this enables it to receive their messages as well. Ensure rsyslog Does Not Accept Remote Messages Unless Acting As Log Server The rsyslog daemon should not accept remote messages unless the system acts as a log server. To ensure that it is not listening on the network, ensure any of the following lines are not found in rsyslog configuration files. If using legacy syntax: $ModLoad imtcp $InputTCPServerRun port $ModLoad imudp $UDPServerRun port $ModLoad imrelp $InputRELPServerRun port If using RainerScript syntax: module(load="imtcp") module(load="imudp") input(type="imtcp" port="514") input(type="imudp" port="514") 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 4 5 6 8 9 APO01.06 APO11.04 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.05 DSS03.01 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 MEA02.01 CCI-000318 CCI-000366 CCI-000368 CCI-001812 CCI-001813 CCI-001814 4.2.3.4 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.4 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 4.4.3.3 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 0988 1405 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.12.1.1 A.12.1.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.2 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.2 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) DE.AE-1 ID.AM-3 PR.AC-5 PR.DS-5 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-4 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 5.1.1.7 Any process which receives messages from the network incurs some risk of receiving malicious messages. This risk can be eliminated for rsyslog by configuring it not to listen on the network. CCE-84275-7 - name: Ensure rsyslog Does Not Accept Remote Messages Unless Acting As Log Server - Define Rsyslog Config Lines Regex in Legacy Syntax ansible.builtin.set_fact: rsyslog_listen_legacy_regex: ^\s*\$(((Input(TCP|RELP)|UDP)ServerRun)|ModLoad\s+(imtcp|imudp|imrelp)) when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84275-7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_nolisten - name: Ensure rsyslog Does Not Accept Remote Messages Unless Acting As Log Server - Search for Legacy Config Lines in Rsyslog Main Config File ansible.builtin.find: paths: /etc pattern: rsyslog.conf contains: '{{ rsyslog_listen_legacy_regex }}' register: rsyslog_listen_legacy_main_file when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84275-7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_nolisten - name: Ensure rsyslog Does Not Accept Remote Messages Unless Acting As Log Server - Search for Legacy Config Lines in Rsyslog Include Files ansible.builtin.find: paths: /etc/rsyslog.d/ pattern: '*.conf' contains: '{{ rsyslog_listen_legacy_regex }}' register: rsyslog_listen_legacy_include_files when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84275-7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_nolisten - name: Ensure rsyslog Does Not Accept Remote Messages Unless Acting As Log Server - Assemble List of Config Files With Listen Lines in Legacy Syntax ansible.builtin.set_fact: rsyslog_legacy_remote_listen_files: '{{ rsyslog_listen_legacy_main_file.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list + rsyslog_listen_legacy_include_files.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84275-7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_nolisten - name: Ensure rsyslog Does Not Accept Remote Messages Unless Acting As Log Server - Comment Listen Config Lines Wherever Defined Using Legacy Syntax ansible.builtin.replace: path: '{{ item }}' regexp: '{{ rsyslog_listen_legacy_regex }}' replace: '# \1' loop: '{{ rsyslog_legacy_remote_listen_files }}' register: rsyslog_listen_legacy_comment when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - rsyslog_legacy_remote_listen_files | length > 0 tags: - CCE-84275-7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_nolisten - name: Ensure rsyslog Does Not Accept Remote Messages Unless Acting As Log Server - Define Rsyslog Config Lines Regex in RainerScript Syntax ansible.builtin.set_fact: rsyslog_listen_rainer_regex: ^\s*(module|input)\((load|type)="(imtcp|imudp)".*$ when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84275-7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_nolisten - name: Ensure rsyslog Does Not Accept Remote Messages Unless Acting As Log Server - Search for RainerScript Config Lines in Rsyslog Main Config File ansible.builtin.find: paths: /etc pattern: rsyslog.conf contains: '{{ rsyslog_listen_rainer_regex }}' register: rsyslog_rainer_remote_main_file when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84275-7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_nolisten - name: Ensure rsyslog Does Not Accept Remote Messages Unless Acting As Log Server - Search for RainerScript Config Lines in Rsyslog Include Files ansible.builtin.find: paths: /etc/rsyslog.d/ pattern: '*.conf' contains: '{{ rsyslog_listen_rainer_regex }}' register: rsyslog_rainer_remote_include_files when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84275-7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_nolisten - name: Ensure rsyslog Does Not Accept Remote Messages Unless Acting As Log Server - Assemble List of Config Files With Listen Lines in RainerScript ansible.builtin.set_fact: rsyslog_rainer_remote_listen_files: '{{ rsyslog_rainer_remote_main_file.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list + rsyslog_rainer_remote_include_files.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84275-7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_nolisten - name: Ensure rsyslog Does Not Accept Remote Messages Unless Acting As Log Server - Comment Listen Config Lines Wherever Defined Using RainerScript ansible.builtin.replace: path: '{{ item }}' regexp: '{{ rsyslog_listen_rainer_regex }}' replace: '# \1' loop: '{{ rsyslog_rainer_remote_listen_files }}' register: rsyslog_listen_rainer_comment when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - rsyslog_rainer_remote_listen_files | length > 0 tags: - CCE-84275-7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_nolisten - name: Ensure rsyslog Does Not Accept Remote Messages Unless Acting As Log Server - Restart Rsyslog if Any Line Were Commented Out ansible.builtin.service: name: rsyslog state: restarted when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - rsyslog_listen_legacy_comment is changed or rsyslog_listen_rainer_comment is changed tags: - CCE-84275-7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_nolisten # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then legacy_regex='^\s*\$(((Input(TCP|RELP)|UDP)ServerRun)|ModLoad\s+(imtcp|imudp|imrelp))' rainer_regex='^\s*(module|input)\((load|type)="(imtcp|imudp)".*$' readarray -t legacy_targets < <(grep -l -E -r "${legacy_regex[@]}" /etc/rsyslog.conf /etc/rsyslog.d/) readarray -t rainer_targets < <(grep -l -E -r "${rainer_regex[@]}" /etc/rsyslog.conf /etc/rsyslog.d/) config_changed=false if [ ${#legacy_targets[@]} -gt 0 ]; then for target in "${legacy_targets[@]}"; do sed -E -i "/$legacy_regex/ s/^/# /" "$target" done config_changed=true fi if [ ${#rainer_targets[@]} -gt 0 ]; then for target in "${rainer_targets[@]}"; do sed -E -i "/$rainer_regex/ s/^/# /" "$target" done config_changed=true fi if $config_changed; then systemctl restart rsyslog.service fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Rsyslog Logs Sent To Remote Host If system logs are to be useful in detecting malicious activities, it is necessary to send logs to a remote server. An intruder who has compromised the root account on a system may delete the log entries which indicate that the system was attacked before they are seen by an administrator. However, it is recommended that logs be stored on the local host in addition to being sent to the loghost, especially if rsyslog has been configured to use the UDP protocol to send messages over a network. UDP does not guarantee reliable delivery, and moderately busy sites will lose log messages occasionally, especially in periods of high traffic which may be the result of an attack. In addition, remote rsyslog messages are not authenticated in any way by default, so it is easy for an attacker to introduce spurious messages to the central log server. Also, some problems cause loss of network connectivity, which will prevent the sending of messages to the central server. For all of these reasons, it is better to store log messages both centrally and on each host, so that they can be correlated if necessary. Remote Log Server Specify an URI or IP address of a remote host where the log messages will be sent and stored. logcollector Ensure Logs Sent To Remote Host To configure rsyslog to send logs to a remote log server, open /etc/rsyslog.conf and read and understand the last section of the file, which describes the multiple directives necessary to activate remote logging. Along with these other directives, the system can be configured to forward its logs to a particular log server by adding or correcting one of the following lines, substituting appropriately. The choice of protocol depends on the environment of the system; although TCP and RELP provide more reliable message delivery, they may not be supported in all environments. To use UDP for log message delivery: *.* @ To use TCP for log message delivery: *.* @@ To use RELP for log message delivery: *.* :omrelp: There must be a resolvable DNS CNAME or Alias record set to "" for logs to be sent correctly to the centralized logging utility. It is important to configure queues in case the client is sending log messages to a remote server. If queues are not configured, the system will stop functioning when the connection to the remote server is not available. Please consult Rsyslog documentation for more information about configuration of queues. The example configuration which should go into /etc/rsyslog.conf can look like the following lines: $ActionQueueType LinkedList $ActionQueueFileName queuefilename $ActionQueueMaxDiskSpace 1g $ActionQueueSaveOnShutdown on $ActionResumeRetryCount -1 BP28(R7) NT28(R43) NT12(R5) 1 13 14 15 16 2 3 5 6 APO11.04 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI04.04 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 MEA02.01 CCI-000366 CCI-001348 CCI-000136 CCI-001851 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(B) 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) 164.308(a)(6)(ii) 164.308(a)(8) 164.310(d)(2)(iii) 164.312(b) 164.314(a)(2)(i)(C) 164.314(a)(2)(iii) 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 7.1 SR 7.2 0988 1405 A.12.1.3 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.17.2.1 CIP-003-8 R5.2 CIP-004-6 R3.3 CM-6(a) AU-4(1) AU-9(2) PR.DS-4 PR.PT-1 FAU_GEN.1.1.c SRG-OS-000479-GPOS-00224 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 SRG-OS-000342-GPOS-00133 RHEL-08-030690 5.1.1.6 SV-230479r917883_rule A log server (loghost) receives syslog messages from one or more systems. This data can be used as an additional log source in the event a system is compromised and its local logs are suspect. Forwarding log messages to a remote loghost also provides system administrators with a centralized place to view the status of multiple hosts within the enterprise. CCE-80863-4 - name: XCCDF Value rsyslog_remote_loghost_address # promote to variable set_fact: rsyslog_remote_loghost_address: !!str tags: - always - name: Set rsyslog remote loghost lineinfile: dest: /etc/rsyslog.conf regexp: ^\*\.\* line: '*.* @@{{ rsyslog_remote_loghost_address }}' create: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80863-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030690 - NIST-800-53-AU-4(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-9(2) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - rsyslog_remote_loghost # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then rsyslog_remote_loghost_address='' # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^\*\.\*") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s %s" "$stripped_key" "@@$rsyslog_remote_loghost_address" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^\*\.\*\\>" "/etc/rsyslog.conf"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^\*\.\*\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/rsyslog.conf" else if [[ -s "/etc/rsyslog.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/rsyslog.conf" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/rsyslog.conf" fi cce="CCE-80863-4" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "/etc/rsyslog.conf" >> "/etc/rsyslog.conf" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/rsyslog.conf" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure TLS for rsyslog remote logging Configure rsyslog to use Transport Layer Security (TLS) support for logging to remote server for the Forwarding Output Module in /etc/rsyslog.conf using action. You can use the following command: echo 'action(type="omfwd" protocol="tcp" Target="<remote system>" port="6514" StreamDriver="gtls" StreamDriverMode="1" StreamDriverAuthMode="x509/name" streamdriver.CheckExtendedKeyPurpose="on")' >> /etc/rsyslog.conf Replace the <remote system> in the above command with an IP address or a host name of the remote logging server. BP28(R43) 0988 1405 AU-9(3) CM-6(a) FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 FTP_ITC_EXT.1.1 FIA_X509_EXT.1.1 FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 SRG-OS-000120-GPOS-00061 For protection of data being logged, the connection to the remote logging server needs to be authenticated and encrypted. CCE-82457-3 - name: XCCDF Value rsyslog_remote_loghost_address # promote to variable set_fact: rsyslog_remote_loghost_address: !!str tags: - always - name: 'Configure TLS for rsyslog remote logging: search for omfwd action directive in rsyslog include files' ansible.builtin.find: paths: /etc/rsyslog.d/ pattern: '*.conf' contains: ^\s*action\s*\(\s*type\s*=\s*"omfwd".* register: rsyslog_includes_with_directive when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82457-3 - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_remote_tls - name: 'Configure TLS for rsyslog remote logging: search for omfwd action directive in rsyslog main config file' ansible.builtin.find: paths: /etc pattern: rsyslog.conf contains: ^\s*action\s*\(\s*type\s*=\s*"omfwd".* register: rsyslog_main_file_with_directive when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82457-3 - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_remote_tls - name: 'Configure TLS for rsyslog remote logging: declare Rsyslog option parameters to be inserted if entirely missing' ansible.builtin.set_fact: rsyslog_parameters_to_add_if_missing: - protocol - target - port - StreamDriver - StreamDriverMode - StreamDriverAuthMode - streamdriver.CheckExtendedKeyPurpose when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82457-3 - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_remote_tls - name: 'Configure TLS for rsyslog remote logging: declare Rsyslog option values to be inserted if entirely missing' ansible.builtin.set_fact: rsyslog_values_to_add_if_missing: - tcp - '{{ rsyslog_remote_loghost_address }}' - '6514' - gtls - '1' - x509/name - 'on' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82457-3 - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_remote_tls - name: 'Configure TLS for rsyslog remote logging: declare Rsyslog option parameters to be replaced if defined with wrong values' ansible.builtin.set_fact: rsyslog_parameters_to_replace_if_wrong_value: - protocol - StreamDriver - StreamDriverMode - StreamDriverAuthMode - streamdriver.CheckExtendedKeyPurpose when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82457-3 - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_remote_tls - name: 'Configure TLS for rsyslog remote logging: declare Rsyslog option values to be replaced when having wrong value' ansible.builtin.set_fact: rsyslog_values_to_replace_if_wrong_value: - tcp - gtls - '1' - x509/name - 'on' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82457-3 - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_remote_tls - name: 'Configure TLS for rsyslog remote logging: assemble list of files with existing directives' ansible.builtin.set_fact: rsyslog_files: '{{ rsyslog_includes_with_directive.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list + rsyslog_main_file_with_directive.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82457-3 - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_remote_tls - name: 'Configure TLS for rsyslog remote logging: try to fix existing directives' block: - name: 'Configure TLS for rsyslog remote logging: Fix existing omfwd directives by adjusting the value' ansible.builtin.replace: path: '{{ item[0] }}' regexp: (?i)^(\s*action\s*\(\s*type\s*=\s*"omfwd"[\s\S]*)({{ item[1][0] | regex_escape() }}\s*=\s*"\S*")([\s\S]*\))$ replace: \1{{ item[1][0] }}="{{ item[1][1] }}"\3 loop: '{{ rsyslog_files | product (rsyslog_parameters_to_replace_if_wrong_value | zip(rsyslog_values_to_replace_if_wrong_value)) | list }}' - name: 'Configure TLS for rsyslog remote logging: Fix existing omfwd directives by adding parameter and value' ansible.builtin.replace: path: '{{ item[0] }}' regexp: (?i)^(\s*action\s*\(\s*type\s*=\s*"omfwd"(?:[\s\S](?!{{ item[1][0] | regex_escape() }}))*.)(\))$ replace: \1 {{ item[1][0] }}="{{ item[1][1] }}" \2 loop: '{{ rsyslog_files | product (rsyslog_parameters_to_add_if_missing | zip(rsyslog_values_to_add_if_missing)) | list }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - rsyslog_includes_with_directive.matched or rsyslog_main_file_with_directive.matched tags: - CCE-82457-3 - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_remote_tls - name: 'Configure TLS for rsyslog remote logging: Add missing rsyslog directive' ansible.builtin.lineinfile: dest: /etc/rsyslog.conf line: action(type="omfwd" protocol="tcp" Target="{{ rsyslog_remote_loghost_address }}" port="6514" StreamDriver="gtls" StreamDriverMode="1" StreamDriverAuthMode="x509/name" streamdriver.CheckExtendedKeyPurpose="on") create: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not rsyslog_includes_with_directive.matched and not rsyslog_main_file_with_directive.matched tags: - CCE-82457-3 - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - rsyslog_remote_tls # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then rsyslog_remote_loghost_address='' params_to_add_if_missing=("protocol" "target" "port" "StreamDriver" "StreamDriverMode" "StreamDriverAuthMode" "streamdriver.CheckExtendedKeyPurpose") values_to_add_if_missing=("tcp" "$rsyslog_remote_loghost_address" "6514" "gtls" "1" "x509/name" "on") params_to_replace_if_wrong_value=("protocol" "StreamDriver" "StreamDriverMode" "StreamDriverAuthMode" "streamdriver.CheckExtendedKeyPurpose") values_to_replace_if_wrong_value=("tcp" "gtls" "1" "x509/name" "on") files_containing_omfwd=("$(grep -ilE '^[^#]*\s*action\s*\(\s*type\s*=\s*"omfwd".*' /etc/rsyslog.conf /etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf)") if [ -n "${files_containing_omfwd[*]}" ]; then for file in "${files_containing_omfwd[@]}"; do for ((i=0; i<${#params_to_replace_if_wrong_value[@]}; i++)); do sed -i -E -e 'H;$!d;x;s/^\n//' -e "s|(\s*action\s*\(\s*type\s*=\s*[\"]omfwd[\"].*?)${params_to_replace_if_wrong_value[$i]}\s*=\s*[\"]\S*[\"](.*\))|\1${params_to_replace_if_wrong_value[$i]}=\"${values_to_replace_if_wrong_value[$i]}\"\2|gI" "$file" done for ((i=0; i<${#params_to_add_if_missing[@]}; i++)); do if ! grep -qPzi "(?s)\s*action\s*\(\s*type\s*=\s*[\"]omfwd[\"].*?${params_to_add_if_missing[$i]}.*?\).*" "$file"; then sed -i -E -e 'H;$!d;x;s/^\n//' -e "s|(\s*action\s*\(\s*type\s*=\s*[\"]omfwd[\"])|\1\n${params_to_add_if_missing[$i]}=\"${values_to_add_if_missing[$i]}\"|gI" "$file" fi done done else echo "action(type=\"omfwd\" protocol=\"tcp\" Target=\"$rsyslog_remote_loghost_address\" port=\"6514\" StreamDriver=\"gtls\" StreamDriverMode=\"1\" StreamDriverAuthMode=\"x509/name\" streamdriver.CheckExtendedKeyPurpose=\"on\")" >> /etc/rsyslog.conf fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure CA certificate for rsyslog remote logging Configure CA certificate for rsyslog logging to remote server using Transport Layer Security (TLS) using correct path for the DefaultNetstreamDriverCAFile global option in /etc/rsyslog.conf, for example with the following command: echo 'global(DefaultNetstreamDriverCAFile="/etc/pki/tls/cert.pem")' >> /etc/rsyslog.conf Replace the /etc/pki/tls/cert.pem in the above command with the path to the file with CA certificate generated for the purpose of remote logging. Automatic remediation is not available as each organization has unique requirements. BP28(R43) 0988 1405 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 The CA certificate needs to be set or rsyslog.service fails to start with error: ca certificate is not set, cannot continue CCE-82458-1 Network Configuration and Firewalls Most systems must be connected to a network of some sort, and this brings with it the substantial risk of network attack. This section discusses the security impact of decisions about networking which must be made when configuring a system. This section also discusses firewalls, network access controls, and other network security frameworks, which allow system-level rules to be written that can limit an attackers' ability to connect to your system. These rules can specify that network traffic should be allowed or denied from certain IP addresses, hosts, and networks. The rules can also specify which of the system's network services are available to particular hosts or networks. Configure Multiple DNS Servers in /etc/resolv.conf Determine whether the system is using local or DNS name resolution with the following command: $ sudo grep hosts /etc/nsswitch.conf hosts: files dns If the DNS entry is missing from the host's line in the "/etc/nsswitch.conf" file, the "/etc/resolv.conf" file must be empty. Verify the "/etc/resolv.conf" file is empty with the following command: $ sudo ls -al /etc/resolv.conf -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 Aug 19 08:31 resolv.conf If the DNS entry is found on the host's line of the "/etc/nsswitch.conf" file, then verify the following: Multiple Domain Name System (DNS) Servers should be configured in /etc/resolv.conf. This provides redundant name resolution services in the event that a domain server crashes. To configure the system to contain as least 2 DNS servers, add a corresponding nameserver ip_address entry in /etc/resolv.conf for each DNS server where ip_address is the IP address of a valid DNS server. For example: search example.com nameserver 192.168.0.1 nameserver 192.168.0.2 This rule doesn't come with a remediation, the IP addresses of local authoritative name servers need to be added by the administrator. 12 15 8 APO13.01 DSS05.02 CCI-000366 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 SC-20(a) CM-6(a) PR.PT-4 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010680 SV-230316r627750_rule To provide availability for name resolution services, multiple redundant name servers are mandated. A failure in name resolution could lead to the failure of security functions requiring name resolution, which may include time synchronization, centralized authentication, and remote system logging. CCE-84049-6 Disable Client Dynamic DNS Updates Dynamic DNS allows clients to dynamically update their own DNS records. The updates are transmitted by unencrypted means which can reveal information to a potential malicious user. If the system does not require Dynamic DNS, remove all DHCP_HOSTNAME references from the /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifcfg-interface scripts. If dhclient is used, remove all send host-name hostname references from the /etc/dhclient.conf configuration file and/or any reference from the /etc/dhcp directory. 11 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 CCI-000366 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 Dynamic DNS updates transmit unencrypted information about a system including its name and address and should not be used unless needed. Disable Zeroconf Networking Zeroconf networking allows the system to assign itself an IP address and engage in IP communication without a statically-assigned address or even a DHCP server. Automatic address assignment via Zeroconf (or DHCP) is not recommended. To disable Zeroconf automatic route assignment in the 169.254.0.0 subnet, add or correct the following line in /etc/sysconfig/network: NOZEROCONF=yes 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 Zeroconf addresses are in the network 169.254.0.0. The networking scripts add entries to the system's routing table for these addresses. Zeroconf address assignment commonly occurs when the system is configured to use DHCP but fails to receive an address assignment from the DHCP server. echo "NOZEROCONF=yes" >> /etc/sysconfig/network Prevent non-Privileged Users from Modifying Network Interfaces using nmcli By default, non-privileged users are given permissions to modify networking interfaces and configurations using the nmcli command. Non-privileged users should not be making configuration changes to network configurations. To ensure that non-privileged users do not have permissions to make changes to the network configuration using nmcli, create the following configuration in /etc/polkit-1/localauthority/20-org.d/10-nm-harden-access.pkla: [Disable General User Access to NetworkManager] Identity=default Action=org.freedesktop.NetworkManager.* ResultAny=no ResultInactive=no ResultActive=auth_admin 3.1.16 0418 1055 1402 AC-18(4) CM-6(a) 1.2.8 Allowing non-privileged users to make changes to network settings can allow untrusted access, prevent system availability, and/or can lead to a compromise or attack. CCE-82179-3 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-82179-3 - NIST-800-171-3.1.16 - NIST-800-53-AC-18(4) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.8 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - network_nmcli_permissions - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure non-privileged users do not have access to nmcli ini_file: path: /etc/polkit-1/localauthority/20-org.d/10-nm-harden-access.pkla section: Disable General User Access to NetworkManager option: '{{ item.option }}' value: '{{ item.value }}' no_extra_spaces: true create: true loop: - option: Identity value: default - option: Action value: org.freedesktop.NetworkManager.* - option: ResultAny value: 'no' - option: ResultInactive value: 'no' - option: ResultActive value: auth_admin when: '"polkit" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-82179-3 - NIST-800-171-3.1.16 - NIST-800-53-AC-18(4) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.8 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - network_nmcli_permissions - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q polkit; then printf "[Disable General User Access to NetworkManager]\nIdentity=default\nAction=org.freedesktop.NetworkManager.*\nResultAny=no\nResultInactive=no\nResultActive=auth_admin\n" > /etc/polkit-1/localauthority/20-org.d/10-nm-harden-access.pkla else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure System is Not Acting as a Network Sniffer The system should not be acting as a network sniffer, which can capture all traffic on the network to which it is connected. Run the following to determine if any interface is running in promiscuous mode: $ ip link | grep PROMISC Promiscuous mode of an interface can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo ip link set dev device_name multicast off promisc off 1 11 14 3 9 APO11.06 APO12.06 BAI03.10 BAI09.01 BAI09.02 BAI09.03 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.05 DSS04.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 CCI-000366 4.2.3.4 4.3.3.3.7 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 4.4.3.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 SR 7.8 A.11.1.2 A.11.2.4 A.11.2.5 A.11.2.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.16.1.6 A.8.1.1 A.8.1.2 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) CM-7(2) MA-3 DE.DP-5 ID.AM-1 PR.IP-1 PR.MA-1 PR.PT-3 1.4.5 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040330 SV-230554r627750_rule Network interfaces in promiscuous mode allow for the capture of all network traffic visible to the system. If unauthorized individuals can access these applications, it may allow them to collect information such as logon IDs, passwords, and key exchanges between systems. If the system is being used to perform a network troubleshooting function, the use of these tools must be documented with the Information Systems Security Manager (ISSM) and restricted to only authorized personnel. CCE-82283-3 - name: Ensure System is Not Acting as a Network Sniffer - Gather network interfaces ansible.builtin.command: cmd: ip link show register: network_interfaces when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82283-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040330 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(2) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MA-3 - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.5 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - network_sniffer_disabled - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure System is Not Acting as a Network Sniffer - Disable promiscuous mode ansible.builtin.command: cmd: ip link set dev {{ item.split(':')[1] }} multicast off promisc off loop: '{{ network_interfaces.stdout_lines }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - item.split(':') | length == 3 tags: - CCE-82283-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040330 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(2) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MA-3 - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.5 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - network_sniffer_disabled - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then for interface in $(ip link show | grep -E '^[0-9]' | cut -d ":" -f 2); do ip link set dev $interface multicast off promisc off done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi firewalld The dynamic firewall daemon firewalld provides a dynamically managed firewall with support for network “zones” to assign a level of trust to a network and its associated connections and interfaces. It has support for IPv4 and IPv6 firewall settings. It supports Ethernet bridges and has a separation of runtime and permanent configuration options. It also has an interface for services or applications to add firewall rules directly. A graphical configuration tool, firewall-config, is used to configure firewalld, which in turn uses iptables tool to communicate with Netfilter in the kernel which implements packet filtering. The firewall service provided by firewalld is dynamic rather than static because changes to the configuration can be made at anytime and are immediately implemented. There is no need to save or apply the changes. No unintended disruption of existing network connections occurs as no part of the firewall has to be reloaded. Configure Firewalld to Use the Nftables Backend Firewalld can be configured with many backends, such as nftables. CCI-002385 SC-5 SRG-OS-000420-GPOS-00186 RHEL-08-040150 SV-230525r902735_rule Nftables is modern kernel module for controling network connections coming into a system. Utilizing the limit statement in "nftables" can help to mitigate DoS attacks. CCE-86506-3 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-86506-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040150 - NIST-800-53-SC-5 - firewalld-backend - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Setting unquoted shell-style assignment of 'FirewallBackend' to 'nftables' in '/etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf' block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf create: true regexp: ^\s*FirewallBackend= state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf lineinfile: path: /etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf create: true regexp: ^\s*FirewallBackend= state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf lineinfile: path: /etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf create: true regexp: ^\s*FirewallBackend= line: FirewallBackend=nftables state: present insertbefore: ^# FirewallBackend validate: /usr/bin/bash -n %s when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"firewalld" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-86506-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040150 - NIST-800-53-SC-5 - firewalld-backend - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { rpm --quiet -q firewalld; }; then if [ -e "/etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*FirewallBackend\s*=\s*/d" "/etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf" else touch "/etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf" cp "/etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf" "/etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf.bak" # Insert before the line matching the regex '^#\s*FirewallBackend'. line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^#\s*FirewallBackend" "/etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then # There was no match of '^#\s*FirewallBackend', insert at # the end of the file. printf '%s\n' "FirewallBackend=nftables" >> "/etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf" else head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "/etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf.bak" > "/etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf" printf '%s\n' "FirewallBackend=nftables" >> "/etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf" tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "/etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf.bak" >> "/etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf" fi # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure network interfaces are assigned to appropriate zone Firewall zones define the trust level of network connections or interfaces. Note: Changing firewall settings while connected over network can result in being locked out of the system. 3.4.1.6 A network interface not assigned to the appropriate zone can allow unexpected or undesired network traffic to be accepted on the interface. CCE-86111-2 Inspect and Activate Default firewalld Rules Firewalls can be used to separate networks into different zones based on the level of trust the user has decided to place on the devices and traffic within that network. NetworkManager informs firewalld to which zone an interface belongs. An interface's assigned zone can be changed by NetworkManager or via the firewall-config tool. The zone settings in /etc/firewalld/ are a range of preset settings which can be quickly applied to a network interface. These are the zones provided by firewalld sorted according to the default trust level of the zones from untrusted to trusted: dropAny incoming network packets are dropped, there is no reply. Only outgoing network connections are possible.blockAny incoming network connections are rejected with an icmp-host-prohibited message for IPv4 and icmp6-adm-prohibited for IPv6. Only network connections initiated from within the system are possible.publicFor use in public areas. You do not trust the other computers on the network to not harm your computer. Only selected incoming connections are accepted.externalFor use on external networks with masquerading enabled especially for routers. You do not trust the other computers on the network to not harm your computer. Only selected incoming connections are accepted.dmzFor computers in your demilitarized zone that are publicly-accessible with limited access to your internal network. Only selected incoming connections are accepted.workFor use in work areas. You mostly trust the other computers on networks to not harm your computer. Only selected incoming connections are accepted.homeFor use in home areas. You mostly trust the other computers on networks to not harm your computer. Only selected incoming connections are accepted.internalFor use on internal networks. You mostly trust the other computers on the networks to not harm your computer. Only selected incoming connections are accepted.trustedAll network connections are accepted. It is possible to designate one of these zones to be the default zone. When interface connections are added to NetworkManager, they are assigned to the default zone. On installation, the default zone in firewalld is set to be the public zone. To find out all the settings of a zone, for example the public zone, enter the following command as root: # firewall-cmd --zone=public --list-all Example output of this command might look like the following: # firewall-cmd --zone=public --list-all public interfaces: services: mdns dhcpv6-client ssh ports: forward-ports: icmp-blocks: source-quench To view the network zones currently active, enter the following command as root: # firewall-cmd --get-service The following listing displays the result of this command on common Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 system: # firewall-cmd --get-service amanda-client bacula bacula-client dhcp dhcpv6 dhcpv6-client dns ftp high-availability http https imaps ipp ipp-client ipsec kerberos kpasswd ldap ldaps libvirt libvirt-tls mdns mountd ms-wbt mysql nfs ntp openvpn pmcd pmproxy pmwebapi pmwebapis pop3s postgresql proxy-dhcp radius rpc-bind samba samba-client smtp ssh telnet tftp tftp-client transmission-client vnc-server wbem-https Finally to view the network zones that will be active after the next firewalld service reload, enter the following command as root: # firewall-cmd --get-service --permanent Install firewalld Package The firewalld package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install firewalld CCI-002314 CM-6(a) FMT_SMF_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000096-GPOS-00050 SRG-OS-000297-GPOS-00115 SRG-OS-000298-GPOS-00116 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00232 RHEL-08-040100 3.4.1.1 SV-230505r854048_rule "Firewalld" provides an easy and effective way to block/limit remote access to the system via ports, services, and protocols. Remote access services, such as those providing remote access to network devices and information systems, which lack automated control capabilities, increase risk and make remote user access management difficult at best. Remote access is access to DoD nonpublic information systems by an authorized user (or an information system) communicating through an external, non-organization-controlled network. Remote access methods include, for example, dial-up, broadband, and wireless. Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 functionality (e.g., SSH) must be capable of taking enforcement action if the audit reveals unauthorized activity. Automated control of remote access sessions allows organizations to ensure ongoing compliance with remote access policies by enforcing connection rules of remote access applications on a variety of information system components (e.g., servers, workstations, notebook computers, smartphones, and tablets)." CCE-82998-6 - name: Ensure firewalld is installed package: name: firewalld state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82998-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040100 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_firewalld_installed [[packages]] name = "firewalld" version = "*" include install_firewalld class install_firewalld { package { 'firewalld': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=firewalld # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "firewalld" ; then yum install -y "firewalld" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify firewalld Enabled The firewalld service can be enabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl enable firewalld.service 11 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 3.1.3 3.4.7 CCI-000366 CCI-000382 CCI-002314 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 CIP-003-8 R4 CIP-003-8 R5 CIP-004-6 R3 AC-4 CM-7(b) CA-3(5) SC-7(21) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 FMT_SMF_EXT.1 1.2.1 SRG-OS-000096-GPOS-00050 SRG-OS-000297-GPOS-00115 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00231 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00232 RHEL-08-040101 3.4.1.4 SV-244544r854073_rule Access control methods provide the ability to enhance system security posture by restricting services and known good IP addresses and address ranges. This prevents connections from unknown hosts and protocols. CCE-80877-4 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80877-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040101 - NIST-800-171-3.1.3 - NIST-800-171-3.4.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-4 - NIST-800-53-CA-3(5) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-7(21) - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.1 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_firewalld_enabled - name: Enable service firewalld block: - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto - name: Enable service firewalld systemd: name: firewalld enabled: 'yes' state: started masked: 'no' when: - '"firewalld" in ansible_facts.packages' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"firewalld" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80877-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040101 - NIST-800-171-3.1.3 - NIST-800-171-3.4.7 - NIST-800-53-AC-4 - NIST-800-53-CA-3(5) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-7(21) - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.1 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_firewalld_enabled [customizations.services] enabled = ["firewalld"] include enable_firewalld class enable_firewalld { service {'firewalld': enable => true, ensure => 'running', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { rpm --quiet -q firewalld; }; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'firewalld.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'firewalld.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'firewalld.service' else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Strengthen the Default Ruleset The default rules can be strengthened. The system scripts that activate the firewall rules expect them to be defined in configuration files under the /etc/firewalld/services and /etc/firewalld/zones directories. The following recommendations describe how to strengthen the default ruleset configuration file. An alternative to editing this configuration file is to create a shell script that makes calls to the firewall-cmd program to load in rules under the /etc/firewalld/services and /etc/firewalld/zones directories. Instructions apply to both unless otherwise noted. Language and address conventions for regular firewalld rules are used throughout this section. The program firewall-config allows additional services to penetrate the default firewall rules and automatically adjusts the firewalld ruleset(s). Configure the Firewalld Ports Configure the firewalld ports to allow approved services to have access to the system. To configure firewalld to open ports, run the following command: firewall-cmd --permanent --add-port=port_number/tcp To configure firewalld to allow access for pre-defined services, run the following command: firewall-cmd --permanent --add-service=service_name 11 12 14 15 3 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 CCI-000382 CCI-002314 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 1416 A.11.2.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.9.1.2 AC-4 CM-7(b) CA-3(5) SC-7(21) CM-6(a) PR.AC-3 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 1.3.1 SRG-OS-000096-GPOS-00050 SRG-OS-000297-GPOS-00115 RHEL-08-040030 SV-230500r627750_rule In order to prevent unauthorized connection of devices, unauthorized transfer of information, or unauthorized tunneling (i.e., embedding of data types within data types), organizations must disable or restrict unused or unnecessary physical and logical ports/protocols on information systems. Operating systems are capable of providing a wide variety of functions and services. Some of the functions and services provided by default may not be necessary to support essential organizational operations. Additionally, it is sometimes convenient to provide multiple services from a single component (e.g., VPN and IPS); however, doing so increases risk over limiting the services provided by one component. To support the requirements and principles of least functionality, the operating system must support the organizational requirements, providing only essential capabilities and limiting the use of ports, protocols, and/or services to only those required, authorized, and approved to conduct official business. CCE-84300-3 Firewalld Must Employ a Deny-all, Allow-by-exception Policy for Allowing Connections to Other Systems Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 incorporates the "firewalld" daemon, which allows for many different configurations. One of these configurations is zones. Zones can be utilized to a deny-all, allow-by-exception approach. The default "drop" zone will drop all incoming network packets unless it is explicitly allowed by the configuration file or is related to an outgoing network connection. CCI-002314 AC-17 (1) SRG-OS-000297-GPOS-00115 RHEL-08-040090 SV-230504r942942_rule Failure to restrict network connectivity only to authorized systems permits inbound connections from malicious systems. It also permits outbound connections that may facilitate exfiltration of data. CCE-86266-4 Set Default firewalld Zone for Incoming Packets To set the default zone to drop for the built-in default zone which processes incoming IPv4 and IPv6 packets, modify the following line in /etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf to be: DefaultZone=drop To prevent denying any access to the system, automatic remediation of this control is not available. Remediation must be automated as a component of machine provisioning, or followed manually as outlined above. 11 14 3 9 5.10.1 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 3.1.3 3.4.7 3.13.6 CCI-000366 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 1416 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CA-3(5) CM-7(b) SC-7(23) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 FMT_MOF_EXT.1 Req-1.4 1.3.1 1.5.1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040090 3.4.1.5 SV-230504r942942_rule In firewalld the default zone is applied only after all the applicable rules in the table are examined for a match. Setting the default zone to drop implements proper design for a firewall, i.e. any packets which are not explicitly permitted should not be accepted. CCE-80890-7 Dectivate firewalld Rules Firewalls can be used to separate networks into different zones based on the level of trust the user has decided to place on the devices and traffic within that network. Firewalls can be implemented using variety of software tools and services, i.e. iptables, nftables, firewalld, ufw, SuSEFirewall2 etc. Having more than one service controlling the firewall functionality may lead to conflicts and misconfiguration. Therefore, in case one uses iptables or nftables firewalld service should be disabled. IPSec Support Support for Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) is provided with Libreswan. Install libreswan Package The libreswan package provides an implementation of IPsec and IKE, which permits the creation of secure tunnels over untrusted networks. The libreswan package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install libreswan 12 15 3 5 8 APO13.01 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 CCI-001130 CCI-001131 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 SR 1.13 SR 2.6 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.4 A.11.2.6 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.15.1.1 A.15.2.1 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 CM-6(a) PR.AC-3 PR.MA-2 PR.PT-4 Req-4.1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 SRG-OS-000120-GPOS-00061 Providing the ability for remote users or systems to initiate a secure VPN connection protects information when it is transmitted over a wide area network. CCE-80845-1 - name: Ensure libreswan is installed package: name: libreswan state: present tags: - CCE-80845-1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-4.1 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_libreswan_installed [[packages]] name = "libreswan" version = "*" include install_libreswan class install_libreswan { package { 'libreswan': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=libreswan if ! rpm -q --quiet "libreswan" ; then yum install -y "libreswan" fi Verify Any Configured IPSec Tunnel Connections Libreswan provides an implementation of IPsec and IKE, which permits the creation of secure tunnels over untrusted networks. As such, IPsec can be used to circumvent certain network requirements such as filtering. Verify that if any IPsec connection (conn) configured in /etc/ipsec.conf and /etc/ipsec.d exists is an approved organizational connection. Automatic remediation of this control is not available due to the unique requirements of each system. 1 12 13 14 15 16 18 4 6 8 9 APO01.06 APO13.01 DSS01.05 DSS03.01 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 CCI-000336 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) 4.2.3.4 4.3.3.4 4.4.3.3 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.12.1.1 A.12.1.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.2 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.2 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 AC-17(a) MA-4(6) CM-6(a) AC-4 SC-8 DE.AE-1 ID.AM-3 PR.AC-5 PR.DS-5 PR.PT-4 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 IP tunneling mechanisms can be used to bypass network filtering. CCE-80836-0 iptables and ip6tables A host-based firewall called netfilter is included as part of the Linux kernel distributed with the system. It is activated by default. This firewall is controlled by the program iptables, and the entire capability is frequently referred to by this name. An analogous program called ip6tables handles filtering for IPv6. Unlike TCP Wrappers, which depends on the network server program to support and respect the rules written, netfilter filtering occurs at the kernel level, before a program can even process the data from the network packet. As such, any program on the system is affected by the rules written. This section provides basic information about strengthening the iptables and ip6tables configurations included with the system. For more complete information that may allow the construction of a sophisticated ruleset tailored to your environment, please consult the references at the end of this section. Install iptables-services Package The iptables-services package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install iptables-services CM-6(a) SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 3.4.3.1.1 iptables-services provides the services iptables and ip6tables that have been split out of the base package since they are not active by default anymore. These services load the iptables rules during the system startup and also allow one to reload the iptables rules during runtime. CCE-85982-7 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-85982-7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_iptables-services_installed - name: Ensure iptables-services is installed package: name: iptables-services state: present when: '"iptables" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-85982-7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_iptables-services_installed [[packages]] name = "iptables-services" version = "*" include install_iptables-services class install_iptables-services { package { 'iptables-services': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=iptables-services # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q iptables; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "iptables-services" ; then yum install -y "iptables-services" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Install iptables Package The iptables package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install iptables CM-6(a) Req-1.4.1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 3.4.3.1.1 iptables controls the Linux kernel network packet filtering code. iptables allows system operators to set up firewalls and IP masquerading, etc. CCE-82982-0 - name: Ensure iptables is installed package: name: iptables state: present when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] ) tags: - CCE-82982-0 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.1 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_iptables_installed [[packages]] name = "iptables" version = "*" include install_iptables class install_iptables { package { 'iptables': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=iptables # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] ); then if ! rpm -q --quiet "iptables" ; then yum install -y "iptables" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Remove iptables-services Package The iptables-services package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase iptables-services 3.4.1.2 3.4.2.3 iptables-services provides the services iptables and ip6tables that have been split out of the base package since they are not active by default anymore. These services load the iptables rules during the system startup and also allow one to reload the iptables rules during runtime. Those iptables services conflicts with firewalld so they should be removed if firewalld is used. CCE-86679-8 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-86679-8 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_iptables-services_removed - name: Ensure iptables-services is removed package: name: iptables-services state: absent when: '"iptables" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-86679-8 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_iptables-services_removed include remove_iptables-services class remove_iptables-services { package { 'iptables-services': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=iptables-services # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q iptables; then # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove iptables-services # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on iptables-services. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "iptables-services" ; then yum remove -y "iptables-services" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Inspect and Activate Default Rules View the currently-enforced iptables rules by running the command: $ sudo iptables -nL --line-numbers The command is analogous for ip6tables. If the firewall does not appear to be active (i.e., no rules appear), activate it and ensure that it starts at boot by issuing the following commands (and analogously for ip6tables): $ sudo service iptables restart The default iptables rules are: Chain INPUT (policy ACCEPT) num target prot opt source destination 1 ACCEPT all -- 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 state RELATED,ESTABLISHED 2 ACCEPT icmp -- 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 3 ACCEPT all -- 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 4 ACCEPT tcp -- 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 state NEW tcp dpt:22 5 REJECT all -- 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 reject-with icmp-host-prohibited Chain FORWARD (policy ACCEPT) num target prot opt source destination 1 REJECT all -- 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 reject-with icmp-host-prohibited Chain OUTPUT (policy ACCEPT) num target prot opt source destination The ip6tables default rules are essentially the same. Verify ip6tables Enabled if Using IPv6 The ip6tables service can be enabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl enable ip6tables.service 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 4 6 8 9 APO01.06 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.05 DSS03.01 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 DSS06.06 4.2.3.4 4.3.3.4 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 4.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.12.1.1 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.2 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.2 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R4 CIP-003-8 R5 CIP-004-6 R3 AC-4 CM-7(b) CA-3(5) SC-7(21) CM-6(a) DE.AE-1 ID.AM-3 PR.AC-5 PR.DS-5 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 3.4.3.3.6 The ip6tables service provides the system's host-based firewalling capability for IPv6 and ICMPv6. CCE-85955-3 - name: Enable service ip6tables block: - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto - name: Enable service ip6tables systemd: name: ip6tables enabled: 'yes' state: started masked: 'no' when: - '"iptables-ipv6" in ansible_facts.packages' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-85955-3 - NIST-800-53-AC-4 - NIST-800-53-CA-3(5) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-7(21) - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_ip6tables_enabled [customizations.services] enabled = ["ip6tables"] include enable_ip6tables class enable_ip6tables { service {'ip6tables': enable => true, ensure => 'running', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'ip6tables.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'ip6tables.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'ip6tables.service' else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify iptables Enabled The iptables service can be enabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl enable iptables.service 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 4 6 8 9 APO01.06 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.05 DSS03.01 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 DSS06.06 4.2.3.4 4.3.3.4 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 4.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.12.1.1 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.2 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.2 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R4 CIP-003-8 R5 CIP-004-6 R3 AC-4 CM-7(b) CA-3(5) SC-7(21) CM-6(a) DE.AE-1 ID.AM-3 PR.AC-5 PR.DS-5 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 3.4.3.2.6 The iptables service provides the system's host-based firewalling capability for IPv4 and ICMP. CCE-85961-1 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-85961-1 - NIST-800-53-AC-4 - NIST-800-53-CA-3(5) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-7(21) - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_iptables_enabled - name: Enable service iptables block: - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto - name: Enable service iptables systemd: name: iptables enabled: 'yes' state: started masked: 'no' when: - '"iptables" in ansible_facts.packages' when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "iptables" in ansible_facts.packages ) tags: - CCE-85961-1 - NIST-800-53-AC-4 - NIST-800-53-CA-3(5) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-7(21) - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_iptables_enabled [customizations.services] enabled = ["iptables"] include enable_iptables class enable_iptables { service {'iptables': enable => true, ensure => 'running', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q iptables ); then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'iptables.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'iptables.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'iptables.service' else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Set Default ip6tables Policy for Incoming Packets To set the default policy to DROP (instead of ACCEPT) for the built-in INPUT chain which processes incoming packets, add or correct the following line in /etc/sysconfig/ip6tables: :INPUT DROP [0:0] If changes were required, reload the ip6tables rules: $ sudo service ip6tables reload 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CIP-003-8 R4 CIP-003-8 R5 CIP-004-6 R3 AC-4 CM-7(b) CA-3(5) SC-7(21) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 1.4.1 3.4.3.3.4 In ip6tables, the default policy is applied only after all the applicable rules in the table are examined for a match. Setting the default policy to DROP implements proper design for a firewall, i.e. any packets which are not explicitly permitted should not be accepted. CCE-85965-2 # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( ! ( rpm --quiet -q nftables ) && ! ( rpm --quiet -q ufw ) && rpm --quiet -q iptables ); then sed -i 's/^:INPUT ACCEPT.*/:INPUT DROP [0:0]/g' /etc/sysconfig/ip6tables else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Set configuration for IPv6 loopback traffic Configure the loopback interface to accept traffic. Configure all other interfaces to deny traffic to the loopback network. Changing firewall settings while connected over network can result in being locked out of the system. Req-1.3 1.4.1 Loopback traffic is generated between processes on machine and is typically critical to operation of the system. The loopback interface is the only place that loopback network traffic should be seen, all other interfaces should ignore traffic on this network as an anti-spoofing measure. Set configuration for loopback traffic Configure the loopback interface to accept traffic. Configure all other interfaces to deny traffic to the loopback network. Changing firewall settings while connected over network can result in being locked out of the system. Req-1.3 1.4.1 Loopback traffic is generated between processes on machine and is typically critical to operation of the system. The loopback interface is the only place that loopback network traffic should be seen, all other interfaces should ignore traffic on this network as an anti-spoofing measure. Strengthen the Default Ruleset The default rules can be strengthened. The system scripts that activate the firewall rules expect them to be defined in the configuration files iptables and ip6tables in the directory /etc/sysconfig. Many of the lines in these files are similar to the command line arguments that would be provided to the programs /sbin/iptables or /sbin/ip6tables - but some are quite different. The following recommendations describe how to strengthen the default ruleset configuration file. An alternative to editing this configuration file is to create a shell script that makes calls to the iptables program to load in rules, and then invokes service iptables save to write those loaded rules to /etc/sysconfig/iptables. The following alterations can be made directly to /etc/sysconfig/iptables and /etc/sysconfig/ip6tables. Instructions apply to both unless otherwise noted. Language and address conventions for regular iptables are used throughout this section; configuration for ip6tables will be either analogous or explicitly covered. The program system-config-securitylevel allows additional services to penetrate the default firewall rules and automatically adjusts /etc/sysconfig/iptables. This program is only useful if the default ruleset meets your security requirements. Otherwise, this program should not be used to make changes to the firewall configuration because it re-writes the saved configuration file. Ensure ip6tables Firewall Rules Exist for All Open Ports Any ports that have been opened on non-loopback addresses need firewall rules to govern traffic. Changing firewall settings while connected over network can result in being locked out of the system. 3.4.3.3.3 Without a firewall rule configured for open ports default firewall policy will drop all packets to these ports. CCE-86801-8 Ensure iptables Firewall Rules Exist for All Open Ports Any ports that have been opened on non-loopback addresses need firewall rules to govern traffic. Changing firewall settings while connected over network can result in being locked out of the system. 3.4.3.2.3 Without a firewall rule configured for open ports default firewall policy will drop all packets to these ports. CCE-86771-3 Set Default iptables Policy for Incoming Packets To set the default policy to DROP (instead of ACCEPT) for the built-in INPUT chain which processes incoming packets, add or correct the following line in /etc/sysconfig/iptables: :INPUT DROP [0:0] 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CA-3(5) CM-7(b) SC-7(23) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 3.4.3.2.4 In iptables the default policy is applied only after all the applicable rules in the table are examined for a match. Setting the default policy to DROP implements proper design for a firewall, i.e. any packets which are not explicitly permitted should not be accepted. CCE-85968-6 # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q iptables && { ( ! ( rpm --quiet -q nftables ) && ! ( rpm --quiet -q ufw ) ); }; then sed -i 's/^:INPUT ACCEPT.*/:INPUT DROP [0:0]/g' /etc/sysconfig/iptables else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Set Default iptables Policy for Forwarded Packets To set the default policy to DROP (instead of ACCEPT) for the built-in FORWARD chain which processes packets that will be forwarded from one interface to another, add or correct the following line in /etc/sysconfig/iptables: :FORWARD DROP [0:0] 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CA-3(5) CM-7(b) SC-7(23) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 In iptables, the default policy is applied only after all the applicable rules in the table are examined for a match. Setting the default policy to DROP implements proper design for a firewall, i.e. any packets which are not explicitly permitted should not be accepted. # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q iptables; then sed -i 's/^:FORWARD ACCEPT.*/:FORWARD DROP [0:0]/g' /etc/sysconfig/iptables else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Restrict ICMP Message Types In /etc/sysconfig/iptables, the accepted ICMP messages types can be restricted. To accept only ICMP echo reply, destination unreachable, and time exceeded messages, remove the line: -A INPUT -p icmp --icmp-type any -j ACCEPT and insert the lines: -A INPUT -p icmp --icmp-type echo-reply -j ACCEPT -A INPUT -p icmp --icmp-type destination-unreachable -j ACCEPT -A INPUT -p icmp --icmp-type time-exceeded -j ACCEPT To allow the system to respond to pings, also insert the following line: -A INPUT -p icmp --icmp-type echo-request -j ACCEPT Ping responses can also be limited to certain networks or hosts by using the -s option in the previous rule. Because IPv6 depends so heavily on ICMPv6, it is preferable to deny the ICMPv6 packets you know you don't need (e.g. ping requests) in /etc/sysconfig/ip6tables, while letting everything else through: -A INPUT -p icmpv6 --icmpv6-type echo-request -j DROP If you are going to statically configure the system's address, it should ignore Router Advertisements which could add another IPv6 address to the interface or alter important network settings: -A INPUT -p icmpv6 --icmpv6-type router-advertisement -j DROP Restricting ICMPv6 message types in /etc/sysconfig/ip6tables is not recommended because the operation of IPv6 depends heavily on ICMPv6. Thus, great care must be taken if any other ICMPv6 types are blocked. Log and Drop Packets with Suspicious Source Addresses Packets with non-routable source addresses should be rejected, as they may indicate spoofing. Because the modified policy will reject non-matching packets, you only need to add these rules if you are interested in also logging these spoofing or suspicious attempts before they are dropped. If you do choose to log various suspicious traffic, add identical rules with a target of DROP after each LOG. To log and then drop these IPv4 packets, insert the following rules in /etc/sysconfig/iptables (excepting any that are intentionally used): -A INPUT -s 10.0.0.0/8 -j LOG --log-prefix "IP DROP SPOOF A: " -A INPUT -s 172.16.0.0/12 -j LOG --log-prefix "IP DROP SPOOF B: " -A INPUT -s 192.168.0.0/16 -j LOG --log-prefix "IP DROP SPOOF C: " -A INPUT -s 224.0.0.0/4 -j LOG --log-prefix "IP DROP MULTICAST D: " -A INPUT -s 240.0.0.0/5 -j LOG --log-prefix "IP DROP SPOOF E: " -A INPUT -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j LOG --log-prefix "IP DROP LOOPBACK: " Similarly, you might wish to log packets containing some IPv6 reserved addresses if they are not expected on your network: -A INPUT -i eth0 -s ::1 -j LOG --log-prefix "IPv6 DROP LOOPBACK: " -A INPUT -s 2002:E000::/20 -j LOG --log-prefix "IPv6 6to4 TRAFFIC: " -A INPUT -s 2002:7F00::/24 -j LOG --log-prefix "IPv6 6to4 TRAFFIC: " -A INPUT -s 2002:0000::/24 -j LOG --log-prefix "IPv6 6to4 TRAFFIC: " -A INPUT -s 2002:FF00::/24 -j LOG --log-prefix "IPv6 6to4 TRAFFIC: " -A INPUT -s 2002:0A00::/24 -j LOG --log-prefix "IPv6 6to4 TRAFFIC: " -A INPUT -s 2002:AC10::/28 -j LOG --log-prefix "IPv6 6to4 TRAFFIC: " -A INPUT -s 2002:C0A8::/32 -j LOG --log-prefix "IPv6 6to4 TRAFFIC: " If you are not expecting to see site-local multicast or auto-tunneled traffic, you can log those: -A INPUT -s FF05::/16 -j LOG --log-prefix "IPv6 SITE-LOCAL MULTICAST: " -A INPUT -s ::0.0.0.0/96 -j LOG --log-prefix "IPv4 COMPATIBLE IPv6 ADDR: " If you wish to block multicasts to all link-local nodes (e.g. if you are not using router auto-configuration and do not plan to have any services that multicast to the entire local network), you can block the link-local all-nodes multicast address (before accepting incoming ICMPv6): -A INPUT -d FF02::1 -j LOG --log-prefix "Link-local All-Nodes Multicast: " However, if you're going to allow IPv4 compatible IPv6 addresses (of the form ::0.0.0.0/96), you should then consider logging the non-routable IPv4-compatible addresses: -A INPUT -s ::0.0.0.0/104 -j LOG --log-prefix "IP NON-ROUTABLE ADDR: " -A INPUT -s ::127.0.0.0/104 -j LOG --log-prefix "IP DROP LOOPBACK: " -A INPUT -s ::224.0.0.0.0/100 -j LOG --log-prefix "IP DROP MULTICAST D: " -A INPUT -s ::255.0.0.0/104 -j LOG --log-prefix "IP BROADCAST: " If you are not expecting to see any IPv4 (or IPv4-compatible) traffic on your network, consider logging it before it gets dropped: -A INPUT -s ::FFFF:0.0.0.0/96 -j LOG --log-prefix "IPv4 MAPPED IPv6 ADDR: " -A INPUT -s 2002::/16 -j LOG --log-prefix "IPv6 6to4 ADDR: " The following rule will log all traffic originating from a site-local address, which is deprecated address space: -A INPUT -s FEC0::/10 -j LOG --log-prefix "SITE-LOCAL ADDRESS TRAFFIC: " IPv6 The system includes support for Internet Protocol version 6. A major and often-mentioned improvement over IPv4 is its enormous increase in the number of available addresses. Another important feature is its support for automatic configuration of many network settings. Disable Support for IPv6 Unless Needed Despite configuration that suggests support for IPv6 has been disabled, link-local IPv6 address auto-configuration occurs even when only an IPv4 address is assigned. The only way to effectively prevent execution of the IPv6 networking stack is to instruct the system not to activate the IPv6 kernel module. Ensure IPv6 is disabled through kernel boot parameter To disable IPv6 protocol support in the Linux kernel, add the argument ipv6.disable=1 to the default GRUB2 command line for the Linux operating system. To ensure that ipv6.disable=1 is added as a kernel command line argument to newly installed kernels, add ipv6.disable=1 to the default Grub2 command line for Linux operating systems. Modify the line within /etc/default/grub as shown below: GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="... ipv6.disable=1 ..." Run the following command to update command line for already installed kernels:# grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="ipv6.disable=1" Req-1.3.1 Req-1.3.2 3.6 Any unnecessary network stacks, including IPv6, should be disabled to reduce the vulnerability to exploitation. CCE-82887-1 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-82887-1 - PCI-DSS-Req-1.3.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-1.3.2 - grub2_ipv6_disable_argument - low_disruption - low_severity - medium_complexity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Update grub defaults and the bootloader menu command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="ipv6.disable=1" when: '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-82887-1 - PCI-DSS-Req-1.3.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-1.3.2 - grub2_ipv6_disable_argument - low_disruption - low_severity - medium_complexity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy [customizations.kernel] append = "ipv6.disable=1" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q grub2-common; then grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args=ipv6.disable=1 --env=/boot/grub2/grubenv else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable IPv6 Networking Support Automatic Loading To prevent the IPv6 kernel module (ipv6) from binding to the IPv6 networking stack, add the following line to /etc/modprobe.d/disabled.conf (or another file in /etc/modprobe.d): options ipv6 disable=1 This permits the IPv6 module to be loaded (and thus satisfy other modules that depend on it), while disabling support for the IPv6 protocol. 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 3.6 Any unnecessary network stacks - including IPv6 - should be disabled, to reduce the vulnerability to exploitation. CCE-82872-3 - name: Disable IPv6 Networking kernel module lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/ipv6.conf regexp: ^options\s+ipv6\s+disable=\d line: options ipv6 disable=1 when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82872-3 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - kernel_module_ipv6_option_disabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - name: Ensure disable_ipv6 (all and default) is set to 1 sysctl: name: '{{ item }}' value: '1' state: present reload: true with_items: - net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 - net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82872-3 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - kernel_module_ipv6_option_disabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Prevent the IPv6 kernel module (ipv6) from loading the IPv6 networking stack echo "options ipv6 disable=1" > /etc/modprobe.d/ipv6.conf # Since according to: https://access.redhat.com/solutions/72733 # "ipv6 disable=1" options doesn't always disable the IPv6 networking stack from # loading, instruct also sysctl configuration to disable IPv6 according to: # https://access.redhat.com/solutions/8709#rhel6disable declare -a IPV6_SETTINGS=("net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6" "net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6") for setting in "${IPV6_SETTINGS[@]}" do # Set runtime =1 for setting /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w "$setting=1" # If setting is present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "1" # else, add "$setting = 1" to /etc/sysctl.conf if grep -q ^"$setting" /etc/sysctl.conf ; then sed -i "s/^$setting.*/$setting = 1/g" /etc/sysctl.conf else echo "" >> /etc/sysctl.conf echo "# Set $setting = 1 per security requirements" >> /etc/sysctl.conf echo "$setting = 1" >> /etc/sysctl.conf fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Interface Usage of IPv6 To disable interface usage of IPv6, add or correct the following lines in /etc/sysconfig/network: NETWORKING_IPV6=no IPV6INIT=no Disable Support for RPC IPv6 RPC services for NFSv4 try to load transport modules for udp6 and tcp6 by default, even if IPv6 has been disabled in /etc/modprobe.d. To prevent RPC services such as rpc.mountd from attempting to start IPv6 network listeners, remove or comment out the following two lines in /etc/netconfig: udp6 tpi_clts v inet6 udp - - tcp6 tpi_cots_ord v inet6 tcp - - 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 3.1.20 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 # Drop 'tcp6' and 'udp6' entries from /etc/netconfig to prevent RPC # services for NFSv4 from attempting to start IPv6 network listeners declare -a IPV6_RPC_ENTRIES=("tcp6" "udp6") for rpc_entry in "${IPV6_RPC_ENTRIES[@]}" do sed -i "/^${rpc_entry}[[:space:]]\\+tpi\\_.*inet6.*/d" /etc/netconfig done Disable IPv6 Addressing on All IPv6 Interfaces To disable support for (ipv6) addressing on all interface add the following line to /etc/sysctl.d/ipv6.conf (or another file in /etc/sysctl.d): net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 = 1 This disables IPv6 on all network interfaces as other services and system functionality require the IPv6 stack loaded to work. BP28(R13) 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 3.1.20 CCI-001551 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 Any unnecessary network stacks - including IPv6 - should be disabled, to reduce the vulnerability to exploitation. CCE-85904-1 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-85904-1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_disable_ipv6 - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-85904-1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_disable_ipv6 - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 is set to 1 sysctl: name: net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 value: '1' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-85904-1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_disable_ipv6 # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" # # Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6="1" # # If net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "1" # else, add "net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 = 1" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "1" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-85904-1" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable IPv6 Addressing on IPv6 Interfaces by Default To disable support for (ipv6) addressing on interfaces by default add the following line to /etc/sysctl.d/ipv6.conf (or another file in /etc/sysctl.d): net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 = 1 This disables IPv6 on network interfaces by default as other services and system functionality require the IPv6 stack loaded to work. BP28(R13) 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 3.1.20 CCI-001551 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 Any unnecessary network stacks - including IPv6 - should be disabled, to reduce the vulnerability to exploitation. CCE-86004-9 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86004-9 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_disable_ipv6 - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86004-9 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_disable_ipv6 - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 is set to 1 sysctl: name: net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 value: '1' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86004-9 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_disable_ipv6 # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" # # Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6="1" # # If net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "1" # else, add "net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 = 1" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "1" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-86004-9" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure IPv6 Settings if Necessary A major feature of IPv6 is the extent to which systems implementing it can automatically configure their networking devices using information from the network. From a security perspective, manually configuring important configuration information is preferable to accepting it from the network in an unauthenticated fashion. IPV6_AUTOCONF Toggle global IPv6 auto-configuration (only, if global forwarding is disabled) no no yes net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr Accept default router in router advertisements? 0 0 1 net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo Accept prefix information in router advertisements? 0 0 1 net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref Accept router preference in router advertisements? 0 0 1 net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra Accept all router advertisements? 0 0 1 net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects Toggle ICMP Redirect Acceptance 0 0 1 net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route Trackers could be using source-routed packets to generate traffic that seems to be intra-net, but actually was created outside and has been redirected. 0 0 1 net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf Enable auto configuration on IPv6 interfaces 0 0 1 net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding Toggle IPv6 Forwarding 0 0 1 net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses Maximum number of autoconfigured IPv6 addresses 1 net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations Accept all router solicitations? 0 0 1 net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr Accept default router in router advertisements? 0 0 1 net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo Accept prefix information in router advertisements? 0 0 1 net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref Accept router preference in router advertisements? 0 0 1 net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra Accept default router advertisements by default? 0 0 1 net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects Toggle ICMP Redirect Acceptance By Default 0 0 1 net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route Trackers could be using source-routed packets to generate traffic that seems to be intra-net, but actually was created outside and has been redirected. 0 0 1 net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf Enable auto configuration on IPv6 interfaces 0 0 1 net.ipv6.conf.default.forwarding Toggle IPv6 default Forwarding 0 0 1 net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses Maximum number of autoconfigured IPv6 addresses 1 net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations Accept all router solicitations by default? 0 0 1 Manually Assign IPv6 Router Address Edit the file /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifcfg-interface, and add or correct the following line (substituting your gateway IP as appropriate): IPV6_DEFAULTGW=2001:0DB8::0001 Router addresses should be manually set and not accepted via any auto-configuration or router advertisement. CCI-000366 Use Privacy Extensions for Address To introduce randomness into the automatic generation of IPv6 addresses, add or correct the following line in /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifcfg-interface: IPV6_PRIVACY=rfc3041 Automatically-generated IPv6 addresses are based on the underlying hardware (e.g. Ethernet) address, and so it becomes possible to track a piece of hardware over its lifetime using its traffic. If it is important for a system's IP address to not trivially reveal its hardware address, this setting should be applied. 3.1.20 CCI-000366 # enable randomness in ipv6 address generation for interface in /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifcfg-* do echo "IPV6_PRIVACY=rfc3041" >> $interface done Manually Assign Global IPv6 Address To manually assign an IP address for an interface, edit the file /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifcfg-interface. Add or correct the following line (substituting the correct IPv6 address): IPV6ADDR=2001:0DB8::ABCD/64 Manually assigning an IP address is preferable to accepting one from routers or from the network otherwise. The example address here is an IPv6 address reserved for documentation purposes, as defined by RFC3849. CCI-000366 1315 1319 CCE-84298-9 Configure Accepting Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra=0 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra = 0 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 3.1.20 CCI-000366 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040261 3.3.9 SV-230541r858812_rule An illicit router advertisement message could result in a man-in-the-middle attack. CCE-81006-9 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81006-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040261 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81006-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040261 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra is set sysctl: name: net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81006-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040261 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra%3D0%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_value='' # # Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_value" # # If net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-81006-9" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure Accepting Default Router in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr=0 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr = 0 BP28(R22) An illicit router advertisement message could result in a man-in-the-middle attack. CCE-84272-4 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84272-4 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_defrtr - unknown_severity - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84272-4 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_defrtr - unknown_severity - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_defrtr_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_defrtr_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr is set sysctl: name: net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_defrtr_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84272-4 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_defrtr - unknown_severity # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_defrtr_value='' # # Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_defrtr_value" # # If net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_defrtr_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-84272-4" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure Accepting Prefix Information in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo=0 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo = 0 BP28(R22) An illicit router advertisement message could result in a man-in-the-middle attack. CCE-84280-7 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84280-7 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_pinfo - unknown_severity - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84280-7 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_pinfo - unknown_severity - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_pinfo_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_pinfo_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo is set sysctl: name: net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_pinfo_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84280-7 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_pinfo - unknown_severity # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_pinfo_value='' # # Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_pinfo_value" # # If net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_pinfo_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-84280-7" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure Accepting Router Preference in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref=0 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref = 0 BP28(R22) An illicit router advertisement message could result in a man-in-the-middle attack. CCE-84288-0 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84288-0 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_rtr_pref - unknown_severity - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84288-0 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_rtr_pref - unknown_severity - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_rtr_pref_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_rtr_pref_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref is set sysctl: name: net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_rtr_pref_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84288-0 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_rtr_pref - unknown_severity # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_rtr_pref_value='' # # Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_rtr_pref_value" # # If net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_rtr_pref_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-84288-0" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Accepting ICMP Redirects for All IPv6 Interfaces To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects=0 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0 BP28(R22) 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 3.1.20 CCI-000366 CCI-001551 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) CM-6(b) CM-6.1(iv) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040280 3.3.2 SV-230544r858820_rule An illicit ICMP redirect message could result in a man-in-the-middle attack. CCE-81009-3 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81009-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040280 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81009-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040280 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects is set sysctl: name: net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81009-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040280 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects%3D0%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects_value='' # # Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects_value" # # If net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-81009-3" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on all IPv6 Interfaces To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route=0 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route = 0 BP28(R22) 1 12 13 14 15 16 18 4 6 8 9 APO01.06 APO13.01 DSS01.05 DSS03.01 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 3.1.20 CCI-000366 4.2.3.4 4.3.3.4 4.4.3.3 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.12.1.1 A.12.1.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.2 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.2 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) DE.AE-1 ID.AM-3 PR.AC-5 PR.DS-5 PR.PT-4 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040240 3.3.1 SV-230538r858801_rule Source-routed packets allow the source of the packet to suggest routers forward the packet along a different path than configured on the router, which can be used to bypass network security measures. This requirement applies only to the forwarding of source-routerd traffic, such as when IPv6 forwarding is enabled and the system is functioning as a router. Accepting source-routed packets in the IPv6 protocol has few legitimate uses. It should be disabled unless it is absolutely required. CCE-81013-5 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81013-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040240 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81013-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040240 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route is set sysctl: name: net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81013-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040240 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route%3D0%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route_value='' # # Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route_value" # # If net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-81013-5" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure Auto Configuration on All IPv6 Interfaces To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf=0 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf = 0 BP28(R22) An illicit router advertisement message could result in a man-in-the-middle attack. CCE-84266-6 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84266-6 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_autoconf - unknown_severity - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84266-6 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_autoconf - unknown_severity - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_autoconf_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_autoconf_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf is set sysctl: name: net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_autoconf_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84266-6 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_autoconf - unknown_severity # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_autoconf_value='' # # Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_autoconf_value" # # If net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_autoconf_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-84266-6" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Kernel Parameter for IPv6 Forwarding To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding=0 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding = 0 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 2 3 7 8 9 APO13.01 BAI04.04 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.06 CCI-000366 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.2 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.1.3 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.17.2.1 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) CM-6(b) CM-6.1(iv) DE.CM-1 PR.DS-4 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040260 3.2.1 SV-230540r858810_rule IP forwarding permits the kernel to forward packets from one network interface to another. The ability to forward packets between two networks is only appropriate for systems acting as routers. CCE-82863-2 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82863-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040260 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_forwarding - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82863-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040260 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_forwarding - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_forwarding_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_forwarding_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding is set sysctl: name: net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_forwarding_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82863-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040260 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_forwarding # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_forwarding_value='' # # Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_forwarding_value" # # If net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_forwarding_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-82863-2" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure Maximum Number of Autoconfigured Addresses on All IPv6 Interfaces To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses=1 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses = 1 BP28(R22) The number of global unicast IPv6 addresses for each interface should be limited exactly to the number of statically configured addresses. CCE-84259-1 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84259-1 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_max_addresses - unknown_severity - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84259-1 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_max_addresses - unknown_severity - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_max_addresses_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_max_addresses_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses is set sysctl: name: net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_max_addresses_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84259-1 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_max_addresses - unknown_severity # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_max_addresses_value='' # # Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_max_addresses_value" # # If net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_max_addresses_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-84259-1" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure Denying Router Solicitations on All IPv6 Interfaces To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations=0 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations = 0 BP28(R22) To prevent discovery of the system by other systems, router solicitation requests should be denied. CCE-84109-8 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84109-8 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_router_solicitations - unknown_severity - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84109-8 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_router_solicitations - unknown_severity - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_router_solicitations_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_router_solicitations_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations is set sysctl: name: net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_router_solicitations_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84109-8 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_router_solicitations - unknown_severity # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_router_solicitations_value='' # # Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_router_solicitations_value" # # If net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_router_solicitations_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-84109-8" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Accepting Router Advertisements on all IPv6 Interfaces by Default To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra=0 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra = 0 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 3.1.20 CCI-000366 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040262 3.3.9 SV-230542r858814_rule An illicit router advertisement message could result in a man-in-the-middle attack. CCE-81007-7 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81007-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040262 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81007-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040262 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra is set sysctl: name: net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81007-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040262 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra%3D0%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_value='' # # Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_value" # # If net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-81007-7" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure Accepting Default Router in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr=0 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr = 0 BP28(R22) An illicit router advertisement message could result in a man-in-the-middle attack. CCE-84268-2 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84268-2 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_defrtr - unknown_severity - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84268-2 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_defrtr - unknown_severity - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_defrtr_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_defrtr_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr is set sysctl: name: net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_defrtr_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84268-2 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_defrtr - unknown_severity # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_defrtr_value='' # # Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_defrtr_value" # # If net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_defrtr_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-84268-2" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure Accepting Prefix Information in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo=0 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo = 0 BP28(R22) An illicit router advertisement message could result in a man-in-the-middle attack. CCE-84051-2 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84051-2 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_pinfo - unknown_severity - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84051-2 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_pinfo - unknown_severity - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_pinfo_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_pinfo_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo is set sysctl: name: net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_pinfo_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84051-2 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_pinfo - unknown_severity # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_pinfo_value='' # # Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_pinfo_value" # # If net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_pinfo_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-84051-2" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure Accepting Router Preference in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref=0 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref = 0 BP28(R22) An illicit router advertisement message could result in a man-in-the-middle attack. CCE-84291-4 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84291-4 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_rtr_pref - unknown_severity - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84291-4 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_rtr_pref - unknown_severity - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_rtr_pref_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_rtr_pref_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref is set sysctl: name: net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_rtr_pref_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84291-4 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_rtr_pref - unknown_severity # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_rtr_pref_value='' # # Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_rtr_pref_value" # # If net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_rtr_pref_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-84291-4" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting ICMP Redirects by Default on IPv6 Interfaces To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects=0 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects = 0 BP28(R22) 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 3.1.20 CCI-000366 CCI-001551 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040210 3.3.2 SV-230535r858793_rule An illicit ICMP redirect message could result in a man-in-the-middle attack. CCE-81010-1 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81010-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040210 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81010-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040210 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects is set sysctl: name: net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81010-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040210 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects%20%3D%200%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects_value='' # # Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects_value" # # If net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-81010-1" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on IPv6 Interfaces by Default To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route=0 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route = 0 BP28(R22) 1 12 13 14 15 16 18 4 6 8 9 APO01.06 APO13.01 DSS01.05 DSS03.01 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 3.1.20 CCI-000366 4.2.3.4 4.3.3.4 4.4.3.3 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.12.1.1 A.12.1.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.2 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.2 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) CM-6(b) CM-6.1(iv) DE.AE-1 ID.AM-3 PR.AC-5 PR.DS-5 PR.PT-4 Req-1.4.3 1.4.2 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040250 3.3.1 SV-230539r861085_rule Source-routed packets allow the source of the packet to suggest routers forward the packet along a different path than configured on the router, which can be used to bypass network security measures. This requirement applies only to the forwarding of source-routerd traffic, such as when IPv6 forwarding is enabled and the system is functioning as a router. Accepting source-routed packets in the IPv6 protocol has few legitimate uses. It should be disabled unless it is absolutely required. CCE-81015-0 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81015-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040250 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3 - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.2 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81015-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040250 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3 - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.2 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route is set sysctl: name: net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81015-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040250 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3 - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.2 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route%3D0%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route_value='' # # Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route_value" # # If net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-81015-0" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure Auto Configuration on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf=0 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf = 0 BP28(R22) An illicit router advertisement message could result in a man-in-the-middle attack. CCE-84264-1 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84264-1 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_autoconf - unknown_severity - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84264-1 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_autoconf - unknown_severity - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_autoconf_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_autoconf_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf is set sysctl: name: net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_autoconf_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84264-1 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_autoconf - unknown_severity # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_autoconf_value='' # # Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_autoconf_value" # # If net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_autoconf_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-84264-1" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure Maximum Number of Autoconfigured Addresses on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses=1 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses = 1 BP28(R22) The number of global unicast IPv6 addresses for each interface should be limited exactly to the number of statically configured addresses. CCE-84257-5 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84257-5 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_max_addresses - unknown_severity - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84257-5 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_max_addresses - unknown_severity - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_max_addresses_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_max_addresses_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses is set sysctl: name: net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_max_addresses_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84257-5 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_max_addresses - unknown_severity # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_max_addresses_value='' # # Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_max_addresses_value" # # If net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_max_addresses_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-84257-5" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure Denying Router Solicitations on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations=0 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations = 0 BP28(R22) To prevent discovery of the system by other systems, router solicitation requests should be denied. CCE-83477-0 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83477-0 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_router_solicitations - unknown_severity - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83477-0 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_router_solicitations - unknown_severity - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_router_solicitations_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_router_solicitations_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations is set sysctl: name: net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_router_solicitations_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83477-0 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_router_solicitations - unknown_severity # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_router_solicitations_value='' # # Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_router_solicitations_value" # # If net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_router_solicitations_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-83477-0" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Limit Network-Transmitted Configuration if Using Static IPv6 Addresses To limit the configuration information requested from other systems and accepted from the network on a system that uses statically-configured IPv6 addresses, add the following lines to /etc/sysctl.conf: net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations = 0 net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref = 0 net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo = 0 net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr = 0 net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf = 0 net.ipv6.conf.default.dad_transmits = 0 net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses = 1 The router_solicitations setting determines how many router solicitations are sent when bringing up the interface. If addresses are statically assigned, there is no need to send any solicitations. The accept_ra_pinfo setting controls whether the system will accept prefix info from the router. The accept_ra_defrtr setting controls whether the system will accept Hop Limit settings from a router advertisement. Setting it to 0 prevents a router from changing your default IPv6 Hop Limit for outgoing packets. The autoconf setting controls whether router advertisements can cause the system to assign a global unicast address to an interface. The dad_transmits setting determines how many neighbor solicitations to send out per address (global and link-local) when bringing up an interface to ensure the desired address is unique on the network. The max_addresses setting determines how many global unicast IPv6 addresses can be assigned to each interface. The default is 16, but it should be set to exactly the number of statically configured global addresses required. Kernel Parameters Which Affect Networking The sysctl utility is used to set parameters which affect the operation of the Linux kernel. Kernel parameters which affect networking and have security implications are described here. Network Related Kernel Runtime Parameters for Hosts and Routers Certain kernel parameters should be set for systems which are acting as either hosts or routers to improve the system's ability defend against certain types of IPv4 protocol attacks. net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects Disable ICMP Redirect Acceptance 0 0 1 net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route Trackers could be using source-routed packets to generate traffic that seems to be intra-net, but actually was created outside and has been redirected. 0 0 1 net.ipv4.conf.default.arp_filter Controls whether the ARP filter is enabled or not. 1 - Allows you to have multiple network interfaces on the same subnet, and have the ARPs for each interface be answered based on whether or not the kernel would route a packet from the ARP’d IP out that interface. In other words it allows control of which cards (usually 1) will respond to an ARP request. 0 - (default) The kernel can respond to arp requests with addresses from other interfaces. This may seem wrong but it usually makes sense, because it increases the chance of successful communication. IP addresses are owned by the complete host on Linux, not by particular interfaces. 0 0 1 net.ipv4.conf.default.arp_ignore Control the response modes for ARP queries that resolve local target IP addresses: 0 - (default): reply for any local target IP address, configured on any interface 1 - reply only if the target IP address is local address configured on the incoming interface 2 - reply only if the target IP address is local address configured on the incoming interface and both with the sender’s IP address are part from same subnet on this interface 3 - do not reply for local addresses configured with scope host, only resolutions for global and link addresses are replied 4-7 - reserved 8 - do not reply for all local addresses 0 0 1 2 3 8 net.ipv4.conf.all.forwarding Toggle IPv4 Forwarding 0 0 1 net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians Disable so you don't Log Spoofed Packets, Source Routed Packets, Redirect Packets 1 0 1 net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter Enable to enforce sanity checking, also called ingress filtering or egress filtering. The point is to drop a packet if the source and destination IP addresses in the IP header do not make sense when considered in light of the physical interface on which it arrived. 1 1 2 net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects Enable to prevent hijacking of routing path by only allowing redirects from gateways known in routing table. Disable to refuse acceptance of secure ICMP redirected packets on all interfaces. 0 0 1 net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media Controls whether the system can send (router) or accept (host) RFC1620 shared media redirects. shared_media for the interface will be enabled if at least one of conf/{all,interface}/shared_media is set to TRUE, it will be disabled otherwise. 0 0 1 net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects Disable ICMP Redirect Acceptance? 0 0 1 net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route Disable IP source routing? 0 0 1 net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians Disable so you don't Log Spoofed Packets, Source Routed Packets, Redirect Packets 1 0 1 net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter Enables source route verification 1 0 1 net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects Enable to prevent hijacking of routing path by only allowing redirects from gateways known in routing table. Disable to refuse acceptance of secure ICMP redirected packages by default. 0 0 1 net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media Controls whether the system can send(router) or accept(host) RFC1620 shared media redirects. shared_media for the interface will be enabled if at least one of conf/{all,interface}/shared_media is set to TRUE, it will be disabled otherwise. 0 0 1 net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts Ignore all ICMP ECHO and TIMESTAMP requests sent to it via broadcast/multicast 1 0 1 net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses Enable to prevent unnecessary logging 1 0 1 net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit Configure the maximal rate for sending duplicate acknowledgments in response to incoming invalid TCP packets. 500 1000 500 250 100 net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337 Enable to enable TCP behavior conformant with RFC 1337 1 0 1 net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies Enable to turn on TCP SYN Cookie Protection 1 0 1 Disable Accepting Packets Routed Between Local Interfaces To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local=0 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local = 0 BP28(R12) Configure net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local=0 to consider as invalid the packets received from outside whose source is the 127.0.0.0/8 address block. In combination with suitable routing, this can be used to direct packets between two local interfaces over the wire and have them accepted properly. CCE-88789-3 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-88789-3 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_local - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-88789-3 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_local - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local is set to 0 sysctl: name: net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local value: '0' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-88789-3 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_local # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" # # Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local="0" # # If net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "0" # else, add "net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local = 0" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "0" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-88789-3" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Accepting ICMP Redirects for All IPv4 Interfaces To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects=0 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0 BP28(R22) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 2 3 7 8 9 5.10.1.1 APO13.01 BAI04.04 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.06 3.1.20 CCI-000366 CCI-001503 CCI-001551 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.2 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.1.3 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.17.2.1 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) SC-7(a) DE.CM-1 PR.DS-4 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040279 3.3.2 SV-244553r858818_rule ICMP redirect messages are used by routers to inform hosts that a more direct route exists for a particular destination. These messages modify the host's route table and are unauthenticated. An illicit ICMP redirect message could result in a man-in-the-middle attack. This feature of the IPv4 protocol has few legitimate uses. It should be disabled unless absolutely required." CCE-80917-8 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80917-8 - CJIS-5.10.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040279 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80917-8 - CJIS-5.10.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040279 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects is set sysctl: name: net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80917-8 - CJIS-5.10.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040279 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects%3D0%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects_value='' # # Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects="$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects_value" # # If net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-80917-8" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on all IPv4 Interfaces To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route=0 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route = 0 BP28(R22) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 APO01.06 APO13.01 BAI04.04 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.03 DSS01.05 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 DSS06.06 3.1.20 CCI-000366 4.2.3.4 4.3.3.4 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 4.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.2 SR 7.6 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.12.1.1 A.12.1.2 A.12.1.3 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.2 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.2 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.17.2.1 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-007-3 R4 CIP-007-3 R4.1 CIP-007-3 R4.2 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) SC-5 CM-6(a) SC-7(a) DE.AE-1 DE.CM-1 ID.AM-3 PR.AC-5 PR.DS-4 PR.DS-5 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040239 3.3.1 SV-244551r858799_rule Source-routed packets allow the source of the packet to suggest routers forward the packet along a different path than configured on the router, which can be used to bypass network security measures. This requirement applies only to the forwarding of source-routerd traffic, such as when IPv4 forwarding is enabled and the system is functioning as a router. Accepting source-routed packets in the IPv4 protocol has few legitimate uses. It should be disabled unless it is absolutely required. CCE-81011-9 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81011-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040239 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-5 - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81011-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040239 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-5 - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route is set sysctl: name: net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81011-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040239 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-5 - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route%3D0%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route_value='' # # Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route="$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route_value" # # If net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-81011-9" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure ARP filtering for All IPv4 Interfaces To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter= To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter = This behaviour may cause problems to system on a high availability or load balancing configuration. BP28(R12) Prevents the Linux Kernel from handling the ARP table globally. By default, the kernel may respond to an ARP request from a certain interface with information from another interface. CCE-88555-8 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-88555-8 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_filter - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-88555-8 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_filter - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_filter_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_filter_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter is set sysctl: name: net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_filter_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-88555-8 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_filter # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_filter_value='' # # Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter="$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_filter_value" # # If net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_filter_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-88555-8" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure Response Mode of ARP Requests for All IPv4 Interfaces To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore= To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore = The ARP response mode may impact behaviour of workloads and firewalls on the system. BP28(R12) Avoids ARP Flux on system that have more than one interface on the same subnet. CCE-88889-1 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-88889-1 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_ignore - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-88889-1 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_ignore - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_ignore_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_ignore_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore is set sysctl: name: net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_ignore_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-88889-1 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_ignore # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_ignore_value='' # # Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore="$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_ignore_value" # # If net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_ignore_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-88889-1" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Drop Gratuitious ARP frames on All IPv4 Interfaces To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp=1 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp = 1 This can cause problems if ARP proxies are used in the network. BP28(R12) Drop Gratuitous ARP frames to prevent ARP poisoning. CCE-88001-3 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-88001-3 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_drop_gratuitous_arp - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-88001-3 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_drop_gratuitous_arp - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp is set to 1 sysctl: name: net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp value: '1' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-88001-3 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_drop_gratuitous_arp # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" # # Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp="1" # # If net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "1" # else, add "net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp = 1" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "1" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-88001-3" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Kernel Parameter for IPv4 Forwarding on all IPv4 Interfaces To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.forwarding kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.forwarding=0 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.conf.all.forwarding = 0 There might be cases when certain applications can systematically override this option. One such case is Libvirt; a toolkit for managing of virtualization platforms. By default, Libvirt requires IP forwarding to be enabled to facilitate network communication between the virtualization host and guest machines. It enables IP forwarding after every reboot. CCI-000366 CM-6(b) SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040259 SV-250317r858808_rule IP forwarding permits the kernel to forward packets from one network interface to another. The ability to forward packets between two networks is only appropriate for systems acting as routers. CCE-86220-1 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.forwarding.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86220-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040259 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_forwarding - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.forwarding from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.forwarding replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.all.forwarding' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86220-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040259 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_forwarding - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_forwarding_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_forwarding_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.forwarding is set sysctl: name: net.ipv4.conf.all.forwarding value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_forwarding_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86220-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040259 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_forwarding # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.forwarding from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.forwarding.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.all.forwarding" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_forwarding_value='' # # Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.all.forwarding # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.all.forwarding="$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_forwarding_value" # # If net.ipv4.conf.all.forwarding present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "net.ipv4.conf.all.forwarding = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.all.forwarding") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_forwarding_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.all.forwarding\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.all.forwarding\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-86220-1" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable Kernel Parameter to Log Martian Packets on all IPv4 Interfaces To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians=1 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians = 1 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 2 3 7 8 9 APO13.01 BAI04.04 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.06 3.1.20 CCI-000126 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.2 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.1.3 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.17.2.1 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) SC-5(3)(a) DE.CM-1 PR.AC-3 PR.DS-4 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 3.3.4 The presence of "martian" packets (which have impossible addresses) as well as spoofed packets, source-routed packets, and redirects could be a sign of nefarious network activity. Logging these packets enables this activity to be detected. CCE-81018-4 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81018-4 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-5(3)(a) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians - unknown_severity - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81018-4 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-5(3)(a) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians - unknown_severity - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians is set sysctl: name: net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81018-4 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-5(3)(a) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians - unknown_severity --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians%3D1%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians_value='' # # Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians="$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians_value" # # If net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-81018-4" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Prevent Routing External Traffic to Local Loopback on All IPv4 Interfaces To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet=0 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet = 0 BP28(R12) Refuse the routing of packets whose source or destination address is the local loopback. This prohibits the use of network 127/8 for local routing purposes. Enabling route_localnet can expose applications listening on localhost to external traffic. CCE-88023-7 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-88023-7 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_route_localnet - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-88023-7 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_route_localnet - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet is set to 0 sysctl: name: net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet value: '0' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-88023-7 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_route_localnet # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" # # Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet="0" # # If net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "0" # else, add "net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet = 0" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "0" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-88023-7" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable Kernel Parameter to Use Reverse Path Filtering on all IPv4 Interfaces To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter=1 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = 1 BP28(R22) 1 12 13 14 15 16 18 2 4 6 7 8 9 APO01.06 APO13.01 BAI04.04 DSS01.03 DSS01.05 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 3.1.20 CCI-000366 CCI-001551 4.2.3.4 4.3.3.4 4.4.3.3 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.2 SR 7.6 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.12.1.1 A.12.1.2 A.12.1.3 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.2 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.2 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.17.2.1 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) SC-7(a) DE.AE-1 DE.CM-1 ID.AM-3 PR.AC-5 PR.DS-4 PR.DS-5 PR.PT-4 Req-1.4.3 1.4.3 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040285 3.3.7 SV-230549r858830_rule Enabling reverse path filtering drops packets with source addresses that should not have been able to be received on the interface they were received on. It should not be used on systems which are routers for complicated networks, but is helpful for end hosts and routers serving small networks. CCE-81021-8 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81021-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040285 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3 - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.3 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81021-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040285 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3 - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.3 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter is set sysctl: name: net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81021-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040285 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3 - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.3 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter%3D1%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter_value='' # # Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter="$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter_value" # # If net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-81021-8" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Secure ICMP Redirects on all IPv4 Interfaces To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects=0 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects = 0 BP28(R22) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 APO01.06 APO13.01 BAI04.04 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.03 DSS01.05 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 DSS06.06 3.1.20 CCI-001503 CCI-001551 4.2.3.4 4.3.3.4 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 4.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.2 SR 7.6 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.12.1.1 A.12.1.2 A.12.1.3 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.2 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.2 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.17.2.1 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) SC-7(a) DE.AE-1 DE.CM-1 ID.AM-3 PR.AC-5 PR.DS-4 PR.DS-5 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 Req-1.4.3 1.4.3 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 3.3.3 Accepting "secure" ICMP redirects (from those gateways listed as default gateways) has few legitimate uses. It should be disabled unless it is absolutely required. CCE-81016-8 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81016-8 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3 - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.3 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81016-8 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3 - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.3 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects is set sysctl: name: net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81016-8 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3 - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.3 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects%3D0%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects_value='' # # Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects="$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects_value" # # If net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-81016-8" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure Sending and Accepting Shared Media Redirects for All IPv4 Interfaces To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media= To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media = BP28(R12) This setting should be aligned with net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects because it overrides it. If shared_media is enabled for an interface secure_redirects will be enabled too. CCE-88333-0 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-88333-0 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_shared_media - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-88333-0 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_shared_media - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_shared_media_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_shared_media_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media is set sysctl: name: net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_shared_media_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-88333-0 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_shared_media # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_shared_media_value='' # # Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media="$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_shared_media_value" # # If net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_shared_media_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-88333-0" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting ICMP Redirects by Default on IPv4 Interfaces To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects=0 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects = 0 BP28(R22) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 5.10.1.1 APO01.06 APO13.01 BAI04.04 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.03 DSS01.05 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 DSS06.06 3.1.20 CCI-000366 CCI-001551 4.2.3.4 4.3.3.4 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 4.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.2 SR 7.6 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.12.1.1 A.12.1.2 A.12.1.3 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.2 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.2 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.17.2.1 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) SC-7(a) DE.AE-1 DE.CM-1 ID.AM-3 PR.AC-5 PR.DS-4 PR.DS-5 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 Req-1.4.3 1.4.3 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040209 3.3.2 SV-244550r858791_rule ICMP redirect messages are used by routers to inform hosts that a more direct route exists for a particular destination. These messages modify the host's route table and are unauthenticated. An illicit ICMP redirect message could result in a man-in-the-middle attack. This feature of the IPv4 protocol has few legitimate uses. It should be disabled unless absolutely required. CCE-80919-4 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80919-4 - CJIS-5.10.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040209 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3 - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.3 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80919-4 - CJIS-5.10.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040209 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3 - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.3 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects is set sysctl: name: net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80919-4 - CJIS-5.10.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040209 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3 - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.3 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects%3D0%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects_value='' # # Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects="$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects_value" # # If net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-80919-4" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on IPv4 Interfaces by Default To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route=0 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route = 0 BP28(R22) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 5.10.1.1 APO01.06 APO13.01 BAI04.04 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.03 DSS01.05 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 DSS06.06 3.1.20 CCI-000366 CCI-001551 4.2.3.4 4.3.3.4 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 4.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.2 SR 7.6 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.12.1.1 A.12.1.2 A.12.1.3 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.2 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.2 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.17.2.1 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-007-3 R4 CIP-007-3 R4.1 CIP-007-3 R4.2 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) SC-5 SC-7(a) DE.AE-1 DE.CM-1 ID.AM-3 PR.AC-5 PR.DS-4 PR.DS-5 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040249 3.3.1 SV-244552r858803_rule Source-routed packets allow the source of the packet to suggest routers forward the packet along a different path than configured on the router, which can be used to bypass network security measures. Accepting source-routed packets in the IPv4 protocol has few legitimate uses. It should be disabled unless it is absolutely required, such as when IPv4 forwarding is enabled and the system is legitimately functioning as a router. CCE-80920-2 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80920-2 - CJIS-5.10.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040249 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-5 - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80920-2 - CJIS-5.10.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040249 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-5 - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route is set sysctl: name: net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80920-2 - CJIS-5.10.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040249 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-5 - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route%3D0%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route_value='' # # Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route="$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route_value" # # If net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-80920-2" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable Kernel Paremeter to Log Martian Packets on all IPv4 Interfaces by Default To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians=1 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians = 1 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 2 3 7 8 9 APO13.01 BAI04.04 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.03 DSS01.04 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.06 3.1.20 CCI-000126 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.2 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.1.3 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.17.2.1 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) SC-5(3)(a) DE.CM-1 PR.AC-3 PR.DS-4 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 3.3.4 The presence of "martian" packets (which have impossible addresses) as well as spoofed packets, source-routed packets, and redirects could be a sign of nefarious network activity. Logging these packets enables this activity to be detected. CCE-81020-0 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81020-0 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-5(3)(a) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians - unknown_severity - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81020-0 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-5(3)(a) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians - unknown_severity - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians is set sysctl: name: net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81020-0 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-5(3)(a) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians - unknown_severity --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians%3D1%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians_value='' # # Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians="$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians_value" # # If net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-81020-0" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable Kernel Parameter to Use Reverse Path Filtering on all IPv4 Interfaces by Default To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter=1 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter = 1 BP28(R22) 1 12 13 14 15 16 18 2 4 6 7 8 9 APO01.06 APO13.01 BAI04.04 DSS01.03 DSS01.05 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 3.1.20 CCI-000366 4.2.3.4 4.3.3.4 4.4.3.3 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.2 SR 7.6 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.12.1.1 A.12.1.2 A.12.1.3 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.2 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.2 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.17.2.1 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) SC-7(a) DE.AE-1 DE.CM-1 ID.AM-3 PR.AC-5 PR.DS-4 PR.DS-5 PR.PT-4 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 3.3.7 Enabling reverse path filtering drops packets with source addresses that should not have been able to be received on the interface they were received on. It should not be used on systems which are routers for complicated networks, but is helpful for end hosts and routers serving small networks. CCE-81022-6 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81022-6 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81022-6 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter is set sysctl: name: net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81022-6 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter%3D1%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter_value='' # # Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter="$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter_value" # # If net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-81022-6" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure Kernel Parameter for Accepting Secure Redirects By Default To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects=0 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects = 0 BP28(R22) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 APO01.06 APO13.01 BAI04.04 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.03 DSS01.05 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 DSS06.06 3.1.20 CCI-001551 4.2.3.4 4.3.3.4 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 4.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.2 SR 7.6 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.12.1.1 A.12.1.2 A.12.1.3 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.2 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.2 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.17.2.1 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-007-3 R4 CIP-007-3 R4.1 CIP-007-3 R4.2 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) SC-5 SC-7(a) DE.AE-1 DE.CM-1 ID.AM-3 PR.AC-5 PR.DS-4 PR.DS-5 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 3.3.3 Accepting "secure" ICMP redirects (from those gateways listed as default gateways) has few legitimate uses. It should be disabled unless it is absolutely required. CCE-81017-6 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81017-6 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-5 - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81017-6 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-5 - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects is set sysctl: name: net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81017-6 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-5 - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects%3D0%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects_value='' # # Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects="$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects_value" # # If net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-81017-6" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure Sending and Accepting Shared Media Redirects by Default To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media= To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media = BP28(R12) This setting should be aligned with net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects because it overrides it. If shared_media is enabled for an interface secure_redirects will be enabled too. CCE-88444-5 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-88444-5 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_shared_media - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-88444-5 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_shared_media - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_shared_media_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_shared_media_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media is set sysctl: name: net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_shared_media_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-88444-5 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_shared_media # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_shared_media_value='' # # Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media="$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_shared_media_value" # # If net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_shared_media_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-88444-5" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable Kernel Parameter to Ignore ICMP Broadcast Echo Requests on IPv4 Interfaces To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts=1 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = 1 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 5.10.1.1 APO01.06 APO13.01 BAI04.04 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.03 DSS01.05 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 DSS06.06 3.1.20 CCI-000366 4.2.3.4 4.3.3.4 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 4.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.2 SR 7.6 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.12.1.1 A.12.1.2 A.12.1.3 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.2 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.2 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.17.2.1 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-007-3 R4 CIP-007-3 R4.1 CIP-007-3 R4.2 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) SC-5 DE.AE-1 DE.CM-1 ID.AM-3 PR.AC-5 PR.DS-4 PR.DS-5 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 Req-1.4.3 1.4.2 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040230 3.3.5 SV-230537r858797_rule Responding to broadcast (ICMP) echoes facilitates network mapping and provides a vector for amplification attacks. Ignoring ICMP echo requests (pings) sent to broadcast or multicast addresses makes the system slightly more difficult to enumerate on the network. CCE-80922-8 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80922-8 - CJIS-5.10.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040230 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-5 - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3 - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.2 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts replace: '#net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80922-8 - CJIS-5.10.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040230 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-5 - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3 - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.2 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts is set sysctl: name: net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80922-8 - CJIS-5.10.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040230 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-5 - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3 - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.2 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts%3D1%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts_value='' # # Set runtime for net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts="$sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts_value" # # If net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-80922-8" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable Kernel Parameter to Ignore Bogus ICMP Error Responses on IPv4 Interfaces To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses=1 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses = 1 BP28(R22) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 2 3 7 8 9 APO13.01 BAI04.04 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.06 3.1.20 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.2 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.1.3 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.17.2.1 A.9.1.2 CIP-007-3 R4 CIP-007-3 R4.1 CIP-007-3 R4.2 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) SC-5 DE.CM-1 PR.DS-4 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 Req-1.4.3 1.4.2 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 3.3.6 Ignoring bogus ICMP error responses reduces log size, although some activity would not be logged. CCE-81023-4 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81023-4 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-5 - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3 - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.2 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses - unknown_severity - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses replace: '#net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81023-4 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-5 - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3 - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.2 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses - unknown_severity - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses is set sysctl: name: net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81023-4 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-5 - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3 - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.2 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses - unknown_severity --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses%3D1%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses_value='' # # Set runtime for net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses="$sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses_value" # # If net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-81023-4" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Set Kernel Parameter to Increase Local Port Range To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range=32768 65535 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range = 32768 65535 BP28(R22) This setting defines the local port range that is used by TCP and UDP to choose the local port. The first number is the first, the second the last local port number. CCE-84277-3 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84277-3 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_local_port_range - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range replace: '#net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84277-3 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_local_port_range - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range is set to 32768 65535 sysctl: name: net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range value: 32768 65535 sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84277-3 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_local_port_range # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" # # Set runtime for net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range="32768 65535" # # If net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "32768 65535" # else, add "net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range = 32768 65535" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "32768 65535" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-84277-3" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure Kernel to Rate Limit Sending of Duplicate TCP Acknowledgments Make sure that the system is configured to limit the maximal rate for sending duplicate acknowledgments in response to incoming TCP packets that are for an existing connection but that are invalid due to any of these reasons: (a) out-of-window sequence number, (b) out-of-window acknowledgment number, or (c) PAWS (Protection Against Wrapped Sequence numbers) check failure This measure protects against or limits effects of DoS attacks against the system. Set the system to implement rate-limiting measures by adding the following line to /etc/sysctl.conf or a configuration file in the /etc/sysctl.d/ directory (or modify the line to have the required value): net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit = Issue the following command to make the changes take effect: # sysctl --system CCI-002385 CIP-007-3 R4 CIP-007-3 R4.1 CIP-007-3 R4.2 CIP-007-3 R5.1 SC-5 SRG-OS-000420-GPOS-00186 Denial of Service (DoS) is a condition when a resource is not available for legitimate users. When this occurs, the organization either cannot accomplish its mission or must operate at degraded capacity. This can help mitigate simple “ack loop” DoS attacks, wherein a buggy or malicious middlebox or man-in-the-middle can rewrite TCP header fields in manner that causes each endpoint to think that the other is sending invalid TCP segments, thus causing each side to send an unterminating stream of duplicate acknowledgments for invalid segments. - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-53-SC-5 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_invalid_ratelimit - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit replace: '#net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-53-SC-5 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_invalid_ratelimit - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_invalid_ratelimit_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_invalid_ratelimit_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit is set sysctl: name: net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_invalid_ratelimit_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-53-SC-5 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_invalid_ratelimit # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_invalid_ratelimit_value='' # # Set runtime for net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit="$sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_invalid_ratelimit_value" # # If net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_invalid_ratelimit_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable Kernel Parameter to Use TCP RFC 1337 on IPv4 Interfaces To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337 kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337=1 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337 = 1 BP28(R22) Enable TCP behavior conformant with RFC 1337. When disabled, if a RST is received in TIME_WAIT state, we close the socket immediately without waiting for the end of the TIME_WAIT period. CCE-84270-8 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84270-8 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_rfc1337 - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337 from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337 replace: '#net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84270-8 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_rfc1337 - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_rfc1337_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_rfc1337_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337 is set sysctl: name: net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337 value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_rfc1337_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84270-8 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_rfc1337 # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337 from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_rfc1337_value='' # # Set runtime for net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337 # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337="$sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_rfc1337_value" # # If net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337 present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337 = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_rfc1337_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-84270-8" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable Kernel Parameter to Use TCP Syncookies on Network Interfaces To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies=1 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1 BP28(R22) 1 12 13 14 15 16 18 2 4 6 7 8 9 5.10.1.1 APO01.06 APO13.01 BAI04.04 DSS01.03 DSS01.05 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 3.1.20 CCI-000366 CCI-001095 4.2.3.4 4.3.3.4 4.4.3.3 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.2 SR 7.6 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.12.1.1 A.12.1.2 A.12.1.3 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.2 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.2 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.17.2.1 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) SC-5(1) SC-5(2) SC-5(3)(a) CM-6(a) DE.AE-1 DE.CM-1 ID.AM-3 PR.AC-5 PR.DS-4 PR.DS-5 PR.PT-4 Req-1.4.1 1.4.3 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 SRG-OS-000420-GPOS-00186 SRG-OS-000142-GPOS-00071 3.3.8 A TCP SYN flood attack can cause a denial of service by filling a system's TCP connection table with connections in the SYN_RCVD state. Syncookies can be used to track a connection when a subsequent ACK is received, verifying the initiator is attempting a valid connection and is not a flood source. This feature is activated when a flood condition is detected, and enables the system to continue servicing valid connection requests. CCE-80923-6 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80923-6 - CJIS-5.10.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-5(1) - NIST-800-53-SC-5(2) - NIST-800-53-SC-5(3)(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.1 - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.3 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies replace: '#net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80923-6 - CJIS-5.10.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-5(1) - NIST-800-53-SC-5(2) - NIST-800-53-SC-5(3)(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.1 - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.3 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies is set sysctl: name: net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80923-6 - CJIS-5.10.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-5(1) - NIST-800-53-SC-5(2) - NIST-800-53-SC-5(3)(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.1 - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.3 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies%3D1%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies_value='' # # Set runtime for net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies="$sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies_value" # # If net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-80923-6" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Network Parameters for Hosts Only If the system is not going to be used as a router, then setting certain kernel parameters ensure that the host will not perform routing of network traffic. Disable Kernel Parameter for Sending ICMP Redirects on all IPv4 Interfaces To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects=0 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects = 0 BP28(R22) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 5.10.1.1 APO01.06 APO13.01 BAI04.04 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.03 DSS01.05 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 DSS06.06 3.1.20 CCI-000366 4.2.3.4 4.3.3.4 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 4.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.2 SR 7.6 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.12.1.1 A.12.1.2 A.12.1.3 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.2 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.2 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.17.2.1 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-007-3 R4 CIP-007-3 R4.1 CIP-007-3 R4.2 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) SC-5 CM-6(a) SC-7(a) DE.AE-1 DE.CM-1 ID.AM-3 PR.AC-5 PR.DS-4 PR.DS-5 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 1.4.5 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040220 3.2.2 SV-230536r858795_rule ICMP redirect messages are used by routers to inform hosts that a more direct route exists for a particular destination. These messages contain information from the system's route table possibly revealing portions of the network topology. The ability to send ICMP redirects is only appropriate for systems acting as routers. CCE-80918-6 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80918-6 - CJIS-5.10.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040220 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-5 - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.5 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_send_redirects - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80918-6 - CJIS-5.10.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040220 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-5 - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.5 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_send_redirects - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects is set to 0 sysctl: name: net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects value: '0' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80918-6 - CJIS-5.10.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040220 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-5 - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.5 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_send_redirects --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects%3D0%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_send_redirects.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" # # Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects="0" # # If net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "0" # else, add "net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects = 0" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "0" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-80918-6" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Kernel Parameter for Sending ICMP Redirects on all IPv4 Interfaces by Default To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects=0 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects = 0 BP28(R22) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 5.10.1.1 APO01.06 APO13.01 BAI04.04 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.03 DSS01.05 DSS03.01 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 DSS06.06 3.1.20 CCI-000366 4.2.3.4 4.3.3.4 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 4.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.2 SR 7.6 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.12.1.1 A.12.1.2 A.12.1.3 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.2 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.2 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.17.2.1 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-007-3 R4 CIP-007-3 R4.1 CIP-007-3 R4.2 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) SC-5 CM-6(a) SC-7(a) DE.AE-1 DE.CM-1 ID.AM-3 PR.AC-5 PR.DS-4 PR.DS-5 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 1.4.5 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040270 3.2.2 SV-230543r858816_rule ICMP redirect messages are used by routers to inform hosts that a more direct route exists for a particular destination. These messages contain information from the system's route table possibly revealing portions of the network topology. The ability to send ICMP redirects is only appropriate for systems acting as routers. CCE-80921-0 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80921-0 - CJIS-5.10.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040270 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-5 - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.5 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_send_redirects - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80921-0 - CJIS-5.10.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040270 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-5 - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.5 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_send_redirects - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects is set to 0 sysctl: name: net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects value: '0' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80921-0 - CJIS-5.10.1.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040270 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-5 - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.5 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_send_redirects --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects%3D0%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_send_redirects.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" # # Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects="0" # # If net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "0" # else, add "net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects = 0" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "0" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-80921-0" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Kernel Parameter for IP Forwarding on IPv4 Interfaces To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.ip_forward kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.ip_forward=0 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.ip_forward = 0 Certain technologies such as virtual machines, containers, etc. rely on IPv4 forwarding to enable and use networking. Disabling IPv4 forwarding would cause those technologies to stop working. Therefore, this rule should not be used in profiles or benchmarks that target usage of IPv4 forwarding. This rule is disabled on Red Hat Virtualization Hosts and Managers, it will report not applicable. RHV host requires IPv4 forwarding for the Hosted Engine bootstrap VM to reach network outside of the initial host. BP28(R22) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 2 3 7 8 9 APO13.01 BAI04.04 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.06 3.1.20 CCI-000366 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.2 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.1.3 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.17.2.1 A.9.1.2 CIP-007-3 R4 CIP-007-3 R4.1 CIP-007-3 R4.2 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) SC-5 CM-6(a) SC-7(a) DE.CM-1 PR.DS-4 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 Req-1.3.1 Req-1.3.2 1.4.3 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 3.2.1 Routing protocol daemons are typically used on routers to exchange network topology information with other routers. If this capability is used when not required, system network information may be unnecessarily transmitted across the network. CCE-81024-2 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.ip_forward.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81024-2 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-5 - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-1.3.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-1.3.2 - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.3 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_forward - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.ip_forward from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.ip_forward replace: '#net.ipv4.ip_forward' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81024-2 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-5 - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-1.3.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-1.3.2 - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.3 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_forward - name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.ip_forward is set to 0 sysctl: name: net.ipv4.ip_forward value: '0' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81024-2 - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-SC-5 - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-1.3.1 - PCI-DSS-Req-1.3.2 - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.3 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_forward # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.ip_forward from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.ip_forward.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.ipv4.ip_forward" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" # # Set runtime for net.ipv4.ip_forward # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.ip_forward="0" # # If net.ipv4.ip_forward present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "0" # else, add "net.ipv4.ip_forward = 0" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.ip_forward") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "0" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.ip_forward\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.ip_forward\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-81024-2" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi nftables If firewalld or iptables are being used in your environment, please follow the guidance in their respective section and pass-over the guidance in this section. nftables is a subsystem of the Linux kernel providing filtering and classification of network packets/datagrams/frames and is the successor to iptables. The biggest change with the successor nftables is its simplicity. With iptables, we have to configure every single rule and use the syntax which can be compared with normal commands. With nftables, the simpler syntax, much like BPF (Berkely Packet Filter) means shorter lines and less repetition. Support for nftables should also be compiled into the kernel, together with the related nftables modules. It is available in Linux kernels >= 3.13. Please ensure that your kernel supports nftables before choosing this option. Nftables Base Chain Hooks The possible hooks which can be used to configure the base chain are: ingress (only in netdev family since Linux kernel 4.2, and inet family since Linux kernel 5.10): sees packets immediately after they are passed up from the NIC driver, before even prerouting. prerouting sees all incoming packets, before any routing decision has been made. Packets may be addressed to the local or remote systems. input sees incoming packets that are addressed to and have now been routed to the local system and processes running there. forward sees incoming packets that are not addressed to the local system. output sees packets that originated from processes in the local machine. postrouting sees all packets after routing, just before they leave the local system. input,forward,output ingress prerouting input forward output postrouting input,forward,output Nftables Chain Names The rules in nftables are attached to chains. Unlike in iptables, there are no predefined chains like INPUT, OUTPUT, etc. Instead, to filter packets at a particular processing step, a base chain with a chosen name should be created, and attached it to the appropriate Netfilter hook. input,forward,output input output forward input,forward,output Nftables Base Chain Policies This is the default verdict that will be applied to packets reaching the end of the chain (i.e, no more rules to be evaluated against). Currently there are 2 policies: accept this verdict means that the packet will keep traversing the network stack. drop this verdict means that the packet is discarded if the packet reaches the end of the base chain. accept,accept,accept accept drop accept,accept,accept Nftables Base Chain Priorities Each nftables base chain is assigned a priority that defines its ordering among other base chains, flowtables, and Netfilter internal operations at the same hook. For example, a chain on the prerouting hook with priority -300 will be placed before connection tracking operations. Netfilter Internal Priority for inet, ip, ip6: NF_IP_PRI_RAW_BEFORE_DEFRAG Typical hooks: prerouting; nft Keyword: n/a; Description: n/a NF_IP_PRI_CONNTRACK_DEFRAG Typical hooks: prerouting; nft Keyword: n/a; Description: Packet defragmentation / datagram reassembly NF_IP_PRI_RAW Typical hooks: all; nft Keyword: raw; Description: Typical hooks: prerouting; nft Keyword: n/a; Description: Traditional priority of the raw table placed before connection tracking operation NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST Typical hooks: n/a; nft Keyword: n/a; Description: SELinux operations NF_IP_PRI_CONNTRACK Typical hooks: prerouting, output;nft Keyword: n/a; Description: Connection tracking processes run early in prerouting and output hooks to associate packets with tracked connections. NF_IP_PRI_MANGLE Typical hooks: all;nft Keyword: mangle; Description: Mangle operation NF_IP_PRI_NAT_DST Typical hooks: prerouting;nft Keyword: dstnat; Description: Destination NAT NF_IP_PRI_FILTER Typical hooks: all;nft Keyword: filter; Description: Filtering operation, the filter table NF_IP_PRI_SECURITY Typical hooks: all;nft Keyword: security; Description: Place of security table, where secmark can be set for example NF_IP_PRI_NAT_SRC Typical hooks: postrouting;nft Keyword: srcnat; Description: Source NAT NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST Typical hooks: postrouting;nft Keyword: n/a; Description: SELinux at packet exit NF_IP_PRI_CONNTRACK_HELPER Typical hooks: postrouting;nft Keyword: n/a; Description: Connection tracking helpers, which identify expected and related packets. NF_IP_PRI_CONNTRACK_CONFIRM Typical hooks: input,postrouting;nft Keyword: n/a; Description: Connection tracking adds new tracked connections at final step in input and postrouting hooks. Netfilter Internal Priority for bridge: NF_BR_PRI_NAT_DST_BRIDGED Typical hooks: prerouting; nft Keyword: n/a; Description: n/a NF_BR_PRI_FILTER_BRIDGED Typical hooks: all;nft Keyword: filter; Description: n/a NF_BR_PRI_BRNF Typical hooks: n/a;nft Keyword: n/a; Description: n/a NF_BR_PRI_NAT_DST_OTHER Typical hooks: output;nft Keyword: out; Description: n/a NF_BR_PRI_FILTER_OTHER Typical hooks: n/a;nft Keyword: n/a; Description: n/a NF_BR_PRI_NAT_SRC Typical hooks: postrouting;nft Keyword: srcnat; Description: n/a 0,0,0 -450 -400 -300 -225 -200 -150 -100 0 50 100 225 300 2147483647 -300 -200 0 100 200 300 0,0,0 Nftables Base Chain Types Base chains are those that are registered into the Netfilter hooks, i.e. these chains see packets flowing through the Linux TCP/IP stack. The possible chain types are: filter, which is used to filter packets. This is supported by the arp, bridge, ip, ip6 and inet table families. route, which is used to reroute packets if any relevant IP header field or the packet mark is modified. This chain type provides equivalent semantics to the mangle table but only for the output hook (for other hooks use type filter instead). This is supported by the ip, ip6 and inet table families. nat, which is used to perform Networking Address Translation (NAT). Only the first packet of a given flow hits this chain; subsequent packets bypass it. This chain should be never used for filtering. The nat chain type is supported by the ip, ip6 and inet table families. filter,filter,filter filter route nat filter,filter,filter Nftables Families Netfilter enables filtering at multiple networking levels. With iptables there is a separate tool for each level: iptables, ip6tables, arptables, ebtables. With nftables the multiple networking levels are abstracted into families, all of which are served by the single tool nft. ipTables of this family see IPv4 traffic/packets. ip6Tables of this family see IPv6 traffic/packets. inetTables of this family see both IPv4 and IPv6 traffic/packets, simplifying dual stack support. arpTables of this family see ARP-level (i.e, L2) traffic, before any L3 handling is done by the kernel. bridgeTables of this family see traffic/packets traversing bridges (i.e. switching). No assumptions are made about L3 protocols. netdevThe netdev family is different from the others in that it is used to create base chains attached to a single network interface. Such base chains see all network traffic on the specified interface, with no assumptions about L2 or L3 protocols. Therefore you can filter ARP traffic from here. inet ip ip6 inet arp bridge netdev Nftables Master configuration file The file which contains top level configuration for nftables service, and with which, the service is started. /etc/sysconfig/nftables.conf /etc/sysconfig/nftables.conf /etc/nftables.conf Nftables Tables Tables in nftables hold chains. Each table only has one address family and only applies to packets of this family. Tables can have one of six families. filter filter firewalld Install nftables Package nftables provides a new in-kernel packet classification framework that is based on a network-specific Virtual Machine (VM) and a new nft userspace command line tool. nftables reuses the existing Netfilter subsystems such as the existing hook infrastructure, the connection tracking system, NAT, userspace queuing and logging subsystem. The nftables package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install nftables 1.2.1 3.4.2.1 nftables is a subsystem of the Linux kernel that can protect against threats originating from within a corporate network to include malicious mobile code and poorly configured software on a host. CCE-86376-1 - name: Ensure nftables is installed package: name: nftables state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86376-1 - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.1 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_nftables_installed [[packages]] name = "nftables" version = "*" include install_nftables class install_nftables { package { 'nftables': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=nftables # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "nftables" ; then yum install -y "nftables" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify nftables Service is Enabled The nftables service allows for the loading of nftables rulesets during boot, or starting on the nftables service The nftables service can be enabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl enable nftables.service 3.4.2.10 The nftables service restores the nftables rules from the rules files referenced in the /etc/sysconfig/nftables.conf file during boot or the starting of the nftables service CCE-86725-9 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-86725-9 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_nftables_enabled - name: Enable service nftables block: - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto - name: Enable service nftables systemd: name: nftables enabled: 'yes' state: started masked: 'no' when: - '"nftables" in ansible_facts.packages' when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "nftables" in ansible_facts.packages ) tags: - CCE-86725-9 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_nftables_enabled [customizations.services] enabled = ["nftables"] include enable_nftables class enable_nftables { service {'nftables': enable => true, ensure => 'running', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q nftables ); then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'nftables.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'nftables.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'nftables.service' else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify nftables Service is Disabled nftables is a subsystem of the Linux kernel providing filtering and classification of network packets/datagrams/frames and is the successor to iptables. The nftables service can be disabled with the following command: systemctl disable nftables 1.2.1 3.4.1.3 Running both firewalld and nftables may lead to conflict. nftables is actually one of the backends for firewalld management tools. CCE-88428-8 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-88428-8 - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.1 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_nftables_disabled - name: Block Disable service nftables block: - name: Disable service nftables block: - name: Disable service nftables systemd: name: nftables.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service nftables' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "firewalld" in ansible_facts.packages and "nftables" in ansible_facts.packages ) tags: - CCE-88428-8 - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.1 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_nftables_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - nftables.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files nftables.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "firewalld" in ansible_facts.packages and "nftables" in ansible_facts.packages ) tags: - CCE-88428-8 - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.1 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_nftables_disabled - name: Disable socket nftables systemd: name: nftables.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "firewalld" in ansible_facts.packages and "nftables" in ansible_facts.packages ) - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("nftables.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-88428-8 - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.1 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_nftables_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: nftables.service enabled: false mask: true - name: nftables.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["nftables"] include disable_nftables class disable_nftables { service {'nftables': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q firewalld && rpm --quiet -q nftables ); then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'nftables.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'nftables.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'nftables.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files nftables.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'nftables.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'nftables.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'nftables.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure a Table Exists for Nftables Tables in nftables hold chains. Each table only has one address family and only applies to packets of this family. Tables can have one of six families. Adding rules to a running nftables can cause loss of connectivity to the system. 3.4.2.5 Nftables doesn't have any default tables. Without a table being built, nftables will not filter network traffic. Note: adding rules to a running nftables can cause loss of connectivity to the system. CCE-86162-5 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-86162-5 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - set_nftables_table - name: XCCDF Value var_nftables_family # promote to variable set_fact: var_nftables_family: !!str tags: - always - name: XCCDF Value var_nftables_table # promote to variable set_fact: var_nftables_table: !!str tags: - always - name: Collect Existing Nftables ansible.builtin.command: nft list tables register: existing_nftables when: '"nftables" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-86162-5 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - set_nftables_table - name: Set Nftable Table ansible.builtin.command: nft create table {{ var_nftables_family }} {{ var_nftables_table }} when: - '"nftables" in ansible_facts.packages' - existing_nftables is not skipped - existing_nftables.stdout_lines | length == 0 tags: - CCE-86162-5 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - set_nftables_table # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q nftables; then #Set nftables family name var_nftables_family='' #Set nftables table name var_nftables_table='' IS_TABLE=$(nft list tables) if [ -z "$IS_TABLE" ] then nft create table "$var_nftables_family" "$var_nftables_table" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi SuSEfirewall2 The SuSEfirewall2 provides a managed firewall. Uncomplicated Firewall (ufw) The Linux kernel in Ubuntu provides a packet filtering system called netfilter, and the traditional interface for manipulating netfilter are the iptables suite of commands. iptables provide a complete firewall solution that is both highly configurable and highly flexible. Becoming proficient in iptables takes time, and getting started with netfilter firewalling using only iptables can be a daunting task. As a result, many frontends for iptables have been created over the years, each trying to achieve a different result and targeting a different audience. The Uncomplicated Firewall (ufw) is a frontend for iptables and is particularly well-suited for host-based firewalls. ufw provides a framework for managing netfilter, as well as a command-line interface for manipulating the firewall. ufw aims to provide an easy to use interface for people unfamiliar with firewall concepts, while at the same time simplifies complicated iptables commands to help an administrator who knows what he or she is doing. ufw is an upstream for other distributions and graphical frontends. Verify ufw Enabled The ufw service can be enabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl enable ufw.service CCI-002314 SRG-OS-000297-GPOS-00115 The ufw service must be enabled and running in order for ufw to protect the system - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_ufw_enabled - name: Enable service ufw block: - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto - name: Enable service ufw systemd: name: ufw enabled: 'yes' state: started masked: 'no' when: - '"ufw" in ansible_facts.packages' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "ufw" in ansible_facts.packages ) tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_ufw_enabled [customizations.services] enabled = ["ufw"] include enable_ufw class enable_ufw { service {'ufw': enable => true, ensure => 'running', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q ufw ); }; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'ufw.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'ufw.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'ufw.service' else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Uncommon Network Protocols The system includes support for several network protocols which are not commonly used. Although security vulnerabilities in kernel networking code are not frequently discovered, the consequences can be dramatic. Ensuring uncommon network protocols are disabled reduces the system's risk to attacks targeted at its implementation of those protocols. Although these protocols are not commonly used, avoid disruption in your network environment by ensuring they are not needed prior to disabling them. Disable ATM Support The Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) is a protocol operating on network, data link, and physical layers, based on virtual circuits and virtual paths. To configure the system to prevent the atm kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to the file /etc/modprobe.d/atm.conf: install atm /bin/true To configure the system to prevent the atm from being used, add the following line to file /etc/modprobe.d/atm.conf: blacklist atm CCI-000381 CCI-000366 AC-18 FMT_SMF_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040021 SV-230494r942918_rule Disabling ATM protects the system against exploitation of any flaws in its implementation. CCE-82028-2 - name: Ensure kernel module 'atm' is disabled lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/atm.conf regexp: install\s+atm line: install atm /bin/false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82028-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040021 - NIST-800-53-AC-18 - disable_strategy - kernel_module_atm_disabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - name: Ensure kernel module 'atm' is blacklisted lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/atm.conf regexp: ^blacklist atm$ line: blacklist atm when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82028-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040021 - NIST-800-53-AC-18 - disable_strategy - kernel_module_atm_disabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,install%20atm%20/bin/true%0Ablacklist%20atm%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/modprobe.d/atm.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^install atm" /etc/modprobe.d/atm.conf ; then sed -i 's#^install atm.*#install atm /bin/true#g' /etc/modprobe.d/atm.conf else echo -e "\n# Disable per security requirements" >> /etc/modprobe.d/atm.conf echo "install atm /bin/false" >> /etc/modprobe.d/atm.conf fi if ! LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^blacklist atm$" /etc/modprobe.d/atm.conf ; then echo "blacklist atm" >> /etc/modprobe.d/atm.conf fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable CAN Support The Controller Area Network (CAN) is a serial communications protocol which was initially developed for automotive and is now also used in marine, industrial, and medical applications. To configure the system to prevent the can kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to the file /etc/modprobe.d/can.conf: install can /bin/true To configure the system to prevent the can from being used, add the following line to file /etc/modprobe.d/can.conf: blacklist can CCI-000381 CCI-000366 AC-18 FMT_SMF_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040022 SV-230495r942921_rule Disabling CAN protects the system against exploitation of any flaws in its implementation. CCE-82059-7 - name: Ensure kernel module 'can' is disabled lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/can.conf regexp: install\s+can line: install can /bin/false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82059-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040022 - NIST-800-53-AC-18 - disable_strategy - kernel_module_can_disabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - name: Ensure kernel module 'can' is blacklisted lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/can.conf regexp: ^blacklist can$ line: blacklist can when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82059-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040022 - NIST-800-53-AC-18 - disable_strategy - kernel_module_can_disabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,install%20can%20/bin/true%0Ablacklist%20can%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/modprobe.d/can.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^install can" /etc/modprobe.d/can.conf ; then sed -i 's#^install can.*#install can /bin/true#g' /etc/modprobe.d/can.conf else echo -e "\n# Disable per security requirements" >> /etc/modprobe.d/can.conf echo "install can /bin/false" >> /etc/modprobe.d/can.conf fi if ! LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^blacklist can$" /etc/modprobe.d/can.conf ; then echo "blacklist can" >> /etc/modprobe.d/can.conf fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable DCCP Support The Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP) is a relatively new transport layer protocol, designed to support streaming media and telephony. To configure the system to prevent the dccp kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to the file /etc/modprobe.d/dccp.conf: install dccp /bin/true To configure the system to prevent the dccp from being used, add the following line to file /etc/modprobe.d/dccp.conf: blacklist dccp 11 14 3 9 5.10.1 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 3.4.6 CCI-001958 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 Req-1.4.2 1.4.2 SRG-OS-000096-GPOS-00050 SRG-OS-000378-GPOS-00163 3.1.3 Disabling DCCP protects the system against exploitation of any flaws in its implementation. CCE-80833-7 - name: Ensure kernel module 'dccp' is disabled lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/dccp.conf regexp: install\s+dccp line: install dccp /bin/false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80833-7 - CJIS-5.10.1 - NIST-800-171-3.4.6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.2 - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.2 - disable_strategy - kernel_module_dccp_disabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - name: Ensure kernel module 'dccp' is blacklisted lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/dccp.conf regexp: ^blacklist dccp$ line: blacklist dccp when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80833-7 - CJIS-5.10.1 - NIST-800-171-3.4.6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.2 - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.2 - disable_strategy - kernel_module_dccp_disabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,install%20dccp%20/bin/true%0Ablacklist%20dccp%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/modprobe.d/dccp.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^install dccp" /etc/modprobe.d/dccp.conf ; then sed -i 's#^install dccp.*#install dccp /bin/true#g' /etc/modprobe.d/dccp.conf else echo -e "\n# Disable per security requirements" >> /etc/modprobe.d/dccp.conf echo "install dccp /bin/false" >> /etc/modprobe.d/dccp.conf fi if ! LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^blacklist dccp$" /etc/modprobe.d/dccp.conf ; then echo "blacklist dccp" >> /etc/modprobe.d/dccp.conf fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable IEEE 1394 (FireWire) Support The IEEE 1394 (FireWire) is a serial bus standard for high-speed real-time communication. To configure the system to prevent the firewire-core kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to the file /etc/modprobe.d/firewire-core.conf: install firewire-core /bin/true To configure the system to prevent the firewire-core from being used, add the following line to file /etc/modprobe.d/firewire-core.conf: blacklist firewire-core CCI-000381 AC-18 FMT_SMF_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 RHEL-08-040026 SV-230499r942933_rule Disabling FireWire protects the system against exploitation of any flaws in its implementation. CCE-82005-0 - name: Ensure kernel module 'firewire-core' is disabled lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/firewire-core.conf regexp: install\s+firewire-core line: install firewire-core /bin/false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82005-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040026 - NIST-800-53-AC-18 - disable_strategy - kernel_module_firewire-core_disabled - low_complexity - low_severity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - name: Ensure kernel module 'firewire-core' is blacklisted lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/firewire-core.conf regexp: ^blacklist firewire-core$ line: blacklist firewire-core when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82005-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040026 - NIST-800-53-AC-18 - disable_strategy - kernel_module_firewire-core_disabled - low_complexity - low_severity - medium_disruption - reboot_required --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,install%20firewire-core%20/bin/true%0Ablacklist%20firewire-core%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/modprobe.d/firewire-core.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^install firewire-core" /etc/modprobe.d/firewire-core.conf ; then sed -i 's#^install firewire-core.*#install firewire-core /bin/true#g' /etc/modprobe.d/firewire-core.conf else echo -e "\n# Disable per security requirements" >> /etc/modprobe.d/firewire-core.conf echo "install firewire-core /bin/false" >> /etc/modprobe.d/firewire-core.conf fi if ! LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^blacklist firewire-core$" /etc/modprobe.d/firewire-core.conf ; then echo "blacklist firewire-core" >> /etc/modprobe.d/firewire-core.conf fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable RDS Support The Reliable Datagram Sockets (RDS) protocol is a transport layer protocol designed to provide reliable high-bandwidth, low-latency communications between nodes in a cluster. To configure the system to prevent the rds kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to the file /etc/modprobe.d/rds.conf: install rds /bin/true To configure the system to prevent the rds from being used, add the following line to file /etc/modprobe.d/rds.conf: blacklist rds 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 Disabling RDS protects the system against exploitation of any flaws in its implementation. CCE-82870-7 - name: Ensure kernel module 'rds' is disabled lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/rds.conf regexp: install\s+rds line: install rds /bin/false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82870-7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - kernel_module_rds_disabled - low_complexity - low_severity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - name: Ensure kernel module 'rds' is blacklisted lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/rds.conf regexp: ^blacklist rds$ line: blacklist rds when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82870-7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - kernel_module_rds_disabled - low_complexity - low_severity - medium_disruption - reboot_required --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,install%20rds%20/bin/true%0Ablacklist%20rds%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/modprobe.d/rds.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^install rds" /etc/modprobe.d/rds.conf ; then sed -i 's#^install rds.*#install rds /bin/true#g' /etc/modprobe.d/rds.conf else echo -e "\n# Disable per security requirements" >> /etc/modprobe.d/rds.conf echo "install rds /bin/false" >> /etc/modprobe.d/rds.conf fi if ! LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^blacklist rds$" /etc/modprobe.d/rds.conf ; then echo "blacklist rds" >> /etc/modprobe.d/rds.conf fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable SCTP Support The Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) is a transport layer protocol, designed to support the idea of message-oriented communication, with several streams of messages within one connection. To configure the system to prevent the sctp kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to the file /etc/modprobe.d/sctp.conf: install sctp /bin/true To configure the system to prevent the sctp from being used, add the following line to file /etc/modprobe.d/sctp.conf: blacklist sctp 11 14 3 9 5.10.1 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 3.4.6 CCI-000381 CCI-000366 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 Req-1.4.2 1.4.2 SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040023 3.1.2 SV-230496r942924_rule Disabling SCTP protects the system against exploitation of any flaws in its implementation. CCE-80834-5 - name: Ensure kernel module 'sctp' is disabled lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/sctp.conf regexp: install\s+sctp line: install sctp /bin/false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80834-5 - CJIS-5.10.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040023 - NIST-800-171-3.4.6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.2 - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.2 - disable_strategy - kernel_module_sctp_disabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - name: Ensure kernel module 'sctp' is blacklisted lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/sctp.conf regexp: ^blacklist sctp$ line: blacklist sctp when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80834-5 - CJIS-5.10.1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040023 - NIST-800-171-3.4.6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.2 - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.2 - disable_strategy - kernel_module_sctp_disabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,install%20sctp%20/bin/true%0Ablacklist%20sctp%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/modprobe.d/sctp.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^install sctp" /etc/modprobe.d/sctp.conf ; then sed -i 's#^install sctp.*#install sctp /bin/true#g' /etc/modprobe.d/sctp.conf else echo -e "\n# Disable per security requirements" >> /etc/modprobe.d/sctp.conf echo "install sctp /bin/false" >> /etc/modprobe.d/sctp.conf fi if ! LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^blacklist sctp$" /etc/modprobe.d/sctp.conf ; then echo "blacklist sctp" >> /etc/modprobe.d/sctp.conf fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable TIPC Support The Transparent Inter-Process Communication (TIPC) protocol is designed to provide communications between nodes in a cluster. To configure the system to prevent the tipc kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to the file /etc/modprobe.d/tipc.conf: install tipc /bin/true To configure the system to prevent the tipc from being used, add the following line to file /etc/modprobe.d/tipc.conf: blacklist tipc This configuration baseline was created to deploy the base operating system for general purpose workloads. When the operating system is configured for certain purposes, such as a node in High Performance Computing cluster, it is expected that the tipc kernel module will be loaded. 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 CCI-000381 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 FMT_SMF_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 RHEL-08-040024 SV-230497r942927_rule Disabling TIPC protects the system against exploitation of any flaws in its implementation. CCE-82297-3 - name: Ensure kernel module 'tipc' is disabled lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/tipc.conf regexp: install\s+tipc line: install tipc /bin/false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82297-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040024 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - kernel_module_tipc_disabled - low_complexity - low_severity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - name: Ensure kernel module 'tipc' is blacklisted lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/tipc.conf regexp: ^blacklist tipc$ line: blacklist tipc when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82297-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040024 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - kernel_module_tipc_disabled - low_complexity - low_severity - medium_disruption - reboot_required --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,install%20tipc%20/bin/true%0Ablacklist%20tipc%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/modprobe.d/tipc.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^install tipc" /etc/modprobe.d/tipc.conf ; then sed -i 's#^install tipc.*#install tipc /bin/true#g' /etc/modprobe.d/tipc.conf else echo -e "\n# Disable per security requirements" >> /etc/modprobe.d/tipc.conf echo "install tipc /bin/false" >> /etc/modprobe.d/tipc.conf fi if ! LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^blacklist tipc$" /etc/modprobe.d/tipc.conf ; then echo "blacklist tipc" >> /etc/modprobe.d/tipc.conf fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Wireless Networking Wireless networking, such as 802.11 (WiFi) and Bluetooth, can present a security risk to sensitive or classified systems and networks. Wireless networking hardware is much more likely to be included in laptop or portable systems than in desktops or servers. Removal of hardware provides the greatest assurance that the wireless capability remains disabled. Acquisition policies often include provisions to prevent the purchase of equipment that will be used in sensitive spaces and includes wireless capabilities. If it is impractical to remove the wireless hardware, and policy permits the device to enter sensitive spaces as long as wireless is disabled, efforts should instead focus on disabling wireless capability via software. Disable Wireless Through Software Configuration If it is impossible to remove the wireless hardware from the device in question, disable as much of it as possible through software. The following methods can disable software support for wireless networking, but note that these methods do not prevent malicious software or careless users from re-activating the devices. Disable Bluetooth Service The bluetooth service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now bluetooth.service $ sudo service bluetooth stop 11 12 14 15 3 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 3.1.16 CCI-000085 CCI-001551 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.9.1.2 AC-18(a) AC-18(3) CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) MP-7 PR.AC-3 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 Disabling the bluetooth service prevents the system from attempting connections to Bluetooth devices, which entails some security risk. Nevertheless, variation in this risk decision may be expected due to the utility of Bluetooth connectivity and its limited range. - name: Block Disable service bluetooth block: - name: Disable service bluetooth block: - name: Disable service bluetooth systemd: name: bluetooth.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service bluetooth' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-171-3.1.16 - NIST-800-53-AC-18(3) - NIST-800-53-AC-18(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_bluetooth_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - bluetooth.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files bluetooth.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-171-3.1.16 - NIST-800-53-AC-18(3) - NIST-800-53-AC-18(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_bluetooth_disabled - name: Disable socket bluetooth systemd: name: bluetooth.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("bluetooth.socket",multiline=True) tags: - NIST-800-171-3.1.16 - NIST-800-53-AC-18(3) - NIST-800-53-AC-18(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_bluetooth_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: bluetooth.service enabled: false mask: true - name: bluetooth.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["bluetooth"] include disable_bluetooth class disable_bluetooth { service {'bluetooth': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'bluetooth.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'bluetooth.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'bluetooth.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files bluetooth.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'bluetooth.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'bluetooth.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'bluetooth.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Bluetooth Kernel Module The kernel's module loading system can be configured to prevent loading of the Bluetooth module. Add the following to the appropriate /etc/modprobe.d configuration file to prevent the loading of the Bluetooth module: install bluetooth /bin/true 11 12 14 15 3 8 9 5.13.1.3 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 3.1.16 CCI-000085 CCI-001443 CCI-001444 CCI-001551 CCI-002418 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.9.1.2 AC-18(a) AC-18(3) CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) MP-7 PR.AC-3 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 SRG-OS-000300-GPOS-00118 RHEL-08-040111 SV-230507r942939_rule If Bluetooth functionality must be disabled, preventing the kernel from loading the kernel module provides an additional safeguard against its activation. CCE-80832-9 - name: Ensure kernel module 'bluetooth' is disabled lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/bluetooth.conf regexp: install\s+bluetooth line: install bluetooth /bin/false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80832-9 - CJIS-5.13.1.3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040111 - NIST-800-171-3.1.16 - NIST-800-53-AC-18(3) - NIST-800-53-AC-18(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - disable_strategy - kernel_module_bluetooth_disabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - name: Ensure kernel module 'bluetooth' is blacklisted lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/bluetooth.conf regexp: ^blacklist bluetooth$ line: blacklist bluetooth when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80832-9 - CJIS-5.13.1.3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040111 - NIST-800-171-3.1.16 - NIST-800-53-AC-18(3) - NIST-800-53-AC-18(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - disable_strategy - kernel_module_bluetooth_disabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,install%20bluetooth%20/bin/true%0Ablacklist%20bluetooth%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/modprobe.d/bluetooth.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^install bluetooth" /etc/modprobe.d/bluetooth.conf ; then sed -i 's#^install bluetooth.*#install bluetooth /bin/true#g' /etc/modprobe.d/bluetooth.conf else echo -e "\n# Disable per security requirements" >> /etc/modprobe.d/bluetooth.conf echo "install bluetooth /bin/false" >> /etc/modprobe.d/bluetooth.conf fi if ! LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^blacklist bluetooth$" /etc/modprobe.d/bluetooth.conf ; then echo "blacklist bluetooth" >> /etc/modprobe.d/bluetooth.conf fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Kernel cfg80211 Module To configure the system to prevent the cfg80211 kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to the file /etc/modprobe.d/cfg80211.conf: install cfg80211 /bin/true To configure the system to prevent the cfg80211 from being used, add the following line to file /etc/modprobe.d/cfg80211.conf: blacklist cfg80211 AC-18(a) AC-18(3) CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) MP-7 AC-18(4) If Wireless functionality must be disabled, preventing the kernel from loading the kernel module provides an additional safeguard against its activation. - name: Ensure kernel module 'cfg80211' is disabled lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/cfg80211.conf regexp: install\s+cfg80211 line: install cfg80211 /bin/false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-53-AC-18(3) - NIST-800-53-AC-18(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-18(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - disable_strategy - kernel_module_cfg80211_disabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - name: Ensure kernel module 'cfg80211' is blacklisted lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/cfg80211.conf regexp: ^blacklist cfg80211$ line: blacklist cfg80211 when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-53-AC-18(3) - NIST-800-53-AC-18(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-18(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - disable_strategy - kernel_module_cfg80211_disabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,install%20cfg80211%20/bin/true%0Ablacklist%20cfg80211%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/modprobe.d/cfg80211.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^install cfg80211" /etc/modprobe.d/cfg80211.conf ; then sed -i 's#^install cfg80211.*#install cfg80211 /bin/true#g' /etc/modprobe.d/cfg80211.conf else echo -e "\n# Disable per security requirements" >> /etc/modprobe.d/cfg80211.conf echo "install cfg80211 /bin/false" >> /etc/modprobe.d/cfg80211.conf fi if ! LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^blacklist cfg80211$" /etc/modprobe.d/cfg80211.conf ; then echo "blacklist cfg80211" >> /etc/modprobe.d/cfg80211.conf fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Kernel iwlmvm Module To configure the system to prevent the iwlmvm kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to the file /etc/modprobe.d/iwlmvm.conf: install iwlmvm /bin/true To configure the system to prevent the iwlmvm from being used, add the following line to file /etc/modprobe.d/iwlmvm.conf: blacklist iwlmvm AC-18(a) AC-18(3) CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) MP-7 AC-18(4) If Wireless functionality must be disabled, preventing the kernel from loading the kernel module provides an additional safeguard against its activation. - name: Ensure kernel module 'iwlmvm' is disabled lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/iwlmvm.conf regexp: install\s+iwlmvm line: install iwlmvm /bin/false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-53-AC-18(3) - NIST-800-53-AC-18(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-18(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - disable_strategy - kernel_module_iwlmvm_disabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - name: Ensure kernel module 'iwlmvm' is blacklisted lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/iwlmvm.conf regexp: ^blacklist iwlmvm$ line: blacklist iwlmvm when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-53-AC-18(3) - NIST-800-53-AC-18(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-18(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - disable_strategy - kernel_module_iwlmvm_disabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,install%20iwlmvm%20/bin/true%0Ablacklist%20iwlmvm%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/modprobe.d/iwlmvm.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^install iwlmvm" /etc/modprobe.d/iwlmvm.conf ; then sed -i 's#^install iwlmvm.*#install iwlmvm /bin/true#g' /etc/modprobe.d/iwlmvm.conf else echo -e "\n# Disable per security requirements" >> /etc/modprobe.d/iwlmvm.conf echo "install iwlmvm /bin/false" >> /etc/modprobe.d/iwlmvm.conf fi if ! LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^blacklist iwlmvm$" /etc/modprobe.d/iwlmvm.conf ; then echo "blacklist iwlmvm" >> /etc/modprobe.d/iwlmvm.conf fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Kernel iwlwifi Module To configure the system to prevent the iwlwifi kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to the file /etc/modprobe.d/iwlwifi.conf: install iwlwifi /bin/true To configure the system to prevent the iwlwifi from being used, add the following line to file /etc/modprobe.d/iwlwifi.conf: blacklist iwlwifi AC-18(a) AC-18(3) CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) MP-7 AC-18(4) If Wireless functionality must be disabled, preventing the kernel from loading the kernel module provides an additional safeguard against its activation. - name: Ensure kernel module 'iwlwifi' is disabled lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/iwlwifi.conf regexp: install\s+iwlwifi line: install iwlwifi /bin/false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-53-AC-18(3) - NIST-800-53-AC-18(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-18(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - disable_strategy - kernel_module_iwlwifi_disabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - name: Ensure kernel module 'iwlwifi' is blacklisted lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/iwlwifi.conf regexp: ^blacklist iwlwifi$ line: blacklist iwlwifi when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-53-AC-18(3) - NIST-800-53-AC-18(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-18(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - disable_strategy - kernel_module_iwlwifi_disabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,install%20iwlwifi%20/bin/true%0Ablacklist%20iwlwifi%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/modprobe.d/iwlwifi.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^install iwlwifi" /etc/modprobe.d/iwlwifi.conf ; then sed -i 's#^install iwlwifi.*#install iwlwifi /bin/true#g' /etc/modprobe.d/iwlwifi.conf else echo -e "\n# Disable per security requirements" >> /etc/modprobe.d/iwlwifi.conf echo "install iwlwifi /bin/false" >> /etc/modprobe.d/iwlwifi.conf fi if ! LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^blacklist iwlwifi$" /etc/modprobe.d/iwlwifi.conf ; then echo "blacklist iwlwifi" >> /etc/modprobe.d/iwlwifi.conf fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Kernel mac80211 Module To configure the system to prevent the mac80211 kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to the file /etc/modprobe.d/mac80211.conf: install mac80211 /bin/true To configure the system to prevent the mac80211 from being used, add the following line to file /etc/modprobe.d/mac80211.conf: blacklist mac80211 AC-18(a) AC-18(3) CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) MP-7 AC-18(4) If Wireless functionality must be disabled, preventing the kernel from loading the kernel module provides an additional safeguard against its activation. - name: Ensure kernel module 'mac80211' is disabled lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/mac80211.conf regexp: install\s+mac80211 line: install mac80211 /bin/false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-53-AC-18(3) - NIST-800-53-AC-18(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-18(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - disable_strategy - kernel_module_mac80211_disabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - name: Ensure kernel module 'mac80211' is blacklisted lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/mac80211.conf regexp: ^blacklist mac80211$ line: blacklist mac80211 when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-53-AC-18(3) - NIST-800-53-AC-18(4) - NIST-800-53-AC-18(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - disable_strategy - kernel_module_mac80211_disabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,install%20mac80211%20/bin/true%0Ablacklist%20mac80211%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/modprobe.d/mac80211.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^install mac80211" /etc/modprobe.d/mac80211.conf ; then sed -i 's#^install mac80211.*#install mac80211 /bin/true#g' /etc/modprobe.d/mac80211.conf else echo -e "\n# Disable per security requirements" >> /etc/modprobe.d/mac80211.conf echo "install mac80211 /bin/false" >> /etc/modprobe.d/mac80211.conf fi if ! LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^blacklist mac80211$" /etc/modprobe.d/mac80211.conf ; then echo "blacklist mac80211" >> /etc/modprobe.d/mac80211.conf fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable WiFi or Bluetooth in BIOS Some machines that include built-in wireless support offer the ability to disable the device through the BIOS. This is hardware-specific; consult your hardware manual or explore the BIOS setup during boot. 11 12 14 15 3 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 CCI-000085 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.9.1.2 AC-18(a) AC-18(3) CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) MP-7 PR.AC-3 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 Disabling wireless support in the BIOS prevents easy activation of the wireless interface, generally requiring administrators to reboot the system first. Deactivate Wireless Network Interfaces Deactivating wireless network interfaces should prevent normal usage of the wireless capability. Configure the system to disable all wireless network interfaces with the following command: $ sudo nmcli radio all off 11 12 14 15 3 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 3.1.16 CCI-000085 CCI-002418 CCI-002421 CCI-001443 CCI-001444 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 1315 1319 A.11.2.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.9.1.2 AC-18(a) AC-18(3) CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) MP-7 PR.AC-3 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 Req-1.3.3 1.3.3 2.3 SRG-OS-000299-GPOS-00117 SRG-OS-000300-GPOS-00118 SRG-OS-000424-GPOS-00188 SRG-OS-000481-GPOS-000481 RHEL-08-040110 3.1.4 SV-230506r627750_rule The use of wireless networking can introduce many different attack vectors into the organization's network. Common attack vectors such as malicious association and ad hoc networks will allow an attacker to spoof a wireless access point (AP), allowing validated systems to connect to the malicious AP and enabling the attacker to monitor and record network traffic. These malicious APs can also serve to create a man-in-the-middle attack or be used to create a denial of service to valid network resources. CCE-83501-7 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-83501-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040110 - NIST-800-171-3.1.16 - NIST-800-53-AC-18(3) - NIST-800-53-AC-18(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - PCI-DSS-Req-1.3.3 - PCI-DSSv4-1.3.3 - PCI-DSSv4-2.3 - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - wireless_disable_interfaces - name: Service facts ansible.builtin.service_facts: null tags: - CCE-83501-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040110 - NIST-800-171-3.1.16 - NIST-800-53-AC-18(3) - NIST-800-53-AC-18(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - PCI-DSS-Req-1.3.3 - PCI-DSSv4-1.3.3 - PCI-DSSv4-2.3 - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - wireless_disable_interfaces - name: Ensure NetworkManager is installed ansible.builtin.package: name: '{{ item }}' state: present with_items: - NetworkManager tags: - CCE-83501-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040110 - NIST-800-171-3.1.16 - NIST-800-53-AC-18(3) - NIST-800-53-AC-18(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - PCI-DSS-Req-1.3.3 - PCI-DSSv4-1.3.3 - PCI-DSSv4-2.3 - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - wireless_disable_interfaces - name: NetworkManager Deactivate Wireless Network Interfaces command: nmcli radio wifi off when: - '''NetworkManager'' in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_facts.services['NetworkManager.service'].state == 'running' tags: - CCE-83501-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040110 - NIST-800-171-3.1.16 - NIST-800-53-AC-18(3) - NIST-800-53-AC-18(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - PCI-DSS-Req-1.3.3 - PCI-DSSv4-1.3.3 - PCI-DSSv4-2.3 - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - unknown_strategy - wireless_disable_interfaces if ! rpm -q --quiet "NetworkManager" ; then yum install -y "NetworkManager" fi if command -v nmcli >/dev/null 2>&1 && systemctl is-active NetworkManager >/dev/null 2>&1; then nmcli radio all off fi if command -v wicked >/dev/null 2>&1 && systemctl is-active wickedd >/dev/null 2>&1; then if [ -n "$(find /sys/class/net/*/ -type d -name wireless)" ]; then interfaces=$(find /sys/class/net/*/wireless -type d -name wireless | xargs -0 dirname | xargs basename) for iface in $interfaces; do wicked ifdown $iface sed -i 's/STARTMODE=.*/STARTMODE=off/' /etc/sysconfig/network/ifcfg-$iface done fi fi Disable Unused Interfaces Network interfaces expand the attack surface of the system. Unused interfaces are not monitored or controlled, and should be disabled. If the system does not require network communications but still needs to use the loopback interface, remove all files of the form ifcfg-interface except for ifcfg-lo from /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts: $ sudo rm /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifcfg-interface If the system is a standalone machine with no need for network access or even communication over the loopback device, then disable this service. The network service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now network.service Transport Layer Security Support Support for Transport Layer Security (TLS), and its predecessor, the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), is included in Red Hat Enterprise Linux in the OpenSSL software (RPM package openssl). TLS provides encrypted and authenticated network communications, and many network services include support for it. TLS or SSL can be leveraged to avoid any plaintext transmission of sensitive data. For information on how to use OpenSSL, see http://www.openssl.org/docs/. Information on FIPS validation of OpenSSL is available at http://www.openssl.org/docs/fips.html and http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140val-all.htm. Network Manager The NetworkManager daemon configures a variety of network connections. This section discusses how to configure NetworkManager. NetoworkManager DNS Mode This sets how NetworkManager handles DNS. none - NetworkManager will not modify resolv.conf. default - NetworkManager will update /etc/resolv.conf to reflect the nameservers provided by currently active connections. none default File Permissions and Masks Traditional Unix security relies heavily on file and directory permissions to prevent unauthorized users from reading or modifying files to which they should not have access. Several of the commands in this section search filesystems for files or directories with certain characteristics, and are intended to be run on every local partition on a given system. When the variable PART appears in one of the commands below, it means that the command is intended to be run repeatedly, with the name of each local partition substituted for PART in turn. The following command prints a list of all xfs partitions on the local system, which is the default filesystem for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 installations: $ mount -t xfs | awk '{print $3}' For any systems that use a different local filesystem type, modify this command as appropriate. Verify Permissions on Important Files and Directories Permissions for many files on a system must be set restrictively to ensure sensitive information is properly protected. This section discusses important permission restrictions which can be verified to ensure that no harmful discrepancies have arisen. Ensure All World-Writable Directories Are Owned by root User All directories in local partitions which are world-writable should be owned by root. If any world-writable directories are not owned by root, this should be investigated. Following this, the files should be deleted or assigned to root user. BP28(R40) CCI-000366 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 SRG-OS-000138-GPOS-00069 RHEL-08-010700 SV-230318r743960_rule Allowing a user account to own a world-writable directory is undesirable because it allows the owner of that directory to remove or replace any files that may be placed in the directory by other users. CCE-83375-6 - name: Ensure All World-Writable Directories Are Owned by root User - Define Excluded (Non-Local) File Systems and Paths ansible.builtin.set_fact: excluded_fstypes: - afs - ceph - cifs - smb3 - smbfs - sshfs - ncpfs - ncp - nfs - nfs4 - gfs - gfs2 - glusterfs - gpfs - pvfs2 - ocfs2 - lustre - davfs - fuse.sshfs excluded_paths: - dev - proc - run - sys search_paths: [] tags: - CCE-83375-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010700 - dir_perms_world_writable_root_owned - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure All World-Writable Directories Are Owned by root User - Find Relevant Root Directories Ignoring Pre-Defined Excluded Paths ansible.builtin.find: paths: / file_type: directory excludes: '{{ excluded_paths }}' hidden: true recurse: false register: result_relevant_root_dirs tags: - CCE-83375-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010700 - dir_perms_world_writable_root_owned - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure All World-Writable Directories Are Owned by root User - Include Relevant Root Directories in a List of Paths to be Searched ansible.builtin.set_fact: search_paths: '{{ search_paths | union([item.path]) }}' loop: '{{ result_relevant_root_dirs.files }}' tags: - CCE-83375-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010700 - dir_perms_world_writable_root_owned - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure All World-Writable Directories Are Owned by root User - Increment Search Paths List with Local Partitions Mount Points ansible.builtin.set_fact: search_paths: '{{ search_paths | union([item.mount]) }}' loop: '{{ ansible_mounts }}' when: - item.fstype not in excluded_fstypes - item.mount != '/' tags: - CCE-83375-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010700 - dir_perms_world_writable_root_owned - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure All World-Writable Directories Are Owned by root User - Increment Search Paths List with Local NFS File System Targets ansible.builtin.set_fact: search_paths: '{{ search_paths | union([item.device.split('':'')[1]]) }}' loop: '{{ ansible_mounts }}' when: item.device is search("localhost:") tags: - CCE-83375-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010700 - dir_perms_world_writable_root_owned - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure All World-Writable Directories Are Owned by root User - Define Rule Specific Facts ansible.builtin.set_fact: world_writable_dirs: [] tags: - CCE-83375-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010700 - dir_perms_world_writable_root_owned - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure All World-Writable Directories Are Owned by root User - Find All Uncompliant Directories in Local File Systems ansible.builtin.command: cmd: find {{ item }} -xdev -type d -perm -0002 -uid +0 loop: '{{ search_paths }}' changed_when: false register: result_found_dirs tags: - CCE-83375-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010700 - dir_perms_world_writable_root_owned - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure All World-Writable Directories Are Owned by root User - Create List of World Writable Directories Not Owned by root ansible.builtin.set_fact: world_writable_dirs: '{{ world_writable_dirs | union(item.stdout_lines) | list }}' loop: '{{ result_found_dirs.results }}' when: item is not skipped tags: - CCE-83375-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010700 - dir_perms_world_writable_root_owned - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure All World-Writable Directories Are Owned by root User - Ensure root Ownership on Local World Writable Directories ansible.builtin.file: path: '{{ item }}' owner: root loop: '{{ world_writable_dirs }}' tags: - CCE-83375-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010700 - dir_perms_world_writable_root_owned - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # At least under containerized env /proc can have files w/o possilibity to # modify even as root. And touching /proc is not good idea anyways. find / -path /proc -prune -o \ -not -fstype afs -not -fstype ceph -not -fstype cifs -not -fstype smb3 -not -fstype smbfs \ -not -fstype sshfs -not -fstype ncpfs -not -fstype ncp -not -fstype nfs -not -fstype nfs4 \ -not -fstype gfs -not -fstype gfs2 -not -fstype glusterfs -not -fstype gpfs \ -not -fstype pvfs2 -not -fstype ocfs2 -not -fstype lustre -not -fstype davfs \ -not -fstype fuse.sshfs -type d -perm -0002 -uid +0 -exec chown root {} \; Verify that All World-Writable Directories Have Sticky Bits Set When the so-called 'sticky bit' is set on a directory, only the owner of a given file may remove that file from the directory. Without the sticky bit, any user with write access to a directory may remove any file in the directory. Setting the sticky bit prevents users from removing each other's files. In cases where there is no reason for a directory to be world-writable, a better solution is to remove that permission rather than to set the sticky bit. However, if a directory is used by a particular application, consult that application's documentation instead of blindly changing modes. To set the sticky bit on a world-writable directory DIR, run the following command: $ sudo chmod +t DIR This rule can take a long time to perform the check and might consume a considerable amount of resources depending on the number of directories present on the system. It is not a problem in most cases, but especially systems with a large number of directories can be affected. See https://access.redhat.com/articles/6999111. BP28(R40) 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 CCI-001090 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000138-GPOS-00069 RHEL-08-010190 6.1.11 SV-230243r792857_rule Failing to set the sticky bit on public directories allows unauthorized users to delete files in the directory structure. The only authorized public directories are those temporary directories supplied with the system, or those designed to be temporary file repositories. The setting is normally reserved for directories used by the system, by users for temporary file storage (such as /tmp), and for directories requiring global read/write access. CCE-80783-4 - name: Verify that All World-Writable Directories Have Sticky Bits Set - Define Excluded (Non-Local) File Systems and Paths ansible.builtin.set_fact: excluded_fstypes: - afs - ceph - cifs - smb3 - smbfs - sshfs - ncpfs - ncp - nfs - nfs4 - gfs - gfs2 - glusterfs - gpfs - pvfs2 - ocfs2 - lustre - davfs - fuse.sshfs excluded_paths: - dev - proc - run - sys search_paths: [] tags: - CCE-80783-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010190 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - dir_perms_world_writable_sticky_bits - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Verify that All World-Writable Directories Have Sticky Bits Set - Find Relevant Root Directories Ignoring Pre-Defined Excluded Paths ansible.builtin.find: paths: / file_type: directory excludes: '{{ excluded_paths }}' hidden: true recurse: false register: result_relevant_root_dirs tags: - CCE-80783-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010190 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - dir_perms_world_writable_sticky_bits - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Verify that All World-Writable Directories Have Sticky Bits Set - Include Relevant Root Directories in a List of Paths to be Searched ansible.builtin.set_fact: search_paths: '{{ search_paths | union([item.path]) }}' loop: '{{ result_relevant_root_dirs.files }}' tags: - CCE-80783-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010190 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - dir_perms_world_writable_sticky_bits - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Verify that All World-Writable Directories Have Sticky Bits Set - Increment Search Paths List with Local Partitions Mount Points ansible.builtin.set_fact: search_paths: '{{ search_paths | union([item.mount]) }}' loop: '{{ ansible_mounts }}' when: - item.fstype not in excluded_fstypes - item.mount != '/' tags: - CCE-80783-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010190 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - dir_perms_world_writable_sticky_bits - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Verify that All World-Writable Directories Have Sticky Bits Set - Increment Search Paths List with Local NFS File System Targets ansible.builtin.set_fact: search_paths: '{{ search_paths | union([item.device.split('':'')[1]]) }}' loop: '{{ ansible_mounts }}' when: item.device is search("localhost:") tags: - CCE-80783-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010190 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - dir_perms_world_writable_sticky_bits - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Verify that All World-Writable Directories Have Sticky Bits Set - Define Rule Specific Facts ansible.builtin.set_fact: world_writable_dirs: [] tags: - CCE-80783-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010190 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - dir_perms_world_writable_sticky_bits - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Verify that All World-Writable Directories Have Sticky Bits Set - Find All Uncompliant Directories in Local File Systems ansible.builtin.command: cmd: find {{ item }} -xdev -type d ( -perm -0002 -a ! -perm -1000 ) loop: '{{ search_paths }}' changed_when: false register: result_found_dirs tags: - CCE-80783-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010190 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - dir_perms_world_writable_sticky_bits - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Verify that All World-Writable Directories Have Sticky Bits Set - Create List of World Writable Directories Without Sticky Bit ansible.builtin.set_fact: world_writable_dirs: '{{ world_writable_dirs | union(item.stdout_lines) | list }}' loop: '{{ result_found_dirs.results }}' when: result_found_dirs is not skipped and item is not skipped tags: - CCE-80783-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010190 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - dir_perms_world_writable_sticky_bits - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Verify that All World-Writable Directories Have Sticky Bits Set - Ensure Sticky Bit is Set on Local World Writable Directories ansible.builtin.file: path: '{{ item }}' mode: a+t loop: '{{ world_writable_dirs }}' tags: - CCE-80783-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010190 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - dir_perms_world_writable_sticky_bits - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy df --local -P | awk '{if (NR!=1) print $6}' \ | xargs -I '$6' find '$6' -xdev -type d \ \( -perm -0002 -a ! -perm -1000 \) 2>/dev/null \ -exec chmod a+t {} + Ensure All World-Writable Directories Are Owned by a System Account All directories in local partitions which are world-writable should be owned by root or another system account. If any world-writable directories are not owned by a system account, this should be investigated. Following this, the files should be deleted or assigned to an appropriate owner. This rule can take a long time to perform the check and might consume a considerable amount of resources depending on the number of directories present on the system. It is not a problem in most cases, but especially systems with a large number of directories can be affected. See https://access.redhat.com/articles/6999111. 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 CCI-000366 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 Allowing a user account to own a world-writable directory is undesirable because it allows the owner of that directory to remove or replace any files that may be placed in the directory by other users. Ensure All World-Writable Directories Are Group Owned by a System Account All directories in local partitions which are world-writable should be group owned by root or another system account. If any world-writable directories are not group owned by a system account, this should be investigated. Following this, the files should be deleted or assigned to an appropriate group. 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 CCI-000366 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010710 SV-230319r743961_rule Allowing a user account to group own a world-writable directory is undesirable because it allows the owner of that directory to remove or replace any files that may be placed in the directory by other users. CCE-85886-0 Verify Permissions on /etc/audit/auditd.conf To properly set the permissions of /etc/audit/auditd.conf, run the command: $ sudo chmod 0640 /etc/audit/auditd.conf CCI-000171 AU-12(b) SRG-OS-000063-GPOS-00032 RHEL-08-030610 SV-230471r627750_rule Without the capability to restrict the roles and individuals that can select which events are audited, unauthorized personnel may be able to prevent the auditing of critical events. Misconfigured audits may degrade the system's performance by overwhelming the audit log. Misconfigured audits may also make it more difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident or identify those responsible for one. CCE-85871-2 - name: Test for existence /etc/audit/auditd.conf stat: path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf register: file_exists tags: - CCE-85871-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030610 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(b) - configure_strategy - file_permissions_etc_audit_auditd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure permission u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt on /etc/audit/auditd.conf file: path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf mode: u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-85871-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030610 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(b) - configure_strategy - file_permissions_etc_audit_auditd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chmod u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt /etc/audit/auditd.conf Verify Permissions on /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules To properly set the permissions of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, run the command: $ sudo chmod 0640 /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules CCI-000171 AU-12(b) SRG-OS-000063-GPOS-00032 RHEL-08-030610 SV-230471r627750_rule Without the capability to restrict the roles and individuals that can select which events are audited, unauthorized personnel may be able to prevent the auditing of critical events. Misconfigured audits may degrade the system's performance by overwhelming the audit log. Misconfigured audits may also make it more difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident or identify those responsible for one. CCE-85875-3 - name: Find /etc/audit/rules.d/ file(s) command: find -H /etc/audit/rules.d/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+xs,g+xws,o+xwrt -type f -regex "^.*rules$" register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false tags: - CCE-85875-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030610 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(b) - configure_strategy - file_permissions_etc_audit_rulesd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Set permissions for /etc/audit/rules.d/ file(s) file: path: '{{ item }}' mode: u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt state: file with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' tags: - CCE-85875-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030610 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(b) - configure_strategy - file_permissions_etc_audit_rulesd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed find -H /etc/audit/rules.d/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+xs,g+xws,o+xwrt -type f -regex '^.*rules$' -exec chmod u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt {} \; Verify that local System.map file (if exists) is readable only by root Files containing sensitive informations should be protected by restrictive permissions. Most of the time, there is no need that these files need to be read by any non-root user To properly set the permissions of /boot/System.map-*, run the command: $ sudo chmod 0600 /boot/System.map-* BP28(R13) The System.map file contains information about kernel symbols and can give some hints to generate local exploitation. CCE-82892-1 Ensure All SGID Executables Are Authorized The SGID (set group id) bit should be set only on files that were installed via authorized means. A straightforward means of identifying unauthorized SGID files is determine if any were not installed as part of an RPM package, which is cryptographically verified. Investigate the origin of any unpackaged SGID files. This configuration check considers authorized SGID files those which were installed via RPM. It is assumed that when an individual has sudo access to install an RPM and all packages are signed with an organizationally-recognized GPG key, the software should be considered an approved package on the system. Any SGID file not deployed through an RPM will be flagged for further review. This rule can take a long time to perform the check and might consume a considerable amount of resources depending on the number of files present on the system. It is not a problem in most cases, but especially systems with a large number of files can be affected. See https://access.redhat.com/articles/6999111. BP28(R37) BP28(R38) 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 6.1.13 Executable files with the SGID permission run with the privileges of the owner of the file. SGID files of uncertain provenance could allow for unprivileged users to elevate privileges. The presence of these files should be strictly controlled on the system. CCE-80816-2 Ensure All SUID Executables Are Authorized The SUID (set user id) bit should be set only on files that were installed via authorized means. A straightforward means of identifying unauthorized SUID files is determine if any were not installed as part of an RPM package, which is cryptographically verified. Investigate the origin of any unpackaged SUID files. This configuration check considers authorized SUID files those which were installed via RPM. It is assumed that when an individual has sudo access to install an RPM and all packages are signed with an organizationally-recognized GPG key, the software should be considered an approved package on the system. Any SUID file not deployed through an RPM will be flagged for further review. This rule can take a long time to perform the check and might consume a considerable amount of resources depending on the number of files present on the system. It is not a problem in most cases, but especially systems with a large number of files can be affected. See https://access.redhat.com/articles/6999111. BP28(R37) BP28(R38) 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 6.1.13 Executable files with the SUID permission run with the privileges of the owner of the file. SUID files of uncertain provenance could allow for unprivileged users to elevate privileges. The presence of these files should be strictly controlled on the system. CCE-80817-0 Ensure No World-Writable Files Exist It is generally a good idea to remove global (other) write access to a file when it is discovered. However, check with documentation for specific applications before making changes. Also, monitor for recurring world-writable files, as these may be symptoms of a misconfigured application or user account. Finally, this applies to real files and not virtual files that are a part of pseudo file systems such as sysfs or procfs. This rule can take a long time to perform the check and might consume a considerable amount of resources depending on the number of files present on the system. It is not a problem in most cases, but especially systems with a large number of files can be affected. See https://access.redhat.com/articles/6999111. BP28(R40) 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 2.2.6 6.1.11 Data in world-writable files can be modified by any user on the system. In almost all circumstances, files can be configured using a combination of user and group permissions to support whatever legitimate access is needed without the risk caused by world-writable files. CCE-80818-8 FILTER_NODEV=$(awk '/nodev/ { print $2 }' /proc/filesystems | paste -sd,) PARTITIONS=$(findmnt -n -l -k -it $FILTER_NODEV | awk '{ print $1 }') for PARTITION in $PARTITIONS; do find "${PARTITION}" -xdev -type f -perm -002 -exec chmod o-w {} \; 2>/dev/null done # Ensure /tmp is also fixed whem tmpfs is used. if grep "^tmpfs /tmp" /proc/mounts; then find /tmp -xdev -type f -perm -002 -exec chmod o-w {} \; 2>/dev/null fi Ensure All Files Are Owned by a Group If any file is not group-owned by a group present in /etc/group, the cause of the lack of group-ownership must be investigated. Following this, those files should be deleted or assigned to an appropriate group. Locate the mount points related to local devices by the following command: $ findmnt -n -l -k -it $(awk '/nodev/ { print $2 }' /proc/filesystems | paste -sd,) For all mount points listed by the previous command, it is necessary to search for files which do not belong to a valid group using the following command: $ sudo find MOUNTPOINT -xdev -nogroup 2>/dev/null This rule only considers local groups as valid groups. If you have your groups defined outside /etc/group, the rule won't consider those. This rule can take a long time to perform the check and might consume a considerable amount of resources depending on the number of files present on the system. It is not a problem in most cases, but especially systems with a large number of files can be affected. See https://access.redhat.com/articles/6999111. BP28(R55) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.02 DSS06.03 DSS06.06 DSS06.10 CCI-000366 CCI-002165 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.18.1.4 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-4 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 PR.DS-5 PR.PT-3 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010790 6.1.12 SV-230327r627750_rule Unowned files do not directly imply a security problem, but they are generally a sign that something is amiss. They may be caused by an intruder, by incorrect software installation or draft software removal, or by failure to remove all files belonging to a deleted account, or other similar cases. The files should be repaired so they will not cause problems when accounts are created in the future, and the cause should be discovered and addressed. CCE-83497-8 Ensure All Files Are Owned by a User If any files are not owned by a user, then the cause of their lack of ownership should be investigated. Following this, the files should be deleted or assigned to an appropriate user. Locate the mount points related to local devices by the following command: $ findmnt -n -l -k -it $(awk '/nodev/ { print $2 }' /proc/filesystems | paste -sd,) For all mount points listed by the previous command, it is necessary to search for files which do not belong to a valid user using the following command: $ sudo find MOUNTPOINT -xdev -nouser 2>/dev/null For this rule to evaluate centralized user accounts, getent must be working properly so that running the command getent passwd returns a list of all users in your organization. If using the System Security Services Daemon (SSSD), enumerate = true must be configured in your organization's domain to return a complete list of users This rule can take a long time to perform the check and might consume a considerable amount of resources depending on the number of files present on the system. It is not a problem in most cases, but especially systems with a large number of files can be affected. See https://access.redhat.com/articles/6999111. BP28(R55) 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 9 APO01.06 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 DSS06.03 DSS06.06 CCI-000366 CCI-002165 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 5.2 SR 7.6 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.AC-6 PR.DS-5 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010780 6.1.12 SV-230326r627750_rule Unowned files do not directly imply a security problem, but they are generally a sign that something is amiss. They may be caused by an intruder, by incorrect software installation or draft software removal, or by failure to remove all files belonging to a deleted account, or other similar cases. The files should be repaired so they will not cause problems when accounts are created in the future, and the cause should be discovered and addressed. CCE-83499-4 Enable Kernel Parameter to Enforce DAC on Hardlinks To set the runtime status of the fs.protected_hardlinks kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w fs.protected_hardlinks=1 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: fs.protected_hardlinks = 1 BP28(R23) CCI-002165 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) SRG-OS-000312-GPOS-00122 SRG-OS-000312-GPOS-00123 SRG-OS-000324-GPOS-00125 RHEL-08-010374 SV-230268r858754_rule By enabling this kernel parameter, users can no longer create soft or hard links to files which they do not own. Disallowing such hardlinks mitigate vulnerabilities based on insecure file system accessed by privileged programs, avoiding an exploitation vector exploiting unsafe use of open() or creat(). CCE-81027-5 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*fs.protected_hardlinks.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81027-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010374 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_fs_protected_hardlinks - name: Comment out any occurrences of fs.protected_hardlinks from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*fs.protected_hardlinks replace: '#fs.protected_hardlinks' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81027-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010374 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_fs_protected_hardlinks - name: Ensure sysctl fs.protected_hardlinks is set to 1 sysctl: name: fs.protected_hardlinks value: '1' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81027-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010374 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_fs_protected_hardlinks --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,fs.protected_hardlinks%3D1%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_fs_protected_hardlinks.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of fs.protected_hardlinks from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*fs.protected_hardlinks.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "fs.protected_hardlinks" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" # # Set runtime for fs.protected_hardlinks # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w fs.protected_hardlinks="1" # # If fs.protected_hardlinks present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "1" # else, add "fs.protected_hardlinks = 1" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^fs.protected_hardlinks") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "1" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^fs.protected_hardlinks\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^fs.protected_hardlinks\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-81027-5" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable Kernel Parameter to Enforce DAC on Symlinks To set the runtime status of the fs.protected_symlinks kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w fs.protected_symlinks=1 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: fs.protected_symlinks = 1 BP28(R23) CCI-002165 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) SRG-OS-000312-GPOS-00122 SRG-OS-000312-GPOS-00123 SRG-OS-000324-GPOS-00125 RHEL-08-010373 SV-230267r858751_rule By enabling this kernel parameter, symbolic links are permitted to be followed only when outside a sticky world-writable directory, or when the UID of the link and follower match, or when the directory owner matches the symlink's owner. Disallowing such symlinks helps mitigate vulnerabilities based on insecure file system accessed by privileged programs, avoiding an exploitation vector exploiting unsafe use of open() or creat(). CCE-81030-9 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*fs.protected_symlinks.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81030-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010373 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_fs_protected_symlinks - name: Comment out any occurrences of fs.protected_symlinks from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*fs.protected_symlinks replace: '#fs.protected_symlinks' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81030-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010373 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_fs_protected_symlinks - name: Ensure sysctl fs.protected_symlinks is set to 1 sysctl: name: fs.protected_symlinks value: '1' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81030-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010373 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_fs_protected_symlinks --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,fs.protected_symlinks%3D1%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_fs_protected_symlinks.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of fs.protected_symlinks from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*fs.protected_symlinks.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "fs.protected_symlinks" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" # # Set runtime for fs.protected_symlinks # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w fs.protected_symlinks="1" # # If fs.protected_symlinks present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "1" # else, add "fs.protected_symlinks = 1" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^fs.protected_symlinks") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "1" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^fs.protected_symlinks\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^fs.protected_symlinks\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-81030-9" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify Permissions on Files with Local Account Information and Credentials The default restrictive permissions for files which act as important security databases such as passwd, shadow, group, and gshadow files must be maintained. Many utilities need read access to the passwd file in order to function properly, but read access to the shadow file allows malicious attacks against system passwords, and should never be enabled. Verify Permissions and Ownership of Old Passwords File To properly set the owner of /etc/security/opasswd, run the command: $ sudo chown root /etc/security/opasswd To properly set the group owner of /etc/security/opasswd, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /etc/security/opasswd To properly set the permissions of /etc/security/opasswd, run the command: $ sudo chmod 0600 /etc/security/opasswd CCI-000200 SRG-OS-000077-GPOS-00045 6.1.3 The /etc/security/opasswd file stores old passwords to prevent password reuse. Protection of this file is critical for system security. CCE-86140-1 Verify Group Who Owns Backup group File To properly set the group owner of /etc/group-, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /etc/group- CCI-002223 AC-6 (1) Req-8.7 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 6.1.5 The /etc/group- file is a backup file of /etc/group, and as such, it contains information regarding groups that are configured on the system. Protection of this file is important for system security. CCE-83475-4 - name: Test for existence /etc/group- stat: path: /etc/group- register: file_exists tags: - CCE-83475-4 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_backup_etc_group - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner 0 on /etc/group- file: path: /etc/group- group: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-83475-4 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_backup_etc_group - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chgrp 0 /etc/group- Verify Group Who Owns Backup gshadow File To properly set the group owner of /etc/gshadow-, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /etc/gshadow- CCI-002223 AC-6 (1) Req-8.7 7.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 6.1.9 The /etc/gshadow- file is a backup of /etc/gshadow, and as such, it contains group password hashes. Protection of this file is critical for system security. CCE-83535-5 - name: Test for existence /etc/gshadow- stat: path: /etc/gshadow- register: file_exists tags: - CCE-83535-5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7 - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_backup_etc_gshadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner 0 on /etc/gshadow- file: path: /etc/gshadow- group: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-83535-5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7 - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_backup_etc_gshadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chgrp 0 /etc/gshadow- Verify Group Who Owns Backup passwd File To properly set the group owner of /etc/passwd-, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /etc/passwd- CCI-002223 AC-6 (1) Req-8.7 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 6.1.2 The /etc/passwd- file is a backup file of /etc/passwd, and as such, it contains information about the users that are configured on the system. Protection of this file is critical for system security. CCE-83324-4 - name: Test for existence /etc/passwd- stat: path: /etc/passwd- register: file_exists tags: - CCE-83324-4 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_backup_etc_passwd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner 0 on /etc/passwd- file: path: /etc/passwd- group: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-83324-4 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_backup_etc_passwd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chgrp 0 /etc/passwd- Verify User Who Owns Backup shadow File To properly set the group owner of /etc/shadow-, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /etc/shadow- Req-8.7 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 6.1.7 The /etc/shadow- file is a backup file of /etc/shadow, and as such, it contains the list of local system accounts and password hashes. Protection of this file is critical for system security. CCE-83415-0 - name: Test for existence /etc/shadow- stat: path: /etc/shadow- register: file_exists tags: - CCE-83415-0 - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_backup_etc_shadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner 0 on /etc/shadow- file: path: /etc/shadow- group: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-83415-0 - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_backup_etc_shadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chgrp 0 /etc/shadow- Verify Group Who Owns group File To properly set the group owner of /etc/group, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /etc/group 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 5.5.2.2 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 Req-8.7.c 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 6.1.4 The /etc/group file contains information regarding groups that are configured on the system. Protection of this file is important for system security. CCE-80796-6 - name: Test for existence /etc/group stat: path: /etc/group register: file_exists tags: - CCE-80796-6 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_etc_group - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner 0 on /etc/group file: path: /etc/group group: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80796-6 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_etc_group - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chgrp 0 /etc/group Verify Group Who Owns gshadow File To properly set the group owner of /etc/gshadow, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /etc/gshadow 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 6.1.8 The /etc/gshadow file contains group password hashes. Protection of this file is critical for system security. CCE-80797-4 - name: Test for existence /etc/gshadow stat: path: /etc/gshadow register: file_exists tags: - CCE-80797-4 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_etc_gshadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner 0 on /etc/gshadow file: path: /etc/gshadow group: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80797-4 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_etc_gshadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chgrp 0 /etc/gshadow Verify Group Who Owns passwd File To properly set the group owner of /etc/passwd, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /etc/passwd 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 5.5.2.2 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 Req-8.7.c 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 6.1.1 The /etc/passwd file contains information about the users that are configured on the system. Protection of this file is critical for system security. CCE-80798-2 - name: Test for existence /etc/passwd stat: path: /etc/passwd register: file_exists tags: - CCE-80798-2 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_etc_passwd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner 0 on /etc/passwd file: path: /etc/passwd group: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80798-2 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_etc_passwd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chgrp 0 /etc/passwd Verify Group Who Owns shadow File To properly set the group owner of /etc/shadow, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /etc/shadow 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 5.5.2.2 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 Req-8.7.c 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 6.1.6 The /etc/shadow file stores password hashes. Protection of this file is critical for system security. CCE-80799-0 - name: Test for existence /etc/shadow stat: path: /etc/shadow register: file_exists tags: - CCE-80799-0 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_etc_shadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner 0 on /etc/shadow file: path: /etc/shadow group: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80799-0 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_etc_shadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chgrp 0 /etc/shadow Verify Group Who Owns /etc/shells File To properly set the group owner of /etc/shells, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /etc/shells AC-3 MP-2 6.1.10 The /etc/shells file contains the list of full pathnames to shells on the system. Since this file is used by many system programs this file should be protected. CCE-87030-3 - name: Test for existence /etc/shells stat: path: /etc/shells register: file_exists tags: - CCE-87030-3 - NIST-800-53-AC-3 - NIST-800-53-MP-2 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_etc_shells - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner 0 on /etc/shells file: path: /etc/shells group: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-87030-3 - NIST-800-53-AC-3 - NIST-800-53-MP-2 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_etc_shells - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chgrp 0 /etc/shells Verify User Who Owns Backup group File To properly set the owner of /etc/group-, run the command: $ sudo chown root /etc/group- CCI-002223 AC-6 (1) Req-8.7.c 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 6.1.5 The /etc/group- file is a backup file of /etc/group, and as such, it contains information regarding groups that are configured on the system. Protection of this file is important for system security. CCE-83473-9 - name: Test for existence /etc/group- stat: path: /etc/group- register: file_exists tags: - CCE-83473-9 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_owner_backup_etc_group - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner 0 on /etc/group- file: path: /etc/group- owner: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-83473-9 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_owner_backup_etc_group - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chown 0 /etc/group- Verify User Who Owns Backup gshadow File To properly set the owner of /etc/gshadow-, run the command: $ sudo chown root /etc/gshadow- CCI-002223 AC-6 (1) Req-8.7 7.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 6.1.9 The /etc/gshadow- file is a backup of /etc/gshadow, and as such, it contains group password hashes. Protection of this file is critical for system security. CCE-83533-0 - name: Test for existence /etc/gshadow- stat: path: /etc/gshadow- register: file_exists tags: - CCE-83533-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7 - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_owner_backup_etc_gshadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner 0 on /etc/gshadow- file: path: /etc/gshadow- owner: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-83533-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7 - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_owner_backup_etc_gshadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chown 0 /etc/gshadow- Verify User Who Owns Backup passwd File To properly set the owner of /etc/passwd-, run the command: $ sudo chown root /etc/passwd- CCI-002223 AC-6 (1) Req-8.7.c 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 6.1.2 The /etc/passwd- file is a backup file of /etc/passwd, and as such, it contains information about the users that are configured on the system. Protection of this file is critical for system security. CCE-83326-9 - name: Test for existence /etc/passwd- stat: path: /etc/passwd- register: file_exists tags: - CCE-83326-9 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_owner_backup_etc_passwd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner 0 on /etc/passwd- file: path: /etc/passwd- owner: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-83326-9 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_owner_backup_etc_passwd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chown 0 /etc/passwd- Verify Group Who Owns Backup shadow File To properly set the owner of /etc/shadow-, run the command: $ sudo chown root /etc/shadow- CCI-002223 AC-6 (1) Req-8.7.c 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 6.1.7 The /etc/shadow- file is a backup file of /etc/shadow, and as such, it contains the list of local system accounts and password hashes. Protection of this file is critical for system security. CCE-83413-5 - name: Test for existence /etc/shadow- stat: path: /etc/shadow- register: file_exists tags: - CCE-83413-5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_owner_backup_etc_shadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner 0 on /etc/shadow- file: path: /etc/shadow- owner: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-83413-5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_owner_backup_etc_shadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chown 0 /etc/shadow- Verify User Who Owns group File To properly set the owner of /etc/group, run the command: $ sudo chown root /etc/group 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 5.5.2.2 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 CCI-002223 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 Req-8.7.c 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 6.1.4 The /etc/group file contains information regarding groups that are configured on the system. Protection of this file is important for system security. CCE-80801-4 - name: Test for existence /etc/group stat: path: /etc/group register: file_exists tags: - CCE-80801-4 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_owner_etc_group - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner 0 on /etc/group file: path: /etc/group owner: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80801-4 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_owner_etc_group - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chown 0 /etc/group Verify User Who Owns gshadow File To properly set the owner of /etc/gshadow, run the command: $ sudo chown root /etc/gshadow BP28(R36) 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 CCI-002223 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 6.1.8 The /etc/gshadow file contains group password hashes. Protection of this file is critical for system security. CCE-80802-2 - name: Test for existence /etc/gshadow stat: path: /etc/gshadow register: file_exists tags: - CCE-80802-2 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - file_owner_etc_gshadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner 0 on /etc/gshadow file: path: /etc/gshadow owner: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80802-2 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - file_owner_etc_gshadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chown 0 /etc/gshadow Verify User Who Owns passwd File To properly set the owner of /etc/passwd, run the command: $ sudo chown root /etc/passwd 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 5.5.2.2 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 CCI-002223 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 Req-8.7.c 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 6.1.1 The /etc/passwd file contains information about the users that are configured on the system. Protection of this file is critical for system security. CCE-80803-0 - name: Test for existence /etc/passwd stat: path: /etc/passwd register: file_exists tags: - CCE-80803-0 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_owner_etc_passwd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner 0 on /etc/passwd file: path: /etc/passwd owner: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80803-0 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_owner_etc_passwd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chown 0 /etc/passwd Verify User Who Owns shadow File To properly set the owner of /etc/shadow, run the command: $ sudo chown root /etc/shadow BP28(R36) 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 5.5.2.2 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 CCI-002223 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 Req-8.7.c 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 6.1.6 The /etc/shadow file contains the list of local system accounts and stores password hashes. Protection of this file is critical for system security. Failure to give ownership of this file to root provides the designated owner with access to sensitive information which could weaken the system security posture. CCE-80804-8 - name: Test for existence /etc/shadow stat: path: /etc/shadow register: file_exists tags: - CCE-80804-8 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_owner_etc_shadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner 0 on /etc/shadow file: path: /etc/shadow owner: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80804-8 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_owner_etc_shadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chown 0 /etc/shadow Verify Who Owns /etc/shells File To properly set the owner of /etc/shells, run the command: $ sudo chown root /etc/shells AC-3 MP-2 6.1.10 The /etc/shells file contains the list of full pathnames to shells on the system. Since this file is used by many system programs this file should be protected. CCE-87055-0 - name: Test for existence /etc/shells stat: path: /etc/shells register: file_exists tags: - CCE-87055-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-3 - NIST-800-53-MP-2 - configure_strategy - file_owner_etc_shells - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner 0 on /etc/shells file: path: /etc/shells owner: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-87055-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-3 - NIST-800-53-MP-2 - configure_strategy - file_owner_etc_shells - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chown 0 /etc/shells Verify Permissions on Backup group File To properly set the permissions of /etc/group-, run the command: $ sudo chmod 0644 /etc/group- CCI-002223 AC-6 (1) Req-8.7.c 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 6.1.5 The /etc/group- file is a backup file of /etc/group, and as such, it contains information regarding groups that are configured on the system. Protection of this file is important for system security. CCE-83483-8 - name: Test for existence /etc/group- stat: path: /etc/group- register: file_exists tags: - CCE-83483-8 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_backup_etc_group - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure permission u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt on /etc/group- file: path: /etc/group- mode: u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-83483-8 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_backup_etc_group - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chmod u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt /etc/group- Verify Permissions on Backup gshadow File To properly set the permissions of /etc/gshadow-, run the command: $ sudo chmod 0000 /etc/gshadow- CCI-002223 AC-6 (1) SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 6.1.9 The /etc/gshadow- file is a backup of /etc/gshadow, and as such, it contains group password hashes. Protection of this file is critical for system security. CCE-83573-6 - name: Test for existence /etc/gshadow- stat: path: /etc/gshadow- register: file_exists tags: - CCE-83573-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) - configure_strategy - file_permissions_backup_etc_gshadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure permission u-xwrs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt on /etc/gshadow- file: path: /etc/gshadow- mode: u-xwrs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-83573-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) - configure_strategy - file_permissions_backup_etc_gshadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chmod u-xwrs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt /etc/gshadow- Verify Permissions on Backup passwd File To properly set the permissions of /etc/passwd-, run the command: $ sudo chmod 0644 /etc/passwd- CCI-002223 AC-6 (1) Req-8.7.c 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 6.1.2 The /etc/passwd- file is a backup file of /etc/passwd, and as such, it contains information about the users that are configured on the system. Protection of this file is critical for system security. CCE-83332-7 - name: Test for existence /etc/passwd- stat: path: /etc/passwd- register: file_exists tags: - CCE-83332-7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_backup_etc_passwd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure permission u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt on /etc/passwd- file: path: /etc/passwd- mode: u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-83332-7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_backup_etc_passwd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chmod u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt /etc/passwd- Verify Permissions on Backup shadow File To properly set the permissions of /etc/shadow-, run the command: $ sudo chmod 0000 /etc/shadow- CCI-002223 AC-6 (1) Req-8.7.c 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 6.1.7 The /etc/shadow- file is a backup file of /etc/shadow, and as such, it contains the list of local system accounts and password hashes. Protection of this file is critical for system security. CCE-83417-6 - name: Test for existence /etc/shadow- stat: path: /etc/shadow- register: file_exists tags: - CCE-83417-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_backup_etc_shadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure permission u-xwrs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt on /etc/shadow- file: path: /etc/shadow- mode: u-xwrs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-83417-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_backup_etc_shadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chmod u-xwrs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt /etc/shadow- Verify Permissions on group File To properly set the permissions of /etc/group, run the command: $ sudo chmod 0644 /etc/group BP28(R36) 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 5.5.2.2 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 CCI-002223 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 Req-8.7.c 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 6.1.4 The /etc/group file contains information regarding groups that are configured on the system. Protection of this file is important for system security. CCE-80810-5 - name: Test for existence /etc/group stat: path: /etc/group register: file_exists tags: - CCE-80810-5 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_etc_group - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure permission u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt on /etc/group file: path: /etc/group mode: u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80810-5 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_etc_group - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chmod u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt /etc/group Verify Permissions on gshadow File To properly set the permissions of /etc/gshadow, run the command: $ sudo chmod 0000 /etc/gshadow BP28(R36) 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 CCI-002223 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 6.1.8 The /etc/gshadow file contains group password hashes. Protection of this file is critical for system security. CCE-80811-3 - name: Test for existence /etc/gshadow stat: path: /etc/gshadow register: file_exists tags: - CCE-80811-3 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - file_permissions_etc_gshadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure permission u-xwrs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt on /etc/gshadow file: path: /etc/gshadow mode: u-xwrs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80811-3 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - file_permissions_etc_gshadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chmod u-xwrs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt /etc/gshadow Verify Permissions on passwd File To properly set the permissions of /etc/passwd, run the command: $ sudo chmod 0644 /etc/passwd BP28(R36) 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 5.5.2.2 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 CCI-002223 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 Req-8.7.c 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 6.1.1 If the /etc/passwd file is writable by a group-owner or the world the risk of its compromise is increased. The file contains the list of accounts on the system and associated information, and protection of this file is critical for system security. CCE-80812-1 - name: Test for existence /etc/passwd stat: path: /etc/passwd register: file_exists tags: - CCE-80812-1 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_etc_passwd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure permission u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt on /etc/passwd file: path: /etc/passwd mode: u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80812-1 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_etc_passwd - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chmod u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt /etc/passwd Verify Permissions on shadow File To properly set the permissions of /etc/shadow, run the command: $ sudo chmod 0000 /etc/shadow BP28(R36) 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 5.5.2.2 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 CCI-002223 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 Req-8.7.c 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 6.1.6 The /etc/shadow file contains the list of local system accounts and stores password hashes. Protection of this file is critical for system security. Failure to give ownership of this file to root provides the designated owner with access to sensitive information which could weaken the system security posture. CCE-80813-9 - name: Test for existence /etc/shadow stat: path: /etc/shadow register: file_exists tags: - CCE-80813-9 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_etc_shadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure permission u-xwrs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt on /etc/shadow file: path: /etc/shadow mode: u-xwrs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80813-9 - CJIS-5.5.2.2 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_etc_shadow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chmod u-xwrs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt /etc/shadow Verify Permissions on /etc/shells File To properly set the permissions of /etc/shells, run the command: $ sudo chmod 0644 /etc/shells AC-3 MP-2 6.1.10 The /etc/shells file contains the list of full pathnames to shells on the system. Since this file is used by many system programs this file should be protected. CCE-86634-3 - name: Test for existence /etc/shells stat: path: /etc/shells register: file_exists tags: - CCE-86634-3 - NIST-800-53-AC-3 - NIST-800-53-MP-2 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_etc_shells - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure permission u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt on /etc/shells file: path: /etc/shells mode: u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86634-3 - NIST-800-53-AC-3 - NIST-800-53-MP-2 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_etc_shells - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chmod u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt /etc/shells Verify Permissions on Files within /var/log Directory The /var/log directory contains files with logs of error messages in the system and should only be accessed by authorized personnel. Verify Group Who Owns /var/log Directory To properly set the group owner of /var/log, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /var/log CCI-001314 SRG-OS-000206-GPOS-00084 SRG-APP-000118-CTR-000240 RHEL-08-010260 SV-230250r627750_rule The /var/log directory contains files with logs of error messages in the system and should only be accessed by authorized personnel. CCE-83659-3 - name: Ensure group owner on /var/log/ file: path: /var/log/ state: directory group: '0' tags: - CCE-83659-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010260 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_var_log - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed find -H /var/log/ -maxdepth 1 -type d -exec chgrp 0 {} \; Verify Group Who Owns /var/log/messages File To properly set the group owner of /var/log/messages, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /var/log/messages CCI-001314 SRG-OS-000206-GPOS-00084 RHEL-08-010230 SV-230247r627750_rule The /var/log/messages file contains logs of error messages in the system and should only be accessed by authorized personnel. CCE-83660-1 - name: Test for existence /var/log/messages stat: path: /var/log/messages register: file_exists tags: - CCE-83660-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010230 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_var_log_messages - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner 0 on /var/log/messages file: path: /var/log/messages group: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-83660-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010230 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_var_log_messages - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chgrp 0 /var/log/messages Verify Group Who Owns /var/log/syslog File To properly set the group owner of /var/log/syslog, run the command: $ sudo chgrp adm /var/log/syslog CCI-001314 SRG-OS-000206-GPOS-00084 The /var/log/syslog file contains logs of error messages in the system and should only be accessed by authorized personnel. - name: Test for existence /var/log/syslog stat: path: /var/log/syslog register: file_exists tags: - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_var_log_syslog - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner 4 on /var/log/syslog file: path: /var/log/syslog group: '4' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_var_log_syslog - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chgrp 4 /var/log/syslog Verify User Who Owns /var/log Directory To properly set the owner of /var/log, run the command: $ sudo chown root /var/log CCI-001314 SRG-OS-000206-GPOS-00084 SRG-APP-000118-CTR-000240 RHEL-08-010250 SV-230249r627750_rule The /var/log directory contains files with logs of error messages in the system and should only be accessed by authorized personnel. CCE-83661-9 - name: Ensure owner on directory /var/log/ file: path: /var/log/ state: directory owner: '0' tags: - CCE-83661-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010250 - configure_strategy - file_owner_var_log - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed find -H /var/log/ -maxdepth 1 -type d -exec chown 0 {} \; Verify User Who Owns /var/log/messages File To properly set the owner of /var/log/messages, run the command: $ sudo chown root /var/log/messages CCI-001314 SRG-OS-000206-GPOS-00084 RHEL-08-010220 SV-230246r627750_rule The /var/log/messages file contains logs of error messages in the system and should only be accessed by authorized personnel. CCE-83662-7 - name: Test for existence /var/log/messages stat: path: /var/log/messages register: file_exists tags: - CCE-83662-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010220 - configure_strategy - file_owner_var_log_messages - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner 0 on /var/log/messages file: path: /var/log/messages owner: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-83662-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010220 - configure_strategy - file_owner_var_log_messages - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chown 0 /var/log/messages Verify User Who Owns /var/log/syslog File To properly set the owner of /var/log/syslog, run the command: $ sudo chown syslog /var/log/syslog CCI-001314 SRG-OS-000206-GPOS-00084 The /var/log/syslog file contains logs of error messages in the system and should only be accessed by authorized personnel. - name: Test for existence /var/log/syslog stat: path: /var/log/syslog register: file_exists tags: - configure_strategy - file_owner_var_log_syslog - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner 104 on /var/log/syslog file: path: /var/log/syslog owner: '104' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - configure_strategy - file_owner_var_log_syslog - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chown 104 /var/log/syslog Verify Permissions on /var/log Directory To properly set the permissions of /var/log, run the command: $ sudo chmod 0755 /var/log CCI-001314 SRG-OS-000206-GPOS-00084 SRG-APP-000118-CTR-000240 RHEL-08-010240 SV-230248r627750_rule The /var/log directory contains files with logs of error messages in the system and should only be accessed by authorized personnel. CCE-83663-5 - name: Find /var/log/ file(s) command: 'find -H /var/log/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+s,g+ws,o+wt -type d ' register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false tags: - CCE-83663-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010240 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_var_log - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Set permissions for /var/log/ file(s) file: path: '{{ item }}' mode: u-s,g-ws,o-wt state: directory with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' tags: - CCE-83663-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010240 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_var_log - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed find -H /var/log/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+s,g+ws,o+wt -type d -exec chmod u-s,g-ws,o-wt {} \; Verify Permissions on /var/log/messages File To properly set the permissions of /var/log/messages, run the command: $ sudo chmod 0640 /var/log/messages CCI-001314 SRG-OS-000206-GPOS-00084 RHEL-08-010210 SV-230245r627750_rule The /var/log/messages file contains logs of error messages in the system and should only be accessed by authorized personnel. CCE-83665-0 - name: Test for existence /var/log/messages stat: path: /var/log/messages register: file_exists tags: - CCE-83665-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010210 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_var_log_messages - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure permission u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt on /var/log/messages file: path: /var/log/messages mode: u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-83665-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010210 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_var_log_messages - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chmod u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt /var/log/messages Verify Permissions on /var/log/syslog File To properly set the permissions of /var/log/syslog, run the command: $ sudo chmod 0640 /var/log/syslog CCI-001314 SRG-OS-000206-GPOS-00084 The /var/log/syslog file contains logs of error messages in the system and should only be accessed by authorized personnel. - name: Test for existence /var/log/syslog stat: path: /var/log/syslog register: file_exists tags: - configure_strategy - file_permissions_var_log_syslog - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure permission u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt on /var/log/syslog file: path: /var/log/syslog mode: u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - configure_strategy - file_permissions_var_log_syslog - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chmod u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt /var/log/syslog Verify File Permissions Within Some Important Directories Some directories contain files whose confidentiality or integrity is notably important and may also be susceptible to misconfiguration over time, particularly if unpackaged software is installed. As such, an argument exists to verify that files' permissions within these directories remain configured correctly and restrictively. Verify that Shared Library Directories Have Root Group Ownership System-wide shared library files, which are linked to executables during process load time or run time, are stored in the following directories by default: /lib /lib64 /usr/lib /usr/lib64 Kernel modules, which can be added to the kernel during runtime, are also stored in /lib/modules. All files in these directories should be group-owned by the root user. If the directories, is found to be owned by a user other than root correct its ownership with the following command: $ sudo chgrp root DIR CCI-001499 CM-5(6) CM-5(6).1 SRG-OS-000259-GPOS-00100 RHEL-08-010351 SV-251709r810014_rule Files from shared library directories are loaded into the address space of processes (including privileged ones) or of the kernel itself at runtime. Proper ownership of library directories is necessary to protect the integrity of the system. CCE-85894-4 - name: Ensure group owner on /lib/ recursively file: path: /lib/ state: directory recurse: true group: '0' tags: - CCE-85894-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010351 - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - configure_strategy - dir_group_ownership_library_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner on /lib64/ recursively file: path: /lib64/ state: directory recurse: true group: '0' tags: - CCE-85894-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010351 - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - configure_strategy - dir_group_ownership_library_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner on /usr/lib/ recursively file: path: /usr/lib/ state: directory recurse: true group: '0' tags: - CCE-85894-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010351 - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - configure_strategy - dir_group_ownership_library_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner on /usr/lib64/ recursively file: path: /usr/lib64/ state: directory recurse: true group: '0' tags: - CCE-85894-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010351 - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - configure_strategy - dir_group_ownership_library_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed find -H /lib/ -type d -exec chgrp 0 {} \; find -H /lib64/ -type d -exec chgrp 0 {} \; find -H /usr/lib/ -type d -exec chgrp 0 {} \; find -H /usr/lib64/ -type d -exec chgrp 0 {} \; Verify that System Executable Have Root Ownership /bin /sbin /usr/bin /usr/sbin /usr/local/bin /usr/local/sbin All these directories should be owned by the root user. If any directory DIR in these directories is found to be owned by a user other than root, correct its ownership with the following command: $ sudo chown root DIR CCI-001495 SRG-OS-000258-GPOS-00099 System binaries are executed by privileged users as well as system services, and restrictive permissions are necessary to ensure that their execution of these programs cannot be co-opted. - name: Ensure owner on directory /bin/ recursively file: path: /bin/ state: directory recurse: true owner: '0' tags: - configure_strategy - dir_ownership_binary_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner on directory /sbin/ recursively file: path: /sbin/ state: directory recurse: true owner: '0' tags: - configure_strategy - dir_ownership_binary_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner on directory /usr/bin/ recursively file: path: /usr/bin/ state: directory recurse: true owner: '0' tags: - configure_strategy - dir_ownership_binary_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner on directory /usr/sbin/ recursively file: path: /usr/sbin/ state: directory recurse: true owner: '0' tags: - configure_strategy - dir_ownership_binary_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner on directory /usr/local/bin/ recursively file: path: /usr/local/bin/ state: directory recurse: true owner: '0' tags: - configure_strategy - dir_ownership_binary_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner on directory /usr/local/sbin/ recursively file: path: /usr/local/sbin/ state: directory recurse: true owner: '0' tags: - configure_strategy - dir_ownership_binary_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed find -H /bin/ -type d -exec chown 0 {} \; find -H /sbin/ -type d -exec chown 0 {} \; find -H /usr/bin/ -type d -exec chown 0 {} \; find -H /usr/sbin/ -type d -exec chown 0 {} \; find -H /usr/local/bin/ -type d -exec chown 0 {} \; find -H /usr/local/sbin/ -type d -exec chown 0 {} \; Verify that Shared Library Directories Have Root Ownership System-wide shared library files, which are linked to executables during process load time or run time, are stored in the following directories by default: /lib /lib64 /usr/lib /usr/lib64 Kernel modules, which can be added to the kernel during runtime, are also stored in /lib/modules. All files in these directories should be owned by the root user. If the directories, is found to be owned by a user other than root correct its ownership with the following command: $ sudo chown root DIR CCI-001499 CM-5(6) CM-5(6).1 SRG-OS-000259-GPOS-00100 RHEL-08-010341 SV-251708r810012_rule Files from shared library directories are loaded into the address space of processes (including privileged ones) or of the kernel itself at runtime. Proper ownership of library directories is necessary to protect the integrity of the system. CCE-89021-0 - name: Ensure owner on directory /lib/ recursively file: path: /lib/ state: directory recurse: true owner: '0' tags: - CCE-89021-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010341 - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - configure_strategy - dir_ownership_library_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner on directory /lib64/ recursively file: path: /lib64/ state: directory recurse: true owner: '0' tags: - CCE-89021-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010341 - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - configure_strategy - dir_ownership_library_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner on directory /usr/lib/ recursively file: path: /usr/lib/ state: directory recurse: true owner: '0' tags: - CCE-89021-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010341 - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - configure_strategy - dir_ownership_library_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner on directory /usr/lib64/ recursively file: path: /usr/lib64/ state: directory recurse: true owner: '0' tags: - CCE-89021-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010341 - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - configure_strategy - dir_ownership_library_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed find -H /lib/ -type d -exec chown 0 {} \; find -H /lib64/ -type d -exec chown 0 {} \; find -H /usr/lib/ -type d -exec chown 0 {} \; find -H /usr/lib64/ -type d -exec chown 0 {} \; Verify that System Executable Directories Have Restrictive Permissions System executables are stored in the following directories by default: /bin /sbin /usr/bin /usr/sbin /usr/local/bin /usr/local/sbin These directories should not be group-writable or world-writable. If any directory DIR in these directories is found to be group-writable or world-writable, correct its permission with the following command: $ sudo chmod go-w DIR CCI-001495 SRG-OS-000258-GPOS-00099 System binaries are executed by privileged users, as well as system services, and restrictive permissions are necessary to ensure execution of these programs cannot be co-opted. - name: Find /bin/ file(s) recursively command: 'find -H /bin/ -perm /u+s,g+ws,o+wt -type d ' register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false tags: - configure_strategy - dir_permissions_binary_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Set permissions for /bin/ file(s) file: path: '{{ item }}' mode: u-s,g-ws,o-wt state: directory with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' tags: - configure_strategy - dir_permissions_binary_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Find /sbin/ file(s) recursively command: 'find -H /sbin/ -perm /u+s,g+ws,o+wt -type d ' register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false tags: - configure_strategy - dir_permissions_binary_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Set permissions for /sbin/ file(s) file: path: '{{ item }}' mode: u-s,g-ws,o-wt state: directory with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' tags: - configure_strategy - dir_permissions_binary_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Find /usr/bin/ file(s) recursively command: 'find -H /usr/bin/ -perm /u+s,g+ws,o+wt -type d ' register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false tags: - configure_strategy - dir_permissions_binary_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Set permissions for /usr/bin/ file(s) file: path: '{{ item }}' mode: u-s,g-ws,o-wt state: directory with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' tags: - configure_strategy - dir_permissions_binary_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Find /usr/sbin/ file(s) recursively command: 'find -H /usr/sbin/ -perm /u+s,g+ws,o+wt -type d ' register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false tags: - configure_strategy - dir_permissions_binary_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Set permissions for /usr/sbin/ file(s) file: path: '{{ item }}' mode: u-s,g-ws,o-wt state: directory with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' tags: - configure_strategy - dir_permissions_binary_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Find /usr/local/bin/ file(s) recursively command: 'find -H /usr/local/bin/ -perm /u+s,g+ws,o+wt -type d ' register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false tags: - configure_strategy - dir_permissions_binary_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Set permissions for /usr/local/bin/ file(s) file: path: '{{ item }}' mode: u-s,g-ws,o-wt state: directory with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' tags: - configure_strategy - dir_permissions_binary_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Find /usr/local/sbin/ file(s) recursively command: 'find -H /usr/local/sbin/ -perm /u+s,g+ws,o+wt -type d ' register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false tags: - configure_strategy - dir_permissions_binary_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Set permissions for /usr/local/sbin/ file(s) file: path: '{{ item }}' mode: u-s,g-ws,o-wt state: directory with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' tags: - configure_strategy - dir_permissions_binary_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed find -H /bin/ -perm /u+s,g+ws,o+wt -type d -exec chmod u-s,g-ws,o-wt {} \; find -H /sbin/ -perm /u+s,g+ws,o+wt -type d -exec chmod u-s,g-ws,o-wt {} \; find -H /usr/bin/ -perm /u+s,g+ws,o+wt -type d -exec chmod u-s,g-ws,o-wt {} \; find -H /usr/sbin/ -perm /u+s,g+ws,o+wt -type d -exec chmod u-s,g-ws,o-wt {} \; find -H /usr/local/bin/ -perm /u+s,g+ws,o+wt -type d -exec chmod u-s,g-ws,o-wt {} \; find -H /usr/local/sbin/ -perm /u+s,g+ws,o+wt -type d -exec chmod u-s,g-ws,o-wt {} \; Verify that Shared Library Directories Have Restrictive Permissions System-wide shared library directories, which contain are linked to executables during process load time or run time, are stored in the following directories by default: /lib /lib64 /usr/lib /usr/lib64 Kernel modules, which can be added to the kernel during runtime, are stored in /lib/modules. All sub-directories in these directories should not be group-writable or world-writable. If any file in these directories is found to be group-writable or world-writable, correct its permission with the following command: $ sudo chmod go-w DIR CCI-001499 CIP-003-8 R6 CM-5 CM-5(6) CM-5(6).1 SRG-OS-000259-GPOS-00100 RHEL-08-010331 SV-251707r809345_rule If the operating system were to allow any user to make changes to software libraries, then those changes might be implemented without undergoing the appropriate testing and approvals that are part of a robust change management process. This requirement applies to operating systems with software libraries that are accessible and configurable, as in the case of interpreted languages. Software libraries also include privileged programs which execute with escalated privileges. Only qualified and authorized individuals must be allowed to obtain access to information system components for purposes of initiating changes, including upgrades and modifications. CCE-88692-9 - name: Find /lib/ file(s) recursively command: 'find -H /lib/ -perm /g+w,o+w -type d ' register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false tags: - CCE-88692-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010331 - NIST-800-53-CM-5 - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - configure_strategy - dir_permissions_library_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Set permissions for /lib/ file(s) file: path: '{{ item }}' mode: g-w,o-w state: directory with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' tags: - CCE-88692-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010331 - NIST-800-53-CM-5 - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - configure_strategy - dir_permissions_library_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Find /lib64/ file(s) recursively command: 'find -H /lib64/ -perm /g+w,o+w -type d ' register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false tags: - CCE-88692-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010331 - NIST-800-53-CM-5 - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - configure_strategy - dir_permissions_library_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Set permissions for /lib64/ file(s) file: path: '{{ item }}' mode: g-w,o-w state: directory with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' tags: - CCE-88692-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010331 - NIST-800-53-CM-5 - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - configure_strategy - dir_permissions_library_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Find /usr/lib/ file(s) recursively command: 'find -H /usr/lib/ -perm /g+w,o+w -type d ' register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false tags: - CCE-88692-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010331 - NIST-800-53-CM-5 - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - configure_strategy - dir_permissions_library_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Set permissions for /usr/lib/ file(s) file: path: '{{ item }}' mode: g-w,o-w state: directory with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' tags: - CCE-88692-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010331 - NIST-800-53-CM-5 - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - configure_strategy - dir_permissions_library_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Find /usr/lib64/ file(s) recursively command: 'find -H /usr/lib64/ -perm /g+w,o+w -type d ' register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false tags: - CCE-88692-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010331 - NIST-800-53-CM-5 - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - configure_strategy - dir_permissions_library_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Set permissions for /usr/lib64/ file(s) file: path: '{{ item }}' mode: g-w,o-w state: directory with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' tags: - CCE-88692-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010331 - NIST-800-53-CM-5 - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - configure_strategy - dir_permissions_library_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed find -H /lib/ -perm /g+w,o+w -type d -exec chmod g-w,o-w {} \; find -H /lib64/ -perm /g+w,o+w -type d -exec chmod g-w,o-w {} \; find -H /usr/lib/ -perm /g+w,o+w -type d -exec chmod g-w,o-w {} \; find -H /usr/lib64/ -perm /g+w,o+w -type d -exec chmod g-w,o-w {} \; Verify that audit tools are owned by group root The Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 operating system audit tools must have the proper ownership configured to protected against unauthorized access. Verify it by running the following command: $ stat -c "%n %G" /sbin/auditctl /sbin/aureport /sbin/ausearch /sbin/autrace /sbin/auditd /sbin/audispd /sbin/augenrules /sbin/auditctl root /sbin/aureport root /sbin/ausearch root /sbin/autrace root /sbin/auditd root /sbin/audispd root /sbin/augenrules root Audit tools needed to successfully view and manipulate audit information system activity and records. Audit tools include custom queries and report generators CCI-001493 CCI-001494 SRG-OS-000256-GPiOS-00097 SRG-OS-000257-GPOS-00098 5.2.4.10 Protecting audit information also includes identifying and protecting the tools used to view and manipulate log data. Therefore, protecting audit tools is necessary to prevent unauthorized operation on audit information. Operating systems providing tools to interface with audit information will leverage user permissions and roles identifying the user accessing the tools and the corresponding rights the user enjoys to make access decisions regarding the access to audit tools. CCE-86455-3 - name: Test for existence /sbin/auditctl stat: path: /sbin/auditctl register: file_exists tags: - CCE-86455-3 - configure_strategy - file_groupownership_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner 0 on /sbin/auditctl file: path: /sbin/auditctl group: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86455-3 - configure_strategy - file_groupownership_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /sbin/aureport stat: path: /sbin/aureport register: file_exists tags: - CCE-86455-3 - configure_strategy - file_groupownership_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner 0 on /sbin/aureport file: path: /sbin/aureport group: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86455-3 - configure_strategy - file_groupownership_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /sbin/ausearch stat: path: /sbin/ausearch register: file_exists tags: - CCE-86455-3 - configure_strategy - file_groupownership_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner 0 on /sbin/ausearch file: path: /sbin/ausearch group: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86455-3 - configure_strategy - file_groupownership_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /sbin/autrace stat: path: /sbin/autrace register: file_exists tags: - CCE-86455-3 - configure_strategy - file_groupownership_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner 0 on /sbin/autrace file: path: /sbin/autrace group: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86455-3 - configure_strategy - file_groupownership_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /sbin/auditd stat: path: /sbin/auditd register: file_exists tags: - CCE-86455-3 - configure_strategy - file_groupownership_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner 0 on /sbin/auditd file: path: /sbin/auditd group: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86455-3 - configure_strategy - file_groupownership_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /sbin/audispd stat: path: /sbin/audispd register: file_exists tags: - CCE-86455-3 - configure_strategy - file_groupownership_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner 0 on /sbin/audispd file: path: /sbin/audispd group: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86455-3 - configure_strategy - file_groupownership_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /sbin/augenrules stat: path: /sbin/augenrules register: file_exists tags: - CCE-86455-3 - configure_strategy - file_groupownership_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner 0 on /sbin/augenrules file: path: /sbin/augenrules group: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86455-3 - configure_strategy - file_groupownership_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chgrp 0 /sbin/auditctl chgrp 0 /sbin/aureport chgrp 0 /sbin/ausearch chgrp 0 /sbin/autrace chgrp 0 /sbin/auditd chgrp 0 /sbin/audispd chgrp 0 /sbin/augenrules Verify that system commands files are group owned by root or a system account System commands files are stored in the following directories by default: /bin /sbin /usr/bin /usr/sbin /usr/local/bin /usr/local/sbin All files in these directories should be owned by the root group, or a system account. If the directory, or any file in these directories, is found to be owned by a group other than root or a a system account correct its ownership with the following command: $ sudo chgrp root FILE CCI-001499 CM-5(6) CM-5(6).1 SRG-OS-000259-GPOS-00100 RHEL-08-010320 SV-230259r792864_rule If the operating system allows any user to make changes to software libraries, then those changes might be implemented without undergoing the appropriate testing and approvals that are part of a robust change management process. This requirement applies to operating systems with software libraries that are accessible and configurable, as in the case of interpreted languages. Software libraries also include privileged programs which execute with escalated privileges. Only qualified and authorized individuals must be allowed to obtain access to information system components for purposes of initiating changes, including upgrades and modifications. CCE-86519-6 - name: Retrieve the system command files and set their group ownership to root command: find -L {{ item }} ! -group root -type f -exec chgrp root '{}' \; with_items: - /bin - /sbin - /usr/bin - /usr/sbin - /usr/local/bin - /usr/local/sbin changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false tags: - CCE-86519-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010320 - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - file_groupownership_system_commands_dirs - medium_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy for SYSCMDFILES in /bin /sbin /usr/bin /usr/sbin /usr/local/bin /usr/local/sbin do find -L $SYSCMDFILES \! -group root -type f -exec chgrp root '{}' \; done Verify that audit tools are owned by root The Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 operating system audit tools must have the proper ownership configured to protected against unauthorized access. Verify it by running the following command: $ stat -c "%n %U" /sbin/auditctl /sbin/aureport /sbin/ausearch /sbin/autrace /sbin/auditd /sbin/audispd /sbin/augenrules /sbin/auditctl root /sbin/aureport root /sbin/ausearch root /sbin/autrace root /sbin/auditd root /sbin/audispd root /sbin/augenrules root Audit tools needed to successfully view and manipulate audit information system activity and records. Audit tools include custom queries and report generators CCI-001493 CCI-001494 SRG-OS-000256-GPiOS-00097 SRG-OS-000257-GPOS-00098 5.2.4.9 Protecting audit information also includes identifying and protecting the tools used to view and manipulate log data. Therefore, protecting audit tools is necessary to prevent unauthorized operation on audit information. Operating systems providing tools to interface with audit information will leverage user permissions and roles identifying the user accessing the tools and the corresponding rights the user enjoys to make access decisions regarding the access to audit tools. CCE-86453-8 - name: Test for existence /sbin/auditctl stat: path: /sbin/auditctl register: file_exists tags: - CCE-86453-8 - configure_strategy - file_ownership_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner 0 on /sbin/auditctl file: path: /sbin/auditctl owner: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86453-8 - configure_strategy - file_ownership_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /sbin/aureport stat: path: /sbin/aureport register: file_exists tags: - CCE-86453-8 - configure_strategy - file_ownership_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner 0 on /sbin/aureport file: path: /sbin/aureport owner: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86453-8 - configure_strategy - file_ownership_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /sbin/ausearch stat: path: /sbin/ausearch register: file_exists tags: - CCE-86453-8 - configure_strategy - file_ownership_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner 0 on /sbin/ausearch file: path: /sbin/ausearch owner: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86453-8 - configure_strategy - file_ownership_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /sbin/autrace stat: path: /sbin/autrace register: file_exists tags: - CCE-86453-8 - configure_strategy - file_ownership_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner 0 on /sbin/autrace file: path: /sbin/autrace owner: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86453-8 - configure_strategy - file_ownership_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /sbin/auditd stat: path: /sbin/auditd register: file_exists tags: - CCE-86453-8 - configure_strategy - file_ownership_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner 0 on /sbin/auditd file: path: /sbin/auditd owner: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86453-8 - configure_strategy - file_ownership_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /sbin/audispd stat: path: /sbin/audispd register: file_exists tags: - CCE-86453-8 - configure_strategy - file_ownership_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner 0 on /sbin/audispd file: path: /sbin/audispd owner: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86453-8 - configure_strategy - file_ownership_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /sbin/augenrules stat: path: /sbin/augenrules register: file_exists tags: - CCE-86453-8 - configure_strategy - file_ownership_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner 0 on /sbin/augenrules file: path: /sbin/augenrules owner: '0' when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86453-8 - configure_strategy - file_ownership_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chown 0 /sbin/auditctl chown 0 /sbin/aureport chown 0 /sbin/ausearch chown 0 /sbin/autrace chown 0 /sbin/auditd chown 0 /sbin/audispd chown 0 /sbin/augenrules Verify that System Executables Have Root Ownership System executables are stored in the following directories by default: /bin /sbin /usr/bin /usr/libexec /usr/local/bin /usr/local/sbin /usr/sbin All files in these directories should be owned by the root user. If any file FILE in these directories is found to be owned by a user other than root, correct its ownership with the following command: $ sudo chown root FILE 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 CCI-001499 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-5(6) CM-5(6).1 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 SRG-OS-000259-GPOS-00100 RHEL-08-010310 SV-230258r627750_rule System binaries are executed by privileged users as well as system services, and restrictive permissions are necessary to ensure that their execution of these programs cannot be co-opted. CCE-80806-3 - name: Read list of system executables without root ownership command: find /bin/ /usr/bin/ /usr/local/bin/ /sbin/ /usr/sbin/ /usr/local/sbin/ /usr/libexec \! -user root register: no_root_system_executables changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false tags: - CCE-80806-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010310 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - file_ownership_binary_dirs - medium_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Set ownership to root of system executables file: path: '{{ item }}' owner: root with_items: '{{ no_root_system_executables.stdout_lines }}' when: no_root_system_executables.stdout_lines | length > 0 tags: - CCE-80806-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010310 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - file_ownership_binary_dirs - medium_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy find /bin/ \ /usr/bin/ \ /usr/local/bin/ \ /sbin/ \ /usr/sbin/ \ /usr/local/sbin/ \ /usr/libexec \ \! -user root -execdir chown root {} \; Verify that Shared Library Files Have Root Ownership System-wide shared library files, which are linked to executables during process load time or run time, are stored in the following directories by default: /lib /lib64 /usr/lib /usr/lib64 Kernel modules, which can be added to the kernel during runtime, are also stored in /lib/modules. All files in these directories should be owned by the root user. If the directory, or any file in these directories, is found to be owned by a user other than root correct its ownership with the following command: $ sudo chown root FILE 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 CCI-001499 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-5(6) CM-5(6).1 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 SRG-OS-000259-GPOS-00100 RHEL-08-010340 SV-230261r627750_rule Files from shared library directories are loaded into the address space of processes (including privileged ones) or of the kernel itself at runtime. Proper ownership is necessary to protect the integrity of the system. CCE-80807-1 - name: Find /lib/ file(s) matching ^.*$ recursively command: find -H /lib/ -type f ! -uid 0 -regex "^.*$" register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false tags: - CCE-80807-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010340 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - file_ownership_library_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner on /lib/ file(s) matching ^.*$ file: path: '{{ item }}' owner: '0' state: file with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' tags: - CCE-80807-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010340 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - file_ownership_library_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Find /lib64/ file(s) matching ^.*$ recursively command: find -H /lib64/ -type f ! -uid 0 -regex "^.*$" register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false tags: - CCE-80807-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010340 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - file_ownership_library_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner on /lib64/ file(s) matching ^.*$ file: path: '{{ item }}' owner: '0' state: file with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' tags: - CCE-80807-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010340 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - file_ownership_library_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Find /usr/lib/ file(s) matching ^.*$ recursively command: find -H /usr/lib/ -type f ! -uid 0 -regex "^.*$" register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false tags: - CCE-80807-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010340 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - file_ownership_library_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner on /usr/lib/ file(s) matching ^.*$ file: path: '{{ item }}' owner: '0' state: file with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' tags: - CCE-80807-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010340 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - file_ownership_library_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Find /usr/lib64/ file(s) matching ^.*$ recursively command: find -H /usr/lib64/ -type f ! -uid 0 -regex "^.*$" register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false tags: - CCE-80807-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010340 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - file_ownership_library_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner on /usr/lib64/ file(s) matching ^.*$ file: path: '{{ item }}' owner: '0' state: file with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' tags: - CCE-80807-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010340 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - file_ownership_library_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed find /lib/ -type f ! -uid 0 -regex '^.*$' -exec chown 0 {} \; find /lib64/ -type f ! -uid 0 -regex '^.*$' -exec chown 0 {} \; find /usr/lib/ -type f ! -uid 0 -regex '^.*$' -exec chown 0 {} \; find /usr/lib64/ -type f ! -uid 0 -regex '^.*$' -exec chown 0 {} \; Verify that audit tools Have Mode 0755 or less The Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 operating system audit tools must have the proper permissions configured to protected against unauthorized access. Verify it by running the following command: $ stat -c "%n %a" /sbin/auditctl /sbin/aureport /sbin/ausearch /sbin/autrace /sbin/auditd /sbin/audispd /sbin/augenrules /sbin/auditctl 755 /sbin/aureport 755 /sbin/ausearch 755 /sbin/autrace 755 /sbin/auditd 755 /sbin/audispd 755 /sbin/augenrules 755 Audit tools needed to successfully view and manipulate audit information system activity and records. Audit tools include custom queries and report generators CCI-001493 CCI-001494 SRG-OS-000256-GPOS-00097 SRG-OS-000257-GPOS-00098 5.2.4.8 Protecting audit information also includes identifying and protecting the tools used to view and manipulate log data. Therefore, protecting audit tools is necessary to prevent unauthorized operation on audit information. Operating systems providing tools to interface with audit information will leverage user permissions and roles identifying the user accessing the tools and the corresponding rights the user enjoys to make access decisions regarding the access to audit tools. CCE-86447-0 - name: Test for existence /sbin/auditctl stat: path: /sbin/auditctl register: file_exists tags: - CCE-86447-0 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure permission u-s,g-ws,o-wt on /sbin/auditctl file: path: /sbin/auditctl mode: u-s,g-ws,o-wt when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86447-0 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /sbin/aureport stat: path: /sbin/aureport register: file_exists tags: - CCE-86447-0 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure permission u-s,g-ws,o-wt on /sbin/aureport file: path: /sbin/aureport mode: u-s,g-ws,o-wt when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86447-0 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /sbin/ausearch stat: path: /sbin/ausearch register: file_exists tags: - CCE-86447-0 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure permission u-s,g-ws,o-wt on /sbin/ausearch file: path: /sbin/ausearch mode: u-s,g-ws,o-wt when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86447-0 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /sbin/autrace stat: path: /sbin/autrace register: file_exists tags: - CCE-86447-0 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure permission u-s,g-ws,o-wt on /sbin/autrace file: path: /sbin/autrace mode: u-s,g-ws,o-wt when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86447-0 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /sbin/auditd stat: path: /sbin/auditd register: file_exists tags: - CCE-86447-0 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure permission u-s,g-ws,o-wt on /sbin/auditd file: path: /sbin/auditd mode: u-s,g-ws,o-wt when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86447-0 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /sbin/audispd stat: path: /sbin/audispd register: file_exists tags: - CCE-86447-0 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure permission u-s,g-ws,o-wt on /sbin/audispd file: path: /sbin/audispd mode: u-s,g-ws,o-wt when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86447-0 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Test for existence /sbin/augenrules stat: path: /sbin/augenrules register: file_exists tags: - CCE-86447-0 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure permission u-s,g-ws,o-wt on /sbin/augenrules file: path: /sbin/augenrules mode: u-s,g-ws,o-wt when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86447-0 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_audit_binaries - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed chmod u-s,g-ws,o-wt /sbin/auditctl chmod u-s,g-ws,o-wt /sbin/aureport chmod u-s,g-ws,o-wt /sbin/ausearch chmod u-s,g-ws,o-wt /sbin/autrace chmod u-s,g-ws,o-wt /sbin/auditd chmod u-s,g-ws,o-wt /sbin/audispd chmod u-s,g-ws,o-wt /sbin/augenrules Verify that System Executables Have Restrictive Permissions System executables are stored in the following directories by default: /bin /sbin /usr/bin /usr/libexec /usr/local/bin /usr/local/sbin /usr/sbin All files in these directories should not be group-writable or world-writable. If any file FILE in these directories is found to be group-writable or world-writable, correct its permission with the following command: $ sudo chmod go-w FILE 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 CCI-001499 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-5(6) CM-5(6).1 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 SRG-OS-000259-GPOS-00100 RHEL-08-010300 SV-230257r792862_rule System binaries are executed by privileged users, as well as system services, and restrictive permissions are necessary to ensure execution of these programs cannot be co-opted. CCE-80809-7 - name: Read list of world and group writable system executables ansible.builtin.command: find /bin /usr/bin /usr/local/bin /sbin /usr/sbin /usr/local/sbin /usr/libexec -perm /022 -type f register: world_writable_library_files changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false tags: - CCE-80809-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010300 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - file_permissions_binary_dirs - medium_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Remove world/group writability of system executables ansible.builtin.file: path: '{{ item }}' mode: go-w state: file with_items: '{{ world_writable_library_files.stdout_lines }}' when: world_writable_library_files.stdout_lines | length > 0 tags: - CCE-80809-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010300 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - file_permissions_binary_dirs - medium_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy DIRS="/bin /usr/bin /usr/local/bin /sbin /usr/sbin /usr/local/sbin /usr/libexec" for dirPath in $DIRS; do find "$dirPath" -perm /022 -exec chmod go-w '{}' \; done Verify that Shared Library Files Have Restrictive Permissions System-wide shared library files, which are linked to executables during process load time or run time, are stored in the following directories by default: /lib /lib64 /usr/lib /usr/lib64 Kernel modules, which can be added to the kernel during runtime, are stored in /lib/modules. All files in these directories should not be group-writable or world-writable. If any file in these directories is found to be group-writable or world-writable, correct its permission with the following command: $ sudo chmod go-w FILE 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 CCI-001499 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-6(a) CM-5(6) CM-5(6).1 AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 SRG-OS-000259-GPOS-00100 RHEL-08-010330 SV-230260r792867_rule Files from shared library directories are loaded into the address space of processes (including privileged ones) or of the kernel itself at runtime. Restrictive permissions are necessary to protect the integrity of the system. CCE-80815-4 - name: Find /lib/ file(s) recursively command: find -H /lib/ -perm /g+w,o+w -type f -regex "^.*$" register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false tags: - CCE-80815-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010330 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - file_permissions_library_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Set permissions for /lib/ file(s) file: path: '{{ item }}' mode: g-w,o-w state: file with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' tags: - CCE-80815-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010330 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - file_permissions_library_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Find /lib64/ file(s) recursively command: find -H /lib64/ -perm /g+w,o+w -type f -regex "^.*$" register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false tags: - CCE-80815-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010330 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - file_permissions_library_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Set permissions for /lib64/ file(s) file: path: '{{ item }}' mode: g-w,o-w state: file with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' tags: - CCE-80815-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010330 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - file_permissions_library_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Find /usr/lib/ file(s) recursively command: find -H /usr/lib/ -perm /g+w,o+w -type f -regex "^.*$" register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false tags: - CCE-80815-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010330 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - file_permissions_library_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Set permissions for /usr/lib/ file(s) file: path: '{{ item }}' mode: g-w,o-w state: file with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' tags: - CCE-80815-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010330 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - file_permissions_library_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Find /usr/lib64/ file(s) recursively command: find -H /usr/lib64/ -perm /g+w,o+w -type f -regex "^.*$" register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false tags: - CCE-80815-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010330 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - file_permissions_library_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Set permissions for /usr/lib64/ file(s) file: path: '{{ item }}' mode: g-w,o-w state: file with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' tags: - CCE-80815-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010330 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - file_permissions_library_dirs - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed find -H /lib/ -perm /g+w,o+w -type f -regex '^.*$' -exec chmod g-w,o-w {} \; find -H /lib64/ -perm /g+w,o+w -type f -regex '^.*$' -exec chmod g-w,o-w {} \; find -H /usr/lib/ -perm /g+w,o+w -type f -regex '^.*$' -exec chmod g-w,o-w {} \; find -H /usr/lib64/ -perm /g+w,o+w -type f -regex '^.*$' -exec chmod g-w,o-w {} \; Verify the system-wide library files in directories "/lib", "/lib64", "/usr/lib/" and "/usr/lib64" are group-owned by root. System-wide library files are stored in the following directories by default: /lib /lib64 /usr/lib /usr/lib64 All system-wide shared library files should be protected from unauthorised access. If any of these files is not group-owned by root, correct its group-owner with the following command: $ sudo chgrp root FILE CCI-001499 CM-5(6) CM-5(6).1 SRG-OS-000259-GPOS-00100 RHEL-08-010350 SV-230262r627750_rule If the operating system were to allow any user to make changes to software libraries, then those changes might be implemented without undergoing the appropriate testing and approvals that are part of a robust change management process. This requirement applies to operating systems with software libraries that are accessible and configurable, as in the case of interpreted languages. Software libraries also include privileged programs which execute with escalated privileges. Only qualified and authorized individuals must be allowed to obtain access to information system components for purposes of initiating changes, including upgrades and modifications. CCE-86523-8 - name: Find /lib/ file(s) matching ^.*$ recursively command: find -H /lib/ -type f ! -group 0 -regex "^.*$" register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false tags: - CCE-86523-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010350 - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - root_permissions_syslibrary_files - name: Ensure group owner on /lib/ file(s) matching ^.*$ file: path: '{{ item }}' group: '0' state: file with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' tags: - CCE-86523-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010350 - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - root_permissions_syslibrary_files - name: Find /lib64/ file(s) matching ^.*$ recursively command: find -H /lib64/ -type f ! -group 0 -regex "^.*$" register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false tags: - CCE-86523-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010350 - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - root_permissions_syslibrary_files - name: Ensure group owner on /lib64/ file(s) matching ^.*$ file: path: '{{ item }}' group: '0' state: file with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' tags: - CCE-86523-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010350 - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - root_permissions_syslibrary_files - name: Find /usr/lib/ file(s) matching ^.*$ recursively command: find -H /usr/lib/ -type f ! -group 0 -regex "^.*$" register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false tags: - CCE-86523-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010350 - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - root_permissions_syslibrary_files - name: Ensure group owner on /usr/lib/ file(s) matching ^.*$ file: path: '{{ item }}' group: '0' state: file with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' tags: - CCE-86523-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010350 - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - root_permissions_syslibrary_files - name: Find /usr/lib64/ file(s) matching ^.*$ recursively command: find -H /usr/lib64/ -type f ! -group 0 -regex "^.*$" register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false tags: - CCE-86523-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010350 - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - root_permissions_syslibrary_files - name: Ensure group owner on /usr/lib64/ file(s) matching ^.*$ file: path: '{{ item }}' group: '0' state: file with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' tags: - CCE-86523-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010350 - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - root_permissions_syslibrary_files find /lib/ -type f ! -group 0 -regex '^.*$' -exec chgrp 0 {} \; find /lib64/ -type f ! -group 0 -regex '^.*$' -exec chgrp 0 {} \; find /usr/lib/ -type f ! -group 0 -regex '^.*$' -exec chgrp 0 {} \; find /usr/lib64/ -type f ! -group 0 -regex '^.*$' -exec chgrp 0 {} \; Restrict Dynamic Mounting and Unmounting of Filesystems Linux includes a number of facilities for the automated addition and removal of filesystems on a running system. These facilities may be necessary in many environments, but this capability also carries some risk -- whether direct risk from allowing users to introduce arbitrary filesystems, or risk that software flaws in the automated mount facility itself could allow an attacker to compromise the system. This command can be used to list the types of filesystems that are available to the currently executing kernel: $ find /lib/modules/`uname -r`/kernel/fs -type f -name '*.ko' If these filesystems are not required then they can be explicitly disabled in a configuratio file in /etc/modprobe.d. Disable the Automounter The autofs daemon mounts and unmounts filesystems, such as user home directories shared via NFS, on demand. In addition, autofs can be used to handle removable media, and the default configuration provides the cdrom device as /misc/cd. However, this method of providing access to removable media is not common, so autofs can almost always be disabled if NFS is not in use. Even if NFS is required, it may be possible to configure filesystem mounts statically by editing /etc/fstab rather than relying on the automounter. The autofs service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now autofs.service 1 12 15 16 5 APO13.01 DSS01.04 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 3.4.6 CCI-000366 CCI-000778 CCI-001958 164.308(a)(3)(i) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.310(d)(1) 164.310(d)(2) 164.312(a)(1) 164.312(a)(2)(iv) 164.312(b) 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.6 A.11.2.6 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.18.1.4 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) MP-7 PR.AC-1 PR.AC-3 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 SRG-OS-000114-GPOS-00059 SRG-OS-000378-GPOS-00163 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040070 2.2.1 SV-230502r627750_rule Disabling the automounter permits the administrator to statically control filesystem mounting through /etc/fstab. Additionally, automatically mounting filesystems permits easy introduction of unknown devices, thereby facilitating malicious activity. CCE-80873-3 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80873-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040070 - NIST-800-171-3.4.6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_autofs_disabled - name: Block Disable service autofs block: - name: Disable service autofs block: - name: Disable service autofs systemd: name: autofs.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service autofs' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "autofs" in ansible_facts.packages ) tags: - CCE-80873-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040070 - NIST-800-171-3.4.6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_autofs_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - autofs.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files autofs.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "autofs" in ansible_facts.packages ) tags: - CCE-80873-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040070 - NIST-800-171-3.4.6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_autofs_disabled - name: Disable socket autofs systemd: name: autofs.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "autofs" in ansible_facts.packages ) - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("autofs.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-80873-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040070 - NIST-800-171-3.4.6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_autofs_disabled --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - enabled: false name: autofs.service [customizations.services] disabled = ["autofs"] include disable_autofs class disable_autofs { service {'autofs': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q autofs ); then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'autofs.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'autofs.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'autofs.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files autofs.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'autofs.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'autofs.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'autofs.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Assign Password to Prevent Changes to Boot Firmware Configuration Assign a password to the system boot firmware (historically called BIOS on PC systems) to require a password for any configuration changes. Assigning a password to the system boot firmware prevents anyone with physical access from configuring the system to boot from local media and circumvent the operating system's access controls. For systems in physically secure locations, such as a data center or Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF), this risk must be weighed against the risk of administrative personnel being unable to conduct recovery operations in a timely fashion. Disable Booting from USB Devices in Boot Firmware Configure the system boot firmware (historically called BIOS on PC systems) to disallow booting from USB drives. 12 16 APO13.01 DSS01.04 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.03 CCI-001250 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.6 A.11.2.6 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 MP-7 CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.AC-3 PR.AC-6 Booting a system from a USB device would allow an attacker to circumvent any security measures provided by the operating system. Attackers could mount partitions and modify the configuration of the OS. Disable Kernel Support for USB via Bootloader Configuration All USB support can be disabled by adding the nousb argument to the kernel's boot loader configuration. To do so, append "nousb" to the kernel line in /etc/default/grub as shown: kernel /vmlinuz-VERSION ro vga=ext root=/dev/VolGroup00/LogVol00 rhgb quiet nousb Disabling all kernel support for USB will cause problems for systems with USB-based keyboards, mice, or printers. This configuration is infeasible for systems which require USB devices, which is common. 12 16 APO13.01 DSS01.04 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.03 CCI-001250 164.308(a)(3)(i) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.310(d)(1) 164.310(d)(2) 164.312(a)(1) 164.312(a)(2)(iv) 164.312(b) 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.6 A.11.2.6 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 MP-7 CM-6(a) PR.AC-3 PR.AC-6 Disabling the USB subsystem within the Linux kernel at system boot will protect against potentially malicious USB devices, although it is only practical in specialized systems. Disable Mounting of cramfs To configure the system to prevent the cramfs kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to the file /etc/modprobe.d/cramfs.conf: install cramfs /bin/true To configure the system to prevent the cramfs from being used, add the following line to file /etc/modprobe.d/cramfs.conf: blacklist cramfs This effectively prevents usage of this uncommon filesystem. The cramfs filesystem type is a compressed read-only Linux filesystem embedded in small footprint systems. A cramfs image can be used without having to first decompress the image. 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 3.4.6 CCI-000381 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 RHEL-08-040025 1.1.1.1 SV-230498r942930_rule Removing support for unneeded filesystem types reduces the local attack surface of the server. CCE-81031-7 - name: Ensure kernel module 'cramfs' is disabled lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/cramfs.conf regexp: install\s+cramfs line: install cramfs /bin/false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81031-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040025 - NIST-800-171-3.4.6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - kernel_module_cramfs_disabled - low_complexity - low_severity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - name: Ensure kernel module 'cramfs' is blacklisted lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/cramfs.conf regexp: ^blacklist cramfs$ line: blacklist cramfs when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81031-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040025 - NIST-800-171-3.4.6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - kernel_module_cramfs_disabled - low_complexity - low_severity - medium_disruption - reboot_required --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,install%20cramfs%20/bin/true%0Ablacklist%20cramfs%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/modprobe.d/cramfs.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^install cramfs" /etc/modprobe.d/cramfs.conf ; then sed -i 's#^install cramfs.*#install cramfs /bin/true#g' /etc/modprobe.d/cramfs.conf else echo -e "\n# Disable per security requirements" >> /etc/modprobe.d/cramfs.conf echo "install cramfs /bin/false" >> /etc/modprobe.d/cramfs.conf fi if ! LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^blacklist cramfs$" /etc/modprobe.d/cramfs.conf ; then echo "blacklist cramfs" >> /etc/modprobe.d/cramfs.conf fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Mounting of freevxfs To configure the system to prevent the freevxfs kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to the file /etc/modprobe.d/freevxfs.conf: install freevxfs /bin/true To configure the system to prevent the freevxfs from being used, add the following line to file /etc/modprobe.d/freevxfs.conf: blacklist freevxfs This effectively prevents usage of this uncommon filesystem. 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 3.4.6 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 1.1.1.2 Linux kernel modules which implement filesystems that are not needed by the local system should be disabled. CCE-86615-2 - name: Ensure kernel module 'freevxfs' is disabled lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/freevxfs.conf regexp: install\s+freevxfs line: install freevxfs /bin/false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86615-2 - NIST-800-171-3.4.6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - kernel_module_freevxfs_disabled - low_complexity - low_severity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - name: Ensure kernel module 'freevxfs' is blacklisted lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/freevxfs.conf regexp: ^blacklist freevxfs$ line: blacklist freevxfs when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86615-2 - NIST-800-171-3.4.6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - kernel_module_freevxfs_disabled - low_complexity - low_severity - medium_disruption - reboot_required --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,install%20freevxfs%20/bin/true%0Ablacklist%20freevxfs%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/modprobe.d/freevxfs.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^install freevxfs" /etc/modprobe.d/freevxfs.conf ; then sed -i 's#^install freevxfs.*#install freevxfs /bin/true#g' /etc/modprobe.d/freevxfs.conf else echo -e "\n# Disable per security requirements" >> /etc/modprobe.d/freevxfs.conf echo "install freevxfs /bin/false" >> /etc/modprobe.d/freevxfs.conf fi if ! LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^blacklist freevxfs$" /etc/modprobe.d/freevxfs.conf ; then echo "blacklist freevxfs" >> /etc/modprobe.d/freevxfs.conf fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Mounting of hfs To configure the system to prevent the hfs kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to the file /etc/modprobe.d/hfs.conf: install hfs /bin/true To configure the system to prevent the hfs from being used, add the following line to file /etc/modprobe.d/hfs.conf: blacklist hfs This effectively prevents usage of this uncommon filesystem. 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 3.4.6 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 1.1.1.3 Linux kernel modules which implement filesystems that are not needed by the local system should be disabled. CCE-86616-0 - name: Ensure kernel module 'hfs' is disabled lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/hfs.conf regexp: install\s+hfs line: install hfs /bin/false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86616-0 - NIST-800-171-3.4.6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - kernel_module_hfs_disabled - low_complexity - low_severity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - name: Ensure kernel module 'hfs' is blacklisted lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/hfs.conf regexp: ^blacklist hfs$ line: blacklist hfs when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86616-0 - NIST-800-171-3.4.6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - kernel_module_hfs_disabled - low_complexity - low_severity - medium_disruption - reboot_required --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,install%20hfs%20/bin/true%0Ablacklist%20hfs%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/modprobe.d/hfs.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^install hfs" /etc/modprobe.d/hfs.conf ; then sed -i 's#^install hfs.*#install hfs /bin/true#g' /etc/modprobe.d/hfs.conf else echo -e "\n# Disable per security requirements" >> /etc/modprobe.d/hfs.conf echo "install hfs /bin/false" >> /etc/modprobe.d/hfs.conf fi if ! LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^blacklist hfs$" /etc/modprobe.d/hfs.conf ; then echo "blacklist hfs" >> /etc/modprobe.d/hfs.conf fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Mounting of hfsplus To configure the system to prevent the hfsplus kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to the file /etc/modprobe.d/hfsplus.conf: install hfsplus /bin/true To configure the system to prevent the hfsplus from being used, add the following line to file /etc/modprobe.d/hfsplus.conf: blacklist hfsplus This effectively prevents usage of this uncommon filesystem. 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 3.4.6 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 1.1.1.4 Linux kernel modules which implement filesystems that are not needed by the local system should be disabled. CCE-86617-8 - name: Ensure kernel module 'hfsplus' is disabled lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/hfsplus.conf regexp: install\s+hfsplus line: install hfsplus /bin/false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86617-8 - NIST-800-171-3.4.6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - kernel_module_hfsplus_disabled - low_complexity - low_severity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - name: Ensure kernel module 'hfsplus' is blacklisted lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/hfsplus.conf regexp: ^blacklist hfsplus$ line: blacklist hfsplus when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86617-8 - NIST-800-171-3.4.6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - kernel_module_hfsplus_disabled - low_complexity - low_severity - medium_disruption - reboot_required --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,install%20hfsplus%20/bin/true%0Ablacklist%20hfsplus%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/modprobe.d/hfsplus.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^install hfsplus" /etc/modprobe.d/hfsplus.conf ; then sed -i 's#^install hfsplus.*#install hfsplus /bin/true#g' /etc/modprobe.d/hfsplus.conf else echo -e "\n# Disable per security requirements" >> /etc/modprobe.d/hfsplus.conf echo "install hfsplus /bin/false" >> /etc/modprobe.d/hfsplus.conf fi if ! LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^blacklist hfsplus$" /etc/modprobe.d/hfsplus.conf ; then echo "blacklist hfsplus" >> /etc/modprobe.d/hfsplus.conf fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Mounting of jffs2 To configure the system to prevent the jffs2 kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to the file /etc/modprobe.d/jffs2.conf: install jffs2 /bin/true To configure the system to prevent the jffs2 from being used, add the following line to file /etc/modprobe.d/jffs2.conf: blacklist jffs2 This effectively prevents usage of this uncommon filesystem. 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 3.4.6 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 1.1.1.5 Linux kernel modules which implement filesystems that are not needed by the local system should be disabled. CCE-86618-6 - name: Ensure kernel module 'jffs2' is disabled lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/jffs2.conf regexp: install\s+jffs2 line: install jffs2 /bin/false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86618-6 - NIST-800-171-3.4.6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - kernel_module_jffs2_disabled - low_complexity - low_severity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - name: Ensure kernel module 'jffs2' is blacklisted lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/jffs2.conf regexp: ^blacklist jffs2$ line: blacklist jffs2 when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86618-6 - NIST-800-171-3.4.6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - kernel_module_jffs2_disabled - low_complexity - low_severity - medium_disruption - reboot_required --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,install%20jffs2%20/bin/true%0Ablacklist%20jffs2%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/modprobe.d/jffs2.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^install jffs2" /etc/modprobe.d/jffs2.conf ; then sed -i 's#^install jffs2.*#install jffs2 /bin/true#g' /etc/modprobe.d/jffs2.conf else echo -e "\n# Disable per security requirements" >> /etc/modprobe.d/jffs2.conf echo "install jffs2 /bin/false" >> /etc/modprobe.d/jffs2.conf fi if ! LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^blacklist jffs2$" /etc/modprobe.d/jffs2.conf ; then echo "blacklist jffs2" >> /etc/modprobe.d/jffs2.conf fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Mounting of squashfs To configure the system to prevent the squashfs kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to the file /etc/modprobe.d/squashfs.conf: install squashfs /bin/true To configure the system to prevent the squashfs from being used, add the following line to file /etc/modprobe.d/squashfs.conf: blacklist squashfs This effectively prevents usage of this uncommon filesystem. The squashfs filesystem type is a compressed read-only Linux filesystem embedded in small footprint systems (similar to cramfs). A squashfs image can be used without having to first decompress the image. 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 3.4.6 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 1.1.1.6 Removing support for unneeded filesystem types reduces the local attack surface of the system. CCE-83498-6 - name: Ensure kernel module 'squashfs' is disabled lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/squashfs.conf regexp: install\s+squashfs line: install squashfs /bin/false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83498-6 - NIST-800-171-3.4.6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - kernel_module_squashfs_disabled - low_complexity - low_severity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - name: Ensure kernel module 'squashfs' is blacklisted lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/squashfs.conf regexp: ^blacklist squashfs$ line: blacklist squashfs when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83498-6 - NIST-800-171-3.4.6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - kernel_module_squashfs_disabled - low_complexity - low_severity - medium_disruption - reboot_required --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,install%20squashfs%20/bin/true%0Ablacklist%20squashfs%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/modprobe.d/squashfs.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^install squashfs" /etc/modprobe.d/squashfs.conf ; then sed -i 's#^install squashfs.*#install squashfs /bin/true#g' /etc/modprobe.d/squashfs.conf else echo -e "\n# Disable per security requirements" >> /etc/modprobe.d/squashfs.conf echo "install squashfs /bin/false" >> /etc/modprobe.d/squashfs.conf fi if ! LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^blacklist squashfs$" /etc/modprobe.d/squashfs.conf ; then echo "blacklist squashfs" >> /etc/modprobe.d/squashfs.conf fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Mounting of udf To configure the system to prevent the udf kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to the file /etc/modprobe.d/udf.conf: install udf /bin/true To configure the system to prevent the udf from being used, add the following line to file /etc/modprobe.d/udf.conf: blacklist udf This effectively prevents usage of this uncommon filesystem. The udf filesystem type is the universal disk format used to implement the ISO/IEC 13346 and ECMA-167 specifications. This is an open vendor filesystem type for data storage on a broad range of media. This filesystem type is neccessary to support writing DVDs and newer optical disc formats. 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 3.4.6 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 1.1.1.7 Removing support for unneeded filesystem types reduces the local attack surface of the system. CCE-82729-5 - name: Ensure kernel module 'udf' is disabled lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/udf.conf regexp: install\s+udf line: install udf /bin/false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82729-5 - NIST-800-171-3.4.6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - kernel_module_udf_disabled - low_complexity - low_severity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - name: Ensure kernel module 'udf' is blacklisted lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/udf.conf regexp: ^blacklist udf$ line: blacklist udf when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82729-5 - NIST-800-171-3.4.6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - kernel_module_udf_disabled - low_complexity - low_severity - medium_disruption - reboot_required --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,install%20udf%20/bin/true%0Ablacklist%20udf%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/modprobe.d/udf.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^install udf" /etc/modprobe.d/udf.conf ; then sed -i 's#^install udf.*#install udf /bin/true#g' /etc/modprobe.d/udf.conf else echo -e "\n# Disable per security requirements" >> /etc/modprobe.d/udf.conf echo "install udf /bin/false" >> /etc/modprobe.d/udf.conf fi if ! LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^blacklist udf$" /etc/modprobe.d/udf.conf ; then echo "blacklist udf" >> /etc/modprobe.d/udf.conf fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Modprobe Loading of USB Storage Driver To prevent USB storage devices from being used, configure the kernel module loading system to prevent automatic loading of the USB storage driver. To configure the system to prevent the usb-storage kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to the file /etc/modprobe.d/usb-storage.conf: install usb-storage /bin/true To configure the system to prevent the usb-storage from being used, add the following line to file /etc/modprobe.d/usb-storage.conf: blacklist usb-storage This will prevent the modprobe program from loading the usb-storage module, but will not prevent an administrator (or another program) from using the insmod program to load the module manually. 1 12 15 16 5 APO13.01 DSS01.04 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 3.1.21 CCI-000366 CCI-000778 CCI-001958 164.308(a)(3)(i) 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) 164.310(d)(1) 164.310(d)(2) 164.312(a)(1) 164.312(a)(2)(iv) 164.312(b) 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.6 A.11.2.6 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.18.1.4 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) MP-7 PR.AC-1 PR.AC-3 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 3.4.2 SRG-OS-000114-GPOS-00059 SRG-OS-000378-GPOS-00163 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040080 1.1.1.8 SV-230503r942936_rule USB storage devices such as thumb drives can be used to introduce malicious software. CCE-80835-2 - name: Ensure kernel module 'usb-storage' is disabled lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/usb-storage.conf regexp: install\s+usb-storage line: install usb-storage /bin/false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80835-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040080 - NIST-800-171-3.1.21 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - PCI-DSSv4-3.4.2 - disable_strategy - kernel_module_usb-storage_disabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - name: Ensure kernel module 'usb-storage' is blacklisted lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/usb-storage.conf regexp: ^blacklist usb-storage$ line: blacklist usb-storage when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80835-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040080 - NIST-800-171-3.1.21 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - PCI-DSSv4-3.4.2 - disable_strategy - kernel_module_usb-storage_disabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,install%20usb-storage%20/bin/true%0Ablacklist%20usb-storage%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/modprobe.d/usb-storage.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^install usb-storage" /etc/modprobe.d/usb-storage.conf ; then sed -i 's#^install usb-storage.*#install usb-storage /bin/true#g' /etc/modprobe.d/usb-storage.conf else echo -e "\n# Disable per security requirements" >> /etc/modprobe.d/usb-storage.conf echo "install usb-storage /bin/false" >> /etc/modprobe.d/usb-storage.conf fi if ! LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^blacklist usb-storage$" /etc/modprobe.d/usb-storage.conf ; then echo "blacklist usb-storage" >> /etc/modprobe.d/usb-storage.conf fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Mounting of vFAT filesystems To configure the system to prevent the vfat kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to the file /etc/modprobe.d/vfat.conf: install vfat /bin/true To configure the system to prevent the vfat from being used, add the following line to file /etc/modprobe.d/vfat.conf: blacklist vfat This effectively prevents usage of this uncommon filesystem. The vFAT filesystem format is primarily used on older windows systems and portable USB drives or flash modules. It comes in three types FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32 all of which are supported by the vfat kernel module. 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 3.4.6 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 1.1.1.2 Removing support for unneeded filesystems reduces the local attack surface of the system. CCE-82170-2 - name: Ensure kernel module 'vfat' is disabled lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/vfat.conf regexp: install\s+vfat line: install vfat /bin/false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82170-2 - NIST-800-171-3.4.6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - kernel_module_vfat_disabled - low_complexity - low_severity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - name: Ensure kernel module 'vfat' is blacklisted lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/vfat.conf regexp: ^blacklist vfat$ line: blacklist vfat when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82170-2 - NIST-800-171-3.4.6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - kernel_module_vfat_disabled - low_complexity - low_severity - medium_disruption - reboot_required --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,install%20vfat%20/bin/true%0Ablacklist%20vfat%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/modprobe.d/vfat.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^install vfat" /etc/modprobe.d/vfat.conf ; then sed -i 's#^install vfat.*#install vfat /bin/true#g' /etc/modprobe.d/vfat.conf else echo -e "\n# Disable per security requirements" >> /etc/modprobe.d/vfat.conf echo "install vfat /bin/false" >> /etc/modprobe.d/vfat.conf fi if ! LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^blacklist vfat$" /etc/modprobe.d/vfat.conf ; then echo "blacklist vfat" >> /etc/modprobe.d/vfat.conf fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Restrict Partition Mount Options System partitions can be mounted with certain options that limit what files on those partitions can do. These options are set in the /etc/fstab configuration file, and can be used to make certain types of malicious behavior more difficult. Value for hidepid option The hidepid mount option is applicable to /proc and is used to control who can access the information in /proc/[pid] directories. The option can have one of the following values: 0: Everybody may access all /proc/[pid] directories. 1: Users may not access files and subdirectories inside any /proc/[pid] directories but their own. The /proc/[pid] directories themselves remain visible. 2: Same as for mode 1, but in addition the /proc/[pid] directories belonging to other users become invisible. 0 1 2 2 Removable Partition This value is used by the checks mount_option_nodev_removable_partitions, mount_option_nodev_removable_partitions, and mount_option_nodev_removable_partitions to ensure that the correct mount options are set on partitions mounted from removable media such as CD-ROMs, USB keys, and floppy drives. This value should be modified to reflect any removable partitions that are required on the local system. /dev/cdrom Add nosuid Option to /boot/efi The nosuid mount option can be used to prevent execution of setuid programs in /boot/efi. The SUID and SGID permissions should not be required on the boot partition. Add the nosuid option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of /boot/efi. CCI-000366 CM-6(b) CM-6.1(iv) SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010572 SV-244530r809336_rule The presence of SUID and SGID executables should be tightly controlled. Users should not be able to execute SUID or SGID binaries from boot partitions. CCE-86038-7 - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /boot/efi: Check information associated to mountpoint' command: findmnt --fstab '/boot/efi' register: device_name failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 changed_when: false when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/boot/efi" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) tags: - CCE-86038-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010572 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_boot_efi_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /boot/efi: Create mount_info dictionary variable' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/boot/efi" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) tags: - CCE-86038-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010572 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_boot_efi_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /boot/efi: If /boot/efi not mounted, craft mount_info manually' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - - target - source - fstype - options - - /boot/efi - '' - '' - defaults when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/boot/efi" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - ("--fstab" | length == 0) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) tags: - CCE-86038-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010572 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_boot_efi_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /boot/efi: Make sure nosuid option is part of the to /boot/efi options' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',nosuid'' }) }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/boot/efi" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined and "nosuid" not in mount_info.options tags: - CCE-86038-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010572 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_boot_efi_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /boot/efi: Ensure /boot/efi is mounted with nosuid option' mount: path: /boot/efi src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' state: mounted fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/boot/efi" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" | length == 0) tags: - CCE-86038-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010572 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_boot_efi_nosuid - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && [ -d /sys/firmware/efi ] ); then function perform_remediation { # the mount point /boot/efi has to be defined in /etc/fstab # before this remediation can be executed. In case it is not defined, the # remediation aborts and no changes regarding the mount point are done. mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/boot/efi")" grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ || { echo "The mount point '/boot/efi' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /boot/efi in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /boot/efi)" # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab if ! grep -q "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nosuid)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. fs_type="" if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") fi echo " /boot/efi defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nosuid 0 0" >> /etc/fstab # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep -q "nosuid"; then previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nosuid|" /etc/fstab fi if mkdir -p "/boot/efi"; then if mountpoint -q "/boot/efi"; then mount -o remount --target "/boot/efi" fi fi } perform_remediation else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Add noauto Option to /boot The noauto mount option is used to prevent automatic mounting of th /boot partition. Add the noauto option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of /boot. Although contents of the /boot partition should not be needed during normal system operation, they might need to be accessible during system maintenance and upgrades. Make sure that applying this rule will not break upgrade or maintenance processes affecting the system. BP28(R12) The /boot partition contains the kernel and the bootloader. Access to the partition after the boot process finishes should not be needed. Files contained within this partition can be analysed and gained information can be used for exploit creation. CCE-83345-9 - name: 'Add noauto Option to /boot: Check information associated to mountpoint' command: findmnt --fstab '/boot' register: device_name failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 changed_when: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83345-9 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_boot_noauto - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add noauto Option to /boot: Create mount_info dictionary variable' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) tags: - CCE-83345-9 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_boot_noauto - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add noauto Option to /boot: If /boot not mounted, craft mount_info manually' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - - target - source - fstype - options - - /boot - '' - '' - defaults when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ("--fstab" | length == 0) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) tags: - CCE-83345-9 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_boot_noauto - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add noauto Option to /boot: Make sure noauto option is part of the to /boot options' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',noauto'' }) }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - mount_info is defined and "noauto" not in mount_info.options tags: - CCE-83345-9 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_boot_noauto - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add noauto Option to /boot: Ensure /boot is mounted with noauto option' mount: path: /boot src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' state: mounted fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - mount_info is defined - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" | length == 0) tags: - CCE-83345-9 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_boot_noauto - no_reboot_needed part /boot --mountoptions="noauto" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then function perform_remediation { # the mount point /boot has to be defined in /etc/fstab # before this remediation can be executed. In case it is not defined, the # remediation aborts and no changes regarding the mount point are done. mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/boot")" grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ || { echo "The mount point '/boot' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /boot in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /boot)" # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab if ! grep -q "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|noauto)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. fs_type="" if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") fi echo " /boot defaults,${previous_mount_opts}noauto 0 0" >> /etc/fstab # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep -q "noauto"; then previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,noauto|" /etc/fstab fi if mkdir -p "/boot"; then if mountpoint -q "/boot"; then mount -o remount --target "/boot" fi fi } perform_remediation else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Add nodev Option to /boot The nodev mount option can be used to prevent device files from being created in /boot. Legitimate character and block devices should exist only in the /dev directory on the root partition or within chroot jails built for system services. Add the nodev option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of /boot. CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) AC-6 AC-6(1) MP-7 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-2 PR.PT-3 SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 The only legitimate location for device files is the /dev directory located on the root partition. The only exception to this is chroot jails. CCE-82941-6 - name: 'Add nodev Option to /boot: Check information associated to mountpoint' command: findmnt --fstab '/boot' register: device_name failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 changed_when: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82941-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_boot_nodev - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nodev Option to /boot: Create mount_info dictionary variable' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) tags: - CCE-82941-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_boot_nodev - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nodev Option to /boot: If /boot not mounted, craft mount_info manually' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - - target - source - fstype - options - - /boot - '' - '' - defaults when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ("--fstab" | length == 0) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) tags: - CCE-82941-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_boot_nodev - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nodev Option to /boot: Make sure nodev option is part of the to /boot options' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',nodev'' }) }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - mount_info is defined and "nodev" not in mount_info.options tags: - CCE-82941-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_boot_nodev - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nodev Option to /boot: Ensure /boot is mounted with nodev option' mount: path: /boot src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' state: mounted fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - mount_info is defined - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" | length == 0) tags: - CCE-82941-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_boot_nodev - no_reboot_needed part /boot --mountoptions="nodev" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then function perform_remediation { # the mount point /boot has to be defined in /etc/fstab # before this remediation can be executed. In case it is not defined, the # remediation aborts and no changes regarding the mount point are done. mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/boot")" grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ || { echo "The mount point '/boot' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /boot in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /boot)" # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab if ! grep -q "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nodev)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. fs_type="" if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") fi echo " /boot defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nodev 0 0" >> /etc/fstab # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep -q "nodev"; then previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nodev|" /etc/fstab fi if mkdir -p "/boot"; then if mountpoint -q "/boot"; then mount -o remount --target "/boot" fi fi } perform_remediation else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Add noexec Option to /boot The noexec mount option can be used to prevent binaries from being executed out of /boot. Add the noexec option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of /boot. BP28(R12) The /boot partition contains the kernel and the bootloader. No binaries should be executed from this partition after the booting process finishes. CCE-83316-0 - name: 'Add noexec Option to /boot: Check information associated to mountpoint' command: findmnt --fstab '/boot' register: device_name failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 changed_when: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83316-0 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_boot_noexec - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add noexec Option to /boot: Create mount_info dictionary variable' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) tags: - CCE-83316-0 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_boot_noexec - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add noexec Option to /boot: If /boot not mounted, craft mount_info manually' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - - target - source - fstype - options - - /boot - '' - '' - defaults when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ("--fstab" | length == 0) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) tags: - CCE-83316-0 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_boot_noexec - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add noexec Option to /boot: Make sure noexec option is part of the to /boot options' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',noexec'' }) }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - mount_info is defined and "noexec" not in mount_info.options tags: - CCE-83316-0 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_boot_noexec - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add noexec Option to /boot: Ensure /boot is mounted with noexec option' mount: path: /boot src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' state: mounted fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - mount_info is defined - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" | length == 0) tags: - CCE-83316-0 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_boot_noexec - no_reboot_needed part /boot --mountoptions="noexec" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then function perform_remediation { # the mount point /boot has to be defined in /etc/fstab # before this remediation can be executed. In case it is not defined, the # remediation aborts and no changes regarding the mount point are done. mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/boot")" grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ || { echo "The mount point '/boot' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /boot in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /boot)" # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab if ! grep -q "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|noexec)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. fs_type="" if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") fi echo " /boot defaults,${previous_mount_opts}noexec 0 0" >> /etc/fstab # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep -q "noexec"; then previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,noexec|" /etc/fstab fi if mkdir -p "/boot"; then if mountpoint -q "/boot"; then mount -o remount --target "/boot" fi fi } perform_remediation else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Add nosuid Option to /boot The nosuid mount option can be used to prevent execution of setuid programs in /boot. The SUID and SGID permissions should not be required on the boot partition. Add the nosuid option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of /boot. BP28(R12) CCI-000366 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) AC-6 AC-6(1) MP-7 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-2 PR.PT-3 SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010571 SV-230300r743959_rule The presence of SUID and SGID executables should be tightly controlled. Users should not be able to execute SUID or SGID binaries from boot partitions. CCE-81033-3 - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /boot: Check information associated to mountpoint' command: findmnt --fstab '/boot' register: device_name failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 changed_when: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81033-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010571 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_boot_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /boot: Create mount_info dictionary variable' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) tags: - CCE-81033-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010571 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_boot_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /boot: If /boot not mounted, craft mount_info manually' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - - target - source - fstype - options - - /boot - '' - '' - defaults when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ("--fstab" | length == 0) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) tags: - CCE-81033-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010571 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_boot_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /boot: Make sure nosuid option is part of the to /boot options' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',nosuid'' }) }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - mount_info is defined and "nosuid" not in mount_info.options tags: - CCE-81033-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010571 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_boot_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /boot: Ensure /boot is mounted with nosuid option' mount: path: /boot src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' state: mounted fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - mount_info is defined - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" | length == 0) tags: - CCE-81033-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010571 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_boot_nosuid - no_reboot_needed part /boot --mountoptions="nosuid" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then function perform_remediation { # the mount point /boot has to be defined in /etc/fstab # before this remediation can be executed. In case it is not defined, the # remediation aborts and no changes regarding the mount point are done. mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/boot")" grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ || { echo "The mount point '/boot' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /boot in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /boot)" # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab if ! grep -q "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nosuid)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. fs_type="" if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") fi echo " /boot defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nosuid 0 0" >> /etc/fstab # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep -q "nosuid"; then previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nosuid|" /etc/fstab fi if mkdir -p "/boot"; then if mountpoint -q "/boot"; then mount -o remount --target "/boot" fi fi } perform_remediation else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Add nodev Option to /dev/shm The nodev mount option can be used to prevent creation of device files in /dev/shm. Legitimate character and block devices should not exist within temporary directories like /dev/shm. Add the nodev option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of /dev/shm. 11 13 14 3 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS05.06 DSS06.06 CCI-001764 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.11.2.9 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.8.2.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.8.3.1 A.8.3.3 A.9.1.2 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) AC-6 AC-6(1) MP-7 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-2 PR.PT-3 SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 RHEL-08-040120 1.1.2.2.2 SV-230508r854049_rule The only legitimate location for device files is the /dev directory located on the root partition. The only exception to this is chroot jails. CCE-80837-8 - name: 'Add nodev Option to /dev/shm: Check information associated to mountpoint' command: findmnt '/dev/shm' register: device_name failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 changed_when: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80837-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040120 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_dev_shm_nodev - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nodev Option to /dev/shm: Create mount_info dictionary variable' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) tags: - CCE-80837-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040120 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_dev_shm_nodev - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nodev Option to /dev/shm: If /dev/shm not mounted, craft mount_info manually' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - - target - source - fstype - options - - /dev/shm - tmpfs - tmpfs - defaults when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ("" | length == 0) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) tags: - CCE-80837-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040120 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_dev_shm_nodev - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nodev Option to /dev/shm: Make sure nodev option is part of the to /dev/shm options' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',nodev'' }) }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - mount_info is defined and "nodev" not in mount_info.options tags: - CCE-80837-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040120 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_dev_shm_nodev - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nodev Option to /dev/shm: Ensure /dev/shm is mounted with nodev option' mount: path: /dev/shm src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' state: mounted fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - mount_info is defined - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("" | length == 0) tags: - CCE-80837-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040120 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_dev_shm_nodev - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then function perform_remediation { mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /dev/shm)" # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab if ! grep -q "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nodev)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. fs_type="tmpfs" if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") fi echo "tmpfs /dev/shm tmpfs defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nodev 0 0" >> /etc/fstab # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep -q "nodev"; then previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nodev|" /etc/fstab fi if mkdir -p "/dev/shm"; then if mountpoint -q "/dev/shm"; then mount -o remount --target "/dev/shm" fi fi } perform_remediation else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Add noexec Option to /dev/shm The noexec mount option can be used to prevent binaries from being executed out of /dev/shm. It can be dangerous to allow the execution of binaries from world-writable temporary storage directories such as /dev/shm. Add the noexec option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of /dev/shm. 11 13 14 3 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS05.06 DSS06.06 CCI-001764 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.11.2.9 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.8.2.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.8.3.1 A.8.3.3 A.9.1.2 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) AC-6 AC-6(1) MP-7 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-2 PR.PT-3 SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 RHEL-08-040122 1.1.2.2.4 SV-230510r854051_rule Allowing users to execute binaries from world-writable directories such as /dev/shm can expose the system to potential compromise. CCE-80838-6 - name: 'Add noexec Option to /dev/shm: Check information associated to mountpoint' command: findmnt '/dev/shm' register: device_name failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 changed_when: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80838-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040122 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_dev_shm_noexec - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add noexec Option to /dev/shm: Create mount_info dictionary variable' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) tags: - CCE-80838-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040122 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_dev_shm_noexec - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add noexec Option to /dev/shm: If /dev/shm not mounted, craft mount_info manually' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - - target - source - fstype - options - - /dev/shm - tmpfs - tmpfs - defaults when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ("" | length == 0) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) tags: - CCE-80838-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040122 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_dev_shm_noexec - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add noexec Option to /dev/shm: Make sure noexec option is part of the to /dev/shm options' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',noexec'' }) }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - mount_info is defined and "noexec" not in mount_info.options tags: - CCE-80838-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040122 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_dev_shm_noexec - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add noexec Option to /dev/shm: Ensure /dev/shm is mounted with noexec option' mount: path: /dev/shm src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' state: mounted fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - mount_info is defined - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("" | length == 0) tags: - CCE-80838-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040122 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_dev_shm_noexec - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then function perform_remediation { mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /dev/shm)" # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab if ! grep -q "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|noexec)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. fs_type="tmpfs" if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") fi echo "tmpfs /dev/shm tmpfs defaults,${previous_mount_opts}noexec 0 0" >> /etc/fstab # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep -q "noexec"; then previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,noexec|" /etc/fstab fi if mkdir -p "/dev/shm"; then if mountpoint -q "/dev/shm"; then mount -o remount --target "/dev/shm" fi fi } perform_remediation else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Add nosuid Option to /dev/shm The nosuid mount option can be used to prevent execution of setuid programs in /dev/shm. The SUID and SGID permissions should not be required in these world-writable directories. Add the nosuid option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of /dev/shm. 11 13 14 3 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS05.06 DSS06.06 CCI-001764 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.11.2.9 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.8.2.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.8.3.1 A.8.3.3 A.9.1.2 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) AC-6 AC-6(1) MP-7 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-2 PR.PT-3 SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 RHEL-08-040121 1.1.2.2.3 SV-230509r854050_rule The presence of SUID and SGID executables should be tightly controlled. Users should not be able to execute SUID or SGID binaries from temporary storage partitions. CCE-80839-4 - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /dev/shm: Check information associated to mountpoint' command: findmnt '/dev/shm' register: device_name failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 changed_when: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80839-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040121 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_dev_shm_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /dev/shm: Create mount_info dictionary variable' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) tags: - CCE-80839-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040121 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_dev_shm_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /dev/shm: If /dev/shm not mounted, craft mount_info manually' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - - target - source - fstype - options - - /dev/shm - tmpfs - tmpfs - defaults when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ("" | length == 0) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) tags: - CCE-80839-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040121 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_dev_shm_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /dev/shm: Make sure nosuid option is part of the to /dev/shm options' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',nosuid'' }) }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - mount_info is defined and "nosuid" not in mount_info.options tags: - CCE-80839-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040121 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_dev_shm_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /dev/shm: Ensure /dev/shm is mounted with nosuid option' mount: path: /dev/shm src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' state: mounted fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - mount_info is defined - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("" | length == 0) tags: - CCE-80839-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040121 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_dev_shm_nosuid - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then function perform_remediation { mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /dev/shm)" # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab if ! grep -q "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nosuid)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. fs_type="tmpfs" if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") fi echo "tmpfs /dev/shm tmpfs defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nosuid 0 0" >> /etc/fstab # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep -q "nosuid"; then previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nosuid|" /etc/fstab fi if mkdir -p "/dev/shm"; then if mountpoint -q "/dev/shm"; then mount -o remount --target "/dev/shm" fi fi } perform_remediation else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Add grpquota Option to /home The grpquota mount option allows for the filesystem to have disk quotas configured. Add the grpquota option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of /home. The quota options for XFS file systems can only be activated when mounting the partition. It is not possible to enable them by remounting an already mounted partition. Therefore, if the desired options were not defined before mounting the partition, dismount and mount it again to apply the quota options. CM-6(b) To ensure the availability of disk space on /home, it is important to limit the impact a single user or group can cause for other users (or the wider system) by intentionally or accidentally filling up the partition. Quotas can also be applied to inodes for filesystems where inode exhaustion is a concern. CCE-86039-5 - name: 'Add grpquota Option to /home: Check information associated to mountpoint' command: findmnt --fstab '/home' register: device_name failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 changed_when: false when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/home" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) tags: - CCE-86039-5 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_home_grpquota - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add grpquota Option to /home: Create mount_info dictionary variable' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/home" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) tags: - CCE-86039-5 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_home_grpquota - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add grpquota Option to /home: If /home not mounted, craft mount_info manually' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - - target - source - fstype - options - - /home - '' - '' - defaults when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/home" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - ("--fstab" | length == 0) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) tags: - CCE-86039-5 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_home_grpquota - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add grpquota Option to /home: Make sure grpquota option is part of the to /home options' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',grpquota'' }) }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/home" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined and "grpquota" not in mount_info.options tags: - CCE-86039-5 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_home_grpquota - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add grpquota Option to /home: Ensure /home is mounted with grpquota option' mount: path: /home src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' state: mounted fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/home" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" | length == 0) tags: - CCE-86039-5 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_home_grpquota - no_reboot_needed part /home --mountoptions="grpquota" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && findmnt --kernel "/home" > /dev/null || findmnt --fstab "/home" > /dev/null ); then function perform_remediation { # the mount point /home has to be defined in /etc/fstab # before this remediation can be executed. In case it is not defined, the # remediation aborts and no changes regarding the mount point are done. mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/home")" grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ || { echo "The mount point '/home' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /home in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /home)" # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab if ! grep -q "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|grpquota)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. fs_type="" if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") fi echo " /home defaults,${previous_mount_opts}grpquota 0 0" >> /etc/fstab # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep -q "grpquota"; then previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,grpquota|" /etc/fstab fi if mkdir -p "/home"; then if mountpoint -q "/home"; then mount -o remount --target "/home" fi fi } perform_remediation else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Add nodev Option to /home The nodev mount option can be used to prevent device files from being created in /home. Legitimate character and block devices should exist only in the /dev directory on the root partition or within chroot jails built for system services. Add the nodev option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of /home. BP28(R12) SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 1.1.2.3.2 The only legitimate location for device files is the /dev directory located on the root partition. The only exception to this is chroot jails. CCE-81048-1 - name: 'Add nodev Option to /home: Check information associated to mountpoint' command: findmnt --fstab '/home' register: device_name failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 changed_when: false when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/home" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) tags: - CCE-81048-1 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - mount_option_home_nodev - no_reboot_needed - unknown_severity - name: 'Add nodev Option to /home: Create mount_info dictionary variable' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/home" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) tags: - CCE-81048-1 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - mount_option_home_nodev - no_reboot_needed - unknown_severity - name: 'Add nodev Option to /home: If /home not mounted, craft mount_info manually' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - - target - source - fstype - options - - /home - '' - '' - defaults when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/home" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - ("--fstab" | length == 0) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) tags: - CCE-81048-1 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - mount_option_home_nodev - no_reboot_needed - unknown_severity - name: 'Add nodev Option to /home: Make sure nodev option is part of the to /home options' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',nodev'' }) }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/home" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined and "nodev" not in mount_info.options tags: - CCE-81048-1 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - mount_option_home_nodev - no_reboot_needed - unknown_severity - name: 'Add nodev Option to /home: Ensure /home is mounted with nodev option' mount: path: /home src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' state: mounted fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/home" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" | length == 0) tags: - CCE-81048-1 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - mount_option_home_nodev - no_reboot_needed - unknown_severity part /home --mountoptions="nodev" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && findmnt --kernel "/home" > /dev/null || findmnt --fstab "/home" > /dev/null ); then function perform_remediation { # the mount point /home has to be defined in /etc/fstab # before this remediation can be executed. In case it is not defined, the # remediation aborts and no changes regarding the mount point are done. mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/home")" grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ || { echo "The mount point '/home' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /home in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /home)" # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab if ! grep -q "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nodev)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. fs_type="" if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") fi echo " /home defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nodev 0 0" >> /etc/fstab # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep -q "nodev"; then previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nodev|" /etc/fstab fi if mkdir -p "/home"; then if mountpoint -q "/home"; then mount -o remount --target "/home" fi fi } perform_remediation else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Add noexec Option to /home The noexec mount option can be used to prevent binaries from being executed out of /home. Add the noexec option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of /home. BP28(R12) CCI-000366 CM-6(b) SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010590 SV-230302r627750_rule The /home directory contains data of individual users. Binaries in this directory should not be considered as trusted and users should not be able to execute them. CCE-83328-5 - name: 'Add noexec Option to /home: Check information associated to mountpoint' command: findmnt --fstab '/home' register: device_name failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 changed_when: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83328-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010590 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_home_noexec - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add noexec Option to /home: Create mount_info dictionary variable' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) tags: - CCE-83328-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010590 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_home_noexec - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add noexec Option to /home: If /home not mounted, craft mount_info manually' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - - target - source - fstype - options - - /home - '' - '' - defaults when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ("--fstab" | length == 0) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) tags: - CCE-83328-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010590 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_home_noexec - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add noexec Option to /home: Make sure noexec option is part of the to /home options' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',noexec'' }) }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - mount_info is defined and "noexec" not in mount_info.options tags: - CCE-83328-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010590 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_home_noexec - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add noexec Option to /home: Ensure /home is mounted with noexec option' mount: path: /home src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' state: mounted fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - mount_info is defined - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" | length == 0) tags: - CCE-83328-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010590 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_home_noexec - no_reboot_needed part /home --mountoptions="noexec" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then function perform_remediation { # the mount point /home has to be defined in /etc/fstab # before this remediation can be executed. In case it is not defined, the # remediation aborts and no changes regarding the mount point are done. mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/home")" grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ || { echo "The mount point '/home' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /home in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /home)" # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab if ! grep -q "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|noexec)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. fs_type="" if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") fi echo " /home defaults,${previous_mount_opts}noexec 0 0" >> /etc/fstab # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep -q "noexec"; then previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,noexec|" /etc/fstab fi if mkdir -p "/home"; then if mountpoint -q "/home"; then mount -o remount --target "/home" fi fi } perform_remediation else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Add nosuid Option to /home The nosuid mount option can be used to prevent execution of setuid programs in /home. The SUID and SGID permissions should not be required in these user data directories. Add the nosuid option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of /home. BP28(R28) 11 13 14 3 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS05.06 DSS06.06 CCI-000366 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.11.2.9 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.8.2.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.8.3.1 A.8.3.3 A.9.1.2 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) AC-6 AC-6(1) MP-7 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-2 PR.PT-3 SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010570 1.1.2.3.3 SV-230299r627750_rule The presence of SUID and SGID executables should be tightly controlled. Users should not be able to execute SUID or SGID binaries from user home directory partitions. CCE-81050-7 - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /home: Check information associated to mountpoint' command: findmnt --fstab '/home' register: device_name failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 changed_when: false when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/home" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) tags: - CCE-81050-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010570 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_home_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /home: Create mount_info dictionary variable' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/home" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) tags: - CCE-81050-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010570 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_home_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /home: If /home not mounted, craft mount_info manually' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - - target - source - fstype - options - - /home - '' - '' - defaults when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/home" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - ("--fstab" | length == 0) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) tags: - CCE-81050-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010570 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_home_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /home: Make sure nosuid option is part of the to /home options' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',nosuid'' }) }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/home" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined and "nosuid" not in mount_info.options tags: - CCE-81050-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010570 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_home_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /home: Ensure /home is mounted with nosuid option' mount: path: /home src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' state: mounted fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/home" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" | length == 0) tags: - CCE-81050-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010570 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_home_nosuid - no_reboot_needed part /home --mountoptions="nosuid" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && findmnt --kernel "/home" > /dev/null || findmnt --fstab "/home" > /dev/null ); then function perform_remediation { # the mount point /home has to be defined in /etc/fstab # before this remediation can be executed. In case it is not defined, the # remediation aborts and no changes regarding the mount point are done. mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/home")" grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ || { echo "The mount point '/home' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /home in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /home)" # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab if ! grep -q "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nosuid)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. fs_type="" if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") fi echo " /home defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nosuid 0 0" >> /etc/fstab # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep -q "nosuid"; then previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nosuid|" /etc/fstab fi if mkdir -p "/home"; then if mountpoint -q "/home"; then mount -o remount --target "/home" fi fi } perform_remediation else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Add usrquota Option to /home The usrquota mount option allows for the filesystem to have disk quotas configured. Add the usrquota option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of /home. The quota options for XFS file systems can only be activated when mounting the partition. It is not possible to enable them by remounting an already mounted partition. Therefore, if the desired options were not defined before mounting the partition, dismount and mount it again to apply the quota options. CM-6(b) To ensure the availability of disk space on /home, it is important to limit the impact a single user or group can cause for other users (or the wider system) by intentionally or accidentally filling up the partition. Quotas can also be applied to inodes for filesystems where inode exhaustion is a concern. CCE-86035-3 - name: 'Add usrquota Option to /home: Check information associated to mountpoint' command: findmnt --fstab '/home' register: device_name failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 changed_when: false when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/home" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) tags: - CCE-86035-3 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_home_usrquota - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add usrquota Option to /home: Create mount_info dictionary variable' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/home" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) tags: - CCE-86035-3 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_home_usrquota - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add usrquota Option to /home: If /home not mounted, craft mount_info manually' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - - target - source - fstype - options - - /home - '' - '' - defaults when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/home" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - ("--fstab" | length == 0) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) tags: - CCE-86035-3 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_home_usrquota - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add usrquota Option to /home: Make sure usrquota option is part of the to /home options' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',usrquota'' }) }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/home" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined and "usrquota" not in mount_info.options tags: - CCE-86035-3 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_home_usrquota - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add usrquota Option to /home: Ensure /home is mounted with usrquota option' mount: path: /home src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' state: mounted fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/home" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" | length == 0) tags: - CCE-86035-3 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_home_usrquota - no_reboot_needed part /home --mountoptions="usrquota" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && findmnt --kernel "/home" > /dev/null || findmnt --fstab "/home" > /dev/null ); then function perform_remediation { # the mount point /home has to be defined in /etc/fstab # before this remediation can be executed. In case it is not defined, the # remediation aborts and no changes regarding the mount point are done. mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/home")" grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ || { echo "The mount point '/home' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /home in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /home)" # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab if ! grep -q "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|usrquota)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. fs_type="" if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") fi echo " /home defaults,${previous_mount_opts}usrquota 0 0" >> /etc/fstab # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep -q "usrquota"; then previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,usrquota|" /etc/fstab fi if mkdir -p "/home"; then if mountpoint -q "/home"; then mount -o remount --target "/home" fi fi } perform_remediation else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Add nodev Option to Non-Root Local Partitions The nodev mount option prevents files from being interpreted as character or block devices. Legitimate character and block devices should exist only in the /dev directory on the root partition or within chroot jails built for system services. Add the nodev option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of any non-root local partitions. BP28(R12) 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 CCI-000366 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) AC-6 AC-6(1) MP-7 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010580 SV-230301r627750_rule The nodev mount option prevents files from being interpreted as character or block devices. The only legitimate location for device files is the /dev directory located on the root partition. The only exception to this is chroot jails, for which it is not advised to set nodev on these filesystems. CCE-82069-6 - name: Ensure non-root local partitions are mounted with nodev option mount: path: '{{ item.mount }}' src: '{{ item.device }}' opts: '{{ item.options }},nodev' state: mounted fstype: '{{ item.fstype }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - item.mount is match('/\w') - item.options is not search('nodev') with_items: - '{{ ansible_facts.mounts }}' tags: - CCE-82069-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010580 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_nodev_nonroot_local_partitions - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then MOUNT_OPTION="nodev" # Create array of local non-root partitions readarray -t partitions_records < <(findmnt --mtab --raw --evaluate | grep "^/\w" | grep "\s/dev/\w") # Create array of polyinstantiated directories, in case one of them is found in mtab readarray -t polyinstantiated_dirs < \ <(grep -oP "^\s*[^#\s]+\s+\S+" /etc/security/namespace.conf | grep -oP "(?<=\s)\S+?(?=/?\$)") for partition_record in "${partitions_records[@]}"; do # Get all important information for fstab mount_point="$(echo ${partition_record} | cut -d " " -f1)" device="$(echo ${partition_record} | cut -d " " -f2)" device_type="$(echo ${partition_record} | cut -d " " -f3)" if ! printf '%s\0' "${polyinstantiated_dirs[@]}" | grep -qxzF "$mount_point"; then # device and device_type will be used only in case when the device doesn't have fstab record mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" $mount_point)" # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab if ! grep -q "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|$MOUNT_OPTION)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. fs_type="$device_type" if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") fi echo "$device $mount_point $device_type defaults,${previous_mount_opts}$MOUNT_OPTION 0 0" >> /etc/fstab # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep -q "$MOUNT_OPTION"; then previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,$MOUNT_OPTION|" /etc/fstab fi if mkdir -p "$mount_point"; then if mountpoint -q "$mount_point"; then mount -o remount --target "$mount_point" fi fi fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Add nodev Option to Removable Media Partitions The nodev mount option prevents files from being interpreted as character or block devices. Legitimate character and block devices should exist only in the /dev directory on the root partition or within chroot jails built for system services. Add the nodev option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of any removable media partitions. 11 12 13 14 16 3 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.06 DSS05.07 DSS06.03 DSS06.06 CCI-000366 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.11.2.9 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.7.1.1 A.8.2.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.8.3.1 A.8.3.3 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) AC-6 AC-6(1) MP-7 PR.AC-3 PR.AC-6 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-2 PR.PT-3 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010600 1.1.18 SV-230303r627750_rule The only legitimate location for device files is the /dev directory located on the root partition. An exception to this is chroot jails, and it is not advised to set nodev on partitions which contain their root filesystems. CCE-82742-8 - name: XCCDF Value var_removable_partition # promote to variable set_fact: var_removable_partition: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure permission nodev are set on var_removable_partition lineinfile: path: /etc/fstab regexp: ^\s*({{ var_removable_partition }})\s+([^\s]*)\s+([^\s]*)\s+([^\s]*)(.*)$ backrefs: true line: \1 \2 \3 \4,nodev \5 when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82742-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010600 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_nodev_removable_partitions - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then var_removable_partition='' device_regex="^\s*$var_removable_partition\s\+" mount_option="nodev" if grep -q $device_regex /etc/fstab ; then previous_opts=$(grep $device_regex /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') sed -i "s|\($device_regex.*$previous_opts\)|\1,$mount_option|" /etc/fstab else echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of $var_removable_partition in /etc/fstab" >&2 fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Add noexec Option to Removable Media Partitions The noexec mount option prevents the direct execution of binaries on the mounted filesystem. Preventing the direct execution of binaries from removable media (such as a USB key) provides a defense against malicious software that may be present on such untrusted media. Add the noexec option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of any removable media partitions. 11 12 13 14 16 3 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.06 DSS05.07 DSS06.03 DSS06.06 CCI-000087 CCI-000366 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.11.2.9 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.7.1.1 A.8.2.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.8.3.1 A.8.3.3 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) AC-6 AC-6(1) MP-7 PR.AC-3 PR.AC-6 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-2 PR.PT-3 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010610 1.1.20 SV-230304r627750_rule Allowing users to execute binaries from removable media such as USB keys exposes the system to potential compromise. CCE-82746-9 - name: XCCDF Value var_removable_partition # promote to variable set_fact: var_removable_partition: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure permission noexec are set on var_removable_partition lineinfile: path: /etc/fstab regexp: ^\s*({{ var_removable_partition }})\s+([^\s]*)\s+([^\s]*)\s+([^\s]*)(.*)$ backrefs: true line: \1 \2 \3 \4,noexec \5 when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82746-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010610 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_noexec_removable_partitions - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then var_removable_partition='' device_regex="^\s*$var_removable_partition\s\+" mount_option="noexec" if grep -q $device_regex /etc/fstab ; then previous_opts=$(grep $device_regex /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') sed -i "s|\($device_regex.*$previous_opts\)|\1,$mount_option|" /etc/fstab else echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of $var_removable_partition in /etc/fstab" >&2 fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Add nosuid Option to Removable Media Partitions The nosuid mount option prevents set-user-identifier (SUID) and set-group-identifier (SGID) permissions from taking effect. These permissions allow users to execute binaries with the same permissions as the owner and group of the file respectively. Users should not be allowed to introduce SUID and SGID files into the system via partitions mounted from removeable media. Add the nosuid option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of any removable media partitions. 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 8 9 APO01.06 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.06 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 DSS06.03 DSS06.06 CCI-000366 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 5.2 SR 7.6 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.11.2.6 A.11.2.9 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.1.2 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.8.3.1 A.8.3.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) AC-6 AC-6(1) MP-7 PR.AC-3 PR.AC-4 PR.AC-6 PR.DS-5 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-2 PR.PT-3 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010620 1.1.19 SV-230305r627750_rule The presence of SUID and SGID executables should be tightly controlled. Allowing users to introduce SUID or SGID binaries from partitions mounted off of removable media would allow them to introduce their own highly-privileged programs. CCE-82744-4 - name: XCCDF Value var_removable_partition # promote to variable set_fact: var_removable_partition: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure permission nosuid are set on var_removable_partition lineinfile: path: /etc/fstab regexp: ^\s*({{ var_removable_partition }})\s+([^\s]*)\s+([^\s]*)\s+([^\s]*)(.*)$ backrefs: true line: \1 \2 \3 \4,nosuid \5 when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82744-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010620 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_nosuid_removable_partitions - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then var_removable_partition='' device_regex="^\s*$var_removable_partition\s\+" mount_option="nosuid" if grep -q $device_regex /etc/fstab ; then previous_opts=$(grep $device_regex /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') sed -i "s|\($device_regex.*$previous_opts\)|\1,$mount_option|" /etc/fstab else echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of $var_removable_partition in /etc/fstab" >&2 fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Add nosuid Option to /opt The nosuid mount option can be used to prevent execution of setuid programs in /opt. The SUID and SGID permissions should not be required in this directory. Add the nosuid option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of /opt. BP28(R12) The presence of SUID and SGID executables should be tightly controlled. The /opt directory contains additional software packages. Users should not be able to execute SUID or SGID binaries from this directory. CCE-83319-4 - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /opt: Check information associated to mountpoint' command: findmnt --fstab '/opt' register: device_name failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 changed_when: false when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/opt" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) tags: - CCE-83319-4 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_opt_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /opt: Create mount_info dictionary variable' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/opt" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) tags: - CCE-83319-4 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_opt_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /opt: If /opt not mounted, craft mount_info manually' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - - target - source - fstype - options - - /opt - '' - '' - defaults when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/opt" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - ("--fstab" | length == 0) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) tags: - CCE-83319-4 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_opt_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /opt: Make sure nosuid option is part of the to /opt options' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',nosuid'' }) }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/opt" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined and "nosuid" not in mount_info.options tags: - CCE-83319-4 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_opt_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /opt: Ensure /opt is mounted with nosuid option' mount: path: /opt src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' state: mounted fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/opt" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" | length == 0) tags: - CCE-83319-4 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_opt_nosuid - no_reboot_needed part /opt --mountoptions="nosuid" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && findmnt --kernel "/opt" > /dev/null || findmnt --fstab "/opt" > /dev/null ); then function perform_remediation { # the mount point /opt has to be defined in /etc/fstab # before this remediation can be executed. In case it is not defined, the # remediation aborts and no changes regarding the mount point are done. mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/opt")" grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ || { echo "The mount point '/opt' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /opt in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /opt)" # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab if ! grep -q "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nosuid)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. fs_type="" if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") fi echo " /opt defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nosuid 0 0" >> /etc/fstab # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep -q "nosuid"; then previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nosuid|" /etc/fstab fi if mkdir -p "/opt"; then if mountpoint -q "/opt"; then mount -o remount --target "/opt" fi fi } perform_remediation else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Add hidepid Option to /proc The hidepid mount option is applicable to /proc and is used to control who can access the information in /proc/[pid] directories. The option can have one of the following values: 0: Everybody may access all /proc/[pid] directories. 1: Users may not access files and subdirectories inside any /proc/[pid] directories but their own. The /proc/[pid] directories themselves remain visible. 2: Same as for mode 1, but in addition the /proc/[pid] directories belonging to other users become invisible. For example, if you choose the value 2: Add the hidepid=2 option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of /proc. Hiding the pid of processes may lead to problems with PolicyKit and D-Bus, it may also convey a false sense of security. Proceed to https://access.redhat.com/solutions/6704531 for more details. BP28(R12) Users should not be able to see and access directories within /proc, which are not related to their own processes in a system. Otherwise, sensitive information from other users could be seem. CCE-85882-9 - name: XCCDF Value var_mount_option_proc_hidepid # promote to variable set_fact: var_mount_option_proc_hidepid: !!str tags: - always - name: 'Add hidepid Option to /proc: Check information associated to mountpoint' command: findmnt '/proc' register: device_name failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 changed_when: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-85882-9 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - low_severity - mount_option_proc_hidepid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add hidepid Option to /proc: Create mount_info dictionary variable' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) tags: - CCE-85882-9 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - low_severity - mount_option_proc_hidepid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add hidepid Option to /proc: If /proc not mounted, craft mount_info manually' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - - target - source - fstype - options - - /proc - proc - proc - defaults when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ("" | length == 0) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) tags: - CCE-85882-9 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - low_severity - mount_option_proc_hidepid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add hidepid Option to /proc: Make sure hidepid option is part of the to /proc options' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',hidepid=''~var_mount_option_proc_hidepid~'''' }) }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - mount_info is defined and "hidepid" not in mount_info.options tags: - CCE-85882-9 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - low_severity - mount_option_proc_hidepid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add hidepid Option to /proc: Ensure /proc is mounted with hidepid option' mount: path: /proc src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' state: mounted fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - mount_info is defined - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("" | length == 0) tags: - CCE-85882-9 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - low_severity - mount_option_proc_hidepid - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then function perform_remediation { var_mount_option_proc_hidepid='' mountoption="hidepid=$var_mount_option_proc_hidepid" mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /proc)" # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab if ! grep -q "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|$mountoption)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. fs_type="proc" if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") fi echo "proc /proc proc defaults,${previous_mount_opts}$mountoption 0 0" >> /etc/fstab # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep -q "$mountoption"; then previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,$mountoption|" /etc/fstab fi if mkdir -p "/proc"; then if mountpoint -q "/proc"; then mount -o remount --target "/proc" fi fi } perform_remediation else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Add nosuid Option to /srv The nosuid mount option can be used to prevent execution of setuid programs in /srv. The SUID and SGID permissions should not be required in this directory. Add the nosuid option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of /srv. BP28(R12) The presence of SUID and SGID executables should be tightly controlled. The /srv directory contains files served by various network services such as FTP. Users should not be able to execute SUID or SGID binaries from this directory. CCE-83322-8 - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /srv: Check information associated to mountpoint' command: findmnt --fstab '/srv' register: device_name failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 changed_when: false when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/srv" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) tags: - CCE-83322-8 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_srv_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /srv: Create mount_info dictionary variable' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/srv" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) tags: - CCE-83322-8 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_srv_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /srv: If /srv not mounted, craft mount_info manually' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - - target - source - fstype - options - - /srv - '' - '' - defaults when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/srv" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - ("--fstab" | length == 0) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) tags: - CCE-83322-8 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_srv_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /srv: Make sure nosuid option is part of the to /srv options' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',nosuid'' }) }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/srv" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined and "nosuid" not in mount_info.options tags: - CCE-83322-8 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_srv_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /srv: Ensure /srv is mounted with nosuid option' mount: path: /srv src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' state: mounted fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/srv" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" | length == 0) tags: - CCE-83322-8 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_srv_nosuid - no_reboot_needed part /srv --mountoptions="nosuid" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && findmnt --kernel "/srv" > /dev/null || findmnt --fstab "/srv" > /dev/null ); then function perform_remediation { # the mount point /srv has to be defined in /etc/fstab # before this remediation can be executed. In case it is not defined, the # remediation aborts and no changes regarding the mount point are done. mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/srv")" grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ || { echo "The mount point '/srv' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /srv in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /srv)" # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab if ! grep -q "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nosuid)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. fs_type="" if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") fi echo " /srv defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nosuid 0 0" >> /etc/fstab # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep -q "nosuid"; then previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nosuid|" /etc/fstab fi if mkdir -p "/srv"; then if mountpoint -q "/srv"; then mount -o remount --target "/srv" fi fi } perform_remediation else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Add nodev Option to /tmp The nodev mount option can be used to prevent device files from being created in /tmp. Legitimate character and block devices should not exist within temporary directories like /tmp. Add the nodev option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of /tmp. BP28(R12) 11 13 14 3 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS05.06 DSS06.06 CCI-001764 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.11.2.9 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.8.2.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.8.3.1 A.8.3.3 A.9.1.2 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) AC-6 AC-6(1) MP-7 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-2 PR.PT-3 SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 RHEL-08-040123 1.1.2.1.2 SV-230511r854052_rule The only legitimate location for device files is the /dev directory located on the root partition. The only exception to this is chroot jails. CCE-82623-0 - name: 'Add nodev Option to /tmp: Check information associated to mountpoint' command: findmnt --fstab '/tmp' register: device_name failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 changed_when: false when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) tags: - CCE-82623-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040123 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_tmp_nodev - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nodev Option to /tmp: Create mount_info dictionary variable' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) tags: - CCE-82623-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040123 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_tmp_nodev - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nodev Option to /tmp: If /tmp not mounted, craft mount_info manually' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - - target - source - fstype - options - - /tmp - '' - '' - defaults when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - ("--fstab" | length == 0) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) tags: - CCE-82623-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040123 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_tmp_nodev - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nodev Option to /tmp: Make sure nodev option is part of the to /tmp options' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',nodev'' }) }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined and "nodev" not in mount_info.options tags: - CCE-82623-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040123 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_tmp_nodev - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nodev Option to /tmp: Ensure /tmp is mounted with nodev option' mount: path: /tmp src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' state: mounted fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" | length == 0) tags: - CCE-82623-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040123 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_tmp_nodev - no_reboot_needed part /tmp --mountoptions="nodev" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && findmnt --kernel "/tmp" > /dev/null || findmnt --fstab "/tmp" > /dev/null ); then function perform_remediation { # the mount point /tmp has to be defined in /etc/fstab # before this remediation can be executed. In case it is not defined, the # remediation aborts and no changes regarding the mount point are done. mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/tmp")" grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ || { echo "The mount point '/tmp' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /tmp in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /tmp)" # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab if ! grep -q "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nodev)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. fs_type="" if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") fi echo " /tmp defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nodev 0 0" >> /etc/fstab # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep -q "nodev"; then previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nodev|" /etc/fstab fi if mkdir -p "/tmp"; then if mountpoint -q "/tmp"; then mount -o remount --target "/tmp" fi fi } perform_remediation else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Add noexec Option to /tmp The noexec mount option can be used to prevent binaries from being executed out of /tmp. Add the noexec option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of /tmp. BP28(R12) 11 13 14 3 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS05.06 DSS06.06 CCI-001764 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.11.2.9 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.8.2.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.8.3.1 A.8.3.3 A.9.1.2 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) AC-6 AC-6(1) MP-7 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-2 PR.PT-3 SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 RHEL-08-040125 1.1.2.1.4 SV-230513r854054_rule Allowing users to execute binaries from world-writable directories such as /tmp should never be necessary in normal operation and can expose the system to potential compromise. CCE-82139-7 - name: 'Add noexec Option to /tmp: Check information associated to mountpoint' command: findmnt --fstab '/tmp' register: device_name failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 changed_when: false when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) tags: - CCE-82139-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040125 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_tmp_noexec - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add noexec Option to /tmp: Create mount_info dictionary variable' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) tags: - CCE-82139-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040125 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_tmp_noexec - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add noexec Option to /tmp: If /tmp not mounted, craft mount_info manually' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - - target - source - fstype - options - - /tmp - '' - '' - defaults when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - ("--fstab" | length == 0) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) tags: - CCE-82139-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040125 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_tmp_noexec - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add noexec Option to /tmp: Make sure noexec option is part of the to /tmp options' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',noexec'' }) }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined and "noexec" not in mount_info.options tags: - CCE-82139-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040125 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_tmp_noexec - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add noexec Option to /tmp: Ensure /tmp is mounted with noexec option' mount: path: /tmp src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' state: mounted fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" | length == 0) tags: - CCE-82139-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040125 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_tmp_noexec - no_reboot_needed part /tmp --mountoptions="noexec" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && findmnt --kernel "/tmp" > /dev/null || findmnt --fstab "/tmp" > /dev/null ); then function perform_remediation { # the mount point /tmp has to be defined in /etc/fstab # before this remediation can be executed. In case it is not defined, the # remediation aborts and no changes regarding the mount point are done. mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/tmp")" grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ || { echo "The mount point '/tmp' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /tmp in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /tmp)" # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab if ! grep -q "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|noexec)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. fs_type="" if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") fi echo " /tmp defaults,${previous_mount_opts}noexec 0 0" >> /etc/fstab # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep -q "noexec"; then previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,noexec|" /etc/fstab fi if mkdir -p "/tmp"; then if mountpoint -q "/tmp"; then mount -o remount --target "/tmp" fi fi } perform_remediation else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Add nosuid Option to /tmp The nosuid mount option can be used to prevent execution of setuid programs in /tmp. The SUID and SGID permissions should not be required in these world-writable directories. Add the nosuid option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of /tmp. BP28(R12) 11 13 14 3 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS05.06 DSS06.06 CCI-001764 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.11.2.9 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.8.2.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.8.3.1 A.8.3.3 A.9.1.2 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) AC-6 AC-6(1) MP-7 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-2 PR.PT-3 SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 RHEL-08-040124 1.1.2.1.3 SV-230512r854053_rule The presence of SUID and SGID executables should be tightly controlled. Users should not be able to execute SUID or SGID binaries from temporary storage partitions. CCE-82140-5 - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /tmp: Check information associated to mountpoint' command: findmnt --fstab '/tmp' register: device_name failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 changed_when: false when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) tags: - CCE-82140-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040124 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_tmp_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /tmp: Create mount_info dictionary variable' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) tags: - CCE-82140-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040124 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_tmp_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /tmp: If /tmp not mounted, craft mount_info manually' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - - target - source - fstype - options - - /tmp - '' - '' - defaults when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - ("--fstab" | length == 0) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) tags: - CCE-82140-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040124 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_tmp_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /tmp: Make sure nosuid option is part of the to /tmp options' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',nosuid'' }) }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined and "nosuid" not in mount_info.options tags: - CCE-82140-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040124 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_tmp_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /tmp: Ensure /tmp is mounted with nosuid option' mount: path: /tmp src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' state: mounted fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" | length == 0) tags: - CCE-82140-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040124 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_tmp_nosuid - no_reboot_needed part /tmp --mountoptions="nosuid" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && findmnt --kernel "/tmp" > /dev/null || findmnt --fstab "/tmp" > /dev/null ); then function perform_remediation { # the mount point /tmp has to be defined in /etc/fstab # before this remediation can be executed. In case it is not defined, the # remediation aborts and no changes regarding the mount point are done. mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/tmp")" grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ || { echo "The mount point '/tmp' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /tmp in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /tmp)" # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab if ! grep -q "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nosuid)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. fs_type="" if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") fi echo " /tmp defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nosuid 0 0" >> /etc/fstab # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep -q "nosuid"; then previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nosuid|" /etc/fstab fi if mkdir -p "/tmp"; then if mountpoint -q "/tmp"; then mount -o remount --target "/tmp" fi fi } perform_remediation else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Add nodev Option to /var/log/audit The nodev mount option can be used to prevent device files from being created in /var/log/audit. Legitimate character and block devices should exist only in the /dev directory on the root partition or within chroot jails built for system services. Add the nodev option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of /var/log/audit. CCI-001764 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) AC-6 AC-6(1) MP-7 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-2 PR.PT-3 SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 RHEL-08-040129 1.1.2.7.2 SV-230517r854058_rule The only legitimate location for device files is the /dev directory located on the root partition. The only exception to this is chroot jails. CCE-82080-3 - name: 'Add nodev Option to /var/log/audit: Check information associated to mountpoint' command: findmnt --fstab '/var/log/audit' register: device_name failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 changed_when: false when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/log/audit" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) tags: - CCE-82080-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040129 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_log_audit_nodev - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nodev Option to /var/log/audit: Create mount_info dictionary variable' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/log/audit" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) tags: - CCE-82080-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040129 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_log_audit_nodev - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nodev Option to /var/log/audit: If /var/log/audit not mounted, craft mount_info manually' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - - target - source - fstype - options - - /var/log/audit - '' - '' - defaults when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/log/audit" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - ("--fstab" | length == 0) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) tags: - CCE-82080-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040129 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_log_audit_nodev - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nodev Option to /var/log/audit: Make sure nodev option is part of the to /var/log/audit options' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',nodev'' }) }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/log/audit" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined and "nodev" not in mount_info.options tags: - CCE-82080-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040129 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_log_audit_nodev - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nodev Option to /var/log/audit: Ensure /var/log/audit is mounted with nodev option' mount: path: /var/log/audit src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' state: mounted fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/log/audit" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" | length == 0) tags: - CCE-82080-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040129 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_log_audit_nodev - no_reboot_needed part /var/log/audit --mountoptions="nodev" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && findmnt --kernel "/var/log/audit" > /dev/null || findmnt --fstab "/var/log/audit" > /dev/null ); then function perform_remediation { # the mount point /var/log/audit has to be defined in /etc/fstab # before this remediation can be executed. In case it is not defined, the # remediation aborts and no changes regarding the mount point are done. mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/var/log/audit")" grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ || { echo "The mount point '/var/log/audit' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /var/log/audit in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /var/log/audit)" # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab if ! grep -q "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nodev)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. fs_type="" if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") fi echo " /var/log/audit defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nodev 0 0" >> /etc/fstab # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep -q "nodev"; then previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nodev|" /etc/fstab fi if mkdir -p "/var/log/audit"; then if mountpoint -q "/var/log/audit"; then mount -o remount --target "/var/log/audit" fi fi } perform_remediation else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Add noexec Option to /var/log/audit The noexec mount option can be used to prevent binaries from being executed out of /var/log/audit. Add the noexec option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of /var/log/audit. CCI-001764 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) AC-6 AC-6(1) MP-7 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-2 PR.PT-3 SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 RHEL-08-040131 1.1.2.7.4 SV-230519r854060_rule Allowing users to execute binaries from directories containing audit log files such as /var/log/audit should never be necessary in normal operation and can expose the system to potential compromise. CCE-82975-4 - name: 'Add noexec Option to /var/log/audit: Check information associated to mountpoint' command: findmnt --fstab '/var/log/audit' register: device_name failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 changed_when: false when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/log/audit" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) tags: - CCE-82975-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040131 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_log_audit_noexec - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add noexec Option to /var/log/audit: Create mount_info dictionary variable' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/log/audit" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) tags: - CCE-82975-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040131 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_log_audit_noexec - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add noexec Option to /var/log/audit: If /var/log/audit not mounted, craft mount_info manually' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - - target - source - fstype - options - - /var/log/audit - '' - '' - defaults when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/log/audit" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - ("--fstab" | length == 0) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) tags: - CCE-82975-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040131 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_log_audit_noexec - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add noexec Option to /var/log/audit: Make sure noexec option is part of the to /var/log/audit options' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',noexec'' }) }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/log/audit" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined and "noexec" not in mount_info.options tags: - CCE-82975-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040131 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_log_audit_noexec - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add noexec Option to /var/log/audit: Ensure /var/log/audit is mounted with noexec option' mount: path: /var/log/audit src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' state: mounted fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/log/audit" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" | length == 0) tags: - CCE-82975-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040131 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_log_audit_noexec - no_reboot_needed part /var/log/audit --mountoptions="noexec" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && findmnt --kernel "/var/log/audit" > /dev/null || findmnt --fstab "/var/log/audit" > /dev/null ); then function perform_remediation { # the mount point /var/log/audit has to be defined in /etc/fstab # before this remediation can be executed. In case it is not defined, the # remediation aborts and no changes regarding the mount point are done. mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/var/log/audit")" grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ || { echo "The mount point '/var/log/audit' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /var/log/audit in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /var/log/audit)" # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab if ! grep -q "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|noexec)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. fs_type="" if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") fi echo " /var/log/audit defaults,${previous_mount_opts}noexec 0 0" >> /etc/fstab # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep -q "noexec"; then previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,noexec|" /etc/fstab fi if mkdir -p "/var/log/audit"; then if mountpoint -q "/var/log/audit"; then mount -o remount --target "/var/log/audit" fi fi } perform_remediation else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Add nosuid Option to /var/log/audit The nosuid mount option can be used to prevent execution of setuid programs in /var/log/audit. The SUID and SGID permissions should not be required in directories containing audit log files. Add the nosuid option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of /var/log/audit. CCI-001764 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) AC-6 AC-6(1) MP-7 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-2 PR.PT-3 SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 RHEL-08-040130 1.1.2.7.3 SV-230518r854059_rule The presence of SUID and SGID executables should be tightly controlled. Users should not be able to execute SUID or SGID binaries from partitions designated for audit log files. CCE-82921-8 - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var/log/audit: Check information associated to mountpoint' command: findmnt --fstab '/var/log/audit' register: device_name failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 changed_when: false when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/log/audit" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) tags: - CCE-82921-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040130 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_log_audit_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var/log/audit: Create mount_info dictionary variable' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/log/audit" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) tags: - CCE-82921-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040130 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_log_audit_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var/log/audit: If /var/log/audit not mounted, craft mount_info manually' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - - target - source - fstype - options - - /var/log/audit - '' - '' - defaults when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/log/audit" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - ("--fstab" | length == 0) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) tags: - CCE-82921-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040130 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_log_audit_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var/log/audit: Make sure nosuid option is part of the to /var/log/audit options' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',nosuid'' }) }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/log/audit" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined and "nosuid" not in mount_info.options tags: - CCE-82921-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040130 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_log_audit_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var/log/audit: Ensure /var/log/audit is mounted with nosuid option' mount: path: /var/log/audit src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' state: mounted fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/log/audit" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" | length == 0) tags: - CCE-82921-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040130 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_log_audit_nosuid - no_reboot_needed part /var/log/audit --mountoptions="nosuid" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && findmnt --kernel "/var/log/audit" > /dev/null || findmnt --fstab "/var/log/audit" > /dev/null ); then function perform_remediation { # the mount point /var/log/audit has to be defined in /etc/fstab # before this remediation can be executed. In case it is not defined, the # remediation aborts and no changes regarding the mount point are done. mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/var/log/audit")" grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ || { echo "The mount point '/var/log/audit' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /var/log/audit in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /var/log/audit)" # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab if ! grep -q "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nosuid)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. fs_type="" if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") fi echo " /var/log/audit defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nosuid 0 0" >> /etc/fstab # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep -q "nosuid"; then previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nosuid|" /etc/fstab fi if mkdir -p "/var/log/audit"; then if mountpoint -q "/var/log/audit"; then mount -o remount --target "/var/log/audit" fi fi } perform_remediation else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Add nodev Option to /var/log The nodev mount option can be used to prevent device files from being created in /var/log. Legitimate character and block devices should exist only in the /dev directory on the root partition or within chroot jails built for system services. Add the nodev option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of /var/log. CCI-001764 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) AC-6 AC-6(1) MP-7 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-2 PR.PT-3 SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 RHEL-08-040126 1.1.2.6.2 SV-230514r854055_rule The only legitimate location for device files is the /dev directory located on the root partition. The only exception to this is chroot jails. CCE-82077-9 - name: 'Add nodev Option to /var/log: Check information associated to mountpoint' command: findmnt --fstab '/var/log' register: device_name failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 changed_when: false when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/log" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) tags: - CCE-82077-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040126 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_log_nodev - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nodev Option to /var/log: Create mount_info dictionary variable' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/log" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) tags: - CCE-82077-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040126 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_log_nodev - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nodev Option to /var/log: If /var/log not mounted, craft mount_info manually' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - - target - source - fstype - options - - /var/log - '' - '' - defaults when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/log" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - ("--fstab" | length == 0) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) tags: - CCE-82077-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040126 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_log_nodev - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nodev Option to /var/log: Make sure nodev option is part of the to /var/log options' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',nodev'' }) }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/log" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined and "nodev" not in mount_info.options tags: - CCE-82077-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040126 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_log_nodev - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nodev Option to /var/log: Ensure /var/log is mounted with nodev option' mount: path: /var/log src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' state: mounted fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/log" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" | length == 0) tags: - CCE-82077-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040126 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_log_nodev - no_reboot_needed part /var/log --mountoptions="nodev" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && findmnt --kernel "/var/log" > /dev/null || findmnt --fstab "/var/log" > /dev/null ); then function perform_remediation { # the mount point /var/log has to be defined in /etc/fstab # before this remediation can be executed. In case it is not defined, the # remediation aborts and no changes regarding the mount point are done. mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/var/log")" grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ || { echo "The mount point '/var/log' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /var/log in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /var/log)" # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab if ! grep -q "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nodev)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. fs_type="" if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") fi echo " /var/log defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nodev 0 0" >> /etc/fstab # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep -q "nodev"; then previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nodev|" /etc/fstab fi if mkdir -p "/var/log"; then if mountpoint -q "/var/log"; then mount -o remount --target "/var/log" fi fi } perform_remediation else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Add noexec Option to /var/log The noexec mount option can be used to prevent binaries from being executed out of /var/log. Add the noexec option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of /var/log. BP28(R12) CCI-001764 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) AC-6 AC-6(1) MP-7 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-2 PR.PT-3 SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 RHEL-08-040128 1.1.2.6.4 SV-230516r854057_rule Allowing users to execute binaries from directories containing log files such as /var/log should never be necessary in normal operation and can expose the system to potential compromise. CCE-82008-4 - name: 'Add noexec Option to /var/log: Check information associated to mountpoint' command: findmnt --fstab '/var/log' register: device_name failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 changed_when: false when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/log" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) tags: - CCE-82008-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040128 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_log_noexec - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add noexec Option to /var/log: Create mount_info dictionary variable' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/log" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) tags: - CCE-82008-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040128 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_log_noexec - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add noexec Option to /var/log: If /var/log not mounted, craft mount_info manually' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - - target - source - fstype - options - - /var/log - '' - '' - defaults when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/log" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - ("--fstab" | length == 0) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) tags: - CCE-82008-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040128 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_log_noexec - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add noexec Option to /var/log: Make sure noexec option is part of the to /var/log options' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',noexec'' }) }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/log" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined and "noexec" not in mount_info.options tags: - CCE-82008-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040128 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_log_noexec - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add noexec Option to /var/log: Ensure /var/log is mounted with noexec option' mount: path: /var/log src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' state: mounted fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/log" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" | length == 0) tags: - CCE-82008-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040128 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_log_noexec - no_reboot_needed part /var/log --mountoptions="noexec" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && findmnt --kernel "/var/log" > /dev/null || findmnt --fstab "/var/log" > /dev/null ); then function perform_remediation { # the mount point /var/log has to be defined in /etc/fstab # before this remediation can be executed. In case it is not defined, the # remediation aborts and no changes regarding the mount point are done. mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/var/log")" grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ || { echo "The mount point '/var/log' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /var/log in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /var/log)" # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab if ! grep -q "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|noexec)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. fs_type="" if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") fi echo " /var/log defaults,${previous_mount_opts}noexec 0 0" >> /etc/fstab # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep -q "noexec"; then previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,noexec|" /etc/fstab fi if mkdir -p "/var/log"; then if mountpoint -q "/var/log"; then mount -o remount --target "/var/log" fi fi } perform_remediation else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Add nosuid Option to /var/log The nosuid mount option can be used to prevent execution of setuid programs in /var/log. The SUID and SGID permissions should not be required in directories containing log files. Add the nosuid option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of /var/log. BP28(R12) CCI-001764 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) AC-6 AC-6(1) MP-7 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-2 PR.PT-3 SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 RHEL-08-040127 1.1.2.6.3 SV-230515r854056_rule The presence of SUID and SGID executables should be tightly controlled. Users should not be able to execute SUID or SGID binaries from partitions designated for log files. CCE-82065-4 - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var/log: Check information associated to mountpoint' command: findmnt --fstab '/var/log' register: device_name failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 changed_when: false when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/log" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) tags: - CCE-82065-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040127 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_log_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var/log: Create mount_info dictionary variable' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/log" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) tags: - CCE-82065-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040127 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_log_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var/log: If /var/log not mounted, craft mount_info manually' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - - target - source - fstype - options - - /var/log - '' - '' - defaults when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/log" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - ("--fstab" | length == 0) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) tags: - CCE-82065-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040127 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_log_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var/log: Make sure nosuid option is part of the to /var/log options' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',nosuid'' }) }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/log" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined and "nosuid" not in mount_info.options tags: - CCE-82065-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040127 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_log_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var/log: Ensure /var/log is mounted with nosuid option' mount: path: /var/log src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' state: mounted fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/log" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" | length == 0) tags: - CCE-82065-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040127 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_log_nosuid - no_reboot_needed part /var/log --mountoptions="nosuid" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && findmnt --kernel "/var/log" > /dev/null || findmnt --fstab "/var/log" > /dev/null ); then function perform_remediation { # the mount point /var/log has to be defined in /etc/fstab # before this remediation can be executed. In case it is not defined, the # remediation aborts and no changes regarding the mount point are done. mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/var/log")" grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ || { echo "The mount point '/var/log' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /var/log in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /var/log)" # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab if ! grep -q "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nosuid)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. fs_type="" if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") fi echo " /var/log defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nosuid 0 0" >> /etc/fstab # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep -q "nosuid"; then previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nosuid|" /etc/fstab fi if mkdir -p "/var/log"; then if mountpoint -q "/var/log"; then mount -o remount --target "/var/log" fi fi } perform_remediation else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Add nodev Option to /var The nodev mount option can be used to prevent device files from being created in /var. Legitimate character and block devices should exist only in the /dev directory on the root partition or within chroot jails built for system services. Add the nodev option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of /var. CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) AC-6 AC-6(1) MP-7 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-2 PR.PT-3 SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 1.1.2.4.2 The only legitimate location for device files is the /dev directory located on the root partition. The only exception to this is chroot jails. CCE-82062-1 - name: 'Add nodev Option to /var: Check information associated to mountpoint' command: findmnt --fstab '/var' register: device_name failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 changed_when: false when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) tags: - CCE-82062-1 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_nodev - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nodev Option to /var: Create mount_info dictionary variable' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) tags: - CCE-82062-1 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_nodev - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nodev Option to /var: If /var not mounted, craft mount_info manually' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - - target - source - fstype - options - - /var - '' - '' - defaults when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - ("--fstab" | length == 0) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) tags: - CCE-82062-1 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_nodev - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nodev Option to /var: Make sure nodev option is part of the to /var options' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',nodev'' }) }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined and "nodev" not in mount_info.options tags: - CCE-82062-1 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_nodev - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nodev Option to /var: Ensure /var is mounted with nodev option' mount: path: /var src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' state: mounted fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" | length == 0) tags: - CCE-82062-1 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-MP-7 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_nodev - no_reboot_needed part /var --mountoptions="nodev" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && findmnt --kernel "/var" > /dev/null || findmnt --fstab "/var" > /dev/null ); then function perform_remediation { # the mount point /var has to be defined in /etc/fstab # before this remediation can be executed. In case it is not defined, the # remediation aborts and no changes regarding the mount point are done. mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/var")" grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ || { echo "The mount point '/var' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /var in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /var)" # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab if ! grep -q "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nodev)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. fs_type="" if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") fi echo " /var defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nodev 0 0" >> /etc/fstab # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep -q "nodev"; then previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nodev|" /etc/fstab fi if mkdir -p "/var"; then if mountpoint -q "/var"; then mount -o remount --target "/var" fi fi } perform_remediation else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Add noexec Option to /var The noexec mount option can be used to prevent binaries from being executed out of /var. Add the noexec option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of /var. BP28(R12) The /var directory contains variable system data such as logs, mails and caches. No binaries should be executed from this directory. CCE-83330-1 - name: 'Add noexec Option to /var: Check information associated to mountpoint' command: findmnt --fstab '/var' register: device_name failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 changed_when: false when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) tags: - CCE-83330-1 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_noexec - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add noexec Option to /var: Create mount_info dictionary variable' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) tags: - CCE-83330-1 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_noexec - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add noexec Option to /var: If /var not mounted, craft mount_info manually' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - - target - source - fstype - options - - /var - '' - '' - defaults when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - ("--fstab" | length == 0) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) tags: - CCE-83330-1 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_noexec - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add noexec Option to /var: Make sure noexec option is part of the to /var options' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',noexec'' }) }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined and "noexec" not in mount_info.options tags: - CCE-83330-1 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_noexec - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add noexec Option to /var: Ensure /var is mounted with noexec option' mount: path: /var src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' state: mounted fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" | length == 0) tags: - CCE-83330-1 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_noexec - no_reboot_needed part /var --mountoptions="noexec" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && findmnt --kernel "/var" > /dev/null || findmnt --fstab "/var" > /dev/null ); then function perform_remediation { # the mount point /var has to be defined in /etc/fstab # before this remediation can be executed. In case it is not defined, the # remediation aborts and no changes regarding the mount point are done. mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/var")" grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ || { echo "The mount point '/var' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /var in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /var)" # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab if ! grep -q "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|noexec)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. fs_type="" if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") fi echo " /var defaults,${previous_mount_opts}noexec 0 0" >> /etc/fstab # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep -q "noexec"; then previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,noexec|" /etc/fstab fi if mkdir -p "/var"; then if mountpoint -q "/var"; then mount -o remount --target "/var" fi fi } perform_remediation else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Add nosuid Option to /var The nosuid mount option can be used to prevent execution of setuid programs in /var. The SUID and SGID permissions should not be required for this directory. Add the nosuid option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of /var. BP28(R12) 1.1.2.4.3 The presence of SUID and SGID executables should be tightly controlled. CCE-83383-0 - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var: Check information associated to mountpoint' command: findmnt --fstab '/var' register: device_name failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 changed_when: false when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) tags: - CCE-83383-0 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var: Create mount_info dictionary variable' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) tags: - CCE-83383-0 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var: If /var not mounted, craft mount_info manually' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - - target - source - fstype - options - - /var - '' - '' - defaults when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - ("--fstab" | length == 0) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) tags: - CCE-83383-0 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var: Make sure nosuid option is part of the to /var options' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',nosuid'' }) }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined and "nosuid" not in mount_info.options tags: - CCE-83383-0 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var: Ensure /var is mounted with nosuid option' mount: path: /var src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' state: mounted fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" | length == 0) tags: - CCE-83383-0 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_nosuid - no_reboot_needed part /var --mountoptions="nosuid" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && findmnt --kernel "/var" > /dev/null || findmnt --fstab "/var" > /dev/null ); then function perform_remediation { # the mount point /var has to be defined in /etc/fstab # before this remediation can be executed. In case it is not defined, the # remediation aborts and no changes regarding the mount point are done. mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/var")" grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ || { echo "The mount point '/var' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /var in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /var)" # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab if ! grep -q "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nosuid)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. fs_type="" if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") fi echo " /var defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nosuid 0 0" >> /etc/fstab # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep -q "nosuid"; then previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nosuid|" /etc/fstab fi if mkdir -p "/var"; then if mountpoint -q "/var"; then mount -o remount --target "/var" fi fi } perform_remediation else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Bind Mount /var/tmp To /tmp The /var/tmp directory is a world-writable directory. Bind-mount it to /tmp in order to consolidate temporary storage into one location protected by the same techniques as /tmp. To do so, edit /etc/fstab and add the following line: /tmp /var/tmp none rw,nodev,noexec,nosuid,bind 0 0 See the mount(8) man page for further explanation of bind mounting. 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) AC-6 AC-6(1) MP-7 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 Having multiple locations for temporary storage is not required. Unless absolutely necessary to meet requirements, the storage location /var/tmp should be bind mounted to /tmp and thus share the same protections. # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && findmnt --kernel "/var/tmp" > /dev/null || findmnt --fstab "/var/tmp" > /dev/null ); then # Delete particular /etc/fstab's row if /var/tmp is already configured to # represent a mount point (for some device or filesystem other than /tmp) if grep -q -P '.*\/var\/tmp.*' /etc/fstab then sed -i '/.*\/var\/tmp.*/d' /etc/fstab fi umount /var/tmp # Bind-mount /var/tmp to /tmp via /etc/fstab (preserving the /etc/fstab form) printf "%-24s%-24s%-8s%-32s%-3s\n" "/tmp" "/var/tmp" "none" "rw,nodev,noexec,nosuid,bind" "0 0" >> /etc/fstab mkdir -p /var/tmp mount -B /tmp /var/tmp else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Add nodev Option to /var/tmp The nodev mount option can be used to prevent device files from being created in /var/tmp. Legitimate character and block devices should not exist within temporary directories like /var/tmp. Add the nodev option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of /var/tmp. BP28(R12) CCI-001764 SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 RHEL-08-040132 1.1.2.5.2 SV-230520r854061_rule The only legitimate location for device files is the /dev directory located on the root partition. The only exception to this is chroot jails. CCE-82068-8 - name: 'Add nodev Option to /var/tmp: Check information associated to mountpoint' command: findmnt --fstab '/var/tmp' register: device_name failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 changed_when: false when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) tags: - CCE-82068-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040132 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_tmp_nodev - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nodev Option to /var/tmp: Create mount_info dictionary variable' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) tags: - CCE-82068-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040132 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_tmp_nodev - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nodev Option to /var/tmp: If /var/tmp not mounted, craft mount_info manually' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - - target - source - fstype - options - - /var/tmp - '' - '' - defaults when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - ("--fstab" | length == 0) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) tags: - CCE-82068-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040132 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_tmp_nodev - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nodev Option to /var/tmp: Make sure nodev option is part of the to /var/tmp options' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',nodev'' }) }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined and "nodev" not in mount_info.options tags: - CCE-82068-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040132 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_tmp_nodev - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nodev Option to /var/tmp: Ensure /var/tmp is mounted with nodev option' mount: path: /var/tmp src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' state: mounted fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" | length == 0) tags: - CCE-82068-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040132 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_tmp_nodev - no_reboot_needed part /var/tmp --mountoptions="nodev" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && findmnt --kernel "/var/tmp" > /dev/null || findmnt --fstab "/var/tmp" > /dev/null ); then function perform_remediation { # the mount point /var/tmp has to be defined in /etc/fstab # before this remediation can be executed. In case it is not defined, the # remediation aborts and no changes regarding the mount point are done. mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/var/tmp")" grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ || { echo "The mount point '/var/tmp' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /var/tmp in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /var/tmp)" # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab if ! grep -q "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nodev)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. fs_type="" if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") fi echo " /var/tmp defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nodev 0 0" >> /etc/fstab # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep -q "nodev"; then previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nodev|" /etc/fstab fi if mkdir -p "/var/tmp"; then if mountpoint -q "/var/tmp"; then mount -o remount --target "/var/tmp" fi fi } perform_remediation else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Add noexec Option to /var/tmp The noexec mount option can be used to prevent binaries from being executed out of /var/tmp. Add the noexec option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of /var/tmp. BP28(R12) CCI-001764 SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 RHEL-08-040134 1.1.3.5.4 SV-230522r854063_rule Allowing users to execute binaries from world-writable directories such as /var/tmp should never be necessary in normal operation and can expose the system to potential compromise. CCE-82151-2 - name: 'Add noexec Option to /var/tmp: Check information associated to mountpoint' command: findmnt --fstab '/var/tmp' register: device_name failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 changed_when: false when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) tags: - CCE-82151-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040134 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_tmp_noexec - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add noexec Option to /var/tmp: Create mount_info dictionary variable' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) tags: - CCE-82151-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040134 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_tmp_noexec - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add noexec Option to /var/tmp: If /var/tmp not mounted, craft mount_info manually' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - - target - source - fstype - options - - /var/tmp - '' - '' - defaults when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - ("--fstab" | length == 0) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) tags: - CCE-82151-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040134 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_tmp_noexec - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add noexec Option to /var/tmp: Make sure noexec option is part of the to /var/tmp options' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',noexec'' }) }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined and "noexec" not in mount_info.options tags: - CCE-82151-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040134 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_tmp_noexec - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add noexec Option to /var/tmp: Ensure /var/tmp is mounted with noexec option' mount: path: /var/tmp src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' state: mounted fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" | length == 0) tags: - CCE-82151-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040134 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_tmp_noexec - no_reboot_needed part /var/tmp --mountoptions="noexec" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && findmnt --kernel "/var/tmp" > /dev/null || findmnt --fstab "/var/tmp" > /dev/null ); then function perform_remediation { # the mount point /var/tmp has to be defined in /etc/fstab # before this remediation can be executed. In case it is not defined, the # remediation aborts and no changes regarding the mount point are done. mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/var/tmp")" grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ || { echo "The mount point '/var/tmp' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /var/tmp in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /var/tmp)" # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab if ! grep -q "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|noexec)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. fs_type="" if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") fi echo " /var/tmp defaults,${previous_mount_opts}noexec 0 0" >> /etc/fstab # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep -q "noexec"; then previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,noexec|" /etc/fstab fi if mkdir -p "/var/tmp"; then if mountpoint -q "/var/tmp"; then mount -o remount --target "/var/tmp" fi fi } perform_remediation else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Add nosuid Option to /var/tmp The nosuid mount option can be used to prevent execution of setuid programs in /var/tmp. The SUID and SGID permissions should not be required in these world-writable directories. Add the nosuid option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of /var/tmp. BP28(R12) CCI-001764 SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 RHEL-08-040133 1.1.2.5.3 SV-230521r854062_rule The presence of SUID and SGID executables should be tightly controlled. Users should not be able to execute SUID or SGID binaries from temporary storage partitions. CCE-82154-6 - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var/tmp: Check information associated to mountpoint' command: findmnt --fstab '/var/tmp' register: device_name failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 changed_when: false when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) tags: - CCE-82154-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040133 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_tmp_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var/tmp: Create mount_info dictionary variable' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) tags: - CCE-82154-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040133 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_tmp_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var/tmp: If /var/tmp not mounted, craft mount_info manually' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' with_together: - - target - source - fstype - options - - /var/tmp - '' - '' - defaults when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - ("--fstab" | length == 0) - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) tags: - CCE-82154-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040133 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_tmp_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var/tmp: Make sure nosuid option is part of the to /var/tmp options' set_fact: mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',nosuid'' }) }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined and "nosuid" not in mount_info.options tags: - CCE-82154-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040133 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_tmp_nosuid - no_reboot_needed - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var/tmp: Ensure /var/tmp is mounted with nosuid option' mount: path: /var/tmp src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' state: mounted fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "/var/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) - mount_info is defined - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" | length == 0) tags: - CCE-82154-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040133 - configure_strategy - high_disruption - low_complexity - medium_severity - mount_option_var_tmp_nosuid - no_reboot_needed part /var/tmp --mountoptions="nosuid" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && findmnt --kernel "/var/tmp" > /dev/null || findmnt --fstab "/var/tmp" > /dev/null ); then function perform_remediation { # the mount point /var/tmp has to be defined in /etc/fstab # before this remediation can be executed. In case it is not defined, the # remediation aborts and no changes regarding the mount point are done. mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/var/tmp")" grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ || { echo "The mount point '/var/tmp' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /var/tmp in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /var/tmp)" # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab if ! grep -q "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nosuid)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. fs_type="" if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") fi echo " /var/tmp defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nosuid 0 0" >> /etc/fstab # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep -q "nosuid"; then previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nosuid|" /etc/fstab fi if mkdir -p "/var/tmp"; then if mountpoint -q "/var/tmp"; then mount -o remount --target "/var/tmp" fi fi } perform_remediation else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify Permissions on Important Files and Directories Are Configured in /etc/permissions.local Permissions for many files on a system must be set restrictively to ensure sensitive information is properly protected. This section discusses the /etc/permissions.local file, where expected permissions can be configured to be checked and fixed through usage of the chkstat command. Restrict Programs from Dangerous Execution Patterns The recommendations in this section are designed to ensure that the system's features to protect against potentially dangerous program execution are activated. These protections are applied at the system initialization or kernel level, and defend against certain types of badly-configured or compromised programs. kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled Prevent unprivileged processes from using the bpf() syscall. 2 1 2 Disable the uvcvideo module If the device contains a camera it should be covered or disabled when not in use. CCI-000381 CM-7 (a) CM-7 (5) (b) SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 SRG-OS-000370-GPOS-00155 RHEL-08-040020 SV-230493r942915_rule Failing to disconnect from collaborative computing devices (i.e., cameras) can result in subsequent compromises of organizational information. Providing easy methods to physically disconnect from such devices after a collaborative computing session helps to ensure participants actually carry out the disconnect activity without having to go through complex and tedious procedures. CCE-86960-2 - name: Ensure kernel module 'uvcvideo' is disabled lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/uvcvideo.conf regexp: install\s+uvcvideo line: install uvcvideo /bin/false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86960-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040020 - NIST-800-53-CM-7 (5) (b) - NIST-800-53-CM-7 (a) - disable_strategy - kernel_module_uvcvideo_disabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - name: Ensure kernel module 'uvcvideo' is blacklisted lineinfile: create: true dest: /etc/modprobe.d/uvcvideo.conf regexp: ^blacklist uvcvideo$ line: blacklist uvcvideo when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86960-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040020 - NIST-800-53-CM-7 (5) (b) - NIST-800-53-CM-7 (a) - disable_strategy - kernel_module_uvcvideo_disabled - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,install%20uvcvideo%20/bin/true%0Ablacklist%20uvcvideo%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/modprobe.d/uvcvideo.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^install uvcvideo" /etc/modprobe.d/uvcvideo.conf ; then sed -i 's#^install uvcvideo.*#install uvcvideo /bin/true#g' /etc/modprobe.d/uvcvideo.conf else echo -e "\n# Disable per security requirements" >> /etc/modprobe.d/uvcvideo.conf echo "install uvcvideo /bin/false" >> /etc/modprobe.d/uvcvideo.conf fi if ! LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^blacklist uvcvideo$" /etc/modprobe.d/uvcvideo.conf ; then echo "blacklist uvcvideo" >> /etc/modprobe.d/uvcvideo.conf fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable storing core dumps To set the runtime status of the kernel.core_pattern kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w kernel.core_pattern=|/bin/false To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: kernel.core_pattern = |/bin/false CCI-000366 SC-7(10) FMT_SMF_EXT.1 3.3.1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010671 SV-230311r858769_rule A core dump includes a memory image taken at the time the operating system terminates an application. The memory image could contain sensitive data and is generally useful only for developers trying to debug problems. CCE-82215-5 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*kernel.core_pattern.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82215-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010671 - NIST-800-53-SC-7(10) - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_core_pattern - name: Comment out any occurrences of kernel.core_pattern from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*kernel.core_pattern replace: '#kernel.core_pattern' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82215-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010671 - NIST-800-53-SC-7(10) - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_core_pattern - name: Ensure sysctl kernel.core_pattern is set to |/bin/false sysctl: name: kernel.core_pattern value: '|/bin/false' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82215-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010671 - NIST-800-53-SC-7(10) - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_core_pattern --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,kernel.core_pattern%20%3D%20%7C/bin/false%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_kernel_core_pattern.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of kernel.core_pattern from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*kernel.core_pattern.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "kernel.core_pattern" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" # # Set runtime for kernel.core_pattern # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w kernel.core_pattern="|/bin/false" # # If kernel.core_pattern present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "|/bin/false" # else, add "kernel.core_pattern = |/bin/false" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^kernel.core_pattern") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "|/bin/false" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^kernel.core_pattern\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^kernel.core_pattern\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-82215-5" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure file name of core dumps To set the runtime status of the kernel.core_uses_pid kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w kernel.core_uses_pid=0 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: kernel.core_uses_pid = 0 FMT_SMF_EXT.1 The default coredump filename is core. By setting core_uses_pid to 1, the coredump filename becomes core.PID. If core_pattern does not include %p (default does not) and core_uses_pid is set, then .PID will be appended to the filename. When combined with kernel.core_pattern = "" configuration, it is ensured that no core dumps are generated and also no confusing error messages are printed by a shell. - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*kernel.core_uses_pid.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_core_uses_pid - name: Comment out any occurrences of kernel.core_uses_pid from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*kernel.core_uses_pid replace: '#kernel.core_uses_pid' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_core_uses_pid - name: Ensure sysctl kernel.core_uses_pid is set to 0 sysctl: name: kernel.core_uses_pid value: '0' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_core_uses_pid # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of kernel.core_uses_pid from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*kernel.core_uses_pid.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "kernel.core_uses_pid" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" # # Set runtime for kernel.core_uses_pid # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w kernel.core_uses_pid="0" # # If kernel.core_uses_pid present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "0" # else, add "kernel.core_uses_pid = 0" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^kernel.core_uses_pid") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "0" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^kernel.core_uses_pid\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^kernel.core_uses_pid\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Restrict Access to Kernel Message Buffer To set the runtime status of the kernel.dmesg_restrict kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w kernel.dmesg_restrict=1 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: kernel.dmesg_restrict = 1 BP28(R23) 3.1.5 CCI-001090 CCI-001314 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3) 164.308(a)(4) 164.310(b) 164.310(c) 164.312(a) 164.312(e) SI-11(a) SI-11(b) SRG-OS-000132-GPOS-00067 SRG-OS-000138-GPOS-00069 SRG-APP-000243-CTR-000600 RHEL-08-010375 SV-230269r858756_rule Unprivileged access to the kernel syslog can expose sensitive kernel address information. CCE-80913-7 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*kernel.dmesg_restrict.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80913-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010375 - NIST-800-171-3.1.5 - NIST-800-53-SI-11(a) - NIST-800-53-SI-11(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_severity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_dmesg_restrict - name: Comment out any occurrences of kernel.dmesg_restrict from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*kernel.dmesg_restrict replace: '#kernel.dmesg_restrict' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80913-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010375 - NIST-800-171-3.1.5 - NIST-800-53-SI-11(a) - NIST-800-53-SI-11(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_severity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_dmesg_restrict - name: Ensure sysctl kernel.dmesg_restrict is set to 1 sysctl: name: kernel.dmesg_restrict value: '1' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80913-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010375 - NIST-800-171-3.1.5 - NIST-800-53-SI-11(a) - NIST-800-53-SI-11(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_severity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_dmesg_restrict --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,kernel.dmesg_restrict%3D1%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_kernel_dmesg_restrict.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of kernel.dmesg_restrict from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*kernel.dmesg_restrict.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "kernel.dmesg_restrict" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" # # Set runtime for kernel.dmesg_restrict # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w kernel.dmesg_restrict="1" # # If kernel.dmesg_restrict present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "1" # else, add "kernel.dmesg_restrict = 1" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^kernel.dmesg_restrict") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "1" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^kernel.dmesg_restrict\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^kernel.dmesg_restrict\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-80913-7" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Kernel Image Loading To set the runtime status of the kernel.kexec_load_disabled kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w kernel.kexec_load_disabled=1 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: kernel.kexec_load_disabled = 1 CCI-001749 CM-6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 SRG-OS-000366-GPOS-00153 RHEL-08-010372 SV-230266r877463_rule Disabling kexec_load allows greater control of the kernel memory. It makes it impossible to load another kernel image after it has been disabled. CCE-80952-5 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*kernel.kexec_load_disabled.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80952-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010372 - NIST-800-53-CM-6 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_kexec_load_disabled - name: Comment out any occurrences of kernel.kexec_load_disabled from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*kernel.kexec_load_disabled replace: '#kernel.kexec_load_disabled' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80952-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010372 - NIST-800-53-CM-6 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_kexec_load_disabled - name: Ensure sysctl kernel.kexec_load_disabled is set to 1 sysctl: name: kernel.kexec_load_disabled value: '1' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80952-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010372 - NIST-800-53-CM-6 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_kexec_load_disabled --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,kernel.kexec_load_disabled%3D1%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_kernel_kexec_load_disabled.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of kernel.kexec_load_disabled from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*kernel.kexec_load_disabled.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "kernel.kexec_load_disabled" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" # # Set runtime for kernel.kexec_load_disabled # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w kernel.kexec_load_disabled="1" # # If kernel.kexec_load_disabled present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "1" # else, add "kernel.kexec_load_disabled = 1" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^kernel.kexec_load_disabled") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "1" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^kernel.kexec_load_disabled\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^kernel.kexec_load_disabled\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-80952-5" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable loading and unloading of kernel modules To set the runtime status of the kernel.modules_disabled kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w kernel.modules_disabled=1 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: kernel.modules_disabled = 1 This rule doesn't come with Bash remediation. Remediating this rule during the installation process disrupts the install and boot process. BP28(R24) Malicious kernel modules can have a significant impact on system security and availability. Disabling loading of kernel modules prevents this threat. Note that once this option has been set, it cannot be reverted without doing a system reboot. Make sure that all needed kernel modules are loaded before setting this option. CCE-83397-0 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*kernel.modules_disabled.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83397-0 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_modules_disabled - name: Comment out any occurrences of kernel.modules_disabled from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*kernel.modules_disabled replace: '#kernel.modules_disabled' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83397-0 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_modules_disabled - name: Ensure sysctl kernel.modules_disabled is set to 1 sysctl: name: kernel.modules_disabled value: '1' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83397-0 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_modules_disabled Kernel panic on oops To set the runtime status of the kernel.panic_on_oops kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w kernel.panic_on_oops=1 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: kernel.panic_on_oops = 1 The system may start to panic when it normally wouldn't. A non-catastrophic error that would have allowed the system to continue operating will now result in a panic. BP28(R9) An attacker trying to exploit the kernel may trigger kernel OOPSes, panicking the system will impede them from continuing. CCE-87666-4 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*kernel.panic_on_oops.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-87666-4 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_panic_on_oops - name: Comment out any occurrences of kernel.panic_on_oops from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*kernel.panic_on_oops replace: '#kernel.panic_on_oops' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-87666-4 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_panic_on_oops - name: Ensure sysctl kernel.panic_on_oops is set to 1 sysctl: name: kernel.panic_on_oops value: '1' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-87666-4 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_panic_on_oops # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of kernel.panic_on_oops from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*kernel.panic_on_oops.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "kernel.panic_on_oops" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" # # Set runtime for kernel.panic_on_oops # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w kernel.panic_on_oops="1" # # If kernel.panic_on_oops present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "1" # else, add "kernel.panic_on_oops = 1" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^kernel.panic_on_oops") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "1" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^kernel.panic_on_oops\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^kernel.panic_on_oops\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-87666-4" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Limit CPU consumption of the Perf system To set the runtime status of the kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent=1 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent = 1 BP28(R23) The kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent configures a treshold of maximum percentile of CPU that can be used by Perf system. Restricting usage of Perf system decreases risk of potential availability problems. CCE-83373-1 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83373-1 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_perf_cpu_time_max_percent - name: Comment out any occurrences of kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent replace: '#kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83373-1 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_perf_cpu_time_max_percent - name: Ensure sysctl kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent is set to 1 sysctl: name: kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent value: '1' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83373-1 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_perf_cpu_time_max_percent # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" # # Set runtime for kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent="1" # # If kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "1" # else, add "kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent = 1" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "1" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-83373-1" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Limit sampling frequency of the Perf system To set the runtime status of the kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate=1 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate = 1 BP28(R23) The kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate parameter configures maximum frequency of collecting of samples for the Perf system. It is expressed in samples per second. Restricting usage of Perf system decreases risk of potential availability problems. CCE-83368-1 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83368-1 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_perf_event_max_sample_rate - name: Comment out any occurrences of kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate replace: '#kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83368-1 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_perf_event_max_sample_rate - name: Ensure sysctl kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate is set to 1 sysctl: name: kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate value: '1' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83368-1 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_perf_event_max_sample_rate # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" # # Set runtime for kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate="1" # # If kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "1" # else, add "kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate = 1" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "1" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-83368-1" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disallow kernel profiling by unprivileged users To set the runtime status of the kernel.perf_event_paranoid kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w kernel.perf_event_paranoid=2 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: kernel.perf_event_paranoid = 2 BP28(R23) CCI-001090 AC-6 FMT_SMF_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000132-GPOS-00067 SRG-OS-000138-GPOS-00069 SRG-APP-000243-CTR-000600 RHEL-08-010376 SV-230270r858758_rule Kernel profiling can reveal sensitive information about kernel behaviour. CCE-81054-9 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*kernel.perf_event_paranoid.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81054-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010376 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_severity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_perf_event_paranoid - name: Comment out any occurrences of kernel.perf_event_paranoid from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*kernel.perf_event_paranoid replace: '#kernel.perf_event_paranoid' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81054-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010376 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_severity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_perf_event_paranoid - name: Ensure sysctl kernel.perf_event_paranoid is set to 2 sysctl: name: kernel.perf_event_paranoid value: '2' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81054-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010376 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_severity - medium_disruption - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_perf_event_paranoid --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,kernel.perf_event_paranoid%3D2%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_kernel_perf_event_paranoid.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of kernel.perf_event_paranoid from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*kernel.perf_event_paranoid.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "kernel.perf_event_paranoid" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" # # Set runtime for kernel.perf_event_paranoid # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w kernel.perf_event_paranoid="2" # # If kernel.perf_event_paranoid present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "2" # else, add "kernel.perf_event_paranoid = 2" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^kernel.perf_event_paranoid") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "2" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^kernel.perf_event_paranoid\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^kernel.perf_event_paranoid\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-81054-9" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure maximum number of process identifiers To set the runtime status of the kernel.pid_max kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w kernel.pid_max=65536 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: kernel.pid_max = 65536 BP28(R23) The kernel.pid_max parameter configures upper limit on process identifiers (PID). If this number is not high enough, it might happen that forking of new processes is not possible, because all available PIDs are exhausted. Increasing this number enhances availability. CCE-83366-5 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*kernel.pid_max.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83366-5 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_pid_max - name: Comment out any occurrences of kernel.pid_max from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*kernel.pid_max replace: '#kernel.pid_max' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83366-5 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_pid_max - name: Ensure sysctl kernel.pid_max is set to 65536 sysctl: name: kernel.pid_max value: '65536' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83366-5 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_pid_max # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of kernel.pid_max from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*kernel.pid_max.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "kernel.pid_max" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" # # Set runtime for kernel.pid_max # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w kernel.pid_max="65536" # # If kernel.pid_max present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "65536" # else, add "kernel.pid_max = 65536" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^kernel.pid_max") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "65536" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^kernel.pid_max\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^kernel.pid_max\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-83366-5" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disallow magic SysRq key To set the runtime status of the kernel.sysrq kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w kernel.sysrq=0 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: kernel.sysrq = 0 BP28(R23) The Magic SysRq key allows sending certain commands directly to the running kernel. It can dump various system and process information, potentially revealing sensitive information. It can also reboot or shutdown the machine, disturbing its availability. CCE-83355-8 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*kernel.sysrq.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83355-8 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_sysrq - name: Comment out any occurrences of kernel.sysrq from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*kernel.sysrq replace: '#kernel.sysrq' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83355-8 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_sysrq - name: Ensure sysctl kernel.sysrq is set to 0 sysctl: name: kernel.sysrq value: '0' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83355-8 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_sysrq # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of kernel.sysrq from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*kernel.sysrq.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "kernel.sysrq" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" # # Set runtime for kernel.sysrq # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w kernel.sysrq="0" # # If kernel.sysrq present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "0" # else, add "kernel.sysrq = 0" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^kernel.sysrq") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "0" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^kernel.sysrq\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^kernel.sysrq\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-83355-8" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Access to Network bpf() Syscall From Unprivileged Processes To set the runtime status of the kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled=1 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled = 1 BP28(R9) CCI-000366 AC-6 SC-7(10) FMT_SMF_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000132-GPOS-00067 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040281 SV-230545r858822_rule Loading and accessing the packet filters programs and maps using the bpf() syscall has the potential of revealing sensitive information about the kernel state. CCE-82974-7 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82974-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040281 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-SC-7(10) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_unprivileged_bpf_disabled - name: Comment out any occurrences of kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled replace: '#kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82974-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040281 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-SC-7(10) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_unprivileged_bpf_disabled - name: Ensure sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled is set to 1 sysctl: name: kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled value: '1' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82974-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040281 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-SC-7(10) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_unprivileged_bpf_disabled --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled%3D1%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_kernel_unprivileged_bpf_disabled.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" # # Set runtime for kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled="1" # # If kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "1" # else, add "kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled = 1" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "1" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-82974-7" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Restrict usage of ptrace to descendant processes To set the runtime status of the kernel.yama.ptrace_scope kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w kernel.yama.ptrace_scope=1 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: kernel.yama.ptrace_scope = 1 BP28(R25) CCI-000366 SC-7(10) SRG-OS-000132-GPOS-00067 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040282 1.4.2 SV-230546r858824_rule Unrestricted usage of ptrace allows compromised binaries to run ptrace on another processes of the user. Like this, the attacker can steal sensitive information from the target processes (e.g. SSH sessions, web browser, ...) without any additional assistance from the user (i.e. without resorting to phishing). CCE-80953-3 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*kernel.yama.ptrace_scope.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80953-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040282 - NIST-800-53-SC-7(10) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_yama_ptrace_scope - name: Comment out any occurrences of kernel.yama.ptrace_scope from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*kernel.yama.ptrace_scope replace: '#kernel.yama.ptrace_scope' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80953-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040282 - NIST-800-53-SC-7(10) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_yama_ptrace_scope - name: Ensure sysctl kernel.yama.ptrace_scope is set to 1 sysctl: name: kernel.yama.ptrace_scope value: '1' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80953-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040282 - NIST-800-53-SC-7(10) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_yama_ptrace_scope --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,kernel.yama.ptrace_scope%3D1%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_kernel_yama_ptrace_scope.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of kernel.yama.ptrace_scope from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*kernel.yama.ptrace_scope.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "kernel.yama.ptrace_scope" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" # # Set runtime for kernel.yama.ptrace_scope # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w kernel.yama.ptrace_scope="1" # # If kernel.yama.ptrace_scope present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "1" # else, add "kernel.yama.ptrace_scope = 1" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^kernel.yama.ptrace_scope") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "1" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^kernel.yama.ptrace_scope\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^kernel.yama.ptrace_scope\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-80953-3" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Harden the operation of the BPF just-in-time compiler To set the runtime status of the net.core.bpf_jit_harden kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.core.bpf_jit_harden=2 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.core.bpf_jit_harden = 2 BP28(R12) CCI-000366 CM-6 SC-7(10) FMT_SMF_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040286 SV-244554r858832_rule When hardened, the extended Berkeley Packet Filter just-in-time compiler will randomize any kernel addresses in the BPF programs and maps, and will not expose the JIT addresses in /proc/kallsyms. CCE-82934-1 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*net.core.bpf_jit_harden.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82934-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040286 - NIST-800-53-CM-6 - NIST-800-53-SC-7(10) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_core_bpf_jit_harden - name: Comment out any occurrences of net.core.bpf_jit_harden from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*net.core.bpf_jit_harden replace: '#net.core.bpf_jit_harden' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82934-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040286 - NIST-800-53-CM-6 - NIST-800-53-SC-7(10) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_core_bpf_jit_harden - name: Ensure sysctl net.core.bpf_jit_harden is set to 2 sysctl: name: net.core.bpf_jit_harden value: '2' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82934-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040286 - NIST-800-53-CM-6 - NIST-800-53-SC-7(10) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_net_core_bpf_jit_harden --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,net.core.bpf_jit_harden%3D2%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_core_bpf_jit_harden.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of net.core.bpf_jit_harden from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.core.bpf_jit_harden.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "net.core.bpf_jit_harden" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" # # Set runtime for net.core.bpf_jit_harden # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.core.bpf_jit_harden="2" # # If net.core.bpf_jit_harden present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "2" # else, add "net.core.bpf_jit_harden = 2" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.core.bpf_jit_harden") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "2" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.core.bpf_jit_harden\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.core.bpf_jit_harden\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-82934-1" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the use of user namespaces To set the runtime status of the user.max_user_namespaces kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w user.max_user_namespaces=0 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: user.max_user_namespaces = 0 When containers are deployed on the machine, the value should be set to large non-zero value. This configuration baseline was created to deploy the base operating system for general purpose workloads. When the operating system is configured for certain purposes, such as to host Linux Containers, it is expected that user.max_user_namespaces will be enabled. CCI-000366 SC-39 CM-6(a) FMT_SMF_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040284 SV-230548r858828_rule It is detrimental for operating systems to provide, or install by default, functionality exceeding requirements or system objectives. These unnecessary capabilities or services are often overlooked and therefore may remain unsecured. They increase the risk to the platform by providing additional attack vectors. User namespaces are used primarily for Linux containers. The value 0 disallows the use of user namespaces. CCE-82211-4 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*user.max_user_namespaces.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82211-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040284 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-39 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_user_max_user_namespaces - name: Comment out any occurrences of user.max_user_namespaces from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*user.max_user_namespaces replace: '#user.max_user_namespaces' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82211-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040284 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-39 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_user_max_user_namespaces - name: Ensure sysctl user.max_user_namespaces is set to 0 sysctl: name: user.max_user_namespaces value: '0' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82211-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040284 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-39 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_user_max_user_namespaces --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,user.max_user_namespaces%20%3D%200%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_user_max_user_namespaces.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of user.max_user_namespaces from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*user.max_user_namespaces.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "user.max_user_namespaces" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" # # Set runtime for user.max_user_namespaces # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w user.max_user_namespaces="0" # # If user.max_user_namespaces present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "0" # else, add "user.max_user_namespaces = 0" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^user.max_user_namespaces") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "0" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^user.max_user_namespaces\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^user.max_user_namespaces\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-82211-4" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Prevent applications from mapping low portion of virtual memory To set the runtime status of the vm.mmap_min_addr kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w vm.mmap_min_addr=65536 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: vm.mmap_min_addr = 65536 BP28(R23) The vm.mmap_min_addr parameter specifies the minimum virtual address that a process is allowed to mmap. Allowing a process to mmap low portion of virtual memory can have security implications such as such as heightened risk of kernel null pointer dereference defects. CCE-83363-2 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*vm.mmap_min_addr.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83363-2 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_vm_mmap_min_addr - name: Comment out any occurrences of vm.mmap_min_addr from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*vm.mmap_min_addr replace: '#vm.mmap_min_addr' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83363-2 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_vm_mmap_min_addr - name: Ensure sysctl vm.mmap_min_addr is set to 65536 sysctl: name: vm.mmap_min_addr value: '65536' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83363-2 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_vm_mmap_min_addr # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of vm.mmap_min_addr from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*vm.mmap_min_addr.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "vm.mmap_min_addr" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" # # Set runtime for vm.mmap_min_addr # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w vm.mmap_min_addr="65536" # # If vm.mmap_min_addr present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "65536" # else, add "vm.mmap_min_addr = 65536" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^vm.mmap_min_addr") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "65536" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^vm.mmap_min_addr\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^vm.mmap_min_addr\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-83363-2" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Core Dumps A core dump file is the memory image of an executable program when it was terminated by the operating system due to errant behavior. In most cases, only software developers legitimately need to access these files. The core dump files may also contain sensitive information, or unnecessarily occupy large amounts of disk space. Once a hard limit is set in /etc/security/limits.conf, or to a file within the /etc/security/limits.d/ directory, a user cannot increase that limit within his or her own session. If access to core dumps is required, consider restricting them to only certain users or groups. See the limits.conf man page for more information. The core dumps of setuid programs are further protected. The sysctl variable fs.suid_dumpable controls whether the kernel allows core dumps from these programs at all. The default value of 0 is recommended. Disable acquiring, saving, and processing core dumps The systemd-coredump.socket unit is a socket activation of the systemd-coredump@.service which processes core dumps. By masking the unit, core dump processing is disabled. CCI-000366 SC-7(10) FMT_SMF_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010672 SV-230312r833308_rule A core dump includes a memory image taken at the time the operating system terminates an application. The memory image could contain sensitive data and is generally useful only for developers trying to debug problems. CCE-82881-4 - name: Disable acquiring, saving, and processing core dumps - Collect systemd Socket Units Present in the System ansible.builtin.command: cmd: systemctl -q list-unit-files --type socket register: result_systemd_unit_files changed_when: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82881-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010672 - NIST-800-53-SC-7(10) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_systemd-coredump_disabled - name: Disable acquiring, saving, and processing core dumps - Ensure systemd-coredump.socket is Masked ansible.builtin.systemd: name: systemd-coredump.socket state: stopped enabled: false masked: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - result_systemd_unit_files.stdout_lines is search("systemd-coredump.socket") tags: - CCE-82881-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010672 - NIST-800-53-SC-7(10) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_systemd-coredump_disabled # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SOCKET_NAME="systemd-coredump.socket" SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files --type socket | grep -q "$SOCKET_NAME"; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop "$SOCKET_NAME" "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask "$SOCKET_NAME" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable core dump backtraces The ProcessSizeMax option in [Coredump] section of /etc/systemd/coredump.conf specifies the maximum size in bytes of a core which will be processed. Core dumps exceeding this size may be stored, but the backtrace will not be generated. If the /etc/systemd/coredump.conf file does not already contain the [Coredump] section, the value will not be configured correctly. CCI-000366 CM-6 FMT_SMF_EXT.1 Req-3.2 3.3.1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010675 1.4.3 SV-230315r627750_rule A core dump includes a memory image taken at the time the operating system terminates an application. The memory image could contain sensitive data and is generally useful only for developers or system operators trying to debug problems. Enabling core dumps on production systems is not recommended, however there may be overriding operational requirements to enable advanced debuging. Permitting temporary enablement of core dumps during such situations should be reviewed through local needs and policy. CCE-82251-0 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-82251-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010675 - NIST-800-53-CM-6 - PCI-DSS-Req-3.2 - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1 - coredump_disable_backtraces - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Disable core dump backtraces block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/systemd/coredump.conf create: false regexp: ^\s*ProcessSizeMax\s*=\s* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/systemd/coredump.conf lineinfile: path: /etc/systemd/coredump.conf create: false regexp: ^\s*ProcessSizeMax\s*=\s* state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/systemd/coredump.conf lineinfile: path: /etc/systemd/coredump.conf create: false regexp: ^\s*ProcessSizeMax\s*=\s* line: ProcessSizeMax=0 state: present when: '"systemd" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-82251-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010675 - NIST-800-53-CM-6 - PCI-DSS-Req-3.2 - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1 - coredump_disable_backtraces - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,%23%20%20This%20file%20is%20part%20of%20systemd.%0A%23%0A%23%20%20systemd%20is%20free%20software%3B%20you%20can%20redistribute%20it%20and/or%20modify%20it%0A%23%20%20under%20the%20terms%20of%20the%20GNU%20Lesser%20General%20Public%20License%20as%20published%20by%0A%23%20%20the%20Free%20Software%20Foundation%3B%20either%20version%202.1%20of%20the%20License%2C%20or%0A%23%20%20%28at%20your%20option%29%20any%20later%20version.%0A%23%0A%23%20Entries%20in%20this%20file%20show%20the%20compile%20time%20defaults.%0A%23%20You%20can%20change%20settings%20by%20editing%20this%20file.%0A%23%20Defaults%20can%20be%20restored%20by%20simply%20deleting%20this%20file.%0A%23%0A%23%20See%20coredump.conf%285%29%20for%20details.%0A%0A%5BCoredump%5D%0A%23Storage%3Dexternal%0A%23Compress%3Dyes%0A%23ProcessSizeMax%3D2G%0A%23ExternalSizeMax%3D2G%0A%23JournalSizeMax%3D767M%0A%23MaxUse%3D%0A%23KeepFree%3D%0AStorage%3Dnone%0AProcessSizeMax%3D0%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/systemd/coredump.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q systemd; then if [ -e "/etc/systemd/coredump.conf" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*ProcessSizeMax\s*=\s*/Id" "/etc/systemd/coredump.conf" else touch "/etc/systemd/coredump.conf" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/systemd/coredump.conf" cp "/etc/systemd/coredump.conf" "/etc/systemd/coredump.conf.bak" # Insert at the end of the file printf '%s\n' "ProcessSizeMax=0" >> "/etc/systemd/coredump.conf" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/systemd/coredump.conf.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable storing core dump The Storage option in [Coredump] sectionof /etc/systemd/coredump.conf can be set to none to disable storing core dumps permanently. If the /etc/systemd/coredump.conf file does not already contain the [Coredump] section, the value will not be configured correctly. CCI-000366 CM-6 FMT_SMF_EXT.1 Req-3.2 3.3.1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010674 1.4.4 SV-230314r627750_rule A core dump includes a memory image taken at the time the operating system terminates an application. The memory image could contain sensitive data and is generally useful only for developers or system operators trying to debug problems. Enabling core dumps on production systems is not recommended, however there may be overriding operational requirements to enable advanced debuging. Permitting temporary enablement of core dumps during such situations should be reviewed through local needs and policy. CCE-82252-8 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-82252-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010674 - NIST-800-53-CM-6 - PCI-DSS-Req-3.2 - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1 - coredump_disable_storage - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Disable storing core dump block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/systemd/coredump.conf create: false regexp: ^\s*Storage\s*=\s* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/systemd/coredump.conf lineinfile: path: /etc/systemd/coredump.conf create: false regexp: ^\s*Storage\s*=\s* state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/systemd/coredump.conf lineinfile: path: /etc/systemd/coredump.conf create: false regexp: ^\s*Storage\s*=\s* line: Storage=none state: present when: '"systemd" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-82252-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010674 - NIST-800-53-CM-6 - PCI-DSS-Req-3.2 - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1 - coredump_disable_storage - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,%23%20%20This%20file%20is%20part%20of%20systemd.%0A%23%0A%23%20%20systemd%20is%20free%20software%3B%20you%20can%20redistribute%20it%20and/or%20modify%20it%0A%23%20%20under%20the%20terms%20of%20the%20GNU%20Lesser%20General%20Public%20License%20as%20published%20by%0A%23%20%20the%20Free%20Software%20Foundation%3B%20either%20version%202.1%20of%20the%20License%2C%20or%0A%23%20%20%28at%20your%20option%29%20any%20later%20version.%0A%23%0A%23%20Entries%20in%20this%20file%20show%20the%20compile%20time%20defaults.%0A%23%20You%20can%20change%20settings%20by%20editing%20this%20file.%0A%23%20Defaults%20can%20be%20restored%20by%20simply%20deleting%20this%20file.%0A%23%0A%23%20See%20coredump.conf%285%29%20for%20details.%0A%0A%5BCoredump%5D%0A%23Storage%3Dexternal%0A%23Compress%3Dyes%0A%23ProcessSizeMax%3D2G%0A%23ExternalSizeMax%3D2G%0A%23JournalSizeMax%3D767M%0A%23MaxUse%3D%0A%23KeepFree%3D%0AStorage%3Dnone%0AProcessSizeMax%3D0%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/systemd/coredump.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q systemd; then if [ -e "/etc/systemd/coredump.conf" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*Storage\s*=\s*/Id" "/etc/systemd/coredump.conf" else touch "/etc/systemd/coredump.conf" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/systemd/coredump.conf" cp "/etc/systemd/coredump.conf" "/etc/systemd/coredump.conf.bak" # Insert at the end of the file printf '%s\n' "Storage=none" >> "/etc/systemd/coredump.conf" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/systemd/coredump.conf.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Core Dumps for All Users To disable core dumps for all users, add the following line to /etc/security/limits.conf, or to a file within the /etc/security/limits.d/ directory: * hard core 0 1 12 13 15 16 2 7 8 APO13.01 BAI04.04 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.07 CCI-000366 SR 6.2 SR 7.1 SR 7.2 A.12.1.3 A.17.2.1 CM-6 SC-7(10) DE.CM-1 PR.DS-4 3.3.1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010673 1.6.1 SV-230313r627750_rule A core dump includes a memory image taken at the time the operating system terminates an application. The memory image could contain sensitive data and is generally useful only for developers trying to debug problems. CCE-81038-2 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-81038-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010673 - NIST-800-53-CM-6 - NIST-800-53-SC-7(10) - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1 - disable_users_coredumps - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Disable core dumps with limits lineinfile: dest: /etc/security/limits.conf regexp: ^[^#].*core line: '* hard core 0' create: true when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-81038-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010673 - NIST-800-53-CM-6 - NIST-800-53-SC-7(10) - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1 - disable_users_coredumps - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,%2A%20%20%20%20%20hard%20%20%20core%20%20%20%200 mode: 0644 path: /etc/security/limits.d/75-disable_users_coredumps.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q pam; then SECURITY_LIMITS_FILE="/etc/security/limits.conf" if grep -qE '^\s*\*\s+hard\s+core' $SECURITY_LIMITS_FILE; then sed -ri 's/(hard\s+core\s+)[[:digit:]]+/\1 0/' $SECURITY_LIMITS_FILE else echo "* hard core 0" >> $SECURITY_LIMITS_FILE fi if ls /etc/security/limits.d/*.conf > /dev/null; then sed -ri '/^\s*\*\s+hard\s+core/d' /etc/security/limits.d/*.conf fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Core Dumps for SUID programs To set the runtime status of the fs.suid_dumpable kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w fs.suid_dumpable=0 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: fs.suid_dumpable = 0 BP28(R23) 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3) 164.308(a)(4) 164.310(b) 164.310(c) 164.312(a) 164.312(e) SI-11(a) SI-11(b) 3.3.1 1.6.1 The core dump of a setuid program is more likely to contain sensitive data, as the program itself runs with greater privileges than the user who initiated execution of the program. Disabling the ability for any setuid program to write a core file decreases the risk of unauthorized access of such data. CCE-80912-9 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*fs.suid_dumpable.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80912-9 - NIST-800-53-SI-11(a) - NIST-800-53-SI-11(b) - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_fs_suid_dumpable - name: Comment out any occurrences of fs.suid_dumpable from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*fs.suid_dumpable replace: '#fs.suid_dumpable' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80912-9 - NIST-800-53-SI-11(a) - NIST-800-53-SI-11(b) - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_fs_suid_dumpable - name: Ensure sysctl fs.suid_dumpable is set to 0 sysctl: name: fs.suid_dumpable value: '0' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80912-9 - NIST-800-53-SI-11(a) - NIST-800-53-SI-11(b) - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_fs_suid_dumpable # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of fs.suid_dumpable from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*fs.suid_dumpable.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "fs.suid_dumpable" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" # # Set runtime for fs.suid_dumpable # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w fs.suid_dumpable="0" # # If fs.suid_dumpable present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "0" # else, add "fs.suid_dumpable = 0" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^fs.suid_dumpable") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "0" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^fs.suid_dumpable\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^fs.suid_dumpable\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-80912-9" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Daemon Umask The umask is a per-process setting which limits the default permissions for creation of new files and directories. The system includes initialization scripts which set the default umask for system daemons. daemon umask Enter umask for daemons 022 027 022 Set Daemon Umask The file /etc/init.d/functions includes initialization parameters for most or all daemons started at boot time. Many daemons on the system already individually restrict themselves to a umask of 077 in their own init scripts. By default, the umask of 022 is set which prevents creation of group- or world-writable files. To set the umask for daemons expected by the profile, edit the following line: umask Setting the umask to too restrictive a setting can cause serious errors at runtime. 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 The umask influences the permissions assigned to files created by a process at run time. An unnecessarily permissive umask could result in files being created with insecure permissions. var_umask_for_daemons='' grep -q ^umask /etc/init.d/functions && \ sed -i "s/umask.*/umask $var_umask_for_daemons/g" /etc/init.d/functions if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then echo "umask $var_umask_for_daemons" >> /etc/init.d/functions fi Enable ExecShield ExecShield describes kernel features that provide protection against exploitation of memory corruption errors such as buffer overflows. These features include random placement of the stack and other memory regions, prevention of execution in memory that should only hold data, and special handling of text buffers. These protections are enabled by default on 32-bit systems and controlled through sysctl variables kernel.exec-shield and kernel.randomize_va_space. On the latest 64-bit systems, kernel.exec-shield cannot be enabled or disabled with sysctl. kernel.kptr_restrict Configure exposition of kernel pointer addresses 1 1 2 Enable ExecShield via sysctl By default on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 64-bit systems, ExecShield is enabled and can only be disabled if the hardware does not support ExecShield or is disabled in /etc/default/grub. 12 15 8 APO13.01 DSS05.02 3.1.7 CCI-002530 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3) 164.308(a)(4) 164.310(b) 164.310(c) 164.312(a) 164.312(e) SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 SC-39 CM-6(a) PR.PT-4 SRG-OS-000433-GPOS-00192 ExecShield uses the segmentation feature on all x86 systems to prevent execution in memory higher than a certain address. It writes an address as a limit in the code segment descriptor, to control where code can be executed, on a per-process basis. When the kernel places a process's memory regions such as the stack and heap higher than this address, the hardware prevents execution in that address range. This is enabled by default on the latest Red Hat and Fedora systems if supported by the hardware. CCE-80914-5 - name: Update grub defaults and the bootloader menu command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --remove-args="noexec" when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80914-5 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-39 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - sysctl_kernel_exec_shield # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then grubby --update-kernel=ALL --remove-args=noexec --env=/boot/grub2/grubenv else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Restrict Exposed Kernel Pointer Addresses Access To set the runtime status of the kernel.kptr_restrict kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w kernel.kptr_restrict= To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: kernel.kptr_restrict = BP28(R23) CCI-002824 CCI-000366 CIP-002-5 R1.1 CIP-002-5 R1.2 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 4.1 CIP-004-6 4.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-004-6 R2.2.4 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-004-6 R4 CIP-005-6 R1 CIP-005-6 R1.1 CIP-005-6 R1.2 CIP-007-3 R3 CIP-007-3 R3.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 CIP-007-3 R8.4 CIP-009-6 R.1.1 CIP-009-6 R4 SC-30 SC-30(2) SC-30(5) CM-6(a) SRG-OS-000132-GPOS-00067 SRG-OS-000433-GPOS-00192 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040283 SV-230547r858826_rule Exposing kernel pointers (through procfs or seq_printf()) exposes kernel writeable structures which may contain functions pointers. If a write vulnerability occurs in the kernel, allowing write access to any of this structure, the kernel can be compromised. This option disallow any program without the CAP_SYSLOG capability to get the addresses of kernel pointers by replacing them with 0. CCE-80915-2 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*kernel.kptr_restrict.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80915-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040283 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-30 - NIST-800-53-SC-30(2) - NIST-800-53-SC-30(5) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_kptr_restrict - name: Comment out any occurrences of kernel.kptr_restrict from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*kernel.kptr_restrict replace: '#kernel.kptr_restrict' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80915-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040283 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-30 - NIST-800-53-SC-30(2) - NIST-800-53-SC-30(5) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_kptr_restrict - name: XCCDF Value sysctl_kernel_kptr_restrict_value # promote to variable set_fact: sysctl_kernel_kptr_restrict_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure sysctl kernel.kptr_restrict is set sysctl: name: kernel.kptr_restrict value: '{{ sysctl_kernel_kptr_restrict_value }}' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80915-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040283 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-30 - NIST-800-53-SC-30(2) - NIST-800-53-SC-30(5) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_kptr_restrict --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,kernel.kptr_restrict%3D1%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_kernel_kptr_restrict.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of kernel.kptr_restrict from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*kernel.kptr_restrict.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "kernel.kptr_restrict" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" sysctl_kernel_kptr_restrict_value='' # # Set runtime for kernel.kptr_restrict # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w kernel.kptr_restrict="$sysctl_kernel_kptr_restrict_value" # # If kernel.kptr_restrict present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value # else, add "kernel.kptr_restrict = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^kernel.kptr_restrict") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_kernel_kptr_restrict_value" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^kernel.kptr_restrict\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^kernel.kptr_restrict\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-80915-2" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable Randomized Layout of Virtual Address Space To set the runtime status of the kernel.randomize_va_space kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_space=2 To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: kernel.randomize_va_space = 2 BP28(R23) 3.1.7 CCI-000366 CCI-002824 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3) 164.308(a)(4) 164.310(b) 164.310(c) 164.312(a) 164.312(e) CIP-002-5 R1.1 CIP-002-5 R1.2 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 4.1 CIP-004-6 4.2 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-004-6 R2.2.4 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-004-6 R4 CIP-005-6 R1 CIP-005-6 R1.1 CIP-005-6 R1.2 CIP-007-3 R3 CIP-007-3 R3.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 CIP-007-3 R8.4 CIP-009-6 R.1.1 CIP-009-6 R4 SC-30 SC-30(2) CM-6(a) Req-2.2.1 3.3.1 SRG-OS-000433-GPOS-00193 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 SRG-APP-000450-CTR-001105 RHEL-08-010430 1.4.1 SV-230280r858767_rule Address space layout randomization (ASLR) makes it more difficult for an attacker to predict the location of attack code they have introduced into a process's address space during an attempt at exploitation. Additionally, ASLR makes it more difficult for an attacker to know the location of existing code in order to re-purpose it using return oriented programming (ROP) techniques. CCE-80916-0 - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files find: paths: - /etc/sysctl.d/ - /run/sysctl.d/ - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ contains: ^[\s]*kernel.randomize_va_space.*$ patterns: '*.conf' file_type: any register: find_sysctl_d when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80916-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010430 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-30 - NIST-800-53-SC-30(2) - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.1 - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_randomize_va_space - name: Comment out any occurrences of kernel.randomize_va_space from config files replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^[\s]*kernel.randomize_va_space replace: '#kernel.randomize_va_space' loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80916-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010430 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-30 - NIST-800-53-SC-30(2) - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.1 - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_randomize_va_space - name: Ensure sysctl kernel.randomize_va_space is set to 2 sysctl: name: kernel.randomize_va_space value: '2' sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf state: present reload: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80916-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010430 - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-30 - NIST-800-53-SC-30(2) - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.1 - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - sysctl_kernel_randomize_va_space --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,kernel.randomize_va_space%3D2%0A mode: 0644 path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_kernel_randomize_va_space.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Comment out any occurrences of kernel.randomize_va_space from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*kernel.randomize_va_space.*$' $f | uniq ) if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then while IFS= read -r entry; do escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") # comment out "kernel.randomize_va_space" matches to preserve user data sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f done <<< "$matching_list" fi done # # Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value # SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" # # Set runtime for kernel.randomize_va_space # /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w kernel.randomize_va_space="2" # # If kernel.randomize_va_space present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "2" # else, add "kernel.randomize_va_space = 2" to /etc/sysctl.conf # # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^kernel.randomize_va_space") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "2" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^kernel.randomize_va_space\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^kernel.randomize_va_space\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" else if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi cce="CCE-80916-0" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable Execute Disable (XD) or No Execute (NX) Support on x86 Systems Recent processors in the x86 family support the ability to prevent code execution on a per memory page basis. Generically and on AMD processors, this ability is called No Execute (NX), while on Intel processors it is called Execute Disable (XD). This ability can help prevent exploitation of buffer overflow vulnerabilities and should be activated whenever possible. Extra steps must be taken to ensure that this protection is enabled, particularly on 32-bit x86 systems. Other processors, such as Itanium and POWER, have included such support since inception and the standard kernel for those platforms supports the feature. This is enabled by default on the latest Oracle Linux, Red Hat and Fedora systems if supported by the hardware. Enable NX or XD Support in the BIOS Reboot the system and enter the BIOS or Setup configuration menu. Navigate the BIOS configuration menu and make sure that the option is enabled. The setting may be located under a Security section. Look for Execute Disable (XD) on Intel-based systems and No Execute (NX) on AMD-based systems. 11 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 3.1.7 CCI-002824 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 SC-39 CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 2.2.1 SRG-OS-000433-GPOS-00192 SRG-APP-000450-CTR-001105 RHEL-08-010420 SV-230276r854031_rule Computers with the ability to prevent this type of code execution frequently put an option in the BIOS that will allow users to turn the feature on or off at will. CCE-83918-3 Install PAE Kernel on Supported 32-bit x86 Systems Systems that are using the 64-bit x86 kernel package do not need to install the kernel-PAE package because the 64-bit x86 kernel already includes this support. However, if the system is 32-bit and also supports the PAE and NX features as determined in the previous section, the kernel-PAE package should be installed to enable XD or NX support. The kernel-PAE package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install kernel-PAE The installation process should also have configured the bootloader to load the new kernel at boot. Verify this after reboot and modify /etc/default/grub if necessary. The kernel-PAE package should not be installed on older systems that do not support the XD or NX bit, as 8this may prevent them from booting.8 BP28(R9) 11 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 3.1.7 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 2.2.1 On 32-bit systems that support the XD or NX bit, the vendor-supplied PAE kernel is required to enable either Execute Disable (XD) or No Execute (NX) support. CCE-83919-1 Memory Poisoning Memory Poisoning consists of writing a special value to uninitialized or freed memory. Poisoning can be used as a mechanism to prevent leak of information and detection of corrupted memory. slub_debug - debug options Defines the debug options to use in slub_debug kernel command line argument. P F Z P FZ FZP Enable page allocator poisoning To enable poisoning of free pages, add the argument page_poison=1 to the default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system. To ensure that page_poison=1 is added as a kernel command line argument to newly installed kernels, add page_poison=1 to the default Grub2 command line for Linux operating systems. Modify the line within /etc/default/grub as shown below: GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="... page_poison=1 ..." Run the following command to update command line for already installed kernels:# grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="page_poison=1" BP28(R8) CCI-001084 CM-6(a) SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 SRG-OS-000134-GPOS-00068 RHEL-08-010421 SV-230277r792884_rule Poisoning writes an arbitrary value to freed pages, so any modification or reference to that page after being freed or before being initialized will be detected and prevented. This prevents many types of use-after-free vulnerabilities at little performance cost. Also prevents leak of data and detection of corrupted memory. CCE-80944-2 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80944-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010421 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - grub2_page_poison_argument - low_disruption - medium_complexity - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: Update grub defaults and the bootloader menu command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="page_poison=1" when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80944-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010421 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - grub2_page_poison_argument - low_disruption - medium_complexity - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy [customizations.kernel] append = "page_poison=1" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { rpm --quiet -q grub2-common; }; then grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args=page_poison=1 --env=/boot/grub2/grubenv else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable SLUB/SLAB allocator poisoning To enable poisoning of SLUB/SLAB objects, add the argument slub_debug= to the default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system. To ensure that slub_debug= is added as a kernel command line argument to newly installed kernels, add slub_debug= to the default Grub2 command line for Linux operating systems. Modify the line within /etc/default/grub as shown below: GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="... slub_debug= ..." Run the following command to update command line for already installed kernels:# grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="slub_debug=" BP28(R8) CCI-001084 CM-6(a) SRG-OS-000433-GPOS-00192 SRG-OS-000134-GPOS-00068 RHEL-08-010423 SV-230279r792888_rule Poisoning writes an arbitrary value to freed objects, so any modification or reference to that object after being freed or before being initialized will be detected and prevented. This prevents many types of use-after-free vulnerabilities at little performance cost. Also prevents leak of data and detection of corrupted memory. CCE-80945-9 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80945-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010423 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - grub2_slub_debug_argument - low_disruption - medium_complexity - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_slub_debug_options # promote to variable set_fact: var_slub_debug_options: !!str tags: - always - name: Update grub defaults and the bootloader menu command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="slub_debug={{ var_slub_debug_options }}" when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80945-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010423 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - grub2_slub_debug_argument - low_disruption - medium_complexity - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy [customizations.kernel] append = "slub_debug=" # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { rpm --quiet -q grub2-common; }; then var_slub_debug_options='' grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args=slub_debug=$var_slub_debug_options --env=/boot/grub2/grubenv else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi SELinux SELinux is a feature of the Linux kernel which can be used to guard against misconfigured or compromised programs. SELinux enforces the idea that programs should be limited in what files they can access and what actions they can take. The default SELinux policy, as configured on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, has been sufficiently developed and debugged that it should be usable on almost any system with minimal configuration and a small amount of system administrator training. This policy prevents system services - including most of the common network-visible services such as mail servers, FTP servers, and DNS servers - from accessing files which those services have no valid reason to access. This action alone prevents a huge amount of possible damage from network attacks against services, from trojaned software, and so forth. This guide recommends that SELinux be enabled using the default (targeted) policy on every Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 system, unless that system has unusual requirements which make a stronger policy appropriate. For more information on SELinux, see https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/8/html/using_selinux. SELinux policy Type of policy in use. Possible values are: targeted - Only targeted network daemons are protected. strict - Full SELinux protection. mls - Multiple levels of security targeted mls targeted SELinux state enforcing - SELinux security policy is enforced. permissive - SELinux prints warnings instead of enforcing. disabled - SELinux is fully disabled. enforcing disabled enforcing permissive Install libselinux Package The libselinux package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install libselinux 1.2.6 1.5.1.1 Security-enhanced Linux is a feature of the Linux kernel and a number of utilities with enhanced security functionality designed to add mandatory access controls to Linux. The libselinux package contains the core library of the Security-enhanced Linux system. CCE-82877-2 - name: Ensure libselinux is installed package: name: libselinux state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82877-2 - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.6 - enable_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - package_libselinux_installed [[packages]] name = "libselinux" version = "*" include install_libselinux class install_libselinux { package { 'libselinux': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=libselinux # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "libselinux" ; then yum install -y "libselinux" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Install policycoreutils-python-utils package The policycoreutils-python-utils package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install policycoreutils-python-utils SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 This package is required to operate and manage an SELinux environment and its policies. It provides utilities such as semanage, audit2allow, audit2why, chcat and sandbox. CCE-82724-6 - name: Ensure policycoreutils-python-utils is installed package: name: policycoreutils-python-utils state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82724-6 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_policycoreutils-python-utils_installed [[packages]] name = "policycoreutils-python-utils" version = "*" include install_policycoreutils-python-utils class install_policycoreutils-python-utils { package { 'policycoreutils-python-utils': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=policycoreutils-python-utils # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "policycoreutils-python-utils" ; then yum install -y "policycoreutils-python-utils" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Install policycoreutils Package The policycoreutils package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install policycoreutils CCI-001084 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 SRG-OS-000134-GPOS-00068 RHEL-08-010171 SV-230241r627750_rule Security-enhanced Linux is a feature of the Linux kernel and a number of utilities with enhanced security functionality designed to add mandatory access controls to Linux. The Security-enhanced Linux kernel contains new architectural components originally developed to improve security of the Flask operating system. These architectural components provide general support for the enforcement of many kinds of mandatory access control policies, including those based on the concepts of Type Enforcement, Role-based Access Control, and Multi-level Security. policycoreutils contains the policy core utilities that are required for basic operation of an SELinux-enabled system. These utilities include load_policy to load SELinux policies, setfiles to label filesystems, newrole to switch roles, and so on. CCE-82976-2 - name: Ensure policycoreutils is installed package: name: policycoreutils state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82976-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010171 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_policycoreutils_installed [[packages]] name = "policycoreutils" version = "*" include install_policycoreutils class install_policycoreutils { package { 'policycoreutils': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=policycoreutils # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "policycoreutils" ; then yum install -y "policycoreutils" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Uninstall mcstrans Package The mcstransd daemon provides category label information to client processes requesting information. The label translations are defined in /etc/selinux/targeted/setrans.conf. The mcstrans package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase mcstrans 1.5.1.7 Since this service is not used very often, disable it to reduce the amount of potentially vulnerable code running on the system. CCE-82756-8 - name: Ensure mcstrans is removed package: name: mcstrans state: absent when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82756-8 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_mcstrans_removed include remove_mcstrans class remove_mcstrans { package { 'mcstrans': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=mcstrans # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove mcstrans # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on mcstrans. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "mcstrans" ; then yum remove -y "mcstrans" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Uninstall setroubleshoot-plugins Package The SETroubleshoot plugins are used to analyze SELinux AVC data. The service provides information around configuration errors, unauthorized intrusions, and other potential errors. The setroubleshoot-plugins package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase setroubleshoot-plugins BP28(R68) The SETroubleshoot service is an unnecessary daemon to have running on a server. CCE-84250-0 - name: Ensure setroubleshoot-plugins is removed package: name: setroubleshoot-plugins state: absent when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84250-0 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_setroubleshoot-plugins_removed include remove_setroubleshoot-plugins class remove_setroubleshoot-plugins { package { 'setroubleshoot-plugins': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=setroubleshoot-plugins # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove setroubleshoot-plugins # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on setroubleshoot-plugins. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "setroubleshoot-plugins" ; then yum remove -y "setroubleshoot-plugins" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Uninstall setroubleshoot-server Package The SETroubleshoot service notifies desktop users of SELinux denials. The service provides information around configuration errors, unauthorized intrusions, and other potential errors. The setroubleshoot-server package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase setroubleshoot-server BP28(R68) The SETroubleshoot service is an unnecessary daemon to have running on a server. CCE-83490-3 - name: Ensure setroubleshoot-server is removed package: name: setroubleshoot-server state: absent when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83490-3 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_setroubleshoot-server_removed include remove_setroubleshoot-server class remove_setroubleshoot-server { package { 'setroubleshoot-server': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=setroubleshoot-server # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove setroubleshoot-server # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on setroubleshoot-server. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "setroubleshoot-server" ; then yum remove -y "setroubleshoot-server" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Uninstall setroubleshoot Package The SETroubleshoot service notifies desktop users of SELinux denials. The service provides information around configuration errors, unauthorized intrusions, and other potential errors. The setroubleshoot package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase setroubleshoot BP28(R68) 1.5.1.8 The SETroubleshoot service is an unnecessary daemon to have running on a server, especially if X Windows is removed or disabled. CCE-82755-0 - name: Ensure setroubleshoot is removed package: name: setroubleshoot state: absent when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82755-0 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_setroubleshoot_removed include remove_setroubleshoot class remove_setroubleshoot { package { 'setroubleshoot': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=setroubleshoot # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove setroubleshoot # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on setroubleshoot. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "setroubleshoot" ; then yum remove -y "setroubleshoot" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure SELinux Not Disabled in the kernel arguments SELinux can be disabled at boot time by disabling it via a kernel argument. Remove any instances of selinux=0 from the kernel arguments in that file to prevent SELinux from being disabled at boot. 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 4 5 6 8 9 APO01.06 APO11.04 APO13.01 BAI03.05 DSS01.05 DSS03.01 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 DSS06.03 DSS06.06 MEA02.01 3.1.2 3.7.2 CCI-000022 CCI-000032 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3) 164.308(a)(4) 164.310(b) 164.310(c) 164.312(a) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.4 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.4 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 4.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.12.1.1 A.12.1.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.2 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.2 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CIP-007-3 R5.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 AC-3 AC-3(3)(a) DE.AE-1 ID.AM-3 PR.AC-4 PR.AC-5 PR.AC-6 PR.DS-5 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 SRG-APP-000233-CTR-000585 Disabling a major host protection feature, such as SELinux, at boot time prevents it from confining system services at boot time. Further, it increases the chances that it will remain off during system operation. Ensure SELinux Not Disabled in /etc/default/grub SELinux can be disabled at boot time by an argument in /etc/default/grub. Remove any instances of selinux=0 from the kernel arguments in that file to prevent SELinux from being disabled at boot. 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 4 5 6 8 9 APO01.06 APO11.04 APO13.01 BAI03.05 DSS01.05 DSS03.01 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 DSS06.03 DSS06.06 MEA02.01 3.1.2 3.7.2 CCI-000022 CCI-000032 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3) 164.308(a)(4) 164.310(b) 164.310(c) 164.312(a) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.4 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.4 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 4.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.12.1.1 A.12.1.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.2 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.2 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CIP-007-3 R5.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 AC-3 AC-3(3)(a) DE.AE-1 ID.AM-3 PR.AC-4 PR.AC-5 PR.AC-6 PR.DS-5 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 1.2.6 1.5.1.2 Disabling a major host protection feature, such as SELinux, at boot time prevents it from confining system services at boot time. Further, it increases the chances that it will remain off during system operation. CCE-80827-9 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80827-9 - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 - NIST-800-171-3.7.2 - NIST-800-53-AC-3 - NIST-800-53-AC-3(3)(a) - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.6 - grub2_enable_selinux - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure SELinux Not Disabled in /etc/default/grub - Find /etc/grub.d/ files ansible.builtin.find: paths: - /etc/grub.d/ follow: true register: result_grub_d when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80827-9 - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 - NIST-800-171-3.7.2 - NIST-800-53-AC-3 - NIST-800-53-AC-3(3)(a) - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.6 - grub2_enable_selinux - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure SELinux Not Disabled in /etc/default/grub - Ensure SELinux Not Disabled in /etc/grub.d/ files ansible.builtin.replace: dest: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: (selinux|enforcing)=0 with_items: - '{{ result_grub_d.files }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80827-9 - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 - NIST-800-171-3.7.2 - NIST-800-53-AC-3 - NIST-800-53-AC-3(3)(a) - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.6 - grub2_enable_selinux - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure SELinux Not Disabled in /etc/default/grub - Check if /etc/grub2.cfg exists ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/grub2.cfg register: result_grub2_cfg_present when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80827-9 - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 - NIST-800-171-3.7.2 - NIST-800-53-AC-3 - NIST-800-53-AC-3(3)(a) - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.6 - grub2_enable_selinux - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure SELinux Not Disabled in /etc/default/grub - Check if /etc/default/grub exists ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/default/grub register: result_default_grub_present when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80827-9 - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 - NIST-800-171-3.7.2 - NIST-800-53-AC-3 - NIST-800-53-AC-3(3)(a) - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.6 - grub2_enable_selinux - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure SELinux Not Disabled in /etc/default/grub - Ensure SELinux Not Disabled in /etc/grub2.cfg ansible.builtin.replace: dest: /etc/grub2.cfg regexp: (selinux|enforcing)=0 when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_grub2_cfg_present.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80827-9 - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 - NIST-800-171-3.7.2 - NIST-800-53-AC-3 - NIST-800-53-AC-3(3)(a) - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.6 - grub2_enable_selinux - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Ensure SELinux Not Disabled in /etc/default/grub - Ensure SELinux Not Disabled in /etc/default/grub ansible.builtin.replace: dest: /etc/default/grub regexp: (selinux|enforcing)=0 when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - result_default_grub_present.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80827-9 - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 - NIST-800-171-3.7.2 - NIST-800-53-AC-3 - NIST-800-53-AC-3(3)(a) - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.6 - grub2_enable_selinux - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { rpm --quiet -q grub2-common; }; then sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/selinux=0//gI" /etc/default/grub /etc/grub2.cfg /etc/grub.d/* sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/enforcing=0//gI" /etc/default/grub /etc/grub2.cfg /etc/grub.d/* else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure No Device Files are Unlabeled by SELinux Device files, which are used for communication with important system resources, should be labeled with proper SELinux types. If any device files carry the SELinux type device_t or unlabeled_t, report the bug so that policy can be corrected. Supply information about what the device is and what programs use it. To check for incorrectly labeled device files, run following commands: $ sudo find /dev -context *:device_t:* \( -type c -o -type b \) -printf "%p %Z\n" $ sudo find /dev -context *:unlabeled_t:* \( -type c -o -type b \) -printf "%p %Z\n" It should produce no output in a well-configured system. Automatic remediation of this control is not available. The remediation can be achieved by amending SELinux policy. 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 APO01.06 APO11.04 BAI01.06 BAI03.05 BAI06.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 DSS06.06 MEA02.01 3.1.2 3.1.5 3.7.2 CCI-000022 CCI-000032 CCI-000318 CCI-000366 CCI-000368 CCI-001812 CCI-001813 CCI-001814 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 5.2 SR 6.2 SR 7.6 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.12.1.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) AC-3(3)(a) AC-6 DE.CM-1 DE.CM-7 PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 PR.IP-1 PR.IP-3 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-3 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 If a device file carries the SELinux type device_t or unlabeled_t, then SELinux cannot properly restrict access to the device file. CCE-80866-7 Ensure No Daemons are Unconfined by SELinux Daemons for which the SELinux policy does not contain rules will inherit the context of the parent process. Because daemons are launched during startup and descend from the init process, they inherit the unconfined_service_t context. To check for unconfined daemons, run the following command: $ sudo ps -eZ | grep "unconfined_service_t" It should produce no output in a well-configured system. Automatic remediation of this control is not available. Remediation can be achieved by amending SELinux policy or stopping the unconfined daemons as outlined above. 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 6 9 APO01.06 APO11.04 BAI03.05 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 DSS06.06 MEA02.01 3.1.2 3.1.5 3.7.2 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3) 164.308(a)(4) 164.310(b) 164.310(c) 164.312(a) 164.312(e) 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 5.2 SR 7.6 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.12.1.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) AC-3(3)(a) AC-6 PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-3 1.2.6 1.5.1.6 Daemons which run with the unconfined_service_t context may cause AVC denials, or allow privileges that the daemon does not require. CCE-80867-5 Ensure SELinux is Not Disabled The SELinux state should be set to enforcing or permissive at system boot time. In the file /etc/selinux/config, add or correct the following line to configure the system to boot into enforcing or permissive mode: SELINUX=enforcing OR SELINUX=permissive In case the SELinux is "disabled", the automated remediation will adopt a more conservative approach and set it to "permissive" in order to avoid any system disruption and give the administrator the opportunity to assess the impact and necessary efforts before setting it to "enforcing", which is strongly recommended. 1.5.1.4 Running SELinux in disabled mode is strongly discouraged. It prevents enforcing the SELinux controls without a system reboot. It also avoids labeling any persistent objects such as files, making it difficult to enable SELinux in the future. CCE-86151-8 - name: Ensure SELinux is Not Disabled block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/selinux/config create: true regexp: ^SELINUX= state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/selinux/config lineinfile: path: /etc/selinux/config create: true regexp: ^SELINUX= state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/selinux/config lineinfile: path: /etc/selinux/config create: true regexp: ^SELINUX= line: SELINUX=permissive state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86151-8 - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - selinux_not_disabled # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if [ -e "/etc/selinux/config" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^SELINUX=/Id" "/etc/selinux/config" else touch "/etc/selinux/config" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/selinux/config" cp "/etc/selinux/config" "/etc/selinux/config.bak" # Insert at the end of the file printf '%s\n' "SELINUX=permissive" >> "/etc/selinux/config" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/selinux/config.bak" fixfiles onboot fixfiles -f relabel else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure SELinux Policy The SELinux targeted policy is appropriate for general-purpose desktops and servers, as well as systems in many other roles. To configure the system to use this policy, add or correct the following line in /etc/selinux/config: SELINUXTYPE= Other policies, such as mls, provide additional security labeling and greater confinement but are not compatible with many general-purpose use cases. BP28(R66) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 4 5 6 8 9 APO01.06 APO11.04 APO13.01 BAI03.05 DSS01.05 DSS03.01 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 DSS06.03 DSS06.06 MEA02.01 3.1.2 3.7.2 CCI-002165 CCI-002696 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3) 164.308(a)(4) 164.310(b) 164.310(c) 164.312(a) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.4 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.4 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 4.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.12.1.1 A.12.1.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.2 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.2 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.2 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-004-6 R3.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CIP-007-3 R5.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 CIP-007-3 R6.5 AC-3 AC-3(3)(a) AU-9 SC-7(21) DE.AE-1 ID.AM-3 PR.AC-4 PR.AC-5 PR.AC-6 PR.DS-5 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 1.2.6 SRG-OS-000445-GPOS-00199 SRG-APP-000233-CTR-000585 RHEL-08-010450 1.5.1.3 SV-230282r854035_rule Setting the SELinux policy to targeted or a more specialized policy ensures the system will confine processes that are likely to be targeted for exploitation, such as network or system services. Note: During the development or debugging of SELinux modules, it is common to temporarily place non-production systems in permissive mode. In such temporary cases, SELinux policies should be developed, and once work is completed, the system should be reconfigured to . CCE-80868-3 - name: XCCDF Value var_selinux_policy_name # promote to variable set_fact: var_selinux_policy_name: !!str tags: - always - name: Configure SELinux Policy block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/selinux/config create: true regexp: ^SELINUXTYPE= state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/selinux/config lineinfile: path: /etc/selinux/config create: true regexp: ^SELINUXTYPE= state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/selinux/config lineinfile: path: /etc/selinux/config create: true regexp: ^SELINUXTYPE= line: SELINUXTYPE={{ var_selinux_policy_name }} state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80868-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010450 - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 - NIST-800-171-3.7.2 - NIST-800-53-AC-3 - NIST-800-53-AC-3(3)(a) - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - NIST-800-53-SC-7(21) - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.6 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - selinux_policytype # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then var_selinux_policy_name='' if [ -e "/etc/selinux/config" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^SELINUXTYPE=/Id" "/etc/selinux/config" else touch "/etc/selinux/config" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/selinux/config" cp "/etc/selinux/config" "/etc/selinux/config.bak" # Insert at the end of the file printf '%s\n' "SELINUXTYPE=$var_selinux_policy_name" >> "/etc/selinux/config" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/selinux/config.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure SELinux State is Enforcing The SELinux state should be set to at system boot time. In the file /etc/selinux/config, add or correct the following line to configure the system to boot into enforcing mode: SELINUX= BP28(R4) BP28(R66) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 4 5 6 8 9 APO01.06 APO11.04 APO13.01 BAI03.05 DSS01.05 DSS03.01 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 DSS06.03 DSS06.06 MEA02.01 3.1.2 3.7.2 CCI-001084 CCI-002165 CCI-002696 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3) 164.308(a)(4) 164.310(b) 164.310(c) 164.312(a) 164.312(e) 4.2.3.4 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.4 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 4.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.12.1.1 A.12.1.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.2 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.2 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.2 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-004-6 R3.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CIP-007-3 R5.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 CIP-007-3 R6.5 AC-3 AC-3(3)(a) AU-9 SC-7(21) DE.AE-1 ID.AM-3 PR.AC-4 PR.AC-5 PR.AC-6 PR.DS-5 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 SRG-OS-000445-GPOS-00199 SRG-OS-000134-GPOS-00068 RHEL-08-010170 1.5.1.5 SV-230240r627750_rule Setting the SELinux state to enforcing ensures SELinux is able to confine potentially compromised processes to the security policy, which is designed to prevent them from causing damage to the system or further elevating their privileges. CCE-80869-1 - name: XCCDF Value var_selinux_state # promote to variable set_fact: var_selinux_state: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure SELinux State is Enforcing block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/selinux/config create: true regexp: ^SELINUX= state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/selinux/config lineinfile: path: /etc/selinux/config create: true regexp: ^SELINUX= state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/selinux/config lineinfile: path: /etc/selinux/config create: true regexp: ^SELINUX= line: SELINUX={{ var_selinux_state }} state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80869-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010170 - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 - NIST-800-171-3.7.2 - NIST-800-53-AC-3 - NIST-800-53-AC-3(3)(a) - NIST-800-53-AU-9 - NIST-800-53-SC-7(21) - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - selinux_state # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then var_selinux_state='' if [ -e "/etc/selinux/config" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^SELINUX=/Id" "/etc/selinux/config" else touch "/etc/selinux/config" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/selinux/config" cp "/etc/selinux/config" "/etc/selinux/config.bak" # Insert at the end of the file printf '%s\n' "SELINUX=$var_selinux_state" >> "/etc/selinux/config" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/selinux/config.bak" fixfiles onboot fixfiles -f relabel else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Map System Users To The Appropriate SELinux Role Configure the operating system to prevent non-privileged users from executing privileged functions to include disabling, circumventing, or altering implemented security safeguards/countermeasures. All administrators must be mapped to the sysadm_u or staff_u users with the appropriate domains (sysadm_t and staff_t). $ sudo semanage login -m -s sysadm_u USER or $ sudo semanage login -m -s staff_u USER All authorized non-administrative users must be mapped to the user_u role or the appropriate domain (user_t). $ sudo semanage login -m -s user_u USER CCI-002165 CCI-002235 SRG-OS-000324-GPOS-00125 RHEL-08-040400 SV-254520r928805_rule Preventing non-privileged users from executing privileged functions mitigates the risk that unauthorized individuals or processes may gain unnecessary access to information or privileges. Privileged functions include, for example, establishing accounts, performing system integrity checks, or administering cryptographic key management activities. Non-privileged users are individuals who do not possess appropriate authorizations. Circumventing intrusion detection and prevention mechanisms or malicious code protection mechanisms are examples of privileged functions that require protection from non-privileged users. CCE-86353-0 SELinux - Booleans Enable or Disable runtime customization of SELinux system policies without having to reload or recompile the SELinux policy. abrt_anon_write SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true abrt_handle_event SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true abrt_upload_watch_anon_write SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true antivirus_can_scan_system SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true antivirus_use_jit SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true auditadm_exec_content SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true authlogin_radius SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true authlogin_yubikey SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true awstats_purge_apache_log_files SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true boinc_execmem SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true cdrecord_read_content SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true cluster_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true cluster_manage_all_files SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true cluster_use_execmem SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true cobbler_anon_write SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true cobbler_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true cobbler_use_cifs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true cobbler_use_nfs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true collectd_tcp_network_connect SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true condor_tcp_network_connect SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true conman_can_network SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true container_connect_any SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true cron_can_relabel SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true cron_system_cronjob_use_shares SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true cron_userdomain_transition SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true cups_execmem SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true cvs_read_shadow SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true daemons_dump_core SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true daemons_enable_cluster_mode SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true daemons_use_tcp_wrapper SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true daemons_use_tty SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true dbadm_exec_content SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true dbadm_manage_user_files SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true dbadm_read_user_files SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true deny_execmem SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true deny_ptrace SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true dhcpc_exec_iptables SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true dhcpd_use_ldap SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true domain_fd_use SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true domain_kernel_load_modules SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true entropyd_use_audio SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true exim_can_connect_db SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true exim_manage_user_files SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true exim_read_user_files SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true fcron_crond SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true fenced_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true fenced_can_ssh SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true fips_mode SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true ftpd_anon_write SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true ftpd_connect_all_unreserved SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true ftpd_connect_db SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true ftpd_full_access SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true ftpd_use_cifs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true ftpd_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true ftpd_use_nfs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true ftpd_use_passive_mode SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true git_cgi_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true git_cgi_use_cifs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true git_cgi_use_nfs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true git_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true git_session_users SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true git_system_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true git_system_use_cifs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true git_system_use_nfs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true gitosis_can_sendmail SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true glance_api_can_network SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true glance_use_execmem SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true glance_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true global_ssp SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true gluster_anon_write SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true gluster_export_all_ro SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true gluster_export_all_rw SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true gpg_web_anon_write SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true gssd_read_tmp SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true guest_exec_content SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true haproxy_connect_any SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true httpd_anon_write SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true httpd_builtin_scripting SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true httpd_can_check_spam SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true httpd_can_connect_ftp SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true httpd_can_connect_ldap SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true httpd_can_connect_mythtv SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true httpd_can_connect_zabbix SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true httpd_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true httpd_can_network_connect_db SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true httpd_can_network_memcache SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true httpd_can_network_relay SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true httpd_can_sendmail SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true httpd_dbus_avahi SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true httpd_dbus_sssd SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true httpd_dontaudit_search_dirs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true httpd_enable_cgi SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true httpd_enable_ftp_server SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true httpd_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true httpd_execmem SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true httpd_graceful_shutdown SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true httpd_manage_ipa SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true httpd_mod_auth_pam SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true httpd_read_user_content SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true httpd_run_ipa SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true httpd_run_preupgrade SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true httpd_run_stickshift SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true httpd_serve_cobbler_files SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true httpd_setrlimit SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true httpd_ssi_exec SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true httpd_sys_script_anon_write SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true httpd_tmp_exec SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true httpd_tty_comm SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true httpd_unified SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true httpd_use_cifs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true httpd_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true httpd_use_gpg SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true httpd_use_nfs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true httpd_use_openstack SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true httpd_use_sasl SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true httpd_verify_dns SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true icecast_use_any_tcp_ports SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true irc_use_any_tcp_ports SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true irssi_use_full_network SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true kdumpgui_run_bootloader SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true kerberos_enabled SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true ksmtuned_use_cifs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true ksmtuned_use_nfs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true logadm_exec_content SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true logging_syslogd_can_sendmail SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true logging_syslogd_run_nagios_plugins SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true logging_syslogd_use_tty SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true login_console_enabled SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true logrotate_use_nfs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true logwatch_can_network_connect_mail SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true lsmd_plugin_connect_any SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true mailman_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true mcelog_client SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true mcelog_exec_scripts SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true mcelog_foreground SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true mcelog_server SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true minidlna_read_generic_user_content SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true mmap_low_allowed SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true mock_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true mount_anyfile SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true mozilla_plugin_bind_unreserved_ports SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true mozilla_plugin_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true mozilla_plugin_use_bluejeans SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true mozilla_plugin_use_gps SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true mozilla_plugin_use_spice SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true mozilla_read_content SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true mpd_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true mpd_use_cifs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true mpd_use_nfs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true mplayer_execstack SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true mysql_connect_any SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true nagios_run_pnp4nagios SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true nagios_run_sudo SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true named_tcp_bind_http_port SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true named_write_master_zones SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true neutron_can_network SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true nfs_export_all_ro SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true nfs_export_all_rw SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true nfsd_anon_write SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true nis_enabled SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true nscd_use_shm SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true openshift_use_nfs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true openvpn_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true openvpn_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true openvpn_run_unconfined SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true pcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true pcp_read_generic_logs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true piranha_lvs_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true polipo_connect_all_unreserved SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true polipo_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true polipo_session_users SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true polipo_use_cifs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true polipo_use_nfs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true polyinstantiation_enabled SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true postfix_local_write_mail_spool SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true postgresql_can_rsync SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true postgresql_selinux_transmit_client_label SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true postgresql_selinux_users_ddl SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true pppd_can_insmod SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true pppd_for_user SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true privoxy_connect_any SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true prosody_bind_http_port SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true puppetagent_manage_all_files SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true puppetmaster_use_db SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true racoon_read_shadow SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true rsync_anon_write SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true rsync_client SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true rsync_export_all_ro SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true rsync_full_access SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true samba_create_home_dirs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true samba_domain_controller SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true samba_enable_home_dirs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true samba_export_all_ro SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true samba_export_all_rw SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true samba_load_libgfapi SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true samba_portmapper SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true samba_run_unconfined SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true samba_share_fusefs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true samba_share_nfs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true sanlock_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true sanlock_use_nfs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true sanlock_use_samba SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true saslauthd_read_shadow SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true secadm_exec_content SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true secure_mode SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true secure_mode_insmod SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true secure_mode_policyload SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true selinuxuser_direct_dri_enabled SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true selinuxuser_execheap SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true selinuxuser_execmod SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true selinuxuser_execstack SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true selinuxuser_mysql_connect_enabled SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true selinuxuser_ping SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true selinuxuser_postgresql_connect_enabled SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true selinuxuser_rw_noexattrfile SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true selinuxuser_share_music SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true selinuxuser_tcp_server SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true selinuxuser_udp_server SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true sge_domain_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true sge_use_nfs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true smartmon_3ware SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true smbd_anon_write SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true spamassassin_can_network SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true spamd_enable_home_dirs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true squid_connect_any SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true squid_use_tproxy SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true ssh_keysign SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true ssh_sysadm_login SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true staff_exec_content SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true staff_use_svirt SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true swift_can_network SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true sysadm_exec_content SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true telepathy_connect_all_ports SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true tftp_anon_write SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true tftp_home_dir SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true tmpreaper_use_nfs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true tmpreaper_use_samba SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true tor_bind_all_unreserved_ports SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true tor_can_network_relay SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true unconfined_login SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true unprivuser_use_svirt SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true use_ecryptfs_home_dirs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true use_fusefs_home_dirs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true use_lpd_server SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true use_nfs_home_dirs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true use_samba_home_dirs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true user_exec_content SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true varnishd_connect_any SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true virt_read_qemu_ga_data SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true virt_rw_qemu_ga_data SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true virt_sandbox_use_all_caps SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true virt_sandbox_use_audit SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true virt_sandbox_use_mknod SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true virt_sandbox_use_netlink SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true virt_sandbox_use_sys_admin SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true virt_transition_userdomain SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true virt_use_comm SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true virt_use_execmem SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true virt_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true virt_use_nfs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true virt_use_rawip SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true virt_use_samba SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true virt_use_sanlock SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true virt_use_usb SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true virt_use_xserver SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true webadm_manage_user_files SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true webadm_read_user_files SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true wine_mmap_zero_ignore SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true xdm_bind_vnc_tcp_port SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true xdm_exec_bootloader SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true xdm_sysadm_login SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true xdm_write_home SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true xen_use_nfs SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true xend_run_blktap SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true xend_run_qemu SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true xguest_connect_network SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true xguest_exec_content SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true xguest_mount_media SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true xguest_use_bluetooth SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. true false true xserver_clients_write_xshm SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true xserver_execmem SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true xserver_object_manager SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true zabbix_can_network SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true zarafa_setrlimit SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true zebra_write_config SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true zoneminder_anon_write SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true zoneminder_run_sudo SELinux Boolean default - Default SELinux boolean setting. on - SELinux boolean is enabled. off - SELinux boolean is disabled. false false true Disable the abrt_anon_write SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean abrt_anon_write is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the abrt_anon_write SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P abrt_anon_write off 3.7.2 - name: Disable the abrt_anon_write SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-171-3.7.2 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_abrt_anon_write - name: XCCDF Value var_abrt_anon_write # promote to variable set_fact: var_abrt_anon_write: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the abrt_anon_write SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean abrt_anon_write Accordingly seboolean: name: abrt_anon_write state: '{{ var_abrt_anon_write }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - NIST-800-171-3.7.2 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_abrt_anon_write # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_abrt_anon_write='' setsebool -P abrt_anon_write $var_abrt_anon_write else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the abrt_handle_event SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean abrt_handle_event is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the abrt_handle_event SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P abrt_handle_event off 3.7.2 - name: Disable the abrt_handle_event SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-171-3.7.2 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_abrt_handle_event - name: XCCDF Value var_abrt_handle_event # promote to variable set_fact: var_abrt_handle_event: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the abrt_handle_event SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean abrt_handle_event Accordingly seboolean: name: abrt_handle_event state: '{{ var_abrt_handle_event }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - NIST-800-171-3.7.2 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_abrt_handle_event # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_abrt_handle_event='' setsebool -P abrt_handle_event $var_abrt_handle_event else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the abrt_upload_watch_anon_write SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean abrt_upload_watch_anon_write is enabled. This setting should be disabled as it allows the Automatic Bug Report Tool (ABRT) to modify public files used for public file transfer services. To disable the abrt_upload_watch_anon_write SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P abrt_upload_watch_anon_write off 3.7.2 - name: Disable the abrt_upload_watch_anon_write SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-171-3.7.2 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_abrt_upload_watch_anon_write - name: XCCDF Value var_abrt_upload_watch_anon_write # promote to variable set_fact: var_abrt_upload_watch_anon_write: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the abrt_upload_watch_anon_write SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean abrt_upload_watch_anon_write Accordingly seboolean: name: abrt_upload_watch_anon_write state: '{{ var_abrt_upload_watch_anon_write }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - NIST-800-171-3.7.2 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_abrt_upload_watch_anon_write # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_abrt_upload_watch_anon_write='' setsebool -P abrt_upload_watch_anon_write $var_abrt_upload_watch_anon_write else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the antivirus_can_scan_system SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean antivirus_can_scan_system is disabled. This setting should be enabled as it allows antivirus programs to read non-security files on a system. To enable the antivirus_can_scan_system SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P antivirus_can_scan_system on 3.7.2 - name: Enable the antivirus_can_scan_system SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-171-3.7.2 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_antivirus_can_scan_system - name: XCCDF Value var_antivirus_can_scan_system # promote to variable set_fact: var_antivirus_can_scan_system: !!str tags: - always - name: Enable the antivirus_can_scan_system SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean antivirus_can_scan_system Accordingly seboolean: name: antivirus_can_scan_system state: '{{ var_antivirus_can_scan_system }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - NIST-800-171-3.7.2 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_antivirus_can_scan_system # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_antivirus_can_scan_system='' setsebool -P antivirus_can_scan_system $var_antivirus_can_scan_system else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the antivirus_use_jit SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean antivirus_use_jit is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the antivirus_use_jit SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P antivirus_use_jit off 3.7.2 - name: Disable the antivirus_use_jit SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-171-3.7.2 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_antivirus_use_jit - name: XCCDF Value var_antivirus_use_jit # promote to variable set_fact: var_antivirus_use_jit: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the antivirus_use_jit SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean antivirus_use_jit Accordingly seboolean: name: antivirus_use_jit state: '{{ var_antivirus_use_jit }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - NIST-800-171-3.7.2 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_antivirus_use_jit # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_antivirus_use_jit='' setsebool -P antivirus_use_jit $var_antivirus_use_jit else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the auditadm_exec_content SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean auditadm_exec_content is enabled. If this setting is disabled, it should be enabled. To enable the auditadm_exec_content SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P auditadm_exec_content on 80424-5 0582 0584 05885 0586 0846 0957 CCE-84297-1 - name: Enable the auditadm_exec_content SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84297-1 - NIST-800-171-80424-5 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_auditadm_exec_content - name: XCCDF Value var_auditadm_exec_content # promote to variable set_fact: var_auditadm_exec_content: !!str tags: - always - name: Enable the auditadm_exec_content SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean auditadm_exec_content Accordingly seboolean: name: auditadm_exec_content state: '{{ var_auditadm_exec_content }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - CCE-84297-1 - NIST-800-171-80424-5 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_auditadm_exec_content # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_auditadm_exec_content='' setsebool -P auditadm_exec_content $var_auditadm_exec_content else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap off 3.7.2 0421 0422 0431 0974 1173 1401 1504 1505 1546 1557 1558 1559 1560 1561 CCE-84296-3 - name: Disable the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84296-3 - NIST-800-171-3.7.2 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap - name: XCCDF Value var_authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap # promote to variable set_fact: var_authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap Accordingly seboolean: name: authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap state: '{{ var_authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - CCE-84296-3 - NIST-800-171-3.7.2 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap='' setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap $var_authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the authlogin_radius SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean authlogin_radius is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the authlogin_radius SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P authlogin_radius off 3.7.2 0421 0422 0431 0974 1173 1401 1504 1505 1546 1557 1558 1559 1560 1561 CCE-84294-8 - name: Disable the authlogin_radius SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84294-8 - NIST-800-171-3.7.2 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_authlogin_radius - name: XCCDF Value var_authlogin_radius # promote to variable set_fact: var_authlogin_radius: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the authlogin_radius SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean authlogin_radius Accordingly seboolean: name: authlogin_radius state: '{{ var_authlogin_radius }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - CCE-84294-8 - NIST-800-171-3.7.2 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_authlogin_radius # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_authlogin_radius='' setsebool -P authlogin_radius $var_authlogin_radius else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the authlogin_yubikey SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean authlogin_yubikey is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the authlogin_yubikey SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P authlogin_yubikey off 3.7.2 - name: Disable the authlogin_yubikey SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-171-3.7.2 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_authlogin_yubikey - name: XCCDF Value var_authlogin_yubikey # promote to variable set_fact: var_authlogin_yubikey: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the authlogin_yubikey SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean authlogin_yubikey Accordingly seboolean: name: authlogin_yubikey state: '{{ var_authlogin_yubikey }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - NIST-800-171-3.7.2 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_authlogin_yubikey # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_authlogin_yubikey='' setsebool -P authlogin_yubikey $var_authlogin_yubikey else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the awstats_purge_apache_log_files SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean awstats_purge_apache_log_files is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the awstats_purge_apache_log_files SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P awstats_purge_apache_log_files off 3.7.2 - name: Disable the awstats_purge_apache_log_files SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-171-3.7.2 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_awstats_purge_apache_log_files - name: XCCDF Value var_awstats_purge_apache_log_files # promote to variable set_fact: var_awstats_purge_apache_log_files: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the awstats_purge_apache_log_files SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean awstats_purge_apache_log_files Accordingly seboolean: name: awstats_purge_apache_log_files state: '{{ var_awstats_purge_apache_log_files }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - NIST-800-171-3.7.2 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_awstats_purge_apache_log_files # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_awstats_purge_apache_log_files='' setsebool -P awstats_purge_apache_log_files $var_awstats_purge_apache_log_files else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the boinc_execmem SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean boinc_execmem is enabled. This setting should be disabled. To disable the boinc_execmem SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P boinc_execmem off BP28(R67) 3.7.2 CCE-83304-6 - name: Disable the boinc_execmem SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83304-6 - NIST-800-171-3.7.2 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_boinc_execmem - name: XCCDF Value var_boinc_execmem # promote to variable set_fact: var_boinc_execmem: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the boinc_execmem SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean boinc_execmem Accordingly seboolean: name: boinc_execmem state: '{{ var_boinc_execmem }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - CCE-83304-6 - NIST-800-171-3.7.2 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_boinc_execmem # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_boinc_execmem='' setsebool -P boinc_execmem $var_boinc_execmem else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the cdrecord_read_content SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean cdrecord_read_content is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the cdrecord_read_content SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P cdrecord_read_content off - name: Disable the cdrecord_read_content SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_cdrecord_read_content - name: XCCDF Value var_cdrecord_read_content # promote to variable set_fact: var_cdrecord_read_content: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the cdrecord_read_content SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean cdrecord_read_content Accordingly seboolean: name: cdrecord_read_content state: '{{ var_cdrecord_read_content }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_cdrecord_read_content # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_cdrecord_read_content='' setsebool -P cdrecord_read_content $var_cdrecord_read_content else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the cluster_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean cluster_can_network_connect is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the cluster_can_network_connect SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P cluster_can_network_connect off - name: Disable the cluster_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_cluster_can_network_connect - name: XCCDF Value var_cluster_can_network_connect # promote to variable set_fact: var_cluster_can_network_connect: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the cluster_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean cluster_can_network_connect Accordingly seboolean: name: cluster_can_network_connect state: '{{ var_cluster_can_network_connect }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_cluster_can_network_connect # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_cluster_can_network_connect='' setsebool -P cluster_can_network_connect $var_cluster_can_network_connect else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the cluster_manage_all_files SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean cluster_manage_all_files is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the cluster_manage_all_files SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P cluster_manage_all_files off - name: Disable the cluster_manage_all_files SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_cluster_manage_all_files - name: XCCDF Value var_cluster_manage_all_files # promote to variable set_fact: var_cluster_manage_all_files: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the cluster_manage_all_files SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean cluster_manage_all_files Accordingly seboolean: name: cluster_manage_all_files state: '{{ var_cluster_manage_all_files }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_cluster_manage_all_files # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_cluster_manage_all_files='' setsebool -P cluster_manage_all_files $var_cluster_manage_all_files else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the cluster_use_execmem SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean cluster_use_execmem is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the cluster_use_execmem SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P cluster_use_execmem off BP28(R67) CCE-83305-3 - name: Disable the cluster_use_execmem SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83305-3 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_cluster_use_execmem - name: XCCDF Value var_cluster_use_execmem # promote to variable set_fact: var_cluster_use_execmem: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the cluster_use_execmem SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean cluster_use_execmem Accordingly seboolean: name: cluster_use_execmem state: '{{ var_cluster_use_execmem }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - CCE-83305-3 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_cluster_use_execmem # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_cluster_use_execmem='' setsebool -P cluster_use_execmem $var_cluster_use_execmem else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the cobbler_anon_write SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean cobbler_anon_write is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the cobbler_anon_write SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P cobbler_anon_write off - name: Disable the cobbler_anon_write SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_cobbler_anon_write - name: XCCDF Value var_cobbler_anon_write # promote to variable set_fact: var_cobbler_anon_write: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the cobbler_anon_write SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean cobbler_anon_write Accordingly seboolean: name: cobbler_anon_write state: '{{ var_cobbler_anon_write }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_cobbler_anon_write # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_cobbler_anon_write='' setsebool -P cobbler_anon_write $var_cobbler_anon_write else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the cobbler_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean cobbler_can_network_connect is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the cobbler_can_network_connect SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P cobbler_can_network_connect off - name: Disable the cobbler_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_cobbler_can_network_connect - name: XCCDF Value var_cobbler_can_network_connect # promote to variable set_fact: var_cobbler_can_network_connect: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the cobbler_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean cobbler_can_network_connect Accordingly seboolean: name: cobbler_can_network_connect state: '{{ var_cobbler_can_network_connect }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_cobbler_can_network_connect # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_cobbler_can_network_connect='' setsebool -P cobbler_can_network_connect $var_cobbler_can_network_connect else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the cobbler_use_cifs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean cobbler_use_cifs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the cobbler_use_cifs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P cobbler_use_cifs off - name: Disable the cobbler_use_cifs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_cobbler_use_cifs - name: XCCDF Value var_cobbler_use_cifs # promote to variable set_fact: var_cobbler_use_cifs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the cobbler_use_cifs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean cobbler_use_cifs Accordingly seboolean: name: cobbler_use_cifs state: '{{ var_cobbler_use_cifs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_cobbler_use_cifs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_cobbler_use_cifs='' setsebool -P cobbler_use_cifs $var_cobbler_use_cifs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the cobbler_use_nfs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean cobbler_use_nfs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the cobbler_use_nfs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P cobbler_use_nfs off - name: Disable the cobbler_use_nfs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_cobbler_use_nfs - name: XCCDF Value var_cobbler_use_nfs # promote to variable set_fact: var_cobbler_use_nfs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the cobbler_use_nfs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean cobbler_use_nfs Accordingly seboolean: name: cobbler_use_nfs state: '{{ var_cobbler_use_nfs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_cobbler_use_nfs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_cobbler_use_nfs='' setsebool -P cobbler_use_nfs $var_cobbler_use_nfs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the collectd_tcp_network_connect SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean collectd_tcp_network_connect is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the collectd_tcp_network_connect SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P collectd_tcp_network_connect off - name: Disable the collectd_tcp_network_connect SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_collectd_tcp_network_connect - name: XCCDF Value var_collectd_tcp_network_connect # promote to variable set_fact: var_collectd_tcp_network_connect: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the collectd_tcp_network_connect SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean collectd_tcp_network_connect Accordingly seboolean: name: collectd_tcp_network_connect state: '{{ var_collectd_tcp_network_connect }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_collectd_tcp_network_connect # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_collectd_tcp_network_connect='' setsebool -P collectd_tcp_network_connect $var_collectd_tcp_network_connect else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the condor_tcp_network_connect SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean condor_tcp_network_connect is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the condor_tcp_network_connect SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P condor_tcp_network_connect off - name: Disable the condor_tcp_network_connect SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_condor_tcp_network_connect - name: XCCDF Value var_condor_tcp_network_connect # promote to variable set_fact: var_condor_tcp_network_connect: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the condor_tcp_network_connect SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean condor_tcp_network_connect Accordingly seboolean: name: condor_tcp_network_connect state: '{{ var_condor_tcp_network_connect }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_condor_tcp_network_connect # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_condor_tcp_network_connect='' setsebool -P condor_tcp_network_connect $var_condor_tcp_network_connect else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the conman_can_network SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean conman_can_network is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the conman_can_network SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P conman_can_network off - name: Disable the conman_can_network SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_conman_can_network - name: XCCDF Value var_conman_can_network # promote to variable set_fact: var_conman_can_network: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the conman_can_network SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean conman_can_network Accordingly seboolean: name: conman_can_network state: '{{ var_conman_can_network }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_conman_can_network # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_conman_can_network='' setsebool -P conman_can_network $var_conman_can_network else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the container_connect_any SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean container_connect_any is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the container_connect_any SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P container_connect_any off - name: Disable the container_connect_any SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_container_connect_any - name: XCCDF Value var_container_connect_any # promote to variable set_fact: var_container_connect_any: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the container_connect_any SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean container_connect_any Accordingly seboolean: name: container_connect_any state: '{{ var_container_connect_any }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_container_connect_any # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_container_connect_any='' setsebool -P container_connect_any $var_container_connect_any else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the cron_can_relabel SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean cron_can_relabel is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the cron_can_relabel SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P cron_can_relabel off - name: Disable the cron_can_relabel SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_cron_can_relabel - name: XCCDF Value var_cron_can_relabel # promote to variable set_fact: var_cron_can_relabel: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the cron_can_relabel SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean cron_can_relabel Accordingly seboolean: name: cron_can_relabel state: '{{ var_cron_can_relabel }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_cron_can_relabel # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_cron_can_relabel='' setsebool -P cron_can_relabel $var_cron_can_relabel else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the cron_system_cronjob_use_shares SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean cron_system_cronjob_use_shares is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the cron_system_cronjob_use_shares SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P cron_system_cronjob_use_shares off - name: Disable the cron_system_cronjob_use_shares SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_cron_system_cronjob_use_shares - name: XCCDF Value var_cron_system_cronjob_use_shares # promote to variable set_fact: var_cron_system_cronjob_use_shares: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the cron_system_cronjob_use_shares SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean cron_system_cronjob_use_shares Accordingly seboolean: name: cron_system_cronjob_use_shares state: '{{ var_cron_system_cronjob_use_shares }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_cron_system_cronjob_use_shares # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_cron_system_cronjob_use_shares='' setsebool -P cron_system_cronjob_use_shares $var_cron_system_cronjob_use_shares else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the cron_userdomain_transition SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean cron_userdomain_transition is enabled. This setting should be enabled as end user cron jobs run in their default associated user domain(s) instead of the general cronjob domain. To enable the cron_userdomain_transition SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P cron_userdomain_transition on - name: Enable the cron_userdomain_transition SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_cron_userdomain_transition - name: XCCDF Value var_cron_userdomain_transition # promote to variable set_fact: var_cron_userdomain_transition: !!str tags: - always - name: Enable the cron_userdomain_transition SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean cron_userdomain_transition Accordingly seboolean: name: cron_userdomain_transition state: '{{ var_cron_userdomain_transition }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_cron_userdomain_transition # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_cron_userdomain_transition='' setsebool -P cron_userdomain_transition $var_cron_userdomain_transition else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the cups_execmem SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean cups_execmem is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the cups_execmem SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P cups_execmem off BP28(R67) CCE-83306-1 - name: Disable the cups_execmem SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83306-1 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_cups_execmem - name: XCCDF Value var_cups_execmem # promote to variable set_fact: var_cups_execmem: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the cups_execmem SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean cups_execmem Accordingly seboolean: name: cups_execmem state: '{{ var_cups_execmem }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - CCE-83306-1 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_cups_execmem # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_cups_execmem='' setsebool -P cups_execmem $var_cups_execmem else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the cvs_read_shadow SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean cvs_read_shadow is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the cvs_read_shadow SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P cvs_read_shadow off - name: Disable the cvs_read_shadow SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_cvs_read_shadow - name: XCCDF Value var_cvs_read_shadow # promote to variable set_fact: var_cvs_read_shadow: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the cvs_read_shadow SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean cvs_read_shadow Accordingly seboolean: name: cvs_read_shadow state: '{{ var_cvs_read_shadow }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_cvs_read_shadow # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_cvs_read_shadow='' setsebool -P cvs_read_shadow $var_cvs_read_shadow else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the daemons_dump_core SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean daemons_dump_core is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the daemons_dump_core SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P daemons_dump_core off - name: Disable the daemons_dump_core SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_daemons_dump_core - name: XCCDF Value var_daemons_dump_core # promote to variable set_fact: var_daemons_dump_core: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the daemons_dump_core SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean daemons_dump_core Accordingly seboolean: name: daemons_dump_core state: '{{ var_daemons_dump_core }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_daemons_dump_core # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_daemons_dump_core='' setsebool -P daemons_dump_core $var_daemons_dump_core else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the daemons_enable_cluster_mode SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean daemons_enable_cluster_mode is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the daemons_enable_cluster_mode SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P daemons_enable_cluster_mode off - name: Disable the daemons_enable_cluster_mode SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_daemons_enable_cluster_mode - name: XCCDF Value var_daemons_enable_cluster_mode # promote to variable set_fact: var_daemons_enable_cluster_mode: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the daemons_enable_cluster_mode SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean daemons_enable_cluster_mode Accordingly seboolean: name: daemons_enable_cluster_mode state: '{{ var_daemons_enable_cluster_mode }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_daemons_enable_cluster_mode # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_daemons_enable_cluster_mode='' setsebool -P daemons_enable_cluster_mode $var_daemons_enable_cluster_mode else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the daemons_use_tcp_wrapper SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean daemons_use_tcp_wrapper is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the daemons_use_tcp_wrapper SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P daemons_use_tcp_wrapper off - name: Disable the daemons_use_tcp_wrapper SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_daemons_use_tcp_wrapper - name: XCCDF Value var_daemons_use_tcp_wrapper # promote to variable set_fact: var_daemons_use_tcp_wrapper: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the daemons_use_tcp_wrapper SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean daemons_use_tcp_wrapper Accordingly seboolean: name: daemons_use_tcp_wrapper state: '{{ var_daemons_use_tcp_wrapper }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_daemons_use_tcp_wrapper # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_daemons_use_tcp_wrapper='' setsebool -P daemons_use_tcp_wrapper $var_daemons_use_tcp_wrapper else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the daemons_use_tty SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean daemons_use_tty is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the daemons_use_tty SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P daemons_use_tty off - name: Disable the daemons_use_tty SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_daemons_use_tty - name: XCCDF Value var_daemons_use_tty # promote to variable set_fact: var_daemons_use_tty: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the daemons_use_tty SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean daemons_use_tty Accordingly seboolean: name: daemons_use_tty state: '{{ var_daemons_use_tty }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_daemons_use_tty # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_daemons_use_tty='' setsebool -P daemons_use_tty $var_daemons_use_tty else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the dbadm_exec_content SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean dbadm_exec_content is enabled. If this setting is disabled, it should be enabled. To enable the dbadm_exec_content SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P dbadm_exec_content on - name: Enable the dbadm_exec_content SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_dbadm_exec_content - name: XCCDF Value var_dbadm_exec_content # promote to variable set_fact: var_dbadm_exec_content: !!str tags: - always - name: Enable the dbadm_exec_content SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean dbadm_exec_content Accordingly seboolean: name: dbadm_exec_content state: '{{ var_dbadm_exec_content }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_dbadm_exec_content # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_dbadm_exec_content='' setsebool -P dbadm_exec_content $var_dbadm_exec_content else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the dbadm_manage_user_files SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean dbadm_manage_user_files is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the dbadm_manage_user_files SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P dbadm_manage_user_files off - name: Disable the dbadm_manage_user_files SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_dbadm_manage_user_files - name: XCCDF Value var_dbadm_manage_user_files # promote to variable set_fact: var_dbadm_manage_user_files: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the dbadm_manage_user_files SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean dbadm_manage_user_files Accordingly seboolean: name: dbadm_manage_user_files state: '{{ var_dbadm_manage_user_files }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_dbadm_manage_user_files # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_dbadm_manage_user_files='' setsebool -P dbadm_manage_user_files $var_dbadm_manage_user_files else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the dbadm_read_user_files SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean dbadm_read_user_files is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the dbadm_read_user_files SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P dbadm_read_user_files off - name: Disable the dbadm_read_user_files SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_dbadm_read_user_files - name: XCCDF Value var_dbadm_read_user_files # promote to variable set_fact: var_dbadm_read_user_files: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the dbadm_read_user_files SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean dbadm_read_user_files Accordingly seboolean: name: dbadm_read_user_files state: '{{ var_dbadm_read_user_files }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_dbadm_read_user_files # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_dbadm_read_user_files='' setsebool -P dbadm_read_user_files $var_dbadm_read_user_files else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure the deny_execmem SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean deny_execmem is disabled. This setting should be configured to . To set the deny_execmem SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P deny_execmem This rule doesn't come with a remediation, as enabling this SELinux boolean can cause applications to malfunction, for example Graphical login managers and Firefox. Proper function and stability should be assessed before applying enabling the SELinux boolean in production systems. BP28(R67) Allowing user domain applications to map a memory region as both writable and executable makes them more susceptible to data execution attacks. CCE-83307-9 Disable the deny_ptrace SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean deny_ptrace is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the deny_ptrace SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P deny_ptrace off - name: Disable the deny_ptrace SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_deny_ptrace - name: XCCDF Value var_deny_ptrace # promote to variable set_fact: var_deny_ptrace: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the deny_ptrace SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean deny_ptrace Accordingly seboolean: name: deny_ptrace state: '{{ var_deny_ptrace }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_deny_ptrace # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_deny_ptrace='' setsebool -P deny_ptrace $var_deny_ptrace else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the dhcpc_exec_iptables SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean dhcpc_exec_iptables is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the dhcpc_exec_iptables SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P dhcpc_exec_iptables off - name: Disable the dhcpc_exec_iptables SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_dhcpc_exec_iptables - name: XCCDF Value var_dhcpc_exec_iptables # promote to variable set_fact: var_dhcpc_exec_iptables: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the dhcpc_exec_iptables SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean dhcpc_exec_iptables Accordingly seboolean: name: dhcpc_exec_iptables state: '{{ var_dhcpc_exec_iptables }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_dhcpc_exec_iptables # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_dhcpc_exec_iptables='' setsebool -P dhcpc_exec_iptables $var_dhcpc_exec_iptables else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the dhcpd_use_ldap SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean dhcpd_use_ldap is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the dhcpd_use_ldap SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P dhcpd_use_ldap off - name: Disable the dhcpd_use_ldap SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_dhcpd_use_ldap - name: XCCDF Value var_dhcpd_use_ldap # promote to variable set_fact: var_dhcpd_use_ldap: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the dhcpd_use_ldap SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean dhcpd_use_ldap Accordingly seboolean: name: dhcpd_use_ldap state: '{{ var_dhcpd_use_ldap }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_dhcpd_use_ldap # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_dhcpd_use_ldap='' setsebool -P dhcpd_use_ldap $var_dhcpd_use_ldap else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the domain_fd_use SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean domain_fd_use is enabled. If this setting is disabled, it should be enabled. To enable the domain_fd_use SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P domain_fd_use on - name: Enable the domain_fd_use SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_domain_fd_use - name: XCCDF Value var_domain_fd_use # promote to variable set_fact: var_domain_fd_use: !!str tags: - always - name: Enable the domain_fd_use SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean domain_fd_use Accordingly seboolean: name: domain_fd_use state: '{{ var_domain_fd_use }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_domain_fd_use # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_domain_fd_use='' setsebool -P domain_fd_use $var_domain_fd_use else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the domain_kernel_load_modules SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean domain_kernel_load_modules is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the domain_kernel_load_modules SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P domain_kernel_load_modules off - name: Disable the domain_kernel_load_modules SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_domain_kernel_load_modules - name: XCCDF Value var_domain_kernel_load_modules # promote to variable set_fact: var_domain_kernel_load_modules: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the domain_kernel_load_modules SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean domain_kernel_load_modules Accordingly seboolean: name: domain_kernel_load_modules state: '{{ var_domain_kernel_load_modules }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_domain_kernel_load_modules # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_domain_kernel_load_modules='' setsebool -P domain_kernel_load_modules $var_domain_kernel_load_modules else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the entropyd_use_audio SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean entropyd_use_audio is enabled. This setting should be disabled as it uses audit input to generate entropy. To disable the entropyd_use_audio SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P entropyd_use_audio off - name: Disable the entropyd_use_audio SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_entropyd_use_audio - name: XCCDF Value var_entropyd_use_audio # promote to variable set_fact: var_entropyd_use_audio: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the entropyd_use_audio SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean entropyd_use_audio Accordingly seboolean: name: entropyd_use_audio state: '{{ var_entropyd_use_audio }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_entropyd_use_audio # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_entropyd_use_audio='' setsebool -P entropyd_use_audio $var_entropyd_use_audio else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the exim_can_connect_db SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean exim_can_connect_db is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the exim_can_connect_db SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P exim_can_connect_db off - name: Disable the exim_can_connect_db SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_exim_can_connect_db - name: XCCDF Value var_exim_can_connect_db # promote to variable set_fact: var_exim_can_connect_db: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the exim_can_connect_db SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean exim_can_connect_db Accordingly seboolean: name: exim_can_connect_db state: '{{ var_exim_can_connect_db }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_exim_can_connect_db # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_exim_can_connect_db='' setsebool -P exim_can_connect_db $var_exim_can_connect_db else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the exim_manage_user_files SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean exim_manage_user_files is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the exim_manage_user_files SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P exim_manage_user_files off - name: Disable the exim_manage_user_files SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_exim_manage_user_files - name: XCCDF Value var_exim_manage_user_files # promote to variable set_fact: var_exim_manage_user_files: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the exim_manage_user_files SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean exim_manage_user_files Accordingly seboolean: name: exim_manage_user_files state: '{{ var_exim_manage_user_files }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_exim_manage_user_files # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_exim_manage_user_files='' setsebool -P exim_manage_user_files $var_exim_manage_user_files else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the exim_read_user_files SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean exim_read_user_files is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the exim_read_user_files SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P exim_read_user_files off - name: Disable the exim_read_user_files SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_exim_read_user_files - name: XCCDF Value var_exim_read_user_files # promote to variable set_fact: var_exim_read_user_files: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the exim_read_user_files SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean exim_read_user_files Accordingly seboolean: name: exim_read_user_files state: '{{ var_exim_read_user_files }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_exim_read_user_files # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_exim_read_user_files='' setsebool -P exim_read_user_files $var_exim_read_user_files else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the fcron_crond SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean fcron_crond is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the fcron_crond SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P fcron_crond off - name: Disable the fcron_crond SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_fcron_crond - name: XCCDF Value var_fcron_crond # promote to variable set_fact: var_fcron_crond: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the fcron_crond SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean fcron_crond Accordingly seboolean: name: fcron_crond state: '{{ var_fcron_crond }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_fcron_crond # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_fcron_crond='' setsebool -P fcron_crond $var_fcron_crond else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the fenced_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean fenced_can_network_connect is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the fenced_can_network_connect SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P fenced_can_network_connect off - name: Disable the fenced_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_fenced_can_network_connect - name: XCCDF Value var_fenced_can_network_connect # promote to variable set_fact: var_fenced_can_network_connect: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the fenced_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean fenced_can_network_connect Accordingly seboolean: name: fenced_can_network_connect state: '{{ var_fenced_can_network_connect }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_fenced_can_network_connect # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_fenced_can_network_connect='' setsebool -P fenced_can_network_connect $var_fenced_can_network_connect else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the fenced_can_ssh SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean fenced_can_ssh is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the fenced_can_ssh SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P fenced_can_ssh off - name: Disable the fenced_can_ssh SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_fenced_can_ssh - name: XCCDF Value var_fenced_can_ssh # promote to variable set_fact: var_fenced_can_ssh: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the fenced_can_ssh SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean fenced_can_ssh Accordingly seboolean: name: fenced_can_ssh state: '{{ var_fenced_can_ssh }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_fenced_can_ssh # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_fenced_can_ssh='' setsebool -P fenced_can_ssh $var_fenced_can_ssh else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the fips_mode SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean fips_mode is enabled. This allows all SELinux domains to execute in fips_mode. If this setting is disabled, it should be enabled. To enable the fips_mode SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P fips_mode on 13 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 3.13.11 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 SC-12(2) SC-12(3) IA-7 SC-13 CM-6(a) SC-12 PR.DS-5 - name: Enable the fips_mode SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-171-3.13.11 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-7 - NIST-800-53-SC-12 - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2) - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) - NIST-800-53-SC-13 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_fips_mode - name: XCCDF Value var_fips_mode # promote to variable set_fact: var_fips_mode: !!str tags: - always - name: Enable the fips_mode SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean fips_mode Accordingly seboolean: name: fips_mode state: '{{ var_fips_mode }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - NIST-800-171-3.13.11 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-7 - NIST-800-53-SC-12 - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2) - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) - NIST-800-53-SC-13 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_fips_mode # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_fips_mode='' setsebool -P fips_mode $var_fips_mode else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the ftpd_anon_write SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean ftpd_anon_write is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the ftpd_anon_write SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P ftpd_anon_write off - name: Disable the ftpd_anon_write SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_ftpd_anon_write - name: XCCDF Value var_ftpd_anon_write # promote to variable set_fact: var_ftpd_anon_write: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the ftpd_anon_write SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean ftpd_anon_write Accordingly seboolean: name: ftpd_anon_write state: '{{ var_ftpd_anon_write }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_ftpd_anon_write # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_ftpd_anon_write='' setsebool -P ftpd_anon_write $var_ftpd_anon_write else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the ftpd_connect_all_unreserved SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean ftpd_connect_all_unreserved is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the ftpd_connect_all_unreserved SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P ftpd_connect_all_unreserved off - name: Disable the ftpd_connect_all_unreserved SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_ftpd_connect_all_unreserved - name: XCCDF Value var_ftpd_connect_all_unreserved # promote to variable set_fact: var_ftpd_connect_all_unreserved: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the ftpd_connect_all_unreserved SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean ftpd_connect_all_unreserved Accordingly seboolean: name: ftpd_connect_all_unreserved state: '{{ var_ftpd_connect_all_unreserved }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_ftpd_connect_all_unreserved # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_ftpd_connect_all_unreserved='' setsebool -P ftpd_connect_all_unreserved $var_ftpd_connect_all_unreserved else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the ftpd_connect_db SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean ftpd_connect_db is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the ftpd_connect_db SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P ftpd_connect_db off - name: Disable the ftpd_connect_db SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_ftpd_connect_db - name: XCCDF Value var_ftpd_connect_db # promote to variable set_fact: var_ftpd_connect_db: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the ftpd_connect_db SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean ftpd_connect_db Accordingly seboolean: name: ftpd_connect_db state: '{{ var_ftpd_connect_db }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_ftpd_connect_db # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_ftpd_connect_db='' setsebool -P ftpd_connect_db $var_ftpd_connect_db else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the ftpd_full_access SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean ftpd_full_access is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the ftpd_full_access SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P ftpd_full_access off - name: Disable the ftpd_full_access SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_ftpd_full_access - name: XCCDF Value var_ftpd_full_access # promote to variable set_fact: var_ftpd_full_access: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the ftpd_full_access SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean ftpd_full_access Accordingly seboolean: name: ftpd_full_access state: '{{ var_ftpd_full_access }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_ftpd_full_access # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_ftpd_full_access='' setsebool -P ftpd_full_access $var_ftpd_full_access else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the ftpd_use_cifs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean ftpd_use_cifs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the ftpd_use_cifs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P ftpd_use_cifs off - name: Disable the ftpd_use_cifs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_ftpd_use_cifs - name: XCCDF Value var_ftpd_use_cifs # promote to variable set_fact: var_ftpd_use_cifs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the ftpd_use_cifs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean ftpd_use_cifs Accordingly seboolean: name: ftpd_use_cifs state: '{{ var_ftpd_use_cifs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_ftpd_use_cifs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_ftpd_use_cifs='' setsebool -P ftpd_use_cifs $var_ftpd_use_cifs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the ftpd_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean ftpd_use_fusefs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the ftpd_use_fusefs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P ftpd_use_fusefs off - name: Disable the ftpd_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_ftpd_use_fusefs - name: XCCDF Value var_ftpd_use_fusefs # promote to variable set_fact: var_ftpd_use_fusefs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the ftpd_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean ftpd_use_fusefs Accordingly seboolean: name: ftpd_use_fusefs state: '{{ var_ftpd_use_fusefs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_ftpd_use_fusefs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_ftpd_use_fusefs='' setsebool -P ftpd_use_fusefs $var_ftpd_use_fusefs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the ftpd_use_nfs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean ftpd_use_nfs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the ftpd_use_nfs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P ftpd_use_nfs off - name: Disable the ftpd_use_nfs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_ftpd_use_nfs - name: XCCDF Value var_ftpd_use_nfs # promote to variable set_fact: var_ftpd_use_nfs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the ftpd_use_nfs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean ftpd_use_nfs Accordingly seboolean: name: ftpd_use_nfs state: '{{ var_ftpd_use_nfs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_ftpd_use_nfs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_ftpd_use_nfs='' setsebool -P ftpd_use_nfs $var_ftpd_use_nfs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the ftpd_use_passive_mode SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean ftpd_use_passive_mode is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the ftpd_use_passive_mode SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P ftpd_use_passive_mode off - name: Disable the ftpd_use_passive_mode SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_ftpd_use_passive_mode - name: XCCDF Value var_ftpd_use_passive_mode # promote to variable set_fact: var_ftpd_use_passive_mode: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the ftpd_use_passive_mode SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean ftpd_use_passive_mode Accordingly seboolean: name: ftpd_use_passive_mode state: '{{ var_ftpd_use_passive_mode }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_ftpd_use_passive_mode # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_ftpd_use_passive_mode='' setsebool -P ftpd_use_passive_mode $var_ftpd_use_passive_mode else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the git_cgi_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean git_cgi_enable_homedirs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the git_cgi_enable_homedirs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P git_cgi_enable_homedirs off - name: Disable the git_cgi_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_git_cgi_enable_homedirs - name: XCCDF Value var_git_cgi_enable_homedirs # promote to variable set_fact: var_git_cgi_enable_homedirs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the git_cgi_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean git_cgi_enable_homedirs Accordingly seboolean: name: git_cgi_enable_homedirs state: '{{ var_git_cgi_enable_homedirs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_git_cgi_enable_homedirs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_git_cgi_enable_homedirs='' setsebool -P git_cgi_enable_homedirs $var_git_cgi_enable_homedirs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the git_cgi_use_cifs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean git_cgi_use_cifs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the git_cgi_use_cifs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P git_cgi_use_cifs off - name: Disable the git_cgi_use_cifs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_git_cgi_use_cifs - name: XCCDF Value var_git_cgi_use_cifs # promote to variable set_fact: var_git_cgi_use_cifs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the git_cgi_use_cifs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean git_cgi_use_cifs Accordingly seboolean: name: git_cgi_use_cifs state: '{{ var_git_cgi_use_cifs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_git_cgi_use_cifs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_git_cgi_use_cifs='' setsebool -P git_cgi_use_cifs $var_git_cgi_use_cifs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the git_cgi_use_nfs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean git_cgi_use_nfs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the git_cgi_use_nfs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P git_cgi_use_nfs off - name: Disable the git_cgi_use_nfs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_git_cgi_use_nfs - name: XCCDF Value var_git_cgi_use_nfs # promote to variable set_fact: var_git_cgi_use_nfs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the git_cgi_use_nfs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean git_cgi_use_nfs Accordingly seboolean: name: git_cgi_use_nfs state: '{{ var_git_cgi_use_nfs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_git_cgi_use_nfs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_git_cgi_use_nfs='' setsebool -P git_cgi_use_nfs $var_git_cgi_use_nfs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the git_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean git_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the git_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P git_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports off - name: Disable the git_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_git_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports - name: XCCDF Value var_git_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports # promote to variable set_fact: var_git_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the git_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean git_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports Accordingly seboolean: name: git_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports state: '{{ var_git_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_git_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_git_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports='' setsebool -P git_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports $var_git_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the git_session_users SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean git_session_users is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the git_session_users SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P git_session_users off - name: Disable the git_session_users SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_git_session_users - name: XCCDF Value var_git_session_users # promote to variable set_fact: var_git_session_users: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the git_session_users SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean git_session_users Accordingly seboolean: name: git_session_users state: '{{ var_git_session_users }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_git_session_users # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_git_session_users='' setsebool -P git_session_users $var_git_session_users else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the git_system_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean git_system_enable_homedirs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the git_system_enable_homedirs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P git_system_enable_homedirs off - name: Disable the git_system_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_git_system_enable_homedirs - name: XCCDF Value var_git_system_enable_homedirs # promote to variable set_fact: var_git_system_enable_homedirs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the git_system_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean git_system_enable_homedirs Accordingly seboolean: name: git_system_enable_homedirs state: '{{ var_git_system_enable_homedirs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_git_system_enable_homedirs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_git_system_enable_homedirs='' setsebool -P git_system_enable_homedirs $var_git_system_enable_homedirs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the git_system_use_cifs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean git_system_use_cifs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the git_system_use_cifs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P git_system_use_cifs off - name: Disable the git_system_use_cifs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_git_system_use_cifs - name: XCCDF Value var_git_system_use_cifs # promote to variable set_fact: var_git_system_use_cifs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the git_system_use_cifs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean git_system_use_cifs Accordingly seboolean: name: git_system_use_cifs state: '{{ var_git_system_use_cifs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_git_system_use_cifs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_git_system_use_cifs='' setsebool -P git_system_use_cifs $var_git_system_use_cifs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the git_system_use_nfs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean git_system_use_nfs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the git_system_use_nfs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P git_system_use_nfs off - name: Disable the git_system_use_nfs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_git_system_use_nfs - name: XCCDF Value var_git_system_use_nfs # promote to variable set_fact: var_git_system_use_nfs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the git_system_use_nfs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean git_system_use_nfs Accordingly seboolean: name: git_system_use_nfs state: '{{ var_git_system_use_nfs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_git_system_use_nfs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_git_system_use_nfs='' setsebool -P git_system_use_nfs $var_git_system_use_nfs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the gitosis_can_sendmail SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean gitosis_can_sendmail is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the gitosis_can_sendmail SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P gitosis_can_sendmail off - name: Disable the gitosis_can_sendmail SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_gitosis_can_sendmail - name: XCCDF Value var_gitosis_can_sendmail # promote to variable set_fact: var_gitosis_can_sendmail: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the gitosis_can_sendmail SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean gitosis_can_sendmail Accordingly seboolean: name: gitosis_can_sendmail state: '{{ var_gitosis_can_sendmail }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_gitosis_can_sendmail # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_gitosis_can_sendmail='' setsebool -P gitosis_can_sendmail $var_gitosis_can_sendmail else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the glance_api_can_network SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean glance_api_can_network is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the glance_api_can_network SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P glance_api_can_network off - name: Disable the glance_api_can_network SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_glance_api_can_network - name: XCCDF Value var_glance_api_can_network # promote to variable set_fact: var_glance_api_can_network: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the glance_api_can_network SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean glance_api_can_network Accordingly seboolean: name: glance_api_can_network state: '{{ var_glance_api_can_network }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_glance_api_can_network # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_glance_api_can_network='' setsebool -P glance_api_can_network $var_glance_api_can_network else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the glance_use_execmem SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean glance_use_execmem is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the glance_use_execmem SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P glance_use_execmem off BP28(R67) CCE-83308-7 - name: Disable the glance_use_execmem SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83308-7 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_glance_use_execmem - name: XCCDF Value var_glance_use_execmem # promote to variable set_fact: var_glance_use_execmem: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the glance_use_execmem SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean glance_use_execmem Accordingly seboolean: name: glance_use_execmem state: '{{ var_glance_use_execmem }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - CCE-83308-7 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_glance_use_execmem # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_glance_use_execmem='' setsebool -P glance_use_execmem $var_glance_use_execmem else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the glance_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean glance_use_fusefs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the glance_use_fusefs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P glance_use_fusefs off - name: Disable the glance_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_glance_use_fusefs - name: XCCDF Value var_glance_use_fusefs # promote to variable set_fact: var_glance_use_fusefs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the glance_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean glance_use_fusefs Accordingly seboolean: name: glance_use_fusefs state: '{{ var_glance_use_fusefs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_glance_use_fusefs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_glance_use_fusefs='' setsebool -P glance_use_fusefs $var_glance_use_fusefs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the global_ssp SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean global_ssp is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the global_ssp SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P global_ssp off - name: Disable the global_ssp SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_global_ssp - name: XCCDF Value var_global_ssp # promote to variable set_fact: var_global_ssp: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the global_ssp SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean global_ssp Accordingly seboolean: name: global_ssp state: '{{ var_global_ssp }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_global_ssp # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_global_ssp='' setsebool -P global_ssp $var_global_ssp else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the gluster_anon_write SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean gluster_anon_write is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the gluster_anon_write SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P gluster_anon_write off - name: Disable the gluster_anon_write SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_gluster_anon_write - name: XCCDF Value var_gluster_anon_write # promote to variable set_fact: var_gluster_anon_write: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the gluster_anon_write SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean gluster_anon_write Accordingly seboolean: name: gluster_anon_write state: '{{ var_gluster_anon_write }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_gluster_anon_write # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_gluster_anon_write='' setsebool -P gluster_anon_write $var_gluster_anon_write else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the gluster_export_all_ro SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean gluster_export_all_ro is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the gluster_export_all_ro SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P gluster_export_all_ro off - name: Disable the gluster_export_all_ro SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_gluster_export_all_ro - name: XCCDF Value var_gluster_export_all_ro # promote to variable set_fact: var_gluster_export_all_ro: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the gluster_export_all_ro SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean gluster_export_all_ro Accordingly seboolean: name: gluster_export_all_ro state: '{{ var_gluster_export_all_ro }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_gluster_export_all_ro # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_gluster_export_all_ro='' setsebool -P gluster_export_all_ro $var_gluster_export_all_ro else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure the gluster_export_all_rw SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean gluster_export_all_rw is enabled. If GlusterFS is in use, this setting should be enabled. Otherwise, disable it. To disable the gluster_export_all_rw SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P gluster_export_all_rw off - name: Configure the gluster_export_all_rw SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_gluster_export_all_rw - name: XCCDF Value var_gluster_export_all_rw # promote to variable set_fact: var_gluster_export_all_rw: !!str tags: - always - name: Configure the gluster_export_all_rw SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean gluster_export_all_rw Accordingly seboolean: name: gluster_export_all_rw state: '{{ var_gluster_export_all_rw }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_gluster_export_all_rw # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_gluster_export_all_rw='' setsebool -P gluster_export_all_rw $var_gluster_export_all_rw else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the gpg_web_anon_write SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean gpg_web_anon_write is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the gpg_web_anon_write SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P gpg_web_anon_write off - name: Disable the gpg_web_anon_write SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_gpg_web_anon_write - name: XCCDF Value var_gpg_web_anon_write # promote to variable set_fact: var_gpg_web_anon_write: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the gpg_web_anon_write SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean gpg_web_anon_write Accordingly seboolean: name: gpg_web_anon_write state: '{{ var_gpg_web_anon_write }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_gpg_web_anon_write # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_gpg_web_anon_write='' setsebool -P gpg_web_anon_write $var_gpg_web_anon_write else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the gssd_read_tmp SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean gssd_read_tmp is enabled. This setting allows gssd processes to access Kerberos to read TGTs in the temp directory. If this setting is disabled, it should be enabled. To enable the gssd_read_tmp SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P gssd_read_tmp on - name: Enable the gssd_read_tmp SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_gssd_read_tmp - name: XCCDF Value var_gssd_read_tmp # promote to variable set_fact: var_gssd_read_tmp: !!str tags: - always - name: Enable the gssd_read_tmp SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean gssd_read_tmp Accordingly seboolean: name: gssd_read_tmp state: '{{ var_gssd_read_tmp }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_gssd_read_tmp # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_gssd_read_tmp='' setsebool -P gssd_read_tmp $var_gssd_read_tmp else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the guest_exec_content SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean guest_exec_content is enabled. This setting should be disabled as no guest accounts should be used. To disable the guest_exec_content SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P guest_exec_content off - name: Disable the guest_exec_content SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_guest_exec_content - name: XCCDF Value var_guest_exec_content # promote to variable set_fact: var_guest_exec_content: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the guest_exec_content SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean guest_exec_content Accordingly seboolean: name: guest_exec_content state: '{{ var_guest_exec_content }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_guest_exec_content # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_guest_exec_content='' setsebool -P guest_exec_content $var_guest_exec_content else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the haproxy_connect_any SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean haproxy_connect_any is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the haproxy_connect_any SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P haproxy_connect_any off - name: Disable the haproxy_connect_any SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_haproxy_connect_any - name: XCCDF Value var_haproxy_connect_any # promote to variable set_fact: var_haproxy_connect_any: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the haproxy_connect_any SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean haproxy_connect_any Accordingly seboolean: name: haproxy_connect_any state: '{{ var_haproxy_connect_any }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_haproxy_connect_any # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_haproxy_connect_any='' setsebool -P haproxy_connect_any $var_haproxy_connect_any else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the httpd_anon_write SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_anon_write is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the httpd_anon_write SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_anon_write off - name: Disable the httpd_anon_write SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_anon_write - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_anon_write # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_anon_write: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the httpd_anon_write SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_anon_write Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_anon_write state: '{{ var_httpd_anon_write }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_anon_write # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_anon_write='' setsebool -P httpd_anon_write $var_httpd_anon_write else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure the httpd_builtin_scripting SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_builtin_scripting is enabled. This setting should be disabled if httpd is not running php or some similary scripting language. To disable the httpd_builtin_scripting SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_builtin_scripting off - name: Configure the httpd_builtin_scripting SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_builtin_scripting - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_builtin_scripting # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_builtin_scripting: !!str tags: - always - name: Configure the httpd_builtin_scripting SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_builtin_scripting Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_builtin_scripting state: '{{ var_httpd_builtin_scripting }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_builtin_scripting # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_builtin_scripting='' setsebool -P httpd_builtin_scripting $var_httpd_builtin_scripting else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the httpd_can_check_spam SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_can_check_spam is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the httpd_can_check_spam SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_can_check_spam off - name: Disable the httpd_can_check_spam SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_can_check_spam - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_can_check_spam # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_can_check_spam: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the httpd_can_check_spam SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_can_check_spam Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_can_check_spam state: '{{ var_httpd_can_check_spam }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_can_check_spam # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_can_check_spam='' setsebool -P httpd_can_check_spam $var_httpd_can_check_spam else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the httpd_can_connect_ftp SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_can_connect_ftp is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the httpd_can_connect_ftp SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_can_connect_ftp off - name: Disable the httpd_can_connect_ftp SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_can_connect_ftp - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_can_connect_ftp # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_can_connect_ftp: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the httpd_can_connect_ftp SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_can_connect_ftp Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_can_connect_ftp state: '{{ var_httpd_can_connect_ftp }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_can_connect_ftp # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_can_connect_ftp='' setsebool -P httpd_can_connect_ftp $var_httpd_can_connect_ftp else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the httpd_can_connect_ldap SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_can_connect_ldap is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the httpd_can_connect_ldap SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_can_connect_ldap off - name: Disable the httpd_can_connect_ldap SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_can_connect_ldap - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_can_connect_ldap # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_can_connect_ldap: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the httpd_can_connect_ldap SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_can_connect_ldap Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_can_connect_ldap state: '{{ var_httpd_can_connect_ldap }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_can_connect_ldap # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_can_connect_ldap='' setsebool -P httpd_can_connect_ldap $var_httpd_can_connect_ldap else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the httpd_can_connect_mythtv SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_can_connect_mythtv is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the httpd_can_connect_mythtv SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_can_connect_mythtv off - name: Disable the httpd_can_connect_mythtv SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_can_connect_mythtv - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_can_connect_mythtv # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_can_connect_mythtv: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the httpd_can_connect_mythtv SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_can_connect_mythtv Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_can_connect_mythtv state: '{{ var_httpd_can_connect_mythtv }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_can_connect_mythtv # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_can_connect_mythtv='' setsebool -P httpd_can_connect_mythtv $var_httpd_can_connect_mythtv else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the httpd_can_connect_zabbix SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_can_connect_zabbix is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the httpd_can_connect_zabbix SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_can_connect_zabbix off - name: Disable the httpd_can_connect_zabbix SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_can_connect_zabbix - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_can_connect_zabbix # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_can_connect_zabbix: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the httpd_can_connect_zabbix SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_can_connect_zabbix Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_can_connect_zabbix state: '{{ var_httpd_can_connect_zabbix }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_can_connect_zabbix # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_can_connect_zabbix='' setsebool -P httpd_can_connect_zabbix $var_httpd_can_connect_zabbix else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the httpd_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_can_network_connect is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the httpd_can_network_connect SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_can_network_connect off - name: Disable the httpd_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_can_network_connect - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_can_network_connect # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_can_network_connect: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the httpd_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_can_network_connect Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_can_network_connect state: '{{ var_httpd_can_network_connect }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_can_network_connect # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_can_network_connect='' setsebool -P httpd_can_network_connect $var_httpd_can_network_connect else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler off - name: Disable the httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler state: '{{ var_httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler='' setsebool -P httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler $var_httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the httpd_can_network_connect_db SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_can_network_connect_db is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the httpd_can_network_connect_db SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_can_network_connect_db off - name: Disable the httpd_can_network_connect_db SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_can_network_connect_db - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_can_network_connect_db # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_can_network_connect_db: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the httpd_can_network_connect_db SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_can_network_connect_db Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_can_network_connect_db state: '{{ var_httpd_can_network_connect_db }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_can_network_connect_db # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_can_network_connect_db='' setsebool -P httpd_can_network_connect_db $var_httpd_can_network_connect_db else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the httpd_can_network_memcache SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_can_network_memcache is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the httpd_can_network_memcache SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_can_network_memcache off - name: Disable the httpd_can_network_memcache SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_can_network_memcache - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_can_network_memcache # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_can_network_memcache: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the httpd_can_network_memcache SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_can_network_memcache Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_can_network_memcache state: '{{ var_httpd_can_network_memcache }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_can_network_memcache # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_can_network_memcache='' setsebool -P httpd_can_network_memcache $var_httpd_can_network_memcache else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the httpd_can_network_relay SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_can_network_relay is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the httpd_can_network_relay SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_can_network_relay off - name: Disable the httpd_can_network_relay SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_can_network_relay - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_can_network_relay # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_can_network_relay: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the httpd_can_network_relay SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_can_network_relay Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_can_network_relay state: '{{ var_httpd_can_network_relay }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_can_network_relay # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_can_network_relay='' setsebool -P httpd_can_network_relay $var_httpd_can_network_relay else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the httpd_can_sendmail SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_can_sendmail is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the httpd_can_sendmail SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_can_sendmail off - name: Disable the httpd_can_sendmail SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_can_sendmail - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_can_sendmail # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_can_sendmail: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the httpd_can_sendmail SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_can_sendmail Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_can_sendmail state: '{{ var_httpd_can_sendmail }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_can_sendmail # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_can_sendmail='' setsebool -P httpd_can_sendmail $var_httpd_can_sendmail else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the httpd_dbus_avahi SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_dbus_avahi is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the httpd_dbus_avahi SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_dbus_avahi off - name: Disable the httpd_dbus_avahi SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_dbus_avahi - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_dbus_avahi # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_dbus_avahi: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the httpd_dbus_avahi SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_dbus_avahi Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_dbus_avahi state: '{{ var_httpd_dbus_avahi }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_dbus_avahi # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_dbus_avahi='' setsebool -P httpd_dbus_avahi $var_httpd_dbus_avahi else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the httpd_dbus_sssd SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_dbus_sssd is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the httpd_dbus_sssd SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_dbus_sssd off - name: Disable the httpd_dbus_sssd SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_dbus_sssd - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_dbus_sssd # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_dbus_sssd: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the httpd_dbus_sssd SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_dbus_sssd Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_dbus_sssd state: '{{ var_httpd_dbus_sssd }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_dbus_sssd # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_dbus_sssd='' setsebool -P httpd_dbus_sssd $var_httpd_dbus_sssd else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the httpd_dontaudit_search_dirs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_dontaudit_search_dirs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the httpd_dontaudit_search_dirs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_dontaudit_search_dirs off - name: Disable the httpd_dontaudit_search_dirs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_dontaudit_search_dirs - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_dontaudit_search_dirs # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_dontaudit_search_dirs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the httpd_dontaudit_search_dirs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_dontaudit_search_dirs Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_dontaudit_search_dirs state: '{{ var_httpd_dontaudit_search_dirs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_dontaudit_search_dirs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_dontaudit_search_dirs='' setsebool -P httpd_dontaudit_search_dirs $var_httpd_dontaudit_search_dirs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure the httpd_enable_cgi SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_enable_cgi is enabled. This setting should be disabled unless httpd is used with CGI scripting. To disable the httpd_enable_cgi SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_enable_cgi off - name: Configure the httpd_enable_cgi SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_enable_cgi - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_enable_cgi # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_enable_cgi: !!str tags: - always - name: Configure the httpd_enable_cgi SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_enable_cgi Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_enable_cgi state: '{{ var_httpd_enable_cgi }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_enable_cgi # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_enable_cgi='' setsebool -P httpd_enable_cgi $var_httpd_enable_cgi else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the httpd_enable_ftp_server SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_enable_ftp_server is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the httpd_enable_ftp_server SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_enable_ftp_server off - name: Disable the httpd_enable_ftp_server SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_enable_ftp_server - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_enable_ftp_server # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_enable_ftp_server: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the httpd_enable_ftp_server SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_enable_ftp_server Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_enable_ftp_server state: '{{ var_httpd_enable_ftp_server }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_enable_ftp_server # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_enable_ftp_server='' setsebool -P httpd_enable_ftp_server $var_httpd_enable_ftp_server else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the httpd_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_enable_homedirs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the httpd_enable_homedirs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_enable_homedirs off - name: Disable the httpd_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_enable_homedirs - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_enable_homedirs # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_enable_homedirs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the httpd_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_enable_homedirs Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_enable_homedirs state: '{{ var_httpd_enable_homedirs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_enable_homedirs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_enable_homedirs='' setsebool -P httpd_enable_homedirs $var_httpd_enable_homedirs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the httpd_execmem SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_execmem is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the httpd_execmem SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_execmem off BP28(R67) CCE-83309-5 - name: Disable the httpd_execmem SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83309-5 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_execmem - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_execmem # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_execmem: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the httpd_execmem SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_execmem Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_execmem state: '{{ var_httpd_execmem }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - CCE-83309-5 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_execmem # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_execmem='' setsebool -P httpd_execmem $var_httpd_execmem else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the httpd_graceful_shutdown SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_graceful_shutdown is enabled. If this setting is disabled, it should be enabled. To enable the httpd_graceful_shutdown SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_graceful_shutdown on - name: Enable the httpd_graceful_shutdown SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_graceful_shutdown - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_graceful_shutdown # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_graceful_shutdown: !!str tags: - always - name: Enable the httpd_graceful_shutdown SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_graceful_shutdown Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_graceful_shutdown state: '{{ var_httpd_graceful_shutdown }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_graceful_shutdown # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_graceful_shutdown='' setsebool -P httpd_graceful_shutdown $var_httpd_graceful_shutdown else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the httpd_manage_ipa SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_manage_ipa is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the httpd_manage_ipa SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_manage_ipa off - name: Disable the httpd_manage_ipa SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_manage_ipa - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_manage_ipa # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_manage_ipa: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the httpd_manage_ipa SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_manage_ipa Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_manage_ipa state: '{{ var_httpd_manage_ipa }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_manage_ipa # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_manage_ipa='' setsebool -P httpd_manage_ipa $var_httpd_manage_ipa else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind off - name: Disable the httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind state: '{{ var_httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind='' setsebool -P httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind $var_httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the httpd_mod_auth_pam SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_mod_auth_pam is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the httpd_mod_auth_pam SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_mod_auth_pam off - name: Disable the httpd_mod_auth_pam SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_mod_auth_pam - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_mod_auth_pam # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_mod_auth_pam: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the httpd_mod_auth_pam SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_mod_auth_pam Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_mod_auth_pam state: '{{ var_httpd_mod_auth_pam }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_mod_auth_pam # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_mod_auth_pam='' setsebool -P httpd_mod_auth_pam $var_httpd_mod_auth_pam else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the httpd_read_user_content SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_read_user_content is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the httpd_read_user_content SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_read_user_content off - name: Disable the httpd_read_user_content SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_read_user_content - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_read_user_content # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_read_user_content: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the httpd_read_user_content SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_read_user_content Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_read_user_content state: '{{ var_httpd_read_user_content }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_read_user_content # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_read_user_content='' setsebool -P httpd_read_user_content $var_httpd_read_user_content else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the httpd_run_ipa SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_run_ipa is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the httpd_run_ipa SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_run_ipa off - name: Disable the httpd_run_ipa SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_run_ipa - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_run_ipa # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_run_ipa: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the httpd_run_ipa SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_run_ipa Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_run_ipa state: '{{ var_httpd_run_ipa }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_run_ipa # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_run_ipa='' setsebool -P httpd_run_ipa $var_httpd_run_ipa else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the httpd_run_preupgrade SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_run_preupgrade is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the httpd_run_preupgrade SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_run_preupgrade off - name: Disable the httpd_run_preupgrade SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_run_preupgrade - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_run_preupgrade # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_run_preupgrade: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the httpd_run_preupgrade SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_run_preupgrade Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_run_preupgrade state: '{{ var_httpd_run_preupgrade }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_run_preupgrade # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_run_preupgrade='' setsebool -P httpd_run_preupgrade $var_httpd_run_preupgrade else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the httpd_run_stickshift SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_run_stickshift is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the httpd_run_stickshift SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_run_stickshift off - name: Disable the httpd_run_stickshift SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_run_stickshift - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_run_stickshift # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_run_stickshift: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the httpd_run_stickshift SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_run_stickshift Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_run_stickshift state: '{{ var_httpd_run_stickshift }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_run_stickshift # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_run_stickshift='' setsebool -P httpd_run_stickshift $var_httpd_run_stickshift else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the httpd_serve_cobbler_files SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_serve_cobbler_files is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the httpd_serve_cobbler_files SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_serve_cobbler_files off - name: Disable the httpd_serve_cobbler_files SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_serve_cobbler_files - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_serve_cobbler_files # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_serve_cobbler_files: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the httpd_serve_cobbler_files SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_serve_cobbler_files Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_serve_cobbler_files state: '{{ var_httpd_serve_cobbler_files }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_serve_cobbler_files # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_serve_cobbler_files='' setsebool -P httpd_serve_cobbler_files $var_httpd_serve_cobbler_files else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the httpd_setrlimit SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_setrlimit is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the httpd_setrlimit SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_setrlimit off - name: Disable the httpd_setrlimit SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_setrlimit - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_setrlimit # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_setrlimit: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the httpd_setrlimit SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_setrlimit Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_setrlimit state: '{{ var_httpd_setrlimit }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_setrlimit # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_setrlimit='' setsebool -P httpd_setrlimit $var_httpd_setrlimit else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the httpd_ssi_exec SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_ssi_exec is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the httpd_ssi_exec SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_ssi_exec off - name: Disable the httpd_ssi_exec SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_ssi_exec - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_ssi_exec # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_ssi_exec: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the httpd_ssi_exec SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_ssi_exec Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_ssi_exec state: '{{ var_httpd_ssi_exec }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_ssi_exec # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_ssi_exec='' setsebool -P httpd_ssi_exec $var_httpd_ssi_exec else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the httpd_sys_script_anon_write SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_sys_script_anon_write is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the httpd_sys_script_anon_write SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_sys_script_anon_write off - name: Disable the httpd_sys_script_anon_write SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_sys_script_anon_write - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_sys_script_anon_write # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_sys_script_anon_write: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the httpd_sys_script_anon_write SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_sys_script_anon_write Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_sys_script_anon_write state: '{{ var_httpd_sys_script_anon_write }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_sys_script_anon_write # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_sys_script_anon_write='' setsebool -P httpd_sys_script_anon_write $var_httpd_sys_script_anon_write else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the httpd_tmp_exec SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_tmp_exec is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the httpd_tmp_exec SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_tmp_exec off - name: Disable the httpd_tmp_exec SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_tmp_exec - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_tmp_exec # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_tmp_exec: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the httpd_tmp_exec SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_tmp_exec Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_tmp_exec state: '{{ var_httpd_tmp_exec }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_tmp_exec # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_tmp_exec='' setsebool -P httpd_tmp_exec $var_httpd_tmp_exec else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the httpd_tty_comm SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_tty_comm is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the httpd_tty_comm SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_tty_comm off - name: Disable the httpd_tty_comm SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_tty_comm - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_tty_comm # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_tty_comm: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the httpd_tty_comm SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_tty_comm Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_tty_comm state: '{{ var_httpd_tty_comm }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_tty_comm # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_tty_comm='' setsebool -P httpd_tty_comm $var_httpd_tty_comm else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the httpd_unified SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_unified is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the httpd_unified SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_unified off - name: Disable the httpd_unified SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_unified - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_unified # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_unified: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the httpd_unified SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_unified Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_unified state: '{{ var_httpd_unified }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_unified # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_unified='' setsebool -P httpd_unified $var_httpd_unified else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the httpd_use_cifs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_use_cifs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the httpd_use_cifs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_use_cifs off - name: Disable the httpd_use_cifs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_use_cifs - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_use_cifs # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_use_cifs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the httpd_use_cifs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_use_cifs Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_use_cifs state: '{{ var_httpd_use_cifs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_use_cifs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_use_cifs='' setsebool -P httpd_use_cifs $var_httpd_use_cifs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the httpd_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_use_fusefs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the httpd_use_fusefs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_use_fusefs off - name: Disable the httpd_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_use_fusefs - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_use_fusefs # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_use_fusefs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the httpd_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_use_fusefs Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_use_fusefs state: '{{ var_httpd_use_fusefs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_use_fusefs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_use_fusefs='' setsebool -P httpd_use_fusefs $var_httpd_use_fusefs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the httpd_use_gpg SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_use_gpg is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the httpd_use_gpg SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_use_gpg off - name: Disable the httpd_use_gpg SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_use_gpg - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_use_gpg # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_use_gpg: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the httpd_use_gpg SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_use_gpg Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_use_gpg state: '{{ var_httpd_use_gpg }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_use_gpg # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_use_gpg='' setsebool -P httpd_use_gpg $var_httpd_use_gpg else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the httpd_use_nfs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_use_nfs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the httpd_use_nfs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_use_nfs off - name: Disable the httpd_use_nfs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_use_nfs - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_use_nfs # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_use_nfs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the httpd_use_nfs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_use_nfs Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_use_nfs state: '{{ var_httpd_use_nfs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_use_nfs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_use_nfs='' setsebool -P httpd_use_nfs $var_httpd_use_nfs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the httpd_use_openstack SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_use_openstack is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the httpd_use_openstack SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_use_openstack off - name: Disable the httpd_use_openstack SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_use_openstack - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_use_openstack # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_use_openstack: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the httpd_use_openstack SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_use_openstack Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_use_openstack state: '{{ var_httpd_use_openstack }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_use_openstack # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_use_openstack='' setsebool -P httpd_use_openstack $var_httpd_use_openstack else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the httpd_use_sasl SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_use_sasl is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the httpd_use_sasl SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_use_sasl off - name: Disable the httpd_use_sasl SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_use_sasl - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_use_sasl # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_use_sasl: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the httpd_use_sasl SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_use_sasl Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_use_sasl state: '{{ var_httpd_use_sasl }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_use_sasl # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_use_sasl='' setsebool -P httpd_use_sasl $var_httpd_use_sasl else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the httpd_verify_dns SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean httpd_verify_dns is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the httpd_verify_dns SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P httpd_verify_dns off - name: Disable the httpd_verify_dns SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_verify_dns - name: XCCDF Value var_httpd_verify_dns # promote to variable set_fact: var_httpd_verify_dns: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the httpd_verify_dns SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean httpd_verify_dns Accordingly seboolean: name: httpd_verify_dns state: '{{ var_httpd_verify_dns }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_httpd_verify_dns # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_httpd_verify_dns='' setsebool -P httpd_verify_dns $var_httpd_verify_dns else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the icecast_use_any_tcp_ports SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean icecast_use_any_tcp_ports is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the icecast_use_any_tcp_ports SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P icecast_use_any_tcp_ports off - name: Disable the icecast_use_any_tcp_ports SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_icecast_use_any_tcp_ports - name: XCCDF Value var_icecast_use_any_tcp_ports # promote to variable set_fact: var_icecast_use_any_tcp_ports: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the icecast_use_any_tcp_ports SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean icecast_use_any_tcp_ports Accordingly seboolean: name: icecast_use_any_tcp_ports state: '{{ var_icecast_use_any_tcp_ports }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_icecast_use_any_tcp_ports # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_icecast_use_any_tcp_ports='' setsebool -P icecast_use_any_tcp_ports $var_icecast_use_any_tcp_ports else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the irc_use_any_tcp_ports SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean irc_use_any_tcp_ports is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the irc_use_any_tcp_ports SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P irc_use_any_tcp_ports off - name: Disable the irc_use_any_tcp_ports SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_irc_use_any_tcp_ports - name: XCCDF Value var_irc_use_any_tcp_ports # promote to variable set_fact: var_irc_use_any_tcp_ports: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the irc_use_any_tcp_ports SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean irc_use_any_tcp_ports Accordingly seboolean: name: irc_use_any_tcp_ports state: '{{ var_irc_use_any_tcp_ports }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_irc_use_any_tcp_ports # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_irc_use_any_tcp_ports='' setsebool -P irc_use_any_tcp_ports $var_irc_use_any_tcp_ports else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the irssi_use_full_network SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean irssi_use_full_network is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the irssi_use_full_network SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P irssi_use_full_network off - name: Disable the irssi_use_full_network SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_irssi_use_full_network - name: XCCDF Value var_irssi_use_full_network # promote to variable set_fact: var_irssi_use_full_network: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the irssi_use_full_network SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean irssi_use_full_network Accordingly seboolean: name: irssi_use_full_network state: '{{ var_irssi_use_full_network }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_irssi_use_full_network # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_irssi_use_full_network='' setsebool -P irssi_use_full_network $var_irssi_use_full_network else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the kdumpgui_run_bootloader SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean kdumpgui_run_bootloader is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the kdumpgui_run_bootloader SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P kdumpgui_run_bootloader off - name: Disable the kdumpgui_run_bootloader SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_kdumpgui_run_bootloader - name: XCCDF Value var_kdumpgui_run_bootloader # promote to variable set_fact: var_kdumpgui_run_bootloader: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the kdumpgui_run_bootloader SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean kdumpgui_run_bootloader Accordingly seboolean: name: kdumpgui_run_bootloader state: '{{ var_kdumpgui_run_bootloader }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_kdumpgui_run_bootloader # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_kdumpgui_run_bootloader='' setsebool -P kdumpgui_run_bootloader $var_kdumpgui_run_bootloader else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the kerberos_enabled SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean kerberos_enabled is enabled. If this setting is disabled, it should be enabled to allow confined applications to run with Kerberos. To enable the kerberos_enabled SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P kerberos_enabled on 0418 1055 1402 CCE-84293-0 - name: Enable the kerberos_enabled SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84293-0 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_kerberos_enabled - name: XCCDF Value var_kerberos_enabled # promote to variable set_fact: var_kerberos_enabled: !!str tags: - always - name: Enable the kerberos_enabled SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean kerberos_enabled Accordingly seboolean: name: kerberos_enabled state: '{{ var_kerberos_enabled }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - CCE-84293-0 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_kerberos_enabled # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_kerberos_enabled='' setsebool -P kerberos_enabled $var_kerberos_enabled else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the ksmtuned_use_cifs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean ksmtuned_use_cifs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the ksmtuned_use_cifs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P ksmtuned_use_cifs off - name: Disable the ksmtuned_use_cifs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_ksmtuned_use_cifs - name: XCCDF Value var_ksmtuned_use_cifs # promote to variable set_fact: var_ksmtuned_use_cifs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the ksmtuned_use_cifs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean ksmtuned_use_cifs Accordingly seboolean: name: ksmtuned_use_cifs state: '{{ var_ksmtuned_use_cifs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_ksmtuned_use_cifs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_ksmtuned_use_cifs='' setsebool -P ksmtuned_use_cifs $var_ksmtuned_use_cifs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the ksmtuned_use_nfs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean ksmtuned_use_nfs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the ksmtuned_use_nfs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P ksmtuned_use_nfs off - name: Disable the ksmtuned_use_nfs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_ksmtuned_use_nfs - name: XCCDF Value var_ksmtuned_use_nfs # promote to variable set_fact: var_ksmtuned_use_nfs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the ksmtuned_use_nfs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean ksmtuned_use_nfs Accordingly seboolean: name: ksmtuned_use_nfs state: '{{ var_ksmtuned_use_nfs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_ksmtuned_use_nfs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_ksmtuned_use_nfs='' setsebool -P ksmtuned_use_nfs $var_ksmtuned_use_nfs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the logadm_exec_content SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean logadm_exec_content is enabled. If this setting is disabled, it should be enabled. To enable the logadm_exec_content SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P logadm_exec_content on - name: Enable the logadm_exec_content SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_logadm_exec_content - name: XCCDF Value var_logadm_exec_content # promote to variable set_fact: var_logadm_exec_content: !!str tags: - always - name: Enable the logadm_exec_content SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean logadm_exec_content Accordingly seboolean: name: logadm_exec_content state: '{{ var_logadm_exec_content }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_logadm_exec_content # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_logadm_exec_content='' setsebool -P logadm_exec_content $var_logadm_exec_content else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the logging_syslogd_can_sendmail SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean logging_syslogd_can_sendmail is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the logging_syslogd_can_sendmail SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P logging_syslogd_can_sendmail off - name: Disable the logging_syslogd_can_sendmail SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_logging_syslogd_can_sendmail - name: XCCDF Value var_logging_syslogd_can_sendmail # promote to variable set_fact: var_logging_syslogd_can_sendmail: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the logging_syslogd_can_sendmail SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean logging_syslogd_can_sendmail Accordingly seboolean: name: logging_syslogd_can_sendmail state: '{{ var_logging_syslogd_can_sendmail }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_logging_syslogd_can_sendmail # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_logging_syslogd_can_sendmail='' setsebool -P logging_syslogd_can_sendmail $var_logging_syslogd_can_sendmail else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the logging_syslogd_run_nagios_plugins SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean logging_syslogd_run_nagios_plugins is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the logging_syslogd_run_nagios_plugins SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P logging_syslogd_run_nagios_plugins off - name: Disable the logging_syslogd_run_nagios_plugins SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_logging_syslogd_run_nagios_plugins - name: XCCDF Value var_logging_syslogd_run_nagios_plugins # promote to variable set_fact: var_logging_syslogd_run_nagios_plugins: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the logging_syslogd_run_nagios_plugins SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean logging_syslogd_run_nagios_plugins Accordingly seboolean: name: logging_syslogd_run_nagios_plugins state: '{{ var_logging_syslogd_run_nagios_plugins }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_logging_syslogd_run_nagios_plugins # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_logging_syslogd_run_nagios_plugins='' setsebool -P logging_syslogd_run_nagios_plugins $var_logging_syslogd_run_nagios_plugins else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the logging_syslogd_use_tty SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean logging_syslogd_use_tty is enabled. If this setting is disabled, it should be enabled as it allows syslog the ability to read/write to terminal. To enable the logging_syslogd_use_tty SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P logging_syslogd_use_tty on - name: Enable the logging_syslogd_use_tty SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_logging_syslogd_use_tty - name: XCCDF Value var_logging_syslogd_use_tty # promote to variable set_fact: var_logging_syslogd_use_tty: !!str tags: - always - name: Enable the logging_syslogd_use_tty SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean logging_syslogd_use_tty Accordingly seboolean: name: logging_syslogd_use_tty state: '{{ var_logging_syslogd_use_tty }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_logging_syslogd_use_tty # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_logging_syslogd_use_tty='' setsebool -P logging_syslogd_use_tty $var_logging_syslogd_use_tty else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the login_console_enabled SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean login_console_enabled is enabled. If this setting is disabled, it should be enabled as it allows login from /dev/console to a console session. To enable the login_console_enabled SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P login_console_enabled on - name: Enable the login_console_enabled SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_login_console_enabled - name: XCCDF Value var_login_console_enabled # promote to variable set_fact: var_login_console_enabled: !!str tags: - always - name: Enable the login_console_enabled SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean login_console_enabled Accordingly seboolean: name: login_console_enabled state: '{{ var_login_console_enabled }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_login_console_enabled # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_login_console_enabled='' setsebool -P login_console_enabled $var_login_console_enabled else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the logrotate_use_nfs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean logrotate_use_nfs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the logrotate_use_nfs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P logrotate_use_nfs off - name: Disable the logrotate_use_nfs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_logrotate_use_nfs - name: XCCDF Value var_logrotate_use_nfs # promote to variable set_fact: var_logrotate_use_nfs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the logrotate_use_nfs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean logrotate_use_nfs Accordingly seboolean: name: logrotate_use_nfs state: '{{ var_logrotate_use_nfs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_logrotate_use_nfs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_logrotate_use_nfs='' setsebool -P logrotate_use_nfs $var_logrotate_use_nfs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the logwatch_can_network_connect_mail SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean logwatch_can_network_connect_mail is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the logwatch_can_network_connect_mail SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P logwatch_can_network_connect_mail off - name: Disable the logwatch_can_network_connect_mail SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_logwatch_can_network_connect_mail - name: XCCDF Value var_logwatch_can_network_connect_mail # promote to variable set_fact: var_logwatch_can_network_connect_mail: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the logwatch_can_network_connect_mail SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean logwatch_can_network_connect_mail Accordingly seboolean: name: logwatch_can_network_connect_mail state: '{{ var_logwatch_can_network_connect_mail }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_logwatch_can_network_connect_mail # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_logwatch_can_network_connect_mail='' setsebool -P logwatch_can_network_connect_mail $var_logwatch_can_network_connect_mail else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the lsmd_plugin_connect_any SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean lsmd_plugin_connect_any is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the lsmd_plugin_connect_any SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P lsmd_plugin_connect_any off - name: Disable the lsmd_plugin_connect_any SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_lsmd_plugin_connect_any - name: XCCDF Value var_lsmd_plugin_connect_any # promote to variable set_fact: var_lsmd_plugin_connect_any: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the lsmd_plugin_connect_any SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean lsmd_plugin_connect_any Accordingly seboolean: name: lsmd_plugin_connect_any state: '{{ var_lsmd_plugin_connect_any }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_lsmd_plugin_connect_any # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_lsmd_plugin_connect_any='' setsebool -P lsmd_plugin_connect_any $var_lsmd_plugin_connect_any else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the mailman_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean mailman_use_fusefs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the mailman_use_fusefs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P mailman_use_fusefs off - name: Disable the mailman_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_mailman_use_fusefs - name: XCCDF Value var_mailman_use_fusefs # promote to variable set_fact: var_mailman_use_fusefs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the mailman_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean mailman_use_fusefs Accordingly seboolean: name: mailman_use_fusefs state: '{{ var_mailman_use_fusefs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_mailman_use_fusefs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_mailman_use_fusefs='' setsebool -P mailman_use_fusefs $var_mailman_use_fusefs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the mcelog_client SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean mcelog_client is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the mcelog_client SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P mcelog_client off - name: Disable the mcelog_client SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_mcelog_client - name: XCCDF Value var_mcelog_client # promote to variable set_fact: var_mcelog_client: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the mcelog_client SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean mcelog_client Accordingly seboolean: name: mcelog_client state: '{{ var_mcelog_client }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_mcelog_client # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_mcelog_client='' setsebool -P mcelog_client $var_mcelog_client else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the mcelog_exec_scripts SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean mcelog_exec_scripts is enabled. If this setting is disabled, it should be enabled. To enable the mcelog_exec_scripts SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P mcelog_exec_scripts on - name: Enable the mcelog_exec_scripts SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_mcelog_exec_scripts - name: XCCDF Value var_mcelog_exec_scripts # promote to variable set_fact: var_mcelog_exec_scripts: !!str tags: - always - name: Enable the mcelog_exec_scripts SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean mcelog_exec_scripts Accordingly seboolean: name: mcelog_exec_scripts state: '{{ var_mcelog_exec_scripts }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_mcelog_exec_scripts # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_mcelog_exec_scripts='' setsebool -P mcelog_exec_scripts $var_mcelog_exec_scripts else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the mcelog_foreground SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean mcelog_foreground is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the mcelog_foreground SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P mcelog_foreground off - name: Disable the mcelog_foreground SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_mcelog_foreground - name: XCCDF Value var_mcelog_foreground # promote to variable set_fact: var_mcelog_foreground: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the mcelog_foreground SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean mcelog_foreground Accordingly seboolean: name: mcelog_foreground state: '{{ var_mcelog_foreground }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_mcelog_foreground # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_mcelog_foreground='' setsebool -P mcelog_foreground $var_mcelog_foreground else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the mcelog_server SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean mcelog_server is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the mcelog_server SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P mcelog_server off - name: Disable the mcelog_server SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_mcelog_server - name: XCCDF Value var_mcelog_server # promote to variable set_fact: var_mcelog_server: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the mcelog_server SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean mcelog_server Accordingly seboolean: name: mcelog_server state: '{{ var_mcelog_server }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_mcelog_server # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_mcelog_server='' setsebool -P mcelog_server $var_mcelog_server else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the minidlna_read_generic_user_content SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean minidlna_read_generic_user_content is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the minidlna_read_generic_user_content SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P minidlna_read_generic_user_content off - name: Disable the minidlna_read_generic_user_content SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_minidlna_read_generic_user_content - name: XCCDF Value var_minidlna_read_generic_user_content # promote to variable set_fact: var_minidlna_read_generic_user_content: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the minidlna_read_generic_user_content SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean minidlna_read_generic_user_content Accordingly seboolean: name: minidlna_read_generic_user_content state: '{{ var_minidlna_read_generic_user_content }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_minidlna_read_generic_user_content # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_minidlna_read_generic_user_content='' setsebool -P minidlna_read_generic_user_content $var_minidlna_read_generic_user_content else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the mmap_low_allowed SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean mmap_low_allowed is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the mmap_low_allowed SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P mmap_low_allowed off - name: Disable the mmap_low_allowed SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_mmap_low_allowed - name: XCCDF Value var_mmap_low_allowed # promote to variable set_fact: var_mmap_low_allowed: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the mmap_low_allowed SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean mmap_low_allowed Accordingly seboolean: name: mmap_low_allowed state: '{{ var_mmap_low_allowed }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_mmap_low_allowed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_mmap_low_allowed='' setsebool -P mmap_low_allowed $var_mmap_low_allowed else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the mock_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean mock_enable_homedirs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the mock_enable_homedirs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P mock_enable_homedirs off - name: Disable the mock_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_mock_enable_homedirs - name: XCCDF Value var_mock_enable_homedirs # promote to variable set_fact: var_mock_enable_homedirs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the mock_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean mock_enable_homedirs Accordingly seboolean: name: mock_enable_homedirs state: '{{ var_mock_enable_homedirs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_mock_enable_homedirs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_mock_enable_homedirs='' setsebool -P mock_enable_homedirs $var_mock_enable_homedirs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the mount_anyfile SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean mount_anyfile is enabled. If this setting is disabled, it should be enabled to allow any file or directory to be mounted. To enable the mount_anyfile SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P mount_anyfile on - name: Enable the mount_anyfile SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_mount_anyfile - name: XCCDF Value var_mount_anyfile # promote to variable set_fact: var_mount_anyfile: !!str tags: - always - name: Enable the mount_anyfile SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean mount_anyfile Accordingly seboolean: name: mount_anyfile state: '{{ var_mount_anyfile }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_mount_anyfile # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_mount_anyfile='' setsebool -P mount_anyfile $var_mount_anyfile else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the mozilla_plugin_bind_unreserved_ports SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean mozilla_plugin_bind_unreserved_ports is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the mozilla_plugin_bind_unreserved_ports SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P mozilla_plugin_bind_unreserved_ports off - name: Disable the mozilla_plugin_bind_unreserved_ports SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_mozilla_plugin_bind_unreserved_ports - name: XCCDF Value var_mozilla_plugin_bind_unreserved_ports # promote to variable set_fact: var_mozilla_plugin_bind_unreserved_ports: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the mozilla_plugin_bind_unreserved_ports SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean mozilla_plugin_bind_unreserved_ports Accordingly seboolean: name: mozilla_plugin_bind_unreserved_ports state: '{{ var_mozilla_plugin_bind_unreserved_ports }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_mozilla_plugin_bind_unreserved_ports # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_mozilla_plugin_bind_unreserved_ports='' setsebool -P mozilla_plugin_bind_unreserved_ports $var_mozilla_plugin_bind_unreserved_ports else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the mozilla_plugin_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean mozilla_plugin_can_network_connect is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the mozilla_plugin_can_network_connect SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P mozilla_plugin_can_network_connect off - name: Disable the mozilla_plugin_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_mozilla_plugin_can_network_connect - name: XCCDF Value var_mozilla_plugin_can_network_connect # promote to variable set_fact: var_mozilla_plugin_can_network_connect: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the mozilla_plugin_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean mozilla_plugin_can_network_connect Accordingly seboolean: name: mozilla_plugin_can_network_connect state: '{{ var_mozilla_plugin_can_network_connect }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_mozilla_plugin_can_network_connect # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_mozilla_plugin_can_network_connect='' setsebool -P mozilla_plugin_can_network_connect $var_mozilla_plugin_can_network_connect else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the mozilla_plugin_use_bluejeans SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean mozilla_plugin_use_bluejeans is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the mozilla_plugin_use_bluejeans SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P mozilla_plugin_use_bluejeans off - name: Disable the mozilla_plugin_use_bluejeans SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_mozilla_plugin_use_bluejeans - name: XCCDF Value var_mozilla_plugin_use_bluejeans # promote to variable set_fact: var_mozilla_plugin_use_bluejeans: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the mozilla_plugin_use_bluejeans SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean mozilla_plugin_use_bluejeans Accordingly seboolean: name: mozilla_plugin_use_bluejeans state: '{{ var_mozilla_plugin_use_bluejeans }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_mozilla_plugin_use_bluejeans # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_mozilla_plugin_use_bluejeans='' setsebool -P mozilla_plugin_use_bluejeans $var_mozilla_plugin_use_bluejeans else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the mozilla_plugin_use_gps SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean mozilla_plugin_use_gps is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the mozilla_plugin_use_gps SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P mozilla_plugin_use_gps off - name: Disable the mozilla_plugin_use_gps SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_mozilla_plugin_use_gps - name: XCCDF Value var_mozilla_plugin_use_gps # promote to variable set_fact: var_mozilla_plugin_use_gps: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the mozilla_plugin_use_gps SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean mozilla_plugin_use_gps Accordingly seboolean: name: mozilla_plugin_use_gps state: '{{ var_mozilla_plugin_use_gps }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_mozilla_plugin_use_gps # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_mozilla_plugin_use_gps='' setsebool -P mozilla_plugin_use_gps $var_mozilla_plugin_use_gps else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the mozilla_plugin_use_spice SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean mozilla_plugin_use_spice is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the mozilla_plugin_use_spice SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P mozilla_plugin_use_spice off - name: Disable the mozilla_plugin_use_spice SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_mozilla_plugin_use_spice - name: XCCDF Value var_mozilla_plugin_use_spice # promote to variable set_fact: var_mozilla_plugin_use_spice: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the mozilla_plugin_use_spice SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean mozilla_plugin_use_spice Accordingly seboolean: name: mozilla_plugin_use_spice state: '{{ var_mozilla_plugin_use_spice }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_mozilla_plugin_use_spice # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_mozilla_plugin_use_spice='' setsebool -P mozilla_plugin_use_spice $var_mozilla_plugin_use_spice else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the mozilla_read_content SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean mozilla_read_content is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the mozilla_read_content SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P mozilla_read_content off - name: Disable the mozilla_read_content SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_mozilla_read_content - name: XCCDF Value var_mozilla_read_content # promote to variable set_fact: var_mozilla_read_content: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the mozilla_read_content SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean mozilla_read_content Accordingly seboolean: name: mozilla_read_content state: '{{ var_mozilla_read_content }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_mozilla_read_content # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_mozilla_read_content='' setsebool -P mozilla_read_content $var_mozilla_read_content else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the mpd_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean mpd_enable_homedirs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the mpd_enable_homedirs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P mpd_enable_homedirs off - name: Disable the mpd_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_mpd_enable_homedirs - name: XCCDF Value var_mpd_enable_homedirs # promote to variable set_fact: var_mpd_enable_homedirs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the mpd_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean mpd_enable_homedirs Accordingly seboolean: name: mpd_enable_homedirs state: '{{ var_mpd_enable_homedirs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_mpd_enable_homedirs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_mpd_enable_homedirs='' setsebool -P mpd_enable_homedirs $var_mpd_enable_homedirs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the mpd_use_cifs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean mpd_use_cifs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the mpd_use_cifs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P mpd_use_cifs off - name: Disable the mpd_use_cifs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_mpd_use_cifs - name: XCCDF Value var_mpd_use_cifs # promote to variable set_fact: var_mpd_use_cifs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the mpd_use_cifs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean mpd_use_cifs Accordingly seboolean: name: mpd_use_cifs state: '{{ var_mpd_use_cifs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_mpd_use_cifs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_mpd_use_cifs='' setsebool -P mpd_use_cifs $var_mpd_use_cifs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the mpd_use_nfs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean mpd_use_nfs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the mpd_use_nfs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P mpd_use_nfs off - name: Disable the mpd_use_nfs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_mpd_use_nfs - name: XCCDF Value var_mpd_use_nfs # promote to variable set_fact: var_mpd_use_nfs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the mpd_use_nfs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean mpd_use_nfs Accordingly seboolean: name: mpd_use_nfs state: '{{ var_mpd_use_nfs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_mpd_use_nfs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_mpd_use_nfs='' setsebool -P mpd_use_nfs $var_mpd_use_nfs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the mplayer_execstack SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean mplayer_execstack is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the mplayer_execstack SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P mplayer_execstack off - name: Disable the mplayer_execstack SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_mplayer_execstack - name: XCCDF Value var_mplayer_execstack # promote to variable set_fact: var_mplayer_execstack: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the mplayer_execstack SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean mplayer_execstack Accordingly seboolean: name: mplayer_execstack state: '{{ var_mplayer_execstack }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_mplayer_execstack # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_mplayer_execstack='' setsebool -P mplayer_execstack $var_mplayer_execstack else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the mysql_connect_any SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean mysql_connect_any is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the mysql_connect_any SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P mysql_connect_any off - name: Disable the mysql_connect_any SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_mysql_connect_any - name: XCCDF Value var_mysql_connect_any # promote to variable set_fact: var_mysql_connect_any: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the mysql_connect_any SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean mysql_connect_any Accordingly seboolean: name: mysql_connect_any state: '{{ var_mysql_connect_any }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_mysql_connect_any # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_mysql_connect_any='' setsebool -P mysql_connect_any $var_mysql_connect_any else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the nagios_run_pnp4nagios SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean nagios_run_pnp4nagios is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the nagios_run_pnp4nagios SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P nagios_run_pnp4nagios off - name: Disable the nagios_run_pnp4nagios SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_nagios_run_pnp4nagios - name: XCCDF Value var_nagios_run_pnp4nagios # promote to variable set_fact: var_nagios_run_pnp4nagios: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the nagios_run_pnp4nagios SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean nagios_run_pnp4nagios Accordingly seboolean: name: nagios_run_pnp4nagios state: '{{ var_nagios_run_pnp4nagios }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_nagios_run_pnp4nagios # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_nagios_run_pnp4nagios='' setsebool -P nagios_run_pnp4nagios $var_nagios_run_pnp4nagios else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the nagios_run_sudo SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean nagios_run_sudo is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the nagios_run_sudo SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P nagios_run_sudo off - name: Disable the nagios_run_sudo SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_nagios_run_sudo - name: XCCDF Value var_nagios_run_sudo # promote to variable set_fact: var_nagios_run_sudo: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the nagios_run_sudo SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean nagios_run_sudo Accordingly seboolean: name: nagios_run_sudo state: '{{ var_nagios_run_sudo }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_nagios_run_sudo # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_nagios_run_sudo='' setsebool -P nagios_run_sudo $var_nagios_run_sudo else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the named_tcp_bind_http_port SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean named_tcp_bind_http_port is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the named_tcp_bind_http_port SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P named_tcp_bind_http_port off - name: Disable the named_tcp_bind_http_port SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_named_tcp_bind_http_port - name: XCCDF Value var_named_tcp_bind_http_port # promote to variable set_fact: var_named_tcp_bind_http_port: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the named_tcp_bind_http_port SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean named_tcp_bind_http_port Accordingly seboolean: name: named_tcp_bind_http_port state: '{{ var_named_tcp_bind_http_port }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_named_tcp_bind_http_port # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_named_tcp_bind_http_port='' setsebool -P named_tcp_bind_http_port $var_named_tcp_bind_http_port else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the named_write_master_zones SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean named_write_master_zones is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the named_write_master_zones SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P named_write_master_zones off - name: Disable the named_write_master_zones SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_named_write_master_zones - name: XCCDF Value var_named_write_master_zones # promote to variable set_fact: var_named_write_master_zones: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the named_write_master_zones SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean named_write_master_zones Accordingly seboolean: name: named_write_master_zones state: '{{ var_named_write_master_zones }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_named_write_master_zones # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_named_write_master_zones='' setsebool -P named_write_master_zones $var_named_write_master_zones else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the neutron_can_network SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean neutron_can_network is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the neutron_can_network SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P neutron_can_network off - name: Disable the neutron_can_network SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_neutron_can_network - name: XCCDF Value var_neutron_can_network # promote to variable set_fact: var_neutron_can_network: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the neutron_can_network SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean neutron_can_network Accordingly seboolean: name: neutron_can_network state: '{{ var_neutron_can_network }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_neutron_can_network # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_neutron_can_network='' setsebool -P neutron_can_network $var_neutron_can_network else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the nfs_export_all_ro SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean nfs_export_all_ro is enabled. If this setting is disabled, it should be enabled as it allows NFS to export read-only mounts. To enable the nfs_export_all_ro SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P nfs_export_all_ro on - name: Enable the nfs_export_all_ro SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_nfs_export_all_ro - name: XCCDF Value var_nfs_export_all_ro # promote to variable set_fact: var_nfs_export_all_ro: !!str tags: - always - name: Enable the nfs_export_all_ro SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean nfs_export_all_ro Accordingly seboolean: name: nfs_export_all_ro state: '{{ var_nfs_export_all_ro }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_nfs_export_all_ro # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_nfs_export_all_ro='' setsebool -P nfs_export_all_ro $var_nfs_export_all_ro else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the nfs_export_all_rw SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean nfs_export_all_rw is enabled. If this setting is disabled, it should be enabled as it allows NFS to export read/write mounts. To enable the nfs_export_all_rw SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P nfs_export_all_rw on - name: Enable the nfs_export_all_rw SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_nfs_export_all_rw - name: XCCDF Value var_nfs_export_all_rw # promote to variable set_fact: var_nfs_export_all_rw: !!str tags: - always - name: Enable the nfs_export_all_rw SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean nfs_export_all_rw Accordingly seboolean: name: nfs_export_all_rw state: '{{ var_nfs_export_all_rw }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_nfs_export_all_rw # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_nfs_export_all_rw='' setsebool -P nfs_export_all_rw $var_nfs_export_all_rw else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the nfsd_anon_write SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean nfsd_anon_write is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the nfsd_anon_write SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P nfsd_anon_write off - name: Disable the nfsd_anon_write SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_nfsd_anon_write - name: XCCDF Value var_nfsd_anon_write # promote to variable set_fact: var_nfsd_anon_write: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the nfsd_anon_write SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean nfsd_anon_write Accordingly seboolean: name: nfsd_anon_write state: '{{ var_nfsd_anon_write }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_nfsd_anon_write # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_nfsd_anon_write='' setsebool -P nfsd_anon_write $var_nfsd_anon_write else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the nis_enabled SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean nis_enabled is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the nis_enabled SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P nis_enabled off - name: Disable the nis_enabled SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_nis_enabled - name: XCCDF Value var_nis_enabled # promote to variable set_fact: var_nis_enabled: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the nis_enabled SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean nis_enabled Accordingly seboolean: name: nis_enabled state: '{{ var_nis_enabled }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_nis_enabled # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_nis_enabled='' setsebool -P nis_enabled $var_nis_enabled else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the nscd_use_shm SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean nscd_use_shm is enabled. If this setting is disabled, it should be enabled to allow nscd to use shared memory. To enable the nscd_use_shm SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P nscd_use_shm on - name: Enable the nscd_use_shm SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_nscd_use_shm - name: XCCDF Value var_nscd_use_shm # promote to variable set_fact: var_nscd_use_shm: !!str tags: - always - name: Enable the nscd_use_shm SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean nscd_use_shm Accordingly seboolean: name: nscd_use_shm state: '{{ var_nscd_use_shm }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_nscd_use_shm # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_nscd_use_shm='' setsebool -P nscd_use_shm $var_nscd_use_shm else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the openshift_use_nfs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean openshift_use_nfs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the openshift_use_nfs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P openshift_use_nfs off - name: Disable the openshift_use_nfs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_openshift_use_nfs - name: XCCDF Value var_openshift_use_nfs # promote to variable set_fact: var_openshift_use_nfs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the openshift_use_nfs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean openshift_use_nfs Accordingly seboolean: name: openshift_use_nfs state: '{{ var_openshift_use_nfs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_openshift_use_nfs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_openshift_use_nfs='' setsebool -P openshift_use_nfs $var_openshift_use_nfs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the openvpn_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean openvpn_can_network_connect is enabled. This setting should be disabled. To disable the openvpn_can_network_connect SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P openvpn_can_network_connect off - name: Disable the openvpn_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_openvpn_can_network_connect - name: XCCDF Value var_openvpn_can_network_connect # promote to variable set_fact: var_openvpn_can_network_connect: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the openvpn_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean openvpn_can_network_connect Accordingly seboolean: name: openvpn_can_network_connect state: '{{ var_openvpn_can_network_connect }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_openvpn_can_network_connect # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_openvpn_can_network_connect='' setsebool -P openvpn_can_network_connect $var_openvpn_can_network_connect else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the openvpn_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean openvpn_enable_homedirs is enabled. This setting should be disabled. To disable the openvpn_enable_homedirs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P openvpn_enable_homedirs off - name: Disable the openvpn_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_openvpn_enable_homedirs - name: XCCDF Value var_openvpn_enable_homedirs # promote to variable set_fact: var_openvpn_enable_homedirs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the openvpn_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean openvpn_enable_homedirs Accordingly seboolean: name: openvpn_enable_homedirs state: '{{ var_openvpn_enable_homedirs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_openvpn_enable_homedirs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_openvpn_enable_homedirs='' setsebool -P openvpn_enable_homedirs $var_openvpn_enable_homedirs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the openvpn_run_unconfined SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean openvpn_run_unconfined is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the openvpn_run_unconfined SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P openvpn_run_unconfined off - name: Disable the openvpn_run_unconfined SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_openvpn_run_unconfined - name: XCCDF Value var_openvpn_run_unconfined # promote to variable set_fact: var_openvpn_run_unconfined: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the openvpn_run_unconfined SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean openvpn_run_unconfined Accordingly seboolean: name: openvpn_run_unconfined state: '{{ var_openvpn_run_unconfined }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_openvpn_run_unconfined # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_openvpn_run_unconfined='' setsebool -P openvpn_run_unconfined $var_openvpn_run_unconfined else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the pcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean pcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the pcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P pcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports off - name: Disable the pcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_pcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports - name: XCCDF Value var_pcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports # promote to variable set_fact: var_pcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the pcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean pcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports Accordingly seboolean: name: pcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports state: '{{ var_pcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_pcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_pcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports='' setsebool -P pcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports $var_pcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the pcp_read_generic_logs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean pcp_read_generic_logs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the pcp_read_generic_logs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P pcp_read_generic_logs off - name: Disable the pcp_read_generic_logs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_pcp_read_generic_logs - name: XCCDF Value var_pcp_read_generic_logs # promote to variable set_fact: var_pcp_read_generic_logs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the pcp_read_generic_logs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean pcp_read_generic_logs Accordingly seboolean: name: pcp_read_generic_logs state: '{{ var_pcp_read_generic_logs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_pcp_read_generic_logs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_pcp_read_generic_logs='' setsebool -P pcp_read_generic_logs $var_pcp_read_generic_logs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the piranha_lvs_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean piranha_lvs_can_network_connect is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the piranha_lvs_can_network_connect SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P piranha_lvs_can_network_connect off - name: Disable the piranha_lvs_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_piranha_lvs_can_network_connect - name: XCCDF Value var_piranha_lvs_can_network_connect # promote to variable set_fact: var_piranha_lvs_can_network_connect: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the piranha_lvs_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean piranha_lvs_can_network_connect Accordingly seboolean: name: piranha_lvs_can_network_connect state: '{{ var_piranha_lvs_can_network_connect }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_piranha_lvs_can_network_connect # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_piranha_lvs_can_network_connect='' setsebool -P piranha_lvs_can_network_connect $var_piranha_lvs_can_network_connect else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the polipo_connect_all_unreserved SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean polipo_connect_all_unreserved is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the polipo_connect_all_unreserved SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P polipo_connect_all_unreserved off - name: Disable the polipo_connect_all_unreserved SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_polipo_connect_all_unreserved - name: XCCDF Value var_polipo_connect_all_unreserved # promote to variable set_fact: var_polipo_connect_all_unreserved: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the polipo_connect_all_unreserved SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean polipo_connect_all_unreserved Accordingly seboolean: name: polipo_connect_all_unreserved state: '{{ var_polipo_connect_all_unreserved }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_polipo_connect_all_unreserved # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_polipo_connect_all_unreserved='' setsebool -P polipo_connect_all_unreserved $var_polipo_connect_all_unreserved else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the polipo_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean polipo_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the polipo_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P polipo_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports off - name: Disable the polipo_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_polipo_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports - name: XCCDF Value var_polipo_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports # promote to variable set_fact: var_polipo_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the polipo_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean polipo_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports Accordingly seboolean: name: polipo_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports state: '{{ var_polipo_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_polipo_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_polipo_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports='' setsebool -P polipo_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports $var_polipo_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the polipo_session_users SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean polipo_session_users is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the polipo_session_users SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P polipo_session_users off - name: Disable the polipo_session_users SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_polipo_session_users - name: XCCDF Value var_polipo_session_users # promote to variable set_fact: var_polipo_session_users: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the polipo_session_users SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean polipo_session_users Accordingly seboolean: name: polipo_session_users state: '{{ var_polipo_session_users }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_polipo_session_users # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_polipo_session_users='' setsebool -P polipo_session_users $var_polipo_session_users else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the polipo_use_cifs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean polipo_use_cifs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the polipo_use_cifs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P polipo_use_cifs off - name: Disable the polipo_use_cifs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_polipo_use_cifs - name: XCCDF Value var_polipo_use_cifs # promote to variable set_fact: var_polipo_use_cifs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the polipo_use_cifs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean polipo_use_cifs Accordingly seboolean: name: polipo_use_cifs state: '{{ var_polipo_use_cifs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_polipo_use_cifs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_polipo_use_cifs='' setsebool -P polipo_use_cifs $var_polipo_use_cifs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the polipo_use_nfs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean polipo_use_nfs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the polipo_use_nfs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P polipo_use_nfs off - name: Disable the polipo_use_nfs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_polipo_use_nfs - name: XCCDF Value var_polipo_use_nfs # promote to variable set_fact: var_polipo_use_nfs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the polipo_use_nfs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean polipo_use_nfs Accordingly seboolean: name: polipo_use_nfs state: '{{ var_polipo_use_nfs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_polipo_use_nfs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_polipo_use_nfs='' setsebool -P polipo_use_nfs $var_polipo_use_nfs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure the polyinstantiation_enabled SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean polyinstantiation_enabled is disabled. This setting should be configured to . To set the polyinstantiation_enabled SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P polyinstantiation_enabled BP28(R39) CCE-84230-2 - name: Configure the polyinstantiation_enabled SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84230-2 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_polyinstantiation_enabled - name: XCCDF Value var_polyinstantiation_enabled # promote to variable set_fact: var_polyinstantiation_enabled: !!str tags: - always - name: Configure the polyinstantiation_enabled SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean polyinstantiation_enabled Accordingly seboolean: name: polyinstantiation_enabled state: '{{ var_polyinstantiation_enabled }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - CCE-84230-2 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_polyinstantiation_enabled # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_polyinstantiation_enabled='' setsebool -P polyinstantiation_enabled $var_polyinstantiation_enabled else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the postfix_local_write_mail_spool SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean postfix_local_write_mail_spool is enabled. If this setting is disabled, it should be enabled as it allows Postfix to write to the mail spool directories. To enable the postfix_local_write_mail_spool SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P postfix_local_write_mail_spool on - name: Enable the postfix_local_write_mail_spool SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_postfix_local_write_mail_spool - name: XCCDF Value var_postfix_local_write_mail_spool # promote to variable set_fact: var_postfix_local_write_mail_spool: !!str tags: - always - name: Enable the postfix_local_write_mail_spool SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean postfix_local_write_mail_spool Accordingly seboolean: name: postfix_local_write_mail_spool state: '{{ var_postfix_local_write_mail_spool }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_postfix_local_write_mail_spool # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_postfix_local_write_mail_spool='' setsebool -P postfix_local_write_mail_spool $var_postfix_local_write_mail_spool else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the postgresql_can_rsync SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean postgresql_can_rsync is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the postgresql_can_rsync SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P postgresql_can_rsync off - name: Disable the postgresql_can_rsync SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_postgresql_can_rsync - name: XCCDF Value var_postgresql_can_rsync # promote to variable set_fact: var_postgresql_can_rsync: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the postgresql_can_rsync SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean postgresql_can_rsync Accordingly seboolean: name: postgresql_can_rsync state: '{{ var_postgresql_can_rsync }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_postgresql_can_rsync # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_postgresql_can_rsync='' setsebool -P postgresql_can_rsync $var_postgresql_can_rsync else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the postgresql_selinux_transmit_client_label SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean postgresql_selinux_transmit_client_label is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the postgresql_selinux_transmit_client_label SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P postgresql_selinux_transmit_client_label off - name: Disable the postgresql_selinux_transmit_client_label SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_postgresql_selinux_transmit_client_label - name: XCCDF Value var_postgresql_selinux_transmit_client_label # promote to variable set_fact: var_postgresql_selinux_transmit_client_label: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the postgresql_selinux_transmit_client_label SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean postgresql_selinux_transmit_client_label Accordingly seboolean: name: postgresql_selinux_transmit_client_label state: '{{ var_postgresql_selinux_transmit_client_label }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_postgresql_selinux_transmit_client_label # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_postgresql_selinux_transmit_client_label='' setsebool -P postgresql_selinux_transmit_client_label $var_postgresql_selinux_transmit_client_label else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm is enabled. If this setting is disabled, it should be enabled as it allows Database Administrators to execute Data Manipulation Language (DML) statements. To enable the postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm on - name: Enable the postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm - name: XCCDF Value var_postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm # promote to variable set_fact: var_postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm: !!str tags: - always - name: Enable the postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm Accordingly seboolean: name: postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm state: '{{ var_postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm='' setsebool -P postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm $var_postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the postgresql_selinux_users_ddl SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean postgresql_selinux_users_ddl is enabled. If this setting is disabled, it should be enabled as it allows Database Administrators to execute Data Definition Language (DDL) statements. To enable the postgresql_selinux_users_ddl SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P postgresql_selinux_users_ddl on - name: Enable the postgresql_selinux_users_ddl SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_postgresql_selinux_users_ddl - name: XCCDF Value var_postgresql_selinux_users_ddl # promote to variable set_fact: var_postgresql_selinux_users_ddl: !!str tags: - always - name: Enable the postgresql_selinux_users_ddl SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean postgresql_selinux_users_ddl Accordingly seboolean: name: postgresql_selinux_users_ddl state: '{{ var_postgresql_selinux_users_ddl }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_postgresql_selinux_users_ddl # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_postgresql_selinux_users_ddl='' setsebool -P postgresql_selinux_users_ddl $var_postgresql_selinux_users_ddl else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the pppd_can_insmod SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean pppd_can_insmod is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the pppd_can_insmod SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P pppd_can_insmod off - name: Disable the pppd_can_insmod SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_pppd_can_insmod - name: XCCDF Value var_pppd_can_insmod # promote to variable set_fact: var_pppd_can_insmod: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the pppd_can_insmod SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean pppd_can_insmod Accordingly seboolean: name: pppd_can_insmod state: '{{ var_pppd_can_insmod }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_pppd_can_insmod # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_pppd_can_insmod='' setsebool -P pppd_can_insmod $var_pppd_can_insmod else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the pppd_for_user SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean pppd_for_user is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the pppd_for_user SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P pppd_for_user off - name: Disable the pppd_for_user SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_pppd_for_user - name: XCCDF Value var_pppd_for_user # promote to variable set_fact: var_pppd_for_user: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the pppd_for_user SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean pppd_for_user Accordingly seboolean: name: pppd_for_user state: '{{ var_pppd_for_user }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_pppd_for_user # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_pppd_for_user='' setsebool -P pppd_for_user $var_pppd_for_user else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the privoxy_connect_any SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean privoxy_connect_any is enabled. This setting should be disabled. To disable the privoxy_connect_any SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P privoxy_connect_any off - name: Disable the privoxy_connect_any SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_privoxy_connect_any - name: XCCDF Value var_privoxy_connect_any # promote to variable set_fact: var_privoxy_connect_any: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the privoxy_connect_any SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean privoxy_connect_any Accordingly seboolean: name: privoxy_connect_any state: '{{ var_privoxy_connect_any }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_privoxy_connect_any # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_privoxy_connect_any='' setsebool -P privoxy_connect_any $var_privoxy_connect_any else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the prosody_bind_http_port SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean prosody_bind_http_port is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the prosody_bind_http_port SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P prosody_bind_http_port off - name: Disable the prosody_bind_http_port SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_prosody_bind_http_port - name: XCCDF Value var_prosody_bind_http_port # promote to variable set_fact: var_prosody_bind_http_port: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the prosody_bind_http_port SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean prosody_bind_http_port Accordingly seboolean: name: prosody_bind_http_port state: '{{ var_prosody_bind_http_port }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_prosody_bind_http_port # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_prosody_bind_http_port='' setsebool -P prosody_bind_http_port $var_prosody_bind_http_port else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the puppetagent_manage_all_files SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean puppetagent_manage_all_files is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the puppetagent_manage_all_files SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P puppetagent_manage_all_files off - name: Disable the puppetagent_manage_all_files SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_puppetagent_manage_all_files - name: XCCDF Value var_puppetagent_manage_all_files # promote to variable set_fact: var_puppetagent_manage_all_files: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the puppetagent_manage_all_files SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean puppetagent_manage_all_files Accordingly seboolean: name: puppetagent_manage_all_files state: '{{ var_puppetagent_manage_all_files }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_puppetagent_manage_all_files # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_puppetagent_manage_all_files='' setsebool -P puppetagent_manage_all_files $var_puppetagent_manage_all_files else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the puppetmaster_use_db SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean puppetmaster_use_db is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the puppetmaster_use_db SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P puppetmaster_use_db off - name: Disable the puppetmaster_use_db SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_puppetmaster_use_db - name: XCCDF Value var_puppetmaster_use_db # promote to variable set_fact: var_puppetmaster_use_db: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the puppetmaster_use_db SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean puppetmaster_use_db Accordingly seboolean: name: puppetmaster_use_db state: '{{ var_puppetmaster_use_db }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_puppetmaster_use_db # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_puppetmaster_use_db='' setsebool -P puppetmaster_use_db $var_puppetmaster_use_db else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the racoon_read_shadow SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean racoon_read_shadow is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the racoon_read_shadow SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P racoon_read_shadow off - name: Disable the racoon_read_shadow SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_racoon_read_shadow - name: XCCDF Value var_racoon_read_shadow # promote to variable set_fact: var_racoon_read_shadow: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the racoon_read_shadow SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean racoon_read_shadow Accordingly seboolean: name: racoon_read_shadow state: '{{ var_racoon_read_shadow }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_racoon_read_shadow # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_racoon_read_shadow='' setsebool -P racoon_read_shadow $var_racoon_read_shadow else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the rsync_anon_write SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean rsync_anon_write is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the rsync_anon_write SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P rsync_anon_write off - name: Disable the rsync_anon_write SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_rsync_anon_write - name: XCCDF Value var_rsync_anon_write # promote to variable set_fact: var_rsync_anon_write: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the rsync_anon_write SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean rsync_anon_write Accordingly seboolean: name: rsync_anon_write state: '{{ var_rsync_anon_write }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_rsync_anon_write # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_rsync_anon_write='' setsebool -P rsync_anon_write $var_rsync_anon_write else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the rsync_client SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean rsync_client is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the rsync_client SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P rsync_client off - name: Disable the rsync_client SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_rsync_client - name: XCCDF Value var_rsync_client # promote to variable set_fact: var_rsync_client: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the rsync_client SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean rsync_client Accordingly seboolean: name: rsync_client state: '{{ var_rsync_client }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_rsync_client # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_rsync_client='' setsebool -P rsync_client $var_rsync_client else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the rsync_export_all_ro SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean rsync_export_all_ro is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the rsync_export_all_ro SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P rsync_export_all_ro off - name: Disable the rsync_export_all_ro SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_rsync_export_all_ro - name: XCCDF Value var_rsync_export_all_ro # promote to variable set_fact: var_rsync_export_all_ro: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the rsync_export_all_ro SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean rsync_export_all_ro Accordingly seboolean: name: rsync_export_all_ro state: '{{ var_rsync_export_all_ro }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_rsync_export_all_ro # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_rsync_export_all_ro='' setsebool -P rsync_export_all_ro $var_rsync_export_all_ro else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the rsync_full_access SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean rsync_full_access is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the rsync_full_access SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P rsync_full_access off - name: Disable the rsync_full_access SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_rsync_full_access - name: XCCDF Value var_rsync_full_access # promote to variable set_fact: var_rsync_full_access: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the rsync_full_access SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean rsync_full_access Accordingly seboolean: name: rsync_full_access state: '{{ var_rsync_full_access }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_rsync_full_access # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_rsync_full_access='' setsebool -P rsync_full_access $var_rsync_full_access else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the samba_create_home_dirs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean samba_create_home_dirs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the samba_create_home_dirs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P samba_create_home_dirs off - name: Disable the samba_create_home_dirs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_samba_create_home_dirs - name: XCCDF Value var_samba_create_home_dirs # promote to variable set_fact: var_samba_create_home_dirs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the samba_create_home_dirs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean samba_create_home_dirs Accordingly seboolean: name: samba_create_home_dirs state: '{{ var_samba_create_home_dirs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_samba_create_home_dirs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_samba_create_home_dirs='' setsebool -P samba_create_home_dirs $var_samba_create_home_dirs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the samba_domain_controller SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean samba_domain_controller is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the samba_domain_controller SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P samba_domain_controller off - name: Disable the samba_domain_controller SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_samba_domain_controller - name: XCCDF Value var_samba_domain_controller # promote to variable set_fact: var_samba_domain_controller: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the samba_domain_controller SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean samba_domain_controller Accordingly seboolean: name: samba_domain_controller state: '{{ var_samba_domain_controller }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_samba_domain_controller # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_samba_domain_controller='' setsebool -P samba_domain_controller $var_samba_domain_controller else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the samba_enable_home_dirs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean samba_enable_home_dirs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the samba_enable_home_dirs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P samba_enable_home_dirs off - name: Disable the samba_enable_home_dirs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_samba_enable_home_dirs - name: XCCDF Value var_samba_enable_home_dirs # promote to variable set_fact: var_samba_enable_home_dirs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the samba_enable_home_dirs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean samba_enable_home_dirs Accordingly seboolean: name: samba_enable_home_dirs state: '{{ var_samba_enable_home_dirs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_samba_enable_home_dirs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_samba_enable_home_dirs='' setsebool -P samba_enable_home_dirs $var_samba_enable_home_dirs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the samba_export_all_ro SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean samba_export_all_ro is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the samba_export_all_ro SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P samba_export_all_ro off - name: Disable the samba_export_all_ro SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_samba_export_all_ro - name: XCCDF Value var_samba_export_all_ro # promote to variable set_fact: var_samba_export_all_ro: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the samba_export_all_ro SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean samba_export_all_ro Accordingly seboolean: name: samba_export_all_ro state: '{{ var_samba_export_all_ro }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_samba_export_all_ro # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_samba_export_all_ro='' setsebool -P samba_export_all_ro $var_samba_export_all_ro else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the samba_export_all_rw SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean samba_export_all_rw is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the samba_export_all_rw SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P samba_export_all_rw off - name: Disable the samba_export_all_rw SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_samba_export_all_rw - name: XCCDF Value var_samba_export_all_rw # promote to variable set_fact: var_samba_export_all_rw: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the samba_export_all_rw SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean samba_export_all_rw Accordingly seboolean: name: samba_export_all_rw state: '{{ var_samba_export_all_rw }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_samba_export_all_rw # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_samba_export_all_rw='' setsebool -P samba_export_all_rw $var_samba_export_all_rw else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the samba_load_libgfapi SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean samba_load_libgfapi is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the samba_load_libgfapi SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P samba_load_libgfapi off - name: Disable the samba_load_libgfapi SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_samba_load_libgfapi - name: XCCDF Value var_samba_load_libgfapi # promote to variable set_fact: var_samba_load_libgfapi: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the samba_load_libgfapi SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean samba_load_libgfapi Accordingly seboolean: name: samba_load_libgfapi state: '{{ var_samba_load_libgfapi }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_samba_load_libgfapi # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_samba_load_libgfapi='' setsebool -P samba_load_libgfapi $var_samba_load_libgfapi else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the samba_portmapper SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean samba_portmapper is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the samba_portmapper SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P samba_portmapper off - name: Disable the samba_portmapper SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_samba_portmapper - name: XCCDF Value var_samba_portmapper # promote to variable set_fact: var_samba_portmapper: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the samba_portmapper SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean samba_portmapper Accordingly seboolean: name: samba_portmapper state: '{{ var_samba_portmapper }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_samba_portmapper # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_samba_portmapper='' setsebool -P samba_portmapper $var_samba_portmapper else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the samba_run_unconfined SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean samba_run_unconfined is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the samba_run_unconfined SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P samba_run_unconfined off - name: Disable the samba_run_unconfined SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_samba_run_unconfined - name: XCCDF Value var_samba_run_unconfined # promote to variable set_fact: var_samba_run_unconfined: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the samba_run_unconfined SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean samba_run_unconfined Accordingly seboolean: name: samba_run_unconfined state: '{{ var_samba_run_unconfined }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_samba_run_unconfined # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_samba_run_unconfined='' setsebool -P samba_run_unconfined $var_samba_run_unconfined else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the samba_share_fusefs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean samba_share_fusefs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the samba_share_fusefs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P samba_share_fusefs off - name: Disable the samba_share_fusefs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_samba_share_fusefs - name: XCCDF Value var_samba_share_fusefs # promote to variable set_fact: var_samba_share_fusefs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the samba_share_fusefs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean samba_share_fusefs Accordingly seboolean: name: samba_share_fusefs state: '{{ var_samba_share_fusefs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_samba_share_fusefs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_samba_share_fusefs='' setsebool -P samba_share_fusefs $var_samba_share_fusefs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the samba_share_nfs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean samba_share_nfs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the samba_share_nfs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P samba_share_nfs off - name: Disable the samba_share_nfs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_samba_share_nfs - name: XCCDF Value var_samba_share_nfs # promote to variable set_fact: var_samba_share_nfs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the samba_share_nfs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean samba_share_nfs Accordingly seboolean: name: samba_share_nfs state: '{{ var_samba_share_nfs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_samba_share_nfs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_samba_share_nfs='' setsebool -P samba_share_nfs $var_samba_share_nfs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the sanlock_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean sanlock_use_fusefs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the sanlock_use_fusefs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P sanlock_use_fusefs off - name: Disable the sanlock_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_sanlock_use_fusefs - name: XCCDF Value var_sanlock_use_fusefs # promote to variable set_fact: var_sanlock_use_fusefs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the sanlock_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean sanlock_use_fusefs Accordingly seboolean: name: sanlock_use_fusefs state: '{{ var_sanlock_use_fusefs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_sanlock_use_fusefs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_sanlock_use_fusefs='' setsebool -P sanlock_use_fusefs $var_sanlock_use_fusefs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the sanlock_use_nfs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean sanlock_use_nfs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the sanlock_use_nfs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P sanlock_use_nfs off - name: Disable the sanlock_use_nfs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_sanlock_use_nfs - name: XCCDF Value var_sanlock_use_nfs # promote to variable set_fact: var_sanlock_use_nfs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the sanlock_use_nfs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean sanlock_use_nfs Accordingly seboolean: name: sanlock_use_nfs state: '{{ var_sanlock_use_nfs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_sanlock_use_nfs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_sanlock_use_nfs='' setsebool -P sanlock_use_nfs $var_sanlock_use_nfs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the sanlock_use_samba SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean sanlock_use_samba is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the sanlock_use_samba SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P sanlock_use_samba off - name: Disable the sanlock_use_samba SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_sanlock_use_samba - name: XCCDF Value var_sanlock_use_samba # promote to variable set_fact: var_sanlock_use_samba: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the sanlock_use_samba SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean sanlock_use_samba Accordingly seboolean: name: sanlock_use_samba state: '{{ var_sanlock_use_samba }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_sanlock_use_samba # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_sanlock_use_samba='' setsebool -P sanlock_use_samba $var_sanlock_use_samba else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the saslauthd_read_shadow SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean saslauthd_read_shadow is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the saslauthd_read_shadow SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P saslauthd_read_shadow off - name: Disable the saslauthd_read_shadow SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_saslauthd_read_shadow - name: XCCDF Value var_saslauthd_read_shadow # promote to variable set_fact: var_saslauthd_read_shadow: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the saslauthd_read_shadow SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean saslauthd_read_shadow Accordingly seboolean: name: saslauthd_read_shadow state: '{{ var_saslauthd_read_shadow }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_saslauthd_read_shadow # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_saslauthd_read_shadow='' setsebool -P saslauthd_read_shadow $var_saslauthd_read_shadow else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the secadm_exec_content SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean secadm_exec_content is enabled. If this setting is disabled, it should be enabled. To enable the secadm_exec_content SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P secadm_exec_content on - name: Enable the secadm_exec_content SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_secadm_exec_content - name: XCCDF Value var_secadm_exec_content # promote to variable set_fact: var_secadm_exec_content: !!str tags: - always - name: Enable the secadm_exec_content SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean secadm_exec_content Accordingly seboolean: name: secadm_exec_content state: '{{ var_secadm_exec_content }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_secadm_exec_content # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_secadm_exec_content='' setsebool -P secadm_exec_content $var_secadm_exec_content else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the secure_mode SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean secure_mode is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the secure_mode SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P secure_mode off - name: Disable the secure_mode SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_secure_mode - name: XCCDF Value var_secure_mode # promote to variable set_fact: var_secure_mode: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the secure_mode SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean secure_mode Accordingly seboolean: name: secure_mode state: '{{ var_secure_mode }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_secure_mode # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_secure_mode='' setsebool -P secure_mode $var_secure_mode else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure the secure_mode_insmod SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean secure_mode_insmod is disabled. This setting should be configured to . To set the secure_mode_insmod SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P secure_mode_insmod BP28(R67) CCE-83310-3 - name: Configure the secure_mode_insmod SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83310-3 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_secure_mode_insmod - name: XCCDF Value var_secure_mode_insmod # promote to variable set_fact: var_secure_mode_insmod: !!str tags: - always - name: Configure the secure_mode_insmod SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean secure_mode_insmod Accordingly seboolean: name: secure_mode_insmod state: '{{ var_secure_mode_insmod }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - CCE-83310-3 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_secure_mode_insmod # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_secure_mode_insmod='' setsebool -P secure_mode_insmod $var_secure_mode_insmod else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the secure_mode_policyload SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean secure_mode_policyload is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the secure_mode_policyload SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P secure_mode_policyload off - name: Disable the secure_mode_policyload SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_secure_mode_policyload - name: XCCDF Value var_secure_mode_policyload # promote to variable set_fact: var_secure_mode_policyload: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the secure_mode_policyload SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean secure_mode_policyload Accordingly seboolean: name: secure_mode_policyload state: '{{ var_secure_mode_policyload }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_secure_mode_policyload # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_secure_mode_policyload='' setsebool -P secure_mode_policyload $var_secure_mode_policyload else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure the selinuxuser_direct_dri_enabled SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean selinuxuser_direct_dri_enabled is enabled. If XWindows is not installed or used on the system, this setting should be disabled. Otherwise, enable it. To disable the selinuxuser_direct_dri_enabled SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P selinuxuser_direct_dri_enabled off - name: Configure the selinuxuser_direct_dri_enabled SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_selinuxuser_direct_dri_enabled - name: XCCDF Value var_selinuxuser_direct_dri_enabled # promote to variable set_fact: var_selinuxuser_direct_dri_enabled: !!str tags: - always - name: Configure the selinuxuser_direct_dri_enabled SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean selinuxuser_direct_dri_enabled Accordingly seboolean: name: selinuxuser_direct_dri_enabled state: '{{ var_selinuxuser_direct_dri_enabled }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_selinuxuser_direct_dri_enabled # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_selinuxuser_direct_dri_enabled='' setsebool -P selinuxuser_direct_dri_enabled $var_selinuxuser_direct_dri_enabled else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the selinuxuser_execheap SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean selinuxuser_execheap is disabled. When enabled this boolean is enabled it allows selinuxusers to execute code from the heap. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the selinuxuser_execheap SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P selinuxuser_execheap off BP28(R67) 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3) 164.308(a)(4) 164.310(b) 164.310(c) 164.312(a) 164.312(e) Disabling code execution from the heap blocks buffer overflow attacks. CCE-80949-1 - name: Disable the selinuxuser_execheap SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80949-1 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_selinuxuser_execheap - name: XCCDF Value var_selinuxuser_execheap # promote to variable set_fact: var_selinuxuser_execheap: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the selinuxuser_execheap SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean selinuxuser_execheap Accordingly seboolean: name: selinuxuser_execheap state: '{{ var_selinuxuser_execheap }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - CCE-80949-1 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_selinuxuser_execheap # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_selinuxuser_execheap='' setsebool -P selinuxuser_execheap $var_selinuxuser_execheap else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the selinuxuser_execmod SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean selinuxuser_execmod is enabled. If this setting is disabled, it should be enabled. To enable the selinuxuser_execmod SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P selinuxuser_execmod on 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3) 164.308(a)(4) 164.310(b) 164.310(c) 164.312(a) 164.312(e) CCE-80950-9 - name: Enable the selinuxuser_execmod SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80950-9 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_selinuxuser_execmod - name: XCCDF Value var_selinuxuser_execmod # promote to variable set_fact: var_selinuxuser_execmod: !!str tags: - always - name: Enable the selinuxuser_execmod SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean selinuxuser_execmod Accordingly seboolean: name: selinuxuser_execmod state: '{{ var_selinuxuser_execmod }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - CCE-80950-9 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_selinuxuser_execmod # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_selinuxuser_execmod='' setsebool -P selinuxuser_execmod $var_selinuxuser_execmod else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the selinuxuser_execstack SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean selinuxuser_execstack is enabled. This setting should be disabled as unconfined executables should not be able to make their stack executable. To disable the selinuxuser_execstack SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P selinuxuser_execstack off BP28(R67) 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3) 164.308(a)(4) 164.310(b) 164.310(c) 164.312(a) 164.312(e) Disabling code execution from the stack blocks buffer overflow attacks. CCE-80951-7 - name: Disable the selinuxuser_execstack SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80951-7 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_selinuxuser_execstack - name: XCCDF Value var_selinuxuser_execstack # promote to variable set_fact: var_selinuxuser_execstack: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the selinuxuser_execstack SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean selinuxuser_execstack Accordingly seboolean: name: selinuxuser_execstack state: '{{ var_selinuxuser_execstack }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - CCE-80951-7 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_selinuxuser_execstack # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_selinuxuser_execstack='' setsebool -P selinuxuser_execstack $var_selinuxuser_execstack else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the selinuxuser_mysql_connect_enabled SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean selinuxuser_mysql_connect_enabled is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the selinuxuser_mysql_connect_enabled SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P selinuxuser_mysql_connect_enabled off - name: Disable the selinuxuser_mysql_connect_enabled SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_selinuxuser_mysql_connect_enabled - name: XCCDF Value var_selinuxuser_mysql_connect_enabled # promote to variable set_fact: var_selinuxuser_mysql_connect_enabled: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the selinuxuser_mysql_connect_enabled SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean selinuxuser_mysql_connect_enabled Accordingly seboolean: name: selinuxuser_mysql_connect_enabled state: '{{ var_selinuxuser_mysql_connect_enabled }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_selinuxuser_mysql_connect_enabled # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_selinuxuser_mysql_connect_enabled='' setsebool -P selinuxuser_mysql_connect_enabled $var_selinuxuser_mysql_connect_enabled else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the selinuxuser_ping SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean selinuxuser_ping is enabled. If this setting is disabled, it should be enabled as it allows confined users to use ping and traceroute which is helpful for network troubleshooting. To enable the selinuxuser_ping SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P selinuxuser_ping on - name: Enable the selinuxuser_ping SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_selinuxuser_ping - name: XCCDF Value var_selinuxuser_ping # promote to variable set_fact: var_selinuxuser_ping: !!str tags: - always - name: Enable the selinuxuser_ping SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean selinuxuser_ping Accordingly seboolean: name: selinuxuser_ping state: '{{ var_selinuxuser_ping }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_selinuxuser_ping # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_selinuxuser_ping='' setsebool -P selinuxuser_ping $var_selinuxuser_ping else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the selinuxuser_postgresql_connect_enabled SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean selinuxuser_postgresql_connect_enabled is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the selinuxuser_postgresql_connect_enabled SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P selinuxuser_postgresql_connect_enabled off - name: Disable the selinuxuser_postgresql_connect_enabled SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_selinuxuser_postgresql_connect_enabled - name: XCCDF Value var_selinuxuser_postgresql_connect_enabled # promote to variable set_fact: var_selinuxuser_postgresql_connect_enabled: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the selinuxuser_postgresql_connect_enabled SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean selinuxuser_postgresql_connect_enabled Accordingly seboolean: name: selinuxuser_postgresql_connect_enabled state: '{{ var_selinuxuser_postgresql_connect_enabled }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_selinuxuser_postgresql_connect_enabled # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_selinuxuser_postgresql_connect_enabled='' setsebool -P selinuxuser_postgresql_connect_enabled $var_selinuxuser_postgresql_connect_enabled else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the selinuxuser_rw_noexattrfile SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean selinuxuser_rw_noexattrfile is enabled. This setting should be disabled as users should not be able to read/write files on filesystems that do not have extended attributes e.g. FAT, CDROM, FLOPPY, etc. To disable the selinuxuser_rw_noexattrfile SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P selinuxuser_rw_noexattrfile off - name: Disable the selinuxuser_rw_noexattrfile SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_selinuxuser_rw_noexattrfile - name: XCCDF Value var_selinuxuser_rw_noexattrfile # promote to variable set_fact: var_selinuxuser_rw_noexattrfile: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the selinuxuser_rw_noexattrfile SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean selinuxuser_rw_noexattrfile Accordingly seboolean: name: selinuxuser_rw_noexattrfile state: '{{ var_selinuxuser_rw_noexattrfile }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_selinuxuser_rw_noexattrfile # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_selinuxuser_rw_noexattrfile='' setsebool -P selinuxuser_rw_noexattrfile $var_selinuxuser_rw_noexattrfile else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the selinuxuser_share_music SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean selinuxuser_share_music is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the selinuxuser_share_music SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P selinuxuser_share_music off - name: Disable the selinuxuser_share_music SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_selinuxuser_share_music - name: XCCDF Value var_selinuxuser_share_music # promote to variable set_fact: var_selinuxuser_share_music: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the selinuxuser_share_music SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean selinuxuser_share_music Accordingly seboolean: name: selinuxuser_share_music state: '{{ var_selinuxuser_share_music }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_selinuxuser_share_music # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_selinuxuser_share_music='' setsebool -P selinuxuser_share_music $var_selinuxuser_share_music else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the selinuxuser_tcp_server SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean selinuxuser_tcp_server is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the selinuxuser_tcp_server SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P selinuxuser_tcp_server off - name: Disable the selinuxuser_tcp_server SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_selinuxuser_tcp_server - name: XCCDF Value var_selinuxuser_tcp_server # promote to variable set_fact: var_selinuxuser_tcp_server: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the selinuxuser_tcp_server SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean selinuxuser_tcp_server Accordingly seboolean: name: selinuxuser_tcp_server state: '{{ var_selinuxuser_tcp_server }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_selinuxuser_tcp_server # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_selinuxuser_tcp_server='' setsebool -P selinuxuser_tcp_server $var_selinuxuser_tcp_server else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the selinuxuser_udp_server SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean selinuxuser_udp_server is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the selinuxuser_udp_server SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P selinuxuser_udp_server off - name: Disable the selinuxuser_udp_server SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_selinuxuser_udp_server - name: XCCDF Value var_selinuxuser_udp_server # promote to variable set_fact: var_selinuxuser_udp_server: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the selinuxuser_udp_server SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean selinuxuser_udp_server Accordingly seboolean: name: selinuxuser_udp_server state: '{{ var_selinuxuser_udp_server }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_selinuxuser_udp_server # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_selinuxuser_udp_server='' setsebool -P selinuxuser_udp_server $var_selinuxuser_udp_server else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot off - name: Disable the selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot - name: XCCDF Value var_selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot # promote to variable set_fact: var_selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot Accordingly seboolean: name: selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot state: '{{ var_selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot='' setsebool -P selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot $var_selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the sge_domain_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean sge_domain_can_network_connect is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the sge_domain_can_network_connect SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P sge_domain_can_network_connect off - name: Disable the sge_domain_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_sge_domain_can_network_connect - name: XCCDF Value var_sge_domain_can_network_connect # promote to variable set_fact: var_sge_domain_can_network_connect: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the sge_domain_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean sge_domain_can_network_connect Accordingly seboolean: name: sge_domain_can_network_connect state: '{{ var_sge_domain_can_network_connect }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_sge_domain_can_network_connect # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_sge_domain_can_network_connect='' setsebool -P sge_domain_can_network_connect $var_sge_domain_can_network_connect else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the sge_use_nfs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean sge_use_nfs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the sge_use_nfs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P sge_use_nfs off - name: Disable the sge_use_nfs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_sge_use_nfs - name: XCCDF Value var_sge_use_nfs # promote to variable set_fact: var_sge_use_nfs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the sge_use_nfs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean sge_use_nfs Accordingly seboolean: name: sge_use_nfs state: '{{ var_sge_use_nfs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_sge_use_nfs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_sge_use_nfs='' setsebool -P sge_use_nfs $var_sge_use_nfs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the smartmon_3ware SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean smartmon_3ware is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the smartmon_3ware SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P smartmon_3ware off - name: Disable the smartmon_3ware SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_smartmon_3ware - name: XCCDF Value var_smartmon_3ware # promote to variable set_fact: var_smartmon_3ware: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the smartmon_3ware SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean smartmon_3ware Accordingly seboolean: name: smartmon_3ware state: '{{ var_smartmon_3ware }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_smartmon_3ware # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_smartmon_3ware='' setsebool -P smartmon_3ware $var_smartmon_3ware else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the smbd_anon_write SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean smbd_anon_write is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the smbd_anon_write SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P smbd_anon_write off - name: Disable the smbd_anon_write SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_smbd_anon_write - name: XCCDF Value var_smbd_anon_write # promote to variable set_fact: var_smbd_anon_write: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the smbd_anon_write SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean smbd_anon_write Accordingly seboolean: name: smbd_anon_write state: '{{ var_smbd_anon_write }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_smbd_anon_write # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_smbd_anon_write='' setsebool -P smbd_anon_write $var_smbd_anon_write else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the spamassassin_can_network SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean spamassassin_can_network is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the spamassassin_can_network SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P spamassassin_can_network off - name: Disable the spamassassin_can_network SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_spamassassin_can_network - name: XCCDF Value var_spamassassin_can_network # promote to variable set_fact: var_spamassassin_can_network: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the spamassassin_can_network SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean spamassassin_can_network Accordingly seboolean: name: spamassassin_can_network state: '{{ var_spamassassin_can_network }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_spamassassin_can_network # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_spamassassin_can_network='' setsebool -P spamassassin_can_network $var_spamassassin_can_network else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the spamd_enable_home_dirs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean spamd_enable_home_dirs is enabled. If this setting is disabled, it should be enabled. To enable the spamd_enable_home_dirs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P spamd_enable_home_dirs on - name: Enable the spamd_enable_home_dirs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_spamd_enable_home_dirs - name: XCCDF Value var_spamd_enable_home_dirs # promote to variable set_fact: var_spamd_enable_home_dirs: !!str tags: - always - name: Enable the spamd_enable_home_dirs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean spamd_enable_home_dirs Accordingly seboolean: name: spamd_enable_home_dirs state: '{{ var_spamd_enable_home_dirs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_spamd_enable_home_dirs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_spamd_enable_home_dirs='' setsebool -P spamd_enable_home_dirs $var_spamd_enable_home_dirs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the squid_connect_any SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean squid_connect_any is enabled. This setting should be disabled as squid should only connect on specified ports. To disable the squid_connect_any SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P squid_connect_any off - name: Disable the squid_connect_any SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_squid_connect_any - name: XCCDF Value var_squid_connect_any # promote to variable set_fact: var_squid_connect_any: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the squid_connect_any SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean squid_connect_any Accordingly seboolean: name: squid_connect_any state: '{{ var_squid_connect_any }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_squid_connect_any # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_squid_connect_any='' setsebool -P squid_connect_any $var_squid_connect_any else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the squid_use_tproxy SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean squid_use_tproxy is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the squid_use_tproxy SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P squid_use_tproxy off - name: Disable the squid_use_tproxy SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_squid_use_tproxy - name: XCCDF Value var_squid_use_tproxy # promote to variable set_fact: var_squid_use_tproxy: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the squid_use_tproxy SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean squid_use_tproxy Accordingly seboolean: name: squid_use_tproxy state: '{{ var_squid_use_tproxy }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_squid_use_tproxy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_squid_use_tproxy='' setsebool -P squid_use_tproxy $var_squid_use_tproxy else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs off - name: Disable the ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs - name: XCCDF Value var_ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs # promote to variable set_fact: var_ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs Accordingly seboolean: name: ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs state: '{{ var_ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs='' setsebool -P ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs $var_ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the ssh_keysign SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean ssh_keysign is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the ssh_keysign SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P ssh_keysign off - name: Disable the ssh_keysign SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_ssh_keysign - name: XCCDF Value var_ssh_keysign # promote to variable set_fact: var_ssh_keysign: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the ssh_keysign SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean ssh_keysign Accordingly seboolean: name: ssh_keysign state: '{{ var_ssh_keysign }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_ssh_keysign # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_ssh_keysign='' setsebool -P ssh_keysign $var_ssh_keysign else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the ssh_sysadm_login SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean ssh_sysadm_login is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the ssh_sysadm_login SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P ssh_sysadm_login off BP28(R67) CCI-002165 CCI-002235 SRG-OS-000324-GPOS-00125 Preventing non-privileged users from executing privileged functions mitigates the risk that unauthorized individuals or processes may gain unnecessary access to information or privileges. Privileged functions include, for example, establishing accounts, performing system integrity checks, or administering cryptographic key management activities. Non-privileged users are individuals who do not possess appropriate authorizations. Circumventing intrusion detection and prevention mechanisms or malicious code protection mechanisms are examples of privileged functions that require protection from non-privileged users. CCE-83311-1 - name: Disable the ssh_sysadm_login SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83311-1 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_ssh_sysadm_login - name: XCCDF Value var_ssh_sysadm_login # promote to variable set_fact: var_ssh_sysadm_login: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the ssh_sysadm_login SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean ssh_sysadm_login Accordingly seboolean: name: ssh_sysadm_login state: '{{ var_ssh_sysadm_login }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - CCE-83311-1 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_ssh_sysadm_login # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_ssh_sysadm_login='' setsebool -P ssh_sysadm_login $var_ssh_sysadm_login else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the staff_exec_content SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean staff_exec_content is enabled. If this setting is disabled, it should be enabled. To enable the staff_exec_content SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P staff_exec_content on - name: Enable the staff_exec_content SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_staff_exec_content - name: XCCDF Value var_staff_exec_content # promote to variable set_fact: var_staff_exec_content: !!str tags: - always - name: Enable the staff_exec_content SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean staff_exec_content Accordingly seboolean: name: staff_exec_content state: '{{ var_staff_exec_content }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_staff_exec_content # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_staff_exec_content='' setsebool -P staff_exec_content $var_staff_exec_content else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the staff_use_svirt SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean staff_use_svirt is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the staff_use_svirt SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P staff_use_svirt off - name: Disable the staff_use_svirt SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_staff_use_svirt - name: XCCDF Value var_staff_use_svirt # promote to variable set_fact: var_staff_use_svirt: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the staff_use_svirt SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean staff_use_svirt Accordingly seboolean: name: staff_use_svirt state: '{{ var_staff_use_svirt }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_staff_use_svirt # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_staff_use_svirt='' setsebool -P staff_use_svirt $var_staff_use_svirt else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the swift_can_network SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean swift_can_network is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the swift_can_network SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P swift_can_network off - name: Disable the swift_can_network SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_swift_can_network - name: XCCDF Value var_swift_can_network # promote to variable set_fact: var_swift_can_network: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the swift_can_network SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean swift_can_network Accordingly seboolean: name: swift_can_network state: '{{ var_swift_can_network }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_swift_can_network # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_swift_can_network='' setsebool -P swift_can_network $var_swift_can_network else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the sysadm_exec_content SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean sysadm_exec_content is enabled. If this setting is disabled, it should be enabled. To enable the sysadm_exec_content SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P sysadm_exec_content on - name: Enable the sysadm_exec_content SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_sysadm_exec_content - name: XCCDF Value var_sysadm_exec_content # promote to variable set_fact: var_sysadm_exec_content: !!str tags: - always - name: Enable the sysadm_exec_content SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean sysadm_exec_content Accordingly seboolean: name: sysadm_exec_content state: '{{ var_sysadm_exec_content }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_sysadm_exec_content # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_sysadm_exec_content='' setsebool -P sysadm_exec_content $var_sysadm_exec_content else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the telepathy_connect_all_ports SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean telepathy_connect_all_ports is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the telepathy_connect_all_ports SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P telepathy_connect_all_ports off - name: Disable the telepathy_connect_all_ports SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_telepathy_connect_all_ports - name: XCCDF Value var_telepathy_connect_all_ports # promote to variable set_fact: var_telepathy_connect_all_ports: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the telepathy_connect_all_ports SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean telepathy_connect_all_ports Accordingly seboolean: name: telepathy_connect_all_ports state: '{{ var_telepathy_connect_all_ports }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_telepathy_connect_all_ports # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_telepathy_connect_all_ports='' setsebool -P telepathy_connect_all_ports $var_telepathy_connect_all_ports else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports is enabled. This setting should be disabled as telepathy should not connect to any generic network ports. To disable the telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports off - name: Disable the telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports - name: XCCDF Value var_telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports # promote to variable set_fact: var_telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports Accordingly seboolean: name: telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports state: '{{ var_telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports='' setsebool -P telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports $var_telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the tftp_anon_write SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean tftp_anon_write is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the tftp_anon_write SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P tftp_anon_write off - name: Disable the tftp_anon_write SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_tftp_anon_write - name: XCCDF Value var_tftp_anon_write # promote to variable set_fact: var_tftp_anon_write: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the tftp_anon_write SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean tftp_anon_write Accordingly seboolean: name: tftp_anon_write state: '{{ var_tftp_anon_write }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_tftp_anon_write # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_tftp_anon_write='' setsebool -P tftp_anon_write $var_tftp_anon_write else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the tftp_home_dir SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean tftp_home_dir is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the tftp_home_dir SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P tftp_home_dir off - name: Disable the tftp_home_dir SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_tftp_home_dir - name: XCCDF Value var_tftp_home_dir # promote to variable set_fact: var_tftp_home_dir: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the tftp_home_dir SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean tftp_home_dir Accordingly seboolean: name: tftp_home_dir state: '{{ var_tftp_home_dir }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_tftp_home_dir # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_tftp_home_dir='' setsebool -P tftp_home_dir $var_tftp_home_dir else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the tmpreaper_use_nfs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean tmpreaper_use_nfs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the tmpreaper_use_nfs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P tmpreaper_use_nfs off - name: Disable the tmpreaper_use_nfs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_tmpreaper_use_nfs - name: XCCDF Value var_tmpreaper_use_nfs # promote to variable set_fact: var_tmpreaper_use_nfs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the tmpreaper_use_nfs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean tmpreaper_use_nfs Accordingly seboolean: name: tmpreaper_use_nfs state: '{{ var_tmpreaper_use_nfs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_tmpreaper_use_nfs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_tmpreaper_use_nfs='' setsebool -P tmpreaper_use_nfs $var_tmpreaper_use_nfs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the tmpreaper_use_samba SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean tmpreaper_use_samba is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the tmpreaper_use_samba SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P tmpreaper_use_samba off - name: Disable the tmpreaper_use_samba SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_tmpreaper_use_samba - name: XCCDF Value var_tmpreaper_use_samba # promote to variable set_fact: var_tmpreaper_use_samba: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the tmpreaper_use_samba SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean tmpreaper_use_samba Accordingly seboolean: name: tmpreaper_use_samba state: '{{ var_tmpreaper_use_samba }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_tmpreaper_use_samba # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_tmpreaper_use_samba='' setsebool -P tmpreaper_use_samba $var_tmpreaper_use_samba else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the tor_bind_all_unreserved_ports SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean tor_bind_all_unreserved_ports is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the tor_bind_all_unreserved_ports SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P tor_bind_all_unreserved_ports off - name: Disable the tor_bind_all_unreserved_ports SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_tor_bind_all_unreserved_ports - name: XCCDF Value var_tor_bind_all_unreserved_ports # promote to variable set_fact: var_tor_bind_all_unreserved_ports: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the tor_bind_all_unreserved_ports SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean tor_bind_all_unreserved_ports Accordingly seboolean: name: tor_bind_all_unreserved_ports state: '{{ var_tor_bind_all_unreserved_ports }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_tor_bind_all_unreserved_ports # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_tor_bind_all_unreserved_ports='' setsebool -P tor_bind_all_unreserved_ports $var_tor_bind_all_unreserved_ports else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the tor_can_network_relay SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean tor_can_network_relay is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the tor_can_network_relay SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P tor_can_network_relay off - name: Disable the tor_can_network_relay SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_tor_can_network_relay - name: XCCDF Value var_tor_can_network_relay # promote to variable set_fact: var_tor_can_network_relay: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the tor_can_network_relay SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean tor_can_network_relay Accordingly seboolean: name: tor_can_network_relay state: '{{ var_tor_can_network_relay }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_tor_can_network_relay # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_tor_can_network_relay='' setsebool -P tor_can_network_relay $var_tor_can_network_relay else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition is enabled. If this setting is disabled, it should be enabled. To enable the unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition on - name: Enable the unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition - name: XCCDF Value var_unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition # promote to variable set_fact: var_unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition: !!str tags: - always - name: Enable the unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition Accordingly seboolean: name: unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition state: '{{ var_unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition='' setsebool -P unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition $var_unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the unconfined_login SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean unconfined_login is enabled. If this setting is disabled, it should be enabled. To enable the unconfined_login SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P unconfined_login on - name: Enable the unconfined_login SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_unconfined_login - name: XCCDF Value var_unconfined_login # promote to variable set_fact: var_unconfined_login: !!str tags: - always - name: Enable the unconfined_login SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean unconfined_login Accordingly seboolean: name: unconfined_login state: '{{ var_unconfined_login }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_unconfined_login # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_unconfined_login='' setsebool -P unconfined_login $var_unconfined_login else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition is enabled. If this setting is disabled, it should be enabled. To enable the unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition on - name: Enable the unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition - name: XCCDF Value var_unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition # promote to variable set_fact: var_unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition: !!str tags: - always - name: Enable the unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition Accordingly seboolean: name: unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition state: '{{ var_unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition='' setsebool -P unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition $var_unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the unprivuser_use_svirt SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean unprivuser_use_svirt is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the unprivuser_use_svirt SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P unprivuser_use_svirt off - name: Disable the unprivuser_use_svirt SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_unprivuser_use_svirt - name: XCCDF Value var_unprivuser_use_svirt # promote to variable set_fact: var_unprivuser_use_svirt: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the unprivuser_use_svirt SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean unprivuser_use_svirt Accordingly seboolean: name: unprivuser_use_svirt state: '{{ var_unprivuser_use_svirt }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_unprivuser_use_svirt # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_unprivuser_use_svirt='' setsebool -P unprivuser_use_svirt $var_unprivuser_use_svirt else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the use_ecryptfs_home_dirs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean use_ecryptfs_home_dirs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the use_ecryptfs_home_dirs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P use_ecryptfs_home_dirs off - name: Disable the use_ecryptfs_home_dirs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_use_ecryptfs_home_dirs - name: XCCDF Value var_use_ecryptfs_home_dirs # promote to variable set_fact: var_use_ecryptfs_home_dirs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the use_ecryptfs_home_dirs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean use_ecryptfs_home_dirs Accordingly seboolean: name: use_ecryptfs_home_dirs state: '{{ var_use_ecryptfs_home_dirs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_use_ecryptfs_home_dirs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_use_ecryptfs_home_dirs='' setsebool -P use_ecryptfs_home_dirs $var_use_ecryptfs_home_dirs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the use_fusefs_home_dirs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean use_fusefs_home_dirs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the use_fusefs_home_dirs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P use_fusefs_home_dirs off - name: Disable the use_fusefs_home_dirs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_use_fusefs_home_dirs - name: XCCDF Value var_use_fusefs_home_dirs # promote to variable set_fact: var_use_fusefs_home_dirs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the use_fusefs_home_dirs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean use_fusefs_home_dirs Accordingly seboolean: name: use_fusefs_home_dirs state: '{{ var_use_fusefs_home_dirs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_use_fusefs_home_dirs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_use_fusefs_home_dirs='' setsebool -P use_fusefs_home_dirs $var_use_fusefs_home_dirs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the use_lpd_server SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean use_lpd_server is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the use_lpd_server SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P use_lpd_server off - name: Disable the use_lpd_server SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_use_lpd_server - name: XCCDF Value var_use_lpd_server # promote to variable set_fact: var_use_lpd_server: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the use_lpd_server SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean use_lpd_server Accordingly seboolean: name: use_lpd_server state: '{{ var_use_lpd_server }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_use_lpd_server # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_use_lpd_server='' setsebool -P use_lpd_server $var_use_lpd_server else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the use_nfs_home_dirs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean use_nfs_home_dirs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the use_nfs_home_dirs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P use_nfs_home_dirs off - name: Disable the use_nfs_home_dirs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_use_nfs_home_dirs - name: XCCDF Value var_use_nfs_home_dirs # promote to variable set_fact: var_use_nfs_home_dirs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the use_nfs_home_dirs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean use_nfs_home_dirs Accordingly seboolean: name: use_nfs_home_dirs state: '{{ var_use_nfs_home_dirs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_use_nfs_home_dirs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_use_nfs_home_dirs='' setsebool -P use_nfs_home_dirs $var_use_nfs_home_dirs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the use_samba_home_dirs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean use_samba_home_dirs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the use_samba_home_dirs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P use_samba_home_dirs off - name: Disable the use_samba_home_dirs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_use_samba_home_dirs - name: XCCDF Value var_use_samba_home_dirs # promote to variable set_fact: var_use_samba_home_dirs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the use_samba_home_dirs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean use_samba_home_dirs Accordingly seboolean: name: use_samba_home_dirs state: '{{ var_use_samba_home_dirs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_use_samba_home_dirs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_use_samba_home_dirs='' setsebool -P use_samba_home_dirs $var_use_samba_home_dirs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the user_exec_content SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean user_exec_content is enabled. If this setting is disabled, it should be enabled. To enable the user_exec_content SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P user_exec_content on - name: Enable the user_exec_content SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_user_exec_content - name: XCCDF Value var_user_exec_content # promote to variable set_fact: var_user_exec_content: !!str tags: - always - name: Enable the user_exec_content SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean user_exec_content Accordingly seboolean: name: user_exec_content state: '{{ var_user_exec_content }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_user_exec_content # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_user_exec_content='' setsebool -P user_exec_content $var_user_exec_content else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the varnishd_connect_any SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean varnishd_connect_any is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the varnishd_connect_any SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P varnishd_connect_any off - name: Disable the varnishd_connect_any SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_varnishd_connect_any - name: XCCDF Value var_varnishd_connect_any # promote to variable set_fact: var_varnishd_connect_any: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the varnishd_connect_any SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean varnishd_connect_any Accordingly seboolean: name: varnishd_connect_any state: '{{ var_varnishd_connect_any }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_varnishd_connect_any # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_varnishd_connect_any='' setsebool -P varnishd_connect_any $var_varnishd_connect_any else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the virt_read_qemu_ga_data SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean virt_read_qemu_ga_data is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the virt_read_qemu_ga_data SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P virt_read_qemu_ga_data off - name: Disable the virt_read_qemu_ga_data SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_virt_read_qemu_ga_data - name: XCCDF Value var_virt_read_qemu_ga_data # promote to variable set_fact: var_virt_read_qemu_ga_data: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the virt_read_qemu_ga_data SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean virt_read_qemu_ga_data Accordingly seboolean: name: virt_read_qemu_ga_data state: '{{ var_virt_read_qemu_ga_data }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_virt_read_qemu_ga_data # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_virt_read_qemu_ga_data='' setsebool -P virt_read_qemu_ga_data $var_virt_read_qemu_ga_data else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the virt_rw_qemu_ga_data SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean virt_rw_qemu_ga_data is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the virt_rw_qemu_ga_data SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P virt_rw_qemu_ga_data off - name: Disable the virt_rw_qemu_ga_data SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_virt_rw_qemu_ga_data - name: XCCDF Value var_virt_rw_qemu_ga_data # promote to variable set_fact: var_virt_rw_qemu_ga_data: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the virt_rw_qemu_ga_data SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean virt_rw_qemu_ga_data Accordingly seboolean: name: virt_rw_qemu_ga_data state: '{{ var_virt_rw_qemu_ga_data }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_virt_rw_qemu_ga_data # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_virt_rw_qemu_ga_data='' setsebool -P virt_rw_qemu_ga_data $var_virt_rw_qemu_ga_data else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the virt_sandbox_use_all_caps SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean virt_sandbox_use_all_caps is enabled. This setting is disabled as containers should not run with privileges. To disable the virt_sandbox_use_all_caps SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P virt_sandbox_use_all_caps off - name: Disable the virt_sandbox_use_all_caps SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_virt_sandbox_use_all_caps - name: XCCDF Value var_virt_sandbox_use_all_caps # promote to variable set_fact: var_virt_sandbox_use_all_caps: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the virt_sandbox_use_all_caps SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean virt_sandbox_use_all_caps Accordingly seboolean: name: virt_sandbox_use_all_caps state: '{{ var_virt_sandbox_use_all_caps }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_virt_sandbox_use_all_caps # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_virt_sandbox_use_all_caps='' setsebool -P virt_sandbox_use_all_caps $var_virt_sandbox_use_all_caps else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the virt_sandbox_use_audit SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean virt_sandbox_use_audit is enabled. If this setting is disabled, it should be enabled to allow sandboxed containers to send audit messages. To enable the virt_sandbox_use_audit SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P virt_sandbox_use_audit on - name: Enable the virt_sandbox_use_audit SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_virt_sandbox_use_audit - name: XCCDF Value var_virt_sandbox_use_audit # promote to variable set_fact: var_virt_sandbox_use_audit: !!str tags: - always - name: Enable the virt_sandbox_use_audit SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean virt_sandbox_use_audit Accordingly seboolean: name: virt_sandbox_use_audit state: '{{ var_virt_sandbox_use_audit }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_virt_sandbox_use_audit # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_virt_sandbox_use_audit='' setsebool -P virt_sandbox_use_audit $var_virt_sandbox_use_audit else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the virt_sandbox_use_mknod SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean virt_sandbox_use_mknod is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the virt_sandbox_use_mknod SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P virt_sandbox_use_mknod off - name: Disable the virt_sandbox_use_mknod SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_virt_sandbox_use_mknod - name: XCCDF Value var_virt_sandbox_use_mknod # promote to variable set_fact: var_virt_sandbox_use_mknod: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the virt_sandbox_use_mknod SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean virt_sandbox_use_mknod Accordingly seboolean: name: virt_sandbox_use_mknod state: '{{ var_virt_sandbox_use_mknod }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_virt_sandbox_use_mknod # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_virt_sandbox_use_mknod='' setsebool -P virt_sandbox_use_mknod $var_virt_sandbox_use_mknod else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the virt_sandbox_use_netlink SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean virt_sandbox_use_netlink is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the virt_sandbox_use_netlink SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P virt_sandbox_use_netlink off - name: Disable the virt_sandbox_use_netlink SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_virt_sandbox_use_netlink - name: XCCDF Value var_virt_sandbox_use_netlink # promote to variable set_fact: var_virt_sandbox_use_netlink: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the virt_sandbox_use_netlink SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean virt_sandbox_use_netlink Accordingly seboolean: name: virt_sandbox_use_netlink state: '{{ var_virt_sandbox_use_netlink }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_virt_sandbox_use_netlink # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_virt_sandbox_use_netlink='' setsebool -P virt_sandbox_use_netlink $var_virt_sandbox_use_netlink else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the virt_sandbox_use_sys_admin SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean virt_sandbox_use_sys_admin is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the virt_sandbox_use_sys_admin SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P virt_sandbox_use_sys_admin off - name: Disable the virt_sandbox_use_sys_admin SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_virt_sandbox_use_sys_admin - name: XCCDF Value var_virt_sandbox_use_sys_admin # promote to variable set_fact: var_virt_sandbox_use_sys_admin: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the virt_sandbox_use_sys_admin SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean virt_sandbox_use_sys_admin Accordingly seboolean: name: virt_sandbox_use_sys_admin state: '{{ var_virt_sandbox_use_sys_admin }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_virt_sandbox_use_sys_admin # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_virt_sandbox_use_sys_admin='' setsebool -P virt_sandbox_use_sys_admin $var_virt_sandbox_use_sys_admin else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the virt_transition_userdomain SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean virt_transition_userdomain is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the virt_transition_userdomain SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P virt_transition_userdomain off - name: Disable the virt_transition_userdomain SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_virt_transition_userdomain - name: XCCDF Value var_virt_transition_userdomain # promote to variable set_fact: var_virt_transition_userdomain: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the virt_transition_userdomain SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean virt_transition_userdomain Accordingly seboolean: name: virt_transition_userdomain state: '{{ var_virt_transition_userdomain }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_virt_transition_userdomain # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_virt_transition_userdomain='' setsebool -P virt_transition_userdomain $var_virt_transition_userdomain else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the virt_use_comm SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean virt_use_comm is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the virt_use_comm SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P virt_use_comm off - name: Disable the virt_use_comm SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_virt_use_comm - name: XCCDF Value var_virt_use_comm # promote to variable set_fact: var_virt_use_comm: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the virt_use_comm SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean virt_use_comm Accordingly seboolean: name: virt_use_comm state: '{{ var_virt_use_comm }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_virt_use_comm # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_virt_use_comm='' setsebool -P virt_use_comm $var_virt_use_comm else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the virt_use_execmem SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean virt_use_execmem is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the virt_use_execmem SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P virt_use_execmem off BP28(R67) CCE-83312-9 - name: Disable the virt_use_execmem SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83312-9 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_virt_use_execmem - name: XCCDF Value var_virt_use_execmem # promote to variable set_fact: var_virt_use_execmem: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the virt_use_execmem SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean virt_use_execmem Accordingly seboolean: name: virt_use_execmem state: '{{ var_virt_use_execmem }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - CCE-83312-9 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_virt_use_execmem # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_virt_use_execmem='' setsebool -P virt_use_execmem $var_virt_use_execmem else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the virt_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean virt_use_fusefs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the virt_use_fusefs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P virt_use_fusefs off - name: Disable the virt_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_virt_use_fusefs - name: XCCDF Value var_virt_use_fusefs # promote to variable set_fact: var_virt_use_fusefs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the virt_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean virt_use_fusefs Accordingly seboolean: name: virt_use_fusefs state: '{{ var_virt_use_fusefs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_virt_use_fusefs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_virt_use_fusefs='' setsebool -P virt_use_fusefs $var_virt_use_fusefs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the virt_use_nfs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean virt_use_nfs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the virt_use_nfs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P virt_use_nfs off - name: Disable the virt_use_nfs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_virt_use_nfs - name: XCCDF Value var_virt_use_nfs # promote to variable set_fact: var_virt_use_nfs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the virt_use_nfs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean virt_use_nfs Accordingly seboolean: name: virt_use_nfs state: '{{ var_virt_use_nfs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_virt_use_nfs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_virt_use_nfs='' setsebool -P virt_use_nfs $var_virt_use_nfs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the virt_use_rawip SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean virt_use_rawip is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the virt_use_rawip SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P virt_use_rawip off - name: Disable the virt_use_rawip SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_virt_use_rawip - name: XCCDF Value var_virt_use_rawip # promote to variable set_fact: var_virt_use_rawip: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the virt_use_rawip SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean virt_use_rawip Accordingly seboolean: name: virt_use_rawip state: '{{ var_virt_use_rawip }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_virt_use_rawip # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_virt_use_rawip='' setsebool -P virt_use_rawip $var_virt_use_rawip else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the virt_use_samba SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean virt_use_samba is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the virt_use_samba SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P virt_use_samba off - name: Disable the virt_use_samba SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_virt_use_samba - name: XCCDF Value var_virt_use_samba # promote to variable set_fact: var_virt_use_samba: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the virt_use_samba SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean virt_use_samba Accordingly seboolean: name: virt_use_samba state: '{{ var_virt_use_samba }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_virt_use_samba # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_virt_use_samba='' setsebool -P virt_use_samba $var_virt_use_samba else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the virt_use_sanlock SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean virt_use_sanlock is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the virt_use_sanlock SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P virt_use_sanlock off - name: Disable the virt_use_sanlock SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_virt_use_sanlock - name: XCCDF Value var_virt_use_sanlock # promote to variable set_fact: var_virt_use_sanlock: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the virt_use_sanlock SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean virt_use_sanlock Accordingly seboolean: name: virt_use_sanlock state: '{{ var_virt_use_sanlock }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_virt_use_sanlock # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_virt_use_sanlock='' setsebool -P virt_use_sanlock $var_virt_use_sanlock else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the virt_use_usb SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean virt_use_usb is enabled. This setting should be disabled. To disable the virt_use_usb SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P virt_use_usb off - name: Disable the virt_use_usb SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_virt_use_usb - name: XCCDF Value var_virt_use_usb # promote to variable set_fact: var_virt_use_usb: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the virt_use_usb SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean virt_use_usb Accordingly seboolean: name: virt_use_usb state: '{{ var_virt_use_usb }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_virt_use_usb # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_virt_use_usb='' setsebool -P virt_use_usb $var_virt_use_usb else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the virt_use_xserver SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean virt_use_xserver is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the virt_use_xserver SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P virt_use_xserver off - name: Disable the virt_use_xserver SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_virt_use_xserver - name: XCCDF Value var_virt_use_xserver # promote to variable set_fact: var_virt_use_xserver: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the virt_use_xserver SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean virt_use_xserver Accordingly seboolean: name: virt_use_xserver state: '{{ var_virt_use_xserver }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_virt_use_xserver # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_virt_use_xserver='' setsebool -P virt_use_xserver $var_virt_use_xserver else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the webadm_manage_user_files SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean webadm_manage_user_files is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the webadm_manage_user_files SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P webadm_manage_user_files off - name: Disable the webadm_manage_user_files SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_webadm_manage_user_files - name: XCCDF Value var_webadm_manage_user_files # promote to variable set_fact: var_webadm_manage_user_files: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the webadm_manage_user_files SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean webadm_manage_user_files Accordingly seboolean: name: webadm_manage_user_files state: '{{ var_webadm_manage_user_files }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_webadm_manage_user_files # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_webadm_manage_user_files='' setsebool -P webadm_manage_user_files $var_webadm_manage_user_files else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the webadm_read_user_files SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean webadm_read_user_files is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the webadm_read_user_files SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P webadm_read_user_files off - name: Disable the webadm_read_user_files SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_webadm_read_user_files - name: XCCDF Value var_webadm_read_user_files # promote to variable set_fact: var_webadm_read_user_files: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the webadm_read_user_files SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean webadm_read_user_files Accordingly seboolean: name: webadm_read_user_files state: '{{ var_webadm_read_user_files }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_webadm_read_user_files # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_webadm_read_user_files='' setsebool -P webadm_read_user_files $var_webadm_read_user_files else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the wine_mmap_zero_ignore SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean wine_mmap_zero_ignore is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the wine_mmap_zero_ignore SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P wine_mmap_zero_ignore off - name: Disable the wine_mmap_zero_ignore SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_wine_mmap_zero_ignore - name: XCCDF Value var_wine_mmap_zero_ignore # promote to variable set_fact: var_wine_mmap_zero_ignore: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the wine_mmap_zero_ignore SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean wine_mmap_zero_ignore Accordingly seboolean: name: wine_mmap_zero_ignore state: '{{ var_wine_mmap_zero_ignore }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_wine_mmap_zero_ignore # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_wine_mmap_zero_ignore='' setsebool -P wine_mmap_zero_ignore $var_wine_mmap_zero_ignore else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the xdm_bind_vnc_tcp_port SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean xdm_bind_vnc_tcp_port is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the xdm_bind_vnc_tcp_port SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P xdm_bind_vnc_tcp_port off - name: Disable the xdm_bind_vnc_tcp_port SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_xdm_bind_vnc_tcp_port - name: XCCDF Value var_xdm_bind_vnc_tcp_port # promote to variable set_fact: var_xdm_bind_vnc_tcp_port: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the xdm_bind_vnc_tcp_port SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean xdm_bind_vnc_tcp_port Accordingly seboolean: name: xdm_bind_vnc_tcp_port state: '{{ var_xdm_bind_vnc_tcp_port }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_xdm_bind_vnc_tcp_port # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_xdm_bind_vnc_tcp_port='' setsebool -P xdm_bind_vnc_tcp_port $var_xdm_bind_vnc_tcp_port else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the xdm_exec_bootloader SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean xdm_exec_bootloader is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the xdm_exec_bootloader SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P xdm_exec_bootloader off - name: Disable the xdm_exec_bootloader SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_xdm_exec_bootloader - name: XCCDF Value var_xdm_exec_bootloader # promote to variable set_fact: var_xdm_exec_bootloader: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the xdm_exec_bootloader SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean xdm_exec_bootloader Accordingly seboolean: name: xdm_exec_bootloader state: '{{ var_xdm_exec_bootloader }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_xdm_exec_bootloader # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_xdm_exec_bootloader='' setsebool -P xdm_exec_bootloader $var_xdm_exec_bootloader else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the xdm_sysadm_login SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean xdm_sysadm_login is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the xdm_sysadm_login SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P xdm_sysadm_login off - name: Disable the xdm_sysadm_login SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_xdm_sysadm_login - name: XCCDF Value var_xdm_sysadm_login # promote to variable set_fact: var_xdm_sysadm_login: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the xdm_sysadm_login SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean xdm_sysadm_login Accordingly seboolean: name: xdm_sysadm_login state: '{{ var_xdm_sysadm_login }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_xdm_sysadm_login # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_xdm_sysadm_login='' setsebool -P xdm_sysadm_login $var_xdm_sysadm_login else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the xdm_write_home SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean xdm_write_home is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the xdm_write_home SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P xdm_write_home off - name: Disable the xdm_write_home SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_xdm_write_home - name: XCCDF Value var_xdm_write_home # promote to variable set_fact: var_xdm_write_home: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the xdm_write_home SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean xdm_write_home Accordingly seboolean: name: xdm_write_home state: '{{ var_xdm_write_home }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_xdm_write_home # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_xdm_write_home='' setsebool -P xdm_write_home $var_xdm_write_home else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the xen_use_nfs SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean xen_use_nfs is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the xen_use_nfs SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P xen_use_nfs off - name: Disable the xen_use_nfs SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_xen_use_nfs - name: XCCDF Value var_xen_use_nfs # promote to variable set_fact: var_xen_use_nfs: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the xen_use_nfs SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean xen_use_nfs Accordingly seboolean: name: xen_use_nfs state: '{{ var_xen_use_nfs }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_xen_use_nfs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_xen_use_nfs='' setsebool -P xen_use_nfs $var_xen_use_nfs else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the xend_run_blktap SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean xend_run_blktap is enabled. If this setting is disabled, it should be enabled. To enable the xend_run_blktap SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P xend_run_blktap on - name: Enable the xend_run_blktap SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_xend_run_blktap - name: XCCDF Value var_xend_run_blktap # promote to variable set_fact: var_xend_run_blktap: !!str tags: - always - name: Enable the xend_run_blktap SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean xend_run_blktap Accordingly seboolean: name: xend_run_blktap state: '{{ var_xend_run_blktap }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_xend_run_blktap # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_xend_run_blktap='' setsebool -P xend_run_blktap $var_xend_run_blktap else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the xend_run_qemu SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean xend_run_qemu is enabled. If this setting is disabled, it should be enabled. To enable the xend_run_qemu SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P xend_run_qemu on - name: Enable the xend_run_qemu SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_xend_run_qemu - name: XCCDF Value var_xend_run_qemu # promote to variable set_fact: var_xend_run_qemu: !!str tags: - always - name: Enable the xend_run_qemu SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean xend_run_qemu Accordingly seboolean: name: xend_run_qemu state: '{{ var_xend_run_qemu }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_xend_run_qemu # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_xend_run_qemu='' setsebool -P xend_run_qemu $var_xend_run_qemu else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the xguest_connect_network SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean xguest_connect_network is enabled. This setting should be disabled as guest users should not be able to configure NetworkManager. To disable the xguest_connect_network SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P xguest_connect_network off - name: Disable the xguest_connect_network SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_xguest_connect_network - name: XCCDF Value var_xguest_connect_network # promote to variable set_fact: var_xguest_connect_network: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the xguest_connect_network SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean xguest_connect_network Accordingly seboolean: name: xguest_connect_network state: '{{ var_xguest_connect_network }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_xguest_connect_network # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_xguest_connect_network='' setsebool -P xguest_connect_network $var_xguest_connect_network else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the xguest_exec_content SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean xguest_exec_content is enabled. This setting should be disabled as guest users should not be able to run executables. To disable the xguest_exec_content SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P xguest_exec_content off - name: Disable the xguest_exec_content SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_xguest_exec_content - name: XCCDF Value var_xguest_exec_content # promote to variable set_fact: var_xguest_exec_content: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the xguest_exec_content SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean xguest_exec_content Accordingly seboolean: name: xguest_exec_content state: '{{ var_xguest_exec_content }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_xguest_exec_content # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_xguest_exec_content='' setsebool -P xguest_exec_content $var_xguest_exec_content else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the xguest_mount_media SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean xguest_mount_media is enabled. This setting should be disabled as guest users should not be able to mount any media. To disable the xguest_mount_media SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P xguest_mount_media off - name: Disable the xguest_mount_media SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_xguest_mount_media - name: XCCDF Value var_xguest_mount_media # promote to variable set_fact: var_xguest_mount_media: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the xguest_mount_media SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean xguest_mount_media Accordingly seboolean: name: xguest_mount_media state: '{{ var_xguest_mount_media }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_xguest_mount_media # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_xguest_mount_media='' setsebool -P xguest_mount_media $var_xguest_mount_media else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the xguest_use_bluetooth SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean xguest_use_bluetooth is enabled. This setting should be disabled as guests users should not be able to access or use bluetooth. To disable the xguest_use_bluetooth SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P xguest_use_bluetooth off - name: Disable the xguest_use_bluetooth SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_xguest_use_bluetooth - name: XCCDF Value var_xguest_use_bluetooth # promote to variable set_fact: var_xguest_use_bluetooth: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the xguest_use_bluetooth SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean xguest_use_bluetooth Accordingly seboolean: name: xguest_use_bluetooth state: '{{ var_xguest_use_bluetooth }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_xguest_use_bluetooth # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_xguest_use_bluetooth='' setsebool -P xguest_use_bluetooth $var_xguest_use_bluetooth else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the xserver_clients_write_xshm SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean xserver_clients_write_xshm is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the xserver_clients_write_xshm SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P xserver_clients_write_xshm off - name: Disable the xserver_clients_write_xshm SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_xserver_clients_write_xshm - name: XCCDF Value var_xserver_clients_write_xshm # promote to variable set_fact: var_xserver_clients_write_xshm: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the xserver_clients_write_xshm SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean xserver_clients_write_xshm Accordingly seboolean: name: xserver_clients_write_xshm state: '{{ var_xserver_clients_write_xshm }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_xserver_clients_write_xshm # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_xserver_clients_write_xshm='' setsebool -P xserver_clients_write_xshm $var_xserver_clients_write_xshm else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the xserver_execmem SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean xserver_execmem is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the xserver_execmem SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P xserver_execmem off BP28(R67) CCE-83313-7 - name: Disable the xserver_execmem SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83313-7 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_xserver_execmem - name: XCCDF Value var_xserver_execmem # promote to variable set_fact: var_xserver_execmem: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the xserver_execmem SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean xserver_execmem Accordingly seboolean: name: xserver_execmem state: '{{ var_xserver_execmem }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - CCE-83313-7 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_xserver_execmem # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_xserver_execmem='' setsebool -P xserver_execmem $var_xserver_execmem else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the xserver_object_manager SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean xserver_object_manager is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the xserver_object_manager SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P xserver_object_manager off - name: Disable the xserver_object_manager SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_xserver_object_manager - name: XCCDF Value var_xserver_object_manager # promote to variable set_fact: var_xserver_object_manager: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the xserver_object_manager SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean xserver_object_manager Accordingly seboolean: name: xserver_object_manager state: '{{ var_xserver_object_manager }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_xserver_object_manager # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_xserver_object_manager='' setsebool -P xserver_object_manager $var_xserver_object_manager else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the zabbix_can_network SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean zabbix_can_network is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the zabbix_can_network SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P zabbix_can_network off - name: Disable the zabbix_can_network SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_zabbix_can_network - name: XCCDF Value var_zabbix_can_network # promote to variable set_fact: var_zabbix_can_network: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the zabbix_can_network SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean zabbix_can_network Accordingly seboolean: name: zabbix_can_network state: '{{ var_zabbix_can_network }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_zabbix_can_network # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_zabbix_can_network='' setsebool -P zabbix_can_network $var_zabbix_can_network else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the zarafa_setrlimit SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean zarafa_setrlimit is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the zarafa_setrlimit SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P zarafa_setrlimit off - name: Disable the zarafa_setrlimit SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_zarafa_setrlimit - name: XCCDF Value var_zarafa_setrlimit # promote to variable set_fact: var_zarafa_setrlimit: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the zarafa_setrlimit SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean zarafa_setrlimit Accordingly seboolean: name: zarafa_setrlimit state: '{{ var_zarafa_setrlimit }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_zarafa_setrlimit # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_zarafa_setrlimit='' setsebool -P zarafa_setrlimit $var_zarafa_setrlimit else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the zebra_write_config SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean zebra_write_config is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the zebra_write_config SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P zebra_write_config off - name: Disable the zebra_write_config SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_zebra_write_config - name: XCCDF Value var_zebra_write_config # promote to variable set_fact: var_zebra_write_config: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the zebra_write_config SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean zebra_write_config Accordingly seboolean: name: zebra_write_config state: '{{ var_zebra_write_config }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_zebra_write_config # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_zebra_write_config='' setsebool -P zebra_write_config $var_zebra_write_config else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the zoneminder_anon_write SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean zoneminder_anon_write is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the zoneminder_anon_write SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P zoneminder_anon_write off - name: Disable the zoneminder_anon_write SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_zoneminder_anon_write - name: XCCDF Value var_zoneminder_anon_write # promote to variable set_fact: var_zoneminder_anon_write: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the zoneminder_anon_write SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean zoneminder_anon_write Accordingly seboolean: name: zoneminder_anon_write state: '{{ var_zoneminder_anon_write }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_zoneminder_anon_write # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_zoneminder_anon_write='' setsebool -P zoneminder_anon_write $var_zoneminder_anon_write else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable the zoneminder_run_sudo SELinux Boolean By default, the SELinux boolean zoneminder_run_sudo is disabled. If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. To disable the zoneminder_run_sudo SELinux boolean, run the following command: $ sudo setsebool -P zoneminder_run_sudo off - name: Disable the zoneminder_run_sudo SELinux Boolean - Ensure python3-libsemanage Installed package: name: python3-libsemanage state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_zoneminder_run_sudo - name: XCCDF Value var_zoneminder_run_sudo # promote to variable set_fact: var_zoneminder_run_sudo: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable the zoneminder_run_sudo SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux Boolean zoneminder_run_sudo Accordingly seboolean: name: zoneminder_run_sudo state: '{{ var_zoneminder_run_sudo }}' persistent: true when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.selinux.status == 'enabled' tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sebool_zoneminder_run_sudo # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libsemanage" ; then yum install -y "python3-libsemanage" fi if selinuxenabled; then var_zoneminder_run_sudo='' setsebool -P zoneminder_run_sudo $var_zoneminder_run_sudo else echo "Skipping remediation, SELinux is disabled"; false fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Services The best protection against vulnerable software is running less software. This section describes how to review the software which Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 installs on a system and disable software which is not needed. It then enumerates the software packages installed on a default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 system and provides guidance about which ones can be safely disabled. Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 provides a convenient minimal install option that essentially installs the bare necessities for a functional system. When building Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 systems, it is highly recommended to select the minimal packages and then build up the system from there. Apport Service The Apport service provides debugging and crash reporting features on Ubuntu distributions. APT service configuration The apt service manage the package management and update of the whole system. Its configuration need to be properly defined to ensure efficient security updates, packages and repository authentication and proper lifecycle management. Avahi Server The Avahi daemon implements the DNS Service Discovery and Multicast DNS protocols, which provide service and host discovery on a network. It allows a system to automatically identify resources on the network, such as printers or web servers. This capability is also known as mDNSresponder and is a major part of Zeroconf networking. Configure Avahi if Necessary If your system requires the Avahi daemon, its configuration can be restricted to improve security. The Avahi daemon configuration file is /etc/avahi/avahi-daemon.conf. The following security recommendations should be applied to this file: See the avahi-daemon.conf(5) man page, or documentation at http://www.avahi.org, for more detailed information about the configuration options. Check Avahi Responses' TTL Field To make Avahi ignore packets unless the TTL field is 255, edit /etc/avahi/avahi-daemon.conf and ensure the following line appears in the [server] section: check-response-ttl=yes 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 This helps to ensure that only mDNS responses from the local network are processed, because the TTL field in a packet is decremented from its initial value of 255 whenever it is routed from one network to another. Although a properly-configured router or firewall should not allow mDNS packets into the local network at all, this option provides another check to ensure they are not permitted. CCE-82377-3 Disable Avahi Publishing To prevent Avahi from publishing its records, edit /etc/avahi/avahi-daemon.conf and ensure the following line appears in the [publish] section: disable-publishing=yes 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 This helps ensure that no record will be published by Avahi. CCE-82372-4 Serve Avahi Only via Required Protocol If you are using only IPv4, edit /etc/avahi/avahi-daemon.conf and ensure the following line exists in the [server] section: use-ipv6=no Similarly, if you are using only IPv6, disable IPv4 sockets with the line: use-ipv4=no 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 CCE-82378-1 Prevent Other Programs from Using Avahi's Port To prevent other mDNS stacks from running, edit /etc/avahi/avahi-daemon.conf and ensure the following line appears in the [server] section: disallow-other-stacks=yes 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 This helps ensure that only Avahi is responsible for mDNS traffic coming from that port on the system. CCE-82376-5 Restrict Information Published by Avahi If it is necessary to publish some information to the network, it should not be joined by any extraneous information, or by information supplied by a non-trusted source on the system. Prevent user applications from using Avahi to publish services by adding or correcting the following line in the [publish] section: disable-user-service-publishing=yes Implement as many of the following lines as possible, to restrict the information published by Avahi. publish-addresses=no publish-hinfo=no publish-workstation=no publish-domain=no Inspect the files in the directory /etc/avahi/services/. Unless there is an operational need to publish information about each of these services, delete the corresponding file. 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 These options prevent publishing attempts from succeeding, and can be applied even if publishing is disabled entirely via disable-publishing. Alternatively, these can be used to restrict the types of published information in the event that some information must be published. CCE-82375-7 Disable Avahi Server if Possible Because the Avahi daemon service keeps an open network port, it is subject to network attacks. Disabling it can reduce the system's vulnerability to such attacks. Uninstall avahi-autoipd Server Package If the system does not need to have an Avahi server which implements the DNS Service Discovery and Multicast DNS protocols, the avahi-autoipd and avahi packages can be uninstalled. 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 CCI-000366 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 Automatic discovery of network services is not normally required for system functionality. It is recommended to remove this package to reduce the potential attack surface. CCE-86515-4 - name: Ensure avahi-autoipd is removed package: name: avahi-autoipd state: absent tags: - CCE-86515-4 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_avahi-autoipd_removed include remove_avahi-autoipd class remove_avahi-autoipd { package { 'avahi-autoipd': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=avahi-autoipd # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove avahi-autoipd # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on avahi-autoipd. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "avahi-autoipd" ; then yum remove -y "avahi-autoipd" fi Uninstall avahi Server Package If the system does not need to have an Avahi server which implements the DNS Service Discovery and Multicast DNS protocols, the avahi-autoipd and avahi packages can be uninstalled. 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 CCI-000366 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 2.2.2 Automatic discovery of network services is not normally required for system functionality. It is recommended to remove this package to reduce the potential attack surface. CCE-86512-1 - name: Ensure avahi is removed package: name: avahi state: absent tags: - CCE-86512-1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_avahi_removed include remove_avahi class remove_avahi { package { 'avahi': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=avahi # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove avahi # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on avahi. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "avahi" ; then yum remove -y "avahi" fi Disable Avahi Server Software The avahi-daemon service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now avahi-daemon.service 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 CCI-000366 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 2.2.4 2.2.2 Because the Avahi daemon service keeps an open network port, it is subject to network attacks. Its functionality is convenient but is only appropriate if the local network can be trusted. CCE-82188-4 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-82188-4 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_avahi-daemon_disabled - name: Block Disable service avahi-daemon block: - name: Disable service avahi-daemon block: - name: Disable service avahi-daemon systemd: name: avahi-daemon.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service avahi-daemon' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "avahi" in ansible_facts.packages ) tags: - CCE-82188-4 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_avahi-daemon_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - avahi-daemon.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files avahi-daemon.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "avahi" in ansible_facts.packages ) tags: - CCE-82188-4 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_avahi-daemon_disabled - name: Disable socket avahi-daemon systemd: name: avahi-daemon.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "avahi" in ansible_facts.packages ) - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("avahi-daemon.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-82188-4 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_avahi-daemon_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: avahi-daemon.service enabled: false mask: true - name: avahi-daemon.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["avahi-daemon"] include disable_avahi-daemon class disable_avahi-daemon { service {'avahi-daemon': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q avahi ); then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'avahi-daemon.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'avahi-daemon.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'avahi-daemon.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files avahi-daemon.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'avahi-daemon.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'avahi-daemon.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'avahi-daemon.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Base Services This section addresses the base services that are installed on a Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 default installation which are not covered in other sections. Some of these services listen on the network and should be treated with particular discretion. Other services are local system utilities that may or may not be extraneous. In general, system services should be disabled if not required. Install the psacct package The process accounting service, psacct, works with programs including acct and ac to allow system administrators to view user activity, such as commands issued by users of the system. The psacct package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install psacct 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 BAI03.05 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.06 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.12.7.1 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.9.1.2 AU-12(a) CM-6(a) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-3 The psacct service can provide administrators a convenient view into some user activities. However, it should be noted that the auditing system and its audit records provide more authoritative and comprehensive records. CCE-82404-5 - name: Ensure psacct is installed package: name: psacct state: present tags: - CCE-82404-5 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_psacct_installed [[packages]] name = "psacct" version = "*" include install_psacct class install_psacct { package { 'psacct': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=psacct if ! rpm -q --quiet "psacct" ; then yum install -y "psacct" fi Uninstall Automatic Bug Reporting Tool (abrt) The Automatic Bug Reporting Tool (abrt) collects and reports crash data when an application crash is detected. Using a variety of plugins, abrt can email crash reports to system administrators, log crash reports to files, or forward crash reports to a centralized issue tracking system such as RHTSupport. The abrt package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase abrt CCI-000381 SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 RHEL-08-040001 SV-230488r627750_rule Mishandling crash data could expose sensitive information about vulnerabilities in software executing on the system, as well as sensitive information from within a process's address space or registers. CCE-80948-3 - name: Ensure abrt is removed package: name: abrt state: absent tags: - CCE-80948-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040001 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_abrt_removed include remove_abrt class remove_abrt { package { 'abrt': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=abrt # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove abrt # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on abrt. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "abrt" ; then yum remove -y "abrt" fi Enable Process Accounting (psacct) The process accounting service, psacct, works with programs including acct and ac to allow system administrators to view user activity, such as commands issued by users of the system. The psacct service can be enabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl enable psacct.service 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 BAI03.05 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.06 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.12.7.1 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 A.9.1.2 AU-12(a) CM-6(a) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-3 The psacct service can provide administrators a convenient view into some user activities. However, it should be noted that the auditing system and its audit records provide more authoritative and comprehensive records. CCE-82401-1 - name: Enable service psacct block: - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto - name: Enable service psacct systemd: name: psacct enabled: 'yes' state: started masked: 'no' when: - '"psacct" in ansible_facts.packages' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82401-1 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_psacct_enabled [customizations.services] enabled = ["psacct"] include enable_psacct class enable_psacct { service {'psacct': enable => true, ensure => 'running', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'psacct.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'psacct.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'psacct.service' else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Automatic Bug Reporting Tool (abrtd) The Automatic Bug Reporting Tool (abrtd) daemon collects and reports crash data when an application crash is detected. Using a variety of plugins, abrtd can email crash reports to system administrators, log crash reports to files, or forward crash reports to a centralized issue tracking system such as RHTSupport. The abrtd service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now abrtd.service 11 12 14 15 3 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-6(a) PR.AC-3 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 Mishandling crash data could expose sensitive information about vulnerabilities in software executing on the system, as well as sensitive information from within a process's address space or registers. CCE-80870-9 - name: Block Disable service abrtd block: - name: Disable service abrtd block: - name: Disable service abrtd systemd: name: abrtd.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service abrtd' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80870-9 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_abrtd_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - abrtd.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files abrtd.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80870-9 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_abrtd_disabled - name: Disable socket abrtd systemd: name: abrtd.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("abrtd.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-80870-9 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_abrtd_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: abrtd.service enabled: false mask: true - name: abrtd.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["abrtd"] include disable_abrtd class disable_abrtd { service {'abrtd': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'abrtd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'abrtd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'abrtd.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files abrtd.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'abrtd.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'abrtd.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'abrtd.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Advanced Configuration and Power Interface (acpid) The Advanced Configuration and Power Interface Daemon (acpid) dispatches ACPI events (such as power/reset button depressed) to userspace programs. The acpid service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now acpid.service 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 ACPI support is highly desirable for systems in some network roles, such as laptops or desktops. For other systems, such as servers, it may permit accidental or trivially achievable denial of service situations and disabling it is appropriate. CCE-82407-8 - name: Block Disable service acpid block: - name: Disable service acpid block: - name: Disable service acpid systemd: name: acpid.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service acpid' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82407-8 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_acpid_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - acpid.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files acpid.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82407-8 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_acpid_disabled - name: Disable socket acpid systemd: name: acpid.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("acpid.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-82407-8 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_acpid_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: acpid.service enabled: false mask: true - name: acpid.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["acpid"] include disable_acpid class disable_acpid { service {'acpid': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'acpid.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'acpid.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'acpid.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files acpid.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'acpid.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'acpid.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'acpid.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Certmonger Service (certmonger) Certmonger is a D-Bus based service that attempts to simplify interaction with certifying authorities on networks which use public-key infrastructure. It is often combined with Red Hat's IPA (Identity Policy Audit) security information management solution to aid in the management of certificates. The certmonger service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now certmonger.service 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 The services provided by certmonger may be essential for systems fulfilling some roles a PKI infrastructure, but its functionality is not necessary for many other use cases. CCE-82452-4 - name: Block Disable service certmonger block: - name: Disable service certmonger block: - name: Disable service certmonger systemd: name: certmonger.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service certmonger' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82452-4 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_certmonger_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - certmonger.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files certmonger.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82452-4 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_certmonger_disabled - name: Disable socket certmonger systemd: name: certmonger.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("certmonger.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-82452-4 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_certmonger_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: certmonger.service enabled: false mask: true - name: certmonger.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["certmonger"] include disable_certmonger class disable_certmonger { service {'certmonger': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'certmonger.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'certmonger.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'certmonger.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files certmonger.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'certmonger.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'certmonger.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'certmonger.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Cockpit Management Server The Cockpit Management Server (cockpit) provides a web based login and management framework. The cockpit service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now cockpit.service Cockpit provides a form of remote login. - name: Block Disable service cockpit block: - name: Disable service cockpit block: - name: Disable service cockpit systemd: name: cockpit.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service cockpit' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_cockpit_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - cockpit.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files cockpit.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_cockpit_disabled - name: Disable socket cockpit systemd: name: cockpit.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("cockpit.socket",multiline=True) tags: - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_cockpit_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: cockpit.service enabled: false mask: true - name: cockpit.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["cockpit"] include disable_cockpit class disable_cockpit { service {'cockpit': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'cockpit.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'cockpit.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'cockpit.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files cockpit.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'cockpit.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'cockpit.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'cockpit.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable CPU Speed (cpupower) The cpupower service can adjust the clock speed of supported CPUs based upon the current processing load thereby conserving power and reducing heat. The cpupower service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now cpupower.service 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 The cpupower service is only necessary if adjusting the CPU clock speed provides benefit. Traditionally this has included laptops (to enhance battery life), but may also apply to server or desktop environments where conserving power is highly desirable or necessary. CCE-82382-3 - name: Block Disable service cpupower block: - name: Disable service cpupower block: - name: Disable service cpupower systemd: name: cpupower.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service cpupower' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82382-3 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_cpupower_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - cpupower.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files cpupower.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82382-3 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_cpupower_disabled - name: Disable socket cpupower systemd: name: cpupower.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("cpupower.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-82382-3 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_cpupower_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: cpupower.service enabled: false mask: true - name: cpupower.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["cpupower"] include disable_cpupower class disable_cpupower { service {'cpupower': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'cpupower.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'cpupower.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'cpupower.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files cpupower.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'cpupower.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'cpupower.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'cpupower.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable KDump Kernel Crash Analyzer (kdump) The kdump service provides a kernel crash dump analyzer. It uses the kexec system call to boot a secondary kernel ("capture" kernel) following a system crash, which can load information from the crashed kernel for analysis. The kdump service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now kdump.service 11 12 14 15 3 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 CCI-000366 CCI-001665 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) 164.308(a)(3) 164.308(a)(4) 164.310(b) 164.310(c) 164.312(a) 164.312(e) 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.AC-3 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1 SRG-OS-000269-GPOS-00103 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010670 SV-230310r627750_rule Kernel core dumps may contain the full contents of system memory at the time of the crash. Kernel core dumps consume a considerable amount of disk space and may result in denial of service by exhausting the available space on the target file system partition. Unless the system is used for kernel development or testing, there is little need to run the kdump service. CCE-80878-2 - name: Block Disable service kdump block: - name: Disable service kdump block: - name: Disable service kdump systemd: name: kdump.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service kdump' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80878-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010670 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_kdump_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - kdump.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files kdump.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80878-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010670 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_kdump_disabled - name: Disable socket kdump systemd: name: kdump.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("kdump.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-80878-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010670 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_kdump_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: kdump.service enabled: false mask: true - name: kdump.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["kdump"] include disable_kdump class disable_kdump { service {'kdump': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } kdump --disable # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'kdump.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'kdump.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'kdump.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files kdump.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'kdump.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'kdump.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'kdump.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Software RAID Monitor (mdmonitor) The mdmonitor service is used for monitoring a software RAID array; hardware RAID setups do not use this service. The mdmonitor service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now mdmonitor.service 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 If software RAID monitoring is not required, there is no need to run this service. CCE-82386-4 - name: Block Disable service mdmonitor block: - name: Disable service mdmonitor block: - name: Disable service mdmonitor systemd: name: mdmonitor.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service mdmonitor' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82386-4 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_mdmonitor_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - mdmonitor.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files mdmonitor.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82386-4 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_mdmonitor_disabled - name: Disable socket mdmonitor systemd: name: mdmonitor.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("mdmonitor.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-82386-4 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_mdmonitor_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: mdmonitor.service enabled: false mask: true - name: mdmonitor.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["mdmonitor"] include disable_mdmonitor class disable_mdmonitor { service {'mdmonitor': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'mdmonitor.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'mdmonitor.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'mdmonitor.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files mdmonitor.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'mdmonitor.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'mdmonitor.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'mdmonitor.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Network Console (netconsole) The netconsole service is responsible for loading the netconsole kernel module, which logs kernel printk messages over UDP to a syslog server. This allows debugging of problems where disk logging fails and serial consoles are impractical. The netconsole service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now netconsole.service 11 12 14 15 3 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 CCI-000381 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.AC-3 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 The netconsole service is not necessary unless there is a need to debug kernel panics, which is not common. CCE-82455-7 - name: Block Disable service netconsole block: - name: Disable service netconsole block: - name: Disable service netconsole systemd: name: netconsole.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service netconsole' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82455-7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_netconsole_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - netconsole.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files netconsole.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82455-7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_netconsole_disabled - name: Disable socket netconsole systemd: name: netconsole.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("netconsole.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-82455-7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_netconsole_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: netconsole.service enabled: false mask: true - name: netconsole.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["netconsole"] include disable_netconsole class disable_netconsole { service {'netconsole': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'netconsole.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'netconsole.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'netconsole.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files netconsole.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'netconsole.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'netconsole.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'netconsole.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable ntpdate Service (ntpdate) The ntpdate service sets the local hardware clock by polling NTP servers when the system boots. It synchronizes to the NTP servers listed in /etc/ntp/step-tickers or /etc/ntp.conf and then sets the local hardware clock to the newly synchronized system time. The ntpdate service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now ntpdate.service 11 12 14 15 3 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 CCI-000382 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.AC-3 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 The ntpdate service may only be suitable for systems which are rebooted frequently enough that clock drift does not cause problems between reboots. In any event, the functionality of the ntpdate service is now available in the ntpd program and should be considered deprecated. CCE-80879-0 - name: Block Disable service ntpdate block: - name: Disable service ntpdate block: - name: Disable service ntpdate systemd: name: ntpdate.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service ntpdate' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80879-0 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_ntpdate_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - ntpdate.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files ntpdate.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80879-0 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_ntpdate_disabled - name: Disable socket ntpdate systemd: name: ntpdate.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("ntpdate.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-80879-0 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_ntpdate_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: ntpdate.service enabled: false mask: true - name: ntpdate.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["ntpdate"] include disable_ntpdate class disable_ntpdate { service {'ntpdate': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'ntpdate.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'ntpdate.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'ntpdate.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files ntpdate.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'ntpdate.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'ntpdate.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'ntpdate.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Odd Job Daemon (oddjobd) The oddjobd service exists to provide an interface and access control mechanism through which specified privileged tasks can run tasks for unprivileged client applications. Communication with oddjobd through the system message bus. The oddjobd service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now oddjobd.service 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 CCI-000381 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 The oddjobd service may provide necessary functionality in some environments, and can be disabled if it is not needed. Execution of tasks by privileged programs, on behalf of unprivileged ones, has traditionally been a source of privilege escalation security issues. CCE-80880-8 - name: Block Disable service oddjobd block: - name: Disable service oddjobd block: - name: Disable service oddjobd systemd: name: oddjobd.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service oddjobd' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80880-8 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_oddjobd_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - oddjobd.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files oddjobd.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80880-8 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_oddjobd_disabled - name: Disable socket oddjobd systemd: name: oddjobd.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("oddjobd.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-80880-8 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_oddjobd_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: oddjobd.service enabled: false mask: true - name: oddjobd.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["oddjobd"] include disable_oddjobd class disable_oddjobd { service {'oddjobd': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'oddjobd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'oddjobd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'oddjobd.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files oddjobd.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'oddjobd.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'oddjobd.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'oddjobd.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Portreserve (portreserve) The portreserve service is a TCP port reservation utility that can be used to prevent portmap from binding to well known TCP ports that are required for other services. The portreserve service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now portreserve.service 11 12 14 15 3 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.AC-3 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 The portreserve service provides helpful functionality by preventing conflicting usage of ports in the reserved port range, but it can be disabled if not needed. CCE-82390-6 - name: Block Disable service portreserve block: - name: Disable service portreserve block: - name: Disable service portreserve systemd: name: portreserve.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service portreserve' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82390-6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_portreserve_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - portreserve.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files portreserve.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82390-6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_portreserve_disabled - name: Disable socket portreserve systemd: name: portreserve.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("portreserve.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-82390-6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_portreserve_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: portreserve.service enabled: false mask: true - name: portreserve.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["portreserve"] include disable_portreserve class disable_portreserve { service {'portreserve': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'portreserve.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'portreserve.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'portreserve.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files portreserve.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'portreserve.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'portreserve.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'portreserve.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Apache Qpid (qpidd) The qpidd service provides high speed, secure, guaranteed delivery services. It is an implementation of the Advanced Message Queuing Protocol. By default the qpidd service will bind to port 5672 and listen for connection attempts. The qpidd service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now qpidd.service 11 12 14 15 3 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 CCI-000382 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.AC-3 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 The qpidd service is automatically installed when the base package selection is selected during installation. The qpidd service listens for network connections, which increases the attack surface of the system. If the system is not intended to receive AMQP traffic, then the qpidd service is not needed and should be disabled or removed. CCE-80882-4 - name: Block Disable service qpidd block: - name: Disable service qpidd block: - name: Disable service qpidd systemd: name: qpidd.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service qpidd' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80882-4 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_qpidd_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - qpidd.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files qpidd.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80882-4 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_qpidd_disabled - name: Disable socket qpidd systemd: name: qpidd.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("qpidd.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-80882-4 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_qpidd_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: qpidd.service enabled: false mask: true - name: qpidd.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["qpidd"] include disable_qpidd class disable_qpidd { service {'qpidd': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'qpidd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'qpidd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'qpidd.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files qpidd.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'qpidd.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'qpidd.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'qpidd.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Quota Netlink (quota_nld) The quota_nld service provides notifications to users of disk space quota violations. It listens to the kernel via a netlink socket for disk quota violations and notifies the appropriate user of the violation using D-Bus or by sending a message to the terminal that the user has last accessed. The quota_nld service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now quota_nld.service 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 If disk quotas are enforced on the local system, then the quota_nld service likely provides useful functionality and should remain enabled. However, if disk quotas are not used or user notification of disk quota violation is not desired then there is no need to run this service. CCE-82406-0 - name: Block Disable service quota_nld block: - name: Disable service quota_nld block: - name: Disable service quota_nld systemd: name: quota_nld.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service quota_nld' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82406-0 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_quota_nld_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - quota_nld.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files quota_nld.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82406-0 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_quota_nld_disabled - name: Disable socket quota_nld systemd: name: quota_nld.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("quota_nld.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-82406-0 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_quota_nld_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: quota_nld.service enabled: false mask: true - name: quota_nld.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["quota_nld"] include disable_quota_nld class disable_quota_nld { service {'quota_nld': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'quota_nld.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'quota_nld.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'quota_nld.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files quota_nld.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'quota_nld.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'quota_nld.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'quota_nld.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Network Router Discovery Daemon (rdisc) The rdisc service implements the client side of the ICMP Internet Router Discovery Protocol (IRDP), which allows discovery of routers on the local subnet. If a router is discovered then the local routing table is updated with a corresponding default route. By default this daemon is disabled. The rdisc service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now rdisc.service 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 4 6 8 9 APO01.06 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.04 DSS01.05 DSS03.01 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 DSS06.06 CCI-000382 4.2.3.4 4.3.3.4 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 4.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.11.2.6 A.12.1.1 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.2 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.2 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.1.2 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 AC-4 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) DE.AE-1 ID.AM-3 PR.AC-3 PR.AC-5 PR.DS-5 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 General-purpose systems typically have their network and routing information configured statically by a system administrator. Workstations or some special-purpose systems often use DHCP (instead of IRDP) to retrieve dynamic network configuration information. CCE-80883-2 - name: Block Disable service rdisc block: - name: Disable service rdisc block: - name: Disable service rdisc systemd: name: rdisc.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service rdisc' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80883-2 - NIST-800-53-AC-4 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_rdisc_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - rdisc.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files rdisc.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80883-2 - NIST-800-53-AC-4 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_rdisc_disabled - name: Disable socket rdisc systemd: name: rdisc.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("rdisc.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-80883-2 - NIST-800-53-AC-4 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_rdisc_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: rdisc.service enabled: false mask: true - name: rdisc.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["rdisc"] include disable_rdisc class disable_rdisc { service {'rdisc': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'rdisc.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'rdisc.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'rdisc.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files rdisc.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'rdisc.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'rdisc.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'rdisc.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Red Hat Network Service (rhnsd) The Red Hat Network service automatically queries Red Hat Network servers to determine whether there are any actions that should be executed, such as package updates. This only occurs if the system was registered to an RHN server or satellite and managed as such. The rhnsd service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now rhnsd.service 11 12 14 15 3 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 CCI-000382 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.AC-3 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 1.2.2 Although systems management and patching is extremely important to system security, management by a system outside the enterprise enclave is not desirable for some environments. However, if the system is being managed by RHN or RHN Satellite Server the rhnsd daemon can remain on. CCE-82405-2 - name: Block Disable service rhnsd block: - name: Disable service rhnsd block: - name: Disable service rhnsd systemd: name: rhnsd.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service rhnsd' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82405-2 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_rhnsd_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - rhnsd.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files rhnsd.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82405-2 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_rhnsd_disabled - name: Disable socket rhnsd systemd: name: rhnsd.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("rhnsd.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-82405-2 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_rhnsd_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: rhnsd.service enabled: false mask: true - name: rhnsd.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["rhnsd"] include disable_rhnsd class disable_rhnsd { service {'rhnsd': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'rhnsd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'rhnsd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'rhnsd.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files rhnsd.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'rhnsd.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'rhnsd.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'rhnsd.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Red Hat Subscription Manager Daemon (rhsmcertd) The Red Hat Subscription Manager (rhsmcertd) periodically checks for changes in the entitlement certificates for a registered system and updates it accordingly. The rhsmcertd service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now rhsmcertd.service 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 The rhsmcertd service can provide administrators with some additional control over which of their systems are entitled to particular subscriptions. However, for systems that are managed locally or which are not expected to require remote changes to their subscription status, it is unnecessary and can be disabled. CCE-82387-2 - name: Block Disable service rhsmcertd block: - name: Disable service rhsmcertd block: - name: Disable service rhsmcertd systemd: name: rhsmcertd.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service rhsmcertd' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82387-2 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_rhsmcertd_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - rhsmcertd.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files rhsmcertd.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82387-2 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_rhsmcertd_disabled - name: Disable socket rhsmcertd systemd: name: rhsmcertd.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("rhsmcertd.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-82387-2 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_rhsmcertd_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: rhsmcertd.service enabled: false mask: true - name: rhsmcertd.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["rhsmcertd"] include disable_rhsmcertd class disable_rhsmcertd { service {'rhsmcertd': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'rhsmcertd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'rhsmcertd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'rhsmcertd.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files rhsmcertd.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'rhsmcertd.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'rhsmcertd.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'rhsmcertd.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Cyrus SASL Authentication Daemon (saslauthd) The saslauthd service handles plaintext authentication requests on behalf of the SASL library. The service isolates all code requiring superuser privileges for SASL authentication into a single process, and can also be used to provide proxy authentication services to clients that do not understand SASL based authentication. The saslauthd service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now saslauthd.service 11 12 14 15 3 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.AC-3 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 The saslauthd service provides essential functionality for performing authentication in some directory environments, such as those which use Kerberos and LDAP. For others, however, in which only local files may be consulted, it is not necessary and should be disabled. CCE-82389-8 - name: Block Disable service saslauthd block: - name: Disable service saslauthd block: - name: Disable service saslauthd systemd: name: saslauthd.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service saslauthd' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82389-8 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_saslauthd_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - saslauthd.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files saslauthd.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82389-8 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_saslauthd_disabled - name: Disable socket saslauthd systemd: name: saslauthd.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("saslauthd.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-82389-8 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_saslauthd_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: saslauthd.service enabled: false mask: true - name: saslauthd.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["saslauthd"] include disable_saslauthd class disable_saslauthd { service {'saslauthd': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'saslauthd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'saslauthd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'saslauthd.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files saslauthd.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'saslauthd.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'saslauthd.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'saslauthd.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable System Statistics Reset Service (sysstat) The sysstat service resets various I/O and CPU performance statistics to zero in order to begin counting from a fresh state at boot time. The sysstat service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now sysstat.service 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 By default the sysstat service runs a program at boot to reset performance statistics. This data can be retrieved using programs such as sar and sadc. While the sysstat service may provide useful insight into system operation, through the lens of providing only essential system services, this service should be disabled. CCE-82388-0 - name: Block Disable service sysstat block: - name: Disable service sysstat block: - name: Disable service sysstat systemd: name: sysstat.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service sysstat' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82388-0 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_sysstat_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - sysstat.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files sysstat.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82388-0 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_sysstat_disabled - name: Disable socket sysstat systemd: name: sysstat.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("sysstat.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-82388-0 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_sysstat_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: sysstat.service enabled: false mask: true - name: sysstat.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["sysstat"] include disable_sysstat class disable_sysstat { service {'sysstat': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'sysstat.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'sysstat.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'sysstat.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files sysstat.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'sysstat.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'sysstat.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'sysstat.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Cron and At Daemons The cron and at services are used to allow commands to be executed at a later time. The cron service is required by almost all systems to perform necessary maintenance tasks, while at may or may not be required on a given system. Both daemons should be configured defensively. Install the cron service The Cron service should be installed. BP28(R50) 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 The cron service allow periodic job execution, needed for almost all administrative tasks and services (software update, log rotating, etc.). Access to cron service should be restricted to administrative accounts only. - name: Ensure cron is installed package: name: cron state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_cron_installed [[packages]] name = "cron" version = "*" include install_cron class install_cron { package { 'cron': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=cron # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "cron" ; then yum install -y "cron" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable cron Service The crond service is used to execute commands at preconfigured times. It is required by almost all systems to perform necessary maintenance tasks, such as notifying root of system activity. The cron service can be enabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl enable cron.service 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 2.2.6 Due to its usage for maintenance and security-supporting tasks, enabling the cron daemon is essential. - name: Enable service cron block: - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto - name: Enable service cron systemd: name: cron enabled: 'yes' state: started masked: 'no' when: - '"cron" in ansible_facts.packages' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_cron_enabled [customizations.services] enabled = ["cron"] include enable_cron class enable_cron { service {'cron': enable => true, ensure => 'running', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'cron.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'cron.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'cron.service' else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable cron Service The crond service is used to execute commands at preconfigured times. It is required by almost all systems to perform necessary maintenance tasks, such as notifying root of system activity. The crond service can be enabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl enable crond.service 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 4.1.1.1 Due to its usage for maintenance and security-supporting tasks, enabling the cron daemon is essential. CCE-80875-8 - name: Enable service crond block: - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto - name: Enable service crond systemd: name: crond enabled: 'yes' state: started masked: 'no' when: - '"cronie" in ansible_facts.packages' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80875-8 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_crond_enabled [customizations.services] enabled = ["crond"] include enable_crond class enable_crond { service {'crond': enable => true, ensure => 'running', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'crond.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'crond.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'crond.service' else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable At Service (atd) The at and batch commands can be used to schedule tasks that are meant to be executed only once. This allows delayed execution in a manner similar to cron, except that it is not recurring. The daemon atd keeps track of tasks scheduled via at and batch, and executes them at the specified time. The atd service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now atd.service 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 CCI-000381 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 The atd service could be used by an unsophisticated insider to carry out activities outside of a normal login session, which could complicate accountability. Furthermore, the need to schedule tasks with at or batch is not common. CCE-80871-7 - name: Block Disable service atd block: - name: Disable service atd block: - name: Disable service atd systemd: name: atd.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service atd' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80871-7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_atd_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - atd.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files atd.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80871-7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_atd_disabled - name: Disable socket atd systemd: name: atd.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("atd.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-80871-7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_atd_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: atd.service enabled: false mask: true - name: atd.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["atd"] include disable_atd class disable_atd { service {'atd': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'atd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'atd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'atd.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files atd.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'atd.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'atd.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'atd.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable anacron Service The cronie-anacron package, which provides anacron functionality, is installed by default. The cronie-anacron package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase cronie-anacron 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 The anacron service provides cron functionality for systems such as laptops and workstations that may be shut down during the normal times that cron jobs are scheduled to run. On systems which do not require this additional functionality, anacron could needlessly increase the possible attack surface for an intruder. Verify Group Who Owns cron.d To properly set the group owner of /etc/cron.d, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /etc/cron.d 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 4.1.1.7 Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective services that if configured incorrectly can lead to insecure and vulnerable configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should be owned by the correct group to prevent unauthorized changes. CCE-82268-4 - name: Ensure group owner on /etc/cron.d/ file: path: /etc/cron.d/ state: directory group: '0' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82268-4 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_cron_d - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then find -H /etc/cron.d/ -maxdepth 1 -type d -exec chgrp 0 {} \; else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify Group Who Owns cron.daily To properly set the group owner of /etc/cron.daily, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /etc/cron.daily 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 4.1.1.4 Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective services that if configured incorrectly can lead to insecure and vulnerable configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should be owned by the correct group to prevent unauthorized changes. CCE-82234-6 - name: Ensure group owner on /etc/cron.daily/ file: path: /etc/cron.daily/ state: directory group: '0' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82234-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_cron_daily - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then find -H /etc/cron.daily/ -maxdepth 1 -type d -exec chgrp 0 {} \; else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify Group Who Owns cron.hourly To properly set the group owner of /etc/cron.hourly, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /etc/cron.hourly 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 4.1.1.3 Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective services that if configured incorrectly can lead to insecure and vulnerable configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should be owned by the correct group to prevent unauthorized changes. CCE-82227-0 - name: Ensure group owner on /etc/cron.hourly/ file: path: /etc/cron.hourly/ state: directory group: '0' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82227-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_cron_hourly - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then find -H /etc/cron.hourly/ -maxdepth 1 -type d -exec chgrp 0 {} \; else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify Group Who Owns cron.monthly To properly set the group owner of /etc/cron.monthly, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /etc/cron.monthly 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 4.1.1.6 Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective services that if configured incorrectly can lead to insecure and vulnerable configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should be owned by the correct group to prevent unauthorized changes. CCE-82256-9 - name: Ensure group owner on /etc/cron.monthly/ file: path: /etc/cron.monthly/ state: directory group: '0' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82256-9 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_cron_monthly - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then find -H /etc/cron.monthly/ -maxdepth 1 -type d -exec chgrp 0 {} \; else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify Group Who Owns cron.weekly To properly set the group owner of /etc/cron.weekly, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /etc/cron.weekly 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 4.1.1.5 Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective services that if configured incorrectly can lead to insecure and vulnerable configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should be owned by the correct group to prevent unauthorized changes. CCE-82244-5 - name: Ensure group owner on /etc/cron.weekly/ file: path: /etc/cron.weekly/ state: directory group: '0' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82244-5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_cron_weekly - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then find -H /etc/cron.weekly/ -maxdepth 1 -type d -exec chgrp 0 {} \; else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify Group Who Owns Crontab To properly set the group owner of /etc/crontab, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /etc/crontab 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 4.1.1.2 Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective services that if configured incorrectly can lead to insecure and vulnerable configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should be owned by the correct group to prevent unauthorized changes. CCE-82223-9 - name: Test for existence /etc/crontab stat: path: /etc/crontab register: file_exists when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82223-9 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_crontab - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner 0 on /etc/crontab file: path: /etc/crontab group: '0' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-82223-9 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_crontab - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then chgrp 0 /etc/crontab else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify Owner on cron.d To properly set the owner of /etc/cron.d, run the command: $ sudo chown root /etc/cron.d 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 4.1.1.7 Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective services that if configured incorrectly can lead to insecure and vulnerable configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should be owned by the correct user to prevent unauthorized changes. CCE-82272-6 - name: Ensure owner on directory /etc/cron.d/ file: path: /etc/cron.d/ state: directory owner: '0' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82272-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_owner_cron_d - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then find -H /etc/cron.d/ -maxdepth 1 -type d -exec chown 0 {} \; else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify Owner on cron.daily To properly set the owner of /etc/cron.daily, run the command: $ sudo chown root /etc/cron.daily 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 4.1.1.4 Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective services that if configured incorrectly can lead to insecure and vulnerable configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should be owned by the correct user to prevent unauthorized changes. CCE-82237-9 - name: Ensure owner on directory /etc/cron.daily/ file: path: /etc/cron.daily/ state: directory owner: '0' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82237-9 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_owner_cron_daily - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then find -H /etc/cron.daily/ -maxdepth 1 -type d -exec chown 0 {} \; else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify Owner on cron.hourly To properly set the owner of /etc/cron.hourly, run the command: $ sudo chown root /etc/cron.hourly 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 4.1.1.3 Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective services that if configured incorrectly can lead to insecure and vulnerable configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should be owned by the correct user to prevent unauthorized changes. CCE-82209-8 - name: Ensure owner on directory /etc/cron.hourly/ file: path: /etc/cron.hourly/ state: directory owner: '0' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82209-8 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_owner_cron_hourly - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then find -H /etc/cron.hourly/ -maxdepth 1 -type d -exec chown 0 {} \; else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify Owner on cron.monthly To properly set the owner of /etc/cron.monthly, run the command: $ sudo chown root /etc/cron.monthly 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 4.1.1.6 Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective services that if configured incorrectly can lead to insecure and vulnerable configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should be owned by the correct user to prevent unauthorized changes. CCE-82260-1 - name: Ensure owner on directory /etc/cron.monthly/ file: path: /etc/cron.monthly/ state: directory owner: '0' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82260-1 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_owner_cron_monthly - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then find -H /etc/cron.monthly/ -maxdepth 1 -type d -exec chown 0 {} \; else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify Owner on cron.weekly To properly set the owner of /etc/cron.weekly, run the command: $ sudo chown root /etc/cron.weekly 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 4.1.1.5 Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective services that if configured incorrectly can lead to insecure and vulnerable configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should be owned by the correct user to prevent unauthorized changes. CCE-82247-8 - name: Ensure owner on directory /etc/cron.weekly/ file: path: /etc/cron.weekly/ state: directory owner: '0' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82247-8 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_owner_cron_weekly - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then find -H /etc/cron.weekly/ -maxdepth 1 -type d -exec chown 0 {} \; else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify Owner on crontab To properly set the owner of /etc/crontab, run the command: $ sudo chown root /etc/crontab 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 4.1.1.2 Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective services that if configured incorrectly can lead to insecure and vulnerable configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should be owned by the correct user to prevent unauthorized changes. CCE-82224-7 - name: Test for existence /etc/crontab stat: path: /etc/crontab register: file_exists when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82224-7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_owner_crontab - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner 0 on /etc/crontab file: path: /etc/crontab owner: '0' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-82224-7 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_owner_crontab - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then chown 0 /etc/crontab else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify Permissions on cron.d To properly set the permissions of /etc/cron.d, run the command: $ sudo chmod 0700 /etc/cron.d 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 4.1.1.7 Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective services that if configured incorrectly can lead to insecure and vulnerable configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should have the correct access rights to prevent unauthorized changes. CCE-82277-5 - name: Find /etc/cron.d/ file(s) command: 'find -H /etc/cron.d/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+s,g+xwrs,o+xwrt -type d ' register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82277-5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_cron_d - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Set permissions for /etc/cron.d/ file(s) file: path: '{{ item }}' mode: u-s,g-xwrs,o-xwrt state: directory with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82277-5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_cron_d - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then find -H /etc/cron.d/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+s,g+xwrs,o+xwrt -type d -exec chmod u-s,g-xwrs,o-xwrt {} \; else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify Permissions on cron.daily To properly set the permissions of /etc/cron.daily, run the command: $ sudo chmod 0700 /etc/cron.daily 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 4.1.1.4 Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective services that if configured incorrectly can lead to insecure and vulnerable configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should have the correct access rights to prevent unauthorized changes. CCE-82240-3 - name: Find /etc/cron.daily/ file(s) command: 'find -H /etc/cron.daily/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+s,g+xwrs,o+xwrt -type d ' register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82240-3 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_cron_daily - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Set permissions for /etc/cron.daily/ file(s) file: path: '{{ item }}' mode: u-s,g-xwrs,o-xwrt state: directory with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82240-3 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_cron_daily - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then find -H /etc/cron.daily/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+s,g+xwrs,o+xwrt -type d -exec chmod u-s,g-xwrs,o-xwrt {} \; else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify Permissions on cron.hourly To properly set the permissions of /etc/cron.hourly, run the command: $ sudo chmod 0700 /etc/cron.hourly 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 4.1.1.3 Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective services that if configured incorrectly can lead to insecure and vulnerable configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should have the correct access rights to prevent unauthorized changes. CCE-82230-4 - name: Find /etc/cron.hourly/ file(s) command: 'find -H /etc/cron.hourly/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+s,g+xwrs,o+xwrt -type d ' register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82230-4 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_cron_hourly - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Set permissions for /etc/cron.hourly/ file(s) file: path: '{{ item }}' mode: u-s,g-xwrs,o-xwrt state: directory with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82230-4 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_cron_hourly - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then find -H /etc/cron.hourly/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+s,g+xwrs,o+xwrt -type d -exec chmod u-s,g-xwrs,o-xwrt {} \; else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify Permissions on cron.monthly To properly set the permissions of /etc/cron.monthly, run the command: $ sudo chmod 0700 /etc/cron.monthly 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 4.1.1.6 Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective services that if configured incorrectly can lead to insecure and vulnerable configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should have the correct access rights to prevent unauthorized changes. CCE-82263-5 - name: Find /etc/cron.monthly/ file(s) command: 'find -H /etc/cron.monthly/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+s,g+xwrs,o+xwrt -type d ' register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82263-5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_cron_monthly - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Set permissions for /etc/cron.monthly/ file(s) file: path: '{{ item }}' mode: u-s,g-xwrs,o-xwrt state: directory with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82263-5 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_cron_monthly - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then find -H /etc/cron.monthly/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+s,g+xwrs,o+xwrt -type d -exec chmod u-s,g-xwrs,o-xwrt {} \; else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify Permissions on cron.weekly To properly set the permissions of /etc/cron.weekly, run the command: $ sudo chmod 0700 /etc/cron.weekly 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 4.1.1.5 Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective services that if configured incorrectly can lead to insecure and vulnerable configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should have the correct access rights to prevent unauthorized changes. CCE-82253-6 - name: Find /etc/cron.weekly/ file(s) command: 'find -H /etc/cron.weekly/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+s,g+xwrs,o+xwrt -type d ' register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82253-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_cron_weekly - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Set permissions for /etc/cron.weekly/ file(s) file: path: '{{ item }}' mode: u-s,g-xwrs,o-xwrt state: directory with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82253-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_cron_weekly - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then find -H /etc/cron.weekly/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+s,g+xwrs,o+xwrt -type d -exec chmod u-s,g-xwrs,o-xwrt {} \; else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify Permissions on crontab To properly set the permissions of /etc/crontab, run the command: $ sudo chmod 0600 /etc/crontab 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 4.1.1.2 Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective services that if configured incorrectly can lead to insecure and vulnerable configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should have the correct access rights to prevent unauthorized changes. CCE-82206-4 - name: Test for existence /etc/crontab stat: path: /etc/crontab register: file_exists when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82206-4 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_crontab - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure permission u-xs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt on /etc/crontab file: path: /etc/crontab mode: u-xs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-82206-4 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_crontab - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then chmod u-xs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt /etc/crontab else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Restrict at and cron to Authorized Users if Necessary The /etc/cron.allow and /etc/at.allow files contain lists of users who are allowed to use cron and at to delay execution of processes. If these files exist and if the corresponding files /etc/cron.deny and /etc/at.deny do not exist, then only users listed in the relevant allow files can run the crontab and at commands to submit jobs to be run at scheduled intervals. On many systems, only the system administrator needs the ability to schedule jobs. Note that even if a given user is not listed in cron.allow, cron jobs can still be run as that user. The cron.allow file controls only administrative access to the crontab command for scheduling and modifying cron jobs. To restrict at and cron to only authorized users: Remove the cron.deny file:$ sudo rm /etc/cron.denyEdit /etc/cron.allow, adding one line for each user allowed to use the crontab command to create cron jobs.Remove the at.deny file:$ sudo rm /etc/at.denyEdit /etc/at.allow, adding one line for each user allowed to use the at command to create at jobs. Ensure that /etc/at.deny does not exist The file /etc/at.deny should not exist. Use /etc/at.allow instead. 2.2.6 4.1.2.1 Access to at should be restricted. It is easier to manage an allow list than a deny list. CCE-86945-3 - name: Remove /etc/at.deny file: path: /etc/at.deny state: absent when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86945-3 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - disable_strategy - file_at_deny_not_exist - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if [[ -f /etc/at.deny ]]; then rm /etc/at.deny fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure that /etc/cron.allow exists The file /etc/cron.allow should exist and should be used instead of /etc/cron.deny. 4.1.1.8 Access to crontab should be restricted. It is easier to manage an allow list than a deny list. Therefore, /etc/cron.allow needs to be created and used instead of /etc/cron.deny. Regardless of the existence of any of these files, the root administrative user is always allowed to setup a crontab. CCE-86184-9 - name: Add empty /etc/cron.allow file: path: /etc/cron.allow state: touch owner: '0' mode: '0600' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86184-9 - disable_strategy - file_cron_allow_exists - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then touch /etc/cron.allow chown 0 /etc/cron.allow chmod 0600 /etc/cron.allow else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure that /etc/cron.deny does not exist The file /etc/cron.deny should not exist. Use /etc/cron.allow instead. 2.2.6 4.1.1.8 Access to cron should be restricted. It is easier to manage an allow list than a deny list. CCE-86849-7 - name: Remove /etc/cron.deny file: path: /etc/cron.deny state: absent when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86849-7 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - disable_strategy - file_cron_deny_not_exist - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if [[ -f /etc/cron.deny ]]; then rm /etc/cron.deny fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify Group Who Owns /etc/at.allow file If /etc/at.allow exists, it must be group-owned by root. To properly set the group owner of /etc/at.allow, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /etc/at.allow 2.2.6 4.1.2.1 If the owner of the at.allow file is not set to root, the possibility exists for an unauthorized user to view or edit sensitive information. CCE-87102-0 - name: Test for existence /etc/at.allow stat: path: /etc/at.allow register: file_exists when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-87102-0 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_at_allow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner 0 on /etc/at.allow file: path: /etc/at.allow group: '0' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-87102-0 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_at_allow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then chgrp 0 /etc/at.allow else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify Group Who Owns /etc/cron.allow file If /etc/cron.allow exists, it must be group-owned by root. To properly set the group owner of /etc/cron.allow, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /etc/cron.allow 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 CCI-000366 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 4.1.1.8 If the owner of the cron.allow file is not set to root, the possibility exists for an unauthorized user to view or edit sensitive information. CCE-86829-9 - name: Test for existence /etc/cron.allow stat: path: /etc/cron.allow register: file_exists when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86829-9 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_cron_allow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner 0 on /etc/cron.allow file: path: /etc/cron.allow group: '0' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86829-9 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_cron_allow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then chgrp 0 /etc/cron.allow else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify User Who Owns /etc/cron.allow file If /etc/cron.allow exists, it must be owned by root. To properly set the owner of /etc/cron.allow, run the command: $ sudo chown root /etc/cron.allow 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 CCI-000366 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 4.1.1.8 If the owner of the cron.allow file is not set to root, the possibility exists for an unauthorized user to view or edit sensitive information. CCE-86843-0 - name: Test for existence /etc/cron.allow stat: path: /etc/cron.allow register: file_exists when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86843-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - file_owner_cron_allow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner 0 on /etc/cron.allow file: path: /etc/cron.allow owner: '0' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86843-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - file_owner_cron_allow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then chown 0 /etc/cron.allow else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify Permissions on /etc/at.allow file If /etc/at.allow exists, it must have permissions 0600 or more restrictive. To properly set the permissions of /etc/at.allow, run the command: $ sudo chmod 0600 /etc/at.allow 2.2.6 4.1.2.1 If the permissions of the at.allow file are not set to 0600 or more restrictive, the possibility exists for an unauthorized user to view or edit sensitive information. CCE-86903-2 - name: Test for existence /etc/at.allow stat: path: /etc/at.allow register: file_exists when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86903-2 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_at_allow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure permission u-xs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt on /etc/at.allow file: path: /etc/at.allow mode: u-xs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86903-2 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_at_allow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then chmod u-xs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt /etc/at.allow else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify Permissions on /etc/cron.allow file If /etc/cron.allow exists, it must have permissions 0600 or more restrictive. To properly set the permissions of /etc/cron.allow, run the command: $ sudo chmod 0600 /etc/cron.allow 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 4.1.1.8 If the permissions of the cron.allow file are not set to 0600 or more restrictive, the possibility exists for an unauthorized user to view or edit sensitive information. CCE-86876-0 - name: Test for existence /etc/cron.allow stat: path: /etc/cron.allow register: file_exists when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86876-0 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_cron_allow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure permission u-xs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt on /etc/cron.allow file: path: /etc/cron.allow mode: u-xs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-86876-0 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_cron_allow - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then chmod u-xs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt /etc/cron.allow else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Deprecated services Some deprecated software services impact the overall system security due to their behavior (leak of confidentiality in network exchange, usage as uncontrolled communication channel, risk associated with the service due to its old age, etc. Uninstall the inet-based telnet server The inet-based telnet daemon should be uninstalled. NT007(R03) 11 12 14 15 3 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.AC-3 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 telnet allows clear text communications, and does not protect any data transmission between client and server. Any confidential data can be listened and no integrity checking is made. - name: Ensure inetutils-telnetd is removed package: name: inetutils-telnetd state: absent tags: - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - package_inetutils-telnetd_removed include remove_inetutils-telnetd class remove_inetutils-telnetd { package { 'inetutils-telnetd': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=inetutils-telnetd # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove inetutils-telnetd # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on inetutils-telnetd. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "inetutils-telnetd" ; then yum remove -y "inetutils-telnetd" fi Uninstall the nis package The support for Yellowpages should not be installed unless it is required. NIS is the historical SUN service for central account management, more and more replaced by LDAP. NIS does not support efficiently security constraints, ACL, etc. and should not be used. - name: Ensure nis is removed package: name: nis state: absent tags: - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_nis_removed include remove_nis class remove_nis { package { 'nis': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=nis # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove nis # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on nis. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "nis" ; then yum remove -y "nis" fi Uninstall the ntpdate package ntpdate is a historical ntp synchronization client for unixes. It sould be uninstalled. ntpdate is an old not security-compliant ntp client. It should be replaced by modern ntp clients such as ntpd, able to use cryptographic mechanisms integrated in NTP. - name: Ensure ntpdate is removed package: name: ntpdate state: absent tags: - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_ntpdate_removed include remove_ntpdate class remove_ntpdate { package { 'ntpdate': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=ntpdate # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove ntpdate # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on ntpdate. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "ntpdate" ; then yum remove -y "ntpdate" fi Uninstall the ssl compliant telnet server The telnet daemon, even with ssl support, should be uninstalled. NT007(R02) 11 12 14 15 3 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.AC-3 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 telnet, even with ssl support, should not be installed. When remote shell is required, up-to-date ssh daemon can be used. - name: Ensure telnetd-ssl is removed package: name: telnetd-ssl state: absent tags: - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - package_telnetd-ssl_removed include remove_telnetd-ssl class remove_telnetd-ssl { package { 'telnetd-ssl': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=telnetd-ssl # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove telnetd-ssl # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on telnetd-ssl. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "telnetd-ssl" ; then yum remove -y "telnetd-ssl" fi Uninstall the telnet server The telnet daemon should be uninstalled. BP28(R1) NT007(R03) 11 12 14 15 3 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.AC-3 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 telnet allows clear text communications, and does not protect any data transmission between client and server. Any confidential data can be listened and no integrity checking is made.' CCE-83302-0 - name: Ensure telnetd is removed package: name: telnetd state: absent tags: - CCE-83302-0 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - package_telnetd_removed include remove_telnetd class remove_telnetd { package { 'telnetd': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=telnetd # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove telnetd # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on telnetd. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "telnetd" ; then yum remove -y "telnetd" fi DHCP The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) allows systems to request and obtain an IP address and other configuration parameters from a server. This guide recommends configuring networking on clients by manually editing the appropriate files under /etc/sysconfig. Use of DHCP can make client systems vulnerable to compromise by rogue DHCP servers, and should be avoided unless necessary. If using DHCP is necessary, however, there are best practices that should be followed to minimize security risk. Configure DHCP Client if Necessary If DHCP must be used, then certain configuration changes can minimize the amount of information it receives and applies from the network, and thus the amount of incorrect information a rogue DHCP server could successfully distribute. For more information on configuring dhclient, see the dhclient(8) and dhclient.conf(5) man pages. Minimize the DHCP-Configured Options Create the file /etc/dhcp/dhclient.conf, and add an appropriate setting for each of the ten configuration settings which can be obtained via DHCP. For each setting, do one of the following: If the setting should not be configured remotely by the DHCP server, select an appropriate static value, and add the line: supersede setting value; If the setting should be configured remotely by the DHCP server, add the lines: request setting; require setting; For example, suppose the DHCP server should provide only the IP address itself and the subnet mask. Then the entire file should look like: supersede domain-name "example.com"; supersede domain-name-servers 192.168.1.2; supersede nis-domain ""; supersede nis-servers ""; supersede ntp-servers "ntp.example.com "; supersede routers 192.168.1.1; supersede time-offset -18000; request subnet-mask; require subnet-mask; In this example, the options nis-servers and nis-domain are set to empty strings, on the assumption that the deprecated NIS protocol is not in use. It is necessary to supersede settings for unused services so that they cannot be set by a hostile DHCP server. If an option is set to an empty string, dhclient will typically not attempt to configure the service. By default, the DHCP client program, dhclient, requests and applies ten configuration options (in addition to the IP address) from the DHCP server. subnet-mask, broadcast-address, time-offset, routers, domain-name, domain-name-servers, host-name, nis-domain, nis-servers, and ntp-servers. Many of the options requested and applied by dhclient may be the same for every system on a network. It is recommended that almost all configuration options be assigned statically, and only options which must vary on a host-by-host basis be assigned via DHCP. This limits the damage which can be done by a rogue DHCP server. If appropriate for your site, it is also possible to supersede the host-name directive in /etc/dhcp/dhclient.conf, establishing a static hostname for the system. However, dhclient does not use the host name option provided by the DHCP server (instead using the value provided by a reverse DNS lookup). Configure DHCP Server If the system must act as a DHCP server, the configuration information it serves should be minimized. Also, support for other protocols and DNS-updating schemes should be explicitly disabled unless needed. The configuration file for dhcpd is called /etc/dhcp/dhcpd.conf. The file begins with a number of global configuration options. The remainder of the file is divided into sections, one for each block of addresses offered by dhcpd, each of which contains configuration options specific to that address block. Configure Logging Ensure that the following line exists in /etc/rsyslog.conf: daemon.* /var/log/daemon.log Configure logwatch or other log monitoring tools to summarize error conditions reported by the dhcpd process. 1 12 13 14 15 16 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 APO10.01 APO10.03 APO10.04 APO10.05 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 MEA01.01 MEA01.02 MEA01.03 MEA01.04 MEA01.05 MEA02.01 4.3.2.6.7 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.1 SR 6.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 A.14.2.7 A.15.2.1 A.15.2.2 AU-12(a) AU-12(c) CM-6(a) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 DE.CM-7 ID.SC-4 PR.PT-1 By default, dhcpd logs notices to the daemon facility. Sending all daemon messages to a dedicated log file is part of the syslog configuration outlined in the Logging and Auditing section Deny BOOTP Queries Unless your network needs to support older BOOTP clients, disable support for the bootp protocol by adding or correcting the global option: deny bootp; 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 The bootp option tells dhcpd to respond to BOOTP queries. If support for this simpler protocol is not needed, it should be disabled to remove attack vectors against the DHCP server. Deny Decline Messages Edit /etc/dhcp/dhcpd.conf and add or correct the following global option to prevent the DHCP server from responding the DHCPDECLINE messages, if possible: deny declines; 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 The DHCPDECLINE message can be sent by a DHCP client to indicate that it does not consider the lease offered by the server to be valid. By issuing many DHCPDECLINE messages, a malicious client can exhaust the DHCP server's pool of IP addresses, causing the DHCP server to forget old address allocations. Do Not Use Dynamic DNS To prevent the DHCP server from receiving DNS information from clients, edit /etc/dhcp/dhcpd.conf, and add or correct the following global option: ddns-update-style none; The ddns-update-style option controls only whether the DHCP server will attempt to act as a Dynamic DNS client. As long as the DNS server itself is correctly configured to reject DDNS attempts, an incorrect ddns-update-style setting on the client is harmless (but should be fixed as a best practice). 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 The Dynamic DNS protocol is used to remotely update the data served by a DNS server. DHCP servers can use Dynamic DNS to publish information about their clients. This setup carries security risks, and its use is not recommended. If Dynamic DNS must be used despite the risks it poses, it is critical that Dynamic DNS transactions be protected using TSIG or some other cryptographic authentication mechanism. See dhcpd.conf(5) for more information about protecting the DHCP server from passing along malicious DNS data from its clients. Minimize Served Information Edit /etc/dhcp/dhcpd.conf. Examine each address range section within the file, and ensure that the following options are not defined unless there is an operational need to provide this information via DHCP: option domain-name option domain-name-servers option nis-domain option nis-servers option ntp-servers option routers option time-offset By default, the Red Hat Enterprise Linux client installation uses DHCP to request much of the above information from the DHCP server. In particular, domain-name, domain-name-servers, and routers are configured via DHCP. These settings are typically necessary for proper network functionality, but are also usually static across systems at a given site. 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 Because the configuration information provided by the DHCP server could be maliciously provided to clients by a rogue DHCP server, the amount of information provided via DHCP should be minimized. Remove these definitions from the DHCP server configuration to ensure that legitimate clients do not unnecessarily rely on DHCP for this information. Disable DHCP Client DHCP is the default network configuration method provided by the system installer, and common on many networks. Nevertheless, manual management of IP addresses for systems implies a greater degree of management and accountability for network activity. Disable DHCP Client in ifcfg For each interface on the system (e.g. eth0), edit /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifcfg-interface and make the following changes: Correct the BOOTPROTO line to read: BOOTPROTO=none Add or correct the following lines, substituting the appropriate values based on your site's addressing scheme: NETMASK=255.255.255.0 IPADDR=192.168.1.2 GATEWAY=192.168.1.1 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 CCI-000366 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 DHCP relies on trusting the local network. If the local network is not trusted, then it should not be used. However, the automatic configuration provided by DHCP is commonly used and the alternative, manual configuration, presents an unacceptable burden in many circumstances. for config_file in /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifcfg-*; do if grep -q ^BOOTPROTO= $config_file; then sed -i 's/^BOOTPROTO=.*/BOOTPROTO=none/' $config_file else echo BOOTPROTO=none >>$config_file fi done Disable DHCP Server The DHCP server dhcpd is not installed or activated by default. If the software was installed and activated, but the system does not need to act as a DHCP server, it should be disabled and removed. Uninstall DHCP Server Package If the system does not need to act as a DHCP server, the dhcp package can be uninstalled. The dhcp-server package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase dhcp-server BP28(R1) 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 CCI-000366 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 2.2.4 2.2.3 Removing the DHCP server ensures that it cannot be easily or accidentally reactivated and disrupt network operation. CCE-83385-5 - name: Ensure dhcp-server is removed package: name: dhcp-server state: absent tags: - CCE-83385-5 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_dhcp_removed include remove_dhcp-server class remove_dhcp-server { package { 'dhcp-server': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=dhcp-server # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove dhcp-server # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on dhcp-server. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "dhcp-server" ; then yum remove -y "dhcp-server" fi Disable DHCP Service The dhcpd service should be disabled on any system that does not need to act as a DHCP server. The dhcpd service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now dhcpd.service 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 CCI-000366 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 2.2.3 Unmanaged or unintentionally activated DHCP servers may provide faulty information to clients, interfering with the operation of a legitimate site DHCP server if there is one. CCE-82864-0 - name: Block Disable service dhcpd block: - name: Disable service dhcpd block: - name: Disable service dhcpd systemd: name: dhcpd.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service dhcpd' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82864-0 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_dhcpd_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - dhcpd.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files dhcpd.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82864-0 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_dhcpd_disabled - name: Disable socket dhcpd systemd: name: dhcpd.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("dhcpd.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-82864-0 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_dhcpd_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: dhcpd.service enabled: false mask: true - name: dhcpd.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["dhcpd"] include disable_dhcpd class disable_dhcpd { service {'dhcpd': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'dhcpd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'dhcpd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'dhcpd.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files dhcpd.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'dhcpd.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'dhcpd.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'dhcpd.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi DNS Server Most organizations have an operational need to run at least one nameserver. However, there are many common attacks involving DNS server software, and this server software should be disabled on any system on which it is not needed. Disable DNS Server DNS software should be disabled on any systems which does not need to be a nameserver. Note that the BIND DNS server software is not installed on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 by default. The remainder of this section discusses secure configuration of systems which must be nameservers. Uninstall bind Package The named service is provided by the bind package. The bind package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase bind 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 CCI-000366 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 2.2.4 If there is no need to make DNS server software available, removing it provides a safeguard against its activation. CCE-82408-6 - name: Ensure bind is removed package: name: bind state: absent tags: - CCE-82408-6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_bind_removed include remove_bind class remove_bind { package { 'bind': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=bind # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove bind # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on bind. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "bind" ; then yum remove -y "bind" fi Disable named Service The named service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now named.service 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 CCI-000366 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 2.2.4 All network services involve some risk of compromise due to implementation flaws and should be disabled if possible. CCE-82409-4 - name: Block Disable service named block: - name: Disable service named block: - name: Disable service named systemd: name: named.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service named' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82409-4 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_named_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - named.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files named.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82409-4 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_named_disabled - name: Disable socket named systemd: name: named.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("named.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-82409-4 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_named_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: named.service enabled: false mask: true - name: named.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["named"] include disable_named class disable_named { service {'named': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'named.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'named.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'named.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files named.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'named.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'named.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'named.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Isolate DNS from Other Services This section discusses mechanisms for preventing the DNS server from interfering with other services. This is done both to protect the remainder of the network should a nameserver be compromised, and to make direct attacks on nameservers more difficult. Run DNS Software in a chroot Jail Install the bind-chroot package: $ sudo yum install bind-chroot Place a valid named.conf file inside the chroot jail: $ sudo cp /etc/named.conf /var/named/chroot/etc/named.conf $ sudo chown root:root /var/named/chroot/etc/named.conf $ sudo chmod 644 /var/named/chroot/etc/named.conf Create and populate an appropriate zone directory within the jail, based on the options directive. If your named.conf includes: options { directory "/path/to/DIRNAME "; ... } then copy that directory and its contents from the original zone directory: $ sudo cp -r /path/to/DIRNAME /var/named/chroot/DIRNAME Add or correct the following line within /etc/sysconfig/named: ROOTDIR=/var/named/chroot If you are running BIND in a chroot jail, then you should use the jailed named.conf as the primary nameserver configuration file. That is, when this guide recommends editing /etc/named.conf, you should instead edit /var/named/chroot/etc/named.conf. Run DNS Software on Dedicated Servers Since DNS is a high-risk service which must frequently be made available to the entire Internet, it is strongly recommended that no other services be offered by systems which act as organizational DNS servers. Protect DNS Data from Tampering or Attack This section discusses DNS configuration options which make it more difficult for attackers to gain access to private DNS data or to modify DNS data. Authenticate Zone Transfers If it is necessary for a secondary nameserver to receive zone data via zone transfer from the primary server, follow the instructions here. Use dnssec-keygen to create a symmetric key file in the current directory: $ cd /tmp $ sudo dnssec-keygen -a HMAC-MD5 -b 128 -n HOST dns.example.com Kdns.example.com .+aaa +iiiii This output is the name of a file containing the new key. Read the file to find the base64-encoded key string: $ sudo cat Kdns.example.com .+NNN +MMMMM .key dns.example.com IN KEY 512 3 157 base64-key-string Add the directives to /etc/named.conf on the primary server: key zone-transfer-key { algorithm hmac-md5; secret "base64-key-string "; }; zone "example.com " IN { type master; allow-transfer { key zone-transfer-key; }; ... }; Add the directives below to /etc/named.conf on the secondary nameserver: key zone-transfer-key { algorithm hmac-md5; secret "base64-key-string "; }; server IP-OF-MASTER { keys { zone-transfer-key; }; }; zone "example.com " IN { type slave; masters { IP-OF-MASTER ; }; ... }; The purpose of the dnssec-keygen command is to create the shared secret string base64-key-string. Once this secret has been obtained and inserted into named.conf on the primary and secondary servers, the key files Kdns.example.com .+NNN +MMMMM .key and Kdns.example.com .+NNN +MMMMM .private are no longer needed, and may safely be deleted. 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 The BIND transaction signature (TSIG) functionality allows primary and secondary nameservers to use a shared secret to verify authorization to perform zone transfers. This method is more secure than using IP-based limiting to restrict nameserver access, since IP addresses can be easily spoofed. However, if you cannot configure TSIG between your servers because, for instance, the secondary nameserver is not under your control and its administrators are unwilling to configure TSIG, you can configure an allow-transfer directive with numerical IP addresses or ACLs as a last resort. CCE-82410-2 Disable Dynamic Updates Is there a mission-critical reason to enable the risky dynamic update functionality? If not, edit /etc/named.conf. For each zone specification, correct the following directive if necessary: zone "example.com " IN { allow-update { none; }; ... }; Dynamic updates allow remote servers to add, delete, or modify any entries in your zone file. Therefore, they should be considered highly risky, and disabled unless there is a very good reason for their use. If dynamic updates must be allowed, IP-based ACLs are insufficient protection, since they are easily spoofed. Instead, use TSIG keys (see the previous section for an example), and consider using the update-policy directive to restrict changes to only the precise type of change needed. Disable Zone Transfers from the Nameserver Is it necessary for a secondary nameserver to receive zone data via zone transfer from the primary server? If not, follow the instructions in this section. If so, see the next section for instructions on protecting zone transfers. Add or correct the following directive within /etc/named.conf: options { allow-transfer { none; }; ... } If both the primary and secondary nameserver are under your control, or if you have only one nameserver, it may be possible to use an external configuration management mechanism to distribute zone updates. In that case, it is not necessary to allow zone transfers within BIND itself, so they should be disabled to avoid the potential for abuse. Use Views to Partition External and Internal Information If it is not possible to run external and internal nameservers on separate physical systems, run BIND9 and simulate this feature using views. Edit /etc/named.conf. Add or correct the following directives (where SUBNET is the numerical IP representation of your organization in the form xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/xx): acl internal { SUBNET ; localhost; }; view "internal-view" { match-clients { internal; }; zone "." IN { type hint; file "db.cache"; }; zone "internal.example.com " IN { ... }; }; view "external-view" { match-clients { any; }; recursion no; zone "example.com " IN { ... }; }; As shown in the example, database files which are required for recursion, such as the root hints file, must be available to any clients which are allowed to make recursive queries. Under typical circumstances, this includes only the internal clients which are allowed to use this server as a general-purpose nameserver. Run Separate DNS Servers for External and Internal Queries Is it possible to run external and internal nameservers on separate systems? If so, follow the configuration guidance in this section. On the external nameserver, edit /etc/named.conf to add or correct the following directives: options { allow-query { any; }; recursion no; ... }; zone "example.com " IN { ... }; On the internal nameserver, edit /etc/named.conf. Add or correct the following directives, where SUBNET is the numerical IP representation of your organization in the form xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/xx: acl internal { SUBNET ; localhost; }; options { allow-query { internal; }; ... }; zone "internal.example.com " IN { ... }; Docker Service The docker service is necessary to create containers, which are self-sufficient and self-contained applications using the resource isolation features of the kernel. Application Whitelisting Daemon Fapolicyd (File Access Policy Daemon) implements application whitelisting to decide file access rights. Applications that are known via a reputation source are allowed access while unknown applications are not. The daemon makes use of the kernel's fanotify interface to determine file access rights. Install fapolicyd Package The fapolicyd package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install fapolicyd CCI-001764 CCI-001774 CM-6(a) SI-4(22) SRG-OS-000370-GPOS-00155 SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00230 RHEL-08-040135 SV-230523r854064_rule fapolicyd (File Access Policy Daemon) implements application whitelisting to decide file access rights. CCE-82191-8 - name: Ensure fapolicyd is installed package: name: fapolicyd state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82191-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040135 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SI-4(22) - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_fapolicyd_installed [[packages]] name = "fapolicyd" version = "*" include install_fapolicyd class install_fapolicyd { package { 'fapolicyd': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=fapolicyd # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "fapolicyd" ; then yum install -y "fapolicyd" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the File Access Policy Service The File Access Policy service should be enabled. The fapolicyd service can be enabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl enable fapolicyd.service CCI-001764 CCI-001774 CM-6(a) SI-4(22) FMT_SMF_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000370-GPOS-00155 SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00230 RHEL-08-040136 SV-244545r854074_rule The fapolicyd service (File Access Policy Daemon) implements application whitelisting to decide file access rights. CCE-82249-4 - name: Enable service fapolicyd block: - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto - name: Enable service fapolicyd systemd: name: fapolicyd enabled: 'yes' state: started masked: 'no' when: - '"fapolicyd" in ansible_facts.packages' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82249-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040136 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SI-4(22) - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_fapolicyd_enabled [customizations.services] enabled = ["fapolicyd"] include enable_fapolicyd class enable_fapolicyd { service {'fapolicyd': enable => true, ensure => 'running', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'fapolicyd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'fapolicyd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'fapolicyd.service' else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure Fapolicy Module to Employ a Deny-all, Permit-by-exception Policy to Allow the Execution of Authorized Software Programs. The Fapolicy module must be configured to employ a deny-all, permit-by-exception policy to allow the execution of authorized software programs and to prevent unauthorized software from running. CCI-001764 CM-7 (2) CM-7 (5) (b) CM-6 b SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 SRG-OS-000370-GPOS-00155 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00232 RHEL-08-040137 SV-244546r858730_rule Utilizing a whitelist provides a configuration management method for allowing the execution of only authorized software. Using only authorized software decreases risk by limiting the number of potential vulnerabilities. Verification of whitelisted software occurs prior to execution or at system startup. Proceed with caution with enforcing the use of this daemon. Improper configuration may render the system non-functional. The "fapolicyd" API is not namespace aware and can cause issues when launching or running containers. CCE-86478-5 - name: Configure Fapolicy Module to Employ a Deny-all, Permit-by-exception Policy to Allow the Execution of Authorized Software Programs. - Ensure a Final Rule Denying Everything ansible.builtin.copy: content: | # Red Hat KCS 7003854 (https://access.redhat.com/solutions/7003854) deny perm=any all : all dest: /etc/fapolicyd/rules.d/99-deny-everything.rules owner: root group: fapolicyd mode: '0644' register: result_fapolicyd_final_rule when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86478-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040137 - NIST-800-53-CM-6 b - NIST-800-53-CM-7 (2) - NIST-800-53-CM-7 (5) (b) - fapolicy_default_deny - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Configure Fapolicy Module to Employ a Deny-all, Permit-by-exception Policy to Allow the Execution of Authorized Software Programs. - Ensure fapolicyd is Not Permissive ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/fapolicyd/fapolicyd.conf regexp: ^(permissive\s*=).*$ line: \1 0 backrefs: true register: result_fapolicyd_enforced when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86478-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040137 - NIST-800-53-CM-6 b - NIST-800-53-CM-7 (2) - NIST-800-53-CM-7 (5) (b) - fapolicy_default_deny - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Configure Fapolicy Module to Employ a Deny-all, Permit-by-exception Policy to Allow the Execution of Authorized Software Programs. - Restart fapolicyd If Permissive Mode or Final Rule is Changed ansible.builtin.service: name: fapolicyd state: restarted when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - result_fapolicyd_final_rule is changed or result_fapolicyd_enforced is changed tags: - CCE-86478-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040137 - NIST-800-53-CM-6 b - NIST-800-53-CM-7 (2) - NIST-800-53-CM-7 (5) (b) - fapolicy_default_deny - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then cat > /etc/fapolicyd/rules.d/99-deny-everything.rules << EOF # Red Hat KCS 7003854 (https://access.redhat.com/solutions/7003854) deny perm=any all : all EOF chmod 644 /etc/fapolicyd/rules.d/99-deny-everything.rules chgrp fapolicyd /etc/fapolicyd/rules.d/99-deny-everything.rules if [ -e "/etc/fapolicyd/fapolicyd.conf" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*permissive\s*=\s*/Id" "/etc/fapolicyd/fapolicyd.conf" else touch "/etc/fapolicyd/fapolicyd.conf" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/fapolicyd/fapolicyd.conf" cp "/etc/fapolicyd/fapolicyd.conf" "/etc/fapolicyd/fapolicyd.conf.bak" # Insert at the end of the file printf '%s\n' "permissive = 0" >> "/etc/fapolicyd/fapolicyd.conf" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/fapolicyd/fapolicyd.conf.bak" systemctl restart fapolicyd else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi fapolicyd Must be Configured to Limit Access to Users Home Folders fapolicyd needs be configured so that users cannot give access to their home folders to other users. This rule is deprecated and there is no replacement at this time. Previous versions of this rule provided fixtext that would cause fapolicyd not to start. CCI-000366 CM-6 b SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00230 Users' home directories/folders may contain information of a sensitive nature. Non-privileged users should coordinate any sharing of information with a System Administrator (SA) through shared resources. fapolicyd can confine users to their home directory, not allowing them to make any changes outside of their own home directories. Confining users to their home directory will minimize the risk of sharing information. FTP Server FTP is a common method for allowing remote access to files. Like telnet, the FTP protocol is unencrypted, which means that passwords and other data transmitted during the session can be captured and that the session is vulnerable to hijacking. Therefore, running the FTP server software is not recommended. However, there are some FTP server configurations which may be appropriate for some environments, particularly those which allow only read-only anonymous access as a means of downloading data available to the public. Remove ftp Package FTP (File Transfer Protocol) is a traditional and widely used standard tool for transferring files between a server and clients over a network, especially where no authentication is necessary (permits anonymous users to connect to a server). The ftp package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase ftp 2.2.4 2.3.1 FTP does not protect the confidentiality of data or authentication credentials. It is recommended SFTP be used if file transfer is required. Unless there is a need to run the system as a FTP server (for example, to allow anonymous downloads), it is recommended that the package be removed to reduce the potential attack surface. CCE-90745-1 - name: Ensure ftp is removed package: name: ftp state: absent tags: - CCE-90745-1 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_ftp_removed include remove_ftp class remove_ftp { package { 'ftp': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=ftp # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove ftp # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on ftp. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "ftp" ; then yum remove -y "ftp" fi Disable vsftpd if Possible To minimize attack surface, disable vsftpd if at all possible. Uninstall vsftpd Package The vsftpd package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase vsftpd 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 CCI-000197 CCI-000366 CCI-000381 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) IA-5(1)(c) IA-5(1).1(v) CM-7 CM-7.1(ii) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 SRG-OS-000074-GPOS-00042 SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040360 2.2.7 SV-230558r627750_rule Removing the vsftpd package decreases the risk of its accidental activation. CCE-82414-4 - name: Ensure vsftpd is removed package: name: vsftpd state: absent tags: - CCE-82414-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040360 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7 - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-7.1(ii) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1).1(v) - disable_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - package_vsftpd_removed include remove_vsftpd class remove_vsftpd { package { 'vsftpd': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=vsftpd # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove vsftpd # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on vsftpd. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "vsftpd" ; then yum remove -y "vsftpd" fi Disable vsftpd Service The vsftpd service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now vsftpd.service 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 CCI-001436 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 2.2.7 Running FTP server software provides a network-based avenue of attack, and should be disabled if not needed. Furthermore, the FTP protocol is unencrypted and creates a risk of compromising sensitive information. CCE-82413-6 - name: Block Disable service vsftpd block: - name: Disable service vsftpd block: - name: Disable service vsftpd systemd: name: vsftpd.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service vsftpd' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82413-6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_vsftpd_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - vsftpd.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files vsftpd.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82413-6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_vsftpd_disabled - name: Disable socket vsftpd systemd: name: vsftpd.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("vsftpd.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-82413-6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_vsftpd_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: vsftpd.service enabled: false mask: true - name: vsftpd.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["vsftpd"] include disable_vsftpd class disable_vsftpd { service {'vsftpd': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'vsftpd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'vsftpd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'vsftpd.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files vsftpd.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'vsftpd.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'vsftpd.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'vsftpd.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure vsftpd to Provide FTP Service if Necessary The primary vsftpd configuration file is /etc/vsftpd.conf, if that file exists, or /etc/vsftpd/vsftpd.conf if it does not. Configure Firewalls to Protect the FTP Server By default, iptables blocks access to the ports used by the web server. To configure iptables to allow port 21 traffic, one must edit /etc/sysconfig/iptables and /etc/sysconfig/ip6tables (if IPv6 is in use). Add the following line, ensuring that it appears before the final LOG and DROP lines for the INPUT chain: -A INPUT -m state --state NEW -p tcp --dport 21 -j ACCEPT Edit the file /etc/sysconfig/iptables-config. Ensure that the space-separated list of modules contains the FTP connection tracking module: IPTABLES_MODULES="ip_conntrack_ftp" These settings configure the firewall to allow connections to an FTP server. The first line allows initial connections to the FTP server port. FTP is an older protocol which is not very compatible with firewalls. During the initial FTP dialogue, the client and server negotiate an arbitrary port to be used for data transfer. The ip_conntrack_ftp module is used by iptables to listen to that dialogue and allow connections to the data ports which FTP negotiates. This allows an FTP server to operate on a system which is running a firewall. Disable FTP Uploads if Possible Is there a mission-critical reason for users to upload files via FTP? If not, edit the vsftpd configuration file to add or correct the following configuration options: write_enable=NO If FTP uploads are necessary, follow the guidance in the remainder of this section to secure these transactions as much as possible. Anonymous FTP can be a convenient way to make files available for universal download. However, it is less common to have a need to allow unauthenticated users to place files on the FTP server. If this must be done, it is necessary to ensure that files cannot be uploaded and downloaded from the same directory. Place the FTP Home Directory on its Own Partition By default, the anonymous FTP root is the home directory of the FTP user account. The df command can be used to verify that this directory is on its own partition. If there is a mission-critical reason for anonymous users to upload files, precautions must be taken to prevent these users from filling a disk used by other services. Enable Logging of All FTP Transactions Add or correct the following configuration options within the vsftpd configuration file, located at /etc/vsftpd/vsftpd.conf: xferlog_enable=YES xferlog_std_format=NO log_ftp_protocol=YES If verbose logging to vsftpd.log is done, sparse logging of downloads to /var/log/xferlog will not also occur. However, the information about what files were downloaded is included in the information logged to vsftpd.log. To trace malicious activity facilitated by the FTP service, it must be configured to ensure that all commands sent to the FTP server are logged using the verbose vsftpd log format. The default vsftpd log file is /var/log/vsftpd.log. Create Warning Banners for All FTP Users Edit the vsftpd configuration file, which resides at /etc/vsftpd/vsftpd.conf by default. Add or correct the following configuration options: banner_file=/etc/issue CCI-000048 This setting will cause the system greeting banner to be used for FTP connections as well. Restrict the Set of Users Allowed to Access FTP This section describes how to disable non-anonymous (password-based) FTP logins, or, if it is not possible to do this entirely due to legacy applications, how to restrict insecure FTP login to only those users who have an identified need for this access. Limit Users Allowed FTP Access if Necessary If there is a mission-critical reason for users to access their accounts via the insecure FTP protocol, limit the set of users who are allowed this access. Edit the vsftpd configuration file. Add or correct the following configuration options: userlist_enable=YES userlist_file=/etc/vsftp.ftpusers userlist_deny=NO Edit the file /etc/vsftp.ftpusers. For each user USERNAME who should be allowed to access the system via FTP, add a line containing that user's name: USERNAME If anonymous access is also required, add the anonymous usernames to /etc/vsftp.ftpusers as well. anonymous ftp Historically, the file /etc/ftpusers contained a list of users who were not allowed to access the system via FTP. It was used to prevent system users such as the root user from logging in via the insecure FTP protocol. However, when the configuration option userlist deny=NO is set, vsftpd interprets ftpusers as the set of users who are allowed to login via FTP. Since it should be possible for most users to access their accounts via secure protocols, it is recommended that this setting be used, so that non-anonymous FTP access can be limited to legacy users who have been explicitly identified. Restrict Access to Anonymous Users if Possible Is there a mission-critical reason for users to transfer files to/from their own accounts using FTP, rather than using a secure protocol like SCP/SFTP? If not, edit the vsftpd configuration file. Add or correct the following configuration option: local_enable=NO If non-anonymous FTP logins are necessary, follow the guidance in the remainder of this section to secure these logins as much as possible. 11 12 14 15 16 18 3 5 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.03 DSS06.06 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) AC-3 AC-17(a) PR.AC-4 PR.AC-6 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 The use of non-anonymous FTP logins is strongly discouraged. Since SSH clients and servers are widely available, and since SSH provides support for a transfer mode which resembles FTP in user interface, there is no good reason to allow password-based FTP access.' CCE-82412-8 Use vsftpd to Provide FTP Service if Necessary If your use-case requires FTP service, install and set-up vsftpd to provide it. Install vsftpd Package If this system must operate as an FTP server, install the vsftpd package via the standard channels. The vsftpd package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install vsftpd 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 After Red Hat Enterprise Linux 2.1, Red Hat switched from distributing wu-ftpd with Red Hat Enterprise Linux to distributing vsftpd. For security and for consistency with future Red Hat releases, the use of vsftpd is recommended. CCE-82411-0 - name: Ensure vsftpd is installed package: name: vsftpd state: present tags: - CCE-82411-0 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_vsftpd_installed [[packages]] name = "vsftpd" version = "*" include install_vsftpd class install_vsftpd { package { 'vsftpd': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=vsftpd if ! rpm -q --quiet "vsftpd" ; then yum install -y "vsftpd" fi Web Server The web server is responsible for providing access to content via the HTTP protocol. Web servers represent a significant security risk because: The HTTP port is commonly probed by malicious sourcesWeb server software is very complex, and includes a long history of vulnerabilitiesThe HTTP protocol is unencrypted and vulnerable to passive monitoring The system's default web server software is Apache 2 and is provided in the RPM package httpd. Disable Apache if Possible If Apache was installed and activated, but the system does not need to act as a web server, then it should be disabled and removed from the system. Uninstall httpd Package The httpd package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase httpd 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 2.2.18 If there is no need to make the web server software available, removing it provides a safeguard against its activation. CCE-85970-2 - name: Ensure httpd is removed package: name: httpd state: absent tags: - CCE-85970-2 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - package_httpd_removed - unknown_severity include remove_httpd class remove_httpd { package { 'httpd': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=httpd # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove httpd # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on httpd. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "httpd" ; then yum remove -y "httpd" fi Disable httpd Service The httpd service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now httpd.service 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 2.2.18 Running web server software provides a network-based avenue of attack, and should be disabled if not needed. CCE-82761-8 - name: Block Disable service httpd block: - name: Disable service httpd block: - name: Disable service httpd systemd: name: httpd.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service httpd' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82761-8 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_httpd_disabled - unknown_severity - name: Unit Socket Exists - httpd.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files httpd.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82761-8 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_httpd_disabled - unknown_severity - name: Disable socket httpd systemd: name: httpd.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("httpd.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-82761-8 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_httpd_disabled - unknown_severity apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: httpd.service enabled: false mask: true - name: httpd.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["httpd"] include disable_httpd class disable_httpd { service {'httpd': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'httpd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'httpd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'httpd.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files httpd.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'httpd.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'httpd.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'httpd.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable NGINX if Possible If NGINX was installed and activated, but the system does not need to act as a web server, then it should be removed from the system. Uninstall nginx Package The nginx package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase nginx BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 2.2.18 If there is no need to make the web server software available, removing it provides a safeguard against its activation. CCE-88034-4 - name: Ensure nginx is removed package: name: nginx state: absent tags: - CCE-88034-4 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - package_nginx_removed - unknown_severity include remove_nginx class remove_nginx { package { 'nginx': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=nginx # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove nginx # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on nginx. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "nginx" ; then yum remove -y "nginx" fi Install Apache if Necessary If httpd was not installed and activated, but the system needs to act as a web server, then it should be installed on the system. Follow these guidelines to install it defensively. The httpd package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install httpd This method of installation is recommended over installing the "Web Server" package group during the system installation process. The Web Server package group includes many packages which are likely extraneous, while the command-line method installs only the required httpd package itself. Confirm Minimal Built-in Modules Installed The default httpd installation minimizes the number of modules that are compiled directly into the binary (core prefork http_core mod_so). This minimizes risk by limiting the capabilities allowed by the web server. Query the set of compiled-in modules using the following command: $ httpd -l If the number of compiled-in modules is significantly larger than the aforementioned set, this guide recommends re-installing httpd with a reduced configuration. Minimizing the number of modules that are compiled into the httpd binary, reduces risk by limiting the capabilities allowed by the webserver. Secure Apache Configuration The httpd configuration file is /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf. Apply the recommendations in the remainder of this section to this file. HTTPD Log Level The setting for LogLevel in /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf alert crit warn emerg error warn Maximum KeepAlive Requests for HTTPD The setting for MaxKeepAliveRequests in httpd.conf 100 1000 10000 100000 500 100 Configure Error Log Format LogFormat should be enabled and set to the following in /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf: LogFormat "a %A %h %H %l %m %s %t %u %U \"%{Referer}i\" \"%{User-Agent}i\"" combined WA00612 The server error logs are invaluable because they can also be used to identify potential problems and enable proactive remediation. Log data can reveal anomalous behavior such as "not found" or "unauthorized" errors that may be an evidence of attack attempts. Failure to enable error logging can significantly reduce the ability of Web Administrators to detect or remediate problems. The LogFormat directive defines the format and information to be included in the access log entries. Configure The Number of Allowed Simultaneous Requests The MaxKeepAliveRequests directive should be set and configured to or greater by setting the following in /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf: MaxKeepAliveRequests WG110 Resource exhaustion can occur when an unlimited number of concurrent requests are allowed on a web site, facilitating a denial of service attack. Mitigating this kind of attack will include limiting the number of concurrent HTTP/HTTPS requests per IP address and may include, where feasible, limiting parameter values associated with keepalive, (i.e., a parameter used to limit the amount of time a connection may be inactive). MIME types for csh or sh shell programs must be disabled Users must not be allowed to access the shell programs. WG370 Shell programs might execute shell escapes and could then perform unauthorized activities that could damage the security posture of the web server. A shell is a program that serves as the basic interface between the user and the operating system. In this regard, there are shells that are security risks in the context of a web server and shells that are unauthorized. Enable HTTPD Error Logging ErrorLog should be enabled and set to the following in /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf: ErrorLog "logs/error_log" WA00605 The server error logs are invaluable because they can also be used to identify potential problems and enable proactive remediation. Log data can reveal anomalous behavior such as "not found" or "unauthorized" errors that may be an evidence of attack attempts. Failure to enable error logging can significantly reduce the ability of Web Administrators to detect or remediate problems. Enable HTTPD LogLevel LogLevel should be enabled and set to . Add or edit the following in /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf: LogLevel WA00620 The server error logs are invaluable because they can also be used to identify potential problems and enable proactive remediation. Log data can reveal anomalous behavior such as "not found" or "unauthorized" errors that may be an evidence of attack attempts. Failure to enable error logging can significantly reduce the ability of Web Administrators to detect or remediate problems. While the ErrorLog directive configures the error log file name, the LogLevel directive is used to configure the severity level for the error logs. The log level values are the standard syslog levels: emerg, alert, crit, error, warn, notice, info and debug. Enable HTTPD System Logging CustomLog should be enabled and set to the following in /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf: CustomLog "logs/access_log" combined WA00615 The server error logs are invaluable because they can also be used to identify potential problems and enable proactive remediation. Log data can reveal anomalous behavior such as "not found" or "unauthorized" errors that may be an evidence of attack attempts. Failure to enable error logging can significantly reduce the ability of Web Administrators to detect or remediate problems. The CustomLog directive specifies the log file, syslog facility, or piped logging utility. The web server password(s) must be entrusted to the SA or Web Manager Normally, a service account is established for the web server. This is because a privileged account is not desirable and the server is designed to run for long uninterrupted periods of time. The SA or Web Manager will need password access to the web server to restart the service in the event or an emergency as the web server is not to restart automatically after an unscheduled interruption. WG050 If the password is not entrusted to an SA or web manager the ability to ensure the availability of the web server is compromised. A public web server, if hosted on the NIPRNet, must be isolated in an accredited DoD DMZ extension To minimize exposure of private assets to unnecesarry risk by attackers, public web servers must be isolated from internal systems. Logically relocate public web servers to be isolated from internal systems. In addition, ensure the public web server does not have trusted connections with assets outside the confines of the demilitarizez done (DMZ) other than application and/or database servers that are a part of the same system as the web server. WA060 Public web servers are by nature more vulnerabile to attack from publically based sources, such as the public Internet. Once compromised, a public server might be used as a base for further attack on private resources, unless additional layers of protection are implemented. Public web servers must be located in a DoD DMZ Extension, if hosted on the NIPRNet, with carefully controlled access. Failure to isolate resources in this way increase risk that private assets are exposed to attacks from public sources. An improperly located public web server is a potential threat to the entire network. Installation of a compiler on production web server is prohibited The presence of a compiler on a production server facilitates the malicious user's task of creating custom versions of programs and installing Trojan Horses or viruses. WG080 An attacker's code could be uploaded and compiled on the server under attack. A private web server must be located on a separate controlled access subnet Private web servers, which host sites that serve controlled access data, must be protected from outside threats in addition to insider threats. Isolate the private web server from the public DMZ and separate it from the internal general population LAN. WA070 Insider threat may be accidental or intentional but, in either case, can cause a disruption in service of the web server. To protect the private web server from these threats, it must be located on a separate controlled access subnet and must not be part of the public DMZ that houses the public web servers. it also cannot be located inside the enclave as part of the local general population LAN. Public web server resources must not be shared with private assets It is important to segregate public web server resources from private resources located behind the DoD DMZ in order to protect private assets. WG040 When folders, drives, or other resources are directly shared between the public web server and private servers the intent of data and resource segregation can be compromised. In addition to the requirements of the DoD Internet-NIPRNet DMZ STIG that isolates inbound traffic from external network to the internal network, resources such as printers, files, and folders/directories will not be shared between public web servers and assets located within the internal network. Backup interactive scripts on the production web server are prohibited Copies of backup files will not execute on the server, but they can be read by the anonymous user if special precautions are not taken. WG420 Such backup copies contain the same sensitive information as the actual scripts being executed and, as such, are useful to malicious users. Techniques and systems exist today that search web servers for such files and are able to exploit the information contained in them. Backup copies of files are automatically created by some text editors such such as emacs and VIM. Editors may write a backup file with an extension ~ added to the name of the original file. The edit plus editor will create a .bak file. Of course, this would imply the presence and use of development tools on the web server, which is a finding under WG130. Having backup scripts on the web server provides one more opportunity for malicious persons to view these scripts and use the information found in them. Configure Operating System to Protect Web Server The following configuration steps should be taken on the system which hosts the web server, in order to provide as safe an environment as possible for the web server. Scan All Uploaded Content for Malicious Software Install anti-virus software on the system and set it to automatically scan new files that are introduced to the web server. WG237 Remote web authors should not be able to upload files to the Document Root directory structure without virus checking and checking for malicious or mobile code. A remote web user, whose agency has a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the hosting agency and has submitted a DoD form 2875 (System Authorization Access Request (SAAR)) or an equivalent document, will be allowed to post files to a temporary location on the server. All posted files to this temporary location will be scanned for viruses and content checked for malicious or mobile code. Only files free of viruses and malicious or mobile code will be posted to the appropriate DocumentRoot directory. Configure firewall to Allow Access to the Web Server By default, iptables blocks access to the ports used by the web server. To configure iptables to allow port 80 traffic, one must edit /etc/sysconfig/iptables and /etc/sysconfig/ip6tables (if IPv6 is in use). Add the following line, ensuring that it appears before the final LOG and DROP lines for the INPUT chain: -A INPUT -m state --state NEW -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT To configure iptables to allow port 443 traffic, one must edit /etc/sysconfig/iptables and /etc/sysconfig/ip6tables (if IPv6 is in use). Add the following line, ensuring that it appears before the final LOG and DROP lines for the INPUT chain: -A INPUT -m state --state NEW -p tcp --dport 443 -j ACCEPT WG610 Failure to comply with DoD ports, protocols, and services (PPS) requirements can result in compromise of enclave boundary protections and/or functionality of the AIS. Ensure Remote Administrative Access Is Encrypted Ensure that the SSH server service is enabled. The sshd service can be enabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl enable sshd.service WG230 Logging into a web server remotely using an unencrypted protocol or service when performing updates and maintenance is a major risk. Data, such as user account, is transmitted in plaintext and can easily be compromised. When performing remote administrative tasks, a protocol or service that encrypts the communication channel must be used. An alternative to remote administration of the web server is to perform web server administration locally at the console. Local administration at the console implies physical access to the server. Run httpd in a chroot Jail if Practical Running httpd inside a chroot jail is designed to isolate the web server process to a small section of the filesystem, limiting the damage if it is compromised. Versions of Apache greater than 2.2.10 (such as the one included with Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8) provide the ChrootDir directive. To run Apache inside a chroot jail in /chroot/apache, add the following line to /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf: ChrootDir /chroot/apache This necessitates placing all files required by httpd inside /chroot/apache , including httpd's binaries, modules, configuration files, and served web pages. The details of this configuration are beyond the scope of this guide. This may also require additional SELinux configuration. Restrict File and Directory Access Minimize access to critical httpd files and directories. Set Permissions on the /etc/httpd/conf/ Directory To properly set the permissions of /etc/http/conf, run the command: $ sudo chmod 0750 /etc/http/conf Access to the web server's configuration files may allow an unauthorized user or attacker to access information about the web server or alter the server's configuration files. Set Permissions on the /var/log/httpd/ Directory Ensure that the permissions on the web server log directory is set to 700: $ sudo chmod 700 /var/log/httpd/ This is its default setting. 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 A major tool in exploring the web site use, attempted use, unusual conditions, and problems are the access and error logs. In the event of a security incident, these logs can provide the SA and the web manager with valuable information. To ensure the integrity of the log files and protect the SA and the web manager from a conflict of interest related to the maintenance of these files, only the members of the Auditors group will be granted permissions to move, copy, and delete these files in the course of their duties related to the archiving of these files. Set Permissions on All Configuration Files Inside /etc/httpd/conf.d/ To properly set the permissions of /etc/http/conf.d/*, run the command: $ sudo chmod 0640 /etc/http/conf.d/* 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 Access to the web server's configuration files may allow an unauthorized user or attacker to access information about the web server or to alter the server's configuration files. - name: Find /etc/httpd/conf.d/ file(s) command: find -H /etc/httpd/conf.d/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+xs,g+xws,o+xwrt -type f -regex "^.*$" register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false tags: - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - configure_strategy - file_permissions_httpd_server_conf_d_files - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - unknown_severity - name: Set permissions for /etc/httpd/conf.d/ file(s) file: path: '{{ item }}' mode: u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt state: file with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' tags: - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - configure_strategy - file_permissions_httpd_server_conf_d_files - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - unknown_severity find -H /etc/httpd/conf.d/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+xs,g+xws,o+xwrt -type f -regex '^.*$' -exec chmod u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt {} \; Set Permissions on All Configuration Files Inside /etc/httpd/conf/ To properly set the permissions of /etc/http/conf/*, run the command: $ sudo chmod 0640 /etc/http/conf/* 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 Access to the web server's configuration files may allow an unauthorized user or attacker to access information about the web server or to alter the server's configuration files. - name: Find /etc/httpd/conf/ file(s) command: find -H /etc/httpd/conf/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+xs,g+xws,o+xwrt -type f -regex "^.*$" register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false tags: - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - configure_strategy - file_permissions_httpd_server_conf_files - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - unknown_severity - name: Set permissions for /etc/httpd/conf/ file(s) file: path: '{{ item }}' mode: u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt state: file with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' tags: - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - configure_strategy - file_permissions_httpd_server_conf_files - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - unknown_severity find -H /etc/httpd/conf/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+xs,g+xws,o+xwrt -type f -regex '^.*$' -exec chmod u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt {} \; Set Permissions on All Configuration Files Inside /etc/httpd/conf.modules.d/ To properly set the permissions of /etc/http/conf.modules.d/*, run the command: $ sudo chmod 0640 /etc/http/conf.modules.d/* 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 Access to the web server's configuration files may allow an unauthorized user or attacker to access information about the web server or to alter the server's configuration files. HTTPD Log Files Must Be Owned By Root All httpd logs must be owned by root user and group. By default, the path for httpd logs is /var/log/httpd/ To properly set the owner of /var/log/httpd, run the command: $ sudo chown root /var/log/httpd To properly set the owner of /var/log/httpd/*, run the command: $ sudo chown root /var/log/httpd/* WG255 A major tool in exploring the web site use, attempted use, unusual conditions, and problems are the access and error logs. In the event of a security incident, these logs can provide the SA and the web administrator with valuable information. Because of the information that is captured in the logs, it is critical that only authorized individuals have access to the logs. Configure PERL Securely PERL (Practical Extraction and Report Language) is an interpreted language optimized for scanning arbitrary text files, extracting information from those text files, and printing reports based on that information. The language is often used in shell scripting and is intended to be practical, easy to use, and efficient means of generating interactive web pages for the user. Configure HTTP PERL Scripts To Use TAINT Option If the mod_perl module is installed, enable Perl Taint checking in /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf. To enable Perl Taint checking, add or uncomment the following to /etc/httpd/conf.d/perl.conf: PerlSwitches -T WG460 PERL (Practical Extraction and Report Language) is an interpreted language optimized for scanning arbitrary text files, extracting information from those text files, and printing reports based on that information. The language is often used in shell scripting and is intended to be practical, easy to use, and efficient means of generating interactive web pages for the user. Unfortunately, many widely available freeware PERL programs (scripts) are extremely insecure. This is most readily accomplished by a malicious user substituting input to a PERL script during a POST or a GET operation. Consequently, the founders of PERL have developed a mechanism named TAINT that protects the system from malicious input sent from outside the program. When the data is tainted, it cannot be used in programs or functions such as eval(), system(), exec(), pipes, or popen(). The script will exit with a warning message. Configure PHP Securely PHP is a widely-used and often misconfigured server-side scripting language. It should be used with caution, but configured appropriately when needed. Review /etc/php.ini and make the following changes if possible: # Do not expose PHP error messages to external users display_errors = Off # Enable safe mode safe_mode = On # Only allow access to executables in isolated directory safe_mode_exec_dir = php-required-executables-path # Limit external access to PHP environment safe_mode_allowed_env_vars = PHP_ # Restrict PHP information leakage expose_php = Off # Log all errors log_errors = On # Do not register globals for input data register_globals = Off # Minimize allowable PHP post size post_max_size = 1K # Ensure PHP redirects appropriately cgi.force_redirect = 0 # Disallow uploading unless necessary file_uploads = Off # Disallow treatment of file requests as fopen calls allow_url_fopen = Off # Enable SQL safe mode sql.safe_mode = On Directory Restrictions The Directory tags in the web server configuration file allow finer grained access control for a specified directory. All web directories should be configured on a case-by-case basis, allowing access only where needed. Web Content Directories Must Not Be Shared Anonymously Web content directories should not be shared anonymously over remote filesystems such as nfs and smb. Remove the shares from the applicable directories. WG210 Sharing web content is a security risk when a web server is involved. Users accessing the share anonymously could experience privileged access to the content of such directories. Network sharable directories expose those directories and their contents to unnecessary access. Any unnecessary exposure increases the risk that someone could exploit that access and either compromises the web content or cause web server performance problems. Remove Write Permissions From Filesystem Paths And Server Scripts Configure permissions for each instance of Alias, ScriptAlias, and ScriptAliasMatch that exist. $ sudo find DIR -type d -exec chmod 755 {} \; $ sudo find DIR -type f -exec chmod 555 {} \; Where DIR matches the paths from Alias, ScriptAlias, and ScriptAliasMatch. WG290 Excessive permissions for the anonymous web user account are one of the most common faults contributing to the compromise of a web server. If this user is able to upload and execute files on the web server, the organization or owner of the server will no longer have control of the asset. Disable Anonymous FTP Access If any directories that contain dynamic scripts can be accessed via FTP by any group or user that does not require access, remove permissions to such directories that allow anonymous access. Also, ensure that any such access employs an encrypted connection. WG430 The directories containing the CGI scripts, such as PERL, must not be accessible to anonymous users via FTP. This applies to all directories that contain scripts that can dynamically produce web pages in an interactive manner (i.e., scripts based upon user-provided input). Such scripts contain information that could be used to compromise a web service, access system resources, or deface a web site. Ignore HTTPD .htaccess Files Set AllowOverride to none for each instant of <Directory>. WG400 CGI scripts represents one of the most common and exploitable means of compromising a web server. By definition, CGI are executable by the operating system of the host server. While access control is provided via the web service, the execution of CGI programs is not otherwise limited unless the SA or Web Manager takes specific measures. CGI programs can access and alter data files, launch other programs and use the network. CGI programs can be written in any available programming language. C, PERL, PHP, Javascript, VBScript and shell (sh, ksh, bash) are popular choices. Limit Available Methods Web server methods are defined in section 9 of RFC 2616 ( http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2616.txt). If a web server does not require the implementation of all available methods, they should be disabled. Note: GET and POST are the most common methods. A majority of the others are limited to the WebDAV protocol. <Directory /var/www/html> # ... # Only allow specific methods (this command is case-sensitive!) <LimitExcept GET POST> Order allow,deny </LimitExcept> # ... </Directory> Minimizing the number of available methods to the web client reduces risk by limiting the capabilities allowed by the web server. Restrict Other Critical Directories All accessible web directories should be configured with similarly restrictive settings. The Options directive should be limited to necessary functionality and the AllowOverride directive should be used only if needed. The Order and Deny access control tags should be used to deny access by default, allowing access only where necessary. Directories accessible from a web client should be configured with the least amount of access possible in order to avoid unauthorized access to restricted content or server information. Restrict Root Directory The httpd root directory should always have the most restrictive configuration enabled. <Directory / > Options None AllowOverride None Order allow,deny </Directory> The Web Server's root directory content should be protected from unauthorized access by web clients. Restrict Web Directory The default configuration for the web (/var/www/html) Directory allows directory indexing (Indexes) and the following of symbolic links (FollowSymLinks). Neither of these is recommended. The /var/www/html directory hierarchy should not be viewable via the web, and symlinks should only be followed if the owner of the symlink also owns the linked file. Ensure that this policy is adhered to by altering the related section of the configuration: <Directory "/var/www/html"> # ... Options SymLinksIfOwnerMatch # ... </Directory> Access to the web server's directory hierarchy could allow access to unauthorized files by web clients. Following symbolic links could also allow such access. Minimize Web Server Loadable Modules A default installation of httpd includes a plethora of dynamically shared objects (DSO) that are loaded at run-time. Unlike the aforementioned compiled-in modules, a DSO can be disabled in the configuration file by removing the corresponding LoadModule directive. Note: A DSO only provides additional functionality if associated directives are included in the httpd configuration file. It should also be noted that removing a DSO will produce errors on httpd startup if the configuration file contains directives that apply to that module. Refer to http://httpd.apache.org/docs/ for details on which directives are associated with each DSO. Following each DSO removal, the configuration can be tested with the following command to check if everything still works: $ sudo service httpd configtest The purpose of each of the modules loaded by default will now be addressed one at a time. If none of a module's directives are being used, remove it. httpd Core Modules These modules comprise a basic subset of modules that are likely needed for base httpd functionality; ensure they are not commented out in /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf: LoadModule auth_basic_module modules/mod_auth_basic.so LoadModule authn_default_module modules/mod_authn_default.so LoadModule authz_host_module modules/mod_authz_host.so LoadModule authz_user_module modules/mod_authz_user.so LoadModule authz_groupfile_module modules/mod_authz_groupfile.so LoadModule authz_default_module modules/mod_authz_default.so LoadModule log_config_module modules/mod_log_config.so LoadModule logio_module modules/mod_logio.so LoadModule setenvif_module modules/mod_setenvif.so LoadModule mime_module modules/mod_mome.so LoadModule autoindex_module modules/mod_autoindex.so LoadModule negotiation_module modules/mod_negotiation.so LoadModule dir_module modules/mod_dir.so LoadModule alias_module modules/mod_alias.so Minimizing the number of loadable modules available to the web server reduces risk by limiting the capabilities allowed by the web server. Disable Cache Support The cache module allows httpd to cache data, optimizing access to frequently accessed content. However, it introduces potential security flaws such as the possibility of circumventing Allow and Deny directives. If this functionality is unnecessary, comment out the module: #LoadModule cache_module modules/mod_cache.so If caching is required, it should not be enabled for any limited-access content. Minimizing the number of loadable modules available to the web server reduces risk by limiting the capabilities allowed by the web server. Disable CGI Support The cgi module allows HTML to interact with the CGI web programming language. If this functionality is unnecessary, comment out the module: #LoadModule cgi_module modules/mod_cgi.so If the web server requires the use of CGI, enable mod_cgi. Minimizing the number of loadable modules available to the web server reduces risk by limiting the capabilities allowed by the web server. Disable HTTP Digest Authentication The auth_digest module provides encrypted authentication sessions. If this functionality is unnecessary, comment out the related module: #LoadModule auth_digest_module modules/mod_auth_digest.so Minimizing the number of loadable modules available to the web server reduces risk by limiting the capabilities allowed by the web server. Enable log_config_module For HTTPD Logging The log_config_module should exist and be configured in the /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf file by adding the following module to configure logging: log_config_module WG240 A major tool in exploring the web site use, attempted use, unusual conditions, and problems are reported in the access and error logs. In the event of a security incident, these logs can provide the SA and the web manager with valuable information. Without these log files, SAs and web managers are seriously hindered in their efforts to respond appropriately to suspicious or criminal actions targeted at the web site. Disable LDAP Support The ldap module provides HTTP authentication via an LDAP directory. If its functionality is unnecessary, comment out the related modules: #LoadModule ldap_module modules/mod_ldap.so #LoadModule authnz_ldap_module modules/mod_authnz_ldap.so If LDAP is to be used, SSL encryption should be used as well. Minimizing the number of loadable modules available to the web server reduces risk by limiting the capabilities allowed by the web server. Disable MIME Magic The mime_magic module provides a second layer of MIME support that in most configurations is likely extraneous. If its functionality is unnecessary, comment out the related module: #LoadModule mime_magic_module modules/mod_mime_magic.so Minimizing the number of loadable modules available to the web server reduces risk by limiting the capabilities allowed by the web server. Disable HTTP mod_rewrite The mod_rewrite module is very powerful and can protect against certain classes of web attacks. However, it is also very complex and has a significant history of vulnerabilities itself. If its functionality is unnecessary, comment out the related module: #LoadModule rewrite_module modules/mod_rewrite.so Minimizing the number of loadable modules available to the web server reduces risk by limiting the capabilities allowed by the web server. Disable Proxy Support The proxy module provides proxying support, allowing httpd to forward requests and serve as a gateway for other servers. If its functionality is unnecessary, comment out the module: #LoadModule proxy_module modules/mod_proxy.so If proxy support is needed, load mod_proxy and the appropriate proxy protocol handler module (one of mod_proxy_http, mod_proxy_ftp, or mod_proxy_connect). Additionally, make certain that a server is secure before enabling proxying, as open proxy servers are a security risk. mod_proxy_balancer enables load balancing, but requires that mod status be enabled. Minimizing the number of loadable modules available to the web server reduces risk by limiting the capabilities allowed by the web server. Disable Server Activity Status The status module provides real-time access to statistics on the internal operation of the web server. This may constitute an unnecessary information leak and should be disabled unless necessary. To do so, comment out the related module: #LoadModule status_module modules/mod_status.so If there is a critical need for this module, ensure that access to the status page is properly restricted to a limited set of hosts in the status handler configuration. Minimizing the number of loadable modules available to the web server reduces risk by limiting the capabilities allowed by the web server. Disable Web Server Configuration Display The info module creates a web page illustrating the configuration of the web server. This can create an unnecessary security leak and should be disabled. If its functionality is unnecessary, comment out the module: #LoadModule info_module modules/mod_info.so If there is a critical need for this module, use the Location directive to provide an access control list to restrict access to the information. Minimizing the number of loadable modules available to the web server reduces risk by limiting the capabilities allowed by the web server. Disable Server Side Includes Server Side Includes provide a method of dynamically generating web pages through the insertion of server-side code. However, the technology is also deprecated and introduces significant security concerns. If this functionality is unnecessary, comment out the related module: #LoadModule include_module modules/mod_include.so If there is a critical need for Server Side Includes, they should be enabled with the option IncludesNoExec to prevent arbitrary code execution. Additionally, user supplied data should be encoded to prevent cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. Minimizing the number of loadable modules available to the web server reduces risk by limiting the capabilities allowed by the web server. Disable URL Correction on Misspelled Entries The speling module attempts to find a document match by allowing one misspelling in an otherwise failed request. If this functionality is unnecessary, comment out the module: #LoadModule speling_module modules/mod_speling.so This functionality weakens server security by making site enumeration easier. Minimizing the number of loadable modules available to the web server reduces risk by limiting the capabilities allowed by the web server. Disable WebDAV (Distributed Authoring and Versioning) WebDAV is an extension of the HTTP protocol that provides distributed and collaborative access to web content. If its functionality is unnecessary, comment out the related modules: #LoadModule dav_module modules/mod_dav.so #LoadModule dav_fs_module modules/mod_dav_fs.so If there is a critical need for WebDAV, extra care should be taken in its configuration. Since DAV access allows remote clients to manipulate server files, any location on the server that is DAV enabled should be protected by access controls. Minimizing the number of loadable modules available to the web server, reduces risk by limiting the capabilities allowed by the web server. Minimize Modules for HTTP Basic Authentication The following modules are necessary if this web server will provide content that will be restricted by a password. Authentication can be performed using local plain text password files (authn_file), local DBM password files (authn_dbm) or an LDAP directory. The only module required by the web server depends on your choice of authentication. Comment out the modules you don't need from the following: LoadModule authn_file_module modules/mod_authn_file.so LoadModule authn_dbm_module modules/mod_authn_dbm.so authn_alias allows for authentication based on aliases. authn_anon allows anonymous authentication similar to that of anonymous ftp sites. authz_owner allows authorization based on file ownership. authz_dbm allows for authorization based on group membership if the web server is using DBM authentication. If the above functionality is unnecessary, comment out the related module: #LoadModule authn_alias_module modules/mod_authn_alias.so #LoadModule authn_anon_module modules/mod_authn_anon.so #LoadModule authz_owner_module modules/mod_authz_owner.so #LoadModule authz_dbm_module modules/mod_authz_dbm.so Minimize Configuration Files Included The Include directive directs httpd to load supplementary configuration files from a provided path. The default configuration loads all files that end in .conf from the /etc/httpd/conf.d directory. To restrict excess configuration, the following line should be commented out and replaced with Include directives that only reference required configuration files: #Include conf.d/*.conf If the above change was made, ensure that the SSL encryption remains loaded by explicitly including the corresponding configuration file: Include conf.d/ssl.conf If PHP is necessary, a similar alteration must be made: Include conf.d/php.conf Explicitly listing the configuration files to be loaded during web server start-up avoids the possibility of unwanted or malicious configuration files to be automatically included as part of the server's running configuration. Minimize Various Optional Components The following modules perform very specific tasks, sometimes providing access to just a few additional directives. If such functionality is not required (or if you are not using these directives), comment out the associated module: External filtering (response passed through external program prior to client delivery) #LoadModule ext_filter_module modules/mod_ext_filter.soUser-specified Cache Control and Expiration #LoadModule expires_module modules/mod_expires.soCompression Output Filter (provides content compression prior to client delivery) #LoadModule deflate_module modules/mod_deflate.soHTTP Response/Request Header Customization #LoadModule headers_module modules/mod_headers.soUser activity monitoring via cookies #LoadModule usertrack_module modules/mod_usertrack.soDynamically configured mass virtual hosting #LoadModule vhost_alias_module modules/mod_vhost_alias.so Minimizing the number of loadable modules available to the web server reduces risk by limiting the capabilities allowed by the web server. Use Appropriate Modules to Improve httpd's Security Among the modules available for httpd are several whose use may improve the security of the web server installation. This section recommends and discusses the deployment of security-relevant modules. Deploy mod_security The security module provides an application level firewall for httpd. Following its installation with the base ruleset, specific configuration advice can be found at http://www.modsecurity.org/ to design a policy that best matches the security needs of the web applications. Usage of mod_security is highly recommended for some environments, but it should be noted this module does not ship with Red Hat Enterprise Linux itself, and instead is provided via Extra Packages for Enterprise Linux (EPEL). For more information on EPEL please refer to http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/EPEL. Install mod_security Install the security module: The mod_security package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install mod_security mod_security provides an additional level of protection for the web server by enabling the administrator to implement content access policies and filters at the application layer. Deploy mod_ssl Because HTTP is a plain text protocol, all traffic is susceptible to passive monitoring. If there is a need for confidentiality, SSL should be configured and enabled to encrypt content. Note: mod_nss is a FIPS 140-2 certified alternative to mod_ssl. The modules share a considerable amount of code and should be nearly identical in functionality. If FIPS 140-2 validation is required, then mod_nss should be used. If it provides some feature or its greater compatibility is required, then mod_ssl should be used. Enable Transport Layer Security (TLS) Encryption Disable old SSL and TLS version and enable the latest TLS encryption by setting the following in /etc/httpd/conf.modules.d/ssl.conf: SSLProtocol all -SSLv2 -SSLv3 -TLSv1 -TLSv1.1 Make sure to also set SSLEngine to on in /etc/httpd/conf.modules.d/ssl.conf like the following: SSLEngine on WG340 Transport Layer Security (TLS) encryption is a required security setting for a private web server. Encryption of private information is essential to ensuring data confidentiality. If private information is not encrypted, it can be intercepted and easily read by an unauthorized party. A web server must use a FIPS 140-2 approved TLS version, and all non-FIPS-approved SSL versions must be disabled. Configure A Valid Server Certificate Configure the web site to use a valid organizationally defined certificate. For DoD, this is a DoD server certificate issued by the DoD CA. WG350 This check verifies that DoD is a hosted web site's CA. The certificate is actually a DoD-issued server certificate used by the organization being reviewed. This is used to verify the authenticity of the web site to the user. If the certificate is not for the server (Certificate belongs to), if the certificate is not issued by DoD (Certificate was issued by), or if the current date is not included in the valid date (Certificate is valid from), then there is no assurance that the use of the certificate is valid. The entire purpose of using a certificate is, therefore, compromised. Install mod_ssl Install the mod_ssl module: The mod_ssl package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install mod_ssl mod_ssl provides encryption capabilities for the httpd Web server. Unencrypted content is transmitted in plain text which could be passively monitored and accessed by unauthorized parties. Require Client Certificates SSLVerifyClient should be set and configured to require by setting the following in /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf: SSLVerifyClient require WG140 Web sites requiring authentication within the DoD must utilize PKI as an authentication mechanism for web users. Information systems residing behind web servers requiring authorization based on individual identity must use the identity provided by certificate-based authentication to support access control decisions. Restrict Web Server Information Leakage The ServerTokens and ServerSignature directives determine how much information the web server discloses about the configuration of the system. Set httpd ServerSignature Directive to Off ServerSignature Off restricts httpd from displaying server version number on error pages. Add or correct the following directive in /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf: ServerSignature Off 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 Information disclosed to clients about the configuration of the web server and system could be used to plan an attack on the given system. This information disclosure should be restricted to a minimum. Set httpd ServerTokens Directive to Prod ServerTokens Prod restricts information in page headers, returning only the word "Apache." Add or correct the following directive in /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf: ServerTokens Prod 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 Information disclosed to clients about the configuration of the web server and system could be used to plan an attack on the given system. This information disclosure should be restricted to a minimum. Configure HTTPD-Served Web Content Securely Running httpd inside a chroot jail is designed to isolate the web server process to a small section of the filesystem, limiting the damage if it is compromised. Versions of Apache greater than 2.2.10 (such as the one included with Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7) provide the ChrootDir directive. To run Apache inside a chroot jail in /chroot/apache, add the following line to /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf: ChrootDir /chroot/apache This necessitates placing all files required by httpd inside /chroot/apache , including httpd's binaries, modules, configuration files, and served web pages. The details of this configuration are beyond the scope of this guide. This may also require additional SELinux configuration. Web Login Banner Verbiage Enter an appropriate login banner for your organization. Please note that new lines must be expressed by the '\n' character and special characters like parentheses and quotation marks must be escaped with '\\'. ^(You[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+accessing[\s\n]+a[\s\n]+U\.S\.[\s\n]+Government[\s\n]+\(USG\)[\s\n]+Information[\s\n]+System[\s\n]+\(IS\)[\s\n]+that[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+provided[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+USG\-authorized[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+By[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+\(which[\s\n]+includes[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+device[\s\n]+attached[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS\),[\s\n]+you[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+following[\s\n]+conditions\:(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-The[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+routinely[\s\n]+intercepts[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+monitors[\s\n]+communications[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+purposes[\s\n]+including,[\s\n]+but[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+limited[\s\n]+to,[\s\n]+penetration[\s\n]+testing,[\s\n]+COMSEC[\s\n]+monitoring,[\s\n]+network[\s\n]+operations[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+defense,[\s\n]+personnel[\s\n]+misconduct[\s\n]+\(PM\),[\s\n]+law[\s\n]+enforcement[\s\n]+\(LE\),[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+counterintelligence[\s\n]+\(CI\)[\s\n]+investigations\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-At[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+time,[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+inspect[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+seize[\s\n]+data[\s\n]+stored[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-Communications[\s\n]+using,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+data[\s\n]+stored[\s\n]+on,[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+private,[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+routine[\s\n]+monitoring,[\s\n]+interception,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+search,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+disclosed[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+used[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+USG\-authorized[\s\n]+purpose\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-This[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+includes[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+measures[\s\n]+\(e\.g\.,[\s\n]+authentication[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+access[\s\n]+controls\)[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+protect[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+interests\-\-not[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+your[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+benefit[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+privacy\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-Notwithstanding[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+above,[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+does[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+constitute[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+PM,[\s\n]+LE[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+CI[\s\n]+investigative[\s\n]+searching[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+content[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+privileged[\s\n]+communications,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+work[\s\n]+product,[\s\n]+related[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+representation[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+services[\s\n]+by[\s\n]+attorneys,[\s\n]+psychotherapists,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+clergy,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+their[\s\n]+assistants\.[\s\n]+Such[\s\n]+communications[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+work[\s\n]+product[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+private[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+confidential\.[\s\n]+See[\s\n]+User[\s\n]+Agreement[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+details\.|I've[\s\n]+read[\s\n]+\&[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+terms[\s\n]+in[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+user[\s\n]+agreem't\.)$ ^You[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+accessing[\s\n]+a[\s\n]+U\.S\.[\s\n]+Government[\s\n]+\(USG\)[\s\n]+Information[\s\n]+System[\s\n]+\(IS\)[\s\n]+that[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+provided[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+USG\-authorized[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+By[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+\(which[\s\n]+includes[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+device[\s\n]+attached[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS\),[\s\n]+you[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+following[\s\n]+conditions\:(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-The[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+routinely[\s\n]+intercepts[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+monitors[\s\n]+communications[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+purposes[\s\n]+including,[\s\n]+but[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+limited[\s\n]+to,[\s\n]+penetration[\s\n]+testing,[\s\n]+COMSEC[\s\n]+monitoring,[\s\n]+network[\s\n]+operations[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+defense,[\s\n]+personnel[\s\n]+misconduct[\s\n]+\(PM\),[\s\n]+law[\s\n]+enforcement[\s\n]+\(LE\),[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+counterintelligence[\s\n]+\(CI\)[\s\n]+investigations\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-At[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+time,[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+inspect[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+seize[\s\n]+data[\s\n]+stored[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-Communications[\s\n]+using,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+data[\s\n]+stored[\s\n]+on,[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+private,[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+routine[\s\n]+monitoring,[\s\n]+interception,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+search,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+disclosed[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+used[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+USG\-authorized[\s\n]+purpose\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-This[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+includes[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+measures[\s\n]+\(e\.g\.,[\s\n]+authentication[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+access[\s\n]+controls\)[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+protect[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+interests\-\-not[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+your[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+benefit[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+privacy\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-Notwithstanding[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+above,[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+does[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+constitute[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+PM,[\s\n]+LE[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+CI[\s\n]+investigative[\s\n]+searching[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+content[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+privileged[\s\n]+communications,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+work[\s\n]+product,[\s\n]+related[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+representation[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+services[\s\n]+by[\s\n]+attorneys,[\s\n]+psychotherapists,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+clergy,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+their[\s\n]+assistants\.[\s\n]+Such[\s\n]+communications[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+work[\s\n]+product[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+private[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+confidential\.[\s\n]+See[\s\n]+User[\s\n]+Agreement[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+details\.$ ^I've[\s\n]+read[\s\n]+\&[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+terms[\s\n]+in[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+user[\s\n]+agreem't\.$ ^Use[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+constitutes[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+at[\s\n]+all[\s\n]+times\.[\s\n]+This[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+a[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+related[\s\n]+equipment[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+intended[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+communication,[\s\n]+transmission,[\s\n]+processing,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+storage[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+official[\s\n]+U\.S\.[\s\n]+Government[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+authorized[\s\n]+information[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+at[\s\n]+all[\s\n]+times[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+ensure[\s\n]+proper[\s\n]+functioning[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+equipment[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+including[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+devices[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+systems,[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+prevent[\s\n]+unauthorized[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+violations[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+statutes[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+regulations,[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+deter[\s\n]+criminal[\s\n]+activity,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+similar[\s\n]+purposes\.[\s\n]+Any[\s\n]+user[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+a[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+should[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+aware[\s\n]+that[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+information[\s\n]+placed[\s\n]+in[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+expectation[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+privacy\.[\s\n]+If[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+reveals[\s\n]+possible[\s\n]+evidence[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+violation[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+criminal[\s\n]+statutes,[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+evidence[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+related[\s\n]+information,[\s\n]+including[\s\n]+identification[\s\n]+information[\s\n]+about[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+user,[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+provided[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+law[\s\n]+enforcement[\s\n]+officials\.[\s\n]+If[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+reveals[\s\n]+violations[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+regulations[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+unauthorized[\s\n]+use,[\s\n]+employees[\s\n]+who[\s\n]+violate[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+regulations[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+make[\s\n]+unauthorized[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+appropriate[\s\n]+disciplinary[\s\n]+action\.[\s\n]+Use[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+constitutes[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+at[\s\n]+all[\s\n]+times\.$ ^\-\-[\s\n]+WARNING[\s\n]+\-\-[\s\n]+This[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+authorized[\s\n]+users[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+Individuals[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+without[\s\n]+authority[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+in[\s\n]+excess[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+their[\s\n]+authority[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+having[\s\n]+all[\s\n]+their[\s\n]+activities[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+monitored[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+recorded[\s\n]+by[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+personnel\.[\s\n]+Anyone[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+expressly[\s\n]+consents[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+such[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+advised[\s\n]+that[\s\n]+if[\s\n]+such[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+reveals[\s\n]+possible[\s\n]+evidence[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+criminal[\s\n]+activity[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+provide[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+evidence[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+such[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+law[\s\n]+enforcement[\s\n]+officials\.$ Configure A Banner Page For Each Website Configure a login banner for each website when authentication is required for user access. WG265 A consent banner will be in place to make prospective entrants aware that the website they are about to enter is a DoD web site and their activity is subject to monitoring. The document, DoDI 8500.01, establishes the policy on the use of DoD information systems. It requires the use of a standard Notice and Consent Banner and standard text to be included in user agreements. The requirement for the banner is for websites with security and access controls. These are restricted and not publicly accessible. If the website does not require authentication/authorization for use, then the banner does not need to be present. A manual check of the document root directory for a banner page file (such as banner.html) or navigation to the website via a browser can be used to confirm the information provided from interviewing the web staff. Each Web Content Directory Must Contain An index.html File Every DocumentRoot that is configured should have an index.html file that exists. Add an index.html file to every configured DocumentRoot. WG170 The goal is to completely control the web users experience in navigating any portion of the web document root directories. Ensuring all web content directories have at least the equivalent of an index.html file is a significant factor to accomplish this end. Also, enumeration techniques, such as URL parameter manipulation, rely upon being able to obtain information about the web server's directory structure by locating directories with default pages. This practice helps ensure that the anonymous web user will not obtain directory browsing information or an error message that reveals the server type and version. Disable Web Content Symbolic Links For each <Directory> instance, remove the following: FollowSymLinks If symbolic links are allowed, the following can be added for each <Directory> instance: Options SymLinksIfOwnerMatchDisable WG360 A symbolic link allows a file or a directory to be referenced using a symbolic name raising a potential hazard if symbolic linkage is made to a sensitive area. When web scripts are executed and symbolic links are allowed, the web user could be allowed to access locations on the web server that are outside the scope of the web document root or home directory. Encrypt All File Uploads Use only secure encrypted logons and connections for uploading files to the web site. WG235 Logging in to a web server via an unencrypted protocol or service, to upload documents to the web site, is a risk if proper encryption is not utilized to protect the data being transmitted. An encrypted protocol or service must be used for remote access to web administration tasks. Remove .java And .jpp Files .java and .jpp files should not exist and should be removed from the web server. WG490 From the source code in a .java or a .jpp file, the Java compiler produces a binary file with an extension of .class. The .java or .jpp file would, therefore, reveal sensitive information regarding an application's logic and permissions to resources on the server. By contrast, the .class file, because it is intended to be machine independent, is referred to as bytecode. Bytecodes are run by the Java Virtual Machine (JVM), or the Java Runtime Environment (JRE), via a browser configured to permit Java code. The robots.txt Files Must Not Exist Remove any robots.txt files that may exist with any web content. Other methods must be employed if there is information on the web site that needs protection from search engines and public view. Inspect all instances of DocumentRoot and Alias and remove any robots.txt file. $ sudo rm -f path/to/robots.txt WG310 Search engines are constantly at work on the Internet. Search engines are augmented by agents, often referred to as spiders or bots, which endeavor to capture and catalog web-site content. In turn, these search engines make the content they obtain and catalog available to any public web user. To request that a well behaved search engine not crawl and catalog a site, the web site may contain a file called robots.txt. This file contains directories and files that the web server SA desires not be crawled or cataloged, but this file can also be used, by an attacker or poorly coded search engine, as a directory and file index to a site. This information may be used to reduce an attacker's time searching and traversing the web site to find files that might be relevant. If information on the web site needs to be protected from search engines and public view, other methods must be used. Ensure Web Content Located on Separate partition The DocumentRoot directory is used for storing web content and data. Ensure that the DocumentRoot directory exists on a separate logical volume at installation time, or migrate it using LVM. WG205 Application partitioning enables an additional security measure by securing user traffic under one security context, while managing system and application files under another. Web content is can be to an anonymous web user. For such an account to have access to system files of any type is a major security risk that is avoidable and desirable. Failure to partition the system files from the web site documents increases risk of attack via directory traversal, or impede web site availability due to drive space exhaustion. Use Denial-of-Service Protection Modules Denial-of-service attacks are difficult to detect and prevent while maintaining acceptable access to authorized users. However, some traffic-shaping modules can be used to address the problem. Well-known DoS protection modules include: mod_cband mod_bwshare mod_limitipconn mod_evasive Denial-of-service prevention should be implemented for a web server if such a threat exists. However, specific configuration details are very dependent on the environment and often best left at the discretion of the administrator. IMAP and POP3 Server Dovecot provides IMAP and POP3 services. It is not installed by default. The project page at http://www.dovecot.org contains more detailed information about Dovecot configuration. Configure Dovecot if Necessary If the system will operate as an IMAP or POP3 server, the dovecot software should be configured securely by following the recommendations below. Allow IMAP Clients to Access the Server The default iptables configuration does not allow inbound access to any services. This modification will allow remote hosts to initiate connections to the IMAP daemon, while keeping all other ports on the server in their default protected state. To configure iptables to allow port 143 traffic, one must edit /etc/sysconfig/iptables and /etc/sysconfig/ip6tables (if IPv6 is in use). Add the following line, ensuring that it appears before the final LOG and DROP lines for the INPUT chain: -A INPUT -m state --state NEW -p tcp --dport 143 -j ACCEPT Enable SSL Support SSL should be used to encrypt network traffic between the Dovecot server and its clients. Users must authenticate to the Dovecot server in order to read their mail, and passwords should never be transmitted in clear text. In addition, protecting mail as it is downloaded is a privacy measure, and clients may use SSL certificates to authenticate the server, preventing another system from impersonating the server. Configure Dovecot to Use the SSL Certificate file This option tells Dovecot where to find the mail server's SSL Certificate. Edit /etc/dovecot/conf.d/10-ssl.conf and add or correct the following line (note: the path below is the default path set by the Dovecot installation. If you are using a different path, ensure you reference the appropriate file): ssl_cert = </etc/pki/dovecot/certs/dovecot.pem" SSL certificates are used by the client to authenticate the identity of the server, as well as to encrypt credentials and message traffic. Not using SSL to encrypt mail server traffic could allow unauthorized access to credentials and mail messages since they are sent in plain text over the network. Configure Dovecot to Use the SSL Key file This option tells Dovecot where to find the mail server's SSL Key. Edit /etc/dovecot/conf.d/10-ssl.conf and add or correct the following line (note: the path below is the default path set by the Dovecot installation. If you are using a different path, ensure you reference the appropriate file): ssl_key = </etc/pki/dovecot/private/dovecot.pem SSL certificates are used by the client to authenticate the identity of the server, as well as to encrypt credentials and message traffic. Not using SSL to encrypt mail server traffic could allow unauthorized access to credentials and mail messages since they are sent in plain text over the network. Disable Plaintext Authentication To prevent Dovecot from attempting plaintext authentication of clients, edit /etc/dovecot/conf.d/10-auth.conf and add\or correct the following line: disable_plaintext_auth = yes Using plain text authentication to the mail server could allow an attacker access to credentials by monitoring network traffic. Enable the SSL flag in /etc/dovecot.conf To allow clients to make encrypted connections the ssl flag in Dovecot's configuration file needs to be set to yes. Edit /etc/dovecot/conf.d/10-ssl.conf and add or correct the following line: ssl = yes SSL encrypt network traffic between the Dovecot server and its clients protecting user credentials, mail as it is downloaded, and clients may use SSL certificates to authenticate the server, preventing another system from impersonating the server. Support Only the Necessary Protocols Dovecot supports the IMAP and POP3 protocols, as well as SSL-protected versions of those protocols. Configure the Dovecot server to support only the protocols needed by your site. Edit /etc/dovecot/dovecot.conf. Add or correct the following lines, replacing PROTOCOL with only the subset of protocols (imap, imaps, pop3, pop3s) required: protocols = PROTOCOL If possible, require SSL protection for all transactions. The SSL protocol variants listen on alternate ports (995 instead of 110 for pop3s, and 993 instead of 143 for imaps), and require SSL-aware clients. An alternate approach is to listen on the standard port and require the client to use the STARTTLS command before authenticating. Disable Cyrus IMAP If the system does not need to operate as an IMAP or POP3 server, the Cyrus IMAP software should be removed. Uninstall cyrus-imapd Package The cyrus-imapd package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase cyrus-imapd 2.2.8 If there is no need to make the cyrus-imapd software available, removing it provides a safeguard against its activation. CCE-88119-3 - name: Ensure cyrus-imapd is removed package: name: cyrus-imapd state: absent tags: - CCE-88119-3 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - package_cyrus-imapd_removed - unknown_severity include remove_cyrus-imapd class remove_cyrus-imapd { package { 'cyrus-imapd': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=cyrus-imapd # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove cyrus-imapd # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on cyrus-imapd. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "cyrus-imapd" ; then yum remove -y "cyrus-imapd" fi Disable Dovecot If the system does not need to operate as an IMAP or POP3 server, the dovecot software should be disabled and removed. Uninstall dovecot Package The dovecot package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase dovecot 2.2.8 If there is no need to make the Dovecot software available, removing it provides a safeguard against its activation. CCE-85976-9 - name: Ensure dovecot is removed package: name: dovecot state: absent tags: - CCE-85976-9 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - package_dovecot_removed - unknown_severity include remove_dovecot class remove_dovecot { package { 'dovecot': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=dovecot # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove dovecot # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on dovecot. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "dovecot" ; then yum remove -y "dovecot" fi Disable Dovecot Service The dovecot service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now dovecot.service 2.2.8 Running an IMAP or POP3 server provides a network-based avenue of attack, and should be disabled if not needed. CCE-82760-0 - name: Block Disable service dovecot block: - name: Disable service dovecot block: - name: Disable service dovecot systemd: name: dovecot.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service dovecot' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82760-0 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_dovecot_disabled - unknown_severity - name: Unit Socket Exists - dovecot.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files dovecot.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82760-0 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_dovecot_disabled - unknown_severity - name: Disable socket dovecot systemd: name: dovecot.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("dovecot.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-82760-0 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_dovecot_disabled - unknown_severity apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: dovecot.service enabled: false mask: true - name: dovecot.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["dovecot"] include disable_dovecot class disable_dovecot { service {'dovecot': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'dovecot.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'dovecot.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'dovecot.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files dovecot.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'dovecot.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'dovecot.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'dovecot.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Kerberos The Kerberos protocol is used for authentication across non-secure network. Authentication can happen between various types of principals -- users, service, or hosts. Their identity and encryption keys can be stored in keytab files. Remove the Kerberos Server Package The krb5-server package should be removed if not in use. Is this system the Kerberos server? If not, remove the package. The krb5-server package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase krb5-server The krb5-server RPM is not installed by default on a Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 system. It is needed only by the Kerberos servers, not by the clients which use Kerberos for authentication. If the system is not intended for use as a Kerberos Server it should be removed. CCI-000803 IA-7 IA-7.1 SRG-OS-000120-GPOS-00061 RHEL-08-010163 SV-237640r646890_rule Unnecessary packages should not be installed to decrease the attack surface of the system. While this software is clearly essential on an KDC server, it is not necessary on typical desktop or workstation systems. CCE-85887-8 - name: Ensure krb5-server is removed package: name: krb5-server state: absent when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-85887-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010163 - NIST-800-53-IA-7 - NIST-800-53-IA-7.1 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_krb5-server_removed include remove_krb5-server class remove_krb5-server { package { 'krb5-server': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=krb5-server # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove krb5-server # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on krb5-server. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "krb5-server" ; then yum remove -y "krb5-server" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Kerberos by removing host keytab Kerberos is not an approved key distribution method for Common Criteria. To prevent using Kerberos by system daemons, remove the Kerberos keytab files, especially /etc/krb5.keytab. CCI-000803 0418 1055 1402 FTP_ITC_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000120-GPOS-00061 RHEL-08-010161 SV-230238r646862_rule The key derivation function (KDF) in Kerberos is not FIPS compatible. CCE-82175-1 - name: Find keytab files find: paths: /etc/ patterns: '*.keytab' register: keytab_files when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82175-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010161 - disable_strategy - kerberos_disable_no_keytab - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Remove keytab files file: path: '{{ item.path }}' state: absent with_items: '{{ keytab_files.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82175-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010161 - disable_strategy - kerberos_disable_no_keytab - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then rm -f /etc/*.keytab else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi LDAP LDAP is a popular directory service, that is, a standardized way of looking up information from a central database. Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 includes software that enables a system to act as both an LDAP client and server. 389 Directory Server 389 Directory Server is a popular open-source LDAP server for Linux. Uninstall 389-ds-base Package The 389-ds-base RPM is not installed by default on a Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 system. It is needed only by the 389-ds server, not by the clients which use LDAP for authentication. If the system is not intended for use as an LDAP Server it should be removed. 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 CCI-000366 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 Unnecessary packages should not be installed to decrease the attack surface of the system. While this software is clearly essential on an LDAP server, it is not necessary on typical desktop or workstation systems. CCE-82728-7 - name: Ensure 389-ds-base is removed package: name: 389-ds-base state: absent tags: - CCE-82728-7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_389-ds-base_removed include remove_389-ds-base class remove_389-ds-base { package { '389-ds-base': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=389-ds-base # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove 389-ds-base # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on 389-ds-base. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "389-ds-base" ; then yum remove -y "389-ds-base" fi Configure OpenLDAP Clients This section provides information on which security settings are important to configure in OpenLDAP clients by manually editing the appropriate configuration files. Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 provides an automated configuration tool called authconfig and a graphical wrapper for authconfig called system-config-authentication. However, these tools do not provide as much control over configuration as manual editing of configuration files. The authconfig tools do not allow you to specify locations of SSL certificate files, which is useful when trying to use SSL cleanly across several protocols. Installation and configuration of OpenLDAP on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is available at Before configuring any system to be an LDAP client, ensure that a working LDAP server is present on the network. Ensure LDAP client is not installed The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) is a service that provides a method for looking up information from a central database. The openldap-clients package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase openldap-clients 2.3.2 If the system does not need to act as an LDAP client, it is recommended that the software is removed to reduce the potential attack surface. CCE-82885-5 - name: Ensure openldap-clients is removed package: name: openldap-clients state: absent tags: - CCE-82885-5 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_openldap-clients_removed include remove_openldap-clients class remove_openldap-clients { package { 'openldap-clients': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=openldap-clients # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove openldap-clients # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on openldap-clients. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "openldap-clients" ; then yum remove -y "openldap-clients" fi Enable the LDAP Client For Use in Authconfig To determine if LDAP is being used for authentication, use the following command: $ sudo grep -i useldapauth /etc/sysconfig/authconfig If USELDAPAUTH=yes, then LDAP is being used. If not, set USELDAPAUTH to yes. 11 12 14 15 3 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 CCI-001453 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 0418 1055 1402 A.11.2.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.9.1.2 AC-17(a) CM-6(a) PR.AC-3 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 SRG-OS-000250-GPOS-00093 Without cryptographic integrity protections, information can be altered by unauthorized users without detection. The ssl directive specifies whether to use TLS or not. If not specified it will default to no. It should be set to start_tls rather than doing LDAP over SSL. CCE-82418-5 Configure LDAP Client to Use TLS For All Transactions This check verifies cryptography has been implemented to protect the integrity of remote LDAP authentication sessions. To determine if LDAP is being used for authentication, use the following command: $ sudo grep -i useldapauth /etc/sysconfig/authconfig If USELDAPAUTH=yes, then LDAP is being used. To check if LDAP is configured to use TLS, use the following command: $ sudo grep -i ssl /etc/pam_ldap.conf 11 12 14 15 3 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 CCI-001453 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.9.1.2 AC-17(a) AC-17(2) CM-6(a) SC-12(a) SC-12(b) PR.AC-3 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 SRG-OS-000250-GPOS-00093 Without cryptographic integrity protections, information can be altered by unauthorized users without detection. The ssl directive specifies whether to use TLS or not. If not specified it will default to no. It should be set to start_tls rather than doing LDAP over SSL. CCE-82416-9 # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q nss-pam-ldapd; then # Use LDAP for authentication # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^USELDAPAUTH") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s=%s" "$stripped_key" "yes" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^USELDAPAUTH\\>" "/etc/sysconfig/authconfig"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^USELDAPAUTH\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/sysconfig/authconfig" else if [[ -s "/etc/sysconfig/authconfig" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/sysconfig/authconfig" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/sysconfig/authconfig" fi cce="CCE-82416-9" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "/etc/sysconfig/authconfig" >> "/etc/sysconfig/authconfig" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/sysconfig/authconfig" fi # Configure client to use TLS for all authentications # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^ssl") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s %s" "$stripped_key" "start_tls" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^ssl\\>" "/etc/nslcd.conf"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^ssl\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/nslcd.conf" else if [[ -s "/etc/nslcd.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/nslcd.conf" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/nslcd.conf" fi cce="CCE-82416-9" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "/etc/nslcd.conf" >> "/etc/nslcd.conf" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/nslcd.conf" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure Certificate Directives for LDAP Use of TLS Ensure a copy of a trusted CA certificate has been placed in the file /etc/pki/tls/CA/cacert.pem. Configure LDAP to enforce TLS use and to trust certificates signed by that CA. First, edit the file /etc/nslcd.conf, and add or correct either of the following lines: tls_cacertdir /etc/pki/tls/CA or tls_cacertfile /etc/pki/tls/CA/cacert.pem Then review the LDAP server and ensure TLS has been configured. 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 CCI-000776 CCI-000778 CCI-001453 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 The tls_cacertdir or tls_cacertfile directives are required when tls_checkpeer is configured (which is the default for openldap versions 2.1 and up). These directives define the path to the trust certificates signed by the site CA. CCE-82417-7 Configure OpenLDAP Server This section details some security-relevant settings for an OpenLDAP server. Uninstall openldap-servers Package The openldap-servers package is not installed by default on a Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 system. It is needed only by the OpenLDAP server, not by the clients which use LDAP for authentication. If the system is not intended for use as an LDAP Server it should be removed. 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 CCI-000366 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 Unnecessary packages should not be installed to decrease the attack surface of the system. While this software is clearly essential on an LDAP server, it is not necessary on typical desktop or workstation systems. CCE-82415-1 - name: Ensure openldap-servers is removed package: name: openldap-servers state: absent tags: - CCE-82415-1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_openldap-servers_removed include remove_openldap-servers class remove_openldap-servers { package { 'openldap-servers': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=openldap-servers # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove openldap-servers # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on openldap-servers. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "openldap-servers" ; then yum remove -y "openldap-servers" fi Disable LDAP Server (slapd) The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) is a service that provides a method for looking up information from a central database. If the system will not need to act as an LDAP server, it is recommended that the software be disabled to reduce the potential attack surface. CCE-87262-2 - name: Block Disable service slapd block: - name: Disable service slapd block: - name: Disable service slapd systemd: name: slapd.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service slapd' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-87262-2 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_slapd_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - slapd.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files slapd.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-87262-2 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_slapd_disabled - name: Disable socket slapd systemd: name: slapd.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("slapd.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-87262-2 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_slapd_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: slapd.service enabled: false mask: true - name: slapd.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["slapd"] include disable_slapd class disable_slapd { service {'slapd': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'slapd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'slapd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'slapd.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files slapd.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'slapd.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'slapd.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'slapd.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Install and Protect LDAP Certificate Files Create the PKI directory for LDAP certificates if it does not already exist: $ sudo mkdir /etc/pki/tls/ldap $ sudo chown root:root /etc/pki/tls/ldap $ sudo chmod 755 /etc/pki/tls/ldap Using removable media or some other secure transmission format, install the certificate files onto the LDAP server: /etc/pki/tls/ldap/serverkey.pem: the private key ldapserverkey.pem/etc/pki/tls/ldap/servercert.pem: the certificate file ldapservercert.pem Verify the ownership and permissions of these files: $ sudo chown root:ldap /etc/pki/tls/ldap/serverkey.pem $ sudo chown root:ldap /etc/pki/tls/ldap/servercert.pem $ sudo chmod 640 /etc/pki/tls/ldap/serverkey.pem $ sudo chmod 640 /etc/pki/tls/ldap/servercert.pem Verify that the CA's public certificate file has been installed as /etc/pki/tls/CA/cacert.pem, and has the correct permissions: $ sudo mkdir /etc/pki/tls/CA $ sudo chown root:root /etc/pki/tls/CA/cacert.pem $ sudo chmod 644 /etc/pki/tls/CA/cacert.pem As a result of these steps, the LDAP server will have access to its own private certificate and the key with which that certificate is encrypted, and to the public certificate file belonging to the CA. Note that it would be possible for the key to be protected further, so that processes running as ldap could not read it. If this were done, the LDAP server process would need to be restarted manually whenever the server rebooted. Mail Server Software Mail servers are used to send and receive email over the network. Mail is a very common service, and Mail Transfer Agents (MTAs) are obvious targets of network attack. Ensure that systems are not running MTAs unnecessarily, and configure needed MTAs as defensively as possible. Very few systems at any site should be configured to directly receive email over the network. Users should instead use mail client programs to retrieve email from a central server that supports protocols such as IMAP or POP3. However, it is normal for most systems to be independently capable of sending email, for instance so that cron jobs can report output to an administrator. Most MTAs, including Postfix, support a submission-only mode in which mail can be sent from the local system to a central site MTA (or directly delivered to a local account), but the system still cannot receive mail directly over a network. The alternatives program in Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 permits selection of other mail server software (such as Sendmail), but Postfix is the default and is preferred. Postfix was coded with security in mind and can also be more effectively contained by SELinux as its modular design has resulted in separate processes performing specific actions. More information is available on its website, http://www.postfix.org. The mailx Package Is Installed A mail server is required for sending emails. The mailx package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install mailx CCI-001744 CM-3(5) SRG-OS-000363-GPOS-00150 RHEL-08-010358 SV-256974r902755_rule Emails can be used to notify designated personnel about important system events such as failures or warnings. CCE-87036-0 - name: Ensure mailx is installed package: name: mailx state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-87036-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010358 - NIST-800-53-CM-3(5) - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_mailx_installed [[packages]] name = "mailx" version = "*" include install_mailx class install_mailx { package { 'mailx': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=mailx # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "mailx" ; then yum install -y "mailx" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi The Postfix package is installed A mail server is required for sending emails. The postfix package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install postfix SRG-OS-000046-GPOS-00022 RHEL-08-030030 SV-230389r627750_rule Emails can be used to notify designated personnel about important system events such as failures or warnings. CCE-85983-5 - name: Ensure postfix is installed package: name: postfix state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-85983-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030030 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_postfix_installed [[packages]] name = "postfix" version = "*" include install_postfix class install_postfix { package { 'postfix': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=postfix # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "postfix" ; then yum install -y "postfix" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Uninstall Sendmail Package Sendmail is not the default mail transfer agent and is not installed by default. The sendmail package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase sendmail BP28(R1) 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 CCI-000381 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 RHEL-08-040002 SV-230489r627750_rule The sendmail software was not developed with security in mind and its design prevents it from being effectively contained by SELinux. Postfix should be used instead. CCE-81039-0 - name: Ensure sendmail is removed package: name: sendmail state: absent when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-81039-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040002 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_sendmail_removed include remove_sendmail class remove_sendmail { package { 'sendmail': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=sendmail # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove sendmail # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on sendmail. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "sendmail" ; then yum remove -y "sendmail" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable Postfix Service The Postfix mail transfer agent is used for local mail delivery within the system. The default configuration only listens for connections to the default SMTP port (port 25) on the loopback interface (127.0.0.1). It is recommended to leave this service enabled for local mail delivery. The postfix service can be enabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl enable postfix.service Local mail delivery is essential to some system maintenance and notification tasks. - name: Enable service postfix block: - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto - name: Enable service postfix systemd: name: postfix enabled: 'yes' state: started masked: 'no' when: - '"postfix" in ansible_facts.packages' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_postfix_enabled - unknown_severity [customizations.services] enabled = ["postfix"] include enable_postfix class enable_postfix { service {'postfix': enable => true, ensure => 'running', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'postfix.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'postfix.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'postfix.service' else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure Mail Transfer Agent is not Listening on any non-loopback Address Mail Transfer Agents (MTA), such as sendmail and Postfix, are used to listen for incoming mail and transfer the messages to the appropriate user or mail server. If the system is not intended to be a mail server, it is recommended that the MTA be configured to only process local mail. 2.2.21 The software for all Mail Transfer Agents is complex and most have a long history of security issues. While it is important to ensure that the system can process local mail messages, it is not necessary to have the MTA's daemon listening on a port unless the server is intended to be a mail server that receives and processes mail from other systems. CCE-88498-1 Configure SMTP For Mail Clients This section discusses settings for Postfix in a submission-only e-mail configuration. Postfix Network Interfaces The setting for inet_interfaces in /etc/postfix/main.cf loopback-only loopback-only localhost Postfix relayhost Specify the host all outbound email should be routed into. smtp.$mydomain Postfix Root Mail Alias Specify an email address (string) for a root mail alias. change_me@localhost system.administrator@mail.mil Configure System to Forward All Mail For The Root Account Make sure that mails delivered to root user are forwarded to a monitored email address. Make sure that the address is a valid email address reachable from the system in question. Use the following command to configure the alias: $ sudo echo "root: " >> /etc/aliases $ sudo newaliases BP28(R49) CCI-000139 CCI-000366 CM-6(a) SRG-OS-000046-GPOS-00022 A number of system services utilize email messages sent to the root user to notify system administrators of active or impending issues. These messages must be forwarded to at least one monitored email address. CCE-82381-5 - name: XCCDF Value var_postfix_root_mail_alias # promote to variable set_fact: var_postfix_root_mail_alias: !!str tags: - always - name: Make sure that "/etc/aliases" has a defined value for root lineinfile: path: /etc/aliases line: 'root: {{ var_postfix_root_mail_alias }}' regexp: ^(?:[rR][oO][oO][tT]|"[rR][oO][oO][tT]")\s*:\s*(.+)$ create: true state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82381-5 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - postfix_client_configure_mail_alias - name: Check if newaliases command is available ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/newaliases register: result_newaliases_present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82381-5 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - postfix_client_configure_mail_alias - name: Update postfix aliases ansible.builtin.command: cmd: newaliases when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - result_newaliases_present.stat.exists tags: - CCE-82381-5 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - postfix_client_configure_mail_alias # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then var_postfix_root_mail_alias='' # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^root") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s: %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_postfix_root_mail_alias" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^root\\>" "/etc/aliases"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^root\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/aliases" else if [[ -s "/etc/aliases" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/aliases" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/aliases" fi cce="CCE-82381-5" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "/etc/aliases" >> "/etc/aliases" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/aliases" fi if [ -f /usr/bin/newaliases ]; then newaliases fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure System to Forward All Mail From Postmaster to The Root Account Verify the administrators are notified in the event of an audit processing failure. Check that the "/etc/aliases" file has a defined value for "root". $ sudo grep "postmaster:\s*root$" /etc/aliases postmaster: root CCI-000139 AU-5(a) AU-5.1(ii) SRG-OS-000046-GPOS-00022 RHEL-08-030030 SV-230389r627750_rule It is critical for the appropriate personnel to be aware if a system is at risk of failing to process audit logs as required. Without this notification, the security personnel may be unaware of an impending failure of the audit capability, and system operation may be adversely affected. Audit processing failures include software/hardware errors, failures in the audit capturing mechanisms, and audit storage capacity being reached or exceeded. CCE-89063-2 - name: Configure System to Forward All Mail From Postmaster to The Root Account block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/aliases create: true regexp: ^\s*postmaster\s*:\s* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/aliases lineinfile: path: /etc/aliases create: true regexp: ^\s*postmaster\s*:\s* state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/aliases lineinfile: path: /etc/aliases create: true regexp: ^\s*postmaster\s*:\s* line: 'postmaster: root' state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-89063-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030030 - NIST-800-53-AU-5(a) - NIST-800-53-AU-5.1(ii) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - postfix_client_configure_mail_alias_postmaster - name: Check if newaliases command is available ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/newaliases register: result_newaliases_present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-89063-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030030 - NIST-800-53-AU-5(a) - NIST-800-53-AU-5.1(ii) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - postfix_client_configure_mail_alias_postmaster - name: Update postfix aliases ansible.builtin.command: cmd: newaliases when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - result_newaliases_present.stat.exists tags: - CCE-89063-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030030 - NIST-800-53-AU-5(a) - NIST-800-53-AU-5.1(ii) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - postfix_client_configure_mail_alias_postmaster # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if [ -e "/etc/aliases" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*postmaster\s*:\s*/Id" "/etc/aliases" else touch "/etc/aliases" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/aliases" cp "/etc/aliases" "/etc/aliases.bak" # Insert at the end of the file printf '%s\n' "postmaster: root" >> "/etc/aliases" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/aliases.bak" if [ -f /usr/bin/newaliases ]; then newaliases fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure System to Forward All Mail through a specific host Set up a relay host that will act as a gateway for all outbound email. Edit the file /etc/postfix/main.cf to ensure that only the following relayhost line appears: relayhost = A central outbound email location ensures messages sent from any network host can be audited for potential unexpected content. Tooling on the central server may help prevent spam or viruses from being delivered. Disable Postfix Network Listening Edit the file /etc/postfix/main.cf to ensure that only the following inet_interfaces line appears: inet_interfaces = BP28(R48) 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 CCI-000382 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 1.4.2 2.2.21 This ensures postfix accepts mail messages (such as cron job reports) from the local system only, and not from the network, which protects it from network attack. CCE-82174-4 - name: XCCDF Value var_postfix_inet_interfaces # promote to variable set_fact: var_postfix_inet_interfaces: !!str tags: - always - name: Gather list of packages package_facts: manager: auto when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '' tags: - CCE-82174-4 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.2 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - postfix_network_listening_disabled - restrict_strategy - name: Make changes to Postfix configuration file lineinfile: path: /etc/postfix/main.cf create: false regexp: ^inet_interfaces\s*=\s.* line: inet_interfaces = {{ var_postfix_inet_interfaces }} state: present insertafter: ^inet_interfaces\s*=\s.* when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"postfix" in ansible_facts.packages' - '"postfix" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-82174-4 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.2 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - postfix_network_listening_disabled - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { rpm --quiet -q postfix; }; then var_postfix_inet_interfaces='' if [ -e "/etc/postfix/main.cf" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*inet_interfaces\s\+=\s\+/Id" "/etc/postfix/main.cf" else touch "/etc/postfix/main.cf" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/postfix/main.cf" cp "/etc/postfix/main.cf" "/etc/postfix/main.cf.bak" # Insert at the end of the file printf '%s\n' "inet_interfaces=$var_postfix_inet_interfaces" >> "/etc/postfix/main.cf" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/postfix/main.cf.bak" systemctl restart postfix else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure Operating System to Protect Mail Server The guidance in this section is appropriate for any host which is operating as a site MTA, whether the mail server runs using Sendmail, Postfix, or some other software. Configure SSL Certificates for Use with SMTP AUTH If SMTP AUTH is to be used, the use of SSL to protect credentials in transit is strongly recommended. There are also configurations for which it may be desirable to encrypt all mail in transit from one MTA to another, though such configurations are beyond the scope of this guide. In either event, the steps for creating and installing an SSL certificate are independent of the MTA in use, and are described here. Ensure Security of Postfix SSL Certificate Create the PKI directory for mail certificates, if it does not already exist: $ sudo mkdir /etc/pki/tls/mail $ sudo chown root:root /etc/pki/tls/mail $ sudo chmod 755 /etc/pki/tls/mail Using removable media or some other secure transmission format, install the files generated in the previous step onto the mail server: /etc/pki/tls/mail/serverkey.pem: the private key mailserverkey.pem /etc/pki/tls/mail/servercert.pem: the certificate file mailservercert.pem Verify the ownership and permissions of these files: $ sudo chown root:root /etc/pki/tls/mail/serverkey.pem $ sudo chown root:root /etc/pki/tls/mail/servercert.pem $ sudo chmod 600 /etc/pki/tls/mail/serverkey.pem $ sudo chmod 644 /etc/pki/tls/mail/servercert.pem Verify that the CA's public certificate file has been installed as /etc/pki/tls/CA/cacert.pem, and has the correct permissions: $ sudo chown root:root /etc/pki/tls/CA/cacert.pem $ sudo chmod 644 /etc/pki/tls/CA/cacert.pem Configure Postfix if Necessary Postfix stores its configuration files in the directory /etc/postfix by default. The primary configuration file is /etc/postfix/main.cf. Configure SMTP Greeting Banner Edit /etc/postfix/main.cf, and add or correct the following line, substituting some other wording for the banner information if you prefer: smtpd_banner = $myhostname ESMTP 1 14 15 16 3 5 6 7 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 MEA02.01 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 6.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 AC-8(a) AC-8(c) DE.CM-3 PR.PT-1 The default greeting banner discloses that the listening mail process is Postfix. When remote mail senders connect to the MTA on port 25, they are greeted by an initial banner as part of the SMTP dialogue. This banner is necessary, but it frequently gives away too much information, including the MTA software which is in use, and sometimes also its version number. Remote mail senders do not need this information in order to send mail, so the banner should be changed to reveal only the hostname (which is already known and may be useful) and the word ESMTP, to indicate that the modern SMTP protocol variant is supported. CCE-82379-9 Configure Postfix Resource Usage to Limit Denial of Service Attacks Edit /etc/postfix/main.cf. Edit the following lines to configure the amount of system resources Postfix can consume: default_process_limit = 100 smtpd_client_connection_count_limit = 10 smtpd_client_connection_rate_limit = 30 queue_minfree = 20971520 header_size_limit = 51200 message_size_limit = 10485760 smtpd_recipient_limit = 100 The values here are examples. Note: The values given here are examples, and may need to be modified for any particular site. By default, the Postfix anvil process gathers mail receipt statistics. To get information about about what connection rates are typical at your site, look in /var/log/maillog for lines with the daemon name postfix/anvil. Control Mail Relaying Postfix's mail relay controls are implemented with the help of the smtpd recipient restrictions option, which controls the restrictions placed on the SMTP dialogue once the sender and recipient envelope addresses are known. The guidance in the following sections should be applied to all systems. If there are systems which must be allowed to relay mail, but which cannot be trusted to relay unconditionally, configure SMTP AUTH with SSL support. Prevent Unrestricted Mail Relaying Modify the /etc/postfix/main.cf file to restrict client connections to the local network with the following command: $ sudo postconf -e 'smtpd_client_restrictions = permit_mynetworks,reject' CCI-000366 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040290 SV-230550r627750_rule If unrestricted mail relaying is permitted, unauthorized senders could use this host as a mail relay for the purpose of sending spam or other unauthorized activity. CCE-84054-6 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-84054-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040290 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - postfix_prevent_unrestricted_relay - restrict_strategy - name: Prevent Unrestricted Mail Relaying block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/postfix/main.cf create: true regexp: ^[ \t]*smtpd_client_restrictions\s*=\s* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/postfix/main.cf lineinfile: path: /etc/postfix/main.cf create: true regexp: ^[ \t]*smtpd_client_restrictions\s*=\s* state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/postfix/main.cf lineinfile: path: /etc/postfix/main.cf create: true regexp: ^[ \t]*smtpd_client_restrictions\s*=\s* line: smtpd_client_restrictions = permit_mynetworks,reject state: present when: - '"postfix" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84054-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040290 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - postfix_prevent_unrestricted_relay - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q postfix; then if ! grep -q ^smtpd_client_restrictions /etc/postfix/main.cf; then echo "smtpd_client_restrictions = permit_mynetworks,reject" >> /etc/postfix/main.cf else sed -i "s/^smtpd_client_restrictions.*/smtpd_client_restrictions = permit_mynetworks,reject/g" /etc/postfix/main.cf fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enact SMTP Recipient Restrictions To configure Postfix to restrict addresses to which it will send mail, see: http://www.postfix.org/SMTPD_ACCESS_README.html#danger The full contents of smtpd_recipient_restrictions will vary by site, since this is a common place to put spam restrictions and other site-specific options. The permit_mynetworks option allows all mail to be relayed from the systems in mynetworks. Then, the reject_unauth_destination option denies all mail whose destination address is not local, preventing any other systems from relaying. These two options should always appear in this order, and should usually follow one another immediately unless SMTP AUTH is used. Enact SMTP Relay Restrictions To configure Postfix to restrict addresses to which it will send mail, see: http://www.postfix.org/SMTPD_ACCESS_README.html#danger The full contents of smtpd_recipient_restrictions will vary by site, since this is a common place to put spam restrictions and other site-specific options. The permit_mynetworks option allows all mail to be relayed from the systems in mynetworks. Then, the reject_unauth_destination option denies all mail whose destination address is not local, preventing any other systems from relaying. These two options should always appear in this order, and should usually follow one another immediately unless SMTP AUTH is used. Use TLS for SMTP AUTH Postfix provides options to use TLS for certificate-based authentication and encrypted sessions. An encrypted session protects the information that is transmitted with SMTP mail or with SASL authentication. To configure Postfix to protect all SMTP AUTH transactions using TLS, see http://www.postfix.org/TLS_README.html. Configure Trusted Networks and Hosts Edit /etc/postfix/main.cf, and configure the contents of the mynetworks variable in one of the following ways: If any system in the subnet containing the MTA may be trusted to relay messages, add or correct the following line: mynetworks_style = subnet This is also the default setting, and is in effect if all my_networks_style directives are commented.If only the MTA host itself is trusted to relay messages, add or correct the following line: mynetworks_style = hostIf the set of systems which can relay is more complicated, manually specify an entry for each netblock or IP address which is trusted to relay by setting the mynetworks variable directly: mynetworks = 10.0.0.0/16, 192.168.1.0/24, 127.0.0.1 Require SMTP AUTH Before Relaying from Untrusted Clients SMTP authentication allows remote clients to relay mail safely by requiring them to authenticate before submitting mail. Postfix's SMTP AUTH uses an authentication library called SASL, which is not part of Postfix itself. To enable the use of SASL authentication, see http://www.postfix.org/SASL_README.html NFS and RPC The Network File System is a popular distributed filesystem for the Unix environment, and is very widely deployed. This section discusses the circumstances under which it is possible to disable NFS and its dependencies, and then details steps which should be taken to secure NFS's configuration. This section is relevant to systems operating as NFS clients, as well as to those operating as NFS servers. Uninstall nfs-utils Package The nfs-utils package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase nfs-utils SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 2.2.9 nfs-utils provides a daemon for the kernel NFS server and related tools. This package also contains the showmount program. showmount queries the mount daemon on a remote host for information about the Network File System (NFS) server on the remote host. For example, showmount can display the clients which are mounted on that host. CCE-82932-5 - name: Ensure nfs-utils is removed package: name: nfs-utils state: absent tags: - CCE-82932-5 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_nfs-utils_removed include remove_nfs-utils class remove_nfs-utils { package { 'nfs-utils': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=nfs-utils # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove nfs-utils # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on nfs-utils. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "nfs-utils" ; then yum remove -y "nfs-utils" fi Disable All NFS Services if Possible If there is not a reason for the system to operate as either an NFS client or an NFS server, follow all instructions in this section to disable subsystems required by NFS. The steps in this section will prevent a system from operating as either an NFS client or an NFS server. Only perform these steps on systems which do not need NFS at all. Disable netfs if Possible To determine if any network filesystems handled by netfs are currently mounted on the system execute the following command: $ mount -t nfs,nfs4,smbfs,cifs,ncpfs If the command did not return any output then disable netfs. Disable Network File Systems (netfs) The netfs script manages the boot-time mounting of several types of networked filesystems, of which NFS and Samba are the most common. If these filesystem types are not in use, the script can be disabled, protecting the system somewhat against accidental or malicious changes to /etc/fstab and against flaws in the netfs script itself. The netfs service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now netfs.service - name: Block Disable service netfs block: - name: Disable service netfs block: - name: Disable service netfs systemd: name: netfs.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service netfs' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_netfs_disabled - unknown_severity - name: Unit Socket Exists - netfs.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files netfs.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_netfs_disabled - unknown_severity - name: Disable socket netfs systemd: name: netfs.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("netfs.socket",multiline=True) tags: - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_netfs_disabled - unknown_severity apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: netfs.service enabled: false mask: true - name: netfs.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["netfs"] include disable_netfs class disable_netfs { service {'netfs': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'netfs.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'netfs.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'netfs.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files netfs.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'netfs.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'netfs.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'netfs.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Services Used Only by NFS If NFS is not needed, disable the NFS client daemons nfslock, rpcgssd, and rpcidmapd. All of these daemons run with elevated privileges, and many listen for network connections. If they are not needed, they should be disabled to improve system security posture. Uninstall rpcbind Package The rpcbind utility maps RPC services to the ports on which they listen. RPC processes notify rpcbind when they start, registering the ports they are listening on and the RPC program numbers they expect to serve. The rpcbind service redirects the client to the proper port number so it can communicate with the requested service. If the system does not require RPC (such as for NFS servers) then this service should be disabled. The rpcbind package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase rpcbind 2.2.12 If the system does not require rpc based services, it is recommended that rpcbind be disabled to reduce the attack surface. CCE-86645-9 - name: Ensure rpcbind is removed package: name: rpcbind state: absent when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86645-9 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_rpcbind_removed include remove_rpcbind class remove_rpcbind { package { 'rpcbind': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=rpcbind # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove rpcbind # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on rpcbind. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "rpcbind" ; then yum remove -y "rpcbind" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Network File System Lock Service (nfslock) The Network File System Lock (nfslock) service starts the required remote procedure call (RPC) processes which allow clients to lock files on the server. If the local system is not configured to mount NFS filesystems then this service should be disabled. The nfslock service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now nfslock.service - name: Block Disable service nfslock block: - name: Disable service nfslock block: - name: Disable service nfslock systemd: name: nfslock.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service nfslock' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_nfslock_disabled - unknown_severity - name: Unit Socket Exists - nfslock.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files nfslock.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_nfslock_disabled - unknown_severity - name: Disable socket nfslock systemd: name: nfslock.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("nfslock.socket",multiline=True) tags: - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_nfslock_disabled - unknown_severity apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: nfslock.service enabled: false mask: true - name: nfslock.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["nfslock"] include disable_nfslock class disable_nfslock { service {'nfslock': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'nfslock.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'nfslock.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'nfslock.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files nfslock.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'nfslock.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'nfslock.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'nfslock.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable rpcbind Service The rpcbind utility maps RPC services to the ports on which they listen. RPC processes notify rpcbind when they start, registering the ports they are listening on and the RPC program numbers they expect to serve. The rpcbind service redirects the client to the proper port number so it can communicate with the requested service. If the system does not require RPC (such as for NFS servers) then this service should be disabled. The rpcbind service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now rpcbind.service 2.2.4 2.2.12 If the system does not require rpc based services, it is recommended that rpcbind be disabled to reduce the attack surface. CCE-82858-2 - name: Block Disable service rpcbind block: - name: Disable service rpcbind block: - name: Disable service rpcbind systemd: name: rpcbind.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service rpcbind' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82858-2 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_rpcbind_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - rpcbind.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files rpcbind.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82858-2 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_rpcbind_disabled - name: Disable socket rpcbind systemd: name: rpcbind.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("rpcbind.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-82858-2 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_rpcbind_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: rpcbind.service enabled: false mask: true - name: rpcbind.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["rpcbind"] include disable_rpcbind class disable_rpcbind { service {'rpcbind': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'rpcbind.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'rpcbind.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'rpcbind.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files rpcbind.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'rpcbind.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'rpcbind.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'rpcbind.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Secure RPC Client Service (rpcgssd) The rpcgssd service manages RPCSEC GSS contexts required to secure protocols that use RPC (most often Kerberos and NFS). The rpcgssd service is the client-side of RPCSEC GSS. If the system does not require secure RPC then this service should be disabled. The rpcgssd service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now rpcgssd.service - name: Block Disable service rpcgssd block: - name: Disable service rpcgssd block: - name: Disable service rpcgssd systemd: name: rpcgssd.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service rpcgssd' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_rpcgssd_disabled - unknown_severity - name: Unit Socket Exists - rpcgssd.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files rpcgssd.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_rpcgssd_disabled - unknown_severity - name: Disable socket rpcgssd systemd: name: rpcgssd.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("rpcgssd.socket",multiline=True) tags: - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_rpcgssd_disabled - unknown_severity apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: rpcgssd.service enabled: false mask: true - name: rpcgssd.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["rpcgssd"] include disable_rpcgssd class disable_rpcgssd { service {'rpcgssd': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'rpcgssd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'rpcgssd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'rpcgssd.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files rpcgssd.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'rpcgssd.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'rpcgssd.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'rpcgssd.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable RPC ID Mapping Service (rpcidmapd) The rpcidmapd service is used to map user names and groups to UID and GID numbers on NFSv4 mounts. If NFS is not in use on the local system then this service should be disabled. The rpcidmapd service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now rpcidmapd.service - name: Block Disable service rpcidmapd block: - name: Disable service rpcidmapd block: - name: Disable service rpcidmapd systemd: name: rpcidmapd.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service rpcidmapd' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_rpcidmapd_disabled - unknown_severity - name: Unit Socket Exists - rpcidmapd.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files rpcidmapd.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_rpcidmapd_disabled - unknown_severity - name: Disable socket rpcidmapd systemd: name: rpcidmapd.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("rpcidmapd.socket",multiline=True) tags: - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_rpcidmapd_disabled - unknown_severity apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: rpcidmapd.service enabled: false mask: true - name: rpcidmapd.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["rpcidmapd"] include disable_rpcidmapd class disable_rpcidmapd { service {'rpcidmapd': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'rpcidmapd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'rpcidmapd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'rpcidmapd.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files rpcidmapd.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'rpcidmapd.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'rpcidmapd.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'rpcidmapd.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure All Systems which Use NFS The steps in this section are appropriate for all systems which run NFS, whether they operate as clients or as servers. Make Each System a Client or a Server, not Both If NFS must be used, it should be deployed in the simplest configuration possible to avoid maintainability problems which may lead to unnecessary security exposure. Due to the reliability and security problems caused by NFS (specially NFSv3 and NFSv2), it is not a good idea for systems which act as NFS servers to also mount filesystems via NFS. At the least, crossed mounts (the situation in which each of two servers mounts a filesystem from the other) should never be used. Configure NFS Services to Use Fixed Ports (NFSv3 and NFSv2) Firewalling should be done at each host and at the border firewalls to protect the NFS daemons from remote access, since NFS servers should never be accessible from outside the organization. However, by default for NFSv3 and NFSv2, the RPC Bind service assigns each NFS service to a port dynamically at service startup time. Dynamic ports cannot be protected by port filtering firewalls such as iptables. Therefore, restrict each service to always use a given port, so that firewalling can be done effectively. Note that, because of the way RPC is implemented, it is not possible to disable the RPC Bind service even if ports are assigned statically to all RPC services. In NFSv4, the mounting and locking protocols have been incorporated into the protocol, and the server listens on the the well-known TCP port 2049. As such, NFSv4 does not need to interact with the rpcbind, lockd, and rpc.statd daemons, which can and should be disabled in a pure NFSv4 environment. The rpc.mountd daemon is still required on the NFS server to setup exports, but is not involved in any over-the-wire operations. Configure lockd to use static TCP port Configure the lockd daemon to use a static TCP port as opposed to letting the RPC Bind service dynamically assign a port. Edit the file /etc/sysconfig/nfs. Add or correct the following line: LOCKD_TCPPORT=lockd-port Where lockd-port is a port which is not used by any other service on your network. Restrict service to always use a given port, so that firewalling can be done effectively. Configure lockd to use static UDP port Configure the lockd daemon to use a static UDP port as opposed to letting the RPC Bind service dynamically assign a port. Edit the file /etc/sysconfig/nfs. Add or correct the following line: LOCKD_UDPPORT=lockd-port Where lockd-port is a port which is not used by any other service on your network. Restricting services to always use a given port enables firewalling to be done more effectively. Configure mountd to use static port Configure the mountd daemon to use a static port as opposed to letting the RPC Bind service dynamically assign a port. Edit the file /etc/sysconfig/nfs. Add or correct the following line: MOUNTD_PORT=statd-port Where mountd-port is a port which is not used by any other service on your network. Restricting services to always use a given port enables firewalling to be done more effectively. Configure statd to use static port Configure the statd daemon to use a static port as opposed to letting the RPC Bind service dynamically assign a port. Edit the file /etc/sysconfig/nfs. Add or correct the following line: STATD_PORT=statd-port Where statd-port is a port which is not used by any other service on your network. Restricting services to always use a given port enables firewalling to be done more effectively. Configure NFS Clients The steps in this section are appropriate for systems which operate as NFS clients. Disable NFS Server Daemons There is no need to run the NFS server daemons nfs and rpcsvcgssd except on a small number of properly secured systems designated as NFS servers. Ensure that these daemons are turned off on clients. Disable Network File System (nfs) The Network File System (NFS) service allows remote hosts to mount and interact with shared filesystems on the local system. If the local system is not designated as a NFS server then this service should be disabled. The nfs-server service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now nfs-server.service 11 12 14 15 16 18 3 5 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.03 DSS06.06 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.AC-4 PR.AC-6 PR.PT-3 2.2.9 Unnecessary services should be disabled to decrease the attack surface of the system. CCE-82762-6 - name: Block Disable service nfs-server block: - name: Disable service nfs-server block: - name: Disable service nfs-server systemd: name: nfs-server.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service nfs-server' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82762-6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_nfs_disabled - unknown_severity - name: Unit Socket Exists - nfs-server.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files nfs-server.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82762-6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_nfs_disabled - unknown_severity - name: Disable socket nfs-server systemd: name: nfs-server.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("nfs-server.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-82762-6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_nfs_disabled - unknown_severity apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: nfs-server.service enabled: false mask: true - name: nfs-server.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["nfs-server"] include disable_nfs-server class disable_nfs-server { service {'nfs-server': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'nfs-server.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'nfs-server.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'nfs-server.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files nfs-server.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'nfs-server.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'nfs-server.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'nfs-server.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Secure RPC Server Service (rpcsvcgssd) The rpcsvcgssd service manages RPCSEC GSS contexts required to secure protocols that use RPC (most often Kerberos and NFS). The rpcsvcgssd service is the server-side of RPCSEC GSS. If the system does not require secure RPC then this service should be disabled. The rpcsvcgssd service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now rpcsvcgssd.service Unnecessary services should be disabled to decrease the attack surface of the system. - name: Block Disable service rpcsvcgssd block: - name: Disable service rpcsvcgssd block: - name: Disable service rpcsvcgssd systemd: name: rpcsvcgssd.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service rpcsvcgssd' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_rpcsvcgssd_disabled - unknown_severity - name: Unit Socket Exists - rpcsvcgssd.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files rpcsvcgssd.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_rpcsvcgssd_disabled - unknown_severity - name: Disable socket rpcsvcgssd systemd: name: rpcsvcgssd.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("rpcsvcgssd.socket",multiline=True) tags: - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_rpcsvcgssd_disabled - unknown_severity apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: rpcsvcgssd.service enabled: false mask: true - name: rpcsvcgssd.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["rpcsvcgssd"] include disable_rpcsvcgssd class disable_rpcsvcgssd { service {'rpcsvcgssd': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'rpcsvcgssd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'rpcsvcgssd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'rpcsvcgssd.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files rpcsvcgssd.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'rpcsvcgssd.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'rpcsvcgssd.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'rpcsvcgssd.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Specify UID and GID for Anonymous NFS Connections To specify the UID and GID for remote root users, edit the /etc/exports file and add the following for each export: anonuid=value greater than UID_MAX from /etc/login.defs anongid=value greater than GID_MAX from /etc/login.defs Note that a value of "-1" is technically acceptable as this will randomize the anonuid and anongid values on a Red Hat Enterprise Linux based NFS server. While acceptable from a security perspective, a value of -1 may cause interoperability issues, particularly with Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 client systems. Alternatively, functionally equivalent values of 60001, 65534, 65535 may be used. Specifying the anonymous UID and GID ensures that the remote root user is mapped to a local account which has no permissions on the system. Mount Remote Filesystems with Restrictive Options Edit the file /etc/fstab. For each filesystem whose type (column 3) is nfs or nfs4, add the text ,nodev,nosuid to the list of mount options in column 4. If appropriate, also add ,noexec. See the section titled "Restrict Partition Mount Options" for a description of the effects of these options. In general, execution of files mounted via NFS should be considered risky because of the possibility that an adversary could intercept the request and substitute a malicious file. Allowing setuid files to be executed from remote servers is particularly risky, both for this reason and because it requires the clients to extend root-level trust to the NFS server. Mount Remote Filesystems with Kerberos Security Add the sec=krb5:krb5i:krb5p option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of any NFS mounts. 1 12 14 15 16 18 3 5 DSS05.04 DSS05.10 DSS06.10 CCI-000366 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 A.18.1.4 A.6.1.2 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) IA-2 IA-2(8) IA-2(9) AC-17(a) PR.AC-4 PR.AC-7 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 When an NFS server is configured to use AUTH_SYS a selected userid and groupid are used to handle requests from the remote user. The userid and groupid could mistakenly or maliciously be set incorrectly. The AUTH_GSS method of authentication uses certificates on the server and client systems to more securely authenticate the remote mount request. - name: Get nfs and nfs4 mount points, that don't have sec=krb5:krb5i:krb5p command: findmnt --fstab --types nfs,nfs4 -O nosec=krb5:krb5i:krb5p -n -P register: points_register check_mode: false changed_when: false failed_when: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-IA-2 - NIST-800-53-IA-2(8) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(9) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - mount_option_krb_sec_remote_filesystems - no_reboot_needed - name: Add sec=krb5:krb5i:krb5p to nfs and nfs4 mount points mount: path: '{{ item | regex_search(''TARGET="([^"]+)"'',''\1'') | first }}' src: '{{ item | regex_search(''SOURCE="([^"]+)"'',''\1'') | first }}' fstype: '{{ item | regex_search(''FSTYPE="([^"]+)"'',''\1'') | first }}' state: present opts: '{{ item | regex_search(''OPTIONS="([^"]+)"'',''\1'') | first }},sec=krb5:krb5i:krb5p' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - (points_register.stdout | length > 0) and '\\x09' not in item with_items: '{{ points_register.stdout_lines }}' tags: - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-IA-2 - NIST-800-53-IA-2(8) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(9) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - mount_option_krb_sec_remote_filesystems - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then vfstype_points=() readarray -t vfstype_points < <(grep -E "[[:space:]]nfs[4]?[[:space:]]" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $2}') for vfstype_point in "${vfstype_points[@]}" do mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" ${vfstype_point//\\/\\\\})" # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab if ! grep -q "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|sec=krb5:krb5i:krb5p)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. fs_type="nfs4" if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") fi echo " ${vfstype_point//\\/\\\\} nfs4 defaults,${previous_mount_opts}sec=krb5:krb5i:krb5p 0 0" >> /etc/fstab # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep -q "sec=krb5:krb5i:krb5p"; then previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,sec=krb5:krb5i:krb5p|" /etc/fstab fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Mount Remote Filesystems with nodev Add the nodev option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of any NFS mounts. 11 13 14 3 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS05.06 DSS06.06 CCI-000366 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.11.2.9 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.8.2.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.8.3.1 A.8.3.3 A.9.1.2 CM-6(a) MP-2 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-2 PR.PT-3 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010640 SV-230307r627750_rule Legitimate device files should only exist in the /dev directory. NFS mounts should not present device files to users. CCE-84052-0 - name: Get nfs and nfs4 mount points, that don't have nodev command: findmnt --fstab --types nfs,nfs4 -O nonodev -n -P register: points_register check_mode: false changed_when: false failed_when: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84052-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010640 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-MP-2 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - mount_option_nodev_remote_filesystems - no_reboot_needed - name: Add nodev to nfs and nfs4 mount points mount: path: '{{ item | regex_search(''TARGET="([^"]+)"'',''\1'') | first }}' src: '{{ item | regex_search(''SOURCE="([^"]+)"'',''\1'') | first }}' fstype: '{{ item | regex_search(''FSTYPE="([^"]+)"'',''\1'') | first }}' state: present opts: '{{ item | regex_search(''OPTIONS="([^"]+)"'',''\1'') | first }},nodev' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - (points_register.stdout | length > 0) and '\\x09' not in item with_items: '{{ points_register.stdout_lines }}' tags: - CCE-84052-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010640 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-MP-2 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - mount_option_nodev_remote_filesystems - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then vfstype_points=() readarray -t vfstype_points < <(grep -E "[[:space:]]nfs[4]?[[:space:]]" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $2}') for vfstype_point in "${vfstype_points[@]}" do mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" ${vfstype_point//\\/\\\\})" # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab if ! grep -q "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nodev)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. fs_type="nfs4" if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") fi echo " ${vfstype_point//\\/\\\\} nfs4 defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nodev 0 0" >> /etc/fstab # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep -q "nodev"; then previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nodev|" /etc/fstab fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Mount Remote Filesystems with noexec Add the noexec option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of any NFS mounts. 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 CCI-000366 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 AC-6 AC-6(8) AC-6(10) CM-6(a) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010630 SV-230306r627750_rule The noexec mount option causes the system not to execute binary files. This option must be used for mounting any file system not containing approved binary files as they may be incompatible. Executing files from untrusted file systems increases the opportunity for unprivileged users to attain unauthorized administrative access. CCE-84050-4 - name: Get nfs and nfs4 mount points, that don't have noexec command: findmnt --fstab --types nfs,nfs4 -O nonoexec -n -P register: points_register check_mode: false changed_when: false failed_when: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84050-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010630 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(10) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(8) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - mount_option_noexec_remote_filesystems - no_reboot_needed - name: Add noexec to nfs and nfs4 mount points mount: path: '{{ item | regex_search(''TARGET="([^"]+)"'',''\1'') | first }}' src: '{{ item | regex_search(''SOURCE="([^"]+)"'',''\1'') | first }}' fstype: '{{ item | regex_search(''FSTYPE="([^"]+)"'',''\1'') | first }}' state: present opts: '{{ item | regex_search(''OPTIONS="([^"]+)"'',''\1'') | first }},noexec' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - (points_register.stdout | length > 0) and '\\x09' not in item with_items: '{{ points_register.stdout_lines }}' tags: - CCE-84050-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010630 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(10) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(8) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - mount_option_noexec_remote_filesystems - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then vfstype_points=() readarray -t vfstype_points < <(grep -E "[[:space:]]nfs[4]?[[:space:]]" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $2}') for vfstype_point in "${vfstype_points[@]}" do mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" ${vfstype_point//\\/\\\\})" # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab if ! grep -q "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|noexec)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. fs_type="nfs4" if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") fi echo " ${vfstype_point//\\/\\\\} nfs4 defaults,${previous_mount_opts}noexec 0 0" >> /etc/fstab # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep -q "noexec"; then previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,noexec|" /etc/fstab fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Mount Remote Filesystems with nosuid Add the nosuid option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of any NFS mounts. 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 CCI-000366 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 AC-6 AC-6(1) CM6(a) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010650 SV-230308r627750_rule NFS mounts should not present suid binaries to users. Only vendor-supplied suid executables should be installed to their default location on the local filesystem. CCE-84053-8 - name: Get nfs and nfs4 mount points, that don't have nosuid command: findmnt --fstab --types nfs,nfs4 -O nonosuid -n -P register: points_register check_mode: false changed_when: false failed_when: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84053-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010650 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM6(a) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - mount_option_nosuid_remote_filesystems - no_reboot_needed - name: Add nosuid to nfs and nfs4 mount points mount: path: '{{ item | regex_search(''TARGET="([^"]+)"'',''\1'') | first }}' src: '{{ item | regex_search(''SOURCE="([^"]+)"'',''\1'') | first }}' fstype: '{{ item | regex_search(''FSTYPE="([^"]+)"'',''\1'') | first }}' state: present opts: '{{ item | regex_search(''OPTIONS="([^"]+)"'',''\1'') | first }},nosuid' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - (points_register.stdout | length > 0) and '\\x09' not in item with_items: '{{ points_register.stdout_lines }}' tags: - CCE-84053-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010650 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM6(a) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - mount_option_nosuid_remote_filesystems - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then vfstype_points=() readarray -t vfstype_points < <(grep -E "[[:space:]]nfs[4]?[[:space:]]" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $2}') for vfstype_point in "${vfstype_points[@]}" do mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "^[[:space:]]*[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" ${vfstype_point//\\/\\\\})" # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab if ! grep -q "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nosuid)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. fs_type="nfs4" if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") fi echo " ${vfstype_point//\\/\\\\} nfs4 defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nosuid 0 0" >> /etc/fstab # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep -q "nosuid"; then previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nosuid|" /etc/fstab fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure NFS Servers The steps in this section are appropriate for systems which operate as NFS servers. Ensure All-Squashing Disabled On All Exports The all_squash maps all uids and gids to an anonymous user. This should be disabled by removing any instances of the all_squash option from the file /etc/exports. The all_squash option maps all client requests to a single anonymous uid/gid on the NFS server, negating the ability to track file access by user ID. Ensure Insecure File Locking is Not Allowed By default the NFS server requires secure file-lock requests, which require credentials from the client in order to lock a file. Most NFS clients send credentials with file lock requests, however, there are a few clients that do not send credentials when requesting a file-lock, allowing the client to only be able to lock world-readable files. To get around this, the insecure_locks option can be used so these clients can access the desired export. This poses a security risk by potentially allowing the client access to data for which it does not have authorization. Remove any instances of the insecure_locks option from the file /etc/exports. CCI-000764 Allowing insecure file locking could allow for sensitive data to be viewed or edited by an unauthorized user. Restrict NFS Clients to Privileged Ports By default, the server NFS implementation requires that all client requests be made from ports less than 1024. If your organization has control over systems connected to its network, and if NFS requests are prohibited at the border firewall, this offers some protection against malicious requests from unprivileged users. Therefore, the default should not be changed. To ensure that the default has not been changed, ensure no line in /etc/exports contains the option insecure. 11 12 14 15 16 18 3 5 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.03 DSS06.06 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.AC-4 PR.AC-6 PR.PT-3 Allowing client requests to be made from ports higher than 1024 could allow a unprivileged user to initiate an NFS connection. If the unprivileged user account has been compromised, an attacker could gain access to data on the NFS server. Use Kerberos Security on All Exports Using Kerberos on all exported mounts prevents a malicious client or user from impersonating a system user. To cryptography authenticate users to the NFS server, add sec=krb5:krb5i:krb5p to each export in /etc/exports. 1 12 14 15 16 18 3 5 DSS05.04 DSS05.10 DSS06.10 CCI-000366 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 A.18.1.4 A.6.1.2 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) IA-2 IA-2(8) IA-2(9) AC-17(a) PR.AC-4 PR.AC-7 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 When an NFS server is configured to use AUTH_SYS a selected userid and groupid are used to handle requests from the remote user. The userid and groupid could mistakenly or maliciously be set incorrectly. The AUTH_GSS method of authentication uses certificates on the server and client systems to more securely authenticate the remote mount request. CCE-80924-4 - name: Drop any security clause for every export replace: path: /etc/exports regexp: ^(/.*\w+.*\(.*),sec=[^,]*(.*\)\w*$) replace: \1\2 tags: - CCE-80924-4 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-IA-2 - NIST-800-53-IA-2(8) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(9) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - use_kerberos_security_all_exports - name: Add kerberos security when no security is defined for an export replace: path: /etc/exports regexp: ^(/.*\w+.*\(.*)(\)\w*$) replace: \1,sec=krb5:krb5i:krb5p\2 tags: - CCE-80924-4 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-IA-2 - NIST-800-53-IA-2(8) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(9) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - use_kerberos_security_all_exports nfs_exports=() readarray -t nfs_exports < <(grep -E "^/.*[[:space:]]+ .*\(.*\)[[:space:]]*$" /etc/exports | awk '{print $2}') for nfs_export in "${nfs_exports[@]}" do correct_export="" if [ "$(grep -c "sec=" <<<"$nfs_export")" -eq 0 ]; then correct_export="$(echo $nfs_export|sed -e 's/).*$/,sec=krb5\:krb5i\:krb5p)/')" else correct_export="$(echo $nfs_export|sed -e 's/sec=[^\,\)]*/sec=krb5\:krb5i\:krb5p/')" fi sed -i "s|$nfs_export|$correct_export|g" /etc/exports done Use Root-Squashing on All Exports If a filesystem is exported using root squashing, requests from root on the client are considered to be unprivileged (mapped to a user such as nobody). This provides some mild protection against remote abuse of an NFS server. Root squashing is enabled by default, and should not be disabled. Ensure that no line in /etc/exports contains the option no_root_squash. If the NFS server allows root access to local file systems from remote hosts, this access could be used to compromise the system. Configure the Exports File Restrictively Linux's NFS implementation uses the file /etc/exports to control what filesystems and directories may be accessed via NFS. (See the exports(5) manpage for more information about the format of this file.) The syntax of the exports file is not necessarily checked fully on reload, and syntax errors can leave your NFS configuration more open than intended. Therefore, exercise caution when modifying the file. The syntax of each line in /etc/exports is: /DIR host1(opt1,opt2) host2(opt3) where /DIR is a directory or filesystem to export, hostN is an IP address, netblock, hostname, domain, or netgroup to which to export, and optN is an option. Export Filesystems Read-Only if Possible If a filesystem is being exported so that users can view the files in a convenient fashion, but there is no need for users to edit those files, exporting the filesystem read-only removes an attack vector against the server. The default filesystem export mode is ro, so do not specify rw without a good reason. Use Access Lists to Enforce Authorization Restrictions When configuring NFS exports, ensure that each export line in /etc/exports contains a list of hosts which are allowed to access that export. If no hosts are specified on an export line, then that export is available to any remote host which requests it. All lines of the exports file should specify the hosts (or subnets, if needed) which are allowed to access the exported directory, so that unknown or remote hosts will be denied. Authorized hosts can be specified in several different formats: Name or alias that is recognized by the resolverFully qualified domain nameIP addressIP subnets in the format address/netmask or address/CIDR Network Time Protocol The Network Time Protocol is used to manage the system clock over a network. Computer clocks are not very accurate, so time will drift unpredictably on unmanaged systems. Central time protocols can be used both to ensure that time is consistent among a network of systems, and that their time is consistent with the outside world. If every system on a network reliably reports the same time, then it is much easier to correlate log messages in case of an attack. In addition, a number of cryptographic protocols (such as Kerberos) use timestamps to prevent certain types of attacks. If your network does not have synchronized time, these protocols may be unreliable or even unusable. Depending on the specifics of the network, global time accuracy may be just as important as local synchronization, or not very important at all. If your network is connected to the Internet, using a public timeserver (or one provided by your enterprise) provides globally accurate timestamps which may be essential in investigating or responding to an attack which originated outside of your network. A typical network setup involves a small number of internal systems operating as NTP servers, and the remainder obtaining time information from those internal servers. There is a choice between the daemons ntpd and chronyd, which are available from the repositories in the ntp and chrony packages respectively. The default chronyd daemon can work well when external time references are only intermittently accesible, can perform well even when the network is congested for longer periods of time, can usually synchronize the clock faster and with better time accuracy, and quickly adapts to sudden changes in the rate of the clock, for example, due to changes in the temperature of the crystal oscillator. Chronyd should be considered for all systems which are frequently suspended or otherwise intermittently disconnected and reconnected to a network. Mobile and virtual systems for example. The ntpd NTP daemon fully supports NTP protocol version 4 (RFC 5905), including broadcast, multicast, manycast clients and servers, and the orphan mode. It also supports extra authentication schemes based on public-key cryptography (RFC 5906). The NTP daemon (ntpd) should be considered for systems which are normally kept permanently on. Systems which are required to use broadcast or multicast IP, or to perform authentication of packets with the Autokey protocol, should consider using ntpd. Refer to https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/8/html/configuring_basic_system_settings/configuring-time-synchronization_configuring-basic-system-settings for more detailed comparison of features of chronyd and ntpd daemon features respectively, and for further guidance how to choose between the two NTP daemons. The upstream manual pages at https://chrony-project.org/documentation.html for chronyd and http://www.ntp.org for ntpd provide additional information on the capabilities and configuration of each of the NTP daemons. Vendor Approved Time pools The list of vendor-approved pool servers 0.pool.ntp.org,1.pool.ntp.org,2.pool.ntp.org,3.pool.ntp.org 0.fedora.pool.ntp.org,1.fedora.pool.ntp.org,2.fedora.pool.ntp.org,3.fedora.pool.ntp.org 0.rhel.pool.ntp.org,1.rhel.pool.ntp.org,2.rhel.pool.ntp.org,3.rhel.pool.ntp.org 0.pool.ntp.org,1.pool.ntp.org,2.pool.ntp.org,3.pool.ntp.org 0.suse.pool.ntp.org,1.suse.pool.ntp.org,2.suse.pool.ntp.org,3.suse.pool.ntp.org 0.ntp.cloud.aliyuncs.com,1.ntp.aliyun.com,2.ntp1.aliyun.com,3.ntp1.cloud.aliyuncs.com Vendor Approved Time Servers The list of vendor-approved time servers 0.pool.ntp.org,1.pool.ntp.org,2.pool.ntp.org,3.pool.ntp.org 0.pool.ntp.org,1.pool.ntp.org,2.pool.ntp.org,3.pool.ntp.org 0.fedora.pool.ntp.org,1.fedora.pool.ntp.org,2.fedora.pool.ntp.org,3.fedora.pool.ntp.org 0.rhel.pool.ntp.org,1.rhel.pool.ntp.org,2.rhel.pool.ntp.org,3.rhel.pool.ntp.org 0.pool.ntp.org,1.pool.ntp.org,2.pool.ntp.org,3.pool.ntp.org 0.suse.pool.ntp.org,1.suse.pool.ntp.org,2.suse.pool.ntp.org,3.suse.pool.ntp.org 0.ntp.cloud.aliyuncs.com,1.ntp.aliyun.com,2.ntp1.aliyun.com,3.ntp1.cloud.aliyuncs.com Maximum NTP or Chrony Poll The maximum NTP or Chrony poll interval number in seconds specified as a power of two. 17 16 10 10 The Chrony package is installed System time should be synchronized between all systems in an environment. This is typically done by establishing an authoritative time server or set of servers and having all systems synchronize their clocks to them. The chrony package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install chrony BP28(R71) 0988 1405 FMT_SMF_EXT.1 Req-10.4 10.6.1 SRG-OS-000355-GPOS-00143 2.1.1 Time synchronization is important to support time sensitive security mechanisms like Kerberos and also ensures log files have consistent time records across the enterprise, which aids in forensic investigations. CCE-82874-9 - name: Ensure chrony is installed package: name: chrony state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82874-9 - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4 - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.1 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_chrony_installed [[packages]] name = "chrony" version = "*" include install_chrony class install_chrony { package { 'chrony': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=chrony # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "chrony" ; then yum install -y "chrony" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Install the ntp service The ntpd service should be installed. NT012(R03) 1 14 15 16 3 5 6 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 MEA02.01 CCI-000160 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 CM-6(a) PR.PT-1 Req-10.4 Time synchronization (using NTP) is required by almost all network and administrative tasks (syslog, cryptographic based services (authentication, etc.), etc.). Ntpd is regulary maintained and updated, supporting security features such as RFC 5906. - name: Ensure ntp is installed package: name: ntp state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4 - enable_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - package_ntp_installed [[packages]] name = "ntp" version = "*" include install_ntp class install_ntp { package { 'ntp': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=ntp # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "ntp" ; then yum install -y "ntp" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi The Chronyd service is enabled chrony is a daemon which implements the Network Time Protocol (NTP) is designed to synchronize system clocks across a variety of systems and use a source that is highly accurate. More information on chrony can be found at http://chrony.tuxfamily.org/. Chrony can be configured to be a client and/or a server. To enable Chronyd service, you can run: # systemctl enable chronyd.service This recommendation only applies if chrony is in use on the system. 0988 1405 SRG-OS-000355-GPOS-00143 2.2.1.2 If chrony is in use on the system proper configuration is vital to ensuring time synchronization is working properly. CCE-82875-6 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-82875-6 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_chronyd_enabled - name: Enable service chronyd block: - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto - name: Enable service chronyd systemd: name: chronyd enabled: 'yes' state: started masked: 'no' when: - '"chrony" in ansible_facts.packages' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"chrony" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-82875-6 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_chronyd_enabled [customizations.services] enabled = ["chronyd"] include enable_chronyd class enable_chronyd { service {'chronyd': enable => true, ensure => 'running', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { rpm --quiet -q chrony; }; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'chronyd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'chronyd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'chronyd.service' else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the NTP Daemon Run the following command to determine the current status of the chronyd service: $ sudo systemctl is-active chronyd If the service is running, it should return the following: active Note: The chronyd daemon is enabled by default. Run the following command to determine the current status of the ntpd service: $ sudo systemctl is-active ntpd If the service is running, it should return the following: active Note: The ntpd daemon is not enabled by default. Though as mentioned in the previous sections in certain environments the ntpd daemon might be preferred to be used rather than the chronyd one. Refer to: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/7/html/system_administrators_guide/ch-configuring_ntp_using_the_chrony_suite for guidance which NTP daemon to choose depending on the environment used. BP28(R71) 1 14 15 16 3 5 6 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 MEA02.01 3.3.7 CCI-000160 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 0988 1405 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 CM-6(a) AU-8(1)(a) AU-12(1) PR.PT-1 Req-10.4.1 10.6.1 SRG-APP-000116-CTR-000235 2.2.1.1 Enabling some of chronyd or ntpd services ensures that the NTP daemon will be running and that the system will synchronize its time to any servers specified. This is important whether the system is configured to be a client (and synchronize only its own clock) or it is also acting as an NTP server to other systems. Synchronizing time is essential for authentication services such as Kerberos, but it is also important for maintaining accurate logs and auditing possible security breaches. The chronyd and ntpd NTP daemons offer all of the functionality of ntpdate, which is now deprecated. CCE-80874-1 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80874-1 - NIST-800-171-3.3.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.1 - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.1 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_chronyd_or_ntpd_enabled - name: Gather the package facts ansible.builtin.package_facts: manager: auto when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80874-1 - NIST-800-171-3.3.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.1 - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.1 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_chronyd_or_ntpd_enabled - name: Start ntpd service if ntp installed systemd: name: ntpd enabled: 'yes' state: started masked: 'no' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '''ntp'' in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80874-1 - NIST-800-171-3.3.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.1 - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.1 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_chronyd_or_ntpd_enabled - name: Start chronyd service if chrony or chronyd installed systemd: name: chronyd enabled: 'yes' state: started masked: 'no' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ('chrony' in ansible_facts.packages) or ('chronyd' in ansible_facts.packages) tags: - CCE-80874-1 - NIST-800-171-3.3.7 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.1 - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.1 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_chronyd_or_ntpd_enabled # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if rpm --quiet -q "chrony" ; then if ! /usr/sbin/pidof ntpd ; then /usr/bin/systemctl enable "chronyd" /usr/bin/systemctl start "chronyd" # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. if /usr/bin/systemctl --failed | grep -q "chronyd"; then /usr/bin/systemctl reset-failed "chronyd" fi fi elif rpm --quiet -q "ntp" ; then /usr/bin/systemctl enable "ntpd" /usr/bin/systemctl start "ntpd" # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. if /usr/bin/systemctl --failed | grep -q "ntpd"; then /usr/bin/systemctl reset-failed "ntpd" fi else if ! rpm -q --quiet "chrony" ; then yum install -y "chrony" fi /usr/bin/systemctl enable "chronyd" /usr/bin/systemctl start "chronyd" # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. if /usr/bin/systemctl --failed | grep -q "chronyd"; then /usr/bin/systemctl reset-failed "chronyd" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the NTP Daemon The ntp service can be enabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl enable ntp.service NT012(R03) 1 14 15 16 3 5 6 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 MEA02.01 CCI-000160 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 CM-6(a) AU-8(1)(a) PR.PT-1 Req-10.4 10.6.1 Enabling the ntp service ensures that the ntp service will be running and that the system will synchronize its time to any servers specified. This is important whether the system is configured to be a client (and synchronize only its own clock) or it is also acting as an NTP server to other systems. Synchronizing time is essential for authentication services such as Kerberos, but it is also important for maintaining accurate logs and auditing possible security breaches. The NTP daemon offers all of the functionality of ntpdate, which is now deprecated. - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4 - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.1 - enable_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_ntp_enabled - name: Enable service ntp block: - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto - name: Enable service ntp systemd: name: ntp enabled: 'yes' state: started masked: 'no' when: - '"ntp" in ansible_facts.packages' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"ntp" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4 - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.1 - enable_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_ntp_enabled [customizations.services] enabled = ["ntp"] include enable_ntp class enable_ntp { service {'ntp': enable => true, ensure => 'running', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { rpm --quiet -q ntp; }; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'ntp.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'ntp.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'ntp.service' else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the NTP Daemon The ntpd service can be enabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl enable ntpd.service 1 14 15 16 3 5 6 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 MEA02.01 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 CM-6(a) AU-8(1)(a) PR.PT-1 Req-10.4 10.6.1 Enabling the ntpd service ensures that the ntpd service will be running and that the system will synchronize its time to any servers specified. This is important whether the system is configured to be a client (and synchronize only its own clock) or it is also acting as an NTP server to other systems. Synchronizing time is essential for authentication services such as Kerberos, but it is also important for maintaining accurate logs and auditing possible security breaches. The NTP daemon offers all of the functionality of ntpdate, which is now deprecated. CCE-86486-8 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-86486-8 - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4 - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.1 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_ntpd_enabled - name: Enable service ntpd block: - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto - name: Enable service ntpd systemd: name: ntpd enabled: 'yes' state: started masked: 'no' when: - '"ntp" in ansible_facts.packages' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"ntp" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-86486-8 - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4 - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.1 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_ntpd_enabled [customizations.services] enabled = ["ntpd"] include enable_ntpd class enable_ntpd { service {'ntpd': enable => true, ensure => 'running', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { rpm --quiet -q ntp; }; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'ntpd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'ntpd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'ntpd.service' else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable chrony daemon from acting as server The port option in /etc/chrony.conf can be set to 0 to make chrony daemon to never open any listening port for server operation and to operate strictly in a client-only mode. CCI-000381 AU-8(1) AU-12(1) FMT_SMF_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000096-GPOS-00050 SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 RHEL-08-030741 SV-230485r928590_rule In order to prevent unauthorized connection of devices, unauthorized transfer of information, or unauthorized tunneling (i.e., embedding of data types within data types), organizations must disable or restrict unused or unnecessary physical and logical ports/protocols on information systems. Operating systems are capable of providing a wide variety of functions and services. Some of the functions and services provided by default may not be necessary to support essential organizational operations. Additionally, it is sometimes convenient to provide multiple services from a single component (e.g., VPN and IPS); however, doing so increases risk over limiting the services provided by any one component. To support the requirements and principles of least functionality, the operating system must support the organizational requirements, providing only essential capabilities and limiting the use of ports, protocols, and/or services to only those required, authorized, and approved to conduct official business or to address authorized quality of life issues. CCE-82988-7 - name: Disable chrony daemon from acting as server block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/chrony.conf create: true regexp: ^\s*port\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/chrony.conf lineinfile: path: /etc/chrony.conf create: true regexp: ^\s*port\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/chrony.conf lineinfile: path: /etc/chrony.conf create: true regexp: ^\s*port\s+ line: port 0 state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82988-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030741 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1) - chronyd_client_only - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,{{ %23%20Allow%20for%20extra%20configuration%20files.%20This%20is%20useful%0A%23%20for%20admins%20specifying%20their%20own%20NTP%20servers%0Ainclude%20/etc/chrony.d/%2A.conf%0A%0A%23%20Set%20chronyd%20as%20client-only.%0Aport%200%0A%0A%23%20Disable%20chronyc%20from%20the%20network%0Acmdport%200%0A%0A%23%20Record%20the%20rate%20at%20which%20the%20system%20clock%20gains/losses%20time.%0Adriftfile%20/var/lib/chrony/drift%0A%0A%23%20Allow%20the%20system%20clock%20to%20be%20stepped%20in%20the%20first%20three%20updates%0A%23%20if%20its%20offset%20is%20larger%20than%201%20second.%0Amakestep%201.0%203%0A%0A%23%20Enable%20kernel%20synchronization%20of%20the%20real-time%20clock%20%28RTC%29.%0Artcsync%0A%0A%23%20Enable%20hardware%20timestamping%20on%20all%20interfaces%20that%20support%20it.%0A%23hwtimestamp%20%2A%0A%0A%23%20Increase%20the%20minimum%20number%20of%20selectable%20sources%20required%20to%20adjust%0A%23%20the%20system%20clock.%0A%23minsources%202%0A%0A%23%20Allow%20NTP%20client%20access%20from%20local%20network.%0A%23allow%20192.168.0.0/16%0A%0A%23%20Serve%20time%20even%20if%20not%20synchronized%20to%20a%20time%20source.%0A%23local%20stratum%2010%0A%0A%23%20Require%20authentication%20%28nts%20or%20key%20option%29%20for%20all%20NTP%20sources.%0A%23authselectmode%20require%0A%0A%23%20Specify%20file%20containing%20keys%20for%20NTP%20authentication.%0Akeyfile%20/etc/chrony.keys%0A%0A%23%20Insert/delete%20leap%20seconds%20by%20slewing%20instead%20of%20stepping.%0A%23leapsecmode%20slew%0A%0A%23%20Get%20TAI-UTC%20offset%20and%20leap%20seconds%20from%20the%20system%20tz%20database.%0Aleapsectz%20right/UTC%0A%0A%23%20Specify%20directory%20for%20log%20files.%0Alogdir%20/var/log/chrony%0A%0A%23%20Select%20which%20information%20is%20logged.%0A%23log%20measurements%20statistics%20tracking }} mode: 420 overwrite: true path: /etc/chrony.conf - contents: source: data:, mode: 420 overwrite: true path: /etc/chrony.d/.mco-keep - contents: source: data:,{{ %23%0A%23%20This%20file%20controls%20the%20configuration%20of%20the%20ntp%20server%0A%23%20%7B%7B.var_multiple_time_servers%7D%7D%20we%20have%20to%20put%20variable%20array%20name%20here%20for%20mutilines%20remediation%0A%7B%7B%24var_time_service_set_maxpoll%3A%3D.var_time_service_set_maxpoll%7D%7D%0A%7B%7Brange%20%24element%3A%3D.var_multiple_time_servers%7CtoArrayByComma%7D%7Dserver%20%7B%7B%24element%7D%7D%20minpoll%204%20maxpoll%20%7B%7B%24var_time_service_set_maxpoll%7D%7D%0A%7B%7Bend%7D%7D }} mode: 420 overwrite: true path: /etc/chrony.d/ntp-server.conf # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^port") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s %s" "$stripped_key" "0" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^port\\>" "/etc/chrony.conf"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^port\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/chrony.conf" else if [[ -s "/etc/chrony.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/chrony.conf" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/chrony.conf" fi cce="CCE-82988-7" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "/etc/chrony.conf" >> "/etc/chrony.conf" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/chrony.conf" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable network management of chrony daemon The cmdport option in /etc/chrony.conf can be set to 0 to stop chrony daemon from listening on the UDP port 323 for management connections made by chronyc. CCI-000381 CM-7(1) FMT_SMF_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000096-GPOS-00050 SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 RHEL-08-030742 SV-230486r928593_rule Minimizing the exposure of the server functionality of the chrony daemon diminishes the attack surface. CCE-82840-0 - name: Disable network management of chrony daemon block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/chrony.conf create: true regexp: ^\s*cmdport\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/chrony.conf lineinfile: path: /etc/chrony.conf create: true regexp: ^\s*cmdport\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/chrony.conf lineinfile: path: /etc/chrony.conf create: true regexp: ^\s*cmdport\s+ line: cmdport 0 state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82840-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030742 - NIST-800-53-CM-7(1) - chronyd_no_chronyc_network - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,{{ %23%20Allow%20for%20extra%20configuration%20files.%20This%20is%20useful%0A%23%20for%20admins%20specifying%20their%20own%20NTP%20servers%0Ainclude%20/etc/chrony.d/%2A.conf%0A%0A%23%20Set%20chronyd%20as%20client-only.%0Aport%200%0A%0A%23%20Disable%20chronyc%20from%20the%20network%0Acmdport%200%0A%0A%23%20Record%20the%20rate%20at%20which%20the%20system%20clock%20gains/losses%20time.%0Adriftfile%20/var/lib/chrony/drift%0A%0A%23%20Allow%20the%20system%20clock%20to%20be%20stepped%20in%20the%20first%20three%20updates%0A%23%20if%20its%20offset%20is%20larger%20than%201%20second.%0Amakestep%201.0%203%0A%0A%23%20Enable%20kernel%20synchronization%20of%20the%20real-time%20clock%20%28RTC%29.%0Artcsync%0A%0A%23%20Enable%20hardware%20timestamping%20on%20all%20interfaces%20that%20support%20it.%0A%23hwtimestamp%20%2A%0A%0A%23%20Increase%20the%20minimum%20number%20of%20selectable%20sources%20required%20to%20adjust%0A%23%20the%20system%20clock.%0A%23minsources%202%0A%0A%23%20Allow%20NTP%20client%20access%20from%20local%20network.%0A%23allow%20192.168.0.0/16%0A%0A%23%20Serve%20time%20even%20if%20not%20synchronized%20to%20a%20time%20source.%0A%23local%20stratum%2010%0A%0A%23%20Require%20authentication%20%28nts%20or%20key%20option%29%20for%20all%20NTP%20sources.%0A%23authselectmode%20require%0A%0A%23%20Specify%20file%20containing%20keys%20for%20NTP%20authentication.%0Akeyfile%20/etc/chrony.keys%0A%0A%23%20Insert/delete%20leap%20seconds%20by%20slewing%20instead%20of%20stepping.%0A%23leapsecmode%20slew%0A%0A%23%20Get%20TAI-UTC%20offset%20and%20leap%20seconds%20from%20the%20system%20tz%20database.%0Aleapsectz%20right/UTC%0A%0A%23%20Specify%20directory%20for%20log%20files.%0Alogdir%20/var/log/chrony%0A%0A%23%20Select%20which%20information%20is%20logged.%0A%23log%20measurements%20statistics%20tracking }} mode: 420 overwrite: true path: /etc/chrony.conf - contents: source: data:, mode: 420 overwrite: true path: /etc/chrony.d/.mco-keep - contents: source: data:,{{ %23%0A%23%20This%20file%20controls%20the%20configuration%20of%20the%20ntp%20server%0A%23%20%7B%7B.var_multiple_time_servers%7D%7D%20we%20have%20to%20put%20variable%20array%20name%20here%20for%20mutilines%20remediation%0A%7B%7B%24var_time_service_set_maxpoll%3A%3D.var_time_service_set_maxpoll%7D%7D%0A%7B%7Brange%20%24element%3A%3D.var_multiple_time_servers%7CtoArrayByComma%7D%7Dserver%20%7B%7B%24element%7D%7D%20minpoll%204%20maxpoll%20%7B%7B%24var_time_service_set_maxpoll%7D%7D%0A%7B%7Bend%7D%7D }} mode: 420 overwrite: true path: /etc/chrony.d/ntp-server.conf # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^cmdport") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s %s" "$stripped_key" "0" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^cmdport\\>" "/etc/chrony.conf"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^cmdport\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/chrony.conf" else if [[ -s "/etc/chrony.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/chrony.conf" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/chrony.conf" fi cce="CCE-82840-0" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "/etc/chrony.conf" >> "/etc/chrony.conf" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/chrony.conf" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure Time Service Maxpoll Interval The maxpoll should be configured to in /etc/ntp.conf or /etc/chrony.conf to continuously poll time servers. To configure maxpoll in /etc/ntp.conf or /etc/chrony.conf add the following after each `server`, `pool` or `peer` entry: maxpoll to server directives. If using chrony any pool directives should be configured too. If no server or pool directives are configured, the rule evaluates to pass. 1 14 15 16 3 5 6 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 MEA02.01 CCI-001891 CCI-002046 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 CM-6(a) AU-8(1)(b) AU-12(1) PR.PT-1 SRG-OS-000355-GPOS-00143 SRG-OS-000356-GPOS-00144 SRG-OS-000359-GPOS-00146 RHEL-08-030740 SV-230484r877038_rule Inaccurate time stamps make it more difficult to correlate events and can lead to an inaccurate analysis. Determining the correct time a particular event occurred on a system is critical when conducting forensic analysis and investigating system events. Sources outside the configured acceptable allowance (drift) may be inaccurate. Synchronizing internal information system clocks provides uniformity of time stamps for information systems with multiple system clocks and systems connected over a network. Organizations should consider endpoints that may not have regular access to the authoritative time server (e.g., mobile, teleworking, and tactical endpoints). CCE-84059-5 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-84059-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030740 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - chronyd_or_ntpd_set_maxpoll - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_time_service_set_maxpoll # promote to variable set_fact: var_time_service_set_maxpoll: !!str tags: - always - name: Configure Time Service Maxpoll Interval - Check That /etc/ntp.conf Exist ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/ntp.conf register: ntp_conf_exist_result when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ( "chrony" in ansible_facts.packages or "ntp" in ansible_facts.packages ) tags: - CCE-84059-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030740 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - chronyd_or_ntpd_set_maxpoll - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Configure Time Service Maxpoll Interval - Update the Maxpoll Values in /etc/ntp.conf ansible.builtin.replace: path: /etc/ntp.conf regexp: ^(server.*maxpoll)[ ]+[0-9]+(.*)$ replace: \1 {{ var_time_service_set_maxpoll }}\2 when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ( "chrony" in ansible_facts.packages or "ntp" in ansible_facts.packages ) - ntp_conf_exist_result.stat.exists tags: - CCE-84059-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030740 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - chronyd_or_ntpd_set_maxpoll - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Configure Time Service Maxpoll Interval - Set the Maxpoll Values in /etc/ntp.conf ansible.builtin.replace: path: /etc/ntp.conf regexp: (^server\s+((?!maxpoll).)*)$ replace: \1 maxpoll {{ var_time_service_set_maxpoll }}\n when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ( "chrony" in ansible_facts.packages or "ntp" in ansible_facts.packages ) - ntp_conf_exist_result.stat.exists tags: - CCE-84059-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030740 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - chronyd_or_ntpd_set_maxpoll - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Configure Time Service Maxpoll Interval - Check That /etc/chrony.conf Exist ansible.builtin.stat: path: /etc/chrony.conf register: chrony_conf_exist_result when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ( "chrony" in ansible_facts.packages or "ntp" in ansible_facts.packages ) tags: - CCE-84059-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030740 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - chronyd_or_ntpd_set_maxpoll - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Configure Time Service Maxpoll Interval - Set Chrony Path Facts ansible.builtin.set_fact: chrony_path: /etc/chrony.conf when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ( "chrony" in ansible_facts.packages or "ntp" in ansible_facts.packages ) tags: - CCE-84059-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030740 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - chronyd_or_ntpd_set_maxpoll - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Configure Time Service Maxpoll Interval - Get Conf Files from {{ chrony_path | dirname }} ansible.builtin.find: path: '{{ chrony_path | dirname }}' patterns: '*.conf' file_type: file register: chrony_conf_files when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ( "chrony" in ansible_facts.packages or "ntp" in ansible_facts.packages ) tags: - CCE-84059-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030740 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - chronyd_or_ntpd_set_maxpoll - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Configure Time Service Maxpoll Interval - Update the Maxpoll Values in /etc/chrony.conf ansible.builtin.replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: ^((?:server|pool|peer).*maxpoll)[ ]+[0-9]+(.*)$ replace: \1 {{ var_time_service_set_maxpoll }}\2 loop: '{{ chrony_conf_files.files }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ( "chrony" in ansible_facts.packages or "ntp" in ansible_facts.packages ) - chrony_conf_files.matched tags: - CCE-84059-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030740 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - chronyd_or_ntpd_set_maxpoll - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Configure Time Service Maxpoll Interval - Set the Maxpoll Values in /etc/chrony.conf ansible.builtin.replace: path: '{{ item.path }}' regexp: (^(?:server|pool|peer)\s+((?!maxpoll).)*)$ replace: \1 maxpoll {{ var_time_service_set_maxpoll }}\n loop: '{{ chrony_conf_files.files }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ( "chrony" in ansible_facts.packages or "ntp" in ansible_facts.packages ) - chrony_conf_files.matched tags: - CCE-84059-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-030740 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - chronyd_or_ntpd_set_maxpoll - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,{{ %23%20Allow%20for%20extra%20configuration%20files.%20This%20is%20useful%0A%23%20for%20admins%20specifying%20their%20own%20NTP%20servers%0Ainclude%20/etc/chrony.d/%2A.conf%0A%0A%23%20Set%20chronyd%20as%20client-only.%0Aport%200%0A%0A%23%20Disable%20chronyc%20from%20the%20network%0Acmdport%200%0A%0A%23%20Record%20the%20rate%20at%20which%20the%20system%20clock%20gains/losses%20time.%0Adriftfile%20/var/lib/chrony/drift%0A%0A%23%20Allow%20the%20system%20clock%20to%20be%20stepped%20in%20the%20first%20three%20updates%0A%23%20if%20its%20offset%20is%20larger%20than%201%20second.%0Amakestep%201.0%203%0A%0A%23%20Enable%20kernel%20synchronization%20of%20the%20real-time%20clock%20%28RTC%29.%0Artcsync%0A%0A%23%20Enable%20hardware%20timestamping%20on%20all%20interfaces%20that%20support%20it.%0A%23hwtimestamp%20%2A%0A%0A%23%20Increase%20the%20minimum%20number%20of%20selectable%20sources%20required%20to%20adjust%0A%23%20the%20system%20clock.%0A%23minsources%202%0A%0A%23%20Allow%20NTP%20client%20access%20from%20local%20network.%0A%23allow%20192.168.0.0/16%0A%0A%23%20Serve%20time%20even%20if%20not%20synchronized%20to%20a%20time%20source.%0A%23local%20stratum%2010%0A%0A%23%20Require%20authentication%20%28nts%20or%20key%20option%29%20for%20all%20NTP%20sources.%0A%23authselectmode%20require%0A%0A%23%20Specify%20file%20containing%20keys%20for%20NTP%20authentication.%0Akeyfile%20/etc/chrony.keys%0A%0A%23%20Insert/delete%20leap%20seconds%20by%20slewing%20instead%20of%20stepping.%0A%23leapsecmode%20slew%0A%0A%23%20Get%20TAI-UTC%20offset%20and%20leap%20seconds%20from%20the%20system%20tz%20database.%0Aleapsectz%20right/UTC%0A%0A%23%20Specify%20directory%20for%20log%20files.%0Alogdir%20/var/log/chrony%0A%0A%23%20Select%20which%20information%20is%20logged.%0A%23log%20measurements%20statistics%20tracking }} mode: 420 overwrite: true path: /etc/chrony.conf - contents: source: data:, mode: 420 overwrite: true path: /etc/chrony.d/.mco-keep - contents: source: data:,{{ %23%0A%23%20This%20file%20controls%20the%20configuration%20of%20the%20ntp%20server%0A%23%20%7B%7B.var_multiple_time_servers%7D%7D%20we%20have%20to%20put%20variable%20array%20name%20here%20for%20mutilines%20remediation%0A%7B%7B%24var_time_service_set_maxpoll%3A%3D.var_time_service_set_maxpoll%7D%7D%0A%7B%7Brange%20%24element%3A%3D.var_multiple_time_servers%7CtoArrayByComma%7D%7Dserver%20%7B%7B%24element%7D%7D%20minpoll%204%20maxpoll%20%7B%7B%24var_time_service_set_maxpoll%7D%7D%0A%7B%7Bend%7D%7D }} mode: 420 overwrite: true path: /etc/chrony.d/ntp-server.conf # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { ( rpm --quiet -q chrony || rpm --quiet -q ntp ); }; then var_time_service_set_maxpoll='' pof="/usr/sbin/pidof" CONFIG_FILES="/etc/ntp.conf" $pof ntpd || { CHRONY_NAME=/etc/chrony.conf CHRONY_PATH=${CHRONY_NAME%%.*} CONFIG_FILES=$(find ${CHRONY_PATH}.* -type f -name '*.conf') } # get list of ntp files for config_file in $CONFIG_FILES; do # Set maxpoll values to var_time_service_set_maxpoll sed -i "s/^\(\(server\|pool\|peer\).*maxpoll\) [0-9][0-9]*\(.*\)$/\1 $var_time_service_set_maxpoll \3/" "$config_file" done for config_file in $CONFIG_FILES; do # Add maxpoll to server, pool or peer entries without maxpoll grep "^\(server\|pool\|peer\)" "$config_file" | grep -v maxpoll | while read -r line ; do sed -i "s/$line/& maxpoll $var_time_service_set_maxpoll/" "$config_file" done done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Specify Additional Remote NTP Servers Depending on specific functional requirements of a concrete production environment, the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 system can be configured to utilize the services of the chronyd NTP daemon (the default), or services of the ntpd NTP daemon. Refer to https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/7/html/system_administrators_guide/ch-configuring_ntp_using_the_chrony_suite for more detailed comparison of the features of both of the choices, and for further guidance how to choose between the two NTP daemons. Additional NTP servers can be specified for time synchronization. To do so, perform the following: if the system is configured to use the chronyd as the NTP daemon (the default), edit the file /etc/chrony.conf as follows, if the system is configured to use the ntpd as the NTP daemon, edit the file /etc/ntp.conf as documented below. Add additional lines of the following form, substituting the IP address or hostname of a remote NTP server for ntpserver: server ntpserver 1 14 15 16 3 5 6 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 MEA02.01 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 0988 1405 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 CM-6(a) AU-8(1)(a) AU-8(2) AU-12(1) PR.PT-1 Req-10.4.3 Specifying additional NTP servers increases the availability of accurate time data, in the event that one of the specified servers becomes unavailable. This is typical for a system acting as an NTP server for other systems. CCE-80764-4 - name: XCCDF Value var_multiple_time_servers # promote to variable set_fact: var_multiple_time_servers: !!str tags: - always - name: Detect if chrony configuration file is present find: path: /etc patterns: chrony.conf register: chrony_server_config when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80764-4 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(a) - NIST-800-53-AU-8(2) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.3 - chronyd_or_ntpd_specify_multiple_servers - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Configure multiple time servers in chrony config lineinfile: path: /etc/chrony.conf line: server {{ item }} state: present create: true loop: '{{ var_multiple_time_servers.split(",") }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - chrony_server_config.matched == 1 tags: - CCE-80764-4 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(a) - NIST-800-53-AU-8(2) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.3 - chronyd_or_ntpd_specify_multiple_servers - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Detect if NTP configuration file is present find: path: /etc patterns: ntp.conf register: ntp_server_config when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80764-4 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(a) - NIST-800-53-AU-8(2) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.3 - chronyd_or_ntpd_specify_multiple_servers - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Configure multiple time servers in NTP config lineinfile: path: /etc/chrony.conf line: pool {{ item }} state: present create: true loop: '{{ var_multiple_time_servers.split(",") }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ntp_server_config.matched == 1 tags: - CCE-80764-4 - NIST-800-53-AU-12(1) - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(a) - NIST-800-53-AU-8(2) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.3 - chronyd_or_ntpd_specify_multiple_servers - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,{{ %23%20Allow%20for%20extra%20configuration%20files.%20This%20is%20useful%0A%23%20for%20admins%20specifying%20their%20own%20NTP%20servers%0Ainclude%20/etc/chrony.d/%2A.conf%0A%0A%23%20Set%20chronyd%20as%20client-only.%0Aport%200%0A%0A%23%20Disable%20chronyc%20from%20the%20network%0Acmdport%200%0A%0A%23%20Record%20the%20rate%20at%20which%20the%20system%20clock%20gains/losses%20time.%0Adriftfile%20/var/lib/chrony/drift%0A%0A%23%20Allow%20the%20system%20clock%20to%20be%20stepped%20in%20the%20first%20three%20updates%0A%23%20if%20its%20offset%20is%20larger%20than%201%20second.%0Amakestep%201.0%203%0A%0A%23%20Enable%20kernel%20synchronization%20of%20the%20real-time%20clock%20%28RTC%29.%0Artcsync%0A%0A%23%20Enable%20hardware%20timestamping%20on%20all%20interfaces%20that%20support%20it.%0A%23hwtimestamp%20%2A%0A%0A%23%20Increase%20the%20minimum%20number%20of%20selectable%20sources%20required%20to%20adjust%0A%23%20the%20system%20clock.%0A%23minsources%202%0A%0A%23%20Allow%20NTP%20client%20access%20from%20local%20network.%0A%23allow%20192.168.0.0/16%0A%0A%23%20Serve%20time%20even%20if%20not%20synchronized%20to%20a%20time%20source.%0A%23local%20stratum%2010%0A%0A%23%20Require%20authentication%20%28nts%20or%20key%20option%29%20for%20all%20NTP%20sources.%0A%23authselectmode%20require%0A%0A%23%20Specify%20file%20containing%20keys%20for%20NTP%20authentication.%0Akeyfile%20/etc/chrony.keys%0A%0A%23%20Insert/delete%20leap%20seconds%20by%20slewing%20instead%20of%20stepping.%0A%23leapsecmode%20slew%0A%0A%23%20Get%20TAI-UTC%20offset%20and%20leap%20seconds%20from%20the%20system%20tz%20database.%0Aleapsectz%20right/UTC%0A%0A%23%20Specify%20directory%20for%20log%20files.%0Alogdir%20/var/log/chrony%0A%0A%23%20Select%20which%20information%20is%20logged.%0A%23log%20measurements%20statistics%20tracking }} mode: 420 overwrite: true path: /etc/chrony.conf - contents: source: data:, mode: 420 overwrite: true path: /etc/chrony.d/.mco-keep - contents: source: data:,{{ %23%0A%23%20This%20file%20controls%20the%20configuration%20of%20the%20ntp%20server%0A%23%20%7B%7B.var_multiple_time_servers%7D%7D%20we%20have%20to%20put%20variable%20array%20name%20here%20for%20mutilines%20remediation%0A%7B%7B%24var_time_service_set_maxpoll%3A%3D.var_time_service_set_maxpoll%7D%7D%0A%7B%7Brange%20%24element%3A%3D.var_multiple_time_servers%7CtoArrayByComma%7D%7Dserver%20%7B%7B%24element%7D%7D%20minpoll%204%20maxpoll%20%7B%7B%24var_time_service_set_maxpoll%7D%7D%0A%7B%7Bend%7D%7D }} mode: 420 overwrite: true path: /etc/chrony.d/ntp-server.conf # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then var_multiple_time_servers='' config_file="/etc/ntp.conf" /usr/sbin/pidof ntpd || config_file="/etc/chrony.conf" if ! [ "$(grep -c '^server' "$config_file")" -gt 1 ] ; then if ! grep -q '#[[:space:]]*server' "$config_file" ; then for server in $(echo "$var_multiple_time_servers" | tr ',' '\n') ; do printf '\nserver %s' "$server" >> "$config_file" done else sed -i 's/#[ \t]*server/server/g' "$config_file" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Specify a Remote NTP Server Depending on specific functional requirements of a concrete production environment, the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 system can be configured to utilize the services of the chronyd NTP daemon (the default), or services of the ntpd NTP daemon. Refer to https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/7/html/system_administrators_guide/ch-configuring_ntp_using_the_chrony_suite for more detailed comparison of the features of both of the choices, and for further guidance how to choose between the two NTP daemons. To specify a remote NTP server for time synchronization, perform the following: if the system is configured to use the chronyd as the NTP daemon (the default), edit the file /etc/chrony.conf as follows, if the system is configured to use the ntpd as the NTP daemon, edit the file /etc/ntp.conf as documented below. Add or correct the following lines, substituting the IP or hostname of a remote NTP server for ntpserver: server ntpserver This instructs the NTP software to contact that remote server to obtain time data. 1 14 15 16 3 5 6 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 MEA02.01 3.3.7 CCI-000160 CCI-001891 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 CM-6(a) AU-8(1)(a) AU-8(2) AU-12(1) PR.PT-1 Req-10.4.1 Req-10.4.3 SRG-APP-000116-CTR-000235 2.2.1.2 Synchronizing with an NTP server makes it possible to collate system logs from multiple sources or correlate computer events with real time events. CCE-80765-1 --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,{{ %23%20Allow%20for%20extra%20configuration%20files.%20This%20is%20useful%0A%23%20for%20admins%20specifying%20their%20own%20NTP%20servers%0Ainclude%20/etc/chrony.d/%2A.conf%0A%0A%23%20Set%20chronyd%20as%20client-only.%0Aport%200%0A%0A%23%20Disable%20chronyc%20from%20the%20network%0Acmdport%200%0A%0A%23%20Record%20the%20rate%20at%20which%20the%20system%20clock%20gains/losses%20time.%0Adriftfile%20/var/lib/chrony/drift%0A%0A%23%20Allow%20the%20system%20clock%20to%20be%20stepped%20in%20the%20first%20three%20updates%0A%23%20if%20its%20offset%20is%20larger%20than%201%20second.%0Amakestep%201.0%203%0A%0A%23%20Enable%20kernel%20synchronization%20of%20the%20real-time%20clock%20%28RTC%29.%0Artcsync%0A%0A%23%20Enable%20hardware%20timestamping%20on%20all%20interfaces%20that%20support%20it.%0A%23hwtimestamp%20%2A%0A%0A%23%20Increase%20the%20minimum%20number%20of%20selectable%20sources%20required%20to%20adjust%0A%23%20the%20system%20clock.%0A%23minsources%202%0A%0A%23%20Allow%20NTP%20client%20access%20from%20local%20network.%0A%23allow%20192.168.0.0/16%0A%0A%23%20Serve%20time%20even%20if%20not%20synchronized%20to%20a%20time%20source.%0A%23local%20stratum%2010%0A%0A%23%20Require%20authentication%20%28nts%20or%20key%20option%29%20for%20all%20NTP%20sources.%0A%23authselectmode%20require%0A%0A%23%20Specify%20file%20containing%20keys%20for%20NTP%20authentication.%0Akeyfile%20/etc/chrony.keys%0A%0A%23%20Insert/delete%20leap%20seconds%20by%20slewing%20instead%20of%20stepping.%0A%23leapsecmode%20slew%0A%0A%23%20Get%20TAI-UTC%20offset%20and%20leap%20seconds%20from%20the%20system%20tz%20database.%0Aleapsectz%20right/UTC%0A%0A%23%20Specify%20directory%20for%20log%20files.%0Alogdir%20/var/log/chrony%0A%0A%23%20Select%20which%20information%20is%20logged.%0A%23log%20measurements%20statistics%20tracking }} mode: 420 overwrite: true path: /etc/chrony.conf - contents: source: data:, mode: 420 overwrite: true path: /etc/chrony.d/.mco-keep - contents: source: data:,{{ %23%0A%23%20This%20file%20controls%20the%20configuration%20of%20the%20ntp%20server%0A%23%20%7B%7B.var_multiple_time_servers%7D%7D%20we%20have%20to%20put%20variable%20array%20name%20here%20for%20mutilines%20remediation%0A%7B%7B%24var_time_service_set_maxpoll%3A%3D.var_time_service_set_maxpoll%7D%7D%0A%7B%7Brange%20%24element%3A%3D.var_multiple_time_servers%7CtoArrayByComma%7D%7Dserver%20%7B%7B%24element%7D%7D%20minpoll%204%20maxpoll%20%7B%7B%24var_time_service_set_maxpoll%7D%7D%0A%7B%7Bend%7D%7D }} mode: 420 overwrite: true path: /etc/chrony.d/ntp-server.conf # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && ( rpm --quiet -q chrony || rpm --quiet -q ntp ) ); }; then var_multiple_time_servers='' config_file="/etc/ntp.conf" /usr/sbin/pidof ntpd || config_file="/etc/chrony.conf" if ! grep -q ^server "$config_file" ; then if ! grep -q '#[[:space:]]*server' "$config_file" ; then for server in $(echo "$var_multiple_time_servers" | tr ',' '\n') ; do printf '\nserver %s' "$server" >> "$config_file" done else sed -i 's/#[ \t]*server/server/g' "$config_file" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure that chronyd is running under chrony user account chrony is a daemon which implements the Network Time Protocol (NTP). It is designed to synchronize system clocks across a variety of systems and use a source that is highly accurate. More information on chrony can be found at http://chrony.tuxfamily.org/. Chrony can be configured to be a client and/or a server. To ensure that chronyd is running under chrony user account, remove any -u ... option from OPTIONS other than -u chrony, as chrony is run under its own user by default. This recommendation only applies if chrony is in use on the system. 10.6.3 2.1.3 If chrony is in use on the system proper configuration is vital to ensuring time synchronization is working properly. CCE-82879-8 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-82879-8 - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 - chronyd_run_as_chrony_user - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Detect if file /etc/sysconfig/chronyd is not empty or missing find: path: /etc/sysconfig/ patterns: chronyd contains: ^([\s]*OPTIONS=["]?[^"]*)("?) register: chronyd_file when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"chrony" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-82879-8 - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 - chronyd_run_as_chrony_user - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Remove any previous configuration of user used to run chronyd process replace: path: /etc/sysconfig/chronyd regexp: \s*-u\s*\w+\s* replace: ' ' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"chrony" in ansible_facts.packages' - chronyd_file is defined and chronyd_file.matched > 0 tags: - CCE-82879-8 - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 - chronyd_run_as_chrony_user - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { rpm --quiet -q chrony; }; then if grep -q 'OPTIONS=.*' /etc/sysconfig/chronyd; then # trying to solve cases where the parameter after OPTIONS #may or may not be enclosed in quotes sed -i -E -e 's/\s*-u\s*\w+\s*/ /' -e 's/^([\s]*OPTIONS=["]?[^"]*)("?)/\1\2/' /etc/sysconfig/chronyd fi if grep -q 'OPTIONS=.*' /etc/sysconfig/chronyd; then # trying to solve cases where the parameter after OPTIONS #may or may not be enclosed in quotes sed -i -E -e 's/\s*-u\s*\w+\s*/ /' -e 's/^([\s]*OPTIONS=["]?[^"]*)("?)/\1 -u chrony\2/' /etc/sysconfig/chronyd else echo 'OPTIONS="-u chrony"' >> /etc/sysconfig/chronyd fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure Chrony is only configured with the server directive Check that Chrony only has time sources configured with the server directive. This rule doesn't come with a remediation, the time source needs to be added by the administrator. CCI-001891 SRG-OS-000355-GPOS-00143 SRG-OS-000356-GPOS-00144 SRG-OS-000359-GPOS-00146 RHEL-08-030740 SV-230484r877038_rule Depending on the infrastructure being used the pool directive may not be supported. CCE-86077-5 A remote time server for Chrony is configured Chrony is a daemon which implements the Network Time Protocol (NTP). It is designed to synchronize system clocks across a variety of systems and use a source that is highly accurate. More information on chrony can be found at http://chrony.tuxfamily.org/. Chrony can be configured to be a client and/or a server. Add or edit server or pool lines to /etc/chrony.conf as appropriate: server <remote-server> Multiple servers may be configured. BP28(R71) CCI-000160 CCI-001891 0988 1405 CM-6(a) AU-8(1)(a) Req-10.4.3 10.6.2 2.1.2 If chrony is in use on the system proper configuration is vital to ensuring time synchronization is working properly. CCE-82873-1 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-82873-1 - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.2 - chronyd_specify_remote_server - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: XCCDF Value var_multiple_time_servers # promote to variable set_fact: var_multiple_time_servers: !!str tags: - always - name: Detect if chrony is already configured with pools or servers find: path: /etc patterns: chrony.conf contains: ^[\s]*(?:server|pool)[\s]+[\w]+ register: chrony_servers when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"chrony" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-82873-1 - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.2 - chronyd_specify_remote_server - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Configure remote time servers lineinfile: path: /etc/chrony.conf line: server {{ item }} state: present create: true loop: '{{ var_multiple_time_servers.split(",") }}' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - '"chrony" in ansible_facts.packages' - chrony_servers.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-82873-1 - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.3 - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.2 - chronyd_specify_remote_server - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { rpm --quiet -q chrony; }; then var_multiple_time_servers='' config_file="/etc/chrony.conf" if ! grep -q '^[[:space:]]*\(server\|pool\)[[:space:]]\+[[:graph:]]\+' "$config_file" ; then if ! grep -q '#[[:space:]]*server' "$config_file" ; then for server in $(echo "$var_multiple_time_servers" | tr ',' '\n') ; do printf '\nserver %s' "$server" >> "$config_file" done else sed -i 's/#[ \t]*server/server/g' "$config_file" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Specify Additional Remote NTP Servers Additional NTP servers can be specified for time synchronization in the file /etc/ntp.conf. To do so, add additional lines of the following form, substituting the IP address or hostname of a remote NTP server for ntpserver: server ntpserver 1 14 15 16 3 5 6 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 MEA02.01 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 CM-6(a) AU-8(1)(a) AU-8(2) PR.PT-1 Req-10.4.3 10.6.2 Specifying additional NTP servers increases the availability of accurate time data, in the event that one of the specified servers becomes unavailable. This is typical for a system acting as an NTP server for other systems. CCE-86488-4 Specify a Remote NTP Server To specify a remote NTP server for time synchronization, edit the file /etc/ntp.conf. Add or correct the following lines, substituting the IP or hostname of a remote NTP server for ntpserver: server ntpserver This instructs the NTP software to contact that remote server to obtain time data. 1 14 15 16 3 5 6 APO11.04 BAI03.05 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 MEA02.01 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.7.1 CM-6(a) AU-8(1)(a) PR.PT-1 Req-10.4.1 Req-10.4.3 10.6.2 Synchronizing with an NTP server makes it possible to collate system logs from multiple sources or correlate computer events with real time events. CCE-86508-9 Obsolete Services This section discusses a number of network-visible services which have historically caused problems for system security, and for which disabling or severely limiting the service has been the best available guidance for some time. As a result of this, many of these services are not installed as part of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 by default. Organizations which are running these services should switch to more secure equivalents as soon as possible. If it remains absolutely necessary to run one of these services for legacy reasons, care should be taken to restrict the service as much as possible, for instance by configuring host firewall software such as iptables to restrict access to the vulnerable service to only those remote hosts which have a known need to use it. Uninstall rsync Package The rsyncd service can be used to synchronize files between systems over network links. The rsync-daemon package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase rsync-daemon 2.2.13 The rsyncd service presents a security risk as it uses unencrypted protocols for communication. CCE-86335-7 - name: Ensure rsync-daemon is removed package: name: rsync-daemon state: absent tags: - CCE-86335-7 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_rsync_removed include remove_rsync-daemon class remove_rsync-daemon { package { 'rsync-daemon': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=rsync-daemon # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove rsync-daemon # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on rsync-daemon. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "rsync-daemon" ; then yum remove -y "rsync-daemon" fi Ensure rsyncd service is disabled The rsyncd service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now rsyncd.service 2.2.4 2.2.13 The rsyncd service presents a security risk as it uses unencrypted protocols for communication. CCE-83335-0 - name: Block Disable service rsyncd block: - name: Disable service rsyncd block: - name: Disable service rsyncd systemd: name: rsyncd.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service rsyncd' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83335-0 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_rsyncd_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - rsyncd.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files rsyncd.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83335-0 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_rsyncd_disabled - name: Disable socket rsyncd systemd: name: rsyncd.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("rsyncd.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-83335-0 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_rsyncd_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: rsyncd.service enabled: false mask: true - name: rsyncd.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["rsyncd"] include disable_rsyncd class disable_rsyncd { service {'rsyncd': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'rsyncd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'rsyncd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'rsyncd.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files rsyncd.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'rsyncd.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'rsyncd.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'rsyncd.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Xinetd The xinetd service acts as a dedicated listener for some network services (mostly, obsolete ones) and can be used to provide access controls and perform some logging. It has been largely obsoleted by other features, and it is not installed by default. The older Inetd service is not even available as part of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8. Uninstall xinetd Package The xinetd package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase xinetd BP28(R1) 11 12 14 15 3 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 CCI-000305 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.AC-3 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 2.2.4 2.2.19 Removing the xinetd package decreases the risk of the xinetd service's accidental (or intentional) activation. CCE-80850-1 - name: Ensure xinetd is removed package: name: xinetd state: absent when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80850-1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_xinetd_removed include remove_xinetd class remove_xinetd { package { 'xinetd': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=xinetd # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove xinetd # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on xinetd. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "xinetd" ; then yum remove -y "xinetd" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable xinetd Service The xinetd service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now xinetd.service 11 12 14 15 3 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 3.4.7 CCI-000305 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.AC-3 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 2.2.19 The xinetd service provides a dedicated listener service for some programs, which is no longer necessary for commonly-used network services. Disabling it ensures that these uncommon services are not running, and also prevents attacks against xinetd itself. CCE-80888-1 - name: Block Disable service xinetd block: - name: Disable service xinetd block: - name: Disable service xinetd systemd: name: xinetd.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service xinetd' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80888-1 - NIST-800-171-3.4.7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_xinetd_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - xinetd.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files xinetd.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80888-1 - NIST-800-171-3.4.7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_xinetd_disabled - name: Disable socket xinetd systemd: name: xinetd.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("xinetd.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-80888-1 - NIST-800-171-3.4.7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_xinetd_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: xinetd.service enabled: false mask: true - name: xinetd.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["xinetd"] include disable_xinetd class disable_xinetd { service {'xinetd': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'xinetd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'xinetd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'xinetd.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files xinetd.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'xinetd.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'xinetd.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'xinetd.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi NIS The Network Information Service (NIS), also known as 'Yellow Pages' (YP), and its successor NIS+ have been made obsolete by Kerberos, LDAP, and other modern centralized authentication services. NIS should not be used because it suffers from security problems inherent in its design, such as inadequate protection of important authentication information. Remove NIS Client The Network Information Service (NIS), formerly known as Yellow Pages, is a client-server directory service protocol used to distribute system configuration files. The NIS client (ypbind) was used to bind a system to an NIS server and receive the distributed configuration files. BP28(R1) 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) 2.2.4 2.3.3 The NIS service is inherently an insecure system that has been vulnerable to DOS attacks, buffer overflows and has poor authentication for querying NIS maps. NIS generally has been replaced by such protocols as Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP). It is recommended that the service be removed. CCE-82181-9 - name: Ensure ypbind is removed package: name: ypbind state: absent tags: - CCE-82181-9 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - package_ypbind_removed - unknown_severity include remove_ypbind class remove_ypbind { package { 'ypbind': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=ypbind # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove ypbind # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on ypbind. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "ypbind" ; then yum remove -y "ypbind" fi Uninstall ypserv Package The ypserv package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase ypserv BP28(R1) 11 12 14 15 3 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 CCI-000381 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) IA-5(1)(c) PR.AC-3 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 Req-2.2.2 2.2.4 SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 2.2.10 The NIS service provides an unencrypted authentication service which does not provide for the confidentiality and integrity of user passwords or the remote session. Removing the ypserv package decreases the risk of the accidental (or intentional) activation of NIS or NIS+ services. CCE-82432-6 - name: Ensure ypserv is removed package: name: ypserv state: absent tags: - CCE-82432-6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.2 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 - disable_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - package_ypserv_removed include remove_ypserv class remove_ypserv { package { 'ypserv': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=ypserv # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove ypserv # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on ypserv. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "ypserv" ; then yum remove -y "ypserv" fi Disable ypbind Service The ypbind service, which allows the system to act as a client in a NIS or NIS+ domain, should be disabled. The ypbind service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now ypbind.service 11 12 14 15 3 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 CCI-000305 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) IA-5(1)(c) PR.AC-3 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 Disabling the ypbind service ensures the system is not acting as a client in a NIS or NIS+ domain. This service should be disabled unless in use. CCE-82433-4 - name: Block Disable service ypbind block: - name: Disable service ypbind block: - name: Disable service ypbind systemd: name: ypbind.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service ypbind' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82433-4 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_ypbind_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - ypbind.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files ypbind.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82433-4 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_ypbind_disabled - name: Disable socket ypbind systemd: name: ypbind.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("ypbind.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-82433-4 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_ypbind_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: ypbind.service enabled: false mask: true - name: ypbind.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["ypbind"] include disable_ypbind class disable_ypbind { service {'ypbind': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'ypbind.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'ypbind.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'ypbind.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files ypbind.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'ypbind.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'ypbind.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'ypbind.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable ypserv Service The ypserv service, which allows the system to act as a client in a NIS or NIS+ domain, should be disabled. The ypserv service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now ypserv.service 2.2.10 Disabling the ypserv service ensures the system is not acting as a client in a NIS or NIS+ domain. This service should be disabled unless in use. CCE-86121-1 - name: Block Disable service ypserv block: - name: Disable service ypserv block: - name: Disable service ypserv systemd: name: ypserv.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service ypserv' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86121-1 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_ypserv_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - ypserv.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files ypserv.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86121-1 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_ypserv_disabled - name: Disable socket ypserv systemd: name: ypserv.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("ypserv.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-86121-1 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_ypserv_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: ypserv.service enabled: false mask: true - name: ypserv.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["ypserv"] include disable_ypserv class disable_ypserv { service {'ypserv': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'ypserv.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'ypserv.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'ypserv.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files ypserv.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'ypserv.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'ypserv.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'ypserv.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Rlogin, Rsh, and Rexec The Berkeley r-commands are legacy services which allow cleartext remote access and have an insecure trust model. Uninstall rsh-server Package The rsh-server package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase rsh-server The package is not available in Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8. BP28(R1) 11 12 14 15 3 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 CCI-000381 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) IA-5(1)(c) PR.AC-3 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 2.2.4 SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 RHEL-08-040010 SV-230492r627750_rule The rsh-server service provides unencrypted remote access service which does not provide for the confidentiality and integrity of user passwords or the remote session and has very weak authentication. If a privileged user were to login using this service, the privileged user password could be compromised. The rsh-server package provides several obsolete and insecure network services. Removing it decreases the risk of those services' accidental (or intentional) activation. CCE-82184-3 - name: Ensure rsh-server is removed package: name: rsh-server state: absent tags: - CCE-82184-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040010 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 - disable_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - package_rsh-server_removed include remove_rsh-server class remove_rsh-server { package { 'rsh-server': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=rsh-server # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove rsh-server # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on rsh-server. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "rsh-server" ; then yum remove -y "rsh-server" fi Uninstall rsh Package The rsh package contains the client commands for the rsh services The package is not available in Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8. BP28(R1) 3.1.13 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) A.8.2.3 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 2.2.4 These legacy clients contain numerous security exposures and have been replaced with the more secure SSH package. Even if the server is removed, it is best to ensure the clients are also removed to prevent users from inadvertently attempting to use these commands and therefore exposing their credentials. Note that removing the rsh package removes the clients for rsh,rcp, and rlogin. CCE-82183-5 - name: Ensure rsh is removed package: name: rsh state: absent tags: - CCE-82183-5 - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - package_rsh_removed - unknown_severity include remove_rsh class remove_rsh { package { 'rsh': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=rsh # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove rsh # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on rsh. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "rsh" ; then yum remove -y "rsh" fi Disable rexec Service The rexec service, which is available with the rsh-server package and runs as a service through xinetd or separately as a systemd socket, should be disabled. If using xinetd, set disable to yes in /etc/xinetd.d/rexec. The rexec socket can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now rexec.socket 11 12 14 15 3 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 3.1.13 3.4.7 CCI-000068 CCI-001436 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) IA-5(1)(c) PR.AC-3 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 The rexec service uses unencrypted network communications, which means that data from the login session, including passwords and all other information transmitted during the session, can be stolen by eavesdroppers on the network. CCE-80884-0 - name: Block Disable service rexec block: - name: Disable service rexec block: - name: Disable service rexec systemd: name: rexec.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service rexec' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80884-0 - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 - NIST-800-171-3.4.7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) - disable_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_rexec_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - rexec.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files rexec.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80884-0 - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 - NIST-800-171-3.4.7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) - disable_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_rexec_disabled - name: Disable socket rexec systemd: name: rexec.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("rexec.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-80884-0 - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 - NIST-800-171-3.4.7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) - disable_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_rexec_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: rexec.service enabled: false mask: true - name: rexec.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["rexec"] include disable_rexec class disable_rexec { service {'rexec': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'rexec.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'rexec.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'rexec.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files rexec.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'rexec.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'rexec.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'rexec.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable rlogin Service The rlogin service, which is available with the rsh-server package and runs as a service through xinetd or separately as a systemd socket, should be disabled. If using xinetd, set disable to yes in /etc/xinetd.d/rlogin. The rlogin socket can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now rlogin.socket 1 11 12 14 15 16 3 5 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.06 DSS06.10 3.1.13 3.4.7 CCI-001436 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.18.1.4 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.7.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) IA-5(1)(c) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-3 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 The rlogin service uses unencrypted network communications, which means that data from the login session, including passwords and all other information transmitted during the session, can be stolen by eavesdroppers on the network. CCE-80885-7 - name: Block Disable service rlogin block: - name: Disable service rlogin block: - name: Disable service rlogin systemd: name: rlogin.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service rlogin' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80885-7 - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 - NIST-800-171-3.4.7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) - disable_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_rlogin_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - rlogin.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files rlogin.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80885-7 - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 - NIST-800-171-3.4.7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) - disable_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_rlogin_disabled - name: Disable socket rlogin systemd: name: rlogin.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("rlogin.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-80885-7 - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 - NIST-800-171-3.4.7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) - disable_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_rlogin_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: rlogin.service enabled: false mask: true - name: rlogin.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["rlogin"] include disable_rlogin class disable_rlogin { service {'rlogin': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'rlogin.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'rlogin.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'rlogin.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files rlogin.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'rlogin.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'rlogin.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'rlogin.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable rsh Service The rsh service, which is available with the rsh-server package and runs as a service through xinetd or separately as a systemd socket, should be disabled. If using xinetd, set disable to yes in /etc/xinetd.d/rsh. The rsh socket can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now rsh.socket 1 11 12 14 15 16 3 5 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.06 DSS06.10 3.1.13 3.4.7 CCI-000068 CCI-001436 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.18.1.4 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.7.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) IA-5(1)(c) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-3 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 The rsh service uses unencrypted network communications, which means that data from the login session, including passwords and all other information transmitted during the session, can be stolen by eavesdroppers on the network. CCE-82431-8 - name: Block Disable service rsh block: - name: Disable service rsh block: - name: Disable service rsh systemd: name: rsh.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service rsh' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82431-8 - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 - NIST-800-171-3.4.7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) - disable_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_rsh_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - rsh.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files rsh.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82431-8 - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 - NIST-800-171-3.4.7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) - disable_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_rsh_disabled - name: Disable socket rsh systemd: name: rsh.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("rsh.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-82431-8 - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 - NIST-800-171-3.4.7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) - disable_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_rsh_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: rsh.service enabled: false mask: true - name: rsh.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["rsh"] include disable_rsh class disable_rsh { service {'rsh': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'rsh.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'rsh.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'rsh.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files rsh.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'rsh.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'rsh.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'rsh.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Remove Host-Based Authentication Files The shosts.equiv file lists remote hosts and users that are trusted by the local system. To remove these files, run the following command to delete them from any location: $ sudo rm /[path]/[to]/[file]/shosts.equiv CCI-000366 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010460 SV-230283r627750_rule The shosts.equiv files are used to configure host-based authentication for the system via SSH. Host-based authentication is not sufficient for preventing unauthorized access to the system, as it does not require interactive identification and authentication of a connection request, or for the use of two-factor authentication. CCE-84055-3 - name: Remove Host-Based Authentication Files - Define Excluded (Non-Local) File Systems and Paths ansible.builtin.set_fact: excluded_fstypes: - afs - ceph - cifs - smb3 - smbfs - sshfs - ncpfs - ncp - nfs - nfs4 - gfs - gfs2 - glusterfs - gpfs - pvfs2 - ocfs2 - lustre - davfs - fuse.sshfs excluded_paths: - dev - proc - run - sys search_paths: [] tags: - CCE-84055-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010460 - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_host_based_files - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Remove Host-Based Authentication Files - Find Relevant Root Directories Ignoring Pre-Defined Excluded Paths ansible.builtin.find: paths: / file_type: directory excludes: '{{ excluded_paths }}' hidden: true recurse: false register: result_relevant_root_dirs tags: - CCE-84055-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010460 - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_host_based_files - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Remove Host-Based Authentication Files - Include Relevant Root Directories in a List of Paths to be Searched ansible.builtin.set_fact: search_paths: '{{ search_paths | union([item.path]) }}' loop: '{{ result_relevant_root_dirs.files }}' tags: - CCE-84055-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010460 - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_host_based_files - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Remove Host-Based Authentication Files - Increment Search Paths List with Local Partitions Mount Points ansible.builtin.set_fact: search_paths: '{{ search_paths | union([item.mount]) }}' loop: '{{ ansible_mounts }}' when: - item.fstype not in excluded_fstypes - item.mount != '/' tags: - CCE-84055-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010460 - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_host_based_files - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Remove Host-Based Authentication Files - Increment Search Paths List with Local NFS File System Targets ansible.builtin.set_fact: search_paths: '{{ search_paths | union([item.device.split('':'')[1]]) }}' loop: '{{ ansible_mounts }}' when: item.device is search("localhost:") tags: - CCE-84055-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010460 - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_host_based_files - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Remove Host-Based Authentication Files - Define Rule Specific Facts ansible.builtin.set_fact: shosts_equiv_files: - /shosts.equiv tags: - CCE-84055-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010460 - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_host_based_files - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Remove Host-Based Authentication Files - Find All shosts.equiv Files in Local File Systems ansible.builtin.command: cmd: find {{ item }} -xdev -type f -name "shosts.equiv" loop: '{{ search_paths }}' changed_when: false register: result_found_shosts_equiv_files tags: - CCE-84055-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010460 - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_host_based_files - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Remove Host-Based Authentication Files - Create List of shosts.equiv Files Present in Local File Systems ansible.builtin.set_fact: shosts_equiv_files: '{{ shosts_equiv_files | union(item.stdout_lines) | list }}' loop: '{{ result_found_shosts_equiv_files.results }}' tags: - CCE-84055-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010460 - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_host_based_files - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - name: Remove Host-Based Authentication Files - Ensure No shosts.equiv Files Are Present in the System ansible.builtin.file: path: '{{ item }}' state: absent loop: '{{ shosts_equiv_files }}' tags: - CCE-84055-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010460 - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_host_based_files - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy # Identify local mounts MOUNT_LIST=$(df --local | awk '{ print $6 }') # Find file on each listed mount point for cur_mount in ${MOUNT_LIST} do find ${cur_mount} -xdev -type f -name "shosts.equiv" -exec rm -f {} \; done Remove Rsh Trust Files The files /etc/hosts.equiv and ~/.rhosts (in each user's home directory) list remote hosts and users that are trusted by the local system when using the rshd daemon. To remove these files, run the following command to delete them from any location: $ sudo rm /etc/hosts.equiv $ rm ~/.rhosts 11 12 14 15 3 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 CCI-001436 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.AC-3 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 6.2.11 This action is only meaningful if .rhosts support is permitted through PAM. Trust files are convenient, but when used in conjunction with the R-services, they can allow unauthenticated access to a system. CCE-80842-8 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80842-8 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - no_rsh_trust_files - restrict_strategy - name: Detect .rhosts files in users home directories find: paths: - /root - /home recurse: true patterns: .rhosts hidden: true file_type: file check_mode: false register: rhosts_locations when: '"rsh-server" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80842-8 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - no_rsh_trust_files - restrict_strategy - name: Remove .rhosts files file: path: '{{ item }}' state: absent with_items: '{{ rhosts_locations.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' when: - '"rsh-server" in ansible_facts.packages' - rhosts_locations is success tags: - CCE-80842-8 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - no_rsh_trust_files - restrict_strategy - name: Remove /etc/hosts.equiv file file: path: /etc/hosts.equiv state: absent when: '"rsh-server" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-80842-8 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - no_rsh_trust_files - restrict_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q rsh-server; then find /root -xdev -type f -name ".rhosts" -exec rm -f {} \; find /home -maxdepth 2 -xdev -type f -name ".rhosts" -exec rm -f {} \; rm -f /etc/hosts.equiv else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Remove User Host-Based Authentication Files The ~/.shosts (in each user's home directory) files list remote hosts and users that are trusted by the local system. To remove these files, run the following command to delete them from any location: $ sudo find / -name '.shosts' -type f -delete CCI-000366 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010470 SV-230284r627750_rule The .shosts files are used to configure host-based authentication for individual users or the system via SSH. Host-based authentication is not sufficient for preventing unauthorized access to the system, as it does not require interactive identification and authentication of a connection request, or for the use of two-factor authentication. CCE-84056-1 - name: Remove User Host-Based Authentication Files - Define Excluded (Non-Local) File Systems and Paths ansible.builtin.set_fact: excluded_fstypes: - afs - ceph - cifs - smb3 - smbfs - sshfs - ncpfs - ncp - nfs - nfs4 - gfs - gfs2 - glusterfs - gpfs - pvfs2 - ocfs2 - lustre - davfs - fuse.sshfs excluded_paths: - dev - proc - run - sys search_paths: [] tags: - CCE-84056-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010470 - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - no_user_host_based_files - restrict_strategy - name: Remove User Host-Based Authentication Files - Find Relevant Root Directories Ignoring Pre-Defined Excluded Paths ansible.builtin.find: paths: / file_type: directory excludes: '{{ excluded_paths }}' hidden: true recurse: false register: result_relevant_root_dirs tags: - CCE-84056-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010470 - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - no_user_host_based_files - restrict_strategy - name: Remove User Host-Based Authentication Files - Include Relevant Root Directories in a List of Paths to be Searched ansible.builtin.set_fact: search_paths: '{{ search_paths | union([item.path]) }}' loop: '{{ result_relevant_root_dirs.files }}' tags: - CCE-84056-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010470 - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - no_user_host_based_files - restrict_strategy - name: Remove User Host-Based Authentication Files - Increment Search Paths List with Local Partitions Mount Points ansible.builtin.set_fact: search_paths: '{{ search_paths | union([item.mount]) }}' loop: '{{ ansible_mounts }}' when: - item.fstype not in excluded_fstypes - item.mount != '/' tags: - CCE-84056-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010470 - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - no_user_host_based_files - restrict_strategy - name: Remove User Host-Based Authentication Files - Increment Search Paths List with Local NFS File System Targets ansible.builtin.set_fact: search_paths: '{{ search_paths | union([item.device.split('':'')[1]]) }}' loop: '{{ ansible_mounts }}' when: item.device is search("localhost:") tags: - CCE-84056-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010470 - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - no_user_host_based_files - restrict_strategy - name: Remove User Host-Based Authentication Files - Define Rule Specific Facts ansible.builtin.set_fact: user_shosts_files: - /.shosts tags: - CCE-84056-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010470 - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - no_user_host_based_files - restrict_strategy - name: Remove User Host-Based Authentication Files - Find All .shosts Files in Local File Systems ansible.builtin.command: cmd: find {{ item }} -xdev -type f -name ".shosts" loop: '{{ search_paths }}' changed_when: false register: result_found_shosts_files tags: - CCE-84056-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010470 - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - no_user_host_based_files - restrict_strategy - name: Remove User Host-Based Authentication Files - Create List of .shosts Files Present in Local File Systems ansible.builtin.set_fact: user_shosts_files: '{{ user_shosts_files | union(item.stdout_lines) | list }}' loop: '{{ result_found_shosts_files.results }}' tags: - CCE-84056-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010470 - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - no_user_host_based_files - restrict_strategy - name: Remove User Host-Based Authentication Files - Ensure No .shosts Files Are Present in the System ansible.builtin.file: path: '{{ item }}' state: absent loop: '{{ user_shosts_files }}' tags: - CCE-84056-1 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010470 - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - no_user_host_based_files - restrict_strategy # Identify local mounts MOUNT_LIST=$(df --local | awk '{ print $6 }') # Find file on each listed mount point for cur_mount in ${MOUNT_LIST} do find ${cur_mount} -xdev -type f -name ".shosts" -exec rm -f {} \; done Chat/Messaging Services The talk software makes it possible for users to send and receive messages across systems through a terminal session. Uninstall talk-server Package The talk-server package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase talk-server The package is not available in Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8. BP28(R1) 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) 2.2.4 The talk software presents a security risk as it uses unencrypted protocols for communications. Removing the talk-server package decreases the risk of the accidental (or intentional) activation of talk services. CCE-82180-1 - name: Ensure talk-server is removed package: name: talk-server state: absent tags: - CCE-82180-1 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_talk-server_removed include remove_talk-server class remove_talk-server { package { 'talk-server': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=talk-server # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove talk-server # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on talk-server. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "talk-server" ; then yum remove -y "talk-server" fi Uninstall talk Package The talk package contains the client program for the Internet talk protocol, which allows the user to chat with other users on different systems. Talk is a communication program which copies lines from one terminal to the terminal of another user. The talk package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase talk The package is not available in Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8. BP28(R1) 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) 2.2.4 The talk software presents a security risk as it uses unencrypted protocols for communications. Removing the talk package decreases the risk of the accidental (or intentional) activation of talk client program. CCE-80848-5 - name: Ensure talk is removed package: name: talk state: absent tags: - CCE-80848-5 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_talk_removed include remove_talk class remove_talk { package { 'talk': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=talk # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove talk # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on talk. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "talk" ; then yum remove -y "talk" fi Telnet The telnet protocol does not provide confidentiality or integrity for information transmitted on the network. This includes authentication information such as passwords. Organizations which use telnet should be actively working to migrate to a more secure protocol. Uninstall telnet-server Package The telnet-server package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase telnet-server BP28(R1) 11 12 14 15 3 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 CCI-000381 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.AC-3 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 Req-2.2.2 2.2.4 SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 RHEL-08-040000 2.2.15 SV-230487r627750_rule It is detrimental for operating systems to provide, or install by default, functionality exceeding requirements or mission objectives. These unnecessary capabilities are often overlooked and therefore may remain unsecure. They increase the risk to the platform by providing additional attack vectors. The telnet service provides an unencrypted remote access service which does not provide for the confidentiality and integrity of user passwords or the remote session. If a privileged user were to login using this service, the privileged user password could be compromised. Removing the telnet-server package decreases the risk of the telnet service's accidental (or intentional) activation. CCE-82182-7 - name: Ensure telnet-server is removed package: name: telnet-server state: absent tags: - CCE-82182-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040000 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.2 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 - disable_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - package_telnet-server_removed include remove_telnet-server class remove_telnet-server { package { 'telnet-server': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=telnet-server # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove telnet-server # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on telnet-server. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "telnet-server" ; then yum remove -y "telnet-server" fi Remove telnet Clients The telnet client allows users to start connections to other systems via the telnet protocol. BP28(R1) 3.1.13 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) A.8.2.3 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 2.2.4 2.3.4 The telnet protocol is insecure and unencrypted. The use of an unencrypted transmission medium could allow an unauthorized user to steal credentials. The ssh package provides an encrypted session and stronger security and is included in Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8. CCE-80849-3 - name: Ensure telnet is removed package: name: telnet state: absent tags: - CCE-80849-3 - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_telnet_removed include remove_telnet class remove_telnet { package { 'telnet': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=telnet # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove telnet # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on telnet. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "telnet" ; then yum remove -y "telnet" fi Disable telnet Service Make sure that the activation of the telnet service on system boot is disabled. The telnet socket can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now telnet.socket If the system relies on xinetd to manage telnet sessions, ensure the telnet service is disabled by the following line: disable = yes. Note that the xinetd file for telnet is not created automatically, therefore it might have different names. 1 11 12 14 15 16 3 5 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.06 DSS06.10 3.1.13 3.4.7 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.18.1.4 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.7.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) IA-5(1)(c) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-3 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 2.2.15 The telnet protocol uses unencrypted network communication, which means that data from the login session, including passwords and all other information transmitted during the session, can be stolen by eavesdroppers on the network. The telnet protocol is also subject to man-in-the-middle attacks. CCE-80887-3 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80887-3 - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 - NIST-800-171-3.4.7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) - disable_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_telnet_disabled - name: Block Disable service telnet block: - name: Disable service telnet block: - name: Disable service telnet systemd: name: telnet.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service telnet' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "telnet-server" in ansible_facts.packages ) tags: - CCE-80887-3 - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 - NIST-800-171-3.4.7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) - disable_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_telnet_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - telnet.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files telnet.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "telnet-server" in ansible_facts.packages ) tags: - CCE-80887-3 - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 - NIST-800-171-3.4.7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) - disable_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_telnet_disabled - name: Disable socket telnet systemd: name: telnet.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "telnet-server" in ansible_facts.packages ) - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("telnet.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-80887-3 - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 - NIST-800-171-3.4.7 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) - disable_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_telnet_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: telnet.service enabled: false mask: true - name: telnet.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["telnet"] include disable_telnet class disable_telnet { service {'telnet': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q telnet-server ); then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'telnet.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'telnet.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'telnet.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files telnet.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'telnet.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'telnet.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'telnet.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi TFTP Server TFTP is a lightweight version of the FTP protocol which has traditionally been used to configure networking equipment. However, TFTP provides little security, and modern versions of networking operating systems frequently support configuration via SSH or other more secure protocols. A TFTP server should be run only if no more secure method of supporting existing equipment can be found. TFTP server secure directory Specify the directory which is used by TFTP server as a root directory when running in secure mode. /var/lib/tftpboot Uninstall tftp-server Package The tftp-server package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase tftp-server BP28(R1) 11 12 14 15 3 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 CCI-000318 CCI-000366 CCI-000368 CCI-001812 CCI-001813 CCI-001814 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.AC-3 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 2.2.4 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040190 2.2.16 SV-230533r627750_rule Removing the tftp-server package decreases the risk of the accidental (or intentional) activation of tftp services. If TFTP is required for operational support (such as transmission of router configurations), its use must be documented with the Information Systems Securty Manager (ISSM), restricted to only authorized personnel, and have access control rules established. CCE-82436-7 - name: Ensure tftp-server is removed package: name: tftp-server state: absent tags: - CCE-82436-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040190 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 - disable_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - package_tftp-server_removed include remove_tftp-server class remove_tftp-server { package { 'tftp-server': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=tftp-server # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove tftp-server # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on tftp-server. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "tftp-server" ; then yum remove -y "tftp-server" fi Remove tftp Daemon Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) is a simple file transfer protocol, typically used to automatically transfer configuration or boot files between systems. TFTP does not support authentication and can be easily hacked. The package tftp is a client program that allows for connections to a tftp server. BP28(R1) 2.2.4 2.3.5 It is recommended that TFTP be removed, unless there is a specific need for TFTP (such as a boot server). In that case, use extreme caution when configuring the services. CCE-83590-0 - name: Ensure tftp is removed package: name: tftp state: absent tags: - CCE-83590-0 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_tftp_removed include remove_tftp class remove_tftp { package { 'tftp': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=tftp # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove tftp # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on tftp. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "tftp" ; then yum remove -y "tftp" fi Disable tftp Service The tftp service should be disabled. The tftp service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now tftp.service 11 12 14 15 3 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 CCI-001436 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.AC-3 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 2.2.16 Disabling the tftp service ensures the system is not acting as a TFTP server, which does not provide encryption or authentication. CCE-82435-9 - name: Block Disable service tftp block: - name: Disable service tftp block: - name: Disable service tftp systemd: name: tftp.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service tftp' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82435-9 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_tftp_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - tftp.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files tftp.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82435-9 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_tftp_disabled - name: Disable socket tftp systemd: name: tftp.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("tftp.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-82435-9 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_tftp_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: tftp.service enabled: false mask: true - name: tftp.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["tftp"] include disable_tftp class disable_tftp { service {'tftp': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'tftp.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'tftp.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'tftp.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files tftp.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'tftp.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'tftp.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'tftp.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure tftp Daemon Uses Secure Mode If running the Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) service is necessary, it should be configured to change its root directory at startup. To do so, ensure /etc/xinetd.d/tftp includes -s as a command line argument, as shown in the following example: server_args = -s 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 8 9 APO01.06 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 DSS06.06 CCI-000366 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.11.2.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.1.2 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(b) AC-6 CM-7(a) PR.AC-3 PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040350 SV-230557r627750_rule Using the -s option causes the TFTP service to only serve files from the given directory. Serving files from an intentionally-specified directory reduces the risk of sharing files which should remain private. CCE-82434-2 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-82434-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040350 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - tftpd_uses_secure_mode - name: XCCDF Value var_tftpd_secure_directory # promote to variable set_fact: var_tftpd_secure_directory: !!str tags: - always - name: Find out if the file exists and contains the line configuring server arguments find: path: /etc/xinetd.d patterns: tftp contains: ^[\s]+server_args.*$ register: tftpd_secure_config_line when: '"tftp-server" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-82434-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040350 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - tftpd_uses_secure_mode - name: Ensure that TFTP server is configured to start with secure directory lineinfile: path: /etc/xinetd.d/tftp regexp: ^[\s]*(server_args[\s]+=[\s]+.*?)(-s[\s]+[/\.\w]+)*(.*)$ line: \1 -s {{ var_tftpd_secure_directory }} \3 state: present backrefs: true when: - '"tftp-server" in ansible_facts.packages' - tftpd_secure_config_line is defined and tftpd_secure_config_line.matched > 0 tags: - CCE-82434-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040350 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - tftpd_uses_secure_mode - name: Insert correct config line to start TFTP server with secure directory lineinfile: path: /etc/xinetd.d/tftp line: server_args = -s {{ var_tftpd_secure_directory }} state: present create: true when: - '"tftp-server" in ansible_facts.packages' - tftpd_secure_config_line is defined and tftpd_secure_config_line.matched == 0 tags: - CCE-82434-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040350 - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - tftpd_uses_secure_mode # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q tftp-server; then var_tftpd_secure_directory='' if grep -q 'server_args' /etc/xinetd.d/tftp; then sed -i -E "s;^([[:blank:]]*server_args[[:blank:]]+=[[:blank:]]+.*?)(-s[[:blank:]]+[[:graph:]]+)*(.*)$;\1 -s $var_tftpd_secure_directory \3;" /etc/xinetd.d/tftp else echo "server_args = -s $var_tftpd_secure_directory" >> /etc/xinetd.d/tftp fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Print Support The Common Unix Printing System (CUPS) service provides both local and network printing support. A system running the CUPS service can accept print jobs from other systems, process them, and send them to the appropriate printer. It also provides an interface for remote administration through a web browser. The CUPS service is installed and activated by default. The project homepage and more detailed documentation are available at http://www.cups.org. Uninstall CUPS Package The cups package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase cups 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 2.2.11 If the system does not need to print jobs or accept print jobs from other systems, it is recommended that CUPS be removed to reduce the potential attack surface. CCE-86299-5 - name: Ensure cups is removed package: name: cups state: absent tags: - CCE-86299-5 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - package_cups_removed - unknown_severity include remove_cups class remove_cups { package { 'cups': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=cups # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove cups # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on cups. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "cups" ; then yum remove -y "cups" fi Disable the CUPS Service The cups service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now cups.service 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 2.2.11 Turn off unneeded services to reduce attack surface. CCE-82861-6 - name: Block Disable service cups block: - name: Disable service cups block: - name: Disable service cups systemd: name: cups.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service cups' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82861-6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_cups_disabled - unknown_severity - name: Unit Socket Exists - cups.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files cups.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82861-6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_cups_disabled - unknown_severity - name: Disable socket cups systemd: name: cups.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("cups.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-82861-6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_cups_disabled - unknown_severity apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: cups.service enabled: false mask: true - name: cups.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["cups"] include disable_cups class disable_cups { service {'cups': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'cups.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'cups.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'cups.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files cups.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'cups.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'cups.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'cups.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure the CUPS Service if Necessary CUPS provides the ability to easily share local printers with other systems over the network. It does this by allowing systems to share lists of available printers. Additionally, each system that runs the CUPS service can potentially act as a print server. Whenever possible, the printer sharing and print server capabilities of CUPS should be limited or disabled. The following recommendations should demonstrate how to do just that. Disable Printer Browsing Entirely if Possible By default, CUPS listens on the network for printer list broadcasts on UDP port 631. This functionality is called printer browsing. To disable printer browsing entirely, edit the CUPS configuration file, located at /etc/cups/cupsd.conf, to include the following: Browsing Off BrowseAllow none 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 The CUPS print service can be configured to broadcast a list of available printers to the network. Other systems on the network, also running the CUPS print service, can be configured to listen to these broadcasts and add and configure these printers for immediate use. By disabling this browsing capability, the system will no longer generate or receive such broadcasts. Disable Print Server Capabilities To prevent remote users from potentially connecting to and using locally configured printers, disable the CUPS print server sharing capabilities. To do so, limit how the server will listen for print jobs by removing the more generic port directive from /etc/cups/cupsd.conf: Port 631 and replacing it with the Listen directive: Listen localhost:631 This will prevent remote users from printing to locally configured printers while still allowing local users on the system to print normally. 11 14 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 By default, locally configured printers will not be shared over the network, but if this functionality has somehow been enabled, these recommendations will disable it again. Be sure to disable outgoing printer list broadcasts, or remote users will still be able to see the locally configured printers, even if they cannot actually print to them. To limit print serving to a particular set of users, use the Policy directive. Proxy Server A proxy server is a very desirable target for a potential adversary because much (or all) sensitive data for a given infrastructure may flow through it. Therefore, if one is required, the system acting as a proxy server should be dedicated to that purpose alone and be stored in a physically secure location. The system's default proxy server software is Squid, and provided in an RPM package of the same name. Disable Squid if Possible If Squid was installed and activated, but the system does not need to act as a proxy server, then it should be disabled and removed. Uninstall squid Package The squid package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase squid 2.2.17 If there is no need to make the proxy server software available, removing it provides a safeguard against its activation. CCE-82189-2 - name: Ensure squid is removed package: name: squid state: absent tags: - CCE-82189-2 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - package_squid_removed - unknown_severity include remove_squid class remove_squid { package { 'squid': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=squid # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove squid # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on squid. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "squid" ; then yum remove -y "squid" fi Disable Squid The squid service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now squid.service 2.2.17 Running proxy server software provides a network-based avenue of attack, and should be removed if not needed. CCE-82190-0 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-82190-0 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_squid_disabled - unknown_severity - name: Block Disable service squid block: - name: Disable service squid block: - name: Disable service squid systemd: name: squid.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service squid' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "squid" in ansible_facts.packages ) tags: - CCE-82190-0 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_squid_disabled - unknown_severity - name: Unit Socket Exists - squid.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files squid.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "squid" in ansible_facts.packages ) tags: - CCE-82190-0 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_squid_disabled - unknown_severity - name: Disable socket squid systemd: name: squid.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "squid" in ansible_facts.packages ) - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("squid.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-82190-0 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_squid_disabled - unknown_severity apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: squid.service enabled: false mask: true - name: squid.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["squid"] include disable_squid class disable_squid { service {'squid': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q squid ); then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'squid.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'squid.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'squid.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files squid.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'squid.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'squid.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'squid.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) is a networking protocol, operating on port 1812 that provides centralized Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA or Triple A) management for users who connect and use a network service. Remove the FreeRadius Server Package The freeradius package should be removed if not in use. Is this system a RADIUS server? If not, remove the package. The freeradius package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase freeradius The freeradius RPM is not installed by default on a Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 system. It is needed only by the RADIUS servers, not by the clients which use RADIUS for authentication. If the system is not intended for use as a RADIUS Server it should be removed. Unnecessary packages should not be installed to decrease the attack surface of the system. While this software is clearly essential on a RADIUS server, it is not necessary on typical desktop or workstation systems. CCE-82752-7 - name: Ensure freeradius is removed package: name: freeradius state: absent tags: - CCE-82752-7 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_freeradius_removed include remove_freeradius class remove_freeradius { package { 'freeradius': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=freeradius # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove freeradius # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on freeradius. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "freeradius" ; then yum remove -y "freeradius" fi Hardware RNG Entropy Gatherer Daemon The rngd feeds random data from hardware device to kernel random device. Enable the Hardware RNG Entropy Gatherer Service The Hardware RNG Entropy Gatherer service should be enabled. The rngd service can be enabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl enable rngd.service For RHEL versions 8.4 and above running with kernel FIPS mode enabled this rule is not applicable. The in-kernel deterministic random bit generator (DRBG) is used in FIPS mode instead. Consequently, the rngd service can't be started in FIPS mode. CCI-000366 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010471 SV-230285r928587_rule The rngd service feeds random data from hardware device to kernel random device. CCE-82831-9 - name: Enable service rngd block: - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto - name: Enable service rngd systemd: name: rngd enabled: 'yes' state: started masked: 'no' when: - '"rng-tools" in ansible_facts.packages' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_distribution == 'RedHat' and ansible_distribution_version is version('8.3', '<=') tags: - CCE-82831-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010471 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_rngd_enabled [customizations.services] enabled = ["rngd"] include enable_rngd class enable_rngd { service {'rngd': enable => true, ensure => 'running', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { grep -qP "^ID=[\"']?rhel[\"']?$" "/etc/os-release" && { real="$(grep -P "^VERSION_ID=[\"']?[\w.]+[\"']?$" /etc/os-release | sed "s/^VERSION_ID=[\"']\?\([^\"']\+\)[\"']\?$/\1/")"; expected="8.3"; printf "%s\n%s" "$real" "$expected" | sort -VC; }; }; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'rngd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'rngd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'rngd.service' else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Network Routing A router is a very desirable target for a potential adversary because they fulfill a variety of infrastructure networking roles such as access to network segments, gateways to other networks, filtering, etc. Therefore, if one is required, the system acting as a router should be dedicated to that purpose alone and be stored in a physically secure location. The system's default routing software is Quagga, and provided in an RPM package of the same name. Disable Quagga if Possible If Quagga was installed and activated, but the system does not need to act as a router, then it should be disabled and removed. Uninstall quagga Package The quagga package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase quagga 12 15 8 APO13.01 DSS05.02 CCI-000366 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.PT-4 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 Routing software is typically used on routers to exchange network topology information with other routers. If routing software is used when not required, system network information may be unnecessarily transmitted across the network. If there is no need to make the router software available, removing it provides a safeguard against its activation. CCE-82187-6 - name: Ensure quagga is removed package: name: quagga state: absent tags: - CCE-82187-6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_quagga_removed include remove_quagga class remove_quagga { package { 'quagga': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=quagga # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove quagga # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on quagga. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "quagga" ; then yum remove -y "quagga" fi Disable Quagga Service The zebra service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now zebra.service 12 15 8 APO13.01 DSS05.02 CCI-000366 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.PT-4 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 Routing protocol daemons are typically used on routers to exchange network topology information with other routers. If routing daemons are used when not required, system network information may be unnecessarily transmitted across the network. CCE-80889-9 - name: Block Disable service zebra block: - name: Disable service zebra block: - name: Disable service zebra systemd: name: zebra.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service zebra' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80889-9 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_zebra_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - zebra.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files zebra.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80889-9 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_zebra_disabled - name: Disable socket zebra systemd: name: zebra.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("zebra.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-80889-9 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_zebra_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: zebra.service enabled: false mask: true - name: zebra.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["zebra"] include disable_zebra class disable_zebra { service {'zebra': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'zebra.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'zebra.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'zebra.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files zebra.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'zebra.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'zebra.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'zebra.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Samba(SMB) Microsoft Windows File Sharing Server When properly configured, the Samba service allows Linux systems to provide file and print sharing to Microsoft Windows systems. There are two software packages that provide Samba support. The first, samba-client, provides a series of command line tools that enable a client system to access Samba shares. The second, simply labeled samba, provides the Samba service. It is this second package that allows a Linux system to act as an Active Directory server, a domain controller, or as a domain member. Only the samba-client package is installed by default. Configure Samba if Necessary All settings for the Samba daemon can be found in /etc/samba/smb.conf. Settings are divided between a [global] configuration section and a series of user created share definition sections meant to describe file or print shares on the system. By default, Samba will operate in user mode and allow client systems to access local home directories and printers. It is recommended that these settings be changed or that additional limitations be set in place. Install the Samba Common Package The samba-common package should be installed. The samba-common package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install samba-common If the samba-common package is not installed, samba cannot be configured. - name: Ensure samba-common is installed package: name: samba-common state: present tags: - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_samba-common_installed [[packages]] name = "samba-common" version = "*" include install_samba-common class install_samba-common { package { 'samba-common': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=samba-common if ! rpm -q --quiet "samba-common" ; then yum install -y "samba-common" fi Require Client SMB Packet Signing, if using mount.cifs Require packet signing of clients who mount Samba shares using the mount.cifs program (e.g., those who specify shares in /etc/fstab). To do so, ensure signing options (either sec=krb5i or sec=ntlmv2i) are used. See the mount.cifs(8) man page for more information. A Samba client should only communicate with servers who can support SMB packet signing. Packet signing can prevent man-in-the-middle attacks which modify SMB packets in transit. Require Client SMB Packet Signing, if using smbclient To require samba clients running smbclient to use packet signing, add the following to the [global] section of the Samba configuration file, /etc/samba/smb.conf: client signing = mandatory Requiring samba clients such as smbclient to use packet signing ensures they can only communicate with servers that support packet signing. Packet signing can prevent man-in-the-middle attacks which modify SMB packets in transit. - name: Check if /etc/samba/smb.conf exists stat: path: /etc/samba/smb.conf register: st_smb tags: - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - require_smb_client_signing - unknown_severity - name: Require Client SMB Packet Signing, if using smbclient lineinfile: dest: /etc/samba/smb.conf line: client signing = mandatory state: present insertafter: - global when: st_smb.stat.exists tags: - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - require_smb_client_signing - unknown_severity ###################################################################### #By Luke "Brisk-OH" Brisk #luke.brisk@boeing.com or luke.brisk@gmail.com ###################################################################### CLIENTSIGNING=$( grep -ic 'client signing' /etc/samba/smb.conf ) if [ "$CLIENTSIGNING" -eq 0 ]; then # Add to global section sed -i 's/\[global\]/\[global\]\n\n\tclient signing = mandatory/g' /etc/samba/smb.conf else sed -i 's/[[:blank:]]*client[[:blank:]]signing[[:blank:]]*=[[:blank:]]*no/ client signing = mandatory/g' /etc/samba/smb.conf fi Disable Root Access to SMB Shares Administrators should not use administrator accounts to access Samba file and printer shares. Disable the root user and the wheel administrator group: [share] invalid users = root @wheel If administrator accounts cannot be disabled, ensure that local system passwords and Samba service passwords do not match. Typically, administrator access is required when Samba must create user and system accounts and shares. Domain member servers and standalone servers may not need administrator access at all. If that is the case, add the invalid users parameter to [global] instead. Restrict Printer Sharing By default, Samba utilizes the CUPS printing service to enable printer sharing with Microsoft Windows workstations. If there are no printers on the local system, or if printer sharing with Microsoft Windows is not required, disable the printer sharing capability by commenting out the following lines, found in /etc/samba/smb.conf: [global] load printers = yes cups options = raw [printers] comment = All Printers path = /usr/spool/samba browseable = no guest ok = no writable = no printable = yes There may be other options present, but these are the only options enabled and uncommented by default. Removing the [printers] share should be enough for most users. If the Samba printer sharing capability is needed, consider disabling the Samba network browsing capability or restricting access to a particular set of users or network addresses. Set the valid users parameter to a small subset of users or restrict it to a particular group of users with the shorthand @. Separate each user or group of users with a space. For example, under the [printers] share: [printers] valid users = user @printerusers Restrict SMB File Sharing to Configured Networks Only users with local user accounts will be able to log in to Samba shares by default. Shares can be limited to particular users or network addresses. Use the hosts allow and hosts deny directives accordingly, and consider setting the valid users directive to a limited subset of users or to a group of users. Separate each address, user, or user group with a space as follows for a particular share or global: [share] hosts allow = 192.168.1. 127.0.0.1 valid users = userone usertwo @usergroup It is also possible to limit read and write access to particular users with the read list and write list options, though the permissions set by the system itself will override these settings. Set the read only attribute for each share to ensure that global settings will not accidentally override the individual share settings. Then, as with the valid users directive, separate each user or group of users with a space: [share] read only = yes write list = userone usertwo @usergroup Disable Samba if Possible Even after the Samba server package has been installed, it will remain disabled. Do not enable this service unless it is absolutely necessary to provide Microsoft Windows file and print sharing functionality. Uninstall Samba Package The samba package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase samba 2.2.6 If there is no need to make the Samba software available, removing it provides a safeguard against its activation. CCE-85978-5 - name: Ensure samba is removed package: name: samba state: absent tags: - CCE-85978-5 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - package_samba_removed - unknown_severity include remove_samba class remove_samba { package { 'samba': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=samba # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove samba # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on samba. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "samba" ; then yum remove -y "samba" fi Disable Samba The smb service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now smb.service CCI-001436 2.2.6 Running a Samba server provides a network-based avenue of attack, and should be disabled if not needed. CCE-82759-2 - name: Block Disable service smb block: - name: Disable service smb block: - name: Disable service smb systemd: name: smb.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service smb' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82759-2 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_smb_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - smb.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files smb.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82759-2 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_smb_disabled - name: Disable socket smb systemd: name: smb.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("smb.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-82759-2 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_smb_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: smb.service enabled: false mask: true - name: smb.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["smb"] include disable_smb class disable_smb { service {'smb': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'smb.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'smb.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'smb.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files smb.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'smb.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'smb.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'smb.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi SNMP Server The Simple Network Management Protocol allows administrators to monitor the state of network devices, including computers. Older versions of SNMP were well-known for weak security, such as plaintext transmission of the community string (used for authentication) and usage of easily-guessable choices for the community string. Disable SNMP Server if Possible The system includes an SNMP daemon that allows for its remote monitoring, though it not installed by default. If it was installed and activated but is not needed, the software should be disabled and removed. Uninstall net-snmp Package The net-snmp package provides the snmpd service. The net-snmp package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase net-snmp 2.2.4 2.2.14 If there is no need to run SNMP server software, removing the package provides a safeguard against its activation. CCE-85980-1 - name: Ensure net-snmp is removed package: name: net-snmp state: absent tags: - CCE-85980-1 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - package_net-snmp_removed - unknown_severity include remove_net-snmp class remove_net-snmp { package { 'net-snmp': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=net-snmp # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove net-snmp # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on net-snmp. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "net-snmp" ; then yum remove -y "net-snmp" fi Disable snmpd Service The snmpd service can be disabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl mask --now snmpd.service 1311 2.2.14 Running SNMP software provides a network-based avenue of attack, and should be disabled if not needed. CCE-82758-4 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-82758-4 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_snmpd_disabled - name: Block Disable service snmpd block: - name: Disable service snmpd block: - name: Disable service snmpd systemd: name: snmpd.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service snmpd' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "net-snmp" in ansible_facts.packages ) tags: - CCE-82758-4 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_snmpd_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - snmpd.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files snmpd.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "net-snmp" in ansible_facts.packages ) tags: - CCE-82758-4 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_snmpd_disabled - name: Disable socket snmpd systemd: name: snmpd.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and "net-snmp" in ansible_facts.packages ) - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("snmpd.socket",multiline=True) tags: - CCE-82758-4 - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_snmpd_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: snmpd.service enabled: false mask: true - name: snmpd.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["snmpd"] include disable_snmpd class disable_snmpd { service {'snmpd': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q net-snmp ); then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'snmpd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'snmpd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'snmpd.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files snmpd.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'snmpd.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'snmpd.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'snmpd.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure SNMP Server if Necessary If it is necessary to run the snmpd agent on the system, some best practices should be followed to minimize the security risk from the installation. The multiple security models implemented by SNMP cannot be fully covered here so only the following general configuration advice can be offered: use only SNMP version 3 security models and enable the use of authentication and encryptionwrite access to the MIB (Management Information Base) should be allowed only if necessaryall access to the MIB should be restricted following a principle of least privilegenetwork access should be limited to the maximum extent possible including restricting to expected network addresses both in the configuration files and in the system firewall rulesensure SNMP agents send traps only to, and accept SNMP queries only from, authorized management stationsensure that permissions on the snmpd.conf configuration file (by default, in /etc/snmp) are 640 or more restrictiveensure that any MIB files' permissions are also 640 or more restrictive SNMP read-only community string Specify the SNMP community string used for read-only access. changemero SNMP read-write community string Specify the SNMP community string used for read-write access. changemerw Ensure SNMP Read Write is disabled Edit /etc/snmp/snmpd.conf, remove any rwuser entries. Once the read write users have been removed, restart the SNMP service: $ sudo service snmpd restart Certain SNMP settings can permit users to execute system behaviors from user writes to the community strings. This may permit a compromised account to execute commands on a remote system. CCE-82733-7 # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q net-snmp; then if grep -s "rwuser" /etc/snmp/snmpd.conf | grep -qv "^#"; then sed -i "/^\s*#/b;/rwuser/ s/^/#/" /etc/snmp/snmpd.conf fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure Default SNMP Password Is Not Used Edit /etc/snmp/snmpd.conf, remove or change the default community strings of public and private. This profile configures new read-only community string to and read-write community string to . Once the default community strings have been changed, restart the SNMP service: $ sudo service snmpd restart 1 12 15 16 5 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 CCI-000366 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 A.18.1.4 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 IA-5(e) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 Whether active or not, default simple network management protocol (SNMP) community strings must be changed to maintain security. If the service is running with the default authenticators, then anyone can gather data about the system and the network and use the information to potentially compromise the integrity of the system and network(s). - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - NIST-800-53-IA-5(e) - configure_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - snmpd_not_default_password - name: XCCDF Value var_snmpd_ro_string # promote to variable set_fact: var_snmpd_ro_string: !!str tags: - always - name: XCCDF Value var_snmpd_rw_string # promote to variable set_fact: var_snmpd_rw_string: !!str tags: - always - name: Check if file /etc/snmp/snmpd.conf exists stat: path: /etc/snmp/snmpd.conf register: snmpd when: '"net-snmp" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - NIST-800-53-IA-5(e) - configure_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - snmpd_not_default_password - name: Replace all instances of SNMP RO strings replace: path: /etc/snmp/snmpd.conf regexp: public replace: '{{ var_snmpd_ro_string }}' when: - '"net-snmp" in ansible_facts.packages' - (snmpd.stat.exists is defined and snmpd.stat.exists) tags: - NIST-800-53-IA-5(e) - configure_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - snmpd_not_default_password - name: Replace all instances of SNMP RW strings replace: path: /etc/snmp/snmpd.conf regexp: private replace: '{{ var_snmpd_rw_string }}' when: - '"net-snmp" in ansible_facts.packages' - (snmpd.stat.exists is defined and snmpd.stat.exists) tags: - NIST-800-53-IA-5(e) - configure_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - snmpd_not_default_password # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q net-snmp; then var_snmpd_ro_string='' var_snmpd_rw_string='' # remediate read-only community string if grep -q 'public' /etc/snmp/snmpd.conf; then sed -i "s/public/$var_snmpd_ro_string/" /etc/snmp/snmpd.conf fi # remediate read-write community string if grep -q 'private' /etc/snmp/snmpd.conf; then sed -i "s/private/$var_snmpd_rw_string/" /etc/snmp/snmpd.conf fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure SNMP Service to Use Only SNMPv3 or Newer Edit /etc/snmp/snmpd.conf, removing any references to rocommunity, rwcommunity, or com2sec. Upon doing that, restart the SNMP service: $ sudo service snmpd restart 1311 Earlier versions of SNMP are considered insecure, as they potentially allow unauthorized access to detailed system management information. CCE-84292-2 SSH Server The SSH protocol is recommended for remote login and remote file transfer. SSH provides confidentiality and integrity for data exchanged between two systems, as well as server authentication, through the use of public key cryptography. The implementation included with the system is called OpenSSH, and more detailed documentation is available from its website, https://www.openssh.com. Its server program is called sshd and provided by the RPM package openssh-server. SSH enabled firewalld zone Specify firewalld zone to enable SSH service. This value is used only for remediation purposes. block public dmz drop external home internal public trusted work SSH Approved ciphers by FIPS Specify the FIPS approved ciphers that are used for data integrity protection by the SSH server. aes256-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes128-ctr aes256-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes128-ctr,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,aes128-gcm@openssh.com aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes128-ctr -3des-cbc,aes128-cbc,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes128-ctr chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes128-ctr chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes128-ctr chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com SSH Approved MACs by FIPS Specify the FIPS approved MACs (message authentication code) algorithms that are used for data integrity protection by the SSH server. hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256 hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha1,hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1,hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256 hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256 hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256 hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256 SSH session Idle time Specify duration of allowed idle time. 600 7200 840 900 1800 300 3600 300 SSH Server Listening Port Specify port the SSH server is listening. 22 SSH Max authentication attempts Specify the maximum number of authentication attempts per connection. 10 3 4 5 4 SSH is required to be installed Specify if the Policy requires SSH to be installed. Used by SSH Rules to determine if SSH should be uninstalled or configured. A value of 0 means that the policy doesn't care if OpenSSH server is installed or not. If it is installed, scanner will check for it's configuration, if it's not installed, the check will pass. A value of 1 indicates that OpenSSH server package is not required by the policy; A value of 2 indicates that OpenSSH server package is required by the policy. 0 1 2 SSH Strong KEX by FIPS Specify the FIPS approved KEXs (Key Exchange Algorithms) algorithms that are used for methods in cryptography by which cryptographic keys are exchanged between two parties ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 -diffie-hellman-group1-sha1,diffie-hellman-group14-sha1,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp256,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp256,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 SSH Strong MACs by FIPS Specify the FIPS approved MACs (Message Authentication Code) algorithms that are used for data integrity protection by the SSH server. hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256,hmac-ripemd160 hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256 -hmac-md5,hmac-md5-96,hmac-ripemd160,hmac-sha1-96,umac-64@openssh.com,hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com,hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com,hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com,umac-64-etm@openssh.com hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256,hmac-ripemd160 hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256 hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256 SSH Max Sessions Count Specify the maximum number of open sessions permitted. 10 4 3 2 1 0 10 SSH Max Keep Alive Count Specify the maximum number of idle message counts before session is terminated. 10 3 5 0 1 0 Install OpenSSH client software The openssh-clients package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install openssh-clients FIA_UAU.5 FTP_ITC_EXT.1 FCS_SSH_EXT.1 FCS_SSHC_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 This package includes utilities to make encrypted connections and transfer files securely to SSH servers. CCE-82722-0 - name: Ensure openssh-clients is installed package: name: openssh-clients state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82722-0 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_openssh-clients_installed [[packages]] name = "openssh-clients" version = "*" include install_openssh-clients class install_openssh-clients { package { 'openssh-clients': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=openssh-clients # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "openssh-clients" ; then yum install -y "openssh-clients" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Install the OpenSSH Server Package The openssh-server package should be installed. The openssh-server package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install openssh-server 13 14 APO01.06 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 DSS06.06 CCI-002418 CCI-002420 CCI-002421 CCI-002422 SR 3.1 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.2 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) PR.DS-2 PR.DS-5 FIA_UAU.5 FTP_ITC_EXT.1 FCS_SSH_EXT.1 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000423-GPOS-00187 SRG-OS-000424-GPOS-00188 SRG-OS-000425-GPOS-00189 SRG-OS-000426-GPOS-00190 RHEL-08-040159 SV-244549r916422_rule Without protection of the transmitted information, confidentiality, and integrity may be compromised because unprotected communications can be intercepted and either read or altered. CCE-83303-8 - name: Ensure openssh-server is installed package: name: openssh-server state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83303-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040159 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_openssh-server_installed [[packages]] name = "openssh-server" version = "*" include install_openssh-server class install_openssh-server { package { 'openssh-server': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=openssh-server # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "openssh-server" ; then yum install -y "openssh-server" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Remove the OpenSSH Server Package The openssh-server package should be removed. The openssh-server package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase openssh-server Without protection of the transmitted information, confidentiality, and integrity may be compromised because unprotected communications can be intercepted and either read or altered. - name: Ensure openssh-server is removed package: name: openssh-server state: absent when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_openssh-server_removed include remove_openssh-server class remove_openssh-server { package { 'openssh-server': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=openssh-server # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove openssh-server # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on openssh-server. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "openssh-server" ; then yum remove -y "openssh-server" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the OpenSSH Service The SSH server service, sshd, is commonly needed. The sshd service can be enabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl enable sshd.service 13 14 APO01.06 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 DSS06.06 3.1.13 3.5.4 3.13.8 CCI-002418 CCI-002420 CCI-002421 CCI-002422 SR 3.1 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.2 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) SC-8 SC-8(1) SC-8(2) SC-8(3) SC-8(4) PR.DS-2 PR.DS-5 SRG-OS-000423-GPOS-00187 SRG-OS-000424-GPOS-00188 SRG-OS-000425-GPOS-00189 SRG-OS-000426-GPOS-00190 RHEL-08-040160 SV-230526r916422_rule Without protection of the transmitted information, confidentiality, and integrity may be compromised because unprotected communications can be intercepted and either read or altered. This checklist item applies to both internal and external networks and all types of information system components from which information can be transmitted (e.g., servers, mobile devices, notebook computers, printers, copiers, scanners, etc). Communication paths outside the physical protection of a controlled boundary are exposed to the possibility of interception and modification. CCE-82426-8 - name: Enable service sshd block: - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto - name: Enable service sshd systemd: name: sshd enabled: 'yes' state: started masked: 'no' when: - '"openssh-server" in ansible_facts.packages' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82426-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040160 - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 - NIST-800-171-3.13.8 - NIST-800-171-3.5.4 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-8 - NIST-800-53-SC-8(1) - NIST-800-53-SC-8(2) - NIST-800-53-SC-8(3) - NIST-800-53-SC-8(4) - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_sshd_enabled [customizations.services] enabled = ["sshd"] include enable_sshd class enable_sshd { service {'sshd': enable => true, ensure => 'running', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'sshd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'sshd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'sshd.service' else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable SSH Server If Possible The SSH server service, sshd, is commonly needed. However, if it can be disabled, do so. This is unusual, as SSH is a common method for encrypted and authenticated remote access. CM-3(6) IA-2(4) SRG-APP-000185-CTR-000490 SRG-APP-000141-CTR-000315 - name: Block Disable service sshd block: - name: Disable service sshd block: - name: Disable service sshd systemd: name: sshd.service enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' rescue: - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service sshd' failure, service was already disabled meta: noop when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-53-CM-3(6) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(4) - disable_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_sshd_disabled - name: Unit Socket Exists - sshd.socket command: systemctl -q list-unit-files sshd.socket register: socket_file_exists changed_when: false failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - NIST-800-53-CM-3(6) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(4) - disable_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_sshd_disabled - name: Disable socket sshd systemd: name: sshd.socket enabled: 'no' state: stopped masked: 'yes' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("sshd.socket",multiline=True) tags: - NIST-800-53-CM-3(6) - NIST-800-53-IA-2(4) - disable_strategy - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - service_sshd_disabled apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: sshd.service enabled: false mask: true - name: sshd.socket enabled: false mask: true [customizations.services] disabled = ["sshd"] include disable_sshd class disable_sshd { service {'sshd': enable => false, ensure => 'stopped', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'sshd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'sshd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'sshd.service' # Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files sshd.socket; then "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'sshd.socket' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'sshd.socket' fi # The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, # so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. # Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'sshd.service' || true else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify Group Who Owns SSH Server config file To properly set the group owner of /etc/ssh/sshd_config, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /etc/ssh/sshd_config 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 AC-17(a) CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 4.2.1 Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective services that if configured incorrectly can lead to insecure and vulnerable configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should be owned by the correct group to prevent unauthorized changes. CCE-82901-0 - name: Test for existence /etc/ssh/sshd_config stat: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config register: file_exists when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82901-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_sshd_config - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner 0 on /etc/ssh/sshd_config file: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config group: '0' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-82901-0 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - file_groupowner_sshd_config - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then chgrp 0 /etc/ssh/sshd_config else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify Group Ownership on SSH Server Private *_key Key Files SSH server private keys, files that match the /etc/ssh/*_key glob, must be group-owned by ssh_keys group. 4.2.2 If an unauthorized user obtains the private SSH host key file, the host could be impersonated. CCE-86126-0 - name: Find /etc/ssh/ file(s) matching ^.*_key$ command: find -H /etc/ssh/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -group ssh_keys -regex "^.*_key$" register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86126-0 - configure_strategy - file_groupownership_sshd_private_key - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner on /etc/ssh/ file(s) matching ^.*_key$ file: path: '{{ item }}' group: ssh_keys state: file with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86126-0 - configure_strategy - file_groupownership_sshd_private_key - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then find /etc/ssh/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -group ssh_keys -regex '^.*_key$' -exec chgrp ssh_keys {} \; else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify Group Ownership on SSH Server Public *.pub Key Files SSH server public keys, files that match the /etc/ssh/*.pub glob, must be group-owned by root group. 4.2.3 If a public host key file is modified by an unauthorized user, the SSH service may be compromised. CCE-86133-6 - name: Find /etc/ssh/ file(s) matching ^.*\.pub$ command: find -H /etc/ssh/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -group 0 -regex "^.*\.pub$" register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86133-6 - configure_strategy - file_groupownership_sshd_pub_key - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure group owner on /etc/ssh/ file(s) matching ^.*\.pub$ file: path: '{{ item }}' group: '0' state: file with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86133-6 - configure_strategy - file_groupownership_sshd_pub_key - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then find /etc/ssh/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -group 0 -regex '^.*\.pub$' -exec chgrp 0 {} \; else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify Owner on SSH Server config file To properly set the owner of /etc/ssh/sshd_config, run the command: $ sudo chown root /etc/ssh/sshd_config 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 AC-17(a) CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 4.2.1 Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective services that if configured incorrectly can lead to insecure and vulnerable configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should be owned by the correct group to prevent unauthorized changes. CCE-82898-8 - name: Test for existence /etc/ssh/sshd_config stat: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config register: file_exists when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82898-8 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - file_owner_sshd_config - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner 0 on /etc/ssh/sshd_config file: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config owner: '0' when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-82898-8 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - configure_strategy - file_owner_sshd_config - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then chown 0 /etc/ssh/sshd_config else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify Ownership on SSH Server Private *_key Key Files SSH server private keys, files that match the /etc/ssh/*_key glob, must be owned by root user. 4.2.2 If an unauthorized user obtains the private SSH host key file, the host could be impersonated. CCE-86118-7 - name: Find /etc/ssh/ file(s) matching ^.*_key$ command: find -H /etc/ssh/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -uid 0 -regex "^.*_key$" register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86118-7 - configure_strategy - file_ownership_sshd_private_key - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner on /etc/ssh/ file(s) matching ^.*_key$ file: path: '{{ item }}' owner: '0' state: file with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86118-7 - configure_strategy - file_ownership_sshd_private_key - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then find /etc/ssh/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -uid 0 -regex '^.*_key$' -exec chown 0 {} \; else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify Ownership on SSH Server Public *.pub Key Files SSH server public keys, files that match the /etc/ssh/*.pub glob, must be owned by root user. 4.2.3 If a public host key file is modified by an unauthorized user, the SSH service may be compromised. CCE-86129-4 - name: Find /etc/ssh/ file(s) matching ^.*\.pub$ command: find -H /etc/ssh/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -uid 0 -regex "^.*\.pub$" register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86129-4 - configure_strategy - file_ownership_sshd_pub_key - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure owner on /etc/ssh/ file(s) matching ^.*\.pub$ file: path: '{{ item }}' owner: '0' state: file with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86129-4 - configure_strategy - file_ownership_sshd_pub_key - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then find /etc/ssh/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -uid 0 -regex '^.*\.pub$' -exec chown 0 {} \; else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify Permissions on SSH Server config file To properly set the permissions of /etc/ssh/sshd_config, run the command: $ sudo chmod 0600 /etc/ssh/sshd_config 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 AC-17(a) CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 4.2.1 Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective services that if configured incorrectly can lead to insecure and vulnerable configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should be owned by the correct group to prevent unauthorized changes. CCE-82894-7 - name: Test for existence /etc/ssh/sshd_config stat: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config register: file_exists when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82894-7 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_sshd_config - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Ensure permission u-xs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt on /etc/ssh/sshd_config file: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config mode: u-xs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists tags: - CCE-82894-7 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_sshd_config - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then chmod u-xs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt /etc/ssh/sshd_config else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify Permissions on SSH Server Private *_key Key Files SSH server private keys - files that match the /etc/ssh/*_key glob, have to have restricted permissions. If those files are owned by the root user and the root group, they have to have the 0600 permission or stricter. If they are owned by the root user, but by a dedicated group ssh_keys, they can have the 0640 permission or stricter. BP28(R36) 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 3.1.13 3.13.10 CCI-000366 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 AC-17(a) CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 Req-2.2.4 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010490 4.2.2 SV-230287r880714_rule If an unauthorized user obtains the private SSH host key file, the host could be impersonated. CCE-82424-3 - name: Find root:root-owned keys ansible.builtin.command: find -H /etc/ssh/ -maxdepth 1 -user root -regex ".*_key$" -type f -group root -perm /u+xs,g+xwrs,o+xwrt register: root_owned_keys changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82424-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010490 - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 - NIST-800-171-3.13.10 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.4 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_sshd_private_key - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Set permissions for root:root-owned keys ansible.builtin.file: path: '{{ item }}' mode: u-xs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt state: file with_items: - '{{ root_owned_keys.stdout_lines }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82424-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010490 - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 - NIST-800-171-3.13.10 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.4 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_sshd_private_key - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Find root:ssh_keys-owned keys ansible.builtin.command: find -H /etc/ssh/ -maxdepth 1 -user root -regex ".*_key$" -type f -group ssh_keys -perm /u+xs,g+xws,o+xwrt register: dedicated_group_owned_keys changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82424-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010490 - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 - NIST-800-171-3.13.10 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.4 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_sshd_private_key - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Set permissions for root:ssh_keys-owned keys ansible.builtin.file: path: '{{ item }}' mode: u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt state: file with_items: - '{{ dedicated_group_owned_keys.stdout_lines }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82424-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010490 - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 - NIST-800-171-3.13.10 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.4 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_sshd_private_key - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed include ssh_private_key_perms class ssh_private_key_perms { exec { 'sshd_priv_key': command => "chmod 0640 /etc/ssh/*_key", path => '/bin:/usr/bin' } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then for keyfile in /etc/ssh/*_key; do test -f "$keyfile" || continue if test root:root = "$(stat -c "%U:%G" "$keyfile")"; then chmod u-xs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt "$keyfile" elif test root:ssh_keys = "$(stat -c "%U:%G" "$keyfile")"; then chmod u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt "$keyfile" else echo "Key-like file '$keyfile' is owned by an unexpected user:group combination" fi done else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify Permissions on SSH Server Public *.pub Key Files To properly set the permissions of /etc/ssh/*.pub, run the command: $ sudo chmod 0644 /etc/ssh/*.pub 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 3.1.13 3.13.10 CCI-000366 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 AC-17(a) CM-6(a) AC-6(1) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 Req-2.2.4 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010480 4.2.3 SV-230286r627750_rule If a public host key file is modified by an unauthorized user, the SSH service may be compromised. CCE-82428-4 - name: Find /etc/ssh/ file(s) command: find -H /etc/ssh/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+xs,g+xws,o+xwt -type f -regex "^.*\.pub$" register: files_found changed_when: false failed_when: false check_mode: false when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82428-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010480 - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 - NIST-800-171-3.13.10 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.4 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_sshd_pub_key - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Set permissions for /etc/ssh/ file(s) file: path: '{{ item }}' mode: u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt state: file with_items: - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82428-4 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010480 - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 - NIST-800-171-3.13.10 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.4 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - file_permissions_sshd_pub_key - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed include ssh_public_key_perms class ssh_public_key_perms { exec { 'sshd_pub_key': command => "chmod 0644 /etc/ssh/*.pub", path => '/bin:/usr/bin' } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then find -H /etc/ssh/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+xs,g+xws,o+xwt -type f -regex '^.*\.pub$' -exec chmod u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt {} \; else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Remove SSH Server firewalld Firewall exception (Unusual) By default, inbound connections to SSH's port are allowed. If the SSH server is not being used, this exception should be removed from the firewall configuration. To configure firewalld to prevent access, run the following command(s): firewall-cmd --permanent --remove-service=ssh 3.1.12 If inbound SSH connections are not expected, disallowing access to the SSH port will avoid possible exploitation of the port by an attacker. Remove SSH Server iptables Firewall exception (Unusual) By default, inbound connections to SSH's port are allowed. If the SSH server is not being used, this exception should be removed from the firewall configuration. Edit the files /etc/sysconfig/iptables and /etc/sysconfig/ip6tables (if IPv6 is in use). In each file, locate and delete the line: -A INPUT -m state --state NEW -m tcp -p tcp --dport 22 -j ACCEPT This is unusual, as SSH is a common method for encrypted and authenticated remote access. If inbound SSH connections are not expected, disallowing access to the SSH port will avoid possible exploitation of the port by an attacker. Configure OpenSSH Client if Necessary The following configuration changes apply to the SSH client. They can improve security parameters relwevant to the client user, e.g. increasing entropy while generating initialization vectors. Note that these changes influence only the default SSH client configuration. Changes in this group can be overridden by the client user by modifying files within the ~/.ssh directory or by supplying parameters on the command line. Configure session renegotiation for SSH client The RekeyLimit parameter specifies how often the session key is renegotiated, both in terms of amount of data that may be transmitted and the time elapsed. To decrease the default limits, put line RekeyLimit to file /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-rekey-limit.conf. Make sure that there is no other RekeyLimit configuration preceding the include directive in the main config file /etc/ssh/ssh_config. Check also other files in /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d directory. Files are processed according to lexicographical order of file names. Make sure that there is no file processed before 02-rekey-limit.conf containing definition of RekeyLimit. CCI-000068 FCS_SSH_EXT.1.8 SRG-OS-000423-GPOS-00187 SRG-OS-000033-GPOS-00014 SRG-OS-000424-GPOS-00188 By decreasing the limit based on the amount of data and enabling time-based limit, effects of potential attacks against encryption keys are limited. CCE-82880-6 - name: XCCDF Value var_ssh_client_rekey_limit_size # promote to variable set_fact: var_ssh_client_rekey_limit_size: !!str tags: - always - name: XCCDF Value var_ssh_client_rekey_limit_time # promote to variable set_fact: var_ssh_client_rekey_limit_time: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure RekeyLimit is not configured in /etc/ssh/ssh_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/ssh_config create: false regexp: ^\s*RekeyLimit.*$ state: absent when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82880-6 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - ssh_client_rekey_limit - name: Collect all include config files for ssh client which configure RekeyLimit find: paths: /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/ contains: ^[\s]*RekeyLimit.*$ patterns: '*.config' register: ssh_config_include_files when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82880-6 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - ssh_client_rekey_limit - name: Remove all occurences of RekeyLimit configuration from include config files of ssh client lineinfile: path: '{{ item }}' regexp: ^[\s]*RekeyLimit.*$ state: absent loop: '{{ ssh_config_include_files.files }}' when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82880-6 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - ssh_client_rekey_limit - name: Ensure that rekey limit is set to {{ var_ssh_client_rekey_limit_size }} {{ var_ssh_client_rekey_limit_time }} in /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-rekey-limit.conf lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-rekey-limit.conf create: true regexp: ^\s*RekeyLimit.*$ line: RekeyLimit {{ var_ssh_client_rekey_limit_size }} {{ var_ssh_client_rekey_limit_time }} state: present when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82880-6 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - ssh_client_rekey_limit # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then var_ssh_client_rekey_limit_size='' var_ssh_client_rekey_limit_time='' main_config="/etc/ssh/ssh_config" include_directory="/etc/ssh/ssh_config.d" if grep -q '^[\s]*RekeyLimit.*$' "$main_config"; then sed -i '/^[\s]*RekeyLimit.*/d' "$main_config" fi for file in "$include_directory"/*.conf; do if grep -q '^[\s]*RekeyLimit.*$' "$file"; then sed -i '/^[\s]*RekeyLimit.*/d' "$file" fi done if [ -e "/etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-rekey-limit.conf" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*RekeyLimit\s\+/d" "/etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-rekey-limit.conf" else touch "/etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-rekey-limit.conf" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-rekey-limit.conf" cp "/etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-rekey-limit.conf" "/etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-rekey-limit.conf.bak" # Insert at the end of the file printf '%s\n' "RekeyLimit $var_ssh_client_rekey_limit_size $var_ssh_client_rekey_limit_time" >> "/etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-rekey-limit.conf" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-rekey-limit.conf.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi SSH client uses strong entropy to seed (for CSH like shells) To set up SSH client to use entropy from a high-quality source, make sure that the appropriate shell environment variable is configured. The SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG environment variable determines how many bytes of entropy to use. Make sure that the file /etc/profile.d/cc-ssh-strong-rng.csh contains line setenv SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG 32. FCS_CKM.1.1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 Some SSH implementations use the openssl library for entropy, which by default, doesn't use high-entropy sources. Randomness is needed to generate considerably more secure data-encryption keys. Plaintext padding, initialization vectors in encryption algorithms, and high-quality entropy eliminates the possibility that the output of the random number generator used by SSH would be known to potential attackers. CCE-83349-1 - name: Ensure that correct variable is exported in /etc/profile.d/cc-ssh-strong-rng.csh lineinfile: path: /etc/profile.d/cc-ssh-strong-rng.csh regexp: ^[\s]*setenv[\s]+SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG.*$ line: setenv SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG 32 state: present create: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83349-1 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - ssh_client_use_strong_rng_csh - name: Ensure that the configuration is not overridden in /etc/profile lineinfile: path: /etc/profile regexp: ^[\s]*setenv[\s]+SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG.*$ state: absent when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83349-1 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - ssh_client_use_strong_rng_csh # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # put line into the file echo "setenv SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG 32" > /etc/profile.d/cc-ssh-strong-rng.csh # remove eventual override in /etc/profile sed -i '/^[[:space:]]*setenv[[:space:]]\+SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG.*$/d' /etc/profile else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi SSH client uses strong entropy to seed (Bash-like shells) To set up SSH client to use entropy from a high-quality source, make sure that the appropriate shell environment variable is configured. The SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG environment variable determines how many bytes of entropy to use. Make sure that the file /etc/profile.d/cc-ssh-strong-rng.sh contains line export SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG=32. FCS_CKM.1.1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 Some SSH implementations use the openssl library for entropy, which by default, doesn't use high-entropy sources. Randomness is needed to generate considerably more secure data-encryption keys. Plaintext padding, initialization vectors in encryption algorithms, and high-quality entropy eliminates the possibility that the output of the random number generator used by SSH would be known to potential attackers. CCE-83346-7 - name: Ensure that correct variable is exported in /etc/profile.d/cc-ssh-strong-rng.sh lineinfile: path: /etc/profile.d/cc-ssh-strong-rng.sh regexp: ^[\s]*export[\s]+SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG=.*$ line: export SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG=32 state: present create: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83346-7 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - ssh_client_use_strong_rng_sh - name: Ensure that the configuration is not overridden in /etc/profile lineinfile: path: /etc/profile regexp: ^[\s]*export[\s]+SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG=.*$ state: absent when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83346-7 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - ssh_client_use_strong_rng_sh # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # put line into the file echo "export SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG=32" > /etc/profile.d/cc-ssh-strong-rng.sh # remove eventual override in /etc/profile sed -i '/^[[:space:]]*export[[:space:]]\+SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG=.*$/d' /etc/profile else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Verify the SSH Private Key Files Have a Passcode When creating SSH key pairs, always use a passcode. You can create such keys with the following command: $ sudo ssh-keygen -n [passphrase] Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, for certificate-based authentication, must enforce authorized access to the corresponding private key. SRG-OS-000067-GPOS-00035 RHEL-08-010100 SV-230230r627750_rule If an unauthorized user obtains access to a private key without a passcode, that user would have unauthorized access to any system where the associated public key has been installed. CCE-90781-6 Configure OpenSSH Server if Necessary If the system needs to act as an SSH server, then certain changes should be made to the OpenSSH daemon configuration file /etc/ssh/sshd_config. The following recommendations can be applied to this file. See the sshd_config(5) man page for more detailed information. SSH RekeyLimit - size Specify the size component of the rekey limit. default 512M 512M 1G SSH RekeyLimit - size Specify the size component of the rekey limit. none 1h 1h SSH Compression Setting Specify the compression setting for SSH connections. no delayed no SSH Privilege Separation Setting Specify whether and how sshd separates privileges when handling incoming network connections. no yes sandbox sandbox SSH LoginGraceTime setting Configure parameters for how long the servers stays connected before the user has successfully logged in 60 60 SSH MaxStartups setting Configure parameters for maximum concurrent unauthenticated connections to the SSH daemon. 10:30:100 10:30:60 Set SSH Client Alive Count Max to zero The SSH server sends at most ClientAliveCountMax messages during a SSH session and waits for a response from the SSH client. The option ClientAliveInterval configures timeout after each ClientAliveCountMax message. If the SSH server does not receive a response from the client, then the connection is considered unresponsive and terminated. To ensure the SSH timeout occurs precisely when the ClientAliveInterval is set, set the ClientAliveCountMax to value of 0 in /etc/ssh/sshd_config: 1 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 7 8 5.5.6 APO13.01 BAI03.01 BAI03.02 BAI03.03 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 3.1.11 CCI-000879 CCI-001133 CCI-002361 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 6.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.3 A.14.1.1 A.14.2.1 A.14.2.5 A.18.1.4 A.6.1.2 A.6.1.5 A.7.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 AC-2(5) AC-12 AC-17(a) SC-10 CM-6(a) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 PR.AC-1 PR.AC-4 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 PR.IP-2 Req-8.1.8 SRG-OS-000126-GPOS-00066 SRG-OS-000163-GPOS-00072 SRG-OS-000279-GPOS-00109 5.2.13 This ensures a user login will be terminated as soon as the ClientAliveInterval is reached. CCE-83405-1 - name: Set SSH Client Alive Count Max to zero block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*ClientAliveCountMax\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*ClientAliveCountMax\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*ClientAliveCountMax\s+ line: ClientAliveCountMax 0 state: present insertbefore: BOF validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83405-1 - CJIS-5.5.6 - NIST-800-171-3.1.11 - NIST-800-53-AC-12 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-2(5) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-10 - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sshd_set_keepalive_0 # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*ClientAliveCountMax\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" else touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" # Insert at the beginning of the file printf '%s\n' "ClientAliveCountMax 0" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cat "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Set SSH Client Alive Count Max The SSH server sends at most ClientAliveCountMax messages during a SSH session and waits for a response from the SSH client. The option ClientAliveInterval configures timeout after each ClientAliveCountMax message. If the SSH server does not receive a response from the client, then the connection is considered unresponsive and terminated. For SSH earlier than v8.2, a ClientAliveCountMax value of 0 causes a timeout precisely when the ClientAliveInterval is set. Starting with v8.2, a value of 0 disables the timeout functionality completely. If the option is set to a number greater than 0, then the session will be disconnected after ClientAliveInterval * ClientAliveCountMax seconds without receiving a keep alive message. BP28(R32) 1 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 7 8 5.5.6 APO13.01 BAI03.01 BAI03.02 BAI03.03 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 3.1.11 CCI-000879 CCI-001133 CCI-002361 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 6.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.3 A.14.1.1 A.14.2.1 A.14.2.5 A.18.1.4 A.6.1.2 A.6.1.5 A.7.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 AC-2(5) AC-12 AC-17(a) SC-10 CM-6(a) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 PR.AC-1 PR.AC-4 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 PR.IP-2 Req-8.1.8 8.2.8 SRG-OS-000163-GPOS-00072 SRG-OS-000279-GPOS-00109 RHEL-08-010200 4.2.7 SV-230244r917867_rule This ensures a user login will be terminated as soon as the ClientAliveInterval is reached. CCE-80907-9 - name: XCCDF Value var_sshd_set_keepalive # promote to variable set_fact: var_sshd_set_keepalive: !!str tags: - always - name: Set SSH Client Alive Count Max block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*ClientAliveCountMax\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*ClientAliveCountMax\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*ClientAliveCountMax\s+ line: ClientAliveCountMax {{ var_sshd_set_keepalive }} state: present insertbefore: BOF validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80907-9 - CJIS-5.5.6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010200 - NIST-800-171-3.1.11 - NIST-800-53-AC-12 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-2(5) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-10 - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sshd_set_keepalive # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then var_sshd_set_keepalive='' if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*ClientAliveCountMax\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" else touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" # Insert at the beginning of the file printf '%s\n' "ClientAliveCountMax $var_sshd_set_keepalive" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cat "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Set SSH Client Alive Interval SSH allows administrators to set a network responsiveness timeout interval. After this interval has passed, the unresponsive client will be automatically logged out. To set this timeout interval, edit the following line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config as follows: ClientAliveInterval The timeout interval is given in seconds. For example, have a timeout of 10 minutes, set interval to 600. If a shorter timeout has already been set for the login shell, that value will preempt any SSH setting made in /etc/ssh/sshd_config. Keep in mind that some processes may stop SSH from correctly detecting that the user is idle. SSH disconnecting unresponsive clients will not have desired effect without also configuring ClientAliveCountMax in the SSH service configuration. Following conditions may prevent the SSH session to time out: Remote processes on the remote machine generates output. As the output has to be transferred over the network to the client, the timeout is reset every time such transfer happens.Any scp or sftp activity by the same user to the host resets the timeout. BP28(R29) 1 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 7 8 5.5.6 APO13.01 BAI03.01 BAI03.02 BAI03.03 DSS01.03 DSS03.05 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 3.1.11 CCI-000879 CCI-001133 CCI-002361 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 6.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.3 A.14.1.1 A.14.2.1 A.14.2.5 A.18.1.4 A.6.1.2 A.6.1.5 A.7.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 CM-6(a) AC-17(a) AC-2(5) AC-12 AC-17(a) SC-10 CM-6(a) DE.CM-1 DE.CM-3 PR.AC-1 PR.AC-4 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 PR.IP-2 Req-8.1.8 8.2.8 SRG-OS-000126-GPOS-00066 SRG-OS-000163-GPOS-00072 SRG-OS-000279-GPOS-00109 SRG-OS-000395-GPOS-00175 RHEL-08-010201 4.2.7 SV-244525r917886_rule Terminating an idle ssh session within a short time period reduces the window of opportunity for unauthorized personnel to take control of a management session enabled on the console or console port that has been let unattended. CCE-80906-1 - name: XCCDF Value sshd_idle_timeout_value # promote to variable set_fact: sshd_idle_timeout_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Set SSH Client Alive Interval block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*ClientAliveInterval\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*ClientAliveInterval\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*ClientAliveInterval\s+ line: ClientAliveInterval {{ sshd_idle_timeout_value }} state: present insertbefore: BOF validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_distribution == 'RedHat' and ansible_distribution_version is version('8.5', '<=') tags: - CCE-80906-1 - CJIS-5.5.6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010201 - NIST-800-171-3.1.11 - NIST-800-53-AC-12 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-2(5) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-10 - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sshd_set_idle_timeout # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { grep -qP "^ID=[\"']?rhel[\"']?$" "/etc/os-release" && { real="$(grep -P "^VERSION_ID=[\"']?[\w.]+[\"']?$" /etc/os-release | sed "s/^VERSION_ID=[\"']\?\([^\"']\+\)[\"']\?$/\1/")"; expected="8.5"; printf "%s\n%s" "$real" "$expected" | sort -VC; }; }; then sshd_idle_timeout_value='' if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*ClientAliveInterval\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" else touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" # Insert at the beginning of the file printf '%s\n' "ClientAliveInterval $sshd_idle_timeout_value" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cat "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Host-Based Authentication SSH's cryptographic host-based authentication is more secure than .rhosts authentication. However, it is not recommended that hosts unilaterally trust one another, even within an organization. The default SSH configuration disables host-based authentication. The appropriate configuration is used if no value is set for HostbasedAuthentication. To explicitly disable host-based authentication, add or correct the following line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config: HostbasedAuthentication no 11 12 14 15 16 18 3 5 9 5.5.6 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.03 DSS06.06 3.1.12 CCI-000366 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 0421 0422 0431 0974 1173 1401 1504 1505 1546 1557 1558 1559 1560 1561 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CIP-007-3 R5.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 AC-3 AC-17(a) CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.AC-4 PR.AC-6 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 FIA_UAU.1 8.3.1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00229 4.2.9 SSH trust relationships mean a compromise on one host can allow an attacker to move trivially to other hosts. CCE-80786-7 - name: Disable Host-Based Authentication block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*HostbasedAuthentication\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*HostbasedAuthentication\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*HostbasedAuthentication\s+ line: HostbasedAuthentication no state: present insertbefore: BOF validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80786-7 - CJIS-5.5.6 - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-3 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.1 - disable_host_auth - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: 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mode: 0600 path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*HostbasedAuthentication\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" else touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" # Insert at the beginning of the file printf '%s\n' "HostbasedAuthentication no" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cat "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable SSH Server firewalld Firewall Exception If the SSH server is in use, inbound connections to SSH's port should be allowed to permit remote access through SSH. In more restrictive firewalld settings, the SSH port should be added to the proper firewalld zone in order to allow SSH remote access. To configure firewalld to allow ssh access, run the following command(s): firewall-cmd --permanent --add-service=ssh Then run the following command to load the newly created rule(s): firewall-cmd --reload The remediation for this rule uses firewall-cmd and nmcli tools. Therefore, it will only be executed if firewalld and NetworkManager services are running. Otherwise, the remediation will be aborted and a informative message will be shown in the remediation report. These respective services will not be started in order to preserve any intentional change in network components related to firewall and network interfaces. This rule also checks if the SSH port was modified by the administrator in the firewalld services definitions and is reflecting the expected port number. Although this is checked, fixing the custom ssh.xml file placed by the administrator at /etc/firewalld/services it is not in the scope of the remediation since there is no reliable way to manually change the respective file. If the default SSH port is modified, it is on the administrator responsibility to ensure the firewalld customizations in the service port level are properly configured. 3.1.12 1416 AC-17(a) CM-6(b) CM-7(a) CM-7(b) SRG-OS-000096-GPOS-00050 If inbound SSH connections are expected, adding the SSH port to the proper firewalld zone will allow remote access through the SSH port. CCE-80820-4 - name: XCCDF Value firewalld_sshd_zone # promote to variable set_fact: firewalld_sshd_zone: !!str tags: - always - name: Enable SSH Server firewalld Firewall Exception - Ensure firewalld and NetworkManager packages are installed ansible.builtin.package: name: '{{ item }}' state: present with_items: - firewalld - NetworkManager when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80820-4 - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - configure_strategy - firewalld_sshd_port_enabled - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Enable SSH Server firewalld Firewall Exception - Collect facts about system services ansible.builtin.service_facts: null register: result_services_states when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80820-4 - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - configure_strategy - firewalld_sshd_port_enabled - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Enable SSH Server firewalld Firewall Exception - Remediation is applicable if firewalld and NetworkManager services are running block: - name: Enable SSH Server firewalld Firewall Exception - Collect NetworkManager connections names ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: nmcli -f UUID,TYPE con | grep ethernet | awk '{ print $1 }' register: result_nmcli_cmd_connections_names changed_when: false - name: Enable SSH Server firewalld Firewall Exception - Collect NetworkManager connections zones ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: nmcli -f connection.zone connection show {{ item | trim }} | awk '{ print $2}' register: result_nmcli_cmd_connections_zones changed_when: false with_items: - '{{ result_nmcli_cmd_connections_names.stdout_lines }}' - name: Enable SSH Server firewalld Firewall Exception - Ensure NetworkManager connections are assigned to a firewalld zone ansible.builtin.command: cmd: nmcli connection modify {{ item.0 }} connection.zone {{ firewalld_sshd_zone }} register: result_nmcli_cmd_connections_assignment with_together: - '{{ result_nmcli_cmd_connections_names.stdout_lines }}' - '{{ result_nmcli_cmd_connections_zones.results }}' when: - item.1.stdout == '--' - name: Enable SSH Server firewalld Firewall Exception - Ensure NetworkManager connections changes are applied ansible.builtin.service: name: NetworkManager state: restarted when: - result_nmcli_cmd_connections_assignment is changed - name: Enable SSH Server firewalld Firewall Exception - Collect firewalld active zones ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: firewall-cmd --get-active-zones | grep -v interfaces register: result_firewall_cmd_zones_names changed_when: false - name: Enable SSH Server firewalld Firewall Exception - Ensure firewalld zones allow SSH ansible.builtin.command: cmd: firewall-cmd --permanent --zone={{ item }} --add-service=ssh register: result_nmcli_cmd_connections_assignment changed_when: - '''ALREADY_ENABLED'' not in result_nmcli_cmd_connections_assignment.stderr' with_items: - '{{ result_firewall_cmd_zones_names.stdout_lines }}' - name: Enable SSH Server firewalld Firewall Exception - Ensure firewalld changes are applied ansible.builtin.service: name: firewalld state: reloaded when: - result_nmcli_cmd_connections_assignment is changed when: - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - ansible_facts.services['firewalld.service'].state == 'running' - ansible_facts.services['NetworkManager.service'].state == 'running' tags: - CCE-80820-4 - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - configure_strategy - firewalld_sshd_port_enabled - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - name: Enable SSH Server firewalld Firewall Exception - Informative message based on services states ansible.builtin.assert: that: - ansible_facts.services['firewalld.service'].state == 'running' - ansible_facts.services['NetworkManager.service'].state == 'running' fail_msg: - firewalld and NetworkManager services are not active. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because it depends on firewalld and NetworkManager services running. - The service is not started by this remediation in order to prevent connection issues. success_msg: - Enable SSH Server firewalld Firewall Exception remediation successfully executed when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80820-4 - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - configure_strategy - firewalld_sshd_port_enabled - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "firewalld" ; then yum install -y "firewalld" fi if ! rpm -q --quiet "NetworkManager" ; then yum install -y "NetworkManager" fi firewalld_sshd_zone='' if systemctl is-active NetworkManager && systemctl is-active firewalld; then # First make sure the SSH service is enabled in run-time for the proper zone. # This is to avoid connection issues when new interfaces are addeded to this zone. firewall-cmd --zone="$firewalld_sshd_zone" --add-service=ssh # This will collect all NetworkManager connections names readarray -t nm_connections < <(nmcli -f UUID,TYPE con | grep ethernet | awk '{ print $1 }') # If the connection is not yet assigned to a firewalld zone, assign it to the proper zone. # This will not change connections which are already assigned to any firewalld zone. for connection in "${nm_connections[@]}"; do current_zone=$(nmcli -f connection.zone connection show "$connection" | awk '{ print $2}') if [ $current_zone = "--" ]; then nmcli connection modify "$connection" connection.zone $firewalld_sshd_zone fi done systemctl restart NetworkManager # Active zones are zones with at least one interface assigned to it. # It is possible that traffic is comming by any active interface and consequently any # active zone. So, this make sure all active zones are permanently allowing SSH service. readarray -t firewalld_active_zones < <(firewall-cmd --get-active-zones | grep -v interfaces) for zone in "${firewalld_active_zones[@]}"; do firewall-cmd --permanent --zone="$zone" --add-service=ssh done firewall-cmd --reload else echo " firewalld and NetworkManager services are not active. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because it depends on firewalld and NetworkManager services running. The service is not started by this remediation in order to prevent connection issues." fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Allow Only SSH Protocol 2 Only SSH protocol version 2 connections should be permitted. The default setting in /etc/ssh/sshd_config is correct, and can be verified by ensuring that the following line appears: Protocol 2 As of openssh-server version 7.4 and above, the only protocol supported is version 2, and line Protocol 2 in /etc/ssh/sshd_config is not necessary. NT007(R1) 1 12 15 16 5 8 5.5.6 APO13.01 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 3.1.13 3.5.4 CCI-000197 CCI-000366 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.6 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 0487 1449 1506 A.11.2.6 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.18.1.4 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 CIP-003-8 R4.2 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R7.1 CM-6(a) AC-17(a) AC-17(2) IA-5(1)(c) SC-13 MA-4(6) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-3 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 PR.PT-4 SRG-OS-000074-GPOS-00042 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 SSH protocol version 1 is an insecure implementation of the SSH protocol and has many well-known vulnerability exploits. Exploits of the SSH daemon could provide immediate root access to the system. CCE-80894-9 - name: Allow Only SSH Protocol 2 block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*Protocol\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*Protocol\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*Protocol\s+ line: Protocol 2 state: present insertbefore: BOF validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80894-9 - CJIS-5.5.6 - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 - NIST-800-171-3.5.4 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) - NIST-800-53-MA-4(6) - NIST-800-53-SC-13 - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sshd_allow_only_protocol2 # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^Protocol") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s %s" "$stripped_key" "2" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^Protocol\\>" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^Protocol\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" else if [[ -s "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi cce="CCE-80894-9" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Compression Or Set Compression to delayed Compression is useful for slow network connections over long distances but can cause performance issues on local LANs. If use of compression is required, it should be enabled only after a user has authenticated; otherwise, it should be disabled. To disable compression or delay compression until after a user has successfully authenticated, add or correct the following line in the /etc/ssh/sshd_config file: Compression 11 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 3.1.12 CCI-000366 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 AC-17(a) CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 If compression is allowed in an SSH connection prior to authentication, vulnerabilities in the compression software could result in compromise of the system from an unauthenticated connection, potentially with root privileges. CCE-80895-6 - name: XCCDF Value var_sshd_disable_compression # promote to variable set_fact: var_sshd_disable_compression: !!str tags: - always - name: Disable Compression Or Set Compression to delayed block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*Compression\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*Compression\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*Compression\s+ line: Compression {{ var_sshd_disable_compression }} state: present insertbefore: BOF validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80895-6 - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sshd_disable_compression # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then var_sshd_disable_compression='' if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*Compression\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" else touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" # Insert at the beginning of the file printf '%s\n' "Compression $var_sshd_disable_compression" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cat "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable SSH Access via Empty Passwords Disallow SSH login with empty passwords. The default SSH configuration disables logins with empty passwords. The appropriate configuration is used if no value is set for PermitEmptyPasswords. To explicitly disallow SSH login from accounts with empty passwords, add or correct the following line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config: PermitEmptyPasswords no Any accounts with empty passwords should be disabled immediately, and PAM configuration should prevent users from being able to assign themselves empty passwords. NT007(R17) 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 9 5.5.6 APO01.06 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 DSS06.03 DSS06.06 3.1.1 3.1.5 CCI-000366 CCI-000766 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 5.2 SR 7.6 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 AC-17(a) CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.AC-4 PR.AC-6 PR.DS-5 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 FIA_UAU.1 Req-2.2.4 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000106-GPOS-00053 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00229 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-020330 4.2.18 SV-230380r858715_rule Configuring this setting for the SSH daemon provides additional assurance that remote login via SSH will require a password, even in the event of misconfiguration elsewhere. CCE-80896-4 - name: Disable SSH Access via Empty Passwords block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*PermitEmptyPasswords\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*PermitEmptyPasswords\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*PermitEmptyPasswords\s+ line: PermitEmptyPasswords no state: present insertbefore: BOF validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80896-4 - CJIS-5.5.6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020330 - NIST-800-171-3.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.4 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sshd_disable_empty_passwords # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*PermitEmptyPasswords\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" else touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" # Insert at the beginning of the file printf '%s\n' "PermitEmptyPasswords no" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cat "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable GSSAPI Authentication Unless needed, SSH should not permit extraneous or unnecessary authentication mechanisms like GSSAPI. The default SSH configuration disallows authentications based on GSSAPI. The appropriate configuration is used if no value is set for GSSAPIAuthentication. To explicitly disable GSSAPI authentication, add or correct the following line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config: GSSAPIAuthentication no 11 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 3.1.12 CCI-000318 CCI-000368 CCI-001812 CCI-001813 CCI-001814 CCI-000366 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 7.6 0418 1055 1402 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) AC-17(a) PR.IP-1 FTP_ITC_EXT.1 FCS_SSH_EXT.1.2 SRG-OS-000364-GPOS-00151 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010522 SV-244528r858709_rule GSSAPI authentication is used to provide additional authentication mechanisms to applications. Allowing GSSAPI authentication through SSH exposes the system's GSSAPI to remote hosts, increasing the attack surface of the system. CCE-80897-2 - name: Disable GSSAPI Authentication block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*GSSAPIAuthentication\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*GSSAPIAuthentication\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*GSSAPIAuthentication\s+ line: GSSAPIAuthentication no state: present insertbefore: BOF validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80897-2 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010522 - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sshd_disable_gssapi_auth # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*GSSAPIAuthentication\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" else touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" # Insert at the beginning of the file printf '%s\n' "GSSAPIAuthentication no" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cat "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable Kerberos Authentication Unless needed, SSH should not permit extraneous or unnecessary authentication mechanisms like Kerberos. The default SSH configuration disallows authentication validation through Kerberos. The appropriate configuration is used if no value is set for KerberosAuthentication. To explicitly disable Kerberos authentication, add or correct the following line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config: KerberosAuthentication no 11 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 3.1.12 CCI-000318 CCI-000368 CCI-001812 CCI-001813 CCI-001814 CCI-000366 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 7.6 0421 0422 0431 0974 1173 1401 1504 1505 1546 1557 1558 1559 1560 1561 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 AC-17(a) CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 FTP_ITC_EXT.1 FCS_SSH_EXT.1.2 SRG-OS-000364-GPOS-00151 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010521 SV-230291r858707_rule Kerberos authentication for SSH is often implemented using GSSAPI. If Kerberos is enabled through SSH, the SSH daemon provides a means of access to the system's Kerberos implementation. Configuring these settings for the SSH daemon provides additional assurance that remote logon via SSH will not use unused methods of authentication, even in the event of misconfiguration elsewhere. CCE-80898-0 - name: Disable Kerberos Authentication block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*KerberosAuthentication\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*KerberosAuthentication\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*KerberosAuthentication\s+ line: KerberosAuthentication no state: present insertbefore: BOF validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80898-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010521 - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sshd_disable_kerb_auth # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*KerberosAuthentication\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" else touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" # Insert at the beginning of the file printf '%s\n' "KerberosAuthentication no" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cat "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable PubkeyAuthentication Authentication Unless needed, SSH should not permit extraneous or unnecessary authentication mechanisms. To disable PubkeyAuthentication authentication, add or correct the following line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config: PubkeyAuthentication no PubkeyAuthentication authentication is used to provide additional authentication mechanisms to applications. Allowing PubkeyAuthentication authentication through SSH allows users to generate their own authentication tokens, increasing the attack surface of the system. CCE-82345-0 - name: Disable PubkeyAuthentication Authentication block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*PubkeyAuthentication\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*PubkeyAuthentication\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*PubkeyAuthentication\s+ line: PubkeyAuthentication no state: present insertbefore: BOF validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82345-0 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sshd_disable_pubkey_auth # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*PubkeyAuthentication\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" else touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" # Insert at the beginning of the file printf '%s\n' "PubkeyAuthentication no" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cat "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable SSH Support for .rhosts Files SSH can emulate the behavior of the obsolete rsh command in allowing users to enable insecure access to their accounts via .rhosts files. The default SSH configuration disables support for .rhosts. The appropriate configuration is used if no value is set for IgnoreRhosts. To explicitly disable support for .rhosts files, add or correct the following line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config: IgnoreRhosts yes 11 12 14 15 16 18 3 5 9 5.5.6 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.03 DSS06.06 3.1.12 CCI-000366 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 AC-17(a) CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.AC-4 PR.AC-6 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 FIA_UAU.1 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 4.2.10 SSH trust relationships mean a compromise on one host can allow an attacker to move trivially to other hosts. CCE-80899-8 - name: Disable SSH Support for .rhosts Files block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*IgnoreRhosts\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*IgnoreRhosts\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*IgnoreRhosts\s+ line: IgnoreRhosts yes state: present insertbefore: BOF validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80899-8 - CJIS-5.5.6 - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sshd_disable_rhosts # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*IgnoreRhosts\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" else touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" # Insert at the beginning of the file printf '%s\n' "IgnoreRhosts yes" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cat "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable SSH Support for Rhosts RSA Authentication SSH can allow authentication through the obsolete rsh command through the use of the authenticating user's SSH keys. This should be disabled. To ensure this behavior is disabled, add or correct the following line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config: RhostsRSAAuthentication no As of openssh-server version 7.4 and above, the RhostsRSAAuthentication option has been deprecated, and the line RhostsRSAAuthentication no in /etc/ssh/sshd_config is not necessary. 11 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 3.1.12 CCI-000366 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 AC-17(a) CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 FIA_UAU.1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 Configuring this setting for the SSH daemon provides additional assurance that remote login via SSH will require a password, even in the event of misconfiguration elsewhere. CCE-80900-4 - name: Disable SSH Support for Rhosts RSA Authentication block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*RhostsRSAAuthentication\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*RhostsRSAAuthentication\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*RhostsRSAAuthentication\s+ line: RhostsRSAAuthentication no state: present insertbefore: BOF validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80900-4 - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sshd_disable_rhosts_rsa # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^RhostsRSAAuthentication") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s %s" "$stripped_key" "no" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^RhostsRSAAuthentication\\>" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^RhostsRSAAuthentication\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" else if [[ -s "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi cce="CCE-80900-4" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable SSH Root Login The root user should never be allowed to login to a system directly over a network. To disable root login via SSH, add or correct the following line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config: PermitRootLogin no This rule is disabled on Red Hat Virtualization Hosts and Managers, it will report not applicable. RHV hosts require root access to be managed by RHV Manager. BP28(R19) NT007(R21) 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 5.5.6 APO01.06 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.02 DSS06.03 DSS06.06 DSS06.10 3.1.1 3.1.5 CCI-000366 CCI-000770 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.18.1.4 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CIP-007-3 R5.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 AC-6(2) AC-17(a) IA-2 IA-2(5) CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-4 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 PR.DS-5 PR.PT-3 FAU_GEN.1 Req-2.2.4 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000109-GPOS-00056 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 SRG-APP-000148-CTR-000335 SRG-APP-000190-CTR-000500 RHEL-08-010550 4.2.19 SV-230296r858711_rule Even though the communications channel may be encrypted, an additional layer of security is gained by extending the policy of not logging directly on as root. In addition, logging in with a user-specific account provides individual accountability of actions performed on the system and also helps to minimize direct attack attempts on root's password. CCE-80901-2 - name: Disable SSH Root Login block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*PermitRootLogin\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*PermitRootLogin\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*PermitRootLogin\s+ line: PermitRootLogin no state: present insertbefore: BOF validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80901-2 - CJIS-5.5.6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010550 - NIST-800-171-3.1.1 - NIST-800-171-3.1.5 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-6(2) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - NIST-800-53-IA-2 - NIST-800-53-IA-2(5) - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.4 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sshd_disable_root_login # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*PermitRootLogin\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" else touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" # Insert at the beginning of the file printf '%s\n' "PermitRootLogin no" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cat "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable SSH root Login with a Password (Insecure) To disable password-based root logins over SSH, add or correct the following line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config: PermitRootLogin prohibit-password While this disables password-based root logins, direct root logins through other means such as through SSH keys or GSSAPI will still be permitted. Permitting any sort of root login remotely opens up the root account to attack. To fully disable direct root logins over SSH (which is considered a best practice) and prevent remote attacks against the root account, see CCE-27100-7, CCE-27445-6, CCE-80901-2, and similar. Even though the communications channel may be encrypted, an additional layer of security is gained by preventing use of a password. This also helps to minimize direct attack attempts on root's password. - name: Disable SSH root Login with a Password (Insecure) block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*PermitRootLogin\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*PermitRootLogin\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*PermitRootLogin\s+ line: PermitRootLogin prohibit-password state: present insertbefore: BOF validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sshd_disable_root_password_login # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*PermitRootLogin\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" else touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" # Insert at the beginning of the file printf '%s\n' "PermitRootLogin prohibit-password" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cat "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable SSH TCP Forwarding The AllowTcpForwarding parameter specifies whether TCP forwarding is permitted. To disable TCP forwarding, add or correct the following line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config: AllowTcpForwarding no 2.2.6 Leaving port forwarding enabled can expose the organization to security risks and back-doors. CCE-83301-2 - name: Disable SSH TCP Forwarding block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*AllowTcpForwarding\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*AllowTcpForwarding\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*AllowTcpForwarding\s+ line: AllowTcpForwarding no state: present insertbefore: BOF validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83301-2 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sshd_disable_tcp_forwarding # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*AllowTcpForwarding\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" else touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" # Insert at the beginning of the file printf '%s\n' "AllowTcpForwarding no" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cat "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable SSH Support for User Known Hosts SSH can allow system users to connect to systems if a cache of the remote systems public keys is available. This should be disabled. To ensure this behavior is disabled, add or correct the following line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config: IgnoreUserKnownHosts yes 11 3 9 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 3.1.12 CCI-000366 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 AC-17(a) CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 FIA_UAU.1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010520 SV-230290r858705_rule Configuring this setting for the SSH daemon provides additional assurance that remote login via SSH will require a password, even in the event of misconfiguration elsewhere. CCE-80902-0 - name: Disable SSH Support for User Known Hosts block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*IgnoreUserKnownHosts\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*IgnoreUserKnownHosts\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*IgnoreUserKnownHosts\s+ line: IgnoreUserKnownHosts yes state: present insertbefore: BOF validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80902-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010520 - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sshd_disable_user_known_hosts # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*IgnoreUserKnownHosts\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" else touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" # Insert at the beginning of the file printf '%s\n' "IgnoreUserKnownHosts yes" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cat "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Disable X11 Forwarding The X11Forwarding parameter provides the ability to tunnel X11 traffic through the connection to enable remote graphic connections. SSH has the capability to encrypt remote X11 connections when SSH's X11Forwarding option is enabled. The default SSH configuration disables X11Forwarding. The appropriate configuration is used if no value is set for X11Forwarding. To explicitly disable X11 Forwarding, add or correct the following line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config: X11Forwarding no CCI-000366 CM-6(b) 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040340 SV-230555r858721_rule Disable X11 forwarding unless there is an operational requirement to use X11 applications directly. There is a small risk that the remote X11 servers of users who are logged in via SSH with X11 forwarding could be compromised by other users on the X11 server. Note that even if X11 forwarding is disabled, users can always install their own forwarders. CCE-83360-8 - name: Disable X11 Forwarding block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*X11Forwarding\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*X11Forwarding\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*X11Forwarding\s+ line: X11Forwarding no state: present insertbefore: BOF validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83360-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040340 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sshd_disable_x11_forwarding # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*X11Forwarding\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" else touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" # Insert at the beginning of the file printf '%s\n' "X11Forwarding no" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cat "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Do Not Allow SSH Environment Options Ensure that users are not able to override environment variables of the SSH daemon. The default SSH configuration disables environment processing. The appropriate configuration is used if no value is set for PermitUserEnvironment. To explicitly disable Environment options, add or correct the following /etc/ssh/sshd_config: PermitUserEnvironment no 11 3 9 5.5.6 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 3.1.12 CCI-000366 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 7.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 AC-17(a) CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.IP-1 Req-2.2.4 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00229 RHEL-08-010830 4.2.20 SV-230330r877377_rule SSH environment options potentially allow users to bypass access restriction in some configurations. CCE-80903-8 - name: Do Not Allow SSH Environment Options block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*PermitUserEnvironment\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*PermitUserEnvironment\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*PermitUserEnvironment\s+ line: PermitUserEnvironment no state: present insertbefore: BOF validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80903-8 - CJIS-5.5.6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010830 - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.4 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sshd_do_not_permit_user_env # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*PermitUserEnvironment\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" else touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" # Insert at the beginning of the file printf '%s\n' "PermitUserEnvironment no" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cat "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable GSSAPI Authentication Sites setup to use Kerberos or other GSSAPI Authenticaion require setting sshd to accept this authentication. To enable GSSAPI authentication, add or correct the following line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config: GSSAPIAuthentication yes Kerberos authentication for SSH is often implemented using GSSAPI. If Kerberos is enabled through SSH, the SSH daemon provides a means of access to the system's Kerberos implementation. Vulnerabilities in the system's Kerberos implementations may be subject to exploitation. For enterprises, Kerberos is often enabled and used with GSSAPI for centralized user account management which may necessitate enabling of GSSAPI functionality in SSH. - name: Enable GSSAPI Authentication block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*GSSAPIAuthentication\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*GSSAPIAuthentication\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*GSSAPIAuthentication\s+ line: GSSAPIAuthentication yes state: present insertbefore: BOF validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sshd_enable_gssapi_auth # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*GSSAPIAuthentication\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" else touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" # Insert at the beginning of the file printf '%s\n' "GSSAPIAuthentication yes" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cat "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable PAM UsePAM Enables the Pluggable Authentication Module interface. If set to “yes” this will enable PAM authentication using ChallengeResponseAuthentication and PasswordAuthentication in addition to PAM account and session module processing for all authentication types. To enable PAM authentication, add or correct the following line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config: UsePAM yes CCI-000877 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000125-GPOS-00065 4.2.21 When UsePAM is set to yes, PAM runs through account and session types properly. This is important if you want to restrict access to services based off of IP, time or other factors of the account. Additionally, you can make sure users inherit certain environment variables on login or disallow access to the server. CCE-86721-8 - name: Enable PAM block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*UsePAM\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*UsePAM\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*UsePAM\s+ line: UsePAM yes state: present insertbefore: BOF validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86721-8 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sshd_enable_pam # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*UsePAM\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" else touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" # Insert at the beginning of the file printf '%s\n' "UsePAM yes" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cat "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable Public Key Authentication Enable SSH login with public keys. The default SSH configuration enables authentication based on public keys. The appropriate configuration is used if no value is set for PubkeyAuthentication. To explicitly enable Public Key Authentication, add or correct the following /etc/ssh/sshd_config: PubkeyAuthentication yes CCI-000765 CCI-000766 CCI-000767 CCI-000768 SRG-OS-000105-GPOS-00052 SRG-OS-000106-GPOS-00053 SRG-OS-000107-GPOS-00054 SRG-OS-000108-GPOS-00055 Without the use of multifactor authentication, the ease of access to privileged functions is greatly increased. Multifactor authentication requires using two or more factors to achieve authentication. A privileged account is defined as an information system account with authorizations of a privileged user. The DoD CAC with DoD-approved PKI is an example of multifactor authentication. - name: Enable Public Key Authentication block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*PubkeyAuthentication\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*PubkeyAuthentication\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*PubkeyAuthentication\s+ line: PubkeyAuthentication yes state: present insertbefore: BOF validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sshd_enable_pubkey_auth # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*PubkeyAuthentication\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" else touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" # Insert at the beginning of the file printf '%s\n' "PubkeyAuthentication yes" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cat "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable Use of Strict Mode Checking SSHs StrictModes option checks file and ownership permissions in the user's home directory .ssh folder before accepting login. If world- writable permissions are found, logon is rejected. The default SSH configuration has StrictModes enabled. The appropriate configuration is used if no value is set for StrictModes. To explicitly enable StrictModes in SSH, add or correct the following line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config: StrictModes yes 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 3.1.12 CCI-000366 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 AC-6 AC-17(a) CM-6(a) PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010500 SV-230288r858701_rule If other users have access to modify user-specific SSH configuration files, they may be able to log into the system as another user. CCE-80904-6 - name: Enable Use of Strict Mode Checking block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*StrictModes\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*StrictModes\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*StrictModes\s+ line: StrictModes yes state: present insertbefore: BOF validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80904-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010500 - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sshd_enable_strictmodes # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*StrictModes\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" else touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" # Insert at the beginning of the file printf '%s\n' "StrictModes yes" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cat "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable SSH Warning Banner To enable the warning banner and ensure it is consistent across the system, add or correct the following line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config: Banner /etc/issue Another section contains information on how to create an appropriate system-wide warning banner. 1 12 15 16 5.5.6 DSS05.04 DSS05.10 DSS06.10 3.1.9 CCI-000048 CCI-000050 CCI-001384 CCI-001385 CCI-001386 CCI-001387 CCI-001388 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 A.18.1.4 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.4 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 AC-8(a) AC-8(c) AC-17(a) CM-6(a) PR.AC-7 FTA_TAB.1 Req-2.2.4 SRG-OS-000023-GPOS-00006 SRG-OS-000228-GPOS-00088 RHEL-08-010040 SV-230225r858694_rule The warning message reinforces policy awareness during the logon process and facilitates possible legal action against attackers. Alternatively, systems whose ownership should not be obvious should ensure usage of a banner that does not provide easy attribution. CCE-80905-3 - name: Enable SSH Warning Banner block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*Banner\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*Banner\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*Banner\s+ line: Banner /etc/issue state: present insertbefore: BOF validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80905-3 - CJIS-5.5.6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010040 - NIST-800-171-3.1.9 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.4 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sshd_enable_warning_banner # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*Banner\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" else touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" # Insert at the beginning of the file printf '%s\n' "Banner /etc/issue" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cat "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable SSH Warning Banner To enable the warning banner and ensure it is consistent across the system, add or correct the following line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config: Banner /etc/issue.net Another section contains information on how to create an appropriate system-wide warning banner. 5.5.6 DSS05.04 DSS05.10 DSS06.10 3.1.9 CCI-000048 CCI-000050 CCI-001384 CCI-001385 CCI-001386 CCI-001387 CCI-001388 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 A.18.1.4 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.4 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 AC-8(a) AC-8(c) AC-17(a) CM-6(a) PR.AC-7 FTA_TAB.1 SRG-OS-000023-GPOS-00006 SRG-OS-000228-GPOS-00088 4.2.5 The warning message reinforces policy awareness during the logon process and facilitates possible legal action against attackers. Alternatively, systems whose ownership should not be obvious should ensure usage of a banner that does not provide easy attribution. CCE-87978-3 - name: Enable SSH Warning Banner block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*Banner\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*Banner\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*Banner\s+ line: Banner /etc/issue.net state: present insertbefore: BOF validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-87978-3 - CJIS-5.5.6 - NIST-800-171-3.1.9 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sshd_enable_warning_banner_net # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*Banner\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" else touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" # Insert at the beginning of the file printf '%s\n' "Banner /etc/issue.net" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cat "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable Encrypted X11 Forwarding By default, remote X11 connections are not encrypted when initiated by users. SSH has the capability to encrypt remote X11 connections when SSH's X11Forwarding option is enabled. To enable X11 Forwarding, add or correct the following line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config: X11Forwarding yes 1 11 12 13 15 16 18 20 3 4 6 9 BAI03.08 BAI07.04 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS03.01 3.1.13 CCI-000366 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 4.4.3.3 SR 7.6 A.12.1.1 A.12.1.2 A.12.1.4 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.2 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 CIP-007-3 R7.1 CM-6(a) AC-17(a) AC-17(2) DE.AE-1 PR.DS-7 PR.IP-1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 Non-encrypted X displays allow an attacker to capture keystrokes and to execute commands remotely. CCE-82421-9 - name: Enable Encrypted X11 Forwarding block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*X11Forwarding\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*X11Forwarding\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*X11Forwarding\s+ line: X11Forwarding yes state: present insertbefore: BOF validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82421-9 - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - high_severity - low_complexity - low_disruption - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sshd_enable_x11_forwarding # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*X11Forwarding\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" else touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" # Insert at the beginning of the file printf '%s\n' "X11Forwarding yes" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cat "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Limit Users' SSH Access By default, the SSH configuration allows any user with an account to access the system. There are several options available to limit which users and group can access the system via SSH. It is recommended that at least one of the following options be leveraged: - AllowUsers variable gives the system administrator the option of allowing specific users to ssh into the system. The list consists of space separated user names. Numeric user IDs are not recognized with this variable. If a system administrator wants to restrict user access further by specifically allowing a user's access only from a particular host, the entry can be specified in the form of user@host. - AllowGroups variable gives the system administrator the option of allowing specific groups of users to ssh into the system. The list consists of space separated group names. Numeric group IDs are not recognized with this variable. - DenyUsers variable gives the system administrator the option of denying specific users to ssh into the system. The list consists of space separated user names. Numeric user IDs are not recognized with this variable. If a system administrator wants to restrict user access further by specifically denying a user's access from a particular host, the entry can be specified in the form of user@host. - DenyGroups variable gives the system administrator the option of denying specific groups of users to ssh into the system. The list consists of space separated group names. Numeric group IDs are not recognized with this variable. 11 12 14 15 16 18 3 5 DSS05.02 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS06.03 DSS06.06 3.1.12 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CIP-007-3 R5.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 AC-3 CM-6(a) PR.AC-4 PR.AC-6 PR.PT-3 Req-2.2.4 2.2.6 4.2.4 Specifying which accounts are allowed SSH access into the system reduces the possibility of unauthorized access to the system. CCE-82422-7 Enable SSH Print Last Log Ensure that SSH will display the date and time of the last successful account logon. The default SSH configuration enables print of the date and time of the last login. The appropriate configuration is used if no value is set for PrintLastLog. To explicitly enable LastLog in SSH, add or correct the following line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config: PrintLastLog yes 1 12 15 16 DSS05.04 DSS05.10 DSS06.10 CCI-000052 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 A.18.1.4 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.4 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 AC-9 AC-9(1) PR.AC-7 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-020350 SV-230382r858717_rule Providing users feedback on when account accesses last occurred facilitates user recognition and reporting of unauthorized account use. CCE-82281-7 - name: Enable SSH Print Last Log block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*PrintLastLog\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*PrintLastLog\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*PrintLastLog\s+ line: PrintLastLog yes state: present insertbefore: BOF validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82281-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020350 - NIST-800-53-AC-9 - NIST-800-53-AC-9(1) - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sshd_print_last_log # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*PrintLastLog\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" else touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" # Insert at the beginning of the file printf '%s\n' "PrintLastLog yes" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cat "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Force frequent session key renegotiation The RekeyLimit parameter specifies how often the session key of the is renegotiated, both in terms of amount of data that may be transmitted and the time elapsed. To decrease the default limits, add or correct the following line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config: RekeyLimit CCI-000068 FCS_SSH_EXT.1.8 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 SRG-OS-000033-GPOS-00014 RHEL-08-040161 SV-230527r877398_rule By decreasing the limit based on the amount of data and enabling time-based limit, effects of potential attacks against encryption keys are limited. CCE-82177-7 - name: XCCDF Value var_rekey_limit_size # promote to variable set_fact: var_rekey_limit_size: !!str tags: - always - name: XCCDF Value var_rekey_limit_time # promote to variable set_fact: var_rekey_limit_time: !!str tags: - always - name: Force frequent session key renegotiation block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*RekeyLimit\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*RekeyLimit\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*RekeyLimit\s+ line: RekeyLimit {{ var_rekey_limit_size }} {{ var_rekey_limit_time }} state: present insertbefore: BOF validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82177-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040161 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sshd_rekey_limit # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then var_rekey_limit_size='' var_rekey_limit_time='' if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*RekeyLimit\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" else touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" # Insert at the beginning of the file printf '%s\n' "RekeyLimit $var_rekey_limit_size $var_rekey_limit_time" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cat "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure SSH LoginGraceTime is configured The LoginGraceTime parameter to the SSH server specifies the time allowed for successful authentication to the SSH server. The longer the Grace period is the more open unauthenticated connections can exist. Like other session controls in this session the Grace Period should be limited to appropriate limits to ensure the service is available for needed access. 2.2.6 4.2.12 Setting the LoginGraceTime parameter to a low number will minimize the risk of successful brute force attacks to the SSH server. It will also limit the number of concurrent unauthenticated connections. CCE-86551-9 - name: XCCDF Value var_sshd_set_login_grace_time # promote to variable set_fact: var_sshd_set_login_grace_time: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure SSH LoginGraceTime is configured block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*LoginGraceTime\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*LoginGraceTime\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*LoginGraceTime\s+ line: LoginGraceTime {{ var_sshd_set_login_grace_time }} state: present insertbefore: BOF validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86551-9 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sshd_set_login_grace_time # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then var_sshd_set_login_grace_time='' if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*LoginGraceTime\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" else touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" # Insert at the beginning of the file printf '%s\n' "LoginGraceTime $var_sshd_set_login_grace_time" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cat "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Set LogLevel to INFO The INFO parameter specifices that record login and logout activity will be logged. The default SSH configuration sets the log level to INFO. The appropriate configuration is used if no value is set for LogLevel. To explicitly specify the log level in SSH, add or correct the following line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config: LogLevel INFO AC-17(a) CM-6(a) 4.2.13 SSH provides several logging levels with varying amounts of verbosity. DEBUG is specifically not recommended other than strictly for debugging SSH communications since it provides so much data that it is difficult to identify important security information. INFO level is the basic level that only records login activity of SSH users. In many situations, such as Incident Response, it is important to determine when a particular user was active on a system. The logout record can eliminate those users who disconnected, which helps narrow the field. CCE-82282-5 - name: Set LogLevel to INFO block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*LogLevel\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*LogLevel\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*LogLevel\s+ line: LogLevel INFO state: present insertbefore: BOF validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82282-5 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sshd_set_loglevel_info # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*LogLevel\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" else touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" # Insert at the beginning of the file printf '%s\n' "LogLevel INFO" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cat "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Set SSH Daemon LogLevel to VERBOSE The VERBOSE parameter configures the SSH daemon to record login and logout activity. To specify the log level in SSH, add or correct the following line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config: LogLevel VERBOSE CCI-000067 CIP-007-3 R7.1 AC-17(a) AC-17(1) CM-6(a) Req-2.2.4 2.2.6 SRG-OS-000032-GPOS-00013 4.2.13 SSH provides several logging levels with varying amounts of verbosity. DEBUG is specifically not recommended other than strictly for debugging SSH communications since it provides so much data that it is difficult to identify important security information. INFO or VERBOSE level is the basic level that only records login activity of SSH users. In many situations, such as Incident Response, it is important to determine when a particular user was active on a system. The logout record can eliminate those users who disconnected, which helps narrow the field. CCE-82420-1 - name: Set SSH Daemon LogLevel to VERBOSE block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*LogLevel\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*LogLevel\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*LogLevel\s+ line: LogLevel VERBOSE state: present insertbefore: BOF validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82420-1 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(1) - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.4 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sshd_set_loglevel_verbose # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*LogLevel\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" else touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" # Insert at the beginning of the file printf '%s\n' "LogLevel VERBOSE" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cat "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Set SSH authentication attempt limit The MaxAuthTries parameter specifies the maximum number of authentication attempts permitted per connection. Once the number of failures reaches half this value, additional failures are logged. to set MaxAUthTries edit /etc/ssh/sshd_config as follows: MaxAuthTries 0421 0422 0431 0974 1173 1401 1504 1505 1546 1557 1558 1559 1560 1561 2.2.6 4.2.15 Setting the MaxAuthTries parameter to a low number will minimize the risk of successful brute force attacks to the SSH server. CCE-83500-9 - name: XCCDF Value sshd_max_auth_tries_value # promote to variable set_fact: sshd_max_auth_tries_value: !!str tags: - always - name: Set SSH authentication attempt limit block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*MaxAuthTries\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*MaxAuthTries\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*MaxAuthTries\s+ line: MaxAuthTries {{ sshd_max_auth_tries_value }} state: present insertbefore: BOF validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83500-9 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sshd_set_max_auth_tries # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then sshd_max_auth_tries_value='' if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*MaxAuthTries\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" else touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" # Insert at the beginning of the file printf '%s\n' "MaxAuthTries $sshd_max_auth_tries_value" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cat "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Set SSH MaxSessions limit The MaxSessions parameter specifies the maximum number of open sessions permitted from a given connection. To set MaxSessions edit /etc/ssh/sshd_config as follows: MaxSessions 2.2.6 4.2.16 To protect a system from denial of service due to a large number of concurrent sessions, use the rate limiting function of MaxSessions to protect availability of sshd logins and prevent overwhelming the daemon. CCE-83357-4 - name: XCCDF Value var_sshd_max_sessions # promote to variable set_fact: var_sshd_max_sessions: !!str tags: - always - name: Set SSH MaxSessions limit block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*MaxSessions\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*MaxSessions\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*MaxSessions\s+ line: MaxSessions {{ var_sshd_max_sessions }} state: present insertbefore: BOF validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83357-4 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sshd_set_max_sessions # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then var_sshd_max_sessions='' if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*MaxSessions\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" else touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" # Insert at the beginning of the file printf '%s\n' "MaxSessions $var_sshd_max_sessions" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cat "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Ensure SSH MaxStartups is configured The MaxStartups parameter specifies the maximum number of concurrent unauthenticated connections to the SSH daemon. Additional connections will be dropped until authentication succeeds or the LoginGraceTime expires for a connection. To confgure MaxStartups, you should add or correct the following line in the /etc/ssh/sshd_config file: MaxStartups CIS recommends a MaxStartups value of '10:30:60', or more restrictive where dictated by site policy. 2.2.6 4.2.17 To protect a system from denial of service due to a large number of pending authentication connection attempts, use the rate limiting function of MaxStartups to protect availability of sshd logins and prevent overwhelming the daemon. CCE-90718-8 - name: XCCDF Value var_sshd_set_maxstartups # promote to variable set_fact: var_sshd_set_maxstartups: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure SSH MaxStartups is configured block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*MaxStartups\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*MaxStartups\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*MaxStartups\s+ line: MaxStartups {{ var_sshd_set_maxstartups }} state: present insertbefore: BOF validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-90718-8 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sshd_set_maxstartups # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then var_sshd_set_maxstartups='' if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*MaxStartups\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" else touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" # Insert at the beginning of the file printf '%s\n' "MaxStartups $var_sshd_set_maxstartups" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cat "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Use Only FIPS 140-2 Validated Ciphers Limit the ciphers to those algorithms which are FIPS-approved. Counter (CTR) mode is also preferred over cipher-block chaining (CBC) mode. The following line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config demonstrates use of FIPS-approved ciphers: Ciphers aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc The man page sshd_config(5) contains a list of supported ciphers. The rule is parametrized to use the following ciphers: . The system needs to be rebooted for these changes to take effect. System Crypto Modules must be provided by a vendor that undergoes FIPS-140 certifications. FIPS-140 is applicable to all Federal agencies that use cryptographic-based security systems to protect sensitive information in computer and telecommunication systems (including voice systems) as defined in Section 5131 of the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, Public Law 104-106. This standard shall be used in designing and implementing cryptographic modules that Federal departments and agencies operate or are operated for them under contract. See https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-2.pdf To meet this, the system has to have cryptographic software provided by a vendor that has undergone this certification. This means providing documentation, test results, design information, and independent third party review by an accredited lab. While open source software is capable of meeting this, it does not meet FIPS-140 unless the vendor submits to this process. 1 11 12 14 15 16 18 3 5 6 8 9 5.5.6 APO11.04 APO13.01 BAI03.05 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.06 DSS06.10 MEA02.01 3.1.13 3.13.11 3.13.8 CCI-000068 CCI-000366 CCI-000803 CCI-000877 CCI-002890 CCI-003123 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(2) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(i) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) 164.314(b)(2)(i) 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.3.9 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 4.3.4.4.7 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.10 SR 2.11 SR 2.12 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 2.8 SR 2.9 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.4.1 A.12.4.2 A.12.4.3 A.12.4.4 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.12.7.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.18.1.4 A.6.1.2 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.7.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-17(a) AC-17(2) SC-13 MA-4(6) IA-5(1)(c) SC-12(2) SC-12(3) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-3 PR.AC-4 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 2.2.7 SRG-OS-000033-GPOS-00014 SRG-OS-000120-GPOS-00061 SRG-OS-000125-GPOS-00065 SRG-OS-000250-GPOS-00093 SRG-OS-000393-GPOS-00173 SRG-OS-000394-GPOS-00174 4.2.6 Unapproved mechanisms that are used for authentication to the cryptographic module are not verified and therefore cannot be relied upon to provide confidentiality or integrity, and system data may be compromised. Operating systems utilizing encryption are required to use FIPS-compliant mechanisms for authenticating to cryptographic modules. FIPS 140-2 is the current standard for validating that mechanisms used to access cryptographic modules utilize authentication that meets industry and government requirements. For government systems, this allows Security Levels 1, 2, 3, or 4 for use on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8. CCE-81032-5 Use Only FIPS 140-2 Validated Key Exchange Algorithms Limit the key exchange algorithms to those which are FIPS-approved. Add or modify the following line in /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config CRYPTO_POLICY='-oKexAlgorithms=ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512' This rule ensures that only the key exchange algorithms mentioned above (or their subset) are configured for use, keeping the given order of algorithms. The system needs to be rebooted for these changes to take effect. This rule doesn't come with a remediation, automatically changing the crypto-policies may be too disruptive. System crypto modules must be provided by a vendor that undergoes FIPS-140 certifications. FIPS-140 is applicable to all Federal agencies that use cryptographic-based security systems to protect sensitive information in computer and telecommunication systems (including voice systems) as defined in Section 5131 of the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, Public Law 104-106. This standard shall be used in designing and implementing cryptographic modules that Federal departments and agencies operate or are operated for them under contract. See https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-2.pdf To meet this requirements, the system has to have cryptographic software provided by a vendor that has undergone this certification. This means providing documentation, test results, design information, and independent third party review by an accredited lab. While open source software is capable of meeting this, it does not meet FIPS-140 unless the vendor submits to this process. CCI-001453 AC-17(2) SRG-OS-000250-GPOS-00093 RHEL-08-040342 SV-255924r917888_rule DoD information systems are required to use FIPS-approved key exchange algorithms. The system will attempt to use the first algorithm presented by the client that matches the server list. Listing the values "strongest to weakest" is a method to ensure the use of the strongest algorithm available to secure the SSH connection. CCE-86059-3 Use Only FIPS 140-2 Validated MACs Limit the MACs to those hash algorithms which are FIPS-approved. The following line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config demonstrates use of FIPS-approved MACs: MACs hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha1 The man page sshd_config(5) contains a list of supported MACs. The rule is parametrized to use the following MACs: . The system needs to be rebooted for these changes to take effect. System Crypto Modules must be provided by a vendor that undergoes FIPS-140 certifications. FIPS-140 is applicable to all Federal agencies that use cryptographic-based security systems to protect sensitive information in computer and telecommunication systems (including voice systems) as defined in Section 5131 of the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, Public Law 104-106. This standard shall be used in designing and implementing cryptographic modules that Federal departments and agencies operate or are operated for them under contract. See https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-2.pdf To meet this, the system has to have cryptographic software provided by a vendor that has undergone this certification. This means providing documentation, test results, design information, and independent third party review by an accredited lab. While open source software is capable of meeting this, it does not meet FIPS-140 unless the vendor submits to this process. 1 12 13 15 16 5 8 APO01.06 APO13.01 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 DSS06.03 3.1.13 3.13.11 3.13.8 CCI-000068 CCI-000803 CCI-000877 CCI-001453 CCI-003123 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(2) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(i) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) 164.314(b)(2)(i) 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.6.6 SR 1.1 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.6 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.11.2.6 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CM-6(a) AC-17(a) AC-17(2) SC-13 MA-4(6) SC-12(2) SC-12(3) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-3 PR.DS-5 PR.PT-4 2.2.7 SRG-OS-000125-GPOS-00065 SRG-OS-000250-GPOS-00093 SRG-OS-000394-GPOS-00174 DoD Information Systems are required to use FIPS-approved cryptographic hash functions. The only SSHv2 hash algorithms meeting this requirement is SHA2. CCE-82198-3 Enable Use of Privilege Separation When enabled, SSH will create an unprivileged child process that has the privilege of the authenticated user. To enable privilege separation in SSH, add or correct the following line in the /etc/ssh/sshd_config file: UsePrivilegeSeparation 12 13 14 15 16 18 3 5 APO01.06 DSS05.04 DSS05.07 DSS06.02 3.1.12 CCI-000366 164.308(a)(4)(i) 164.308(b)(1) 164.308(b)(3) 164.310(b) 164.312(e)(1) 164.312(e)(2)(ii) 4.3.3.7.3 SR 2.1 SR 5.2 A.10.1.1 A.11.1.4 A.11.1.5 A.11.2.1 A.13.1.1 A.13.1.3 A.13.2.1 A.13.2.3 A.13.2.4 A.14.1.2 A.14.1.3 A.6.1.2 A.7.1.1 A.7.1.2 A.7.3.1 A.8.2.2 A.8.2.3 A.9.1.1 A.9.1.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.4.1 A.9.4.4 A.9.4.5 CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 CIP-003-8 R5.3 CIP-004-6 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R2.1 CIP-007-3 R2.2 CIP-007-3 R2.3 CIP-007-3 R5.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 CM-6(a) AC-17(a) AC-6 PR.AC-4 PR.DS-5 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 SSH daemon privilege separation causes the SSH process to drop root privileges when not needed which would decrease the impact of software vulnerabilities in the unprivileged section. CCE-80908-7 - name: XCCDF Value var_sshd_priv_separation # promote to variable set_fact: var_sshd_priv_separation: !!str tags: - always - name: Enable Use of Privilege Separation block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*UsePrivilegeSeparation\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*UsePrivilegeSeparation\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*UsePrivilegeSeparation\s+ line: UsePrivilegeSeparation {{ var_sshd_priv_separation }} state: present insertbefore: BOF validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80908-7 - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) - NIST-800-53-AC-6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sshd_use_priv_separation # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then var_sshd_priv_separation='' if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*UsePrivilegeSeparation\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" else touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" # Insert at the beginning of the file printf '%s\n' "UsePrivilegeSeparation $var_sshd_priv_separation" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cat "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Use Only Strong Key Exchange algorithms Limit the Key Exchange to strong algorithms. The following line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config demonstrates use of those: KexAlgorithms Req-2.3 2.2.7 4.2.11 Key exchange is any method in cryptography by which cryptographic keys are exchanged between two parties, allowing use of a cryptographic algorithm. If the sender and receiver wish to exchange encrypted messages, each must be equipped to encrypt messages to be sent and decrypt messages received CCE-86518-8 - name: XCCDF Value sshd_strong_kex # promote to variable set_fact: sshd_strong_kex: !!str tags: - always - name: Use Only Strong Key Exchange algorithms block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*KexAlgorithms\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*KexAlgorithms\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*KexAlgorithms\s+ line: KexAlgorithms {{ sshd_strong_kex }} state: present insertbefore: BOF validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86518-8 - PCI-DSS-Req-2.3 - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.7 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sshd_use_strong_kex # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then sshd_strong_kex='' if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*KexAlgorithms\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" else touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" # Insert at the beginning of the file printf '%s\n' "KexAlgorithms $sshd_strong_kex" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cat "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Use Only Strong MACs Limit the MACs to strong hash algorithms. The following line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config demonstrates use of those MACs: MACs 4.2.14 MD5 and 96-bit MAC algorithms are considered weak and have been shown to increase exploitability in SSH downgrade attacks. Weak algorithms continue to have a great deal of attention as a weak spot that can be exploited with expanded computing power. An attacker that breaks the algorithm could take advantage of a MiTM position to decrypt the SSH tunnel and capture credentials and information CCE-86504-8 - name: XCCDF Value sshd_strong_macs # promote to variable set_fact: sshd_strong_macs: !!str tags: - always - name: Use Only Strong MACs block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*MACs\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*MACs\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*MACs\s+ line: MACs {{ sshd_strong_macs }} state: present insertbefore: BOF validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-86504-8 - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sshd_use_strong_macs # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then sshd_strong_macs='' # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without # adding any search characters to the config file. stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^MACs") # shellcheck disable=SC2059 printf -v formatted_output "%s %s" "$stripped_key" "$sshd_strong_macs" # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. # We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), # so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^MACs\\>" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config"; then escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^MACs\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" else if [[ -s "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" || true)" ]]; then LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi cce="CCE-86504-8" printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi SSH server uses strong entropy to seed To set up SSH server to use entropy from a high-quality source, edit the /etc/sysconfig/sshd file. The SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG configuration value determines how many bytes of entropy to use, so make sure that the file contains line SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG=32 This setting can cause problems on computers without the hardware random generator, because insufficient entropy causes the connection to be blocked until enough entropy is available. CCI-000366 FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00232 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-010292 SV-230253r627750_rule SSH implementation in Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 uses the openssl library, which doesn't use high-entropy sources by default. Randomness is needed to generate data-encryption keys, and as plaintext padding and initialization vectors in encryption algorithms, and high-quality entropy elliminates the possibility that the output of the random number generator used by SSH would be known to potential attackers. CCE-82462-3 - name: Setting unquoted shell-style assignment of 'SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG' to '32' in '/etc/sysconfig/sshd' block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/sysconfig/sshd create: true regexp: ^\s*SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG= state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/sysconfig/sshd lineinfile: path: /etc/sysconfig/sshd create: true regexp: ^\s*SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG= state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/sysconfig/sshd lineinfile: path: /etc/sysconfig/sshd create: true regexp: ^\s*SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG= line: SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG=32 state: present insertbefore: ^# SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG validate: /usr/bin/bash -n %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82462-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010292 - low_complexity - low_disruption - low_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sshd_use_strong_rng # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if [ -e "/etc/sysconfig/sshd" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG\s*=\s*/d" "/etc/sysconfig/sshd" else touch "/etc/sysconfig/sshd" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/sysconfig/sshd" cp "/etc/sysconfig/sshd" "/etc/sysconfig/sshd.bak" # Insert before the line matching the regex '^#\s*SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG'. line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^#\s*SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG" "/etc/sysconfig/sshd.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then # There was no match of '^#\s*SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG', insert at # the end of the file. printf '%s\n' "SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG=32" >> "/etc/sysconfig/sshd" else head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "/etc/sysconfig/sshd.bak" > "/etc/sysconfig/sshd" printf '%s\n' "SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG=32" >> "/etc/sysconfig/sshd" tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "/etc/sysconfig/sshd.bak" >> "/etc/sysconfig/sshd" fi # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/sysconfig/sshd.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Prevent remote hosts from connecting to the proxy display The SSH daemon should prevent remote hosts from connecting to the proxy display. The default SSH configuration for X11UseLocalhost is yes, which prevents remote hosts from connecting to the proxy display. To explicitly prevent remote connections to the proxy display, add or correct the following line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config: X11UseLocalhost yes CCI-000366 CM-6(b) SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040341 SV-230556r858723_rule When X11 forwarding is enabled, there may be additional exposure to the server and client displays if the sshd proxy display is configured to listen on the wildcard address. By default, sshd binds the forwarding server to the loopback address and sets the hostname part of the DISPLAY environment variable to localhost. This prevents remote hosts from connecting to the proxy display. CCE-84058-7 - name: Prevent remote hosts from connecting to the proxy display block: - name: Check for duplicate values lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*X11UseLocalhost\s+ state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: dupes - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*X11UseLocalhost\s+ state: absent when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config lineinfile: path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config create: true regexp: (?i)^\s*X11UseLocalhost\s+ line: X11UseLocalhost yes state: present insertbefore: BOF validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84058-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040341 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - restrict_strategy - sshd_x11_use_localhost # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*X11UseLocalhost\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" else touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" # Insert at the beginning of the file printf '%s\n' "X11UseLocalhost yes" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" cat "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Strengthen Firewall Configuration if Possible If the SSH server is expected to only receive connections from the local network, then strengthen the default firewall rule for the SSH service to only accept connections from the appropriate network segment(s). Determine an appropriate network block, netwk, network mask, mask, and network protocol, ip_protocol, representing the systems on your network which will be allowed to access this SSH server. Run the following command: firewall-cmd --permanent --add-rich-rule='rule family="ip_protocol" source address="netwk/mask" service name="ssh" accept' System Security Services Daemon The System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) is a system daemon that provides access to different identity and authentication providers such as Red Hat's IdM, Microsoft's AD, openLDAP, MIT Kerberos, etc. It uses a common framework that can provide caching and offline support to systems utilizing SSSD. SSSD using caching to reduce load on authentication servers permit offline authentication as well as store extended user data. For more information, see https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/8/html-single/installing_identity_management/index#assembly_installing-an-idm-client_installing-identity-management SSSD certificate_verification option Value of the certificate_verification option in the SSSD config. sha1 sha256 sha384 sha512 sha1 SSSD memcache_timeout option Value of the memcache_timeout option in the [nss] section of SSSD config /etc/sssd/sssd.conf. 180 300 600 900 1800 86400 300 SSSD ssh_known_hosts_timeout option Value of the ssh_known_hosts_timeout option in the [ssh] section of SSSD configuration file /etc/sssd/sssd.conf. 180 300 600 900 1800 86400 180 Install sssd-ipa Package The sssd-ipa package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install sssd-ipa SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 sssd-ipa provides the IPA back end that the SSSD can utilize to fetch identity data from and authenticate against an IPA server. CCE-82994-5 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-82994-5 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_sssd-ipa_installed - name: Ensure sssd-ipa is installed package: name: sssd-ipa state: present when: '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-82994-5 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_sssd-ipa_installed [[packages]] name = "sssd-ipa" version = "*" include install_sssd-ipa class install_sssd-ipa { package { 'sssd-ipa': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=sssd-ipa # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q sssd-common; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "sssd-ipa" ; then yum install -y "sssd-ipa" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Install the SSSD Package The sssd package should be installed. The sssd package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install sssd 1 12 15 16 5 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 A.18.1.4 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 CM-6(a) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 CCE-82444-1 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-82444-1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_sssd_installed - name: Ensure sssd is installed package: name: sssd state: present when: '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-82444-1 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_sssd_installed [[packages]] name = "sssd" version = "*" include install_sssd class install_sssd { package { 'sssd': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=sssd # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q sssd-common; then if ! rpm -q --quiet "sssd" ; then yum install -y "sssd" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the SSSD Service The SSSD service should be enabled. The sssd service can be enabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl enable sssd.service 1 12 15 16 5 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 A.18.1.4 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 CM-6(a) IA-5(10) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 CCE-82440-9 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-82440-9 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(10) - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_sssd_enabled - name: Enable service sssd block: - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto - name: Enable service sssd systemd: name: sssd enabled: 'yes' state: started masked: 'no' when: - '"sssd" in ansible_facts.packages' when: - '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82440-9 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(10) - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_sssd_enabled [customizations.services] enabled = ["sssd"] include enable_sssd class enable_sssd { service {'sssd': enable => true, ensure => 'running', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q sssd-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'sssd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'sssd.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'sssd.service' else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Certificate status checking in SSSD Multifactor solutions that require devices separate from information systems gaining access include, for example, hardware tokens providing time-based or challenge-response authenticators and smart cards. Configuring certificate_verification to ocsp_dgst= ensures that certificates for multifactor solutions are checked via Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP). CCI-001948 CCI-001954 IA-2(11) SRG-OS-000375-GPOS-00160 SRG-OS-000377-GPOS-00162 RHEL-08-010400 SV-230274r858741_rule Ensuring that multifactor solutions certificates are checked via Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) ensures the security of the system. CCE-86120-3 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-86120-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010400 - NIST-800-53-IA-2(11) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sssd_certificate_verification - name: XCCDF Value var_sssd_certificate_verification_digest_function # promote to variable set_fact: var_sssd_certificate_verification_digest_function: !!str tags: - always - name: Ensure that "certificate_verification" is not set in /etc/sssd/sssd.conf ini_file: path: /etc/sssd/sssd.conf section: sssd option: certificate_verification state: absent mode: 384 when: '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-86120-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010400 - NIST-800-53-IA-2(11) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sssd_certificate_verification - name: Ensure that "certificate_verification" is not set in /etc/sssd/conf.d/*.conf ini_file: path: /etc/sssd/conf.d/*.conf section: sssd option: certificate_verification state: absent mode: 384 when: '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-86120-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010400 - NIST-800-53-IA-2(11) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sssd_certificate_verification - name: Ensure that "certificate_verification" is set ini_file: path: /etc/sssd/conf.d/certificate_verification.conf section: sssd option: certificate_verification value: ocsp_dgst = {{ var_sssd_certificate_verification_digest_function }} state: present mode: 384 when: '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-86120-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-010400 - NIST-800-53-IA-2(11) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sssd_certificate_verification # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q sssd-common; then var_sssd_certificate_verification_digest_function='' # sssd configuration files must be created with 600 permissions if they don't exist # otherwise the sssd module fails to start OLD_UMASK=$(umask) umask u=rw,go= MAIN_CONF="/etc/sssd/conf.d/certificate_verification.conf" found=false # set value in all files if they contain section or key for f in $(echo -n "$MAIN_CONF /etc/sssd/sssd.conf /etc/sssd/conf.d/*.conf"); do if [ ! -e "$f" ]; then continue fi # find key in section and change value if grep -qzosP "[[:space:]]*\[sssd\]([^\n\[]*\n+)+?[[:space:]]*certificate_verification" "$f"; then sed -i "s/certificate_verification[^(\n)]*/certificate_verification = ocsp_dgst = $var_sssd_certificate_verification_digest_function/" "$f" found=true # find section and add key = value to it elif grep -qs "[[:space:]]*\[sssd\]" "$f"; then sed -i "/[[:space:]]*\[sssd\]/a certificate_verification = ocsp_dgst = $var_sssd_certificate_verification_digest_function" "$f" found=true fi done # if section not in any file, append section with key = value to FIRST file in files parameter if ! $found ; then file=$(echo "$MAIN_CONF /etc/sssd/sssd.conf /etc/sssd/conf.d/*.conf" | cut -f1 -d ' ') mkdir -p "$(dirname "$file")" echo -e "[sssd]\ncertificate_verification = ocsp_dgst = $var_sssd_certificate_verification_digest_function" >> "$file" fi umask $OLD_UMASK else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable Certmap in SSSD SSSD should be configured to verify the certificate of the user or group. To set this up ensure that section like certmap/testing.test/rule_name is setup in /etc/sssd/sssd.conf. For example [certmap/testing.test/rule_name] matchrule =<SAN>.*EDIPI@mil maprule = (userCertificate;binary={cert!bin}) domains = testing.test Automatic remediation of this control is not available, since all of the settings in in the certmap need to be customized. CCI-000187 IA-5 (2) (c) SRG-OS-000068-GPOS-00036 RHEL-08-020090 SV-230355r858743_rule Without mapping the certificate used to authenticate to the user account, the ability to determine the identity of the individual user or group will not be available for forensic analysis. CCE-86060-1 Configure PAM in SSSD Services SSSD should be configured to run SSSD pam services. To configure SSSD to known SSH hosts, add pam to services under the [sssd] section in /etc/sssd/sssd.conf. For example: [sssd] services = sudo, autofs, pam 1 12 15 16 5 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 CCI-001948 CCI-001953 CCI-001954 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 A.18.1.4 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 IA-2(1) CM-6(a) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 SRG-OS-000375-GPOS-00160 SRG-OS-000376-GPOS-00161 SRG-OS-000377-GPOS-00162 Using an authentication device, such as a CAC or token that is separate from the information system, ensures that even if the information system is compromised, that compromise will not affect credentials stored on the authentication device. CCE-82446-6 # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q sssd-common; then # sssd configuration files must be created with 600 permissions if they don't exist # otherwise the sssd module fails to start OLD_UMASK=$(umask) umask u=rw,go= SSSD_CONF="/etc/sssd/sssd.conf" SSSD_CONF_DIR="/etc/sssd/conf.d/*.conf" if [ ! -f "$SSSD_CONF" ] && [ ! -f "$SSSD_CONF_DIR" ]; then mkdir -p /etc/sssd touch "$SSSD_CONF" fi # Flag to check if there is already services with pam service_already_exist=false for f in $SSSD_CONF $SSSD_CONF_DIR; do if [ ! -e "$f" ]; then continue fi # finds all services entries under [sssd] configuration category, get a unique list so it doesn't add redundant fix services_list=$( awk '/^\s*\[/{f=0} /^\s*\[sssd\]/{f=1}f' $f | grep -P '^services[ \t]*=' | uniq ) if [ -z "$services_list" ]; then continue fi while IFS= read -r services; do if [[ ! $services =~ "pam" ]]; then sed -i "s/$services$/&, pam/" $f fi # Either pam service was already there or got added now service_already_exist=true done <<< "$services_list" done # If there was no service in [sssd], add it to first config if [ "$service_already_exist" = false ]; then for f in $SSSD_CONF $SSSD_CONF_DIR; do cat << EOF >> "$f" [sssd] services = pam EOF break done fi umask $OLD_UMASK else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable Smartcards in SSSD SSSD should be configured to authenticate access to the system using smart cards. To enable smart cards in SSSD, set pam_cert_auth to True under the [pam] section in /etc/sssd/sssd.conf. For example: [pam] pam_cert_auth = True Add or update "pam_sss.so" line in auth section of "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" file to include "try_cert_auth" or "require_cert_auth" option, like in the following example: /etc/pam.d/system-auth:auth [success=done authinfo_unavail=ignore ignore=ignore default=die] pam_sss.so try_cert_auth Also add or update "pam_sss.so" line in auth section of "/etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth" file to include the "allow_missing_name" option, like in the following example: /etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth:auth sufficient pam_sss.so allow_missing_name CCI-001954 CCI-000765 CCI-000766 CCI-000767 CCI-000768 0421 0422 0431 0974 1173 1401 1504 1505 1546 1557 1558 1559 1560 1561 Req-8.3 8.4 SRG-OS-000375-GPOS-00160 SRG-OS-000105-GPOS-00052 SRG-OS-000106-GPOS-00053 SRG-OS-000107-GPOS-00054 SRG-OS-000108-GPOS-00055 RHEL-08-020250 SV-230372r942945_rule Using an authentication device, such as a CAC or token that is separate from the information system, ensures that even if the information system is compromised, that compromise will not affect credentials stored on the authentication device. Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) solutions that require devices separate from information systems gaining access include, for example, hardware tokens providing time-based or challenge-response authenticators and smart cards such as the U.S. Government Personal Identity Verification card and the DoD Common Access Card. CCE-80909-5 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80909-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020250 - PCI-DSS-Req-8.3 - PCI-DSSv4-8.4 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sssd_enable_smartcards - name: Test for domain group command: grep '^\s*\[domain\/[^]]*]' /etc/sssd/sssd.conf register: test_grep_domain ignore_errors: true changed_when: false check_mode: false when: - '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80909-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020250 - PCI-DSS-Req-8.3 - PCI-DSSv4-8.4 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sssd_enable_smartcards - name: Add default domain group (if no domain there) ini_file: path: /etc/sssd/sssd.conf section: '{{ item.section }}' option: '{{ item.option }}' value: '{{ item.value }}' create: true mode: 384 with_items: - section: sssd option: domains value: default - section: domain/default option: id_provider value: files when: - '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - test_grep_domain.stdout is defined - test_grep_domain.stdout | length < 1 tags: - CCE-80909-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020250 - PCI-DSS-Req-8.3 - PCI-DSSv4-8.4 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sssd_enable_smartcards - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD ini_file: dest: /etc/sssd/sssd.conf section: pam option: pam_cert_auth value: 'True' create: true mode: 384 when: - '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80909-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020250 - PCI-DSS-Req-8.3 - PCI-DSSv4-8.4 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sssd_enable_smartcards - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Check if system relies on authselect ansible.builtin.stat: path: /usr/bin/authselect register: result_authselect_present when: - '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80909-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020250 - PCI-DSS-Req-8.3 - PCI-DSSv4-8.4 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sssd_enable_smartcards - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Remediate using authselect block: - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Check integrity of authselect current profile ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect check register: result_authselect_check_cmd changed_when: false failed_when: false - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result ansible.builtin.assert: that: - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 fail_msg: - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. success_msg: - authselect integrity check passed - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Get authselect current features ansible.builtin.shell: cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' register: result_authselect_features changed_when: false when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Ensure "with-smartcard" feature is enabled using authselect tool ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect enable-feature with-smartcard register: result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd when: - result_authselect_check_cmd is success - result_authselect_features.stdout is not search("with-smartcard") - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is not skipped - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is success when: - '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - result_authselect_present.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80909-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020250 - PCI-DSS-Req-8.3 - PCI-DSSv4-8.4 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sssd_enable_smartcards - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Remediate by directly editing PAM files block: - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Check if expected PAM module line is present in /etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth regexp: ^\s*auth\s+{{ 'sufficient' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_sss.so\s*.* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_line_present - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Include or update the PAM module line in /etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth block: - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Check if required PAM module line is present in /etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth with different control ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth regexp: ^\s*auth\s+.*\s+pam_sss.so\s* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_line_other_control_present - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Ensure the correct control for the required PAM module line in /etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth ansible.builtin.replace: dest: /etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth regexp: ^(\s*auth\s+).*(\bpam_sss.so.*) replace: \1sufficient \2 register: result_pam_module_edit when: - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 1 - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Ensure the required PAM module line is included in /etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth ansible.builtin.lineinfile: dest: /etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth line: auth sufficient pam_sss.so register: result_pam_module_add when: - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 0 or result_pam_line_other_control_present.found > 1 - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present is defined - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - |- (result_pam_module_add is defined and result_pam_module_add.changed) or (result_pam_module_edit is defined and result_pam_module_edit.changed) when: - result_pam_line_present.found is defined - result_pam_line_present.found == 0 - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Check if the required PAM module option is present in /etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth regexp: ^\s*auth\s+{{ 'sufficient' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_sss.so\s*.*\sallow_missing_name\b state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_module_allow_missing_name_option_present - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Ensure the "allow_missing_name" PAM option for "pam_sss.so" is included in /etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth backrefs: true regexp: ^(\s*auth\s+{{ 'sufficient' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_sss.so.*) line: \1 allow_missing_name state: present register: result_pam_allow_missing_name_add when: - result_pam_module_allow_missing_name_option_present.found == 0 - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Check if expected PAM module line is present in /etc/pam.d/system-auth ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth regexp: ^\s*auth\s+{{ '\[success=done authinfo_unavail=ignore ignore=ignore default=die\]' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_sss.so\s*.* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_line_present - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Include or update the PAM module line in /etc/pam.d/system-auth block: - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Check if required PAM module line is present in /etc/pam.d/system-auth with different control ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth regexp: ^\s*auth\s+.*\s+pam_sss.so\s* state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_line_other_control_present - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Ensure the correct control for the required PAM module line in /etc/pam.d/system-auth ansible.builtin.replace: dest: /etc/pam.d/system-auth regexp: ^(\s*auth\s+).*(\bpam_sss.so.*) replace: \1\[success=done authinfo_unavail=ignore ignore=ignore default=die\] \2 register: result_pam_module_edit when: - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 1 - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Ensure the required PAM module line is included in /etc/pam.d/system-auth ansible.builtin.lineinfile: dest: /etc/pam.d/system-auth line: auth \[success=done authinfo_unavail=ignore ignore=ignore default=die\] pam_sss.so register: result_pam_module_add when: - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 0 or result_pam_line_other_control_present.found > 1 - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Ensure authselect changes are applied ansible.builtin.command: cmd: authselect apply-changes -b when: - result_authselect_present is defined - result_authselect_present.stat.exists - |- (result_pam_module_add is defined and result_pam_module_add.changed) or (result_pam_module_edit is defined and result_pam_module_edit.changed) when: - result_pam_line_present.found is defined - result_pam_line_present.found == 0 - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Check if the required PAM module option is present in /etc/pam.d/system-auth ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth regexp: ^\s*auth\s+{{ '\[success=done authinfo_unavail=ignore ignore=ignore default=die\]' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_sss.so\s*.*\stry_cert_auth\b state: absent check_mode: true changed_when: false register: result_pam_module_try_cert_auth_option_present - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Ensure the "try_cert_auth" PAM option for "pam_sss.so" is included in /etc/pam.d/system-auth ansible.builtin.lineinfile: path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth backrefs: true regexp: ^(\s*auth\s+{{ '\[success=done authinfo_unavail=ignore ignore=ignore default=die\]' | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_sss.so.*) line: \1 try_cert_auth state: present register: result_pam_try_cert_auth_add when: - result_pam_module_try_cert_auth_option_present.found == 0 when: - '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - not result_authselect_present.stat.exists tags: - CCE-80909-5 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020250 - PCI-DSS-Req-8.3 - PCI-DSSv4-8.4 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sssd_enable_smartcards # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q sssd-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then # sssd configuration files must be created with 600 permissions if they don't exist # otherwise the sssd module fails to start OLD_UMASK=$(umask) umask u=rw,go= found=false # set value in all files if they contain section or key for f in $(echo -n "/etc/sssd/sssd.conf"); do if [ ! -e "$f" ]; then continue fi # find key in section and change value if grep -qzosP "[[:space:]]*\[pam\]([^\n\[]*\n+)+?[[:space:]]*pam_cert_auth" "$f"; then sed -i "s/pam_cert_auth[^(\n)]*/pam_cert_auth = True/" "$f" found=true # find section and add key = value to it elif grep -qs "[[:space:]]*\[pam\]" "$f"; then sed -i "/[[:space:]]*\[pam\]/a pam_cert_auth = True" "$f" found=true fi done # if section not in any file, append section with key = value to FIRST file in files parameter if ! $found ; then file=$(echo "/etc/sssd/sssd.conf" | cut -f1 -d ' ') mkdir -p "$(dirname "$file")" echo -e "[pam]\npam_cert_auth = True" >> "$file" fi umask $OLD_UMASK if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then if ! authselect check; then echo " authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." exit 1 fi authselect enable-feature with-smartcard authselect apply-changes -b else if ! grep -qP '^\s*auth\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_sss.so\s*.*' "/etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth"; then # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*auth\s+.*\s+pam_sss.so\s*' "/etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth")" -eq 1 ]; then # The control is updated only if one single line matches. sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*auth\s+).*(\bpam_sss.so.*)/\1'"sufficient"' \2/' "/etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth" else echo 'auth '"sufficient"' pam_sss.so' >> "/etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth" fi fi # Check the option if ! grep -qP '^\s*auth\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_sss.so\s*.*\sallow_missing_name\b' "/etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth"; then sed -i -E --follow-symlinks '/\s*auth\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_sss.so.*/ s/$/ allow_missing_name/' "/etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth" fi if ! grep -qP '^\s*auth\s+'"\[success=done authinfo_unavail=ignore ignore=ignore default=die\]"'\s+pam_sss.so\s*.*' "/etc/pam.d/system-auth"; then # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*auth\s+.*\s+pam_sss.so\s*' "/etc/pam.d/system-auth")" -eq 1 ]; then # The control is updated only if one single line matches. sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*auth\s+).*(\bpam_sss.so.*)/\1'"\[success=done authinfo_unavail=ignore ignore=ignore default=die\]"' \2/' "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" else echo 'auth '"\[success=done authinfo_unavail=ignore ignore=ignore default=die\]"' pam_sss.so' >> "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" fi fi # Check the option if ! grep -qP '^\s*auth\s+'"\[success=done authinfo_unavail=ignore ignore=ignore default=die\]"'\s+pam_sss.so\s*.*\stry_cert_auth\b' "/etc/pam.d/system-auth"; then sed -i -E --follow-symlinks '/\s*auth\s+'"\[success=done authinfo_unavail=ignore ignore=ignore default=die\]"'\s+pam_sss.so.*/ s/$/ try_cert_auth/' "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi SSSD Has a Correct Trust Anchor SSSD must have acceptable trust anchor present. Automatic remediation of this control is not available. CCI-000185 IA-5 (2) (a) SRG-OS-000066-GPOS-00034 SRG-OS-000384-GPOS-00167 RHEL-08-010090 SV-230229r858739_rule Without path validation, an informed trust decision by the relying party cannot be made when presented with any certificate not already explicitly trusted. A trust anchor is an authoritative entity represented via a public key and associated data. It is used in the context of public key infrastructures, X.509 digital certificates, and DNSSEC. When there is a chain of trust, usually the top entity to be trusted becomes the trust anchor; it can be, for example, a Certification Authority (CA). A certification path starts with the subject certificate and proceeds through a number of intermediate certificates up to a trusted root certificate, typically issued by a trusted CA. This requirement verifies that a certification path to an accepted trust anchor is used for certificate validation and that the path includes status information. Path validation is necessary for a relying party to make an informed trust decision when presented with any certificate not already explicitly trusted. Status information for certification paths includes certificate revocation lists or online certificate status protocol responses. Validation of the certificate status information is out of scope for this requirement. CCE-86312-6 Configure SSSD's Memory Cache to Expire SSSD's memory cache should be configured to set to expire records after seconds. To configure SSSD to expire memory cache, set memcache_timeout to under the [nss] section in /etc/sssd/sssd.conf. For example: [nss] memcache_timeout = 1 12 15 16 5 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 CCI-002007 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 A.18.1.4 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 CM-6(a) IA-5(13) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 SRG-OS-000383-GPOS-00166 If cached authentication information is out-of-date, the validity of the authentication information may be questionable. CCE-80910-3 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-80910-3 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(13) - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sssd_memcache_timeout - unknown_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_sssd_memcache_timeout # promote to variable set_fact: var_sssd_memcache_timeout: !!str tags: - always - name: Test for domain group command: grep '\s*\[domain\/[^]]*]' /etc/sssd/sssd.conf register: test_grep_domain ignore_errors: true changed_when: false check_mode: false when: - '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80910-3 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(13) - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sssd_memcache_timeout - unknown_strategy - name: Add default domain group (if no domain there) ini_file: path: /etc/sssd/sssd.conf section: '{{ item.section }}' option: '{{ item.option }}' value: '{{ item.value }}' create: true mode: 384 with_items: - section: sssd option: domains value: default - section: domain/default option: id_provider value: files when: - '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - test_grep_domain.stdout is defined - test_grep_domain.stdout | length < 1 tags: - CCE-80910-3 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(13) - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sssd_memcache_timeout - unknown_strategy - name: Configure SSSD's Memory Cache to Expire ini_file: dest: /etc/sssd/sssd.conf section: nss option: memcache_timeout value: '{{ var_sssd_memcache_timeout }}' create: true mode: 384 when: - '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-80910-3 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(13) - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sssd_memcache_timeout - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q sssd-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then var_sssd_memcache_timeout='' # sssd configuration files must be created with 600 permissions if they don't exist # otherwise the sssd module fails to start OLD_UMASK=$(umask) umask u=rw,go= found=false # set value in all files if they contain section or key for f in $(echo -n "/etc/sssd/sssd.conf"); do if [ ! -e "$f" ]; then continue fi # find key in section and change value if grep -qzosP "[[:space:]]*\[nss\]([^\n\[]*\n+)+?[[:space:]]*memcache_timeout" "$f"; then sed -i "s/memcache_timeout[^(\n)]*/memcache_timeout = $var_sssd_memcache_timeout/" "$f" found=true # find section and add key = value to it elif grep -qs "[[:space:]]*\[nss\]" "$f"; then sed -i "/[[:space:]]*\[nss\]/a memcache_timeout = $var_sssd_memcache_timeout" "$f" found=true fi done # if section not in any file, append section with key = value to FIRST file in files parameter if ! $found ; then file=$(echo "/etc/sssd/sssd.conf" | cut -f1 -d ' ') mkdir -p "$(dirname "$file")" echo -e "[nss]\nmemcache_timeout = $var_sssd_memcache_timeout" >> "$file" fi umask $OLD_UMASK else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure SSSD to Expire Offline Credentials SSSD should be configured to expire offline credentials after 1 day. Check if SSSD allows cached authentications with the following command: $ sudo grep cache_credentials /etc/sssd/sssd.conf cache_credentials = true If "cache_credentials" is set to "false" or is missing no further checks are required. To configure SSSD to expire offline credentials, set offline_credentials_expiration to 1 under the [pam] section in /etc/sssd/sssd.conf. For example: [pam] offline_credentials_expiration = 1 1 12 15 16 5 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 CCI-002007 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 A.18.1.4 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 CM-6(a) IA-5(13) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 SRG-OS-000383-GPOS-00166 RHEL-08-020290 SV-230376r942948_rule If cached authentication information is out-of-date, the validity of the authentication information may be questionable. CCE-82460-7 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-82460-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020290 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(13) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sssd_offline_cred_expiration - name: Test for domain group command: grep '\s*\[domain\/[^]]*]' /etc/sssd/sssd.conf register: test_grep_domain ignore_errors: true changed_when: false check_mode: false when: - '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82460-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020290 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(13) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sssd_offline_cred_expiration - name: Add default domain group (if no domain there) ini_file: path: /etc/sssd/sssd.conf section: '{{ item.section }}' option: '{{ item.option }}' value: '{{ item.value }}' create: true mode: 384 with_items: - section: sssd option: domains value: default - section: domain/default option: id_provider value: files when: - '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - test_grep_domain.stdout is defined - test_grep_domain.stdout | length < 1 tags: - CCE-82460-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020290 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(13) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sssd_offline_cred_expiration - name: Configure SSD to Expire Offline Credentials ini_file: dest: /etc/sssd/sssd.conf section: pam option: offline_credentials_expiration value: 1 create: true mode: 384 when: - '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82460-7 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-020290 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(13) - configure_strategy - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sssd_offline_cred_expiration # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q sssd-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then # sssd configuration files must be created with 600 permissions if they don't exist # otherwise the sssd module fails to start OLD_UMASK=$(umask) umask u=rw,go= found=false # set value in all files if they contain section or key for f in $(echo -n "/etc/sssd/sssd.conf"); do if [ ! -e "$f" ]; then continue fi # find key in section and change value if grep -qzosP "[[:space:]]*\[pam\]([^\n\[]*\n+)+?[[:space:]]*offline_credentials_expiration" "$f"; then sed -i "s/offline_credentials_expiration[^(\n)]*/offline_credentials_expiration = 1/" "$f" found=true # find section and add key = value to it elif grep -qs "[[:space:]]*\[pam\]" "$f"; then sed -i "/[[:space:]]*\[pam\]/a offline_credentials_expiration = 1" "$f" found=true fi done # if section not in any file, append section with key = value to FIRST file in files parameter if ! $found ; then file=$(echo "/etc/sssd/sssd.conf" | cut -f1 -d ' ') mkdir -p "$(dirname "$file")" echo -e "[pam]\noffline_credentials_expiration = 1" >> "$file" fi umask $OLD_UMASK else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure SSSD to run as user sssd SSSD processes should be configured to run as user sssd, not root. FMT_SMF_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 To minimize privileges of SSSD processes, they are configured to run as non-root user. CCE-82072-0 # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q sssd-common; then MAIN_CONF="/etc/sssd/conf.d/ospp.conf" # sssd configuration files must be created with 600 permissions if they don't exist # otherwise the sssd module fails to start OLD_UMASK=$(umask) umask u=rw,go= found=false # set value in all files if they contain section or key for f in $(echo -n "$MAIN_CONF /etc/sssd/sssd.conf /etc/sssd/conf.d/*.conf"); do if [ ! -e "$f" ]; then continue fi # find key in section and change value if grep -qzosP "[[:space:]]*\[sssd\]([^\n\[]*\n+)+?[[:space:]]*user" "$f"; then sed -i "s/user[^(\n)]*/user = sssd/" "$f" found=true # find section and add key = value to it elif grep -qs "[[:space:]]*\[sssd\]" "$f"; then sed -i "/[[:space:]]*\[sssd\]/a user = sssd" "$f" found=true fi done # if section not in any file, append section with key = value to FIRST file in files parameter if ! $found ; then file=$(echo "$MAIN_CONF /etc/sssd/sssd.conf /etc/sssd/conf.d/*.conf" | cut -f1 -d ' ') mkdir -p "$(dirname "$file")" echo -e "[sssd]\nuser = sssd" >> "$file" fi umask $OLD_UMASK else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure SSSD to Expire SSH Known Hosts SSSD should be configured to expire keys from known SSH hosts after seconds. To configure SSSD to known SSH hosts, set ssh_known_hosts_timeout to under the [ssh] section in /etc/sssd/sssd.conf. For example: [ssh] ssh_known_hosts_timeout = 1 12 15 16 5 DSS05.04 DSS05.05 DSS05.07 DSS05.10 DSS06.03 DSS06.10 CCI-002007 4.3.3.2.2 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.4 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 A.18.1.4 A.7.1.1 A.9.2.1 A.9.2.2 A.9.2.3 A.9.2.4 A.9.2.6 A.9.3.1 A.9.4.2 A.9.4.3 CM-6(a) IA-5(13) PR.AC-1 PR.AC-6 PR.AC-7 SRG-OS-000383-GPOS-00166 If cached authentication information is out-of-date, the validity of the authentication information may be questionable. CCE-82442-5 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-82442-5 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(13) - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sssd_ssh_known_hosts_timeout - unknown_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_sssd_ssh_known_hosts_timeout # promote to variable set_fact: var_sssd_ssh_known_hosts_timeout: !!str tags: - always - name: Test for domain group command: grep '\s*\[domain\/[^]]*]' /etc/sssd/sssd.conf register: test_grep_domain ignore_errors: true changed_when: false check_mode: false when: - '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82442-5 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(13) - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sssd_ssh_known_hosts_timeout - unknown_strategy - name: Add default domain group (if no domain there) ini_file: path: /etc/sssd/sssd.conf section: '{{ item.section }}' option: '{{ item.option }}' value: '{{ item.value }}' create: true mode: 384 with_items: - section: sssd option: domains value: default - section: domain/default option: id_provider value: files when: - '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - test_grep_domain.stdout is defined - test_grep_domain.stdout | length < 1 tags: - CCE-82442-5 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(13) - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sssd_ssh_known_hosts_timeout - unknown_strategy - name: Configure SSSD to Expire SSH Known Hosts ini_file: dest: /etc/sssd/sssd.conf section: ssh option: ssh_known_hosts_timeout value: '{{ var_sssd_ssh_known_hosts_timeout }}' create: true mode: 384 when: - '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82442-5 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-5(13) - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sssd_ssh_known_hosts_timeout - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if rpm --quiet -q sssd-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then var_sssd_ssh_known_hosts_timeout='' # sssd configuration files must be created with 600 permissions if they don't exist # otherwise the sssd module fails to start OLD_UMASK=$(umask) umask u=rw,go= found=false # set value in all files if they contain section or key for f in $(echo -n "/etc/sssd/sssd.conf"); do if [ ! -e "$f" ]; then continue fi # find key in section and change value if grep -qzosP "[[:space:]]*\[ssh\]([^\n\[]*\n+)+?[[:space:]]*ssh_known_hosts_timeout" "$f"; then sed -i "s/ssh_known_hosts_timeout[^(\n)]*/ssh_known_hosts_timeout = $var_sssd_ssh_known_hosts_timeout/" "$f" found=true # find section and add key = value to it elif grep -qs "[[:space:]]*\[ssh\]" "$f"; then sed -i "/[[:space:]]*\[ssh\]/a ssh_known_hosts_timeout = $var_sssd_ssh_known_hosts_timeout" "$f" found=true fi done # if section not in any file, append section with key = value to FIRST file in files parameter if ! $found ; then file=$(echo "/etc/sssd/sssd.conf" | cut -f1 -d ' ') mkdir -p "$(dirname "$file")" echo -e "[ssh]\nssh_known_hosts_timeout = $var_sssd_ssh_known_hosts_timeout" >> "$file" fi umask $OLD_UMASK else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) - LDAP The System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) is a system daemon that provides access to different identity and authentication providers such as Red Hat's IdM, Microsoft's AD, openLDAP, MIT Kerberos, etc. It uses a common framework that can provide caching and offline support to systems utilizing SSSD. SSSD using caching to reduce load on authentication servers permit offline authentication as well as store extended user data. SSSD can support many backends including LDAP. The sssd-ldap backend allows SSSD to fetch identity information from an LDAP server. SSSD LDAP Backend Client CA Certificate Location Path of a directory that contains Certificate Authority certificates. /etc/openldap/cacerts Configure SSSD LDAP Backend Client CA Certificate Configure SSSD to implement cryptography to protect the integrity of LDAP remote access sessions. By setting the ldap_tls_cacert option in /etc/sssd/sssd.conf to point to the path for the X.509 certificates used for peer authentication. ldap_tls_cacert /path/to/tls/ca.cert A remediation is not provided for this rule as each system has unique requirements. CCI-001453 SC-12(3) CM-6(a) SRG-OS-000250-GPOS-00093 Without cryptographic integrity protections, information can be altered by unauthorized users without detection. Cryptographic mechanisms used for protecting the integrity of information include, for example, signed hash functions using asymmetric cryptography enabling distribution of the public key to verify the hash information while maintaining the confidentiality of the key used to generate the hash. CCE-82438-3 Configure SSSD LDAP Backend Client CA Certificate Location Configure SSSD to implement cryptography to protect the integrity of LDAP remote access sessions. By setting the ldap_tls_cacertdir option in /etc/sssd/sssd.conf to point to the path for the X.509 certificates used for peer authentication. ldap_tls_cacertdir /path/to/tls/cacert CCI-001453 SC-12(3) CM-6(a) SRG-OS-000250-GPOS-00093 Without cryptographic integrity protections, information can be altered by unauthorized users without detection. Cryptographic mechanisms used for protecting the integrity of information include, for example, signed hash functions using asymmetric cryptography enabling distribution of the public key to verify the hash information while maintaining the confidentiality of the key used to generate the hash. CCE-82456-5 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-82456-5 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sssd_ldap_configure_tls_ca_dir - unknown_strategy - name: XCCDF Value var_sssd_ldap_tls_ca_dir # promote to variable set_fact: var_sssd_ldap_tls_ca_dir: !!str tags: - always - name: Test for id_provider different than Active Directory (ad) command: grep -qzosP '[[:space:]]*\[domain\/[^]]*]([^(\n)]*(\n)+)+?[[:space:]]*id_provider[[:space:]]*=[[:space:]]*((?i)ad)[[:space:]]*$' /etc/sssd/sssd.conf register: test_id_provider failed_when: false changed_when: false check_mode: false when: - '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82456-5 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sssd_ldap_configure_tls_ca_dir - unknown_strategy - name: Test for domain group command: grep '\s*\[domain\/[^]]*]' /etc/sssd/sssd.conf register: test_grep_domain failed_when: false changed_when: false check_mode: false when: - '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82456-5 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sssd_ldap_configure_tls_ca_dir - unknown_strategy - name: Add default domain group and set ldap_tls_cacertdir in sssd configuration (if no domain there) ini_file: path: /etc/sssd/sssd.conf section: '{{ item.section }}' option: '{{ item.option }}' value: '{{ item.value }}' mode: 384 with_items: - section: sssd option: domains value: default - section: domain/default option: ldap_tls_cacertdir value: '{{ var_sssd_ldap_tls_ca_dir }}' when: - '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - test_grep_domain.stdout is defined - test_grep_domain.stdout | length < 1 - test_id_provider.stdout is defined - test_id_provider.stdout | length < 1 tags: - CCE-82456-5 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sssd_ldap_configure_tls_ca_dir - unknown_strategy - name: Set ldap_tls_cacertdir in sssd configuration ini_file: path: /etc/sssd/sssd.conf section: '{{ test_grep_domain.stdout | regex_replace(''\[(.*)\]'',''\1'') }}' option: ldap_tls_cacertdir value: '{{ var_sssd_ldap_tls_ca_dir }}' mode: 384 when: - '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - test_grep_domain.stdout is defined - test_grep_domain.stdout | length > 0 - test_id_provider.stdout is defined - test_id_provider.stdout | length < 1 tags: - CCE-82456-5 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sssd_ldap_configure_tls_ca_dir - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q sssd-common; then var_sssd_ldap_tls_ca_dir='' SSSD_CONF="/etc/sssd/sssd.conf" LDAP_REGEX='[[:space:]]*\[domain\/[^]]*]([^(\n)]*(\n)+)+?[[:space:]]*ldap_tls_cacertdir' AD_REGEX='[[:space:]]*\[domain\/[^]]*]([^(\n)]*(\n)+)+?[[:space:]]*id_provider[[:space:]]*=[[:space:]]*((?i)ad)[[:space:]]*$' DOMAIN_REGEX="[[:space:]]*\[domain\/[^]]*]" # Check if id_provider is not set to ad (Active Directory) which makes start_tls not applicable, note the -v option to invert the grep. # Try to find [domain/..] and ldap_tls_cacertdir in sssd.conf, if it exists, set to '$var_sssd_ldap_tls_ca_dir' # if ldap_tls_cacertdir isn't here, add it # if [domain/..] doesn't exist, add it here for default domain if grep -qvzosP $AD_REGEX $SSSD_CONF; then if grep -qzosP $LDAP_REGEX $SSSD_CONF; then sed -i "s#ldap_tls_cacertdir[^(\n)]*#ldap_tls_cacertdir = $var_sssd_ldap_tls_ca_dir#" $SSSD_CONF elif grep -qs $DOMAIN_REGEX $SSSD_CONF; then sed -i "/$DOMAIN_REGEX/a ldap_tls_cacertdir = $var_sssd_ldap_tls_ca_dir" $SSSD_CONF else if test -f "$SSSD_CONF"; then echo -e "[domain/default]\nldap_tls_cacertdir = $var_sssd_ldap_tls_ca_dir" >> $SSSD_CONF else echo "Config file '$SSSD_CONF' doesnt exist, not remediating, assuming non-applicability." >&2 fi fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure SSSD LDAP Backend Client to Demand a Valid Certificate from the Server Configure SSSD to demand a valid certificate from the server to protect the integrity of LDAP remote access sessions by setting the ldap_tls_reqcert option in /etc/sssd/sssd.conf to demand. CCI-001453 SC-12(3) CM-6(a) SRG-OS-000250-GPOS-00093 Without a valid certificate presented to the LDAP client backend, the identity of a server can be forged compromising LDAP remote access sessions. CCE-84062-9 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-84062-9 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sssd_ldap_configure_tls_reqcert - unknown_strategy - name: Test for id_provider different than Active Directory (ad) command: grep -qzosP '[[:space:]]*\[domain\/[^]]*]([^(\n)]*(\n)+)+?[[:space:]]*id_provider[[:space:]]*=[[:space:]]*((?i)ad)[[:space:]]*$' /etc/sssd/sssd.conf register: test_id_provider failed_when: false changed_when: false check_mode: false when: - '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84062-9 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sssd_ldap_configure_tls_reqcert - unknown_strategy - name: Test for domain group command: grep '\s*\[domain\/[^]]*]' /etc/sssd/sssd.conf register: test_grep_domain failed_when: false changed_when: false check_mode: false when: - '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-84062-9 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sssd_ldap_configure_tls_reqcert - unknown_strategy - name: Add default domain group and set ldap_tls_reqcert in sssd configuration (if no domain there) ini_file: path: /etc/sssd/sssd.conf section: '{{ item.section }}' option: '{{ item.option }}' value: '{{ item.value }}' mode: 384 with_items: - section: sssd option: domains value: default - section: domain/default option: ldap_tls_reqcert value: demand when: - '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - test_grep_domain.stdout is defined - test_grep_domain.stdout | length < 1 - test_id_provider.stdout is defined - test_id_provider.stdout | length < 1 tags: - CCE-84062-9 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sssd_ldap_configure_tls_reqcert - unknown_strategy - name: Set ldap_tls_reqcert in sssd configuration ini_file: path: /etc/sssd/sssd.conf section: '{{ test_grep_domain.stdout | regex_replace(''\[(.*)\]'',''\1'') }}' option: ldap_tls_reqcert value: demand mode: 384 when: - '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - test_grep_domain.stdout is defined - test_grep_domain.stdout | length > 0 - test_id_provider.stdout is defined - test_id_provider.stdout | length < 1 tags: - CCE-84062-9 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) - low_complexity - medium_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - sssd_ldap_configure_tls_reqcert - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q sssd-common; then SSSD_CONF="/etc/sssd/sssd.conf" LDAP_REGEX='[[:space:]]*\[domain\/[^]]*]([^(\n)]*(\n)+)+?[[:space:]]*ldap_tls_reqcert' AD_REGEX='[[:space:]]*\[domain\/[^]]*]([^(\n)]*(\n)+)+?[[:space:]]*id_provider[[:space:]]*=[[:space:]]*((?i)ad)[[:space:]]*$' DOMAIN_REGEX="[[:space:]]*\[domain\/[^]]*]" # Check if id_provider is not set to ad (Active Directory) which makes start_tls not applicable, note the -v option to invert the grep. # Try to find [domain/..] and ldap_tls_reqcert in sssd.conf, if it exists, set to 'demand' # if ldap_tls_reqcert isn't here, add it # if [domain/..] doesn't exist, add it here for default domain if grep -qvzosP $AD_REGEX $SSSD_CONF; then if grep -qzosP $LDAP_REGEX $SSSD_CONF; then sed -i "s#ldap_tls_reqcert[^(\n)]*#ldap_tls_reqcert = demand#" $SSSD_CONF elif grep -qs $DOMAIN_REGEX $SSSD_CONF; then sed -i "/$DOMAIN_REGEX/a ldap_tls_reqcert = demand" $SSSD_CONF else if test -f "$SSSD_CONF"; then echo -e "[domain/default]\nldap_tls_reqcert = demand" >> $SSSD_CONF else echo "Config file '$SSSD_CONF' doesnt exist, not remediating, assuming non-applicability." >&2 fi fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Configure SSSD LDAP Backend to Use TLS For All Transactions The LDAP client should be configured to implement TLS for the integrity of all remote LDAP authentication sessions. If the id_provider is set to ldap or ipa in /etc/sssd/sssd.conf or any of the /etc/sssd/sssd.conf.d configuration files, ldap_id_use_start_tls must be set to true. To check if LDAP is configured to use TLS when id_provider is set to ldap or ipa, use the following command: $ sudo grep -i ldap_id_use_start_tls /etc/sssd/sssd.conf 11 12 14 15 3 8 9 APO13.01 BAI10.01 BAI10.02 BAI10.03 BAI10.05 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 DSS05.05 DSS06.06 CCI-001453 4.3.3.5.1 4.3.3.5.2 4.3.3.5.3 4.3.3.5.4 4.3.3.5.5 4.3.3.5.6 4.3.3.5.7 4.3.3.5.8 4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 4.3.3.6.3 4.3.3.6.4 4.3.3.6.5 4.3.3.6.6 4.3.3.6.7 4.3.3.6.8 4.3.3.6.9 4.3.3.7.1 4.3.3.7.2 4.3.3.7.3 4.3.3.7.4 4.3.4.3.2 4.3.4.3.3 SR 1.1 SR 1.10 SR 1.11 SR 1.12 SR 1.13 SR 1.2 SR 1.3 SR 1.4 SR 1.5 SR 1.6 SR 1.7 SR 1.8 SR 1.9 SR 2.1 SR 2.2 SR 2.3 SR 2.4 SR 2.5 SR 2.6 SR 2.7 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.12.1.2 A.12.5.1 A.12.6.2 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.14.2.2 A.14.2.3 A.14.2.4 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 A.9.1.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.AC-3 PR.IP-1 PR.PT-3 PR.PT-4 SRG-OS-000250-GPOS-00093 Without cryptographic integrity protections, information can be altered by unauthorized users without detection. The ssl directive specifies whether to use TLS or not. If not specified it will default to no. It should be set to start_tls rather than doing LDAP over SSL. CCE-82437-5 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-82437-5 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - sssd_ldap_start_tls - unknown_strategy - name: Test for id_provider different than Active Directory (ad) command: grep -qzosP '[[:space:]]*\[domain\/[^]]*]([^(\n)]*(\n)+)+?[[:space:]]*id_provider[[:space:]]*=[[:space:]]*((?i)ad)[[:space:]]*$' /etc/sssd/sssd.conf register: test_id_provider failed_when: false changed_when: false check_mode: false when: - '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82437-5 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - sssd_ldap_start_tls - unknown_strategy - name: Test for domain group command: grep '\s*\[domain\/[^]]*]' /etc/sssd/sssd.conf register: test_grep_domain failed_when: false changed_when: false check_mode: false when: - '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-82437-5 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - sssd_ldap_start_tls - unknown_strategy - name: Add default domain group and set ldap_id_use_start_tls in sssd configuration (if no domain there) ini_file: path: /etc/sssd/sssd.conf section: '{{ item.section }}' option: '{{ item.option }}' value: '{{ item.value }}' mode: 384 with_items: - section: sssd option: domains value: default - section: domain/default option: ldap_id_use_start_tls value: 'true' when: - '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - test_grep_domain.stdout is defined - test_grep_domain.stdout | length < 1 - test_id_provider.stdout is defined - test_id_provider.stdout | length < 1 tags: - CCE-82437-5 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - sssd_ldap_start_tls - unknown_strategy - name: Set ldap_id_use_start_tls in sssd configuration ini_file: path: /etc/sssd/sssd.conf section: '{{ test_grep_domain.stdout | regex_replace(''\[(.*)\]'',''\1'') }}' option: ldap_id_use_start_tls value: 'true' mode: 384 when: - '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] - test_grep_domain.stdout is defined - test_grep_domain.stdout | length > 0 - test_id_provider.stdout is defined - test_id_provider.stdout | length < 1 tags: - CCE-82437-5 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - high_severity - low_complexity - medium_disruption - no_reboot_needed - sssd_ldap_start_tls - unknown_strategy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q sssd-common; then SSSD_CONF="/etc/sssd/sssd.conf" LDAP_REGEX='[[:space:]]*\[domain\/[^]]*]([^(\n)]*(\n)+)+?[[:space:]]*ldap_id_use_start_tls' AD_REGEX='[[:space:]]*\[domain\/[^]]*]([^(\n)]*(\n)+)+?[[:space:]]*id_provider[[:space:]]*=[[:space:]]*((?i)ad)[[:space:]]*$' DOMAIN_REGEX="[[:space:]]*\[domain\/[^]]*]" # Check if id_provider is not set to ad (Active Directory) which makes start_tls not applicable, note the -v option to invert the grep. # Try to find [domain/..] and ldap_id_use_start_tls in sssd.conf, if it exists, set to 'true' # if ldap_id_use_start_tls isn't here, add it # if [domain/..] doesn't exist, add it here for default domain if grep -qvzosP $AD_REGEX $SSSD_CONF; then if grep -qzosP $LDAP_REGEX $SSSD_CONF; then sed -i "s#ldap_id_use_start_tls[^(\n)]*#ldap_id_use_start_tls = true#" $SSSD_CONF elif grep -qs $DOMAIN_REGEX $SSSD_CONF; then sed -i "/$DOMAIN_REGEX/a ldap_id_use_start_tls = true" $SSSD_CONF else if test -f "$SSSD_CONF"; then echo -e "[domain/default]\nldap_id_use_start_tls = true" >> $SSSD_CONF else echo "Config file '$SSSD_CONF' doesnt exist, not remediating, assuming non-applicability." >&2 fi fi fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi USBGuard daemon The USBGuard daemon enforces the USB device authorization policy for all USB devices. Install usbguard Package The usbguard package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install usbguard CCI-001958 1418 CM-8(3) IA-3 SRG-OS-000378-GPOS-00163 RHEL-08-040139 SV-244547r854076_rule usbguard is a software framework that helps to protect against rogue USB devices by implementing basic whitelisting/blacklisting capabilities based on USB device attributes. CCE-82959-8 - name: Ensure usbguard is installed package: name: usbguard state: present when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and ansible_architecture != "s390x" ) tags: - CCE-82959-8 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040139 - NIST-800-53-CM-8(3) - NIST-800-53-IA-3 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_usbguard_installed --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 extensions: - usbguard [[packages]] name = "usbguard" version = "*" include install_usbguard class install_usbguard { package { 'usbguard': ensure => 'installed', } } package --add=usbguard # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && ! grep -q s390x /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ); then if ! rpm -q --quiet "usbguard" ; then yum install -y "usbguard" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Enable the USBGuard Service The USBGuard service should be enabled. The usbguard service can be enabled with the following command: $ sudo systemctl enable usbguard.service CCI-000416 CCI-001958 1418 CM-8(3)(a) IA-3 FMT_SMF_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000378-GPOS-00163 RHEL-08-040141 SV-244548r854077_rule The usbguard service must be running in order to enforce the USB device authorization policy for all USB devices. CCE-82853-3 - name: Enable service usbguard block: - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto - name: Enable service usbguard systemd: name: usbguard enabled: 'yes' state: started masked: 'no' when: - '"usbguard" in ansible_facts.packages' when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and ansible_architecture != "s390x" ) tags: - CCE-82853-3 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040141 - NIST-800-53-CM-8(3)(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-3 - enable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - service_usbguard_enabled --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: annotations: complianceascode.io/depends-on: xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_package_usbguard_installed spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 systemd: units: - name: usbguard.service enabled: true [customizations.services] enabled = ["usbguard"] include enable_usbguard class enable_usbguard { service {'usbguard': enable => true, ensure => 'running', } } # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && ! grep -q s390x /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ); then SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'usbguard.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'usbguard.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'usbguard.service' else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Log USBGuard daemon audit events using Linux Audit To configure USBGuard daemon to log via Linux Audit (as opposed directly to a file), AuditBackend option in /etc/usbguard/usbguard-daemon.conf needs to be set to LinuxAudit. CCI-000169 CCI-000172 AU-2 CM-8(3) IA-3 FMT_SMF_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 SRG-APP-000141-CTR-000315 RHEL-08-030603 SV-230470r744006_rule Using the Linux Audit logging allows for centralized trace of events. CCE-82168-6 --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: annotations: complianceascode.io/depends-on: xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_package_usbguard_installed complianceascode.io/ocp-version: '>=4.7.0' spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,{{ %0A%23%0A%23%20Rule%20set%20file%20path.%0A%23%0A%23%20The%20USBGuard%20daemon%20will%20use%20this%20file%20to%20load%20the%20policy%0A%23%20rule%20set%20from%20it%20and%20to%20write%20new%20rules%20received%20via%20the%0A%23%20IPC%20interface.%0A%23%0A%23%20RuleFile%3D/path/to/rules.conf%0A%23%0ARuleFile%3D/etc/usbguard/rules.conf%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20Rule%20set%20folder%20path.%0A%23%0A%23%20The%20USBGuard%20daemon%20will%20use%20this%20folder%20to%20load%20the%20policy%0A%23%20rule%20set%20from%20it%20and%20to%20write%20new%20rules%20received%20via%20the%0A%23%20IPC%20interface.%20Usually%2C%20we%20set%20the%20option%20to%0A%23%20/etc/usbguard/rules.d/.%20The%20USBGuard%20daemon%20is%20supposed%20to%0A%23%20behave%20like%20any%20other%20standard%20Linux%20daemon%20therefore%20it%0A%23%20loads%20rule%20files%20in%20alpha-numeric%20order.%20File%20names%20inside%0A%23%20RuleFolder%20directory%20should%20start%20with%20a%20two-digit%20number%0A%23%20prefix%20indicating%20the%20position%2C%20in%20which%20the%20rules%20are%0A%23%20scanned%20by%20the%20daemon.%0A%23%0A%23%20RuleFolder%3D/path/to/rulesfolder/%0A%23%0ARuleFolder%3D/etc/usbguard/rules.d/%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20Implicit%20policy%20target.%0A%23%0A%23%20How%20to%20treat%20devices%20that%20don%27t%20match%20any%20rule%20in%20the%0A%23%20policy.%20One%20of%3A%0A%23%0A%23%20%2A%20allow%20%20-%20authorize%20the%20device%0A%23%20%2A%20block%20%20-%20block%20the%20device%0A%23%20%2A%20reject%20-%20remove%20the%20device%0A%23%0AImplicitPolicyTarget%3Dblock%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20Present%20device%20policy.%0A%23%0A%23%20How%20to%20treat%20devices%20that%20are%20already%20connected%20when%20the%0A%23%20daemon%20starts.%20One%20of%3A%0A%23%0A%23%20%2A%20allow%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20-%20authorize%20every%20present%20device%0A%23%20%2A%20block%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20-%20deauthorize%20every%20present%20device%0A%23%20%2A%20reject%20%20%20%20%20%20%20-%20remove%20every%20present%20device%0A%23%20%2A%20keep%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20-%20just%20sync%20the%20internal%20state%20and%20leave%20it%0A%23%20%2A%20apply-policy%20-%20evaluate%20the%20ruleset%20for%20every%20present%0A%23%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20device%0A%23%0APresentDevicePolicy%3Dapply-policy%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20Present%20controller%20policy.%0A%23%0A%23%20How%20to%20treat%20USB%20controllers%20that%20are%20already%20connected%0A%23%20when%20the%20daemon%20starts.%20One%20of%3A%0A%23%0A%23%20%2A%20allow%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20-%20authorize%20every%20present%20device%0A%23%20%2A%20block%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20-%20deauthorize%20every%20present%20device%0A%23%20%2A%20reject%20%20%20%20%20%20%20-%20remove%20every%20present%20device%0A%23%20%2A%20keep%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20-%20just%20sync%20the%20internal%20state%20and%20leave%20it%0A%23%20%2A%20apply-policy%20-%20evaluate%20the%20ruleset%20for%20every%20present%0A%23%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20device%0A%23%0APresentControllerPolicy%3Dkeep%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20Inserted%20device%20policy.%0A%23%0A%23%20How%20to%20treat%20USB%20devices%20that%20are%20already%20connected%0A%23%20%2Aafter%2A%20the%20daemon%20starts.%20One%20of%3A%0A%23%0A%23%20%2A%20block%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20-%20deauthorize%20every%20present%20device%0A%23%20%2A%20reject%20%20%20%20%20%20%20-%20remove%20every%20present%20device%0A%23%20%2A%20apply-policy%20-%20evaluate%20the%20ruleset%20for%20every%20present%0A%23%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20device%0A%23%0AInsertedDevicePolicy%3Dapply-policy%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20Control%20which%20devices%20are%20authorized%20by%20default.%0A%23%0A%23%20The%20USBGuard%20daemon%20modifies%20some%20the%20default%20authorization%20state%20attributes%0A%23%20of%20controller%20devices.%20This%20setting%2C%20enables%20you%20to%20define%20what%20value%20the%0A%23%20default%20authorization%20is%20set%20to.%0A%23%0A%23%20%2A%20keep%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20-%20do%20not%20change%20the%20authorization%20state%0A%23%20%2A%20none%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20-%20every%20new%20device%20starts%20out%20deauthorized%0A%23%20%2A%20all%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20-%20every%20new%20device%20starts%20out%20authorized%0A%23%20%2A%20internal%20%20%20%20%20-%20internal%20devices%20start%20out%20authorized%2C%20external%20devices%20start%0A%23%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20out%20deauthorized%20%28this%20requires%20the%20ACPI%20tables%20to%20properly%0A%23%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20label%20internal%20devices%2C%20and%20kernel%20support%29%0A%23%0A%23AuthorizedDefault%3Dnone%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20Restore%20controller%20device%20state.%0A%23%0A%23%20The%20USBGuard%20daemon%20modifies%20some%20attributes%20of%20controller%0A%23%20devices%20like%20the%20default%20authorization%20state%20of%20new%20child%20device%0A%23%20instances.%20Using%20this%20setting%2C%20you%20can%20control%20whether%20the%0A%23%20daemon%20will%20try%20to%20restore%20the%20attribute%20values%20to%20the%20state%0A%23%20before%20modification%20on%20shutdown.%0A%23%0A%23%20SECURITY%20CONSIDERATIONS%3A%20If%20set%20to%20true%2C%20the%20USB%20authorization%0A%23%20policy%20could%20be%20bypassed%20by%20performing%20some%20sort%20of%20attack%20on%20the%0A%23%20daemon%20%28via%20a%20local%20exploit%20or%20via%20a%20USB%20device%29%20to%20make%20it%20shutdown%0A%23%20and%20restore%20to%20the%20operating-system%20default%20state%20%28known%20to%20be%20permissive%29.%0A%23%0ARestoreControllerDeviceState%3Dfalse%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20Device%20manager%20backend%0A%23%0A%23%20Which%20device%20manager%20backend%20implementation%20to%20use.%20One%20of%3A%0A%23%0A%23%20%2A%20uevent%20%20%20-%20Netlink%20based%20implementation%20which%20uses%20sysfs%20to%20scan%20for%20present%0A%23%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20devices%20and%20an%20uevent%20netlink%20socket%20for%20receiving%20USB%20device%0A%23%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20related%20events.%0A%23%20%2A%20umockdev%20-%20umockdev%20based%20device%20manager%20capable%20of%20simulating%20devices%20based%0A%23%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20on%20umockdev-record%20files.%20Useful%20for%20testing.%0A%23%0ADeviceManagerBackend%3Duevent%0A%0A%23%21%21%21%20WARNING%3A%20It%27s%20good%20practice%20to%20set%20at%20least%20one%20of%20the%20%21%21%21%0A%23%21%21%21%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20two%20options%20bellow.%20If%20none%20of%20them%20are%20set%2C%20%20%21%21%21%0A%23%21%21%21%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20the%20daemon%20will%20accept%20IPC%20connections%20from%20%20%20%21%21%21%0A%23%21%21%21%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20anyone%2C%20thus%20allowing%20anyone%20to%20modify%20the%20%20%20%20%21%21%21%0A%23%21%21%21%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20rule%20set%20and%20%28de%29authorize%20USB%20devices.%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%21%21%21%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20Users%20allowed%20to%20use%20the%20IPC%20interface.%0A%23%0A%23%20A%20space%20delimited%20list%20of%20usernames%20that%20the%20daemon%20will%0A%23%20accept%20IPC%20connections%20from.%0A%23%0A%23%20IPCAllowedUsers%3Dusername1%20username2%20...%0A%23%0AIPCAllowedUsers%3Droot%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20Groups%20allowed%20to%20use%20the%20IPC%20interface.%0A%23%0A%23%20A%20space%20delimited%20list%20of%20groupnames%20that%20the%20daemon%20will%0A%23%20accept%20IPC%20connections%20from.%0A%23%0A%23%20IPCAllowedGroups%3Dgroupname1%20groupname2%20...%0A%23%0AIPCAllowedGroups%3Dwheel%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20IPC%20access%20control%20definition%20files%20path.%0A%23%0A%23%20The%20files%20at%20this%20location%20will%20be%20interpreted%20by%20the%20daemon%0A%23%20as%20access%20control%20definition%20files.%20The%20%28base%29name%20of%20a%20file%0A%23%20should%20be%20in%20the%20form%3A%0A%23%0A%23%20%20%20%5Buser%5D%5B%3A%3Cgroup%3E%5D%0A%23%0A%23%20and%20should%20contain%20lines%20in%20the%20form%3A%0A%23%0A%23%20%20%20%3Csection%3E%3D%5Bprivilege%5D%20...%0A%23%0A%23%20This%20way%20each%20file%20defines%20who%20is%20able%20to%20connect%20to%20the%20IPC%0A%23%20bus%20and%20what%20privileges%20he%20has.%0A%23%0AIPCAccessControlFiles%3D/etc/usbguard/IPCAccessControl.d/%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20Generate%20device%20specific%20rules%20including%20the%20%22via-port%22%0A%23%20attribute.%0A%23%0A%23%20This%20option%20modifies%20the%20behavior%20of%20the%20allowDevice%0A%23%20action.%20When%20instructed%20to%20generate%20a%20permanent%20rule%2C%0A%23%20the%20action%20can%20generate%20a%20port%20specific%20rule.%20Because%0A%23%20some%20systems%20have%20unstable%20port%20numbering%2C%20the%20generated%0A%23%20rule%20might%20not%20match%20the%20device%20after%20rebooting%20the%20system.%0A%23%0A%23%20If%20set%20to%20false%2C%20the%20generated%20rule%20will%20still%20contain%0A%23%20the%20%22parent-hash%22%20attribute%20which%20also%20defines%20an%20association%0A%23%20to%20the%20parent%20device.%20See%20usbguard-rules.conf%285%29%20for%20more%0A%23%20details.%0A%23%0ADeviceRulesWithPort%3Dfalse%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20USBGuard%20Audit%20events%20log%20backend%0A%23%0A%23%20One%20of%3A%0A%23%0A%23%20%2A%20FileAudit%20-%20Log%20audit%20events%20into%20a%20file%20specified%20by%0A%23%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20AuditFilePath%20setting%20%28see%20below%29%0A%23%20%2A%20LinuxAudit%20-%20Log%20audit%20events%20using%20the%20Linux%20Audit%0A%23%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20subsystem%20%28using%20audit_log_user_message%29%0A%23%0AAuditBackend%3DLinuxAudit%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20USBGuard%20audit%20events%20log%20file%20path.%0A%23%0A%23AuditFilePath%3D/var/log/usbguard/usbguard-audit.log%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20Hides%20personally%20identifiable%20information%20such%20as%20device%20serial%20numbers%20and%0A%23%20hashes%20of%20descriptors%20%28which%20include%20the%20serial%20number%29%20from%20audit%20entries.%0A%23%0A%23HidePII%3Dfalse }} mode: 0600 path: /etc/usbguard/usbguard-daemon.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && ! grep -q s390x /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ) && { rpm --quiet -q usbguard; }; then if [ -e "/etc/usbguard/usbguard-daemon.conf" ] ; then LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*AuditBackend=/d" "/etc/usbguard/usbguard-daemon.conf" else touch "/etc/usbguard/usbguard-daemon.conf" fi # make sure file has newline at the end sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/usbguard/usbguard-daemon.conf" cp "/etc/usbguard/usbguard-daemon.conf" "/etc/usbguard/usbguard-daemon.conf.bak" # Insert at the end of the file printf '%s\n' "AuditBackend=LinuxAudit" >> "/etc/usbguard/usbguard-daemon.conf" # Clean up after ourselves. rm "/etc/usbguard/usbguard-daemon.conf.bak" else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Authorize Human Interface Devices in USBGuard daemon To allow authorization of Human Interface Devices (keyboard, mouse) by USBGuard daemon, add the line allow with-interface match-all { 03:*:* } to /etc/usbguard/rules.conf. This rule should be understood primarily as a convenience administration feature. This rule ensures that if the USBGuard default rules.conf file is present, it will alter it so that USB human interface devices are allowed. However, if the rules.conf file is altered by system administrator, the rule does not check if USB human interface devices are allowed. This assumes that an administrator modified the file with some purpose in mind. FMT_SMF_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000114-GPOS-00059 Without allowing Human Interface Devices, it might not be possible to interact with the system. CCE-82274-2 - name: Allow HID devices lineinfile: path: /etc/usbguard/rules.conf create: true line: allow with-interface match-all { 03:*:* } state: present when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and ansible_architecture != "s390x" ) tags: - CCE-82274-2 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - usbguard_allow_hid # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && ! grep -q s390x /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ); then # path of file with Usbguard rules rulesfile="/etc/usbguard/rules.conf" echo "allow with-interface match-all { 03:*:* }" >> $rulesfile else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Authorize Human Interface Devices and USB hubs in USBGuard daemon To allow authorization of USB devices combining human interface device and hub capabilities by USBGuard daemon, add the line allow with-interface match-all { 03:*:* 09:00:* } to /etc/usbguard/rules.conf. This rule should be understood primarily as a convenience administration feature. This rule ensures that if the USBGuard default rules.conf file is present, it will alter it so that USB human interface devices and hubs are allowed. However, if the rules.conf file is altered by system administrator, the rule does not check if USB human interface devices and hubs are allowed. This assumes that an administrator modified the file with some purpose in mind. CM-8(3) IA-3 FMT_SMF_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000114-GPOS-00059 Without allowing Human Interface Devices, it might not be possible to interact with the system. Without allowing hubs, it might not be possible to use any USB devices on the system. CCE-82368-2 - name: Allow HID devices and hubs lineinfile: path: /etc/usbguard/rules.conf create: true line: allow with-interface match-all { 03:*:* 09:00:* } state: present when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and ansible_architecture != "s390x" ) tags: - CCE-82368-2 - NIST-800-53-CM-8(3) - NIST-800-53-IA-3 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - usbguard_allow_hid_and_hub --- apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: annotations: complianceascode.io/depends-on: xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_package_usbguard_installed spec: config: ignition: version: 3.1.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:,{{ %0Aallow%20with-interface%20match-all%20%7B%2003%3A%2A%3A%2A%2009%3A00%3A%2A%20%7D }} mode: 0600 path: /etc/usbguard/rules.d/75-hid-and-hub.conf overwrite: true # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && ! grep -q s390x /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ); then echo "allow with-interface match-all { 03:*:* 09:00:* }" >> /etc/usbguard/rules.conf else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Authorize USB hubs in USBGuard daemon To allow authorization of USB hub devices by USBGuard daemon, add line allow with-interface match-all { 09:00:* } to /etc/usbguard/rules.conf. This rule should be understood primarily as a convenience administration feature. This rule ensures that if the USBGuard default rules.conf file is present, it will alter it so that USB hub devices are allowed. However, if the rules.conf file is altered by system administrator, the rule does not check if USB hub devices are allowed. This assumes that an administrator modified the file with some purpose in mind. FMT_SMF_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000114-GPOS-00059 Without allowing hubs, it might not be possible to use any USB devices on the system. CCE-82273-4 - name: Allow hubs lineinfile: path: /etc/usbguard/rules.conf create: true line: allow with-interface match-all { 09:00:* } state: present when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and ansible_architecture != "s390x" ) tags: - CCE-82273-4 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - usbguard_allow_hub # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && ! grep -q s390x /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ); then echo "allow with-interface match-all { 09:00:* }" >> /etc/usbguard/rules.conf else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Generate USBGuard Policy By default USBGuard when enabled prevents access to all USB devices and this lead to inaccessible system if they use USB mouse/keyboard. To prevent this scenario, the initial policy configuration must be generated based on current connected USB devices. CCI-000416 CCI-001958 CM-8(3)(a) IA-3 FMT_SMF_EXT.1 SRG-OS-000378-GPOS-00163 RHEL-08-040140 SV-230524r854065_rule The usbguard must be configured to allow connected USB devices to work properly, avoiding the system to become inaccessible. CCE-83774-0 - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto tags: - CCE-83774-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040140 - NIST-800-53-CM-8(3)(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-3 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - usbguard_generate_policy - name: Generate USBGuard Policy block: - name: Gather the package facts package_facts: manager: auto - name: Check that the /etc/usbguard/rules.conf exists stat: path: /etc/usbguard/rules.conf register: policy_file - name: Create USBGuard Policy configuration command: usbguard generate-policy register: policy when: not policy_file.stat.exists or policy_file.stat.size == 0 - name: Copy the Generated Policy configuration to a persistent file copy: content: '{{ policy.stdout }}' dest: /etc/usbguard/rules.conf mode: 384 when: not policy_file.stat.exists or policy_file.stat.size == 0 - name: Add comment into /etc/usbguard/rules.conf when system has no USB devices lineinfile: path: /etc/usbguard/rules.conf line: '# No USB devices found' state: present when: not policy_file.stat.exists or policy_file.stat.size == 0 - name: Enable service usbguard systemd: name: usbguard enabled: 'yes' state: started masked: 'no' when: - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] and ansible_architecture != "s390x" ) - '"usbguard" in ansible_facts.packages' tags: - CCE-83774-0 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040140 - NIST-800-53-CM-8(3)(a) - NIST-800-53-IA-3 - configure_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - usbguard_generate_policy # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && ! grep -q s390x /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ); then if rpm --quiet -q usbguard then USBGUARD_CONF=/etc/usbguard/rules.conf if [ ! -f "$USBGUARD_CONF" ] || [ ! -s "$USBGUARD_CONF" ]; then usbguard generate-policy > $USBGUARD_CONF if [ ! -s "$USBGUARD_CONF" ]; then # make sure OVAL check doesn't fail on systems where # generate-policy doesn't find any USB devices (for # example a system might not have a USB bus) echo "# No USB devices found" > $USBGUARD_CONF fi # make sure it has correct permissions chmod 600 $USBGUARD_CONF SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'usbguard.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" restart 'usbguard.service' "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'usbguard.service' fi else echo "USBGuard is not installed. No remediation was applied!" fi else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi X Window System The X Window System implementation included with the system is called X.org. Disable X Windows Unless there is a mission-critical reason for the system to run a graphical user interface, ensure X is not set to start automatically at boot and remove the X Windows software packages. There is usually no reason to run X Windows on a dedicated server system, as it increases the system's attack surface and consumes system resources. Administrators of server systems should instead login via SSH or on the text console. Remove the X Windows Package Group By removing the xorg-x11-server-common package, the system no longer has X Windows installed. If X Windows is not installed then the system cannot boot into graphical user mode. This prevents the system from being accidentally or maliciously booted into a graphical.target mode. To do so, run the following command:$ sudo yum groupremove base-x $ sudo yum remove xorg-x11-server-common The installation and use of a Graphical User Interface (GUI) increases your attack vector and decreases your overall security posture. Removing the package xorg-x11-server-common package will remove the graphical target which might bring your system to an inconsistent state requiring additional configuration to access the system again. If a GUI is an operational requirement, a tailored profile that removes this rule should used before continuing installation. 12 15 8 APO13.01 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 CCI-000366 4.3.3.6.6 SR 1.13 SR 2.6 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.AC-3 PR.PT-4 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 2.2.20 Unnecessary service packages must not be installed to decrease the attack surface of the system. X windows has a long history of security vulnerabilities and should not be installed unless approved and documented. CCE-82757-6 - name: Ensure xorg-x11-server-common is removed package: name: xorg-x11-server-common state: absent tags: - CCE-82757-6 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - disable_strategy - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - no_reboot_needed - package_xorg-x11-server-common_removed include remove_xorg-x11-server-common class remove_xorg-x11-server-common { package { 'xorg-x11-server-common': ensure => 'purged', } } package --remove=xorg-x11-server-common # CAUTION: This remediation script will remove xorg-x11-server-common # from the system, and may remove any packages # that depend on xorg-x11-server-common. Execute this # remediation AFTER testing on a non-production # system! if rpm -q --quiet "xorg-x11-server-common" ; then yum remove -y "xorg-x11-server-common" fi Disable graphical user interface By removing the following packages, the system no longer has X Windows installed. xorg-x11-server-Xorg xorg-x11-server-common xorg-x11-server-utils xorg-x11-server-Xwayland If X Windows is not installed then the system cannot boot into graphical user mode. This prevents the system from being accidentally or maliciously booted into a graphical.target mode. To do so, run the following command: sudo yum remove xorg-x11-server-Xorg xorg-x11-server-common xorg-x11-server-utils xorg-x11-server-Xwayland The installation and use of a Graphical User Interface (GUI) increases your attack vector and decreases your overall security posture. Removing the package xorg-x11-server-common package will remove the graphical target which might bring your system to an inconsistent state requiring additional configuration to access the system again. The rule xwindows_runlevel_target can be used to configure the system to boot into the multi-user.target. If a GUI is an operational requirement, a tailored profile that removes this rule should be used before continuing installation. This rule is disabled on Red Hat Virtualization Hosts and Managers, it will report not applicable. X11 graphic libraries are dependency of OpenStack Cinderlib storage provider. CCI-000366 CM-6(b) SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040320 SV-230553r809324_rule Unnecessary service packages must not be installed to decrease the attack surface of the system. X windows has a long history of security vulnerabilities and should not be installed unless approved and documented. CCE-83411-9 - name: Ensure xorg packages are removed package: name: - xorg-x11-server-Xorg - xorg-x11-server-common - xorg-x11-server-utils - xorg-x11-server-Xwayland state: absent tags: - CCE-83411-9 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040320 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - xwindows_remove_packages package --remove=xorg-x11-server-Xorg --remove=xorg-x11-server-common --remove=xorg-x11-server-utils --remove=xorg-x11-server-Xwayland # remove packages if rpm -q --quiet "xorg-x11-server-Xorg" ; then yum remove -y "xorg-x11-server-Xorg" fi if rpm -q --quiet "xorg-x11-server-utils" ; then yum remove -y "xorg-x11-server-utils" fi if rpm -q --quiet "xorg-x11-server-common" ; then yum remove -y "xorg-x11-server-common" fi if rpm -q --quiet "xorg-x11-server-Xwayland" ; then yum remove -y "xorg-x11-server-Xwayland" fi Disable X Windows Startup By Setting Default Target Systems that do not require a graphical user interface should only boot by default into multi-user.target mode. This prevents accidental booting of the system into a graphical.target mode. Setting the system's default target to multi-user.target will prevent automatic startup of the X server. To do so, run: $ systemctl set-default multi-user.target You should see the following output: Removed symlink /etc/systemd/system/default.target. Created symlink from /etc/systemd/system/default.target to /usr/lib/systemd/system/multi-user.target. 12 15 8 APO13.01 DSS01.04 DSS05.02 DSS05.03 CCI-000366 4.3.3.6.6 SR 1.13 SR 2.6 SR 3.1 SR 3.5 SR 3.8 SR 4.1 SR 4.3 SR 5.1 SR 5.2 SR 5.3 SR 7.1 SR 7.6 A.11.2.6 A.13.1.1 A.13.2.1 A.14.1.3 A.6.2.1 A.6.2.2 CM-7(a) CM-7(b) CM-6(a) PR.AC-3 PR.PT-4 SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 RHEL-08-040321 2.2.20 SV-251718r809378_rule Services that are not required for system and application processes must not be active to decrease the attack surface of the system. X windows has a long history of security vulnerabilities and should not be used unless approved and documented. CCE-83380-6 - name: Switch to multi-user runlevel file: src: /usr/lib/systemd/system/multi-user.target dest: /etc/systemd/system/default.target state: link force: true when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] tags: - CCE-83380-6 - DISA-STIG-RHEL-08-040321 - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) - low_complexity - low_disruption - medium_severity - reboot_required - restrict_strategy - xwindows_runlevel_target # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then systemctl set-default multi-user.target else >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' fi Introduction The purpose of this guidance is to provide security configuration recommendations and baselines for the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 operating system. Recommended settings for the basic operating system are provided, as well as for many network services that the system can provide to other systems. The guide is intended for system administrators. Readers are assumed to possess basic system administration skills for Unix-like systems, as well as some familiarity with the product's documentation and administration conventions. Some instructions within this guide are complex. All directions should be followed completely and with understanding of their effects in order to avoid serious adverse effects on the system and its security. General Principles The following general principles motivate much of the advice in this guide and should also influence any configuration decisions that are not explicitly covered. Encrypt Transmitted Data Whenever Possible Data transmitted over a network, whether wired or wireless, is susceptible to passive monitoring. Whenever practical solutions for encrypting such data exist, they should be applied. Even if data is expected to be transmitted only over a local network, it should still be encrypted. Encrypting authentication data, such as passwords, is particularly important. Networks of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 machines can and should be configured so that no unencrypted authentication data is ever transmitted between machines. Least Privilege Grant the least privilege necessary for user accounts and software to perform tasks. For example, sudo can be implemented to limit authorization to super user accounts on the system only to designated personnel. Another example is to limit logins on server systems to only those administrators who need to log into them in order to perform administration tasks. Using SELinux also follows the principle of least privilege: SELinux policy can confine software to perform only actions on the system that are specifically allowed. This can be far more restrictive than the actions permissible by the traditional Unix permissions model. Minimize Software to Minimize Vulnerability The simplest way to avoid vulnerabilities in software is to avoid installing that software. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8,the RPM Package Manager (originally Red Hat Package Manager, abbreviated RPM) allows for careful management of the set of software packages installed on a system. Installed software contributes to system vulnerability in several ways. Packages that include setuid programs may provide local attackers a potential path to privilege escalation. Packages that include network services may give this opportunity to network-based attackers. Packages that include programs which are predictably executed by local users (e.g. after graphical login) may provide opportunities for trojan horses or other attack code to be run undetected. The number of software packages installed on a system can almost always be significantly pruned to include only the software for which there is an environmental or operational need. Run Different Network Services on Separate Systems Whenever possible, a server should be dedicated to serving exactly one network service. This limits the number of other services that can be compromised in the event that an attacker is able to successfully exploit a software flaw in one network service. Configure Security Tools to Improve System Robustness Several tools exist which can be effectively used to improve a system's resistance to and detection of unknown attacks. These tools can improve robustness against attack at the cost of relatively little configuration effort. In particular, this guide recommends and discusses the use of host-based firewalling, SELinux for protection against vulnerable services, and a logging and auditing infrastructure for detection of problems. How to Use This Guide Readers should heed the following points when using the guide. Formatting Conventions Commands intended for shell execution, as well as configuration file text, are featured in a monospace font. Italics are used to indicate instances where the system administrator must substitute the appropriate information into a command or configuration file. Read Sections Completely and in Order Each section may build on information and recommendations discussed in prior sections. Each section should be read and understood completely; instructions should never be blindly applied. Relevant discussion may occur after instructions for an action. Reboot Required A system reboot is implicitly required after some actions in order to complete the reconfiguration of the system. In many cases, the changes will not take effect until a reboot is performed. In order to ensure that changes are applied properly and to test functionality, always reboot the system after applying a set of recommendations from this guide. Root Shell Environment Assumed Most of the actions listed in this document are written with the assumption that they will be executed by the root user running the /bin/bash shell. Commands preceded with a hash mark (#) assume that the administrator will execute the commands as root, i.e. apply the command via sudo whenever possible, or use su to gain root privileges if sudo cannot be used. Commands which can be executed as a non-root user are are preceded by a dollar sign ($) prompt. Test in Non-Production Environment This guidance should always be tested in a non-production environment before deployment. This test environment should simulate the setup in which the system will be deployed as closely as possible. OVALFileLinker from SCAP Security Guide ssg: [0, 1, 72], python: 3.10.12 5.11 2024-01-26T00:06:41 Disable DHCP Client in ifcfg Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 DHCP configuration should be static for all interfaces. Configure Fapolicy Module to Employ a Deny-all, Permit-by-exception Policy to Allow the Execution of Authorized Software Programs. Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Configure Fapolicy Module to Employ a Deny-all, Permit-by-exception Policy Enable Logging of All FTP Transactions Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 To trace malicious activity facilitated by the FTP service, it must be configured to ensure that all commands sent to the FTP server are logged using the verbose vsftpd log format. Create Warning Banners for All FTP Users Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This setting will cause the system greeting banner to be used for FTP connections as well. Set Permissions on the /etc/httpd/conf/ Directory Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Directory permissions for /etc/httpd/conf/ should be set to 0750 (or stronger). Set Permissions on the /var/log/httpd/ Directory Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Directory permissions for /var/log/httpd should be set to 0700 (or stronger). Set Permissions on All Configuration Files Inside /etc/httpd/conf.d/ Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The /etc/httpd/conf.d/* files should have the appropriate permissions (0640 or stronger). Set Permissions on All Configuration Files Inside /etc/httpd/conf/ Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The /etc/httpd/conf/* files should have the appropriate permissions (0640 or stronger). Set Permissions on All Configuration Files Inside /etc/httpd/conf.modules.d/ Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The /etc/httpd/conf.modules.d/* files should have the appropriate permissions (0640 or stronger). Disable Plaintext Authentication Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Plaintext authentication of mail clients should be disabled. Enable the SSL flag in /etc/dovecot.conf Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 SSL capabilities should be enabled for the mail server. Disable Kerberos by removing host keytab Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check that there is no Kerberos keytab file present in /etc Enable the LDAP Client For Use in Authconfig Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Enable LDAP in authconfig. Configure LDAP Client to Use TLS For All Transactions Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Require the use of TLS for LDAP clients. Configure Certificate Directives for LDAP Use of TLS Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Require the use of TLS for LDAP clients. Ensure Mail Transfer Agent is not Listening on any non-loopback Address Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Verify MTA is not listening on any non-loopback address Configure System to Forward All Mail For The Root Account Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check if root has the correct mail alias. Configure System to Forward All Mail From Postmaster to The Root Account Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check if postmaster has the correct mail alias. Disable Postfix Network Listening Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Postfix network listening should be disabled Configure SMTP Greeting Banner Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Protect against unnecessary release of information. Prevent Unrestricted Mail Relaying Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'smtpd_client_restrictions' is configured with value 'permit_mynetworks[ \t]*[, \t][ \t]*reject' in /etc/postfix/main.cf Ensure Insecure File Locking is Not Allowed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Allowing insecure file locking could allow for sensitive data to be viewed or edited by an unauthorized user. Use Kerberos Security on All Exports Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Using Kerberos Security allows to cryptography authenticate a valid user to an NFS share. Disable chrony daemon from acting as server Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Configure the port setting in /etc/chrony.conf to disable server operation. Disable network management of chrony daemon Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Configure the cmdport setting in /etc/chrony.conf to disable chronyc management connections over network. Configure Time Service Maxpoll Interval Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Configure the maxpoll setting in /etc/ntp.conf or chrony.conf to continuously poll the time source servers. Specify Additional Remote NTP Servers Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Multiple remote chronyd or ntpd NTP Servers for time synchronization should be specified (and dependencies are met) Specify a Remote NTP Server Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 A remote chronyd or ntpd NTP Server for time synchronization should be specified (and dependencies are met) Ensure that chronyd is running under chrony user account Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure that no other user than chrony is configured to run the chrony service Ensure Chrony is only configured with the server directive Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure Chrony has time sources configured with server directive A remote time server for Chrony is configured Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 A remote NTP Server for time synchronization should be specified (and dependencies are met) Specify Additional Remote NTP Servers Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Multiple ntpd NTP Servers for time synchronization should be specified. Specify a Remote NTP Server Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 A remote ntpd NTP Server for time synchronization should be specified (and dependencies are met) Enable the NTP Daemon Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 At least one of the chronyd or ntpd services should be enabled if possible. Remove Host-Based Authentication Files Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 There should not be any shosts.equiv files on the system. Remove Rsh Trust Files Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 There should not be any .rhosts or hosts.equiv files on the system. Remove User Host-Based Authentication Files Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 There should not be any .shosts files on the system. Ensure tftp Daemon Uses Secure Mode Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The TFTP daemon should use secure mode. Disable Printer Browsing Entirely if Possible Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The CUPS print service can be configured to broadcast a list of available printers to the network. Other machines on the network, also running the CUPS print service, can be configured to listen to these broadcasts and add and configure these printers for immediate use. By disabling this browsing capability, the machine will no longer generate or receive such broadcasts. Disable Print Server Capabilities Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 By default, locally configured printers will not be shared over the network, but if this functionality has somehow been enabled, these recommendations will disable it again. Be sure to disable outgoing printer list broadcasts, or remote users will still be able to see the locally configured printers, even if they cannot actually print to them. To limit print serving to a particular set of users, use the Policy directive. Require Client SMB Packet Signing, if using mount.cifs Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Require packet signing of clients who mount Samba shares using the mount.cifs program (e.g., those who specify shares in /etc/fstab). To do so, ensure that signing options (either sec=krb5i or sec=ntlmv2i) are used. Require Client SMB Packet Signing, if using smbclient Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Require samba clients which use smb.conf, such as smbclient, to use packet signing. A Samba client should only communicate with servers who can support SMB packet signing. Ensure Default SNMP Password Is Not Used Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 SNMP default communities must be removed. Configure SNMP Service to Use Only SNMPv3 or Newer Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 SNMP version 1 and 2c must not be enabled. Verify Permissions on SSH Server Private *_key Key Files Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The system sshd key is owned by root:root and has the 0600 permission, or by a root:ssh_keys with the 0640 permission Remove SSH Server firewalld Firewall exception (Unusual) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 If inbound SSH access is not needed, the firewall should disallow or reject access to the SSH port (22). Configure session renegotiation for SSH client Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'RekeyLimit' is configured with the correct value in /etc/ssh/ssh_config and /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/*.conf SSH client uses strong entropy to seed (for CSH like shells) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG environment variable is exported in /etc/profile.d/cc-ssh-strong-rng.csh and is not overridden in /etc/profile SSH client uses strong entropy to seed (Bash-like shells) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG environment variable is exported in /etc/profile.d/cc-ssh-strong-rng.sh and is not overridden in /etc/profile Enable SSH Server firewalld Firewall Exception Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 If inbound SSH access is needed, the firewall should allow access to the SSH service. Allow Only SSH Protocol 2 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The OpenSSH daemon should be running protocol 2. Disable Compression Or Set Compression to delayed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 SSH should either have compression disabled or set to delayed. Disable SSH Support for Rhosts RSA Authentication Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 SSH can allow authentication through the obsolete rsh command through the use of the authenticating user's SSH keys. This should be disabled. Limit Users' SSH Access Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 One of the following parameters of the sshd configuration file is set: AllowUsers, DenyUsers, AllowGroups, DenyGroups. Force frequent session key renegotiation Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure RekeyLimit is configured with the appropriate value in /etc/ssh/sshd_config Set SSH Client Alive Interval Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SSH idle timeout interval should be set to an appropriate value. Set SSH Client Alive Count Max Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SSH ClientAliveCountMax should be set to an appropriate value (and dependencies are met) Ensure SSH LoginGraceTime is configured Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SSH number seconds for login grace time should be set to an appropriate value. Set SSH authentication attempt limit Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SSH MaxAuthTries should be set to an appropriate value. Set SSH MaxSessions limit Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SSH number of max sessions should be set to an appropriate value. Ensure SSH MaxStartups is configured Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'MaxStartups' is configured in '/etc/ssh/sshd_config' Use Only FIPS 140-2 Validated Ciphers Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Limit the ciphers to those which are FIPS-approved. Use Only FIPS 140-2 Validated Key Exchange Algorithms Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Limit the Key Exchange (Kex) algorithms to those which are FIPS-approved. Use Only FIPS 140-2 Validated MACs Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Limit the Message Authentication Codes (MACs) to those which are FIPS-approved. Enable Use of Privilege Separation Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'UsePrivilegeSeparation' is configured with value 'sandbox' in '/etc/ssh/sshd_config' Use Only Strong Key Exchange algorithms Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Limit the Key Exchange Algorithms to those which are FIPS-approved. Use Only Strong MACs Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure only strong MAC algorithms are used Certificate status checking in SSSD Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 SSSD should be configured with the correct ocsp_dgst digest function Configure PAM in SSSD Services Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 SSSD should be configured to run SSSD PAM services. Enable Smartcards in SSSD Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 SSSD should be configured to authenticate access to the system using smart cards. Configure SSSD's Memory Cache to Expire Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 SSSD's memory cache should be configured to set to expire records after 1 day. Configure SSSD to Expire Offline Credentials Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 SSSD should be configured to expire offline credentials after 1 day. Configure SSSD to run as user sssd Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 SSSD processes should be configured to run as user sssd, not root. Configure SSSD to Expire SSH Known Hosts Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 SSSD should be configured to expire keys from known SSH hosts after 1 day. Configure SSSD LDAP Backend Client CA Certificate Location Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Configure SSSD to implement cryptography to protect the integrity of LDAP remote access sessions. Configure SSSD LDAP Backend Client to Demand a Valid Certificate from the Server Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Configure SSSD to request a valid certificate from the server to protect LDAP remote access sessions. Configure SSSD LDAP Backend to Use TLS For All Transactions Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 LDAP should be used for authentication and use STARTTLS Log USBGuard daemon audit events using Linux Audit Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'AuditBackend' is configured with value 'LinuxAudit' in /etc/usbguard/usbguard-daemon.conf Authorize Human Interface Devices in USBGuard daemon Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check that /etc/usbguard/rules.conf exists and that it contains at least one non white space character. Authorize Human Interface Devices and USB hubs in USBGuard daemon Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check that /etc/usbguard/rules.conf contains at least one non whitespace character and exists. Authorize USB hubs in USBGuard daemon Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check that /etc/usbguard/rules.conf contains at least one non whitespace character and exists. Generate USBGuard Policy Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check that /etc/usbguard/rules.conf contains at least one non whitespace character and exists. Disable graphical user interface Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure that the default runlevel target is set to multi-user.target. Disable X Windows Startup By Setting Default Target Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure that the default runlevel target is set to multi-user.target. Enable authselect Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check that authselect is enabled Modify the System Login Banner Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The system login banner text should be set correctly. Modify the System Login Banner for Remote Connections Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The system login banner text should be set correctly. Modify the System Message of the Day Banner Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The system motd banner text should be set correctly. Enable GNOME3 Login Warning Banner Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Enable the GNOME3 Login warning banner. Set the GNOME3 Login Warning Banner Text Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Enable the GUI warning banner. Disallow Configuration to Bypass Password Requirements for Privilege Escalation Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Disallow Configuration to Bypass Password Requirements for Privilege Escalation. Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Configure the system to notify users of last login/access using pam_lastlog. Set Up a Private Namespace in PAM Configuration Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check presence of pam_namespace.so module in the /etc/pam.d/login file An SELinux Context must be configured for the pam_faillock.so records directory Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 An SELinux Context must be configured for the Faillock directory. Account Lockouts Must Be Logged Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Account Lockouts Must Be Logged Limit Password Reuse: password-auth Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The passwords to remember should be set correctly. Limit Password Reuse: system-auth Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The passwords to remember should be set correctly. Limit Password Reuse Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The passwords to remember should be set correctly. Account Lockouts Must Be Logged Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Account Lockouts Must Be Logged Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Lockout account after failed login attempts Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The root account should be configured to deny access after the number of defined failed attempts has been reached. Lock Accounts Must Persist Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Persist lockout account after reboot Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The number of allowed failed logins should be set correctly. Do Not Show System Messages When Unsuccessful Logon Attempts Occur Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Prevent System Messages When Three Unsuccessful Logon Attempts Occur Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The unlock time after number of failed logins should be set correctly. Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The PAM module pam_pwquality is used in password-auth Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The PAM module pam_pwquality is used in system-auth Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The password retry should meet minimum requirements Set Password Hashing Algorithm in /etc/libuser.conf Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The password hashing algorithm should be set correctly in /etc/libuser.conf. Set Password Hashing Algorithm in /etc/login.defs Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The password hashing algorithm should be set correctly in /etc/login.defs. Set PAM''s Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The password hashing algorithm should be set correctly in /etc/pam.d/password-auth. Set PAM''s Password Hashing Algorithm Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The password hashing algorithm should be set correctly in /etc/pam.d/system-auth. Set Password Hashing Minimum Rounds in /etc/login.defs Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The password hashing minimum rounds should be set correctly in /etc/login.defs. Disable Ctrl-Alt-Del Burst Action Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Configure the CtrlAltDelBurstAction setting in /etc/systemd/system.conf or /etc/systemd/system.conf.d/* to none to prevent a reboot if Ctrl-Alt-Delete is pressed more than 7 times in 2 seconds. Disable Ctrl-Alt-Del Reboot Activation Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 By default, the system will reboot when the Ctrl-Alt-Del key sequence is pressed. Verify that Interactive Boot is Disabled Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The ability for users to perform interactive startups should be disabled. Configure Logind to terminate idle sessions after certain time of inactivity Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'StopIdleSessionSec' is configured with desired value in section 'Login' in /etc/systemd/logind.conf Require Authentication for Emergency Systemd Target Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The requirement for a password to boot into emergency mode should be configured correctly. Require Authentication for Single User Mode Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The requirement for a password to boot into single-user mode should be configured correctly. Support session locking with tmux Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check if tmux is configured to exec at the end of bashrc. Support session locking with tmux (not enforcing) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check if tmux is configured to be launched at the end of bashrc. Configure tmux to lock session after inactivity Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check if tmux is configured to lock sessions after period of inactivity. Configure the tmux Lock Command Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check if the vlock command is configured to be used as a locking mechanism in tmux. Configure the tmux lock session key binding Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check if the lock-session command is bound to a key. Prevent user from disabling the screen lock Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check that tmux is not listed in /etc/shells Configure opensc Smart Card Drivers Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Configure the organization's smart card driver so that only the smart card in use by the organization will be recognized by the system. Force opensc To Use Defined Smart Card Driver Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Force opensc to use the organization's smart card driver so that only the smart card in use by the organization will be recognized by the system. Ensure All Accounts on the System Have Unique User IDs Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 All accounts on the system should have unique IDs for proper accountability. Only Authorized Local User Accounts Exist on Operating System Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Besides the default operating system user, there should be no other users except the users that are authorized to exist locally on the operating system. Ensure All Groups on the System Have Unique Group ID Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 All groups on the system should have unique names for proper accountability. Ensure All Groups on the System Have Unique Group Names Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 All groups on the system should have unique names for proper accountability. Set Account Expiration Following Inactivity Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The accounts should be configured to expire automatically following password expiration. Ensure All Accounts on the System Have Unique Names Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 All accounts on the system should have unique names for proper accountability. Set Password Maximum Age Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The maximum password age policy should meet minimum requirements. Set Password Minimum Age Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The minimum password age policy should be set appropriately. Set Password Minimum Length in login.defs Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The password minimum length should be set appropriately. Set Existing Passwords Maximum Age Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Set Existing Passwords Maximum Age Set Existing Passwords Minimum Age Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Set Existing Passwords Maximum Age Set Existing Passwords Warning Age Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Set Existing Passwords Warning Age Set Password Warning Age Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The password expiration warning age should be set appropriately. Set existing passwords a period of inactivity before they been locked Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Set existing passwords a period of inactivity before they been locked Verify All Account Password Hashes are Shadowed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 All password hashes should be shadowed. Verify All Account Password Hashes are Shadowed with SHA512 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 All password hashes should be shadowed. Ensure all users last password change date is in the past Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 All passwords last change date is in the past. Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The number of rounds for password hashing should be set correctly. Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The number of rounds for password hashing should be set correctly. All GIDs referenced in /etc/passwd must be defined in /etc/group Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 All GIDs referenced in /etc/passwd must be defined in /etc/group. Prevent Login to Accounts With Empty Password Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The file /etc/pam.d/system-auth should not contain the nullok option Ensure There Are No Accounts With Blank or Null Passwords Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The file /etc/shadow shows that there aren't empty passwords Verify No .forward Files Exist Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The .forward file specifies an email address to forward the user's mail to. Any .forward files should be removed. Ensure there are no legacy + NIS entries in /etc/group Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 No lines starting with + are in /etc/group Ensure there are no legacy + NIS entries in /etc/passwd Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 No lines starting with + are in /etc/passwd Ensure there are no legacy + NIS entries in /etc/shadow Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 No lines starting with + are in /etc/shadow Verify No netrc Files Exist Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The .netrc files contain login information used to auto-login into FTP servers and reside in the user's home directory. Any .netrc files should be removed. Verify Only Root Has UID 0 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Only the root account should be assigned a user id of 0. Verify Root Has A Primary GID 0 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The root account should have primary group of 0 Ensure the Group Used by pam_wheel.so Module Exists on System and is Empty Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Group referred by var_pam_wheel_group_for_su variable exists and has no members. Ensure Authentication Required for Single User Mode Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure root password is configured Direct root Logins Not Allowed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Preventing direct root logins help ensure accountability for actions taken on the system using the root account. Ensure that System Accounts Are Locked Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure that System Accounts Are Locked Ensure that System Accounts Do Not Run a Shell Upon Login Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The root account is the only system account that should have a login shell. Restrict Serial Port Root Logins Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Preventing direct root login to serial port interfaces helps ensure accountability for actions taken on the system using the root account. Restrict Virtual Console Root Logins Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Preventing direct root login to virtual console devices helps ensure accountability for actions taken on the system using the root account. Enforce usage of pam_wheel for su authentication Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Only members of the wheel group should be able to authenticate through the su command. Enforce Usage of pam_wheel with Group Parameter for su Authentication Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Only members of the group set in variable 'var_pam_wheel_group_for_su' should be able to authenticate through the su command. Ensure Home Directories are Created for New Users Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CREATE_HOME should be enabled Ensure the Logon Failure Delay is Set Correctly in login.defs Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The delay between failed authentication attempts should be set for all users specified in /etc/login.defs Limit the Number of Concurrent Login Sessions Allowed Per User Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The maximum number of concurrent login sessions per user should meet minimum requirements. Configure Polyinstantiation of /tmp Directories Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Configure Polyinstantiation of /var/tmp Directories Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Set Interactive Session Timeout Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Checks interactive shell timeout User Initialization Files Must Be Group-Owned By The Primary Group Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 User Initialization Files Must Be Group-Owned By The Primary Group User Initialization Files Must Not Run World-Writable Programs Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 User Initialization Files Must Not Execute World-Writable Programs User Initialization Files Must Be Owned By the Primary User Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 User Initialization Files Must Be Owned By the Primary User All Interactive Users Must Have A Home Directory Defined Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 All Interactive Users Must Have A Home Directory Defined All Interactive Users Home Directories Must Exist Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 All Interactive Users Home Directories Must Exist All User Files and Directories In The Home Directory Must Be Group-Owned By The Primary Group Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 All User Files and Directories In The Home Directory Must Be Group-Owned By The Primary Group All User Files and Directories In The Home Directory Must Have a Valid Owner Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 All User Files and Directories In The Home Directory Must Have a Valid Owner All User Files and Directories In The Home Directory Must Have Mode 0750 Or Less Permissive Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 All User Files and Directories In The Home Directory Must Have Mode 0750 Or Less Permissive Ensure users' .netrc Files are not group or world accessible Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Netrc User File In The Home Directory Must Not be group or world accessible All Interactive User Home Directories Must Be Group-Owned By The Primary Group Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 All interactive user's Home Directories must be group-owned by its user All Interactive User Home Directories Must Be Owned By The Primary User Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 All interactive user's Home Directories must be owned by its user Ensure All User Initialization Files Have Mode 0740 Or Less Permissive Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 User initialization files have mode 0740 or less permissive All Interactive User Home Directories Must Have mode 0750 Or Less Permissive Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 All Interactive User Home Directories Must Have mode 0750 Or Less Permissive Ensure that User Home Directories are not Group-Writable or World-Readable Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure that User Home Directories are not Group-Writable or World-Readable Ensure that Root's Path Does Not Include World or Group-Writable Directories Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check each directory in root's path and make use it does not grant write permission to group and other Ensure that Root's Path Does Not Include Relative Paths or Null Directories Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The environment variable PATH should be set correctly for the root user. Ensure the Default Bash Umask is Set Correctly Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The default umask for users of the bash shell Ensure the Default C Shell Umask is Set Correctly Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The default umask for users of the csh shell Ensure the Default Umask is Set Correctly in login.defs Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The default umask for all users specified in /etc/login.defs Ensure the Default Umask is Set Correctly in /etc/profile Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The default umask for all users should be set correctly Ensure the Default Umask is Set Correctly For Interactive Users Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure the Default Umask is Set Correctly For Interactive Users Enable Syscall Auditing Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Syscall auditing should not be disabled. Make the auditd Configuration Immutable Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Force a reboot to change audit rules is enabled Configure immutable Audit login UIDs Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check if system is configured to make login UIDs immutable Record Events that Modify the System's Mandatory Access Controls Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules that detect changes to the system's mandatory access controls (SELinux) are enabled. Record Events that Modify the System's Mandatory Access Controls in usr/share Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules that detect changes to the system's mandatory access controls (SELinux) in usr/share/selinux are enabled. Record Events that Modify the System's Network Environment Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The network environment should not be modified by anything other than administrator action. Any change to network parameters should be audited. Record Attempts to Alter Process and Session Initiation Information Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules should capture information about session initiation. Ensure auditd Collects System Administrator Actions - /etc/sudoers Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit actions taken by system administrators on the system - /etc/sudoers. Ensure auditd Collects System Administrator Actions - /etc/sudoers.d/ Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit actions taken by system administrators on the system - /etc/sudoers.d/. Record Events When Executables Are Run As Another User Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure audit rule for all uses of privileged functions is enabled Record Events When Privileged Executables Are Run Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure audit rule for all uses of privileged functions is enabled Ensure auditd Collects System Administrator Actions Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit actions taken by system administrators on the system. Shutdown System When Auditing Failures Occur Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The system will shutdown when auditing fails. Record Events that Modify User/Group Information Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules should detect modification to system files that hold information about users and groups. Record Access Events to Audit Log Directory Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the read events to /var/log/audit System Audit Directories Must Be Group Owned By Root Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Checks that all /var/log/audit directories are group owned by the root user. System Audit Directories Must Be Owned By Root Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Checks that all /var/log/audit directories are owned by the root user. System Audit Logs Must Have Mode 0750 or Less Permissive Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Checks for correct permissions for audit logs. System Audit Logs Must Be Group Owned By Root Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Checks that all audit log files are group owned by the root user. System Audit Logs Must Be Owned By Root Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Checks that all /var/log/audit files and directories are owned by the root user and group. System Audit Logs Must Be Owned By Root Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Checks that all audit log files are owned by the root user. System Audit Logs Must Have Mode 0640 or Less Permissive Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Checks for correct permissions for all audit log files. Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - umount Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The changing of file permissions and attributes should be audited. Ensure auditd Collects File Deletion Events by User Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit files deletion events. Ensure auditd Collects Unauthorized Access Attempts to Files (unsuccessful) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the unauthorized access attempts to files (unsuccessful) are enabled. Ensure auditd Collects Information on Kernel Module Loading and Unloading Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The audit rules should be configured to log information about kernel module loading and unloading. Ensure auditd Collects Information on Kernel Module Unloading - create_module Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The audit rules should be configured to log information about kernel module loading and unloading. Ensure auditd Collects Information on Kernel Module Unloading - delete_module Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The audit rules should be configured to log information about kernel module loading and unloading. Ensure auditd Collects Information on Kernel Module Loading and Unloading - finit_module Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The audit rules should be configured to log information about kernel module loading and unloading. Ensure auditd Collects Information on Kernel Module Loading - init_module Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The audit rules should be configured to log information about kernel module loading and unloading. Ensure auditd Collects Information on Kernel Module Loading and Unloading - query_module Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The audit rules should be configured to log information about kernel module loading and unloading. Record Attempts to Alter Logon and Logout Events Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules should be configured to log successful and unsuccessful login and logout events. Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the use of privileged commands are enabled. Record attempts to alter time through adjtimex Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Record attempts to alter time through adjtimex. Record Attempts to Alter Time Through clock_settime Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Record attempts to alter time through clock_settime. Record attempts to alter time through settimeofday Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Record attempts to alter time through settimeofday. Record Attempts to Alter Time Through stime Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Record attempts to alter time through stime. Note that on 64-bit architectures the stime system call is not defined in the audit system calls lookup table. Record Attempts to Alter the localtime File Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Record attempts to alter time through /etc/localtime. Configure audispd Plugin To Send Logs To Remote Server Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 remote_server setting in /etc/audit/audisp-remote.conf is set to a certain IP address or hostname Configure audispd's Plugin disk_full_action When Disk Is Full Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 remote_server setting in /etc/audit/audisp-remote.conf is set to a certain IP address or hostname Encrypt Audit Records Sent With audispd Plugin Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 transport setting in /etc/audit/audisp-remote.conf is set to 'KRB5' Configure audispd's Plugin network_failure_action On Network Failure Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 remote_server setting in /etc/audit/audisp-remote.conf is set to a certain IP address or hostname Configure auditd to use audispd's syslog plugin Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 active setting in /etc/audit/plugins.d/syslog.conf is set to 'yes' Configure auditd Disk Error Action on Disk Error Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 disk_error_action setting in /etc/audit/auditd.conf is set to a certain action Configure auditd Disk Error Action on Disk Error Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 disk_error_action setting in /etc/audit/auditd.conf is set to SYSLOG, SINGLE or HALT Configure auditd Disk Full Action when Disk Space Is Full Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 disk_full_action setting in /etc/audit/auditd.conf is set to a certain action Configure auditd Disk Full Action when Disk Space Is Full Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 disk_full_action setting in /etc/audit/auditd.conf is set to SYSLOG, SINGLE or HALT Configure auditd mail_acct Action on Low Disk Space Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 action_mail_acct setting in /etc/audit/auditd.conf is set to a certain account Configure auditd admin_space_left Action on Low Disk Space Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 admin_space_left_action setting in /etc/audit/auditd.conf is set to a certain action Configure auditd admin_space_left on Low Disk Space Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 admin_space_left setting in /etc/audit/auditd.conf is set to at least a certain value Configure auditd flush priority Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The setting for flush in /etc/audit/auditd.conf Configure auditd Max Log File Size Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 max_log_file setting in /etc/audit/auditd.conf is set to at least a certain value Configure auditd max_log_file_action Upon Reaching Maximum Log Size Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 max_log_file_action setting in /etc/audit/auditd.conf is set to a certain action Configure auditd max_log_file_action Upon Reaching Maximum Log Size Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 max_log_file_action setting in /etc/audit/auditd.conf is set to a certain action Configure auditd Number of Logs Retained Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 num_logs setting in /etc/audit/auditd.conf is set to at least a certain value Configure auditd space_left on Low Disk Space Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 space_left setting in /etc/audit/auditd.conf is set to at least a certain value Configure auditd space_left Action on Low Disk Space Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 space_left_action setting in /etc/audit/auditd.conf is set to a certain action Configure auditd space_left on Low Disk Space Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 space_left setting in /etc/audit/auditd.conf is set to at least a certain value Set type of computer node name logging in audit logs Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'name_format' is configured with value 'hostname|fdq|numeric' in /etc/audit/auditd.conf Appropriate Action Must be Setup When the Internal Audit Event Queue is Full Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'overflow_action' is configured with value '(syslog|single|halt)' in /etc/audit/auditd.conf Configure audit according to OSPP requirements Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Compare configure audit rules against the recommended pre-configured files. Disable Recovery Booting Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Recovery mode should be disabled. Configure kernel to trust the CPU random number generator Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure the kernel is configured to trust the CPU hardware random number generator. Set the Boot Loader Admin Username to a Non-Default Value Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The grub2 boot loader superuser should have a username that is hard to guess. Boot Loader Is Not Installed On Removeable Media Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure the system is not configured to use a boot loader on removable media. Set Boot Loader Password in grub2 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The grub2 boot loader should have password protection enabled. Set the UEFI Boot Loader Admin Username to a Non-Default Value Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The grub2 boot loader superuser should have a username that is hard to guess. Set the UEFI Boot Loader Password Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The UEFI grub2 boot loader should have password protection enabled. UEFI Boot Loader Is Not Installed On Removeable Media Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure the system is not configured to use a boot loader on removable media. Ensure all zIPL boot entries are BLS compliant Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check if /etc/zipl.conf configures any boot entry Ensure zIPL bootmap is up to date Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check if /boot/bootmap is up to date Ensure debug-shell service is not enabled in zIPL Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure systemd.debug-shell option is not configured in the 'options' line in /boot/loader/entries/*.conf. Make sure that newly installed kernels won't have this option, it should not be configured in /etc/kernel/cmdline. Ensure rsyslog Default File Permissions Configured Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 FileCreateMode setting controls permissions applied to newly created files. Configure Logwatch HostLimit Line Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Test if HostLimit line in logwatch.conf is set appropriately. Configure Logwatch SplitHosts Line Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check if SplitHosts line in logwatch.conf is set appropriately. Ensure cron Is Logging To Rsyslog Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Rsyslog should be configured to capture cron messages. Ensure Rsyslog Authenticates Off-Loaded Audit Records Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Rsyslogd must authenticate remote system its sending logs to. Ensure Rsyslog Encrypts Off-Loaded Audit Records Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Rsyslogd must encrypt the off-loading of logs off of the system. Ensure Rsyslog Encrypts Off-Loaded Audit Records Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Rsyslogd must encrypt the off-loading of logs off of the system. Ensure logging is configured Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Syslog logs should be configured Ensure remote access methods are monitored in Rsyslog Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Rsyslog should be configured to monitor remote access methods. Ensure Logrotate Runs Periodically Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The frequency of automatic log files rotation performed by the logrotate utility should be configured to run daily Ensure rsyslog Does Not Accept Remote Messages Unless Acting As Log Server Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 rsyslogd should reject remote messages Ensure Logs Sent To Remote Host Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Syslog logs should be sent to a remote loghost Configure TLS for rsyslog remote logging Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check that all needed TLS-related options are present Configure CA certificate for rsyslog remote logging Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check that the CA certificate path is set Configure Multiple DNS Servers in /etc/resolv.conf Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Multiple Domain Name System (DNS) Servers should be configured in /etc/resolv.conf. Disable Client Dynamic DNS Updates Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Clients should not automatically update their own DNS record. Disable Zeroconf Networking Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Disable Zeroconf automatic route assignment in the 169.254.0.0 subnet. Prevent non-Privileged Users from Modifying Network Interfaces using nmcli Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 polkit is properly configured to prevent non-privileged users from changing networking settings Ensure System is Not Acting as a Network Sniffer Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Disable the network sniffer Manually Assign IPv6 Router Address Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Define default gateways for IPv6 traffic Use Privacy Extensions for Address Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Enable privacy extensions for IPv6 Manually Assign Global IPv6 Address Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Manually configure addresses for IPv6 Disable IPv6 Networking Support Automatic Loading Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The disable option will allow the IPv6 module to be inserted, but prevent address assignment and activation of the network stack. Disable Support for RPC IPv6 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Disable ipv6 based rpc services Deactivate Wireless Network Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 All wireless interfaces should be disabled. Ensure All World-Writable Directories Are Owned by root User Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 All world writable directories should be owned by root. Verify that All World-Writable Directories Have Sticky Bits Set Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The sticky bit should be set for all world-writable directories. Ensure All World-Writable Directories Are Owned by a System Account Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 All world writable directories should be owned by a system account. Ensure All World-Writable Directories Are Group Owned by a System Account Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 All world writable directories should be group owned by a system user. Verify that local System.map file (if exists) is readable only by root Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Checks that /boot/System.map-* are only readable by root. Ensure All SGID Executables Are Authorized Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Evaluates to true if all files with SGID set are owned by RPM packages. Ensure All SUID Executables Are Authorized Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Evaluates to true if all files with SUID set are owned by RPM packages. Ensure No World-Writable Files Exist Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The world-write permission should be disabled for all files. Ensure All Files Are Owned by a Group Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 All files should be owned by a group Ensure All Files Are Owned by a User Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 All files should be owned by a user Verify Permissions and Ownership of Old Passwords File Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Verify Permissions and Ownership of Old Passwords File Verify that system commands files are group owned by root or a system account Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Checks that system commands in /bin /sbin /usr/bin /usr/sbin /usr/local/bin /usr/local/sbin are owned by root group or a system account. Verify that System Executables Have Root Ownership Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Checks that /bin, /sbin, /usr/bin, /usr/sbin, /usr/local/bin, /usr/local/sbin, /usr/libexec, and objects therein, are owned by root. Verify that System Executables Have Restrictive Permissions Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Checks that binary files under /bin, /sbin, /usr/bin, /usr/sbin, /usr/local/bin, /usr/local/sbin, and /usr/libexec are not group-writable or world-writable. Disable Kernel Support for USB via Bootloader Configuration Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX' is configured with value 'nousb' in /etc/default/grub Add nodev Option to Non-Root Local Partitions Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The nodev mount option prevents files from being interpreted as character or block devices. Legitimate character and block devices should exist in the /dev directory on the root partition or within chroot jails built for system services. All other locations should not allow character and block devices. Bind Mount /var/tmp To /tmp Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The /var/tmp directory should be bind mounted to /tmp in order to consolidate temporary storage into one location protected by the same techniques as /tmp. Disable core dump backtraces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'ProcessSizeMax' is configured with value '0 in section 'Coredump' in /etc/systemd/coredump.conf Disable storing core dump Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'Storage' is configured with value 'none in section 'Coredump' in /etc/systemd/coredump.conf Disable Core Dumps for All Users Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Core dumps for all users should be disabled Set Daemon Umask Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The daemon umask should be set as appropriate Enable ExecShield via sysctl Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel runtime parameter 'kernel.exec-shield' should not be disabled and set to 1 on 32-bit systems. Enable NX or XD Support in the BIOS Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The NX (no-execution) bit flag should be set on the system. Install PAE Kernel on Supported 32-bit x86 Systems Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package kernel-PAE should be installed on 32-bit systems. Ensure SELinux Not Disabled in /etc/default/grub Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check if selinux=0 OR enforcing=0 within the GRUB2 configuration files, fail if found. Ensure No Device Files are Unlabeled by SELinux Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 All device files in /dev should be assigned an SELinux security context other than 'device_t' and 'unlabeled_t'. Ensure No Daemons are Unconfined by SELinux Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 All pids in /proc should be assigned an SELinux security context other than 'unconfined_service_t'. Ensure SELinux is Not Disabled Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 SELinux is not Disabled. Configure SELinux Policy Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux policy should be set appropriately. Ensure SELinux State is Enforcing Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux state should be enforcing the local policy. Prefer to use a 64-bit Operating System when supported Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check if the system supports a 64-bit Operating System Make sure that the dconf databases are up-to-date with regards to respective keyfiles Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Make sure that the dconf databases are up-to-date with regards to respective keyfiles. Configure GNOME3 DConf User Profile Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The DConf User profile should have the local DB configured. Disable the GNOME3 Login Restart and Shutdown Buttons Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Disable the GNOME3 Login GUI Restart and Shutdown buttons to all users on the login screen. Disable the GNOME3 Login User List Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Disable the GNOME3 GUI listing of all known users on the login screen. Enable the GNOME3 Login Smartcard Authentication Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Enable smartcard authentication in the GNOME3 Login GUI. Set the GNOME3 Login Number of Failures Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Set the GNOME3 number of login failure attempts. Disable GDM Automatic Login Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Disable the GNOME Display Manager (GDM) ability to allow users to automatically login. Disable GDM Guest Login Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Disable the GNOME Display Manager (GDM) ability to allow guest users to login. Disable XDMCP in GDM Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'Enable' is configured with value 'false in section 'xdmcp' in /etc/gdm/custom.conf Disable GNOME3 automount Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The system's default desktop environment, GNOME3, will mount devices and removable media (such as DVDs, CDs and USB flash drives) whenever they are inserted into the system. Disable automount within GNOME3. Disable GNOME3 automount-open Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The system's default desktop environment, GNOME3, will mount devices and removable media (such as DVDs, CDs and USB flash drives) whenever they are inserted into the system. Disable automount-open within GNOME3. Disable GNOME3 autorun Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The system's default desktop environment, GNOME3, will mount devices and removable media (such as DVDs, CDs and USB flash drives) whenever they are inserted into the system. Disable autorun within GNOME3. Disable All GNOME3 Thumbnailers Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The system's default desktop environment, GNOME3, uses a number of different thumbnailer programs to generate thumbnails for any new or modified content in an opened folder. Disable the execution of these thumbnail applications within GNOME3. Disable WIFI Network Connection Creation in GNOME3 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Disable the GNOME3 wireless network creation settings. Disable WIFI Network Notification in GNOME3 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Disable the GNOME3 wireless network notification. Require Credential Prompting for Remote Access in GNOME3 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Configure GNOME3 to require credential prompting for remote access. Require Encryption for Remote Access in GNOME3 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Configure GNOME3 to require encryption for remote access connections. Enable GNOME3 Screensaver Idle Activation Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Idle activation of the screen saver should be enabled. Ensure Users Cannot Change GNOME3 Screensaver Idle Activation Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Idle activation of the screen saver should not be changed by users. Set GNOME3 Screensaver Inactivity Timeout Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The allowed period of inactivity before the screensaver is activated. Set GNOME3 Screensaver Lock Delay After Activation Period Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Idle activation of the screen lock should be enabled immediately or after a delay. Enable GNOME3 Screensaver Lock After Idle Period Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Idle activation of the screen lock should be enabled. Ensure Users Cannot Change GNOME3 Screensaver Lock After Idle Period Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Idle activation of the screen lock should not be changed by users. Implement Blank Screensaver Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The GNOME3 screensaver should be blank. Disable Full User Name on Splash Shield Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 GNOME3 screen splash shield should not display full name of logged in user. Ensure Users Cannot Change GNOME3 Screensaver Settings Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure that users cannot change GNOME3 screensaver idle and lock settings. Ensure Users Cannot Change GNOME3 Session Idle Settings Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure that users cannot change GNOME3 session idle settings. Disable Ctrl-Alt-Del Reboot Key Sequence in GNOME3 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Disable the GNOME3 ctrl-alt-del reboot key sequence in GNOME3. Disable Geolocation in GNOME3 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Disable GNOME3 Geolocation for the clock and system. Disable Power Settings in GNOME3 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Disable GNOME3 power settings. The Installed Operating System Is FIPS 140-2 Certified Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is a certified operating system that meets FIPS 140-2 requirements. The Installed Operating System Is Vendor Supported Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is supported by a vendor that provides security patches. Configure BIND to use System Crypto Policy Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 BIND should be configured to use the system-wide crypto policy setting. Configure System Cryptography Policy Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure crypto policy is correctly configured in /etc/crypto-policies/config, and the policy is current. Configure GnuTLS library to use DoD-approved TLS Encryption Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check presence of +VERS-ALL:-VERS-DTLS0.9:-VERS-SSL3.0:-VERS-TLS1.0:-VERS-TLS1.1:-VERS-DTLS1.0 in /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/gnutls.config Configure Kerberos to use System Crypto Policy Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Kerberos should be configured to use the system-wide crypto policy setting. Configure Libreswan to use System Crypto Policy Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Libreswan should be configured to use the system-wide crypto policy setting. Configure OpenSSL library to use System Crypto Policy Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL should be configured to use the system-wide crypto policy setting. Configure OpenSSL library to use TLS Encryption Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Configure OpenSSL library to use TLS Encryption Configure SSH to use System Crypto Policy Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 SSH should be configured to use the system-wide crypto policy setting. Harden OpenSSL Crypto Policy Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'Ciphersuites' is configured with value 'TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256' in /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config Harden SSH client Crypto Policy Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure the ssh client ciphers are configured correctly in /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-ospp.conf Configure SSH Client to Use FIPS 140-2 Validated Ciphers: openssh.config Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Limit the Ciphers to those which are FIPS-approved. Configure SSH Server to Use FIPS 140-2 Validated Ciphers: opensshserver.config Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Limit the Ciphers to those which are FIPS-approved. Harden SSHD Crypto Policy Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'CRYPTO_POLICY' is configured with value ''-oCiphers=aes256-ctr,aes128-ctr,aes256-cbc,aes128-cbc -oMACs=hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256 -oGSSAPIKeyExchange=no -oKexAlgorithms=ecdh-sha2-nistp521,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp256,diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 -oHostKeyAlgorithms=ssh-rsa,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 -oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes=rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256'' in /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config Configure SSH Client to Use FIPS 140-2 Validated MACs: openssh.config Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Limit the Message Authentication Codes (MACs) to those which are FIPS-approved. Configure SSH Server to Use FIPS 140-2 Validated MACs: opensshserver.config Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Limit the Message Authentication Codes (MACs) to those which are FIPS-approved. OpenSSL uses strong entropy source Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL should be configured to generate random data with strong entropy. Install Virus Scanning Software Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Antivirus software should be installed. Install Intrusion Detection Software Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Install McAfee Host-Based Intrusion Detection Software (HBSS) Install Intrusion Detection Software Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Intrusion detection software or SELinux should be installed and enabled. Install McAfee Virus Scanning Software Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 McAfee Antivirus software should be installed. Install the McAfee Runtime Libraries and Linux Agent Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Install the McAfee Runtime Libraries (MFErt) and Linux Agent (MFEcma). Virus Scanning Software Definitions Are Updated Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Verify that McAfee AntiVirus definitions have been updated. Ensure McAfee Endpoint Security for Linux (ENSL) is running Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure that McAfee Endpoint Security for Linux (ENSL) is running. Install the Asset Configuration Compliance Module (ACCM) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Install the Asset Configuration Compliance Module (ACCM). Install the Policy Auditor (PA) Module Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Install the Policy Auditor (PA) Module. Enable Dracut FIPS Module Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 fips module should be enabled in Dracut configuration Enable FIPS Mode Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check if FIPS mode is enabled on the system Ensure '/etc/system-fips' exists Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check /etc/system-fips exists Set kernel parameter 'crypto.fips_enabled' to 1 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'crypto.fips_enabled' parameter should be set to '1' in system runtime. Build and Test AIDE Database Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The aide database must be initialized. Configure AIDE to Verify the Audit Tools Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 operating system file integrity tool must be configured to protect the integrity of the audit tools. Configure Periodic Execution of AIDE Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 By default, AIDE does not install itself for periodic execution. Periodically running AIDE is necessary to reveal unexpected changes in installed files. Configure Notification of Post-AIDE Scan Details Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 AIDE should notify appropriate personnel of the details of a scan after the scan has been run. Configure AIDE to Use FIPS 140-2 for Validating Hashes Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 AIDE should be configured to use the FIPS 140-2 cryptographic hashes. Configure AIDE to Verify Access Control Lists (ACLs) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 AIDE should be configured to verify Access Control Lists (ACLs). Configure AIDE to Verify Extended Attributes Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 AIDE should be configured to verify extended file attributes. Verify File Hashes with RPM Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Verify the RPM digests of system binaries using the RPM database. Verify and Correct Ownership with RPM Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Verify ownership of installed packages by comparing the installed files with information about the files taken from the package metadata stored in the RPM database. Verify and Correct File Permissions with RPM Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Verify the permissions of installed packages by comparing the installed files with information about the files taken from the package metadata stored in the RPM database. Ensure a dedicated group owns sudo Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /usr/bin/sudo is owned by the group set in var_sudo_dedicated_group Ensure Users Re-Authenticate for Privilege Escalation - sudo !authenticate Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Checks sudo usage without authentication Ensure Users Re-Authenticate for Privilege Escalation - sudo NOPASSWD Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Checks sudo usage without password Ensure Users Re-Authenticate for Privilege Escalation - sudo Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Checks sudo usage without password Require Re-Authentication When Using the sudo Command Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 'Ensure sudo timestamp_timeout is appropriate - sudo timestamp_timeout The operating system must restrict privilege elevation to authorized personnel Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check that sudoers doesn't allow all users to run commands via sudo Only the VDSM User Can Use sudo NOPASSWD Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Checks sudo usage for the vdsm user without a password Ensure sudo only includes the default configuration directory Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check if sudo includes only the default includedir Explicit arguments in sudo specifications Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check that sudoers doesn't contain commands without arguments specified Don't define allowed commands in sudoers by means of exclusion Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check that sudoers doesn't contain command negations Don't target root user in the sudoers file Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check that sudoers doesn't allow users to run commands as root Ensure invoking users password for privilege escalation when using sudo Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure invoking user's password for privilege escalation when using sudo Ensure yum Removes Previous Package Versions Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The clean_requirements_on_remove option should be used to ensure that old versions of software components are removed after updating. Configure dnf-automatic to Install Available Updates Automatically Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'apply_updates' is configured with value 'yes in section 'commands' in /etc/dnf/automatic.conf Configure dnf-automatic to Install Only Security Updates Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'upgrade_type' is configured with value 'security in section 'commands' in /etc/dnf/automatic.conf Ensure gpgcheck Enabled In Main yum Configuration Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The gpgcheck option should be used to ensure that checking of an RPM package's signature always occurs prior to its installation. Ensure gpgcheck Enabled for Local Packages Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The localpkg_gpgcheck option should be used to ensure that checking of an RPM package's signature always occurs prior to its installation. Ensure gpgcheck Enabled for All yum Package Repositories Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure all yum or dnf repositories utilize signature checking. Ensure gpgcheck Enabled for Repository Metadata Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The repo_gpgcheck option should be used to ensure that checking of repository metadata always occurs. Ensure Red Hat GPG Key Installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The Red Hat release and auxiliary key packages are required to be installed. Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Digit Characters Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The password dcredit should meet minimum requirements Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Prevent the Use of Dictionary Words Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The password dictcheck should meet minimum requirements Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Characters Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The password difok should meet minimum requirements Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Enforce for Local Accounts Only Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check presence of local_users_only in /etc/security/pwquality.conf Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Enforce for root User Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check presence of enforce_for_root in /etc/security/pwquality.conf Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Lowercase Characters Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The password lcredit should meet minimum requirements Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Maximum Consecutive Repeating Characters from Same Character Class Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The password maxclassrepeat should meet minimum requirements Set Password Maximum Consecutive Repeating Characters Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The password maxrepeat should meet minimum requirements Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Categories Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The password minclass should meet minimum requirements Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Length Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The password minlen should meet minimum requirements Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Special Characters Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The password ocredit should meet minimum requirements Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Uppercase Characters Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The password ucredit should meet minimum requirements Configure auditing of unsuccessful file accesses Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Inspect the contents of /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-3-access-failed.rules Configure auditing of successful file accesses Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Inspect the contents of /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-3-access-success.rules Configure basic parameters of Audit system Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Inspect the contents of /etc/audit/rules.d/10-base-config.rules Configure auditing of unsuccessful file creations Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Inspect the contents of /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-1-create-failed.rules Configure auditing of successful file creations Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Inspect the contents of /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-1-create-success.rules Configure auditing of unsuccessful file deletions Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Inspect the contents of /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-4-delete-failed.rules Configure auditing of successful file deletions Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Inspect the contents of /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-4-delete-success.rules Configure immutable Audit login UIDs Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Inspect the contents of /etc/audit/rules.d/11-loginuid.rules Configure auditing of unsuccessful file modifications Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Inspect the contents of /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-2-modify-failed.rules Configure auditing of successful file modifications Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Inspect the contents of /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-2-modify-success.rules Configure auditing of loading and unloading of kernel modules Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Inspect the contents of /etc/audit/rules.d/43-module-load.rules Perform general configuration of Audit for OSPP Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Inspect the contents of /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42.rules Configure auditing of unsuccessful ownership changes Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Inspect the contents of /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-failed.rules Configure auditing of successful ownership changes Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Inspect the contents of /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-success.rules Configure auditing of unsuccessful permission changes Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Inspect the contents of /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-failed.rules Configure auditing of successful permission changes Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Inspect the contents of /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-success.rules Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - init Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the use of init is enabled. Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - poweroff Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the use of poweroff is enabled. Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - reboot Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the use of reboot is enabled. Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - shutdown Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the use of shutdown is enabled. Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - chmod Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The changing of file permissions and attributes should be audited. Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - chown Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The changing of file permissions and attributes should be audited. Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fchmod Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The changing of file permissions and attributes should be audited. Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fchmodat Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The changing of file permissions and attributes should be audited. Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fchown Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The changing of file permissions and attributes should be audited. Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fchownat Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The changing of file permissions and attributes should be audited. Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fremovexattr Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The changing of file permissions and attributes should be audited. Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fsetxattr Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The changing of file permissions and attributes should be audited. Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - lchown Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The changing of file permissions and attributes should be audited. Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - lremovexattr Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The changing of file permissions and attributes should be audited. Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - lsetxattr Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The changing of file permissions and attributes should be audited. Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - removexattr Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The changing of file permissions and attributes should be audited. Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - setxattr Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The changing of file permissions and attributes should be audited. Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - umount2 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The changing of file permissions and attributes should be audited. Record Events that Modify User/Group Information via open syscall - /etc/group Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the write events to /etc/group Record Events that Modify User/Group Information via open_by_handle_at syscall - /etc/group Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the write events to /etc/group Record Events that Modify User/Group Information via openat syscall - /etc/group Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the write events to /etc/group Record Events that Modify User/Group Information via open syscall - /etc/gshadow Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the write events to /etc/gshadow Record Events that Modify User/Group Information via open_by_handle_at syscall - /etc/gshadow Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the write events to /etc/gshadow Record Events that Modify User/Group Information via openat syscall - /etc/gshadow Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the write events to /etc/gshadow Record Events that Modify User/Group Information via open syscall - /etc/passwd Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the write events to /etc/passwd Record Events that Modify User/Group Information via open_by_handle_at syscall - /etc/passwd Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the write events to /etc/passwd Record Events that Modify User/Group Information via openat syscall - /etc/passwd Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the write events to /etc/passwd Record Events that Modify User/Group Information via open syscall - /etc/shadow Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the write events to /etc/shadow Record Events that Modify User/Group Information via open_by_handle_at syscall - /etc/shadow Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the write events to /etc/shadow Record Events that Modify User/Group Information via openat syscall - /etc/shadow Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the write events to /etc/shadow Record Any Attempts to Run chacl Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the use of chacl is enabled. Record Any Attempts to Run chcon Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the use of chcon is enabled. Record Any Attempts to Run restorecon Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the use of restorecon is enabled. Record Any Attempts to Run semanage Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the use of semanage is enabled. Record Any Attempts to Run setfacl Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the use of setfacl is enabled. Record Any Attempts to Run setfiles Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the use of setfiles is enabled. Record Any Attempts to Run setsebool Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the use of setsebool is enabled. Record Any Attempts to Run seunshare Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the use of seunshare is enabled. Ensure auditd Collects File Deletion Events by User - rename Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The deletion of files should be audited. Ensure auditd Collects File Deletion Events by User - renameat Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The deletion of files should be audited. Ensure auditd Collects File Deletion Events by User - rmdir Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The deletion of files should be audited. Ensure auditd Collects File Deletion Events by User - unlink Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The deletion of files should be audited. Ensure auditd Collects File Deletion Events by User - unlinkat Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The deletion of files should be audited. Record Attempts to Alter Logon and Logout Events - faillock Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules should be configured to log successful and unsuccessful login and logout events. Record Attempts to Alter Logon and Logout Events - lastlog Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules should be configured to log successful and unsuccessful login and logout events. Record Attempts to Alter Logon and Logout Events - tallylog Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules should be configured to log successful and unsuccessful login and logout events. Ensure auditd Collects Information on Exporting to Media (successful) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The changing of file permissions and attributes should be audited. Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - at Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the use of at is enabled. Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - chage Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the use of chage is enabled. Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - chsh Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the use of chsh is enabled. Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - crontab Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the use of crontab is enabled. Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - gpasswd Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the use of gpasswd is enabled. Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - kmod Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the use of kmod is enabled. Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - mount Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the use of mount is enabled. Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - newgidmap Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the use of newgidmap is enabled. Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - newgrp Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the use of newgrp is enabled. Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - newuidmap Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the use of newuidmap is enabled. Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - pam_timestamp_check Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the use of pam_timestamp_check is enabled. Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - passwd Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the use of passwd is enabled. Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - postdrop Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the use of postdrop is enabled. Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - postqueue Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the use of postqueue is enabled. Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - pt_chown Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the use of pt_chown is enabled. Record Any Attempts to Run ssh-agent Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the use of ssh_agent is enabled. Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - ssh-keysign Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the use of ssh_keysign is enabled. Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - su Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the use of su is enabled. Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - sudo Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the use of sudo is enabled. Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - sudoedit Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the use of sudoedit is enabled. Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - umount Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the use of umount is enabled. Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - unix_chkpwd Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the use of unix_chkpwd is enabled. Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - unix_update Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the use of unix_update is enabled. Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - userhelper Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the use of userhelper is enabled. Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - usermod Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the use of usermod is enabled. Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - usernetctl Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the use of usernetctl is enabled. Record Unsuccessful Permission Changes to Files - chmod Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the unauthorized access attempts to files (unsuccessful) are enabled. Record Unsuccessful Ownership Changes to Files - chown Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the unauthorized access attempts to files (unsuccessful) are enabled. Record Unsuccessful Access Attempts to Files - creat Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the unauthorized access attempts to files (unsuccessful) are enabled. Record Unsuccessful Permission Changes to Files - fchmod Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the unauthorized access attempts to files (unsuccessful) are enabled. Record Unsuccessful Permission Changes to Files - fchmodat Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the unauthorized access attempts to files (unsuccessful) are enabled. Record Unsuccessful Ownership Changes to Files - fchown Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the unauthorized access attempts to files (unsuccessful) are enabled. Record Unsuccessful Ownership Changes to Files - fchownat Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the unauthorized access attempts to files (unsuccessful) are enabled. Record Unsuccessful Permission Changes to Files - fremovexattr Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the unauthorized access attempts to files (unsuccessful) are enabled. Record Unsuccessful Permission Changes to Files - fsetxattr Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the unauthorized access attempts to files (unsuccessful) are enabled. Record Unsuccessful Access Attempts to Files - ftruncate Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the unauthorized access attempts to files (unsuccessful) are enabled. Record Unsuccessful Ownership Changes to Files - lchown Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the unauthorized access attempts to files (unsuccessful) are enabled. Record Unsuccessful Permission Changes to Files - lremovexattr Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the unauthorized access attempts to files (unsuccessful) are enabled. Record Unsuccessful Permission Changes to Files - lsetxattr Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the unauthorized access attempts to files (unsuccessful) are enabled. Record Unsuccessful Access Attempts to Files - open Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the unauthorized access attempts to files (unsuccessful) are enabled. Record Unsuccessful Access Attempts to Files - open_by_handle_at Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the unauthorized access attempts to files (unsuccessful) are enabled. Record Unsuccessful Creation Attempts to Files - open_by_handle_at O_CREAT Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the unsuccessful use of open_by_handle_at O_CREAT is enabled. Record Unsuccessful Modification Attempts to Files - open_by_handle_at O_TRUNC_WRITE Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the unsuccessful use of open_by_handle_at O_TRUNC is enabled. Ensure auditd Unauthorized Access Attempts To open_by_handle_at Are Ordered Correctly Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the unsuccessful use of open_by_handle_at is configured in the proper rule order. Record Unsuccessful Creation Attempts to Files - open O_CREAT Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the unsuccessful use of open O_CREAT is enabled. Record Unsuccessful Modification Attempts to Files - open O_TRUNC_WRITE Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the unsuccessful use of open O_TRUNC is enabled. Ensure auditd Rules For Unauthorized Attempts To open Are Ordered Correctly Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the unsuccessful use of open is configured in the proper rule order. Record Unsuccessful Access Attempts to Files - openat Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the unauthorized access attempts to files (unsuccessful) are enabled. Record Unsuccessful Creation Attempts to Files - openat O_CREAT Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the unsuccessful use of openat O_CREAT is enabled. Record Unsuccessful Modification Attempts to Files - openat O_TRUNC_WRITE Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the unsuccessful use of openat O_TRUNC is enabled. Ensure auditd Rules For Unauthorized Attempts To openat Are Ordered Correctly Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the information on the unsuccessful use of openat is configured in the proper rule order. Record Unsuccessful Permission Changes to Files - removexattr Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the unauthorized access attempts to files (unsuccessful) are enabled. Record Unsuccessful Delete Attempts to Files - rename Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the unauthorized access attempts to files (unsuccessful) are enabled. Record Unsuccessful Delete Attempts to Files - renameat Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the unauthorized access attempts to files (unsuccessful) are enabled. Record Unsuccessful Permission Changes to Files - setxattr Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the unauthorized access attempts to files (unsuccessful) are enabled. Record Unsuccessful Access Attempts to Files - truncate Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the unauthorized access attempts to files (unsuccessful) are enabled. Record Unsuccessful Delete Attempts to Files - unlink Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the unauthorized access attempts to files (unsuccessful) are enabled. Record Unsuccessful Delete Attempts to Files - unlinkat Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules about the unauthorized access attempts to files (unsuccessful) are enabled. Record Events that Modify User/Group Information - /etc/group Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit user/group modification. Record Events that Modify User/Group Information - /etc/gshadow Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit user/group modification. Record Events that Modify User/Group Information - /etc/security/opasswd Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit user/group modification. Record Events that Modify User/Group Information - /etc/passwd Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit user/group modification. Record Events that Modify User/Group Information - /etc/shadow Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit user/group modification. Record Attempts to perform maintenance activities Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Audit rules should be configured to log successful and unsuccessful login and logout events. Set number of records to cause an explicit flush to audit logs Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'freq' is configured with value '50' in /etc/audit/auditd.conf Include Local Events in Audit Logs Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'local_events' is configured with value 'yes' in /etc/audit/auditd.conf Resolve information before writing to audit logs Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'log_format' is configured with value 'ENRICHED' in /etc/audit/auditd.conf Write Audit Logs to the Disk Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'write_logs' is configured with value 'yes' in /etc/audit/auditd.conf Ensure SELinux Not Disabled in the kernel arguments Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure selinux=0 argument is not present in the 'options' line of /boot/loader/entries/ostree-2-*.conf (or ostree-1-*.conf if there is no ostree-2-*.conf as ostree has only two enries at the most, with *-2-*.conf entry always being the most recent). Also, ensure that kernel is currently running with this argument by checking /proc/cmdline. Disable User Administration in GNOME3 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'user-administration-disabled' is configured with value 'true in section 'org/gnome/desktop/lockdown' in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ Enable the GNOME3 Screen Locking On Smartcard Removal Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'removal-action' is configured with value ''lock-screen' in section 'org/gnome/settings-daemon/peripherals/smartcard' in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ Verify that Shared Library Directories Have Root Group Ownership Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /lib/, /lib64/, /usr/lib/, /usr/lib64/ is group owned by 0. Verify that System Executable Have Root Ownership Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /bin/, /sbin/, /usr/bin/, /usr/sbin/, /usr/local/bin/, /usr/local/sbin/ is owned by 0. Verify that Shared Library Directories Have Root Ownership Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /lib/, /lib64/, /usr/lib/, /usr/lib64/ is owned by 0. Verify that System Executable Directories Have Restrictive Permissions Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /bin/, /sbin/, /usr/bin/, /usr/sbin/, /usr/local/bin/, /usr/local/sbin/ has mode 0755. If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. Verify that Shared Library Directories Have Restrictive Permissions Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /lib/, /lib64/, /usr/lib/, /usr/lib64/ has mode 7755. If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. Disable Host-Based Authentication Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'HostbasedAuthentication' is configured with value 'no' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config Ensure that /etc/at.deny does not exist Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that/etc/at.deny does not exist. Audit Tools Must Be Group-owned by Root Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /sbin/auditctl, /sbin/aureport, /sbin/ausearch, /sbin/autrace, /sbin/auditd, /sbin/rsyslogd, /sbin/augenrules is group owned by 0. Audit Tools Must Be Owned by Root Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /sbin/auditctl, /sbin/aureport, /sbin/ausearch, /sbin/autrace, /sbin/auditd, /sbin/rsyslogd, /sbin/augenrules is owned by 0. Audit Tools Must Have a Mode of 0755 or Less Permissive Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /sbin/auditctl, /sbin/aureport, /sbin/ausearch, /sbin/autrace, /sbin/auditd, /sbin/rsyslogd, /sbin/augenrules has mode 0755. If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. Ensure that /etc/cron.allow exists Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that/etc/cron.allow does exist. Ensure that /etc/cron.deny does not exist Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that/etc/cron.deny does not exist. Verify Group Who Owns /etc/at.allow file Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/at.allow is group owned by 0. Verify Group Who Owns Backup group File Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/group- is group owned by 0. Verify Group Who Owns Backup gshadow File Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/gshadow- is group owned by 0. Verify Group Who Owns Backup passwd File Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/passwd- is group owned by 0. Verify User Who Owns Backup shadow File Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/shadow- is group owned by 0. Verify Group Who Owns /etc/cron.allow file Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/cron.allow is group owned by 0. Verify Group Who Owns cron.d Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/cron.d/ is group owned by 0. Verify Group Who Owns cron.daily Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/cron.daily/ is group owned by 0. Verify Group Who Owns cron.hourly Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/cron.hourly/ is group owned by 0. Verify Group Who Owns cron.monthly Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/cron.monthly/ is group owned by 0. Verify Group Who Owns cron.weekly Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/cron.weekly/ is group owned by 0. Verify Group Who Owns Crontab Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/crontab is group owned by 0. Verify the UEFI Boot Loader grub.cfg Group Ownership Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg is group owned by 0. Verify /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg Group Ownership Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg is group owned by 0. Verify Group Who Owns group File Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/group is group owned by 0. Verify Group Who Owns gshadow File Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/gshadow is group owned by 0. Verify Group Ownership of System Login Banner Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/issue is group owned by 0. Verify Group Ownership of System Login Banner for Remote Connections Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/issue.net is group owned by 0. Verify Group Ownership of Message of the Day Banner Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/motd is group owned by 0. Verify Group Who Owns passwd File Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/passwd is group owned by 0. Verify Group Who Owns shadow File Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/shadow is group owned by 0. Verify Group Who Owns /etc/shells File Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/shells is group owned by 0. Verify /boot/grub2/grub.cfg Group Ownership Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /boot/grub2/grub.cfg is group owned by 0. Verify Group Who Owns SSH Server config file Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/ssh/sshd_config is group owned by 0. Verify /boot/grub2/user.cfg Group Ownership Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /boot/grub2/user.cfg is group owned by 0. Verify Group Who Owns /var/log Directory Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /var/log/ is group owned by 0. Verify Group Who Owns /var/log/messages File Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /var/log/messages is group owned by 0. Verify Group Who Owns /var/log/syslog File Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /var/log/syslog is group owned by 4. Verify that audit tools are owned by group root Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /sbin/auditctl, /sbin/aureport, /sbin/ausearch, /sbin/autrace, /sbin/auditd, /sbin/audispd, /sbin/augenrules is group owned by 0. Audit Configuration Files Must Be Owned By Group root Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/audit/, /etc/audit/rules.d/ is group owned by 0. Verify Group Ownership on SSH Server Private *_key Key Files Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/ssh/ is group owned by ssh_keys. Verify Group Ownership on SSH Server Public *.pub Key Files Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/ssh/ is group owned by 0. Verify User Who Owns Backup group File Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/group- is owned by 0. Verify User Who Owns Backup gshadow File Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/gshadow- is owned by 0. Verify User Who Owns Backup passwd File Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/passwd- is owned by 0. Verify Group Who Owns Backup shadow File Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/shadow- is owned by 0. Verify User Who Owns /etc/cron.allow file Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/cron.allow is owned by 0. Verify Owner on cron.d Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/cron.d/ is owned by 0. Verify Owner on cron.daily Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/cron.daily/ is owned by 0. Verify Owner on cron.hourly Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/cron.hourly/ is owned by 0. Verify Owner on cron.monthly Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/cron.monthly/ is owned by 0. Verify Owner on cron.weekly Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/cron.weekly/ is owned by 0. Verify Owner on crontab Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/crontab is owned by 0. Verify the UEFI Boot Loader grub.cfg User Ownership Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg is owned by 0. Verify /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg User Ownership Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg is owned by 0. Verify User Who Owns group File Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/group is owned by 0. Verify User Who Owns gshadow File Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/gshadow is owned by 0. Verify ownership of System Login Banner Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/issue is owned by 0. Verify ownership of System Login Banner for Remote Connections Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/issue.net is owned by 0. Verify ownership of Message of the Day Banner Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/motd is owned by 0. Verify User Who Owns passwd File Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/passwd is owned by 0. Verify User Who Owns shadow File Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/shadow is owned by 0. Verify Who Owns /etc/shells File Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/shells is owned by 0. Verify /boot/grub2/grub.cfg User Ownership Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /boot/grub2/grub.cfg is owned by 0. Verify Owner on SSH Server config file Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/ssh/sshd_config is owned by 0. Verify /boot/grub2/user.cfg User Ownership Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /boot/grub2/user.cfg is owned by 0. Verify User Who Owns /var/log Directory Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /var/log/ is owned by 0. Verify User Who Owns /var/log/messages File Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /var/log/messages is owned by 0. Verify User Who Owns /var/log/syslog File Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /var/log/syslog is owned by 104. Verify that audit tools are owned by root Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /sbin/auditctl, /sbin/aureport, /sbin/ausearch, /sbin/autrace, /sbin/auditd, /sbin/audispd, /sbin/augenrules is owned by 0. Audit Configuration Files Must Be Owned By Root Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/audit/, /etc/audit/rules.d/ is owned by 0. Verify that Shared Library Files Have Root Ownership Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /lib/, /lib64/, /usr/lib/, /usr/lib64/ is owned by 0. Verify Ownership on SSH Server Private *_key Key Files Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/ssh/ is owned by 0. Verify Ownership on SSH Server Public *.pub Key Files Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/ssh/ is owned by 0. Verify Permissions on /etc/at.allow file Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/at.allow has mode 0600. If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. Verify that audit tools Have Mode 0755 or less Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /sbin/auditctl, /sbin/aureport, /sbin/ausearch, /sbin/autrace, /sbin/auditd, /sbin/audispd, /sbin/augenrules has mode 0755. If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. Audit Configuration Files Permissions are 640 or More Restrictive Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/audit/, /etc/audit/rules.d/ has mode 0640. If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. Verify Permissions on Backup group File Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/group- has mode 0644. If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. Verify Permissions on Backup gshadow File Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/gshadow- has mode 0000. If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. Verify Permissions on Backup passwd File Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/passwd- has mode 0644. If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. Verify Permissions on Backup shadow File Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/shadow- has mode 0000. If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. Verify Permissions on /etc/cron.allow file Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/cron.allow has mode 0600. If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. Verify Permissions on cron.d Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/cron.d/ has mode 0700. If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. Verify Permissions on cron.daily Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/cron.daily/ has mode 0700. If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. Verify Permissions on cron.hourly Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/cron.hourly/ has mode 0700. If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. Verify Permissions on cron.monthly Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/cron.monthly/ has mode 0700. If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. Verify Permissions on cron.weekly Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/cron.weekly/ has mode 0700. If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. Verify Permissions on crontab Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/crontab has mode 0600. If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. Verify the UEFI Boot Loader grub.cfg Permissions Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg has mode 0700. If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. Verify /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg Permissions Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg has mode 0700. If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. Verify Permissions on /etc/audit/auditd.conf Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/audit/auditd.conf has mode 0640. If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. Verify Permissions on /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/audit/rules.d/ has mode 0640. If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. Verify Permissions on group File Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/group has mode 0644. If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. Verify Permissions on gshadow File Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/gshadow has mode 0000. If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. Verify permissions on System Login Banner Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/issue has mode 0644. If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. Verify permissions on System Login Banner for Remote Connections Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/issue.net has mode 0644. If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. Verify permissions on Message of the Day Banner Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/motd has mode 0644. If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. Verify Permissions on passwd File Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/passwd has mode 0644. If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. Verify Permissions on shadow File Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/shadow has mode 0000. If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. Verify Permissions on /etc/shells File Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/shells has mode 0644. If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. Verify /boot/grub2/grub.cfg Permissions Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /boot/grub2/grub.cfg has mode 0600. If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. Verify that Shared Library Files Have Restrictive Permissions Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /lib/, /lib64/, /usr/lib/, /usr/lib64/ has mode 7755. If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. Verify Permissions on SSH Server config file Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/ssh/sshd_config has mode 0600. If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. Verify Permissions on SSH Server Public *.pub Key Files Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /etc/ssh/ has mode 0644. If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. Verify /boot/grub2/user.cfg Permissions Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /boot/grub2/user.cfg has mode 0600. If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. Verify Permissions on /var/log Directory Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /var/log/ has mode 0755. If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. Verify Permissions on /var/log/messages File Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /var/log/messages has mode 0640. If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. Verify Permissions on /var/log/syslog File Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /var/log/syslog has mode 0640. If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. Configure Firewalld to Use the Nftables Backend Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'FirewallBackend' is configured with value 'nftables' in /etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf Enable Auditing for Processes Which Start Prior to the Audit Daemon Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure audit=1 is configured in the kernel line in /etc/default/grub. Extend Audit Backlog Limit for the Audit Daemon Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure audit_backlog_limit=8192 is configured in the kernel line in /etc/default/grub. IOMMU configuration directive Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure iommu=force is configured in the kernel line in /etc/default/grub. Ensure IPv6 is disabled through kernel boot parameter Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure ipv6.disable=1 is configured in the kernel line in /etc/default/grub. Configure L1 Terminal Fault mitigations Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure l1tf is configured in the kernel line in /etc/default/grub. Force kernel panic on uncorrected MCEs Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure mce=0 is configured in the kernel line in /etc/default/grub. Ensure SMAP is not disabled during boot Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure nosmap is not set in the kernel line in /etc/default/grub. Ensure SMEP is not disabled during boot Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure nosmep is not set in the kernel line in /etc/default/grub. Enable page allocator poisoning Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure page_poison=1 is configured in the kernel line in /etc/default/grub. Enable Kernel Page-Table Isolation (KPTI) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure pti=on is configured in the kernel line in /etc/default/grub. Configure the confidence in TPM for entropy Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure rng_core.default_quality is configured in the kernel line in /etc/default/grub. Disable merging of slabs with similar size Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure slab_nomerge=yes is configured in the kernel line in /etc/default/grub. Enable SLUB/SLAB allocator poisoning Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure slub_debug is configured in the kernel line in /etc/default/grub. Configure Speculative Store Bypass Mitigation Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure spec_store_bypass_disable is configured in the kernel line in /etc/default/grub. Enforce Spectre v2 mitigation Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure spectre_v2=on is configured in the kernel line in /etc/default/grub. Ensure debug-shell service is not enabled during boot Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure systemd.debug-shell is not set in the kernel line in /etc/default/grub. Disable vsyscalls Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure vsyscall=none is configured in the kernel line in /etc/default/grub. Install Smart Card Packages For Multifactor Authentication Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package openssl-pkcs11 should be installed. Ensure journald is configured to compress large log files Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'Compress' is configured with value 'yes' in /etc/systemd/journald.conf Ensure journald is configured to send logs to rsyslog Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'ForwardToSyslog' is configured with value 'yes' in /etc/systemd/journald.conf Ensure journald is configured to write log files to persistent disk Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'Storage' is configured with value 'persistent' in /etc/systemd/journald.conf Do not allow ACPI methods to be inserted/replaced at run time Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_ACPI_CUSTOM_METHOD should have value n Emulate Privileged Access Never (PAN) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN should have value y Disable kernel support for MISC binaries Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC should have value n Enable support for BUG() Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_BUG should have value y Trigger a kernel BUG when data corruption is detected Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION should have value y Disable compatibility with brk() Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK should have value n Disable the 32-bit vDSO Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO should have value n Enable checks on credential management Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS should have value y Disable kernel debugfs Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_DEBUG_FS should have value n Enable checks on linked list manipulation Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST should have value y Enable checks on notifier call chains Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_DEBUG_NOTIFIERS should have value y Enable checks on scatter-gather (SG) table operations Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_DEBUG_SG should have value y Warn on W+X mappings found at boot Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_DEBUG_WX should have value y Configure low address space to protect from user allocation Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR should have value 65536 Disable /dev/kmem virtual device support Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_DEVKMEM should have value n Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE should have value y Generate some entropy during boot and runtime Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY should have value y Force initialization of variables containing userspace addresses Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK should have value y Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY should have value y Do not allow usercopy whitelist violations to fallback to object size Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK should have value n Disable hibernation Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_HIBERNATION should have value n Disable IA32 emulation Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION should have value n Disable the IPv6 protocol Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_IPV6 should have value n Disable kexec system call Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_KEXEC should have value n Disable legacy (BSD) PTY support Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_LEGACY_PTYS should have value n Disable vsyscall emulation Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_EMULATE should have value n Disable vsyscall mapping Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE should have value y Disable the LDT (local descriptor table) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL should have value n Enable module signature verification Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_MODULE_SIG should have value y Enable automatic signing of all modules Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_ALL should have value y Require modules to be validly signed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE should have value y Specify the hash to use when signing modules Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH should have value according to var_kernel_config_module_sig_hash Specify module signing key to use Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY should have value according to var_kernel_config_module_sig_key Sign kernel modules with SHA-512 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA512 should have value y Enable poison of pages after freeing Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING should have value y Enable poison without sanity check Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_NO_SANITY should have value y Use zero for poisoning instead of debugging value Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO should have value y Remove the kernel mapping in user mode Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION should have value y Kernel panic oops Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_PANIC_ON_OOPS should have value y Kernel panic timeout Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_PANIC_TIMEOUT should have value according to var_kernel_config_panic_timeout Disable support for /proc/kkcore Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_PROC_KCORE should have value n Randomize the address of the kernel image (KASLR) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE should have value y Randomize the kernel memory sections Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY should have value y Perform full reference count validation Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL should have value y Avoid speculative indirect branches in kernel Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_RETPOLINE should have value y Detect stack corruption on calls to schedule() Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK should have value y Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_SECCOMP should have value y Enable use of Berkeley Packet Filter with seccomp Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER should have value y Enable different security models Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_SECURITY should have value y Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT should have value y Disable mutable hooks Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS should have value n Enable Yama support Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA should have value y Harden slab freelist metadata Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED should have value y Randomize slab freelist Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM should have value y Disallow merge of slab caches Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT should have value n Enable SLUB debugging support Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG should have value y Stack Protector buffer overlow detection Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR should have value y Strong Stack Protector Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG should have value y Make the kernel text and rodata read-only Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX should have value y Make the module text and rodata read-only Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX should have value y Enable TCP/IP syncookie support Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES should have value y Unmap kernel when running in userspace (aka KAISER) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 should have value y User a virtually-mapped stack Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_VMAP_STACK should have value y Disable x86 vsyscall emulation Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel CONFIG_X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION should have value n Disable ATM Support Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel module atm should be disabled. Disable Bluetooth Kernel Module Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel module bluetooth should be disabled. Disable CAN Support Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel module can should be disabled. Disable Kernel cfg80211 Module Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel module cfg80211 should be disabled. Disable Mounting of cramfs Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel module cramfs should be disabled. Disable DCCP Support Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel module dccp should be disabled. Disable IEEE 1394 (FireWire) Support Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel module firewire-core should be disabled. Disable Mounting of freevxfs Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel module freevxfs should be disabled. Disable Mounting of hfs Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel module hfs should be disabled. Disable Mounting of hfsplus Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel module hfsplus should be disabled. Disable Kernel iwlmvm Module Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel module iwlmvm should be disabled. Disable Kernel iwlwifi Module Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel module iwlwifi should be disabled. Disable Mounting of jffs2 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel module jffs2 should be disabled. Disable Kernel mac80211 Module Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel module mac80211 should be disabled. Disable RDS Support Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel module rds should be disabled. Disable SCTP Support Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel module sctp should be disabled. Disable Mounting of squashfs Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel module squashfs should be disabled. Disable TIPC Support Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel module tipc should be disabled. Disable Mounting of udf Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel module udf should be disabled. Disable Modprobe Loading of USB Storage Driver Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel module usb-storage should be disabled. Disable the uvcvideo module Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel module uvcvideo should be disabled. Disable Mounting of vFAT filesystems Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel module vfat should be disabled. Add nosuid Option to /boot/efi Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 /boot/efi should be mounted with mount option nosuid. Add noauto Option to /boot Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 /boot should be mounted with mount option noauto. Add nodev Option to /boot Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 /boot should be mounted with mount option nodev. Add noexec Option to /boot Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 /boot should be mounted with mount option noexec. Add nosuid Option to /boot Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 /boot should be mounted with mount option nosuid. Add nodev Option to /dev/shm Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 /dev/shm should be mounted with mount option nodev. Add noexec Option to /dev/shm Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 /dev/shm should be mounted with mount option noexec. Add nosuid Option to /dev/shm Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 /dev/shm should be mounted with mount option nosuid. Add grpquota Option to /home Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 /home should be mounted with mount option grpquota. Add nodev Option to /home Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 /home should be mounted with mount option nodev. Add noexec Option to /home Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 /home should be mounted with mount option noexec. Add nosuid Option to /home Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 /home should be mounted with mount option nosuid. Add usrquota Option to /home Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 /home should be mounted with mount option usrquota. Mount Remote Filesystems with Kerberos Security Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The sec_krb5_krb5i_krb5p option should be enabled for all NFS mounts in /etc/fstab. Mount Remote Filesystems with nodev Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The nodev option should be enabled for all NFS mounts in /etc/fstab. Add nodev Option to Removable Media Partitions Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The nodev option should be enabled for all removable devices mounts in /etc/fstab. Mount Remote Filesystems with noexec Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The noexec option should be enabled for all NFS mounts in /etc/fstab. Add noexec Option to Removable Media Partitions Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The noexec option should be enabled for all removable devices mounts in /etc/fstab. Mount Remote Filesystems with nosuid Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The nosuid option should be enabled for all NFS mounts in /etc/fstab. Add nosuid Option to Removable Media Partitions Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The nosuid option should be enabled for all removable devices mounts in /etc/fstab. Add nosuid Option to /opt Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 /opt should be mounted with mount option nosuid. Add hidepid Option to /proc Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 /proc should be mounted with mount option hidepid. Add nosuid Option to /srv Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 /srv should be mounted with mount option nosuid. Add nodev Option to /tmp Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 /tmp should be mounted with mount option nodev. Add noexec Option to /tmp Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 /tmp should be mounted with mount option noexec. Add nosuid Option to /tmp Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 /tmp should be mounted with mount option nosuid. Add nodev Option to /var/log/audit Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 /var/log/audit should be mounted with mount option nodev. Add noexec Option to /var/log/audit Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 /var/log/audit should be mounted with mount option noexec. Add nosuid Option to /var/log/audit Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 /var/log/audit should be mounted with mount option nosuid. Add nodev Option to /var/log Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 /var/log should be mounted with mount option nodev. Add noexec Option to /var/log Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 /var/log should be mounted with mount option noexec. Add nosuid Option to /var/log Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 /var/log should be mounted with mount option nosuid. Add nodev Option to /var Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 /var should be mounted with mount option nodev. Add noexec Option to /var Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 /var should be mounted with mount option noexec. Add nosuid Option to /var Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 /var should be mounted with mount option nosuid. Add nodev Option to /var/tmp Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 /var/tmp should be mounted with mount option nodev. Add noexec Option to /var/tmp Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 /var/tmp should be mounted with mount option noexec. Add nosuid Option to /var/tmp Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 /var/tmp should be mounted with mount option nosuid. Uninstall 389-ds-base Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package 389-ds-base should be removed. package_GConf2_installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package GConf2 should be installed. Install the Host Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS) Module Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package MFEhiplsm should be installed. Uninstall abrt-addon-ccpp Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package abrt-addon-ccpp should be removed. Uninstall abrt-addon-kerneloops Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package abrt-addon-kerneloops should be removed. Uninstall abrt-cli Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package abrt-cli should be removed. Uninstall abrt-plugin-logger Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package abrt-plugin-logger should be removed. Uninstall abrt-plugin-rhtsupport Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package abrt-plugin-rhtsupport should be removed. Uninstall abrt-plugin-sosreport Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package abrt-plugin-sosreport should be removed. Uninstall Automatic Bug Reporting Tool (abrt) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package abrt should be removed. Install AIDE Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package aide should be installed. Install audispd-plugins Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package audispd-plugins should be installed. Ensure the default plugins for the audit dispatcher are Installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package audit-audispd-plugins should be installed. Ensure the audit Subsystem is Installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package audit should be installed. Uninstall avahi-autoipd Server Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package avahi-autoipd should be removed. package_avahi_installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package avahi should be installed. Uninstall avahi Server Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package avahi should be removed. Uninstall bind Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package bind should be removed. Install binutils Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package binutils should be installed. The Chrony package is installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package chrony should be installed. Install the cron service Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package cron should be installed. Install crypto-policies package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package crypto-policies should be installed. Uninstall CUPS Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package cups should be removed. Uninstall cyrus-imapd Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package cyrus-imapd should be removed. package_dconf_installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package dconf should be installed. Uninstall DHCP Server Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package dhcp-server should be removed. Install dnf-automatic Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package dnf-automatic should be installed. Install dnf-plugin-subscription-manager Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package dnf-plugin-subscription-manager should be installed. Uninstall dovecot Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package dovecot should be removed. package_esc_installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package esc should be installed. Install fapolicyd Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package fapolicyd should be installed. Install firewalld Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package firewalld should be installed. Remove the FreeRadius Server Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package freeradius should be removed. Remove ftp Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package ftp should be removed. package_gdm_installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package gdm should be installed. Remove the GDM Package Group Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package gdm should be removed. Uninstall geolite2-city Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package geolite2-city should be removed. Uninstall geolite2-country Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package geolite2-country should be removed. Ensure gnutls-utils is installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package gnutls-utils should be installed. Uninstall gssproxy Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package gssproxy should be removed. Uninstall httpd Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package httpd should be removed. Uninstall the inet-based telnet server Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package inetutils-telnetd should be removed. Uninstall iprutils Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package iprutils should be removed. Install iptables-services Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package iptables-services should be installed. Remove iptables-services Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package iptables-services should be removed. Install iptables Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package iptables should be installed. Remove the Kerberos Server Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package krb5-server should be removed. Uninstall krb5-workstation Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package krb5-workstation should be removed. Install libcap-ng-utils Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package libcap-ng-utils should be installed. Uninstall libreport-plugin-logger Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package libreport-plugin-logger should be removed. Uninstall libreport-plugin-rhtsupport Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package libreport-plugin-rhtsupport should be removed. Install libreswan Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package libreswan should be installed. Install libselinux Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package libselinux should be installed. Ensure logrotate is Installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package logrotate should be installed. The mailx Package Is Installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package mailx should be installed. Install McAfee Endpoint Security for Linux (ENSL) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package McAfeeTP should be installed. Uninstall mcstrans Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package mcstrans should be removed. Uninstall net-snmp Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package net-snmp should be removed. Uninstall nfs-utils Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package nfs-utils should be removed. Install nftables Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package nftables should be installed. Uninstall nginx Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package nginx should be removed. Uninstall the nis package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package nis should be removed. Ensure nss-tools is installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package nss-tools should be installed. Install the ntp service Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package ntp should be installed. Uninstall the ntpdate package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package ntpdate should be removed. Ensure LDAP client is not installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package openldap-clients should be removed. Uninstall openldap-servers Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package openldap-servers should be removed. Install the opensc Package For Multifactor Authentication Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package opensc should be installed. Install openscap-scanner Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package openscap-scanner should be installed. Install OpenSSH client software Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package openssh-clients should be installed. Install the OpenSSH Server Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package openssh-server should be installed. Remove the OpenSSH Server Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package openssh-server should be removed. package_pam_ldap_removed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package pam_ldap should be removed. Install pam_pwquality Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package libpwquality should be installed. Install the pcsc-lite package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package pcsc-lite should be installed. Uninstall pigz Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package pigz should be removed. Install policycoreutils-python-utils package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package policycoreutils-python-utils should be installed. Install policycoreutils Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package policycoreutils should be installed. The Postfix package is installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package postfix should be installed. package_prelink_removed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package prelink should be removed. Install the psacct package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package psacct should be installed. Uninstall python3-abrt-addon Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package python3-abrt-addon should be removed. Uninstall quagga Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package quagga should be removed. Install rear Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package rear should be installed. Install rng-tools Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package rng-tools should be installed. Uninstall rpcbind Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package rpcbind should be removed. Uninstall rsh-server Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package rsh-server should be removed. Uninstall rsh Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package rsh should be removed. Uninstall rsync Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package rsync-daemon should be removed. Ensure rsyslog-gnutls is installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package rsyslog-gnutls should be installed. Ensure rsyslog is Installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package rsyslog should be installed. Install the Samba Common Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package samba-common should be installed. package_samba-common_removed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package samba-common should be removed. Uninstall Samba Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package samba should be removed. Install scap-security-guide Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package scap-security-guide should be installed. Uninstall Sendmail Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package sendmail should be removed. Uninstall setroubleshoot-plugins Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package setroubleshoot-plugins should be removed. Uninstall setroubleshoot-server Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package setroubleshoot-server should be removed. Uninstall setroubleshoot Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package setroubleshoot should be removed. Uninstall squid Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package squid should be removed. Install sssd-ipa Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package sssd-ipa should be installed. Install the SSSD Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package sssd should be installed. Install subscription-manager Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package subscription-manager should be installed. Install sudo Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package sudo should be installed. Ensure syslog-ng is Installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package syslog-ng should be installed. Install systemd-journal-remote Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package systemd-journal-remote should be installed. Uninstall talk-server Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package talk-server should be removed. Uninstall talk Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package talk should be removed. Install tar Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package tar should be installed. Uninstall telnet-server Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package telnet-server should be removed. Remove telnet Clients Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package telnet should be removed. Uninstall the ssl compliant telnet server Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package telnetd-ssl should be removed. Uninstall the telnet server Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package telnetd should be removed. Uninstall tftp-server Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package tftp-server should be removed. Remove tftp Daemon Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package tftp should be removed. Install the tmux Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package tmux should be installed. Uninstall tuned Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package tuned should be removed. Install usbguard Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package usbguard should be installed. Install vim Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package vim-enhanced should be installed. Install vsftpd Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package vsftpd should be installed. Uninstall vsftpd Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package vsftpd should be removed. Uninstall xinetd Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package xinetd should be removed. Remove the X Windows Package Group Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package xorg-x11-server-common should be removed. Remove NIS Client Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package ypbind should be removed. Uninstall ypserv Package Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package ypserv should be removed. Ensure /boot Located On Separate Partition Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 If stored locally, create a separate partition for /boot. If /boot will be mounted from another system such as an NFS server, then creating a separate partition is not necessary at this time, and the mountpoint can instead be configured later. Ensure /dev/shm is configured Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 If stored locally, create a separate partition for /dev/shm. If /dev/shm will be mounted from another system such as an NFS server, then creating a separate partition is not necessary at this time, and the mountpoint can instead be configured later. Ensure /home Located On Separate Partition Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 If stored locally, create a separate partition for /home. If /home will be mounted from another system such as an NFS server, then creating a separate partition is not necessary at this time, and the mountpoint can instead be configured later. Ensure /opt Located On Separate Partition Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 If stored locally, create a separate partition for /opt. If /opt will be mounted from another system such as an NFS server, then creating a separate partition is not necessary at this time, and the mountpoint can instead be configured later. Ensure /srv Located On Separate Partition Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 If stored locally, create a separate partition for /srv. If /srv will be mounted from another system such as an NFS server, then creating a separate partition is not necessary at this time, and the mountpoint can instead be configured later. Ensure /tmp Located On Separate Partition Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 If stored locally, create a separate partition for /tmp. If /tmp will be mounted from another system such as an NFS server, then creating a separate partition is not necessary at this time, and the mountpoint can instead be configured later. Ensure /usr Located On Separate Partition Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 If stored locally, create a separate partition for /usr. If /usr will be mounted from another system such as an NFS server, then creating a separate partition is not necessary at this time, and the mountpoint can instead be configured later. Ensure /var Located On Separate Partition Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 If stored locally, create a separate partition for /var. If /var will be mounted from another system such as an NFS server, then creating a separate partition is not necessary at this time, and the mountpoint can instead be configured later. Ensure /var/log Located On Separate Partition Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 If stored locally, create a separate partition for /var/log. If /var/log will be mounted from another system such as an NFS server, then creating a separate partition is not necessary at this time, and the mountpoint can instead be configured later. Ensure /var/log/audit Located On Separate Partition Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 If stored locally, create a separate partition for /var/log/audit. If /var/log/audit will be mounted from another system such as an NFS server, then creating a separate partition is not necessary at this time, and the mountpoint can instead be configured later. Ensure /var/tmp Located On Separate Partition Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 If stored locally, create a separate partition for /var/tmp. If /var/tmp will be mounted from another system such as an NFS server, then creating a separate partition is not necessary at this time, and the mountpoint can instead be configured later. Verify the system-wide library files in directories "/lib", "/lib64", "/usr/lib/" and "/usr/lib64" are group-owned by root. Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /lib/, /lib64/, /usr/lib/, /usr/lib64/ is group owned by 0. Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate Group Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 All syslog log files should have appropriate ownership. Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate User Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 All syslog log files should have appropriate ownership. Ensure System Log Files Have Correct Permissions Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 All syslog log files should have appropriate ownership. Disable the abrt_anon_write SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'abrt_anon_write' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the abrt_handle_event SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'abrt_handle_event' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the abrt_upload_watch_anon_write SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'abrt_upload_watch_anon_write' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Enable the antivirus_can_scan_system SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'antivirus_can_scan_system' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the antivirus_use_jit SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'antivirus_use_jit' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Enable the auditadm_exec_content SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'auditadm_exec_content' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the authlogin_radius SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'authlogin_radius' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the authlogin_yubikey SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'authlogin_yubikey' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the awstats_purge_apache_log_files SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'awstats_purge_apache_log_files' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the boinc_execmem SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'boinc_execmem' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the cdrecord_read_content SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'cdrecord_read_content' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the cluster_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'cluster_can_network_connect' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the cluster_manage_all_files SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'cluster_manage_all_files' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the cluster_use_execmem SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'cluster_use_execmem' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the cobbler_anon_write SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'cobbler_anon_write' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the cobbler_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'cobbler_can_network_connect' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the cobbler_use_cifs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'cobbler_use_cifs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the cobbler_use_nfs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'cobbler_use_nfs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the collectd_tcp_network_connect SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'collectd_tcp_network_connect' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the condor_tcp_network_connect SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'condor_tcp_network_connect' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the conman_can_network SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'conman_can_network' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the container_connect_any SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'container_connect_any' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the cron_can_relabel SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'cron_can_relabel' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the cron_system_cronjob_use_shares SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'cron_system_cronjob_use_shares' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Enable the cron_userdomain_transition SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'cron_userdomain_transition' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the cups_execmem SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'cups_execmem' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the cvs_read_shadow SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'cvs_read_shadow' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the daemons_dump_core SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'daemons_dump_core' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the daemons_enable_cluster_mode SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'daemons_enable_cluster_mode' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the daemons_use_tcp_wrapper SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'daemons_use_tcp_wrapper' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the daemons_use_tty SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'daemons_use_tty' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Enable the dbadm_exec_content SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'dbadm_exec_content' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the dbadm_manage_user_files SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'dbadm_manage_user_files' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the dbadm_read_user_files SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'dbadm_read_user_files' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Configure the deny_execmem SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'deny_execmem' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the deny_ptrace SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'deny_ptrace' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the dhcpc_exec_iptables SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'dhcpc_exec_iptables' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the dhcpd_use_ldap SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'dhcpd_use_ldap' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Enable the domain_fd_use SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'domain_fd_use' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the domain_kernel_load_modules SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'domain_kernel_load_modules' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the entropyd_use_audio SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'entropyd_use_audio' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the exim_can_connect_db SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'exim_can_connect_db' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the exim_manage_user_files SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'exim_manage_user_files' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the exim_read_user_files SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'exim_read_user_files' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the fcron_crond SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'fcron_crond' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the fenced_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'fenced_can_network_connect' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the fenced_can_ssh SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'fenced_can_ssh' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Enable the fips_mode SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'fips_mode' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the ftpd_anon_write SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'ftpd_anon_write' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the ftpd_connect_all_unreserved SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'ftpd_connect_all_unreserved' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the ftpd_connect_db SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'ftpd_connect_db' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the ftpd_full_access SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'ftpd_full_access' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the ftpd_use_cifs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'ftpd_use_cifs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the ftpd_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'ftpd_use_fusefs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the ftpd_use_nfs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'ftpd_use_nfs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the ftpd_use_passive_mode SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'ftpd_use_passive_mode' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the git_cgi_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'git_cgi_enable_homedirs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the git_cgi_use_cifs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'git_cgi_use_cifs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the git_cgi_use_nfs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'git_cgi_use_nfs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the git_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'git_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the git_session_users SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'git_session_users' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the git_system_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'git_system_enable_homedirs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the git_system_use_cifs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'git_system_use_cifs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the git_system_use_nfs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'git_system_use_nfs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the gitosis_can_sendmail SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'gitosis_can_sendmail' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the glance_api_can_network SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'glance_api_can_network' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the glance_use_execmem SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'glance_use_execmem' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the glance_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'glance_use_fusefs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the global_ssp SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'global_ssp' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the gluster_anon_write SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'gluster_anon_write' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the gluster_export_all_ro SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'gluster_export_all_ro' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Configure the gluster_export_all_rw SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'gluster_export_all_rw' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the gpg_web_anon_write SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'gpg_web_anon_write' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Enable the gssd_read_tmp SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'gssd_read_tmp' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the guest_exec_content SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'guest_exec_content' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the haproxy_connect_any SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'haproxy_connect_any' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the httpd_anon_write SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_anon_write' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Configure the httpd_builtin_scripting SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_builtin_scripting' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the httpd_can_check_spam SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_can_check_spam' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the httpd_can_connect_ftp SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_can_connect_ftp' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the httpd_can_connect_ldap SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_can_connect_ldap' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the httpd_can_connect_mythtv SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_can_connect_mythtv' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the httpd_can_connect_zabbix SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_can_connect_zabbix' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the httpd_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_can_network_connect' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the httpd_can_network_connect_db SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_can_network_connect_db' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the httpd_can_network_memcache SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_can_network_memcache' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the httpd_can_network_relay SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_can_network_relay' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the httpd_can_sendmail SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_can_sendmail' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the httpd_dbus_avahi SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_dbus_avahi' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the httpd_dbus_sssd SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_dbus_sssd' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the httpd_dontaudit_search_dirs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_dontaudit_search_dirs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Configure the httpd_enable_cgi SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_enable_cgi' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the httpd_enable_ftp_server SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_enable_ftp_server' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the httpd_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_enable_homedirs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the httpd_execmem SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_execmem' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Enable the httpd_graceful_shutdown SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_graceful_shutdown' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the httpd_manage_ipa SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_manage_ipa' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the httpd_mod_auth_pam SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_mod_auth_pam' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the httpd_read_user_content SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_read_user_content' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the httpd_run_ipa SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_run_ipa' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the httpd_run_preupgrade SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_run_preupgrade' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the httpd_run_stickshift SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_run_stickshift' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the httpd_serve_cobbler_files SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_serve_cobbler_files' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the httpd_setrlimit SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_setrlimit' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the httpd_ssi_exec SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_ssi_exec' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the httpd_sys_script_anon_write SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_sys_script_anon_write' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the httpd_tmp_exec SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_tmp_exec' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the httpd_tty_comm SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_tty_comm' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the httpd_unified SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_unified' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the httpd_use_cifs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_use_cifs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the httpd_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_use_fusefs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the httpd_use_gpg SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_use_gpg' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the httpd_use_nfs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_use_nfs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the httpd_use_openstack SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_use_openstack' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the httpd_use_sasl SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_use_sasl' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the httpd_verify_dns SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'httpd_verify_dns' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the icecast_use_any_tcp_ports SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'icecast_use_any_tcp_ports' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the irc_use_any_tcp_ports SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'irc_use_any_tcp_ports' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the irssi_use_full_network SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'irssi_use_full_network' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the kdumpgui_run_bootloader SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'kdumpgui_run_bootloader' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Enable the kerberos_enabled SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'kerberos_enabled' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the ksmtuned_use_cifs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'ksmtuned_use_cifs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the ksmtuned_use_nfs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'ksmtuned_use_nfs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Enable the logadm_exec_content SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'logadm_exec_content' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the logging_syslogd_can_sendmail SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'logging_syslogd_can_sendmail' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the logging_syslogd_run_nagios_plugins SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'logging_syslogd_run_nagios_plugins' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Enable the logging_syslogd_use_tty SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'logging_syslogd_use_tty' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Enable the login_console_enabled SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'login_console_enabled' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the logrotate_use_nfs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'logrotate_use_nfs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the logwatch_can_network_connect_mail SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'logwatch_can_network_connect_mail' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the lsmd_plugin_connect_any SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'lsmd_plugin_connect_any' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the mailman_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'mailman_use_fusefs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the mcelog_client SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'mcelog_client' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Enable the mcelog_exec_scripts SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'mcelog_exec_scripts' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the mcelog_foreground SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'mcelog_foreground' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the mcelog_server SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'mcelog_server' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the minidlna_read_generic_user_content SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'minidlna_read_generic_user_content' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the mmap_low_allowed SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'mmap_low_allowed' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the mock_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'mock_enable_homedirs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Enable the mount_anyfile SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'mount_anyfile' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the mozilla_plugin_bind_unreserved_ports SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'mozilla_plugin_bind_unreserved_ports' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the mozilla_plugin_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'mozilla_plugin_can_network_connect' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the mozilla_plugin_use_bluejeans SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'mozilla_plugin_use_bluejeans' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the mozilla_plugin_use_gps SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'mozilla_plugin_use_gps' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the mozilla_plugin_use_spice SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'mozilla_plugin_use_spice' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the mozilla_read_content SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'mozilla_read_content' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the mpd_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'mpd_enable_homedirs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the mpd_use_cifs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'mpd_use_cifs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the mpd_use_nfs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'mpd_use_nfs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the mplayer_execstack SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'mplayer_execstack' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the mysql_connect_any SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'mysql_connect_any' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the nagios_run_pnp4nagios SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'nagios_run_pnp4nagios' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the nagios_run_sudo SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'nagios_run_sudo' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the named_tcp_bind_http_port SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'named_tcp_bind_http_port' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the named_write_master_zones SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'named_write_master_zones' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the neutron_can_network SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'neutron_can_network' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Enable the nfs_export_all_ro SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'nfs_export_all_ro' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Enable the nfs_export_all_rw SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'nfs_export_all_rw' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the nfsd_anon_write SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'nfsd_anon_write' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the nis_enabled SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'nis_enabled' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Enable the nscd_use_shm SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'nscd_use_shm' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the openshift_use_nfs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'openshift_use_nfs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the openvpn_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'openvpn_can_network_connect' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the openvpn_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'openvpn_enable_homedirs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the openvpn_run_unconfined SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'openvpn_run_unconfined' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the pcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'pcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the pcp_read_generic_logs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'pcp_read_generic_logs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the piranha_lvs_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'piranha_lvs_can_network_connect' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the polipo_connect_all_unreserved SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'polipo_connect_all_unreserved' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the polipo_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'polipo_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the polipo_session_users SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'polipo_session_users' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the polipo_use_cifs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'polipo_use_cifs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the polipo_use_nfs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'polipo_use_nfs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Configure the polyinstantiation_enabled SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'polyinstantiation_enabled' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Enable the postfix_local_write_mail_spool SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'postfix_local_write_mail_spool' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the postgresql_can_rsync SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'postgresql_can_rsync' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the postgresql_selinux_transmit_client_label SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'postgresql_selinux_transmit_client_label' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Enable the postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Enable the postgresql_selinux_users_ddl SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'postgresql_selinux_users_ddl' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the pppd_can_insmod SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'pppd_can_insmod' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the pppd_for_user SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'pppd_for_user' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the privoxy_connect_any SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'privoxy_connect_any' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the prosody_bind_http_port SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'prosody_bind_http_port' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the puppetagent_manage_all_files SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'puppetagent_manage_all_files' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the puppetmaster_use_db SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'puppetmaster_use_db' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the racoon_read_shadow SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'racoon_read_shadow' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the rsync_anon_write SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'rsync_anon_write' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the rsync_client SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'rsync_client' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the rsync_export_all_ro SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'rsync_export_all_ro' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the rsync_full_access SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'rsync_full_access' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the samba_create_home_dirs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'samba_create_home_dirs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the samba_domain_controller SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'samba_domain_controller' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the samba_enable_home_dirs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'samba_enable_home_dirs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the samba_export_all_ro SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'samba_export_all_ro' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the samba_export_all_rw SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'samba_export_all_rw' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the samba_load_libgfapi SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'samba_load_libgfapi' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the samba_portmapper SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'samba_portmapper' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the samba_run_unconfined SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'samba_run_unconfined' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the samba_share_fusefs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'samba_share_fusefs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the samba_share_nfs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'samba_share_nfs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the sanlock_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'sanlock_use_fusefs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the sanlock_use_nfs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'sanlock_use_nfs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the sanlock_use_samba SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'sanlock_use_samba' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the saslauthd_read_shadow SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'saslauthd_read_shadow' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Enable the secadm_exec_content SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'secadm_exec_content' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the secure_mode SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'secure_mode' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Configure the secure_mode_insmod SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'secure_mode_insmod' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the secure_mode_policyload SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'secure_mode_policyload' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Configure the selinuxuser_direct_dri_enabled SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'selinuxuser_direct_dri_enabled' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the selinuxuser_execheap SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'selinuxuser_execheap' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Enable the selinuxuser_execmod SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'selinuxuser_execmod' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the selinuxuser_execstack SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'selinuxuser_execstack' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the selinuxuser_mysql_connect_enabled SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'selinuxuser_mysql_connect_enabled' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Enable the selinuxuser_ping SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'selinuxuser_ping' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the selinuxuser_postgresql_connect_enabled SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'selinuxuser_postgresql_connect_enabled' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the selinuxuser_rw_noexattrfile SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'selinuxuser_rw_noexattrfile' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the selinuxuser_share_music SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'selinuxuser_share_music' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the selinuxuser_tcp_server SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'selinuxuser_tcp_server' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the selinuxuser_udp_server SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'selinuxuser_udp_server' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the sge_domain_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'sge_domain_can_network_connect' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the sge_use_nfs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'sge_use_nfs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the smartmon_3ware SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'smartmon_3ware' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the smbd_anon_write SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'smbd_anon_write' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the spamassassin_can_network SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'spamassassin_can_network' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Enable the spamd_enable_home_dirs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'spamd_enable_home_dirs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the squid_connect_any SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'squid_connect_any' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the squid_use_tproxy SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'squid_use_tproxy' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the ssh_keysign SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'ssh_keysign' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the ssh_sysadm_login SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'ssh_sysadm_login' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Enable the staff_exec_content SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'staff_exec_content' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the staff_use_svirt SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'staff_use_svirt' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the swift_can_network SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'swift_can_network' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Enable the sysadm_exec_content SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'sysadm_exec_content' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the telepathy_connect_all_ports SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'telepathy_connect_all_ports' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the tftp_anon_write SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'tftp_anon_write' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the tftp_home_dir SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'tftp_home_dir' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the tmpreaper_use_nfs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'tmpreaper_use_nfs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the tmpreaper_use_samba SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'tmpreaper_use_samba' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the tor_bind_all_unreserved_ports SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'tor_bind_all_unreserved_ports' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the tor_can_network_relay SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'tor_can_network_relay' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Enable the unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Enable the unconfined_login SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'unconfined_login' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Enable the unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the unprivuser_use_svirt SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'unprivuser_use_svirt' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the use_ecryptfs_home_dirs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'use_ecryptfs_home_dirs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the use_fusefs_home_dirs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'use_fusefs_home_dirs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the use_lpd_server SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'use_lpd_server' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the use_nfs_home_dirs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'use_nfs_home_dirs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the use_samba_home_dirs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'use_samba_home_dirs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Enable the user_exec_content SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'user_exec_content' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the varnishd_connect_any SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'varnishd_connect_any' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the virt_read_qemu_ga_data SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'virt_read_qemu_ga_data' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the virt_rw_qemu_ga_data SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'virt_rw_qemu_ga_data' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the virt_sandbox_use_all_caps SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'virt_sandbox_use_all_caps' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Enable the virt_sandbox_use_audit SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'virt_sandbox_use_audit' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the virt_sandbox_use_mknod SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'virt_sandbox_use_mknod' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the virt_sandbox_use_netlink SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'virt_sandbox_use_netlink' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the virt_sandbox_use_sys_admin SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'virt_sandbox_use_sys_admin' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the virt_transition_userdomain SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'virt_transition_userdomain' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the virt_use_comm SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'virt_use_comm' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the virt_use_execmem SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'virt_use_execmem' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the virt_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'virt_use_fusefs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the virt_use_nfs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'virt_use_nfs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the virt_use_rawip SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'virt_use_rawip' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the virt_use_samba SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'virt_use_samba' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the virt_use_sanlock SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'virt_use_sanlock' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the virt_use_usb SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'virt_use_usb' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the virt_use_xserver SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'virt_use_xserver' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the webadm_manage_user_files SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'webadm_manage_user_files' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the webadm_read_user_files SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'webadm_read_user_files' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the wine_mmap_zero_ignore SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'wine_mmap_zero_ignore' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the xdm_bind_vnc_tcp_port SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'xdm_bind_vnc_tcp_port' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the xdm_exec_bootloader SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'xdm_exec_bootloader' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the xdm_sysadm_login SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'xdm_sysadm_login' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the xdm_write_home SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'xdm_write_home' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the xen_use_nfs SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'xen_use_nfs' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Enable the xend_run_blktap SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'xend_run_blktap' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Enable the xend_run_qemu SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'xend_run_qemu' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the xguest_connect_network SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'xguest_connect_network' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the xguest_exec_content SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'xguest_exec_content' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the xguest_mount_media SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'xguest_mount_media' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the xguest_use_bluetooth SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'xguest_use_bluetooth' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the xserver_clients_write_xshm SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'xserver_clients_write_xshm' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the xserver_execmem SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'xserver_execmem' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the xserver_object_manager SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'xserver_object_manager' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the zabbix_can_network SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'zabbix_can_network' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the zarafa_setrlimit SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'zarafa_setrlimit' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the zebra_write_config SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'zebra_write_config' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the zoneminder_anon_write SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'zoneminder_anon_write' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable the zoneminder_run_sudo SELinux Boolean Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The SELinux 'zoneminder_run_sudo' boolean should be set in the system configuration. Disable Automatic Bug Reporting Tool (abrtd) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The abrtd service should be disabled. Disable Advanced Configuration and Power Interface (acpid) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The acpid service should be disabled. Disable At Service (atd) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The atd service should be disabled. Enable auditd Service Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The auditd service should be enabled if possible. Disable the Automounter Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The autofs service should be disabled. Disable Avahi Server Software Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The avahi-daemon service should be disabled. Disable Bluetooth Service Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The bluetooth service should be disabled. Disable Certmonger Service (certmonger) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The certmonger service should be disabled. The Chronyd service is enabled Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The chronyd service should be enabled if possible. Disable Cockpit Management Server Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The cockpit service should be disabled. Disable CPU Speed (cpupower) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The cpupower service should be disabled. Enable cron Service Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The cron service should be enabled if possible. Enable cron Service Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The crond service should be enabled if possible. Disable the CUPS Service Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The cups service should be disabled. Disable debug-shell SystemD Service Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The debug-shell service should be disabled. Disable DHCP Service Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The dhcpd service should be disabled. Disable Dovecot Service Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The dovecot service should be disabled. Enable the File Access Policy Service Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The fapolicyd service should be enabled if possible. Verify firewalld Enabled Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The firewalld service should be enabled if possible. Disable httpd Service Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The httpd service should be disabled. Verify ip6tables Enabled if Using IPv6 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The ip6tables service should be enabled if possible. Verify iptables Enabled Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The iptables service should be enabled if possible. Disable KDump Kernel Crash Analyzer (kdump) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kdump service should be disabled. Disable Software RAID Monitor (mdmonitor) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The mdmonitor service should be disabled. Enable nails Service Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The nails service should be enabled if possible. Disable named Service Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The named service should be disabled. Disable Network Console (netconsole) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The netconsole service should be disabled. Disable Network File Systems (netfs) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The netfs service should be disabled. Disable Network File System (nfs) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The nfs-server service should be disabled. Disable Network File System Lock Service (nfslock) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The nfslock service should be disabled. Verify nftables Service is Disabled Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The nftables service should be disabled. Verify nftables Service is Enabled Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The nftables service should be enabled if possible. Enable the NTP Daemon Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The ntp service should be enabled if possible. Enable the NTP Daemon Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The ntpd service should be enabled if possible. Disable ntpdate Service (ntpdate) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The ntpdate service should be disabled. Disable Odd Job Daemon (oddjobd) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The oddjobd service should be disabled. Enable the pcscd Service Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The pcscd service should be enabled if possible. Disable Portreserve (portreserve) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The portreserve service should be disabled. Enable Postfix Service Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The postfix service should be enabled if possible. Enable Process Accounting (psacct) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The psacct service should be enabled if possible. Disable Apache Qpid (qpidd) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The qpidd service should be disabled. Disable Quota Netlink (quota_nld) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The quota_nld service should be disabled. Disable Network Router Discovery Daemon (rdisc) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The rdisc service should be disabled. Disable rexec Service Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The rexec service should be disabled. Disable Red Hat Network Service (rhnsd) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The rhnsd service should be disabled. Disable Red Hat Subscription Manager Daemon (rhsmcertd) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The rhsmcertd service should be disabled. Disable rlogin Service Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The rlogin service should be disabled. Enable the Hardware RNG Entropy Gatherer Service Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The rngd service should be enabled if possible. Disable rpcbind Service Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The rpcbind service should be disabled. Disable Secure RPC Client Service (rpcgssd) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The rpcgssd service should be disabled. Disable RPC ID Mapping Service (rpcidmapd) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The rpcidmapd service should be disabled. Disable Secure RPC Server Service (rpcsvcgssd) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The rpcsvcgssd service should be disabled. Disable rsh Service Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The rsh service should be disabled. Ensure rsyncd service is disabled Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The rsyncd service should be disabled. Enable rsyslog Service Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The rsyslog service should be enabled if possible. Disable Cyrus SASL Authentication Daemon (saslauthd) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The saslauthd service should be disabled. Disable LDAP Server (slapd) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The slapd service should be disabled. Disable Samba Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The smb service should be disabled. Disable snmpd Service Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The snmpd service should be disabled. Disable Squid Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The squid service should be disabled. Disable SSH Server If Possible Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The sshd service should be disabled. Enable the OpenSSH Service Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The sshd service should be enabled if possible. Enable the SSSD Service Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The sssd service should be enabled if possible. service_syslog_disabled Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The syslog service should be disabled. Enable syslog-ng Service Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The syslog-ng service should be enabled if possible. Disable System Statistics Reset Service (sysstat) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The sysstat service should be disabled. Disable acquiring, saving, and processing core dumps Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Disable {{{ SOCKETNAME }}}.socket Enable systemd-journald Service Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The systemd-journald service should be enabled if possible. Disable telnet Service Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The telnet service should be disabled. Disable tftp Service Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The tftp service should be disabled. Verify ufw Enabled Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The ufw service should be enabled if possible. Enable the USBGuard Service Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The usbguard service should be enabled if possible. Disable vsftpd Service Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The vsftpd service should be disabled. Disable xinetd Service Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The xinetd service should be disabled. Disable ypbind Service Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The ypbind service should be disabled. Disable ypserv Service Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The ypserv service should be disabled. Disable Quagga Service Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The zebra service should be disabled. Set Default firewalld Zone for Incoming Packets Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check presence of DefaultZone=drop in /etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf Disable systemd-journal-remote Socket Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Disable {{{ SOCKETNAME }}}.socket Disable SSH Access via Empty Passwords Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'PermitEmptyPasswords' is configured with value 'no' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config Disable GSSAPI Authentication Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'GSSAPIAuthentication' is configured with value 'no' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config Disable Kerberos Authentication Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'KerberosAuthentication' is configured with value 'no' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config Disable PubkeyAuthentication Authentication Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'PubkeyAuthentication' is configured with value 'no' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config Disable SSH Support for .rhosts Files Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'IgnoreRhosts' is configured with value 'yes' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config Disable SSH Root Login Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'PermitRootLogin' is configured with value 'no' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config Disable SSH root Login with a Password (Insecure) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'PermitRootLogin' is configured with value 'prohibit-password' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config Disable SSH TCP Forwarding Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'AllowTcpForwarding' is configured with value 'no' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config Disable SSH Support for User Known Hosts Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'IgnoreUserKnownHosts' is configured with value 'yes' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config Disable X11 Forwarding Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'X11Forwarding' is configured with value 'no' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config Do Not Allow SSH Environment Options Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'PermitUserEnvironment' is configured with value 'no' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config Enable GSSAPI Authentication Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'GSSAPIAuthentication' is configured with value 'yes' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config Enable PAM Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'UsePAM' is configured with value 'yes' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config Enable Public Key Authentication Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'PubkeyAuthentication' is configured with value 'yes' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config Enable Use of Strict Mode Checking Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'StrictModes' is configured with value 'yes' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config Enable SSH Warning Banner Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'Banner' is configured with value '/etc/issue' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config Enable SSH Warning Banner Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'Banner' is configured with value '/etc/issue.net' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config Enable Encrypted X11 Forwarding Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'X11Forwarding' is configured with value 'yes' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config sshd_includes_config_files Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check presence of Include /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/*.conf in /etc/ssh/sshd_config Enable SSH Print Last Log Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'PrintLastLog' is configured with value 'yes' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config Set SSH Client Alive Count Max to zero Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'ClientAliveCountMax' is configured with value '0' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config Set LogLevel to INFO Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'LogLevel' is configured with value 'INFO' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config Set SSH Daemon LogLevel to VERBOSE Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'LogLevel' is configured with value 'VERBOSE' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config SSH server uses strong entropy to seed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG' is configured with value '32' in /etc/sysconfig/sshd Prevent remote hosts from connecting to the proxy display Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure 'X11UseLocalhost' is configured with value 'yes' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config Enable Certmap in SSSD Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check presence of \[certmap\/.+\/.+\] in /etc/sssd/sssd.conf Ensure sudo Runs In A Minimal Environment - sudo env_reset Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Checks sudoers Defaults {{ OPTION }} configuration Ensure sudo Ignores Commands In Current Dir - sudo ignore_dot Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Checks sudoers Defaults {{ OPTION }} configuration Ensure Privileged Escalated Commands Cannot Execute Other Commands - sudo NOEXEC Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Checks sudoers Defaults {{ OPTION }} configuration Ensure sudo passwd_timeout is appropriate - sudo passwd_timeout Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Checks sudoers Defaults {{ OPTION }} configuration Ensure Only Users Logged In To Real tty Can Execute Sudo - sudo requiretty Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Checks sudoers Defaults {{ OPTION }} configuration Ensure sudo umask is appropriate - sudo umask Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Checks sudoers Defaults {{ OPTION }} configuration Ensure Only Users Logged In To Real tty Can Execute Sudo - sudo use_pty Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Checks sudoers Defaults {{ OPTION }} configuration Ensure Sudo Logfile Exists - sudo logfile Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Checks sudoers Defaults {{ OPTION }} configuration Ensure only owner and members of group owner of /usr/bin/sudo can execute it Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 This test makes sure that /usr/bin/sudo has mode 4110. If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. Enable Kernel Parameter to Enforce DAC on Hardlinks Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'fs.protected_hardlinks' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Enable Kernel Parameter to Enforce DAC on Hardlinks Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'fs.protected_hardlinks' parameter should be set to 1 in the system runtime. Enable Kernel Parameter to Enforce DAC on Hardlinks Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'fs.protected_hardlinks' parameter should be set to 1 in the system configuration. Enable Kernel Parameter to Enforce DAC on Symlinks Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'fs.protected_symlinks' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Enable Kernel Parameter to Enforce DAC on Symlinks Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'fs.protected_symlinks' parameter should be set to 1 in the system runtime. Enable Kernel Parameter to Enforce DAC on Symlinks Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'fs.protected_symlinks' parameter should be set to 1 in the system configuration. Disable Core Dumps for SUID programs Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'fs.suid_dumpable' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Disable Core Dumps for SUID programs Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'fs.suid_dumpable' parameter should be set to 0 in the system runtime. Disable Core Dumps for SUID programs Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'fs.suid_dumpable' parameter should be set to 0 in the system configuration. Disable storing core dumps Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'kernel.core_pattern' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Disable storing core dumps Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'kernel.core_pattern' parameter should be set to |/bin/false in the system runtime. Disable storing core dumps Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'kernel.core_pattern' parameter should be set to |/bin/false in the system configuration. Configure file name of core dumps Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'kernel.core_uses_pid' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Configure file name of core dumps Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'kernel.core_uses_pid' parameter should be set to 0 in the system runtime. Configure file name of core dumps Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'kernel.core_uses_pid' parameter should be set to 0 in the system configuration. Restrict Access to Kernel Message Buffer Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'kernel.dmesg_restrict' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Restrict Access to Kernel Message Buffer Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'kernel.dmesg_restrict' parameter should be set to 1 in the system runtime. Restrict Access to Kernel Message Buffer Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'kernel.dmesg_restrict' parameter should be set to 1 in the system configuration. Disable Kernel Image Loading Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'kernel.kexec_load_disabled' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Disable Kernel Image Loading Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'kernel.kexec_load_disabled' parameter should be set to 1 in the system runtime. Disable Kernel Image Loading Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'kernel.kexec_load_disabled' parameter should be set to 1 in the system configuration. Restrict Exposed Kernel Pointer Addresses Access Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'kernel.kptr_restrict' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Restrict Exposed Kernel Pointer Addresses Access Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'kernel.kptr_restrict' parameter should be set to 1 or 2 in the system runtime. Restrict Exposed Kernel Pointer Addresses Access Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'kernel.kptr_restrict' parameter should be set to 1 or 2 in the system configuration. Disable loading and unloading of kernel modules Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'kernel.modules_disabled' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Disable loading and unloading of kernel modules Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'kernel.modules_disabled' parameter should be set to 1 in the system runtime. Disable loading and unloading of kernel modules Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'kernel.modules_disabled' parameter should be set to 1 in the system configuration. Kernel panic on oops Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'kernel.panic_on_oops' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Kernel panic on oops Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'kernel.panic_on_oops' parameter should be set to 1 in the system runtime. Kernel panic on oops Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'kernel.panic_on_oops' parameter should be set to 1 in the system configuration. Limit CPU consumption of the Perf system Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Limit CPU consumption of the Perf system Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent' parameter should be set to 1 in the system runtime. Limit CPU consumption of the Perf system Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent' parameter should be set to 1 in the system configuration. Limit sampling frequency of the Perf system Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Limit sampling frequency of the Perf system Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate' parameter should be set to 1 in the system runtime. Limit sampling frequency of the Perf system Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate' parameter should be set to 1 in the system configuration. Disallow kernel profiling by unprivileged users Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'kernel.perf_event_paranoid' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Disallow kernel profiling by unprivileged users Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'kernel.perf_event_paranoid' parameter should be set to 2 in the system runtime. Disallow kernel profiling by unprivileged users Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'kernel.perf_event_paranoid' parameter should be set to 2 in the system configuration. Configure maximum number of process identifiers Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'kernel.pid_max' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Configure maximum number of process identifiers Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'kernel.pid_max' parameter should be set to 65536 in the system runtime. Configure maximum number of process identifiers Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'kernel.pid_max' parameter should be set to 65536 in the system configuration. Enable Randomized Layout of Virtual Address Space Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'kernel.randomize_va_space' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Enable Randomized Layout of Virtual Address Space Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'kernel.randomize_va_space' parameter should be set to 2 in the system runtime. Enable Randomized Layout of Virtual Address Space Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'kernel.randomize_va_space' parameter should be set to 2 in the system configuration. Disallow magic SysRq key Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'kernel.sysrq' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Disallow magic SysRq key Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'kernel.sysrq' parameter should be set to 0 in the system runtime. Disallow magic SysRq key Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'kernel.sysrq' parameter should be set to 0 in the system configuration. Disable Access to Network bpf() Syscall From Unprivileged Processes Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Disable Access to Network bpf() Syscall From Unprivileged Processes Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled' parameter should be set to 1 in the system runtime. Disable Access to Network bpf() Syscall From Unprivileged Processes Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled' parameter should be set to 1 in the system configuration. Restrict usage of ptrace to descendant processes Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'kernel.yama.ptrace_scope' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Restrict usage of ptrace to descendant processes Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'kernel.yama.ptrace_scope' parameter should be set to 1 in the system runtime. Restrict usage of ptrace to descendant processes Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'kernel.yama.ptrace_scope' parameter should be set to 1 in the system configuration. Harden the operation of the BPF just-in-time compiler Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'net.core.bpf_jit_harden' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Harden the operation of the BPF just-in-time compiler Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.core.bpf_jit_harden' parameter should be set to 2 in the system runtime. Harden the operation of the BPF just-in-time compiler Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.core.bpf_jit_harden' parameter should be set to 2 in the system configuration. Disable Accepting Packets Routed Between Local Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Disable Accepting Packets Routed Between Local Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local' parameter should be set to 0 in the system runtime. Disable Accepting Packets Routed Between Local Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local' parameter should be set to 0 in the system configuration. Disable Accepting ICMP Redirects for All IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Disable Accepting ICMP Redirects for All IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. Disable Accepting ICMP Redirects for All IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on all IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on all IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on all IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. Configure ARP filtering for All IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Configure ARP filtering for All IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. Configure ARP filtering for All IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. Configure Response Mode of ARP Requests for All IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Configure Response Mode of ARP Requests for All IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. Configure Response Mode of ARP Requests for All IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. Drop Gratuitious ARP frames on All IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Drop Gratuitious ARP frames on All IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp' parameter should be set to 1 in the system runtime. Drop Gratuitious ARP frames on All IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp' parameter should be set to 1 in the system configuration. Disable Kernel Parameter for IPv4 Forwarding on all IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'net.ipv4.conf.all.forwarding' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Disable Kernel Parameter for IPv4 Forwarding on all IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.forwarding' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. Disable Kernel Parameter for IPv4 Forwarding on all IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.forwarding' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. Enable Kernel Parameter to Log Martian Packets on all IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Enable Kernel Parameter to Log Martian Packets on all IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. Enable Kernel Parameter to Log Martian Packets on all IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. Prevent Routing External Traffic to Local Loopback on All IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Prevent Routing External Traffic to Local Loopback on All IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet' parameter should be set to 0 in the system runtime. Prevent Routing External Traffic to Local Loopback on All IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet' parameter should be set to 0 in the system configuration. Enable Kernel Parameter to Use Reverse Path Filtering on all IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Enable Kernel Parameter to Use Reverse Path Filtering on all IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter' parameter should be set to 1 or 2 in the system runtime. Enable Kernel Parameter to Use Reverse Path Filtering on all IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter' parameter should be set to 1 or 2 in the system configuration. Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Secure ICMP Redirects on all IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Secure ICMP Redirects on all IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Secure ICMP Redirects on all IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. Disable Kernel Parameter for Sending ICMP Redirects on all IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Disable Kernel Parameter for Sending ICMP Redirects on all IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects' parameter should be set to 0 in the system runtime. Disable Kernel Parameter for Sending ICMP Redirects on all IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects' parameter should be set to 0 in the system configuration. Configure Sending and Accepting Shared Media Redirects for All IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Configure Sending and Accepting Shared Media Redirects for All IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. Configure Sending and Accepting Shared Media Redirects for All IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting ICMP Redirects by Default on IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting ICMP Redirects by Default on IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting ICMP Redirects by Default on IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on IPv4 Interfaces by Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on IPv4 Interfaces by Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on IPv4 Interfaces by Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. Enable Kernel Paremeter to Log Martian Packets on all IPv4 Interfaces by Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Enable Kernel Paremeter to Log Martian Packets on all IPv4 Interfaces by Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. Enable Kernel Paremeter to Log Martian Packets on all IPv4 Interfaces by Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. Enable Kernel Parameter to Use Reverse Path Filtering on all IPv4 Interfaces by Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Enable Kernel Parameter to Use Reverse Path Filtering on all IPv4 Interfaces by Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. Enable Kernel Parameter to Use Reverse Path Filtering on all IPv4 Interfaces by Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. Configure Kernel Parameter for Accepting Secure Redirects By Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Configure Kernel Parameter for Accepting Secure Redirects By Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. Configure Kernel Parameter for Accepting Secure Redirects By Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. Disable Kernel Parameter for Sending ICMP Redirects on all IPv4 Interfaces by Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Disable Kernel Parameter for Sending ICMP Redirects on all IPv4 Interfaces by Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects' parameter should be set to 0 in the system runtime. Disable Kernel Parameter for Sending ICMP Redirects on all IPv4 Interfaces by Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects' parameter should be set to 0 in the system configuration. Configure Sending and Accepting Shared Media Redirects by Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Configure Sending and Accepting Shared Media Redirects by Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. Configure Sending and Accepting Shared Media Redirects by Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. Enable Kernel Parameter to Ignore ICMP Broadcast Echo Requests on IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Enable Kernel Parameter to Ignore ICMP Broadcast Echo Requests on IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. Enable Kernel Parameter to Ignore ICMP Broadcast Echo Requests on IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. Enable Kernel Parameter to Ignore Bogus ICMP Error Responses on IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Enable Kernel Parameter to Ignore Bogus ICMP Error Responses on IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. Enable Kernel Parameter to Ignore Bogus ICMP Error Responses on IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. Disable Kernel Parameter for IP Forwarding on IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'net.ipv4.ip_forward' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Disable Kernel Parameter for IP Forwarding on IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.ip_forward' parameter should be set to 0 in the system runtime. Disable Kernel Parameter for IP Forwarding on IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.ip_forward' parameter should be set to 0 in the system configuration. Set Kernel Parameter to Increase Local Port Range Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Set Kernel Parameter to Increase Local Port Range Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range' parameter should be set to 32768 65535 in the system runtime. Set Kernel Parameter to Increase Local Port Range Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range' parameter should be set to 32768 65535 in the system configuration. Configure Kernel to Rate Limit Sending of Duplicate TCP Acknowledgments Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Configure Kernel to Rate Limit Sending of Duplicate TCP Acknowledgments Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. Configure Kernel to Rate Limit Sending of Duplicate TCP Acknowledgments Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. Enable Kernel Parameter to Use TCP RFC 1337 on IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Enable Kernel Parameter to Use TCP RFC 1337 on IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. Enable Kernel Parameter to Use TCP RFC 1337 on IPv4 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. Enable Kernel Parameter to Use TCP Syncookies on Network Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Enable Kernel Parameter to Use TCP Syncookies on Network Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. Enable Kernel Parameter to Use TCP Syncookies on Network Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. Configure Accepting Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Configure Accepting Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. Configure Accepting Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. Configure Accepting Default Router in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Configure Accepting Default Router in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. Configure Accepting Default Router in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. Configure Accepting Prefix Information in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Configure Accepting Prefix Information in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. Configure Accepting Prefix Information in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. Configure Accepting Router Preference in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Configure Accepting Router Preference in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. Configure Accepting Router Preference in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. Disable Accepting ICMP Redirects for All IPv6 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Disable Accepting ICMP Redirects for All IPv6 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. Disable Accepting ICMP Redirects for All IPv6 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on all IPv6 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on all IPv6 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on all IPv6 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. Configure Auto Configuration on All IPv6 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Configure Auto Configuration on All IPv6 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. Configure Auto Configuration on All IPv6 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. Disable IPv6 Addressing on All IPv6 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Disable IPv6 Addressing on All IPv6 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6' parameter should be set to 1 in the system runtime. Disable IPv6 Addressing on All IPv6 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6' parameter should be set to 1 in the system configuration. Disable Kernel Parameter for IPv6 Forwarding Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Disable Kernel Parameter for IPv6 Forwarding Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. Disable Kernel Parameter for IPv6 Forwarding Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. Configure Maximum Number of Autoconfigured Addresses on All IPv6 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Configure Maximum Number of Autoconfigured Addresses on All IPv6 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. Configure Maximum Number of Autoconfigured Addresses on All IPv6 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. Configure Denying Router Solicitations on All IPv6 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Configure Denying Router Solicitations on All IPv6 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. Configure Denying Router Solicitations on All IPv6 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. Disable Accepting Router Advertisements on all IPv6 Interfaces by Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Disable Accepting Router Advertisements on all IPv6 Interfaces by Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. Disable Accepting Router Advertisements on all IPv6 Interfaces by Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. Configure Accepting Default Router in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Configure Accepting Default Router in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. Configure Accepting Default Router in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. Configure Accepting Prefix Information in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Configure Accepting Prefix Information in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. Configure Accepting Prefix Information in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. Configure Accepting Router Preference in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Configure Accepting Router Preference in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. Configure Accepting Router Preference in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting ICMP Redirects by Default on IPv6 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting ICMP Redirects by Default on IPv6 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting ICMP Redirects by Default on IPv6 Interfaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on IPv6 Interfaces by Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on IPv6 Interfaces by Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on IPv6 Interfaces by Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. Configure Auto Configuration on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Configure Auto Configuration on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. Configure Auto Configuration on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. Disable IPv6 Addressing on IPv6 Interfaces by Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Disable IPv6 Addressing on IPv6 Interfaces by Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6' parameter should be set to 1 in the system runtime. Disable IPv6 Addressing on IPv6 Interfaces by Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6' parameter should be set to 1 in the system configuration. Configure Maximum Number of Autoconfigured Addresses on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Configure Maximum Number of Autoconfigured Addresses on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. Configure Maximum Number of Autoconfigured Addresses on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. Configure Denying Router Solicitations on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Configure Denying Router Solicitations on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. Configure Denying Router Solicitations on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. Disable the use of user namespaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'user.max_user_namespaces' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Disable the use of user namespaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'user.max_user_namespaces' parameter should be set to 0 in the system runtime. Disable the use of user namespaces Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'user.max_user_namespaces' parameter should be set to 0 in the system configuration. Prevent applications from mapping low portion of virtual memory Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The 'vm.mmap_min_addr' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. Prevent applications from mapping low portion of virtual memory Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'vm.mmap_min_addr' parameter should be set to 65536 in the system runtime. Prevent applications from mapping low portion of virtual memory Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The kernel 'vm.mmap_min_addr' parameter should be set to 65536 in the system configuration. Enable dnf-automatic Timer Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The dnf-automatic timer should be enabled if possible. Enable logrotate Timer Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The logrotate timer should be enabled if possible. Enable Auditing to Start Prior to the Audit Daemon in zIPL Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure audit=1 option is configured in the 'options' line in /boot/loader/entries/*.conf. Make sure that newly installed kernels will retain this option, it should be configured in /etc/kernel/cmdline as well. Extend Audit Backlog Limit for the Audit Daemon in zIPL Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure audit_backlog_limit=8192 option is configured in the 'options' line in /boot/loader/entries/*.conf. Make sure that newly installed kernels will retain this option, it should be configured in /etc/kernel/cmdline as well. Enable page allocator poisoning in zIPL Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure page_poison=1 option is configured in the 'options' line in /boot/loader/entries/*.conf. Make sure that newly installed kernels will retain this option, it should be configured in /etc/kernel/cmdline as well. Enable SLUB/SLAB allocator poisoning in zIPL Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure slub_debug=P option is configured in the 'options' line in /boot/loader/entries/*.conf. Make sure that newly installed kernels will retain this option, it should be configured in /etc/kernel/cmdline as well. Disable vsyscalls in zIPL Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure vsyscall=none option is configured in the 'options' line in /boot/loader/entries/*.conf. Make sure that newly installed kernels will retain this option, it should be configured in /etc/kernel/cmdline as well. Check pam_faillock Existence in system-auth Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check that pam_faillock.so exists in system-auth Check pam_pwquality Existence in system-auth Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check that pam_pwquality.so exists in system-auth Record Any Attempts to Run semanage Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Test if auditctl is in use for audit rules. Record Any Attempts to Run semanage Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Test if augenrules is enabled for audit rules. Record Events that Modify the System's Network Environment Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The network environment should not be modified by anything other than administrator action. Any change to network parameters should be audited. Record Events that Modify the System's Network Environment Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The network environment should not be modified by anything other than administrator action. Any change to network parameters should be audited. 'log_file' Not Set In /etc/audit/auditd.conf Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Verify 'log_file' is not set in /etc/audit/auditd.conf. 'log_group' Not Set To 'root' In /etc/audit/auditd.conf Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Verify 'log_group' is not set to 'root' in /etc/audit/auditd.conf. Verify GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY Set to true Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY set to 'true' in /etc/default/grub Specify Multiple Remote chronyd NTP Servers for Time Data Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Multiple chronyd NTP Servers for time synchronization should be specified. GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT existance check Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check if GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT exists in /etc/default/grub. Use $kernelopts in /boot/loader/entries/*.conf Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Ensure that grubenv-defined kernel options are referenced in individual boot loader entries Anolis OS 23 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Anolis OS 23 CentOS 7 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is CentOS 7 CentOS 8 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is CentOS 8 CentOS Stream 9 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is CentOS Stream 9 Debian Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed is a Debian System Installed operating system is Fedora Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Fedora Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Installed OS is OL Oracle Linux 7 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Oracle Linux 7 Oracle Linux 8 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Oracle Linux 8 Oracle Linux 9 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Oracle Linux 9 OpenEmbedded Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed is an OpenEmbedded based system openSUSE Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is openSUSE. Installed operating system is part of the Unix family Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is part of the Unix OS family Poky Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed is a Poky based System Red Hat Enterprise Linux CoreOS Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux CoreOS release 4 Red Hat Enterprise Linux CoreOS RHEL9 Based Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux CoreOS RHEL9 Based Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Installed OS is RHEL Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.0 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.0 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.1 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.1 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.2 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.2 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.3 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.3 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.4 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.4 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.5 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.5 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.6 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.6 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.7 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.7 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.8 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.8 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.9 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.9 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.10 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.10 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 Red Hat Virtualization 4 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Virtualization Host 4.4+ or Red Hat Enterprise Host. Scientific Linux 7 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Scientific Linux 7 SUSE Linux Enterprise 12 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is SUSE Linux Enterprise 12. SUSE Linux Enterprise 15 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is SUSE Linux Enterprise 15. Ubuntu Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed is an Ubuntu System Ubuntu 16.04 LTS Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Ubuntu 16.04 LTS Ubuntu 18.04 LTS Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Ubuntu 18.04 LTS Ubuntu 20.04 LTS Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Ubuntu 20.04 LTS System uses zIPL Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Checks if system uses zIPL bootloader. Check if the environment is a OSBuild pipeline Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check the value of environment variable container. No CD/DVD drive is configured to automount in /etc/fstab Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check the /etc/fstab and check if a CD/DVD drive is not configured for automount. Device Files for Removable Media Partitions Does Not Exist on the System Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Verify if device file representing removable partitions exist on the system SSHD is not required to be installed or requirement not set Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 If SSHD is not required, we check it is not installed. If SSH requirement is unset, we are good. SSHD is required to be installed or requirement not set Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 If SSHD is required, we check it is installed. If SSH requirement is unset, we are good. It doesn't matter if sshd is installed or not Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Test if value sshd_required is 0. OpenSSH Server is 7.4 or newer Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check if version of OpenSSH Server is equal or higher than 7.4 Kernel Runtime Parameter IPv6 Check Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Disables IPv6 for all network interfaces. Test for 64-bit Architecture Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Generic test for 64-bit architectures to be used by other tests Test for aarch_64 Architecture Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Generic test for aarch_64 architecture to be used by other tests Test for PPC and PPCLE Architecture Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Generic test for PPC PPC64LE architecture to be used by other tests Test for s390_64 Architecture Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Generic test for s390_64 architecture to be used by other tests Test for x86 Architecture Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Generic test for x86 architecture to be used by other tests Test for x86_64 Architecture Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Generic test for x86_64 architecture to be used by other tests Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check /etc/tmux.conf is readable by others Check that file storing USBGuard rules exists and is not empty Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check that file storing USBGuard rules at /etc/usbguard/rules.conf exists and is not empty Value of 'var_accounts_user_umask' variable represented as octal number Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Value of 'var_accounts_user_umask' variable represented as octal number Value of 'var_removable_partition' variable is set to '/dev/cdrom' Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Verify if value of 'var_removable_partition' variable is set to '/dev/cdrom' Value of 'var_umask_for_daemons' variable represented as octal number Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Value of 'var_umask_for_daemons' variable represented as octal number /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts ifcfg-.* ^[\s]*BOOTPROTO[\s]*=[\s"]*([^#"\s]*) 1 /etc/fapolicyd/compiled.rules ^\s*deny\s*perm=any\s*all\s*:\s*all\s*\z 1 /etc/fapolicyd/fapolicyd.rules ^\s*deny\s*perm=any\s*all\s*:\s*all\s*\z 1 /etc/fapolicyd/fapolicyd.conf ^\s*permissive\s*=\s*(\d+) 1 /etc/vsftpd/vsftpd.conf ^[\s]*xferlog_enable[\s]*=[\s]*YES$ 1 /etc/vsftpd/vsftpd.conf ^[\s]*xferlog_std_format[\s]*=[\s]*NO$ 1 /etc/vsftpd/vsftpd.conf ^[\s]*log_ftp_protocol[\s]*=[\s]*YES$ 1 /etc/vsftpd/vsftpd.conf ^[\s]*banner_file=/etc/issue[\s]*$ 1 /etc/httpd/conf /var/log/httpd /etc/httpd/conf.d/ ^.*$ /etc/httpd/conf ^.*$ /etc/httpd/conf.modules.d/ ^.*$ /etc/dovecot/conf.d/10-auth.conf ^[\s]*disable_plaintext_auth[\s]*=[\s]*yes[\s]*$ 1 /etc/dovecot/conf.d/10-ssl.conf ^[\s]*ssl[\s]*=[\s]*(yes|required)[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/.+\.keytab$ /etc/sysconfig/authconfig ^[\s]*USELDAPAUTH=yes[\s]*$ 1 /etc/nslcd.conf ^[\s]*ssl[\s]+start_tls[\s]*$ 1 /etc/nslcd.conf ^[\s]*tls_cacertdir[\s]+/etc/pki/tls/CA$ 1 /etc/nslcd.conf ^[\s]*tls_cacertfile[\s]+/etc/pki/tls/CA/.*\.(pem|crt)$ 1 tcp 127.0.0.1 25 oval:ssg-ste_not_port_25:ste:1 oval:ssg-ste_not_on_localhost:ste:1 /etc/aliases ^(?:[rR][oO][oO][tT]|"[rR][oO][oO][tT]")\s*:\s*(.+)$ 1 /etc/aliases ^(?i)postmaster\s*:\s*(.+)$ 1 /etc/postfix/main.cf ^[\s]*inet_interfaces[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/postfix/main.cf ^[\s]*smtpd_banner[\s]*=[\s]*\$myhostname[\s]+ESMTP[\s]*$ 1 /etc/postfix/main.cf ^[ \t]*smtpd_client_restrictions = (.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 ^/etc/postfix/main.cf /etc/exports ^(.*?(\binsecure_locks\b)[^$]*)$ 1 /etc/exports ^\/.*\((\S+)\)$ 0 /etc/exports ^\/.*$ 0 /etc/chrony.conf ^\s*port[\s]+(\S+) 1 /etc/chrony.conf ^\s*cmdport[\s]+(\S+) 1 /etc/ntp.conf ^server[\s]+[\S]+.*maxpoll[\s]+(\d+) 1 ^/etc/chrony\.(conf|d/.+\.conf)$ ^(?:server|pool|peer)[\s]+[\S]+.*maxpoll[\s]+(\d+) 1 /etc/ntp.conf ^server[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+(.*) 1 ^/etc/chrony\.(conf|d/.+\.conf)$ ^(?:server|pool|peer)[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+(.*) 1 ^/etc/chrony\.(conf|d/.+\.conf)$ ^(?:server|pool).* 1 /etc/ntp.conf ^server.* 1 /etc/sysconfig/chronyd ^\s*OPTIONS=.*[\s'"]-u(?!\s*chrony\b).* 0 ^/etc/chrony\.(conf|d/.+\.conf)$ ^[\s]*server.*$ 1 ^/etc/chrony\.(conf|d/.+\.conf)$ ^[\s]+pool.*$ 1 ^/etc/chrony\.(conf|d/.+\.conf)$ ^[\s]*(?:server|pool)[\s]+.+$ 1 /etc/ntp.conf ^([\s]*server[\s]+.+$){2,}$ 1 /etc/ntp.conf ^[\s]*server[\s]+.+$ 1 / shosts.equiv /root ^\.rhosts$ /home ^\.rhosts$ /etc ^hosts\.equiv$ / .shosts /etc/xinetd.d/tftp ^[\s]*server_args[\s]+=[\s]+.*?-s[\s]+([/\.\w]+).*$ 1 /etc/cups/cupsd.conf ^[\s]*Browsing[\s]+(?:Off|No) 1 /etc/cups/cupsd.conf ^[\s]*BrowseAllow[\s]+(?:none) 1 /etc/cups/cupsd.conf ^[\s]*Port[\s]+(\d)+ 1 /etc/cups/cupsd.conf ^[\s]*Listen[\s]+(?:localhost|127\.0\.0\.1|::1):(\d)+ 1 /etc/fstab ^[\s]*[\S]+[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+cifs[\s]+([\S]+) 1 /etc/mtab ^[\s]*[\S]+[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+cifs[\s]+([\S]+) 1 /etc/samba/smb.conf ^[\s]*client[\s]+signing[\s]*=[\s]*mandatory 1 /etc/snmp/snmpd.conf ^((?!#).)*(public|private).* 1 /etc/snmp/snmpd.conf ^[\s]*(com2se|rocommunity|rwcommunity) 1 /etc/ssh .*_key$ oval:ssg-exclude_symlinks__sshd_private_key:ste:1 oval:ssg-filter_ssh_key_owner_root:ste:1 oval:ssg-filter_ssh_key_owner_ssh_keys:ste:1 /etc/group ^ssh_keys:\w+:(\w+):.* 1 /etc/firewalld/services ^.*\.xml$ /service/service[@name='ssh'] /etc/firewalld/services ^.*\.xml$ /service/port[@port='22'] /etc/firewalld/zones ^.*\.xml$ /zone/service[@name='ssh'] /etc/firewalld/zones ^.*\.xml$ /zone/port[@port='22'] /etc/ssh/ssh_config ^[\s]*RekeyLimit.*$ 1 ^/etc/ssh/ssh_config\.d/.*\.conf$ 1 /etc/profile.d/cc-ssh-strong-rng.csh ^[\s]*setenv[\s]+SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG[\s]+([\d]+)$ 1 /etc/profile ^[\s]*setenv[\s]+SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG.*$ 1 /etc/profile.d/cc-ssh-strong-rng.sh ^[\s]*export[\s]+SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG=([\d]+)$ 1 /etc/profile ^[\s]*export[\s]+SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG=.*$ 1 oval:ssg-var_firewalld_sshd_port_enabled_network_conf_files_with_zone_count:var:1 /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts ^ifcfg-(?!lo).* ^ZONE=(.*)$ 1 /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts ^ifcfg-(?!lo).* /usr/lib/firewalld/zones /zone/service[@name='ssh'] /etc/firewalld/zones oval:ssg-var_firewalld_sshd_port_enabled_custom_zone_files_with_ssh_count:var:1 /etc/firewalld/zones ^.*\.xml$ /zone/service[@name='ssh'] /etc/firewalld/zones ^.*\.xml$ /usr/lib/firewalld/services/ssh.xml /service/port[@port='22'] /etc/firewalld/services/ssh.xml <port.*port="(\d+)" 1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config ^[\s]*(?i)Protocol[\s]+2[\s]*(?:|(?:#.*))?$ 1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config ^[ \t]*(?i)Compression(?-i)[ \t]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config ^[\s]*(?i)RhostsRSAAuthentication(?-i)[\s]+no[\s]*(?:#.*)?$ 1 ^\/etc\/ssh\/sshd_config.*$ (?i)^[ ]*AllowUsers[ ]+((?:[^ \n]+[ ]*)+)$ 1 ^/etc/ssh/sshd_config.*$ (?i)^[ ]*AllowGroups[ ]+((?:[^ \n]+[ ]*)+)$ 1 ^/etc/ssh/sshd_config.*$ (?i)^[ ]*DenyUsers[ ]+((?:[^ \n]+[ ]*)+)$ 1 ^/etc/ssh/sshd_config.*$ (?i)^[ ]*DenyGroups[ ]+((?:[^ \n]+[ ]*)+)$ 1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config ^[\s]*RekeyLimit[\s]+(.*)$ 1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config ^[\s]*(?i)ClientAliveInterval[\s]+(\d+)[\s]*(?:#.*)?$ 1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config ^[ \t]*(?i)ClientAliveCountMax(?-i)[ \t]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config ^[\s]*(?i)LoginGraceTime[\s]+(\d+)[\s]*(?:#.*)?$ 1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config ^[\s]*(?i)MaxAuthTries[\s]+(\d+)[\s]*(?:#.*)?$ 1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config ^[\s]*(?i)MaxSessions[\s]+(\d+)[\s]*(?:#.*)?$ 1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config (?i)^\s*MaxStartups\s+(\d+):\d+:\d+\s*$ 1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config (?i)^\s*MaxStartups\s+\d+:(\d+):\d+\s*$ 1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config (?i)^\s*MaxStartups\s+\d+:\d+:(\d+)\s*$ 1 oval:ssg-var_sshd_config_ciphers:var:1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config ^[\s]*(?i)Ciphers(?-i)[\s]+([\w,-@]+)+[\s]*(?:#.*)?$ 1 /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config ^\s*CRYPTO_POLICY\s*=.*-oKexAlgorithms=.* 1 oval:ssg-var_sshd_config_macs:var:1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config ^[\s]*(?i)MACs(?-i)[\s]+([\w,-@]+)+[\s]*(?:#.*)?$ 1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config ^[ \t]*(?i)UsePrivilegeSeparation(?-i)[ \t]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 oval:ssg-var_sshd_config_kex:var:1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config ^[\s]*(?i)KexAlgorithms(?-i)[\s]+([\w,-@]+)+[\s]*(?:#.*)?$ 1 oval:ssg-var_sshd_config_strong_macs:var:1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config ^[\s]*(?i)MACs(?-i)[\s]+([\w,-@]+)+[\s]*(?:#.*)?$ 1 ^/etc/sssd/(sssd|conf\.d/.*)\.conf$ ^[\s]*\[sssd](?:[^\n\[]*\n+)+?[\s]*certificate_verification\s*=\s*ocsp_dgst\s*=\s*(\w+)$ 1 ^/etc/sssd/(sssd|conf\.d/.*)\.conf$ ^\s*\[sssd\].*(?:\n\s*[^[\s].*)*\n\s*services[ \t]*=[ \t]*(.*)$ 1 /etc/sssd/sssd.conf ^[\s]*\[pam](?:[^\n\[]*\n+)+?[\s]*pam_cert_auth[\s]*=[\s]*(?i)true\s*$ 1 /etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth ^\s*auth.*?pam_sss\.so(.*) 1 /etc/pam.d/system-auth ^\s*auth.*?pam_sss\.so(.*) 1 /etc/sssd/sssd.conf ^[\s]*\[nss](?:[^\n\[]*\n+)+?[\s]*memcache_timeout[\s]*=[\s]*(\d+)$ 1 ^\/etc\/sssd\/(sssd.conf|conf\.d\/.+\.conf)$ ^[\s]*\[pam](?:[^\n\[]*\n+)+?[\s]*offline_credentials_expiration[\s]*=[\s]*1\s*(?:#.*)?$ 1 ^\/etc\/sssd\/(sssd.conf|conf\.d\/.+\.conf)$ ^[\s]*cache_credentials\s*=\s*(\w+)\s*(?:#.*)?$ 1 ^/etc/sssd/(sssd|conf\.d/.*)\.conf$ ^\s*\[sssd\].*(?:\n\s*[^[\s].*)*\n\s*user[ \t]*=[ \t]*(\S*) 1 /etc/sssd/sssd.conf ^[\s]*\[ssh](?:[^\n\[]*\n+)+?[\s]*ssh_known_hosts_timeout[\s]*=[\s]*(\d+)$ 1 /etc/sssd/sssd.conf ^[\s]*\[domain\/[^]]*](?:[^\n[\]]*\n+)+?[\s]*ldap_tls_cacertdir[\s]+=[\s]+([^\s]+)[\s]*$ 1 ^\/etc\/sssd\/(sssd.conf|conf\.d\/.+\.conf)$ ^[\s]*\[domain\/[^]]*]([^\n\[\]]*\n+)+?[\s]*ldap_tls_reqcert[ \t]*=[ \t]*((?i)demand)[ \t]*$ 1 ^\/etc\/sssd\/(sssd.conf|conf\.d\/.+\.conf)$ ^[\s]*\[domain\/[^]]*]([^\n\[\]]*\n+)+?[\s]*ldap_id_use_start_tls[ \t]*=[ \t]*((?i)true)[ \t]*$ 1 /etc/usbguard/usbguard-daemon.conf ^[ \t]*AuditBackend=(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 ^/etc/usbguard/usbguard-daemon.conf xorg-x11-server-Xorg xorg-x11-server-utils xorg-x11-server-Xwayland /etc/systemd/system/default.target /etc/pam.d/fingerprint-auth /etc/pam.d/password-auth /etc/pam.d/postlogin /etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth /etc/pam.d/system-auth ^/etc/issue(\.d/.*)?$ ^(.*)$ 1 ^/etc/issue\.net$ ^(.*)$ 1 /etc/motd ^(.*)$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/ ^.*$ ^\[org/gnome/login-screen\]([^\n]*\n+)+?banner-message-enable=true$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/ ^.*$ ^/org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-enable$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/ ^.*$ ^/org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-text$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/ ^.*$ ^banner-message-text=[\s]*'*(.*?)'$ 1 /etc/pam.d/sudo ^.*pam_succeed_if.*$ 1 /etc/pam.d/postlogin ^\s*session\s+.*\s+pam_lastlog\.so\b(?!.*\ssilent\s).*\sshowfailed\s.*$ 1 /etc/pam.d/login ^\s*session\s+required\s+pam_namespace\.so\s*$ 1 /etc/pam.d/password-auth|/etc/pam.d/system-auth|/etc/security/faillock.conf ^\s*(?:auth.*pam_faillock\.so.*)?dir\s*=\s*(\S+) 1 oval:ssg-var_account_password_selinux_faillock_dir_collector:var:1 /etc/pam.d/system-auth 1 /etc/pam.d/password-auth 1 /etc/security/faillock.conf ^\s*audit 1 /etc/pam.d/password-auth 1 /etc/pam.d/password-auth 1 ^/etc/security/pwhistory.conf$ 1 /etc/pam.d/system-auth 1 /etc/pam.d/system-auth 1 ^/etc/security/pwhistory.conf$ 1 /etc/pam.d/system-auth 1 /etc/pam.d/system-auth 1 ^/etc/security/pwhistory.conf$ 1 /etc/pam.d/system-auth ^\s*password\s+(?:(?:sufficient)|(?:required))\s+pam_unix\.so.*remember=([0-9]*).*$ 1 /etc/pam.d/system-auth 1 /etc/pam.d/password-auth 1 /etc/security/faillock.conf ^\s*audit 1 ^/etc/pam.d/system-auth$ 1 ^/etc/pam.d/password-auth$ 1 ^/etc/pam.d/system-auth$ 1 ^/etc/pam.d/system-auth$ 1 ^/etc/pam.d/password-auth$ 1 ^/etc/pam.d/password-auth$ 1 ^/etc/pam.d/system-auth$ 1 ^/etc/pam.d/password-auth$ 1 ^/etc/security/faillock.conf$ 1 ^/etc/pam.d/system-auth$ 1 ^/etc/pam.d/password-auth$ 1 ^/etc/pam.d/system-auth$ 1 ^/etc/pam.d/system-auth$ 1 ^/etc/pam.d/password-auth$ 1 ^/etc/pam.d/password-auth$ 1 ^/etc/pam.d/system-auth$ 1 ^/etc/pam.d/password-auth$ 1 ^/etc/security/faillock.conf$ 1 /etc/pam.d/system-auth 1 oval:ssg-state_pam_faillock_dir_parameter_not_default_value:ste:1 /etc/pam.d/password-auth 1 oval:ssg-state_pam_faillock_dir_parameter_not_default_value:ste:1 /etc/pam.d/system-auth 1 oval:ssg-var_faillock_dir_set_both_preauth_authfail_system_auth:var:1 oval:ssg-var_faillock_dir_set_both_preauth_authfail_password_auth:var:1 /etc/security/faillock.conf 1 ^/etc/pam.d/system-auth$ 1 ^/etc/pam.d/password-auth$ 1 ^/etc/pam.d/system-auth$ 1 ^/etc/pam.d/system-auth$ 1 ^/etc/pam.d/password-auth$ 1 ^/etc/pam.d/password-auth$ 1 ^/etc/security/faillock.conf$ 1 ^/etc/pam.d/system-auth$ 1 ^/etc/pam.d/password-auth$ 1 ^/etc/pam.d/system-auth$ 1 ^/etc/pam.d/system-auth$ 1 ^/etc/pam.d/password-auth$ 1 ^/etc/pam.d/password-auth$ 1 ^/etc/pam.d/system-auth$ 1 ^/etc/pam.d/password-auth$ 1 ^/etc/security/faillock.conf$ 1 /etc/pam.d/system-auth 1 /etc/pam.d/password-auth 1 /etc/security/faillock.conf ^\s*silent 1 ^/etc/pam.d/system-auth$ 1 ^/etc/pam.d/password-auth$ 1 ^/etc/pam.d/system-auth$ 1 ^/etc/pam.d/system-auth$ 1 ^/etc/pam.d/password-auth$ 1 ^/etc/pam.d/password-auth$ 1 ^/etc/pam.d/system-auth$ 1 ^/etc/pam.d/password-auth$ 1 ^/etc/security/faillock.conf$ 1 /etc/pam.d/password-auth ^password[\s]*requisite[\s]*pam_pwquality\.so 1 /etc/pam.d/system-auth ^password[\s]*requisite[\s]*pam_pwquality\.so 1 /etc/pam.d/password-auth ^\s*password\s+(?:(?:required)|(?:requisite))\s+pam_pwquality\.so.*retry=([0-9]*).*$ 1 /etc/pam.d/system-auth ^\s*password\s+(?:(?:required)|(?:requisite))\s+pam_pwquality\.so.*retry=([0-9]*).*$ 1 /etc/security/pwquality.conf ^[\s]*retry[\s]*=[\s]*(\d+)(?:[\s]|$) 1 /etc/libuser.conf ^[\s]*crypt_style[\s]+=[\s]+(?i)sha512[\s]*$ 1 /etc/login.defs .*\n[^#]*(ENCRYPT_METHOD\s+\w+)\s*\n 1 oval:ssg-variable_last_encrypt_method_instance_value:var:1 /etc/pam.d/password-auth ^[\s]*password[\s]+(?:(?:required)|(?:sufficient))[\s]+pam_unix\.so[\s]+.*sha512.*$ 1 /etc/pam.d/system-auth ^[\s]*password[\s]+(?:(?:required)|(?:sufficient))[\s]+pam_unix\.so[\s]+.*sha512.*$ 1 /etc/login.defs ^\s*SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS\s* 1 /etc/login.defs ^\s*SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS\s+(\d+)\s*$ 1 /etc/login.defs ^\s*SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS\s* 1 /etc/login.defs ^\s*SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS\s+(\d+)\s*$ 1 ^/etc/systemd/system.conf(\.d/.*\.conf)?$ ^[\s]*CtrlAltDelBurstAction[\s]*=[\s]*none$ 1 /etc/systemd/system/ctrl-alt-del.target /etc/default/grub ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="(?:.*\s)?systemd\.confirm_spawn(?:=(?:1|yes|true|on))?(?:\s.*)?"$ 1 /etc/default/grub ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT=".*systemd\.confirm_spawn=(?:1|yes|true|on).*$ 1 /etc/systemd/logind.conf ^\s*\[Login\].*(?:\n\s*[^[\s].*)*\n^\s*StopIdleSessionSec[ \t]*=[ \t]*(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 ^/etc/systemd/logind.conf /usr/lib/systemd/system/emergency.service ^ExecStart=\-/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sulogin-shell[\s]+emergency 1 /usr/lib/systemd/system/emergency.target ^Requires=.*emergency\.service 1 /etc/systemd/system ^emergency.service$ /etc/systemd/system ^emergency.target$ /usr/lib/systemd/system/rescue.service ^ExecStart=\-.*/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sulogin-shell[ ]+rescue 1 ^/etc/bashrc$|^/etc/profile\.d/.*$ if \[ "\$PS1" \]; then\n\s+parent=\$\(ps -o ppid= -p \$\$\)\n\s+name=\$\(ps -o comm= -p \$parent\)\n\s+case "\$name" in sshd\|login\) exec tmux ;; esac\nfi 1 ^/etc/bashrc$|^/etc/profile\.d/.*$ if \[ "\$PS1" \]; then\n\s+parent=\$\(ps -o ppid= -p \$\$\)\n\s+name=\$\(ps -o comm= -p \$parent\)\n\s+case "\$name" in \(?sshd\|login\) tmux ;; esac\nfi 1 /etc/tmux.conf ^\s*set\s+-g\s+lock-after-time\s+(\d+)\s*(?:#.*)?$ 1 /etc/tmux.conf ^\s*set\s+-g\s+lock-command\s+vlock\s*(?:#.*)?$ 1 /etc/tmux.conf ^\s*bind\s+[a-zA-Z]\s+lock-session(?:#.*)?$ 1 /etc/shells tmux\s*$ 1 ^/etc/opensc.*\.conf$ ^[\s]+card_drivers[\s]+=[\s]+(\S+);$ 1 ^/etc/opensc.*\.conf$ ^[\s]+force_card_driver[\s]+=[\s]+(\S+);$ 1 .* oval:ssg-variable_count_of_all_uids:var:1 /etc/passwd ^([a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+?): 1 oval:ssg-state_default_os_user:ste:1 /etc/group ^.+:.+:(\d+):.*$ 1 oval:ssg-variable_count_of_all_group_ids:var:1 /etc/group ^(.+):.+ 1 oval:ssg-variable_count_of_all_group_names:var:1 /etc/default/useradd ^\s*INACTIVE\s*=\s*(\d+)\s*$ 1 /etc/passwd ^([^:]+):.*$ 1 oval:ssg-variable_count_of_all_usernames_from_etc_passwd:var:1 /etc/login.defs ^(?:.*\n)*\s*[^#]*(PASS_MAX_DAYS\s+\d+)\s*\n 1 oval:ssg-variable_last_pass_max_days_instance_value:var:1 /etc/login.defs .*\n[^#]*(PASS_MIN_DAYS\s+\d+)\s*\n 1 oval:ssg-variable_last_pass_min_days_instance_value:var:1 /etc/login.defs .*\n[^#]*(PASS_MIN_LEN\s+\d+)\s*\n 1 oval:ssg-variable_last_pass_min_len_instance_value:var:1 /etc/shadow ^(?:[^:]*:)(?:[^\!\*:]*:)(?:[^:]*:){2}(\d+):(?:[^:]*:){3}(?:[^:]*)$ 1 /etc/shadow ^(?:[^:]*:)(?:[^\!\*:]*:)(?:[^:]*:){2}(\d+):(?:[^:]*:){3}(?:[^:]*)$ 1 /etc/shadow ^(?:[^:]*:)(?:[^\!\*:]+:)(?:[^:]*:){2}():(?:[^:]*:){3}(?:[^:]*)$ 1 /etc/shadow ^(?:[^:]*:)(?:[^\!\*:]*:)(?:[^:]*:)(\d+):(?:[^:]*:){4}(?:[^:]*)$ 1 /etc/shadow ^(?:[^:]*:)(?:[^\!\*:]*:)(?:[^:]*:)(\d+):(?:[^:]*:){4}(?:[^:]*)$ 1 /etc/shadow ^(?:[^:]*:)(?:[^\!\*:]+:)(?:[^:]*:)():(?:[^:]*:){4}(?:[^:]*)$ 1 /etc/shadow ^(?:[^:]*:)(?:[^\!\*:]*:)(?:[^:]*:){3}(\d+):(?:[^:]*:){2}(?:[^:]*)$ 1 /etc/shadow ^(?:[^:]*:)(?:[^\!\*:]*:)(?:[^:]*:){3}(\d+):(?:[^:]*:){2}(?:[^:]*)$ 1 /etc/login.defs .*\n[^#]*(PASS_WARN_AGE\s+\d+)\s*\n 1 oval:ssg-variable_last_pass_warn_age_instance_value:var:1 /etc/shadow ^(?:[^:]*:)(?:[^\!\*:]*:)(?:[^:]*:){4}(\d+):(?:[^:]*:)(?:[^:]*)$ 1 /etc/shadow ^(?:[^:]*:)(?:[^\!\*:]*:)(?:[^:]*:){4}(\d+):(?:[^:]*:)(?:[^:]*)$ 1 .* .* oval:ssg-state_accounts_password_all_shadowed_has_no_password:ste:1 oval:ssg-state_accounts_password_all_shadowed_has_locked_password:ste:1 oval:ssg-state_accounts_password_all_shadowed_sha512:ste:1 .* oval:ssg-state_accounts_password_all_chage_past_has_no_password:ste:1 oval:ssg-var_accounts_password_last_change_time_diff:var:1 ^/etc/pam.d/password-auth$ ^\s*password\s+(?:(?:sufficient)|(?:required))\s+pam_unix\.so.*rounds=([0-9]*).*$ 1 oval:ssg-var_password_pam_unix_rounds:var:1 ^/etc/pam.d/system-auth$ ^\s*password\s+(?:(?:sufficient)|(?:required))\s+pam_unix\.so.*rounds=([0-9]*).*$ 1 oval:ssg-var_password_pam_unix_rounds:var:1 /etc/group ^[^:]+:[^:]+:([0-9]+): 1 /etc/passwd ^[^:]+:[^:]+:[0-9]+:([0-9]+): 1 ^/etc/pam.d/(system|password)-auth$ ^[^#]*\bnullok\b.*$ 1 /etc/shadow ^[^:]+::.*$ 1 .* oval:ssg-state_no_forward_files_users_uids:ste:1 oval:ssg-state_no_forward_files_users_ignored:ste:1 oval:ssg-state_no_forward_files_users_nologin_shell:ste:1 \.forward$ /etc/group ^\+.*$ 1 /etc/passwd ^\+.*$ 1 /etc/shadow ^\+.*$ 1 /home ^\.netrc$ /etc/passwd ^(?!root:)[^:]*:[^:]*:0 1 /etc/passwd ^root:.+:\d+:(\d+).+ 1 /etc/group 1 /etc/shadow ^root:\$(y|[0-9].+)\$.*$ 1 /etc/securetty ^.*$ 1 /etc/securetty ^$ 1 .* oval:ssg-state_no_password_auth_for_systemaccounts_users_uids:ste:1 oval:ssg-state_no_password_auth_for_systemaccounts_users_ignored:ste:1 oval:ssg-filter_no_password_auth_for_systemaccounts_no_passwords_or_locked_accounts:ste:1 /etc/login.defs .*(?:^|\n)\s*(UID_MIN[\s]+[\d]+)\s*(?:$|\n) 1 /etc/login.defs .*(?:^|\n)\s*(SYS_UID_MIN[\s]+[\d]+)\s*(?:$|\n) 1 /etc/login.defs .*(?:^|\n)\s*(SYS_UID_MAX[\s]+[\d]+)\s*(?:$|\n) 1 /etc/passwd ^(?!root).*:x:([\d]+):[\d]+:[^:]*:[^:]*:(?!\/usr\/sbin\/nologin|\/sbin\/nologin|\/bin\/sync|\/sbin\/shutdown|\/sbin\/halt|\/bin\/false|\/usr\/bin\/false).*$ 1 /etc/securetty ^ttyS[0-9]+$ 1 /etc/securetty ^vc/[0-9]+$ 1 /etc/pam.d/su ^[\s]*auth[\s]+required[\s]+pam_wheel\.so[\s]+\buse_uid\b 1 /etc/pam.d/su ^\s*auth\s+required\s+pam_wheel\.so\s+(?=[^#]*\buse_uid\b)[^#]*\bgroup=([_a-z][-0-9_a-z]*) 1 /etc/login.defs ^[\s]*(?i)CREATE_HOME(?-i)[\s]+yes[\s]*(?:#.*)?$ 1 /etc/login.defs ^[\s]*(?i)FAIL_DELAY(?-i)[\s]+([^#\s]*) 1 /etc/security/limits.conf ^[\s]*\*[\s]+(?:(?:hard)|(?:-))[\s]+maxlogins[\s]+(\d+)\s*$ 1 /etc/security/limits.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*\*[\s]+(?:(?:hard)|(?:-))[\s]+maxlogins[\s]+(\d+)\s*$ 1 /etc/security/limits.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*\*[\s]+(?:(?:hard)|(?:-))[\s]+maxlogins 1 /tmp/tmp-inst /etc/security/namespace.conf ^\s*/tmp\s+/tmp/tmp-inst/\s+level\s+root,adm$ 1 /var/tmp/tmp-inst /etc/security/namespace.conf ^\s*/var/tmp\s+/var/tmp/tmp-inst/\s+level\s+root,adm$ 1 /etc/profile ^[\s]*(?:typeset|declare)[\s]+-xr[\s]+TMOUT=([\w$]+).*$ 1 /etc/profile.d ^.*\.sh$ ^[\s]*(?:typeset|declare)[\s]+-xr[\s]+TMOUT=([\w$]+).*$ 1 oval:ssg-object_etc_profile_tmout:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_etc_profiled_tmout:obj:1 oval:ssg-variable_count_of_tmout_instances:var:1 /etc/passwd 1 /etc/passwd ^([^:]*):[^:]*:\d{4,}:(?:[^:]*:){3}(?!\/sbin\/nologin)[^:]*$ 1 oval:ssg-state_object_accounts_user_dot_group_ownership_home_dirs_users_ignored:ste:1 /etc/passwd 1 /etc/passwd ^([^:]*):[^:]*:\d{4,}:(?:[^:]*:){3}(?!\/sbin\/nologin)[^:]*$ 1 oval:ssg-state_object_accounts_user_dot_group_ownership_gids_users_ignored:ste:1 ^\..* .* oval:ssg-state_accounts_user_dot_no_world_writable_programs_users_uids:ste:1 oval:ssg-state_accounts_user_dot_no_world_writable_programs_users_ignored:ste:1 oval:ssg-state_accounts_user_dot_no_world_writable_programs_users_nologin_shell:ste:1 / ^.*$ oval:ssg-state_world_writable_programs:ste:1 1 /etc/passwd 1 /etc/passwd ^([^:]*):[^:]*:\d{4,}:(?:[^:]*:){3}(?!\/sbin\/nologin)[^:]*$ 1 oval:ssg-state_object_accounts_user_dot_user_ownership_home_dirs_users_ignored:ste:1 /etc/passwd 1 /etc/passwd ^([^:]*):[^:]*:\d{4,}:(?:[^:]*:){3}(?!\/sbin\/nologin)[^:]*$ 1 oval:ssg-state_object_accounts_user_dot_user_ownership_uids_users_ignored:ste:1 ^\..* .* oval:ssg-state_accounts_user_interactive_home_directory_defined_users_uids:ste:1 oval:ssg-state_accounts_user_interactive_home_directory_defined_users_ignored:ste:1 oval:ssg-state_accounts_user_interactive_home_directory_defined_users_nologin_shell:ste:1 /etc/passwd 1 /etc/passwd ^([^:]*):[^:]*:\d{4,}:(?:[^:]*:){3}(?!\/sbin\/nologin)[^:]*$ 1 oval:ssg-state_object_accounts_user_interactive_home_directory_exists_objects_users_ignored:ste:1 oval:ssg-var_accounts_user_interactive_home_directory_exists_dirs_count_fs:var:1 oval:ssg-var_accounts_user_interactive_home_directory_exists_dirs_count:var:1 /etc/passwd 1 /etc/passwd ^([^:]*):[^:]*:\d{4,}:(?:[^:]*:){3}(?!\/sbin\/nologin)[^:]*$ 1 oval:ssg-state_object_accounts_users_home_files_groupownership_home_dirs_users_ignored:ste:1 /etc/passwd 1 /etc/passwd ^([^:]*):[^:]*:\d{4,}:(?:[^:]*:){3}(?!\/sbin\/nologin)[^:]*$ 1 oval:ssg-state_object_accounts_users_home_files_groupownership_gids_users_ignored:ste:1 .* /etc/passwd 1 /etc/passwd ^([^:]*):[^:]*:\d{4,}:(?:[^:]*:){3}(?!\/sbin\/nologin)[^:]*$ 1 oval:ssg-state_object_accounts_users_home_files_ownership_home_dirs_users_ignored:ste:1 /etc/passwd 1 /etc/passwd ^([^:]*):[^:]*:\d{4,}:(?:[^:]*:){3}(?!\/sbin\/nologin)[^:]*$ 1 oval:ssg-state_object_accounts_users_home_files_ownership_uids_users_ignored:ste:1 .* /etc/passwd 1 /etc/passwd ^([^:]*):[^:]*:\d{4,}:(?:[^:]*:){3}(?!\/sbin\/nologin)[^:]*$ 1 oval:ssg-state_object_accounts_users_home_files_permissions_home_dirs_users_ignored:ste:1 ^[^\.].* .* oval:ssg-state_accounts_users_netrc_file_permissions_users_uids:ste:1 oval:ssg-state_accounts_users_netrc_file_permissions_users_ignored:ste:1 oval:ssg-state_accounts_users_netrc_file_permissions_users_nologin_shell:ste:1 \.netrc /etc/passwd 1 /etc/passwd ^([^:]*):[^:]*:\d{4,}:(?:[^:]*:){3}(?!\/sbin\/nologin)[^:]*$ 1 oval:ssg-state_object_file_groupownership_home_directories_home_dirs_users_ignored:ste:1 /etc/passwd 1 /etc/passwd ^([^:]*):[^:]*:\d{4,}:(?:[^:]*:){3}(?!\/sbin\/nologin)[^:]*$ 1 oval:ssg-state_object_file_groupownership_home_directories_gids_users_ignored:ste:1 /etc/passwd 1 /etc/passwd ^([^:]*):[^:]*:\d{4,}:(?:[^:]*:){3}(?!\/sbin\/nologin)[^:]*$ 1 oval:ssg-state_object_file_ownership_home_directories_home_dirs_users_ignored:ste:1 /etc/passwd 1 /etc/passwd ^([^:]*):[^:]*:\d{4,}:(?:[^:]*:){3}(?!\/sbin\/nologin)[^:]*$ 1 oval:ssg-state_object_file_ownership_home_directories_uids_users_ignored:ste:1 oval:ssg-var_file_ownership_home_directories_uids_count:var:1 .* oval:ssg-state_file_permission_user_init_files_users_uids:ste:1 oval:ssg-state_file_permission_user_init_files_users_ignored:ste:1 oval:ssg-state_file_permission_user_init_files_users_nologin_shell:ste:1 /etc/passwd 1 /etc/passwd ^([^:]*):[^:]*:\d{4,}:(?:[^:]*:){3}(?!\/sbin\/nologin)[^:]*$ 1 oval:ssg-state_object_file_permissions_home_directories_objects_users_ignored:ste:1 .* oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_home_dirs_users_uids:ste:1 oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_home_dirs_users_ignored:ste:1 oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_home_dirs_users_nologin_shell:ste:1 PATH oval:ssg-state_accounts_root_path_dirs_wrong_perms:ste:1 oval:ssg-state_accounts_root_path_dirs_symlink:ste:1 PATH /etc/bashrc ^[\s]*umask[\s]+([^#\s]*) 1 oval:ssg-var_etc_bashrc_umask_as_number:var:1 /etc/csh.cshrc ^[\s]*(?i)UMASK(?-i)[\s]+([^#\s]*) 1 oval:ssg-var_etc_csh_cshrc_umask_as_number:var:1 /etc/login.defs ^[\s]*UMASK[\s]+([^#\s]*) 1 oval:ssg-var_etc_login_defs_umask_as_number:var:1 ^\/etc\/profile(?:\.d\/.*\.sh|\.d\/sh\.local)?$ ^[\s]*umask[\s]+([^#\s]*) 1 oval:ssg-var_etc_profile_umask_as_number:var:1 /etc/passwd 1 /etc/passwd ^([^:]*):[^:]*:\d{4,}:(?:[^:]*:){3}(?!\/sbin\/nologin)[^:]*$ 1 oval:ssg-state_object_accounts_umask_interactive_users_objects_users_ignored:ste:1 ^\..* ^[\s]*umask\s* 1 oval:ssg-state_accounts_umask_interactive_users_bash_history:ste:1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+task,never[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+task,never[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^\-e\s+2\s*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^\-e\s+2\s*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^\s*--loginuid-immutable\s*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^\s*--loginuid-immutable\s*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^\-w[\s]+/etc/selinux/[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^\-w[\s]+/etc/selinux/[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^\-w[\s]+/usr/share/selinux/[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^\-w[\s]+/usr/share/selinux/[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^\-w[\s]+/etc/issue[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^\-w[\s]+/etc/issue\.net[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^\-w[\s]+/etc/hosts[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^\-w[\s]+/etc/sysconfig/network[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^\-w[\s]+/etc/issue[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^\-w[\s]+/etc/issue\.net[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^\-w[\s]+/etc/hosts[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^\-w[\s]+/etc/sysconfig/network[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^\-w\s+/var/run/utmp\s+\-p\s+wa\b.*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^\-w\s+/var/log/btmp\s+\-p\s+wa\b.*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^\-w\s+/var/log/wtmp\s+\-p\s+wa\b.*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^\-w\s+/var/run/utmp\s+\-p\s+wa\b.*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^\-w\s+/var/log/btmp\s+\-p\s+wa\b.*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^\-w\s+/var/log/wtmp\s+\-p\s+wa\b.*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^\-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^\-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^\-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers\.d/[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^\-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers\.d/[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+-S[\s]+execve[\s]+-C[\s]+euid!=uid[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=unset[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+-S[\s]+execve[\s]+-C[\s]+euid!=uid[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=unset[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+-S[\s]+execve[\s]+-C[\s]+euid!=uid[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=unset[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+-S[\s]+execve[\s]+-C[\s]+euid!=uid[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=unset[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+-S[\s]+execve[\s]+-C[\s]+uid!=euid[\s]+-F[\s]+euid=0[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+-S[\s]+execve[\s]+-C[\s]+uid!=euid[\s]+-F[\s]+euid=0[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+-S[\s]+execve[\s]+-C[\s]+uid!=euid[\s]+-F[\s]+euid=0[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+-S[\s]+execve[\s]+-C[\s]+uid!=euid[\s]+-F[\s]+euid=0[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+-S[\s]+execve[\s]+-C[\s]+gid!=egid[\s]+-F[\s]+egid=0[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+-S[\s]+execve[\s]+-C[\s]+gid!=egid[\s]+-F[\s]+egid=0[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+-S[\s]+execve[\s]+-C[\s]+gid!=egid[\s]+-F[\s]+egid=0[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+-S[\s]+execve[\s]+-C[\s]+gid!=egid[\s]+-F[\s]+egid=0[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^\-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^\-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers\.d/[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^\-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^\-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers\.d/[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^\-f\s+(\d)\s*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^\-f\s+(\d)\s*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^\-w[\s]+/etc/group[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^\-w[\s]+/etc/passwd[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^\-w[\s]+/etc/gshadow[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^\-w[\s]+/etc/shadow[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^\-w[\s]+/etc/security/opasswd[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^\-w[\s]+/etc/group[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^\-w[\s]+/etc/passwd[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^\-w[\s]+/etc/gshadow[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^\-w[\s]+/etc/shadow[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^\-w[\s]+/etc/security/opasswd[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules 1 /var/log/audit oval:ssg-state_group_owner_not_root_var_log_audit_directories:ste:1 /var/log/audit oval:ssg-state_group_owner_not_root_var_log_audit_directories-non_root:ste:1 oval:ssg-state_group_owner_not_root_var_log_audit_directories:ste:1 oval:ssg-state_owner_not_root_var_log_audit_directories:ste:1 /var/log/audit oval:ssg-state_owner_not_root_var_log_audit_directories:ste:1 oval:ssg-state_not_mode_0700:ste:1 /var/log/audit oval:ssg-state_not_mode_0700:ste:1 oval:ssg-state_group_owner_not_root_var_log_audit:ste:1 /var/log/audit/audit.log oval:ssg-state_group_owner_not_root_var_log_audit:ste:1 /var/log/audit oval:ssg-state_owner_not_root_root_var_log_audit:ste:1 /var/log/audit ^.*$ oval:ssg-state_owner_not_root_root_var_log_audit:ste:1 /var/log/audit oval:ssg-state_owner_not_root_var_log_audit-non_root:ste:1 /var/log/audit ^.*$ oval:ssg-state_owner_not_root_var_log_audit-non_root:ste:1 oval:ssg-state_owner_not_root_var_log_audit:ste:1 /var/log/audit/audit.log oval:ssg-state_owner_not_root_var_log_audit:ste:1 oval:ssg-state_not_mode_0600:ste:1 /var/log/audit/audit.log oval:ssg-state_not_mode_0600:ste:1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+umount[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])umount([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+umount[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])umount([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+create_module[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])create_module([\s]+|[,]))).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+create_module[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])create_module([\s]+|[,]))).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+create_module[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])create_module([\s]+|[,]))).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+create_module[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])create_module([\s]+|[,]))).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+delete_module[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])delete_module([\s]+|[,]))).*(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295))\s+(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+delete_module[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])delete_module([\s]+|[,]))).*(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295))\s+(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+delete_module[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])delete_module([\s]+|[,]))).*(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295))\s+(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+delete_module[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])delete_module([\s]+|[,]))).*(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295))\s+(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+finit_module[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])finit_module([\s]+|[,]))).*(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295))\s+(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+finit_module[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])finit_module([\s]+|[,]))).*(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295))\s+(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+finit_module[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])finit_module([\s]+|[,]))).*(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295))\s+(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+finit_module[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])finit_module([\s]+|[,]))).*(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295))\s+(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+init_module[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])init_module([\s]+|[,]))).*(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295))\s+(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+init_module[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])init_module([\s]+|[,]))).*(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295))\s+(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+init_module[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])init_module([\s]+|[,]))).*(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295))\s+(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+init_module[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])init_module([\s]+|[,]))).*(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295))\s+(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+query_module[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])query_module([\s]+|[,]))).*(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295))\s+(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+query_module[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])query_module([\s]+|[,]))).*(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295))\s+(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+query_module[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])query_module([\s]+|[,]))).*(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295))\s+(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+query_module[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])query_module([\s]+|[,]))).*(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295))\s+(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^(?!/proc(/.*|$)).*$ oval:ssg-state_audit_rules_privileged_commands_dev_partitons:ste:1 oval:ssg-state_audit_rules_privileged_commands_nosuid_partitons:ste:1 oval:ssg-state_audit_rules_privileged_commands_noexec_partitons:ste:1 ^\w+ oval:ssg-state_setuid_or_setgid_set:ste:1 oval:ssg-state_dracut_tmp_files:ste:1 oval:ssg-var_audit_rules_privileged_commands_priv_cmds_count:var:1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ 1 oval:ssg-state_unprivileged_commands:ste:1 /etc/audit/audit.rules 1 oval:ssg-state_unprivileged_commands:ste:1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b32.*(-S[\s]+adjtimex[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])adjtimex([\s]+|[,])).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b64.*(-S[\s]+adjtimex[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])adjtimex([\s]+|[,])).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b32.*(-S[\s]+adjtimex[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])adjtimex([\s]+|[,])).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b64.*(-S[\s]+adjtimex[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])adjtimex([\s]+|[,])).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+(-S[\s]+clock_settime[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])clock_settime([\s]+|[,]))-F[\s]+a0=(?:0x)?0[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+key=|-k[\s]+)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+(-S[\s]+clock_settime[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])clock_settime([\s]+|[,]))-F[\s]+a0=(?:0x)?0[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+key=|-k[\s]+)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+(-S[\s]+clock_settime[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])clock_settime([\s]+|[,]))-F[\s]+a0=(?:0x)?0[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+key=|-k[\s]+)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+(-S[\s]+clock_settime[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])clock_settime([\s]+|[,]))-F[\s]+a0=(?:0x)?0[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+key=|-k[\s]+)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b32.*(-S[\s]+settimeofday[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])settimeofday([\s]+|[,])).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b64.*(-S[\s]+settimeofday[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])settimeofday([\s]+|[,])).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b32.*(-S[\s]+settimeofday[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])settimeofday([\s]+|[,])).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b64.*(-S[\s]+settimeofday[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])settimeofday([\s]+|[,])).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b32.*(-S[\s]+stime[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])stime([\s]+|[,])).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b32.*(-S[\s]+stime[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])stime([\s]+|[,])).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-w[\s]+\/etc\/localtime[\s]+-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-w[\s]+\/etc\/localtime[\s]+-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ 1 /etc/audit/audisp-remote.conf ^[ ]*remote_server[ ]+=[ ]+(\S+)[ ]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audisp-remote.conf ^[ ]*disk_full_action[ ]+=[ ]+(\S+)[ ]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audisp-remote.conf ^[ ]*transport[ ]+=[ ]+KRB5[ ]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audisp-remote.conf ^[ ]*network_failure_action[ ]+=[ ]+(\S+)[ ]*$ 1 /etc/audit/plugins.d/syslog.conf ^[ ]*active[ ]+=[ ]+yes[ ]*$ 1 /etc/audit/auditd.conf ^[ ]*disk_error_action[ ]+=[ ]+(\S+)[ ]*$ 1 /etc/audit/auditd.conf ^[ ]*disk_error_action[ ]+=[ ]+(\S+)[ ]*$ 1 /etc/audit/auditd.conf ^[ ]*disk_full_action[ ]+=[ ]+(\S+)[ ]*$ 1 /etc/audit/auditd.conf ^[ ]*disk_full_action[ ]+=[ ]+(\S+)[ ]*$ 1 /etc/audit/auditd.conf ^[ ]*action_mail_acct[ ]+=[ ]+(\S+)[ ]*$ 1 /etc/audit/auditd.conf ^[ ]*admin_space_left_action[ ]+=[ ]+(\S+)[ ]*$ 1 /etc/audit/auditd.conf ^[\s]*admin_space_left[\s]+=[\s]+(\d+)%[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/auditd.conf ^[ ]*flush[ ]+=[ ]+(\S+)[ ]*$ 1 /etc/audit/auditd.conf ^[ ]*max_log_file[ ]+=[ ]+(\d+)[ ]*$ 1 /etc/audit/auditd.conf ^[ ]*max_log_file_action[ ]+=[ ]+(\S+)[ ]*$ 1 /etc/audit/auditd.conf ^[ ]*max_log_file_action[ ]+=[ ]+(\S+)[ ]*$ 1 /etc/audit/auditd.conf ^[ ]*num_logs[ ]+=[ ]+(\d+)[ ]*$ 1 /etc/audit/auditd.conf ^[\s]*space_left[\s]+=[\s]+(\d+)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/auditd.conf ^[ ]*space_left_action[ ]+=[ ]+(\S+)[ ]*$ 1 /etc/audit/auditd.conf ^[\s]*space_left[\s]+=[\s]+(\d+)%[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/auditd.conf ^[ \t]*(?i)name_format(?-i)[ \t]*=[ \t]*(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 /etc/audit/auditd.conf ^[ \t]*(?i)overflow_action(?-i)[ \t]*=[ \t]*(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 /etc/audit/rules.d/10-base-config.rules (?:.*\n)* 1 ^/usr/share/doc/audit(?:-\d.\d.\d)?/rules/10-base-config.rules (?:.*\n)* 1 /etc/audit/rules.d/11-loginuid.rules (?:.*\n)* 1 ^/usr/share/doc/audit(?:-\d.\d.\d)?/rules/11-loginuid.rules (?:.*\n)* 1 /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42.rules (?:.*\n)* 1 ^/usr/share/doc/audit(?:-\d.\d.\d)?/rules/30-ospp-v42.rules (?:.*\n)* 1 /etc/audit/rules.d/43-module-load.rules (?:.*\n)* 1 ^/usr/share/doc/audit(?:-\d.\d.\d)?/rules/43-module-load.rules (?:.*\n)* 1 ^CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU=(y|Y)$ 1 /boot/grub2/grubenv ^kernelopts=(.*)$ 1 .* /boot/grub2/grub.cfg ^[\s]*set[\s]+superusers="(?i)\b(?!(?:root|admin|administrator)\b)(\w+)"$ 1 /boot/grub2/grub.cfg ^[ \t]*set root=(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 /boot/grub2/grub.cfg ^menuentry 1 oval:ssg-var_grub2_menuentry_count:var:1 ^/boot/grub2/grub.cfg /boot/grub2/user.cfg ^[\s]*GRUB2_PASSWORD=grub\.pbkdf2\.sha512.*$ 1 .* /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg ^[\s]*set[\s]+superusers="(?i)\b(?!(?:root|admin|administrator)\b)(\w+)"$ 1 /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg ^[\s]*GRUB2_PASSWORD=grub\.pbkdf2\.sha512.*$ 1 /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg ^[ \t]*set root=(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg ^menuentry 1 oval:ssg-var_uefi_menuentry_count:var:1 ^/boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg /etc/zipl.conf ^\s*image\s*=.*$ 1 /boot/bootmap /etc/zipl.conf ^/boot/loader/entries/.*\.conf$ ^/boot/loader/entries/.*\.conf ^options (.*)$ 1 ^/etc/kernel/cmdline ^(.*)$ 1 ^\/etc\/rsyslog(\.conf|\.d\/.*\.conf)$ ^\$FileCreateMode\s+(\d+) 1 oval:ssg-var_filecreatemode_dec:var:1 /etc/logwatch/conf/logwatch.conf ^[\s]HostLimit[\s]*=[\s]*no[\s]*$ 1 /etc/logwatch/conf/logwatch.conf ^[\s]SplitHosts[\s]*=[\s]*yes[\s]*$ 1 /etc/rsyslog.conf ^[\s]*cron\.\*[\s]+/var/log/cron\s*(?:#.*)?$ 1 /etc/rsyslog.d ^.*$ ^[\s]*cron\.\*[\s]+/var/log/cron\s*(?:#.*)?$ 1 /etc/rsyslog.conf ^\$ActionSendStreamDriverAuthMode x509/name$ 1 /etc/rsyslog.d ^.*conf$ ^\$ActionSendStreamDriverAuthMode x509/name$ 1 /etc/rsyslog.conf ^\$ActionSendStreamDriverMode 1$ 1 /etc/rsyslog.d ^.*conf$ ^\$ActionSendStreamDriverMode 1$ 1 /etc/rsyslog.conf ^\$DefaultNetstreamDriver gtls$ 1 /etc/rsyslog.d ^.*conf$ ^\$DefaultNetstreamDriver gtls$ 1 /etc/rsyslog.conf ^[^(\s|#|\$)]+[\s]+.*[\s]+(\:\w+\:\S*|-?(\/+[^:;\s]+);*\.*)$ 1 /etc/rsyslog.d ^.+\.conf$ ^[^(\s|#|\$)]+[\s]+.*[\s]+(\:\w+\:\S*|-?(\/+[^:;\s]+);*\.*)$ 1 ^/etc/rsyslog\.(conf|d/.+\.conf)$ ^[^#]*auth\.\*.*$ 1 ^/etc/rsyslog\.(conf|d/.+\.conf)$ ^[^#]*authpriv\.\*.*$ 1 ^/etc/rsyslog\.(conf|d/.+\.conf)$ ^[^#]*daemon\.\*.*$ 1 /etc/logrotate.conf ^\s*daily[\s#]*$ 1 /etc/logrotate.conf ^\s*(weekly|monthly|yearly)[\s#]*$ 1 /etc/cron.daily/logrotate ^[\s]*/usr/sbin/logrotate[\s\S]*/etc/logrotate.conf$ 1 ^\/etc\/rsyslog(\.conf|\.d\/.*\.conf)$ ^[\s]*\$((?:Input(?:TCP|RELP)|UDP)ServerRun|ModLoad[\s]+(imtcp|imudp|imrelp)) 1 ^\/etc\/rsyslog(\.conf|\.d\/.*\.conf)$ ^\s*(?:module|input)\((?:load|type)="(imtcp|imudp)".*$ 1 /etc/rsyslog.conf ^\*\.\*[\s]+(?:@|\:omrelp\:) 1 /etc/rsyslog.d ^.+\.conf$ ^\*\.\*[\s]+(?:@|\:omrelp\:) 1 ^/etc/rsyslog\.(conf|d/.+\.conf)$ ^\s*action\((?i)type(?-i)="omfwd"(.+?)\) 0 ^/etc/rsyslog\.(conf|d/.+\.conf)$ ^\s*global\(DefaultNetstreamDriverCAFile="(.+?)"\)\s*\n 0 /etc/resolv.conf ^[\s]*nameserver[\s]+([0-9\.]+)$ 1 /etc/nsswitch.conf ^\s*hosts\s*:\s*.*dns.*$ 1 /etc/resolv.conf /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts ifcfg-.* ^[\s]*DHCP_HOSTNAME[\s]*=.*$ 1 ^/etc/dhclient.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*send[\s]+host-name.*$ 1 /etc/dhcp ^.*$ ^[\s]*send[\s]+host-name.*$ 1 /etc/sysconfig/network ^[\s]*NOZEROCONF[\s]*=[\s]*yes 1 ^/etc/polkit-1/localauthority/20-org.d/.*$ ^\[.*\]\n\s*Identity=default\n\s*Action=org\.freedesktop\.NetworkManager\.\*\n\s*ResultAny=no\n\s*ResultInactive=no\n\s*(ResultActive=auth_admin)\n*\s*$ 1 ^.*$ oval:ssg-state_promisc:ste:1 /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts ifcfg-.* ^IPV6_DEFAULTGW=.+$ 1 /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts ifcfg-.* ^IPV6_PRIVACY=rfc3041$ 1 /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts ifcfg-.* ^IPV6ADDR=.+$ 1 /etc/modprobe.d ^.*\.conf$ ^\s*options\s+ipv6\s+.*disable=1.*$ 1 /etc/netconfig ^udp6\s+tpi_clts\s+v\s+inet6\s+udp\s+-\s+-$ 1 /etc/netconfig ^tcp6\s+tpi_cots_ord\s+v\s+inet6\s+tcp\s+-\s+-$ 1 ^wl.*$ / oval:ssg-state_uid_is_not_root_and_world_writable:ste:1 .* oval:ssg-state_dir_perms_world_writable_sticky_bits_dev_partitons:ste:1 oval:ssg-state_dir_perms_world_writable_sticky_bits:ste:1 .* oval:ssg-state_dir_perms_world_writable_system_owned_dev_partitons:ste:1 oval:ssg-state_dir_perms_world_writable_system_owned:ste:1 / oval:ssg-state_gid_is_user_and_world_writable:ste:1 /boot ^System\.map.*$ .* oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_unauthorized_sgid_dev_partitons:ste:1 ^.*$ oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_unauthorized_sgid_set:ste:1 .* .* .* .* .* oval:ssg-var_file_permissions_unauthorized_sgid_all_sgid_files:var:1 oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_unauthorized_sgid_rpm_filepaths:ste:1 .* oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_unauthorized_suid_dev_partitons:ste:1 ^.*$ oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_unauthorized_suid_set:ste:1 .* .* .* .* .* oval:ssg-var_file_permissions_unauthorized_suid_all_suid_files:var:1 oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_unauthorized_suid_rpm_filepaths:ste:1 .* oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_unauthorized_world_writable_dev_partitons:ste:1 ^.*$ oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_unauthorized_world_write:ste:1 oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_unauthorized_world_write_special_selinux_files:ste:1 /etc/group ^[^:]+:[^:]*:([\d]+):[^:]*$ 1 .* oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_ungroupowned_dev_partitons:ste:1 .* oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_ungroupowned_local_group_owner:ste:1 .* .* oval:ssg-state_no_files_unowned_by_user_dev_partitons:ste:1 .* oval:ssg-state_no_files_unowned_by_user_uids_list:ste:1 /etc/security/opasswd ^\/s?bin|^\/usr\/s?bin|^\/usr\/local\/s?bin ^.*$ oval:ssg-state_groupowner_system_commands_dirs_not_root_or_system_account:ste:1 ^\/(|s)bin|^\/usr\/(|local\/)(|s)bin|^\/usr\/libexec oval:ssg-state_owner_binaries_not_root:ste:1 ^\/(|s)bin|^\/usr\/(|local\/)(|s)bin|^\/usr\/libexec ^.*$ oval:ssg-state_owner_binaries_not_root:ste:1 ^\/(|s)bin|^\/usr\/(|local\/)(|s)bin|^\/usr\/libexec ^.*$ oval:ssg-state_perms_binary_files_nogroupwrite_noworldwrite:ste:1 oval:ssg-state_perms_binary_files_symlink:ste:1 /etc/default/grub ^[ \t]*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX=([^#]*).*$ 1 ^/\w.*$ oval:ssg-state_local_nodev:ste:1 /etc/fstab ^[\s]*/tmp[\s]+/var/tmp[\s]+.*bind.*$ 1 ^/var/tmp$ /etc/mtab ^[\s]*/tmp[\s]+/var/tmp[\s]+.*bind.*$ 1 ^/tmp$ /etc/systemd/coredump.conf ^\s*\[Coredump\].*(?:\n\s*[^[\s].*)*\n^[ \t]*(?i)ProcessSizeMax(?-i)[ \t]*=[ \t]*(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 /etc/systemd/coredump.conf.d .*\.conf$ ^\s*\[Coredump\].*(?:\n\s*[^[\s].*)*\n^[ \t]*(?i)ProcessSizeMax(?-i)[ \t]*=[ \t]*(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 /etc/systemd/coredump.conf ^\s*\[Coredump\].*(?:\n\s*[^[\s].*)*\n^[ \t]*(?i)Storage(?-i)[ \t]*=[ \t]*(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 /etc/systemd/coredump.conf.d .*\.conf$ ^\s*\[Coredump\].*(?:\n\s*[^[\s].*)*\n^[ \t]*(?i)Storage(?-i)[ \t]*=[ \t]*(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 /etc/security/limits.conf ^[\s]*\*[\s]+(?:hard|-)[\s]+core[\s]+([\d]+) 1 /etc/security/limits.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*\*[\s]+(?:hard|-)[\s]+core[\s]+([\d]+) 1 /etc/security/limits.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*\*[\s]+(?:hard|-)[\s]+core 1 /etc/init.d/functions ^[\s]*(?i)UMASK(?-i)[\s]+([^#\s]*) 1 oval:ssg-var_etc_init_d_functions_umask_as_number:var:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*kernel.exec-shield[\s]*=[\s]*1[\s]*$ 1 kernel.exec-shield /boot/grub2/grub.cfg [\s]*noexec[\s]*=[\s]*off 1 /proc/cpuinfo ^flags[\s]+:.*[\s]+nx[\s]+.*$ 1 /proc/cmdline .+noexec[0-9]*=off.+ 1 kernel-PAE /proc/cpuinfo ^flags[\s]+:.*[\s]+pae[\s]+.*[\s]+nx[\s]+.*$ 1 /etc/sysconfig/kernel ^\s*DEFAULTKERNEL[\s]*=[\s]*kernel-PAE$ 1 /etc/default/grub ^[\s]*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX.*(selinux|enforcing)=0.*$ 1 /etc/grub2.cfg ^.*(selinux|enforcing)=0.*$ 1 /etc/grub.d ^.*$ ^.*(selinux|enforcing)=0.*$ 1 /dev ^.*$ oval:ssg-state_block_or_char_device_file:ste:1 oval:ssg-state_selinux_dev_device_t:ste:1 oval:ssg-state_selinux_dev_unlabeled_t:ste:1 /proc ^.*$ oval:ssg-state_selinux_confinement_of_daemons:ste:1 /etc/selinux/config ^SELINUX=(.*)$ 1 /etc/selinux/config ^SELINUXTYPE=([\w]*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/selinux/config ^SELINUX=(.*)$ 1 kernel /proc/cpuinfo ^flags\s+:\s+(.*)$ 1 /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ^.*\.(.*)$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/gdm ^/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/.* oval:ssg-var_dconf_gdm_db_modified_time:var:1 /etc/dconf/db/local ^/etc/dconf/db/local.d/.* oval:ssg-var_dconf_local_db_modified_time:var:1 /etc/dconf/profile/user ^user-db:user\nsystem-db:local$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/ ^.*$ ^\[org/gnome/login-screen\]([^\n]*\n+)+?disable-restart-buttons=true$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/ ^.*$ ^/org/gnome/login-screen/disable-restart-buttons$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/ ^.*$ ^\[org/gnome/login-screen\]([^\n]*\n+)+?disable-user-list=true$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/ ^.*$ ^/org/gnome/login-screen/disable-user-list$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/ ^.*$ ^\[org/gnome/login-screen\]([^\n]*\n+)+?enable-smartcard-authentication=true$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/ ^.*$ ^/org/gnome/login-screen/enable-smartcard-authentication$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/ ^.*$ ^\[org/gnome/login-screen\]([^\n]*\n+)+?allowed-failures=3$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/ ^.*$ ^/org/gnome/login-screen/allowed-failures$ 1 /etc/gdm/custom.conf ^\[daemon]([^\n]*\n+)+?AutomaticLoginEnable=[Ff]alse$ 1 /etc/gdm/custom.conf ^\[daemon]([^\n]*\n+)+?TimedLoginEnable=[Ff]alse$ 1 /etc/gdm/custom.conf ^\s*\[xdmcp\].*(?:\n\s*[^[\s].*)*\n^\s*Enable[ \t]*=[ \t]*(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 ^/etc/gdm/custom.conf /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ ^.*$ ^\[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling\]([^\n]*\n+)+?automount=false$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/ ^.*$ ^/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ ^.*$ ^\[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling\]([^\n]*\n+)+?automount-open=false$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/ ^.*$ ^/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount-open$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ ^.*$ ^\[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling\]([^\n]*\n+)+?autorun-never=true$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/ ^.*$ ^/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/autorun-never$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ ^.*$ ^\[org/gnome/desktop/thumbnailers\]([^\n]*\n+)+?disable-all=true$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/ ^.*$ ^/org/gnome/desktop/thumbnailers/disable-all$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ ^.*$ ^\[org/gnome/nm-applet\]([^\n]*\n+)+?disable-wifi-create=true$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/ ^.*$ ^/org/gnome/nm-applet/disable-wifi-create$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ ^.*$ ^\[org/gnome/nm-applet\]([^\n]*\n+)+?suppress-wireless-networks-available=true$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/ ^.*$ ^/org/gnome/nm-applet/suppress-wireless-networks-available$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ ^.*$ ^\[org/gnome/Vino\]([^\n]*\n+)+?authentication-methods=\['vnc'\]$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/ ^.*$ ^/org/gnome/Vino/authentication-methods$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ ^.*$ ^\[org/gnome/Vino\]([^\n]*\n+)+?require-encryption=true$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/ ^.*$ ^/org/gnome/Vino/require-encryption$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ ^.*$ ^\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\]([^\n]*\n+)+?idle-activation-enabled=true$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/ ^.*$ ^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/idle-activation-enabled$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/ ^.*$ ^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/idle-activation-enabled$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ ^.*$ ^\[org/gnome/desktop/session\]([^\n]*\n+)+?idle-delay=uint32[\s][0-9]*$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ ^.*$ ^idle-delay[\s=]*uint32[\s]([^=\s]*) 1 /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ ^.*$ ^\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\]([^\n]*\n+)+?lock-delay=uint32[\s][0-9]*$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ ^.*$ ^lock-delay[\s=]*uint32[\s]([^=\s]*) 1 /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ ^.*$ ^\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\]([^\n]*\n+)+?lock-enabled=true$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/ ^.*$ ^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/ ^.*$ ^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ ^.*$ ^\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\]([^\n]*\n+)+?picture-uri=string \'\'$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/ ^.*$ ^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/picture-uri$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ ^.*$ ^\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\]([^\n]*\n+)+?show-full-name-in-top-bar=false$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/ ^.*$ ^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/show-full-name-in-top-bar$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/ ^.*$ ^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-delay$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/ ^.*$ ^/org/gnome/desktop/session/idle-delay$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ ^.*$ ^\[org/gnome/settings-daemon/plugins/media-keys\]([^\n]*\n+)+?logout[\s]*=[\s]*''$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/ ^.*$ ^/org/gnome/settings-daemon/plugins/media-keys/logout$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ ^.*$ ^\[org/gnome/system/location\]([^\n]*\n+)+?enabled=false$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/ ^.*$ ^/org/gnome/system/location/enabled$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ ^.*$ ^\[org/gnome/clocks\]([^\n]*\n+)+?geolocation=false$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/ ^.*$ ^/org/gnome/clocks/geolocation$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ ^.*$ ^\[org/gnome/settings-daemon/plugins/power\]([^\n]*\n+)+?active=false$ 1 /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/ ^.*$ ^/org/gnome/settings-daemon/plugins/power/active$ 1 /etc/named.conf ^\s*include\s+"/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/bind.config"\s*;\s*$ 1 /etc/crypto-policies/state/current /etc/crypto-policies/config oval:ssg-variable_crypto_policies_config_file_timestamp:var:1 /etc/crypto-policies/config ^(?!#)(\S+)$ 1 /etc/crypto-policies/state/current ^(?!#)(\S+)$ 1 /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/nss.config /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/gnutls.config \+VERS-ALL:-VERS-DTLS0\.9:-VERS-SSL3\.0:-VERS-TLS1\.0:-VERS-TLS1\.1:-VERS-DTLS1\.0 1 oval:ssg-var_symlink_kerberos_crypto_policy_configuration:var:1 /etc/krb5.conf.d/crypto-policies /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/krb5.config /etc/ipsec.conf ^\s*include\s+/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/libreswan.config\s*(?:#.*)?$ 1 /etc/pki/tls/openssl.cnf ^\s*\[\s*crypto_policy\s*\]\s*\n*\s*\.include\s*(?:=\s*)?/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config\s*$ 1 /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config ^\s*(?:TLS\.)?(?i)MinProtocol\s*=\s*TLSv(\S*) 1 /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config ^\s*(?:DTLS\.)?(?i)MinProtocol\s*=\s*DTLSv(\S*) 1 crypto-policies /etc/sysconfig/sshd ^\s*(?i)CRYPTO_POLICY\s*=.*$ 1 /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config ^(?:.*\n)*\s*Ciphersuites\s*=\s*(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-ospp.conf ^[ \t]*Match[\s]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-ospp.conf ^Match final all(?:.* )*?\s*RekeyLimit[\s]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-ospp.conf ^Match final all(?:.* )*?\s*GSSAPIAuthentication[\s]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-ospp.conf ^Match final all(?:.* )*?\s*Ciphers[\s]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-ospp.conf ^Match final all(?:.* )*?\s*PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes[\s]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-ospp.conf ^Match final all(?:.* )*?\s*MACs[\s]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-ospp.conf ^Match final all(?:.* )*?\s*KexAlgorithms[\s]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config ^Ciphers.*$ 1 /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config ^(?!#).*(-oCiphers=[^\s']+).*$ 1 /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config ^(?:.*\n)*\s*CRYPTO_POLICY=(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config ^MACs.*$ 1 /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config ^(?!#).*(-oMACs=\S+).+$ 1 /etc/profile.d/openssl-rand.sh SHA-256 /etc/selinux/config ^[\s]*SELINUX[\s]*=[\s]*enforcing[\s]*$ 1 McAfeeVSEForLinux MFErt MFEcma /opt/NAI/LinuxShield/engine/dat ^.*\.dat$ oval:ssg-variable_mcafee_dat_files_mtime:var:1 ^mfetpd.*$ 0 /opt/McAfee/accm/bin accm /opt/McAfee/auditengine/bin auditmanager /etc/dracut.conf.d/40-fips.conf ^\s*add_dracutmodules\+="\s*(\w*)\s*"\s*(?:#.*)?$ 1 ^/boot/loader/entries/.*.conf ^options (.*)$ 1 oval:ssg-var_system_crypto_policy:var:1 /boot/grub2/grubenv fips=1 1 /etc/system-fips crypto.fips_enabled /etc/aide.conf ^database=file:@@{DBDIR}/([a-z.]+)$ 1 /etc/aide.conf ^@@define[\s]DBDIR[\s]+(/.*)$ 1 /etc/aide.conf ^\/usr\/sbin\/auditctl\s+([^\n]+)$ 1 /etc/aide.conf ^/usr/sbin/auditd\s+([^\n]+)$ 1 /etc/aide.conf ^/usr/sbin/ausearch\s+([^\n]+)$ 1 /etc/aide.conf ^/usr/sbin/aureport\s+([^\n]+)$ 1 /etc/aide.conf ^/usr/sbin/autrace\s+([^\n]+)$ 1 /etc/aide.conf ^/usr/sbin/rsyslogd\s+([^\n]+)$ 1 /etc/aide.conf ^/usr/sbin/augenrules\s+([^\n]+)$ 1 /etc/crontab ^(([0-9]*[\s]*[0-9]*[\s]*\*[\s]*\*[\s]*(\*|([0-7]|mon|tue|wed|thu|fri|sat|sun)|[0-7]-[0-7]))|@(hourly|daily|weekly))[\s]*root[\s]*\/usr\/sbin\/aide[\s]*\-\-check.*$ 1 /etc/cron.d ^.*$ ^(([0-9]*[\s]*[0-9]*[\s]*\*[\s]*\*[\s]*(\*|([0-7]|mon|tue|wed|thu|fri|sat|sun)|[0-7]-[0-7]))|@(hourly|daily|weekly))[\s]*root[\s]*\/usr\/sbin\/aide[\s]*\-\-check.*$ 1 /var/spool/cron/root ^(([0-9]*[\s]*[0-9]*[\s]*\*[\s]*\*[\s]*(\*|([0-7]|mon|tue|wed|thu|fri|sat|sun)|[0-7]-[0-7]))|@(hourly|daily|weekly))[\s]*(root)?[\s]*\/usr\/sbin\/aide[\s]*\-\-check.*$ 1 ^/etc/cron.(daily|weekly)$ ^.*$ ^[^#]*\/usr\/sbin\/aide\s+\-\-check\s*$ 1 /etc/crontab ^.*/usr/sbin/aide[\s]*\-\-check.*\|.*/bin/mail[\s]*-s[\s]*".*"[\s]*.+@.+$ 1 /var/spool/cron/root ^.*/usr/sbin/aide[\s]*\-\-check.*\|.*/bin/mail[\s]*-s[\s]*".*"[\s]*.+@.+$ 1 ^/etc/cron.(d|daily|weekly|monthly)$ ^.*$ ^.*/usr/sbin/aide[\s]*\-\-check.*\|.*/bin/mail[\s]*-s[\s]*".*"[\s]*.+@.+$ 1 /etc/aide.conf ^[A-Z][a-zA-Z_]*[\s]*=[\s]*.*(sha1|rmd160|sha256|whirlpool|tiger|haval|gost|crc32).*$ 0 /etc/aide.conf ^[A-Z][A-Za-z_]*[\s]*=[\s]*([a-zA-Z0-9\+]*)$ 1 /etc/aide.conf ^(?!ALLXTRAHASHES)[A-Z][a-zA-Z_]*[\s]*=[\s]*([a-zA-Z0-9\+]*)$ 1 /etc/aide.conf ^(?!ALLXTRAHASHES)[A-Z][a-zA-Z_]*[\s]*=[\s]*([a-zA-Z0-9\+]*)$ 1 .* .* .* .* .* ^/(bin|sbin|lib|lib64|usr)/.+$ oval:ssg-state_rpm_verify_hashes_fail_md5_hash:ste:1 .* .* .* .* .* .* oval:ssg-state_rpm_verify_ownership_files_fail_ownership:ste:1 .* .* .* .* .* .* oval:ssg-state_rpm_verify_permissions_files_fail_mode:ste:1 /usr/bin/sudo /etc/group 1 /etc/sudoers ^(?!#).*[\s]+\!authenticate.*$ 1 /etc/sudoers.d ^.*$ ^(?!#).*[\s]+\!authenticate.*$ 1 /etc/sudoers ^(?!#).*[\s]+NOPASSWD[\s]*\:.*$ 1 /etc/sudoers.d ^.*$ ^(?!#).*[\s]+NOPASSWD[\s]*\:.*$ 1 ^\/etc\/(sudoers|sudoers\.d\/.*)$ ^[\s]*Defaults[\s]+timestamp_timeout[\s]*=\s*[+]?(\d*\.\d+|\d+\.\d*|\d+)$ 1 ^\/etc\/(sudoers|sudoers\.d\/.*)$ ^[\s]*Defaults[\s]+timestamp_timeout[\s]*=\s*[\-](\d*\.\d+|\d+\.\d*|\d+)$ 1 ^/etc/sudoers(\.d/.*)?$ ^\s*ALL\s+ALL\=\(ALL\)\s+ALL\s*$ 1 ^/etc/sudoers(\.d/.*)?$ ^\s*ALL\s+ALL\=\(ALL\:ALL\)\s+ALL\s* 1 /etc/sudoers ^(?!(#|vdsm.*)).*[\s]+NOPASSWD[\s]*\:.*$ 1 /etc/sudoers.d ^.*$ ^(?!(#|vdsm.*)).*[\s]+NOPASSWD[\s]*\:.*$ 1 /etc/sudoers ^#includedir[\s]+(.*)$ 1 /etc/sudoers ^[#@]include[\s]+.*$ 1 /etc/sudoers ^@includedir[\s]+.*$ 1 /etc/sudoers ^[#@]includedir[\s]+.*$ 1 /etc/sudoers.d/ .* ^[#@]include(?:dir)?[\s]+.*$ 1 ^/etc/sudoers(\.d/.*)?$ ^(?:\s*[^#=]+)=(?:\s*(?:\([^\)]+\))?\s*(?!\s*\()[^,\s]+(?:[ \t]+[^,\s]+)+[ \t]*,)*(\s*(?:\([^\)]+\))?\s*(?!\s*\()[^,\s]+[ \t]*(?:,|$)) 1 ^/etc/sudoers(\.d/.*)?$ ^(?:\s*[^#=]+)=(?:\s*(?:\([^\)]+\))?\s*(?!\s*\()[^,!\n][^,\n]+,)*\s*(?:\([^\)]+\))?\s*(?!\s*\()(!\S+).* 1 ^/etc/sudoers(\.d/.*)?$ ^\s*((?!root\b)[\w]+)\s*(\w+)\s*=\s*(.*,)?\s*\([\w\s]*\b(root|ALL)\b[\w\s]*\) 1 ^/etc/sudoers(\.d/.*)?$ ^\s*((?!root\b)[\w]+)\s*(\w+)\s*=\s*(.*,)?\s*[^\(\s] 1 ^/etc/sudoers(\.d/.*)?$ ^Defaults !targetpw$\r?\n 1 ^/etc/sudoers(\.d/.*)?$ ^Defaults !rootpw$\r?\n 1 ^/etc/sudoers(\.d/.*)?$ ^Defaults !runaspw$\r?\n 1 ^/etc/sudoers(\.d/.*)?$ ^Defaults targetpw$\r?\n 1 ^/etc/sudoers(\.d/.*)?$ ^Defaults rootpw$\r?\n 1 ^/etc/sudoers(\.d/.*)?$ ^Defaults runaspw$\r?\n 1 /etc/yum.conf ^\s*clean_requirements_on_remove\s*=\s*(1|True|yes)\s*$ 1 /etc/dnf/automatic.conf ^\s*\[commands\].*(?:\n\s*[^[\s].*)*\n^\s*apply_updates[ \t]*=[ \t]*(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 ^/etc/dnf/automatic.conf /etc/dnf/automatic.conf ^\s*\[commands\].*(?:\n\s*[^[\s].*)*\n^\s*upgrade_type[ \t]*=[ \t]*(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 ^/etc/dnf/automatic.conf /etc/yum.conf ^\s*gpgcheck\s*=\s*1\s*$ 1 /etc/yum.conf ^\s*localpkg_gpgcheck\s*=\s*(1|True|yes)\s*$ 1 /etc/yum.repos.d .* ^\s*gpgcheck\s*=\s*0\s*$ 1 /etc/yum.conf ^\s*repo_gpgcheck\s*=\s*(1|True|yes)\s*$ 1 gpg-pubkey ^/etc/security/pwquality\.conf$ ^\s*dcredit[\s]*=[\s]*(-?\d+)(?:[\s]|$) 1 ^/etc/security/pwquality\.conf$ ^\s*dictcheck[\s]*=[\s]*(-?\d+)(?:[\s]|$) 1 ^/etc/security/pwquality\.conf$ ^\s*difok[\s]*=[\s]*(-?\d+)(?:[\s]|$) 1 /etc/security/pwquality.conf ^[\s]*local_users_only[\s]*$ 1 /etc/security/pwquality.conf ^[\s]*enforce_for_root[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/security/pwquality\.conf$ ^\s*lcredit[\s]*=[\s]*(-?\d+)(?:[\s]|$) 1 ^/etc/security/pwquality\.conf$ ^\s*maxclassrepeat[\s]*=[\s]*(-?\d+)(?:[\s]|$) 1 ^/etc/security/pwquality\.conf$ ^\s*maxrepeat[\s]*=[\s]*(-?\d+)(?:[\s]|$) 1 ^/etc/security/pwquality\.conf$ ^\s*minclass[\s]*=[\s]*(-?\d+)(?:[\s]|$) 1 ^/etc/security/pwquality\.conf$ ^\s*minlen[\s]*=[\s]*(-?\d+)(?:[\s]|$) 1 ^/etc/security/pwquality\.conf$ ^\s*ocredit[\s]*=[\s]*(-?\d+)(?:[\s]|$) 1 ^/etc/security/pwquality\.conf$ ^\s*ucredit[\s]*=[\s]*(-?\d+)(?:[\s]|$) 1 /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-3-access-failed.rules ^.*$ 1 /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-3-access-success.rules ^.*$ 1 /etc/audit/rules.d/10-base-config.rules ^.*$ 1 /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-1-create-failed.rules ^.*$ 1 /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-1-create-success.rules ^.*$ 1 /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-4-delete-failed.rules ^.*$ 1 /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-4-delete-success.rules ^.*$ 1 /etc/audit/rules.d/11-loginuid.rules ^.*$ 1 /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-2-modify-failed.rules ^.*$ 1 /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-2-modify-success.rules ^.*$ 1 /etc/audit/rules.d/43-module-load.rules ^.*$ 1 /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42.rules ^.*$ 1 /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-failed.rules ^.*$ 1 /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-success.rules ^.*$ 1 /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-failed.rules ^.*$ 1 /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-success.rules ^.*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/init(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/init(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/poweroff(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/poweroff(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/reboot(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/reboot(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/shutdown(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/shutdown(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+chmod[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])chmod([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+chmod[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])chmod([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+chmod[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])chmod([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+chmod[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])chmod([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+chown[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])chown([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+chown[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])chown([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+chown[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])chown([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+chown[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])chown([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+fchmod[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])fchmod([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+fchmod[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])fchmod([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+fchmod[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])fchmod([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+fchmod[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])fchmod([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+fchmodat[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])fchmodat([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+fchmodat[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])fchmodat([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+fchmodat[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])fchmodat([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+fchmodat[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])fchmodat([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+fchown[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])fchown([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+fchown[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])fchown([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+fchown[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])fchown([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+fchown[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])fchown([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+fchownat[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])fchownat([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+fchownat[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])fchownat([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+fchownat[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])fchownat([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+fchownat[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])fchownat([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+fremovexattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])fremovexattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+fremovexattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])fremovexattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+fremovexattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])fremovexattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+fremovexattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])fremovexattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+fremovexattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])fremovexattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid=0[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+fremovexattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])fremovexattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid=0[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+fremovexattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])fremovexattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid=0[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+fremovexattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])fremovexattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid=0[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+fsetxattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])fsetxattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+fsetxattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])fsetxattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+fsetxattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])fsetxattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+fsetxattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])fsetxattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+fsetxattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])fsetxattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid=0[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+fsetxattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])fsetxattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid=0[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+fsetxattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])fsetxattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid=0[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+fsetxattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])fsetxattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid=0[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+lchown[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])lchown([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+lchown[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])lchown([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+lchown[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])lchown([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+lchown[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])lchown([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+lremovexattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])lremovexattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+lremovexattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])lremovexattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+lremovexattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])lremovexattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+lremovexattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])lremovexattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+lremovexattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])lremovexattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid=0[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+lremovexattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])lremovexattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid=0[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+lremovexattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])lremovexattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid=0[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+lremovexattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])lremovexattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid=0[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+lsetxattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])lsetxattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+lsetxattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])lsetxattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+lsetxattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])lsetxattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+lsetxattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])lsetxattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+lsetxattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])lsetxattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid=0[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+lsetxattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])lsetxattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid=0[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+lsetxattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])lsetxattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid=0[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+lsetxattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])lsetxattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid=0[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+removexattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])removexattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+removexattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])removexattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+removexattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])removexattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+removexattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])removexattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+removexattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])removexattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid=0[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+removexattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])removexattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid=0[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+removexattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])removexattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid=0[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+removexattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])removexattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid=0[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+setxattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])setxattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+setxattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])setxattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+setxattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])setxattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+setxattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])setxattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+setxattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])setxattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid=0[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+setxattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])setxattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid=0[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+setxattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])setxattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid=0[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+setxattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])setxattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid=0[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+umount2[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])umount2([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+umount2[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])umount2([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+umount2[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])umount2([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+umount2[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])umount2([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/chacl(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/chacl(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/chcon(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/chcon(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/restorecon(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/restorecon(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/semanage(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/semanage(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/setfacl(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/setfacl(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/setfiles(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/setfiles(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/setsebool(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/setsebool(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/seunshare(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/seunshare(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+rename[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])rename([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+rename[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])rename([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+rename[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])rename([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+rename[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])rename([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+renameat[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])renameat([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+renameat[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])renameat([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+renameat[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])renameat([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+renameat[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])renameat([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+rmdir[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])rmdir([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+rmdir[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])rmdir([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+rmdir[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])rmdir([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+rmdir[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])rmdir([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+unlink[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])unlink([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+unlink[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])unlink([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+unlink[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])unlink([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+unlink[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])unlink([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+unlinkat[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])unlinkat([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+unlinkat[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])unlinkat([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+unlinkat[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])unlinkat([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+unlinkat[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])unlinkat([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+mount[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])mount([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+mount[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])mount([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+mount[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])mount([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+mount[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])mount([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/at(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/at(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/chage(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/chage(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/chsh(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/chsh(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/crontab(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/crontab(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/gpasswd(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/gpasswd(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/kmod(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/kmod(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/mount(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/mount(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/newgidmap(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/newgidmap(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/newgrp(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/newgrp(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/newuidmap(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/newuidmap(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/pam_timestamp_check(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/pam_timestamp_check(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/passwd(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/passwd(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/postdrop(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/postdrop(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/postqueue(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/postqueue(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/libexec\/pt_chown(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/libexec\/pt_chown(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/ssh-agent(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/ssh-agent(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/libexec\/openssh\/ssh-keysign(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/libexec\/openssh\/ssh-keysign(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/su(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/su(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/sudo(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/sudo(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/sudoedit(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/sudoedit(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/umount(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/umount(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/unix_chkpwd(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/unix_chkpwd(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/unix_update(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/unix_update(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/userhelper(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/userhelper(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/usermod(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/usermod(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/usernetctl(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/usernetctl(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ 1 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^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="(.*)"$ 1 /boot/grub2/grubenv ^kernelopts=(.*)$ 1 /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grubenv ^kernelopts=(.*)$ 1 /etc/default/grub ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="(.*)"$ 1 /etc/default/grub ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="(.*)"$ 1 /boot/grub2/grubenv ^kernelopts=(.*)$ 1 /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grubenv ^kernelopts=(.*)$ 1 /etc/default/grub ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="(.*)"$ 1 /etc/default/grub ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="(.*)"$ 1 /boot/grub2/grubenv ^kernelopts=(.*)$ 1 /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grubenv ^kernelopts=(.*)$ 1 /etc/default/grub ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="(.*)"$ 1 /etc/default/grub ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="(.*)"$ 1 /boot/grub2/grubenv ^kernelopts=(.*)$ 1 /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grubenv ^kernelopts=(.*)$ 1 /etc/default/grub ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="(.*)"$ 1 /etc/default/grub ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="(.*)"$ 1 /boot/grub2/grubenv ^kernelopts=(.*)$ 1 /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grubenv ^kernelopts=(.*)$ 1 /etc/default/grub ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="(.*)"$ 1 /etc/default/grub ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="(.*)"$ 1 /boot/grub2/grubenv ^kernelopts=(.*)$ 1 /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grubenv ^kernelopts=(.*)$ 1 /etc/default/grub ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="(?!.*\bsystemd.debug-shell\b.*).*"$ 1 /etc/default/grub ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="(?!.*\bsystemd.debug-shell\b).*"$ 1 /boot/grub2/grubenv ^kernelopts=(?!.*\bsystemd.debug-shell\b).*$ 1 /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grubenv ^kernelopts=(?!.*\bsystemd.debug-shell\b).*$ 1 /etc/default/grub ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="(.*)"$ 1 /etc/default/grub ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="(.*)"$ 1 /boot/grub2/grubenv ^kernelopts=(.*)$ 1 /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grubenv ^kernelopts=(.*)$ 1 openssl-pkcs11 /etc/systemd/journald.conf ^[ \t]*Compress=(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 /etc/systemd/journald.conf.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[ \t]*Compress=(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 /etc/systemd/journald.conf ^[ \t]*ForwardToSyslog=(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 /etc/systemd/journald.conf.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[ \t]*ForwardToSyslog=(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 /etc/systemd/journald.conf ^[ \t]*Storage=(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 /etc/systemd/journald.conf.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[ \t]*Storage=(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_ACPI_CUSTOM_METHOD="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_acpi_custom_method_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_arm64_sw_ttbr0_pan_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_binfmt_misc_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_BUG="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_bug_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_bug_on_data_corruption_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_compat_brk_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_compat_vdso_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_debug_credentials_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_DEBUG_FS="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_debug_fs_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_debug_list_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_DEBUG_NOTIFIERS="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_debug_notifiers_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_DEBUG_SG="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_debug_sg_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_DEBUG_WX="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_debug_wx_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_default_mmap_min_addr_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_DEVKMEM="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_devkmem_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_fortify_source_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_gcc_plugin_latent_entropy_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_gcc_plugin_structleak_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_hardened_usercopy_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_hardened_usercopy_fallback_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_HIBERNATION="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_hibernation_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_ia32_emulation_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_IPV6="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_ipv6_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_KEXEC="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_kexec_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_LEGACY_PTYS="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_legacy_ptys_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_EMULATE="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_legacy_vsyscall_emulate_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_legacy_vsyscall_none_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_modify_ldt_syscall_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_MODULE_SIG="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_module_sig_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_ALL="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_module_sig_all_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_module_sig_force_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_module_sig_hash_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_module_sig_key_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA512="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_module_sig_sha512_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_page_poisoning_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_NO_SANITY="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_page_poisoning_no_sanity_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_page_poisoning_zero_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_page_table_isolation_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_PANIC_ON_OOPS="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_panic_on_oops_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_PANIC_TIMEOUT="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_panic_timeout_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_PROC_KCORE="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_proc_kcore_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_randomize_base_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_randomize_memory_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_refcount_full_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_RETPOLINE="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_retpoline_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_sched_stack_end_check_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_SECCOMP="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_seccomp_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_seccomp_filter_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_SECURITY="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_security_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_security_dmesg_restrict_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_security_writable_hooks_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_security_yama_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_slab_freelist_hardened_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_slab_freelist_random_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_slab_merge_default_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_slub_debug_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_stackprotector_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_stackprotector_strong_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_strict_kernel_rwx_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_strict_module_rwx_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_syn_cookies_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_unmap_kernel_at_el0_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_VMAP_STACK="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_vmap_stack_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^/boot/config-.*$ ^CONFIG_X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION="?(.*?)"?$ 1 oval:ssg-local_var_config_x86_vsyscall_emulation_count_kernels_installed:var:1 /boot ^config-.*$ ^.*\.conf$ ^\s*install\s+atm\s+(/bin/false|/bin/true)$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^blacklist\s+atm$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^\s*install\s+bluetooth\s+(/bin/false|/bin/true)$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^blacklist\s+bluetooth$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^\s*install\s+can\s+(/bin/false|/bin/true)$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^blacklist\s+can$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^\s*install\s+cfg80211\s+(/bin/false|/bin/true)$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^blacklist\s+cfg80211$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^\s*install\s+cramfs\s+(/bin/false|/bin/true)$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^blacklist\s+cramfs$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^\s*install\s+dccp\s+(/bin/false|/bin/true)$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^blacklist\s+dccp$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^\s*install\s+firewire-core\s+(/bin/false|/bin/true)$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^blacklist\s+firewire-core$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^\s*install\s+freevxfs\s+(/bin/false|/bin/true)$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^blacklist\s+freevxfs$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^\s*install\s+hfs\s+(/bin/false|/bin/true)$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^blacklist\s+hfs$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^\s*install\s+hfsplus\s+(/bin/false|/bin/true)$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^blacklist\s+hfsplus$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^\s*install\s+iwlmvm\s+(/bin/false|/bin/true)$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^blacklist\s+iwlmvm$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^\s*install\s+iwlwifi\s+(/bin/false|/bin/true)$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^blacklist\s+iwlwifi$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^\s*install\s+jffs2\s+(/bin/false|/bin/true)$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^blacklist\s+jffs2$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^\s*install\s+mac80211\s+(/bin/false|/bin/true)$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^blacklist\s+mac80211$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^\s*install\s+rds\s+(/bin/false|/bin/true)$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^blacklist\s+rds$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^\s*install\s+sctp\s+(/bin/false|/bin/true)$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^blacklist\s+sctp$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^\s*install\s+squashfs\s+(/bin/false|/bin/true)$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^blacklist\s+squashfs$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^\s*install\s+tipc\s+(/bin/false|/bin/true)$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^blacklist\s+tipc$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^\s*install\s+udf\s+(/bin/false|/bin/true)$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^blacklist\s+udf$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^\s*install\s+usb-storage\s+(/bin/false|/bin/true)$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^blacklist\s+usb-storage$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^\s*install\s+uvcvideo\s+(/bin/false|/bin/true)$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^blacklist\s+uvcvideo$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^\s*install\s+vfat\s+(/bin/false|/bin/true)$ 1 ^.*\.conf$ ^blacklist\s+vfat$ 1 /boot/efi /etc/fstab ^[\s]*(?!#)[\S]+[\s]+/boot/efi[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+([\S]+) 1 /boot /etc/fstab ^[\s]*(?!#)[\S]+[\s]+/boot[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+([\S]+) 1 /boot /etc/fstab ^[\s]*(?!#)[\S]+[\s]+/boot[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+([\S]+) 1 /boot /etc/fstab ^[\s]*(?!#)[\S]+[\s]+/boot[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+([\S]+) 1 /boot /etc/fstab ^[\s]*(?!#)[\S]+[\s]+/boot[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+([\S]+) 1 /dev/shm /etc/fstab ^[\s]*(?!#)[\S]+[\s]+/dev/shm[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+([\S]+) 1 /dev/shm /etc/fstab ^[\s]*(?!#)[\S]+[\s]+/dev/shm[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+([\S]+) 1 /dev/shm /etc/fstab ^[\s]*(?!#)[\S]+[\s]+/dev/shm[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+([\S]+) 1 /home /etc/fstab ^[\s]*(?!#)[\S]+[\s]+/home[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+([\S]+) 1 /home /etc/fstab ^[\s]*(?!#)[\S]+[\s]+/home[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+([\S]+) 1 /home /etc/fstab ^[\s]*(?!#)[\S]+[\s]+/home[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+([\S]+) 1 /home /etc/fstab ^[\s]*(?!#)[\S]+[\s]+/home[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+([\S]+) 1 /home /etc/fstab ^[\s]*(?!#)[\S]+[\s]+/home[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+([\S]+) 1 /etc/fstab ^\s*\[?[\.\w:-]+\]?[:=][/\w-]+\s+[/\w\\-]+\s+nfs[4]?\s+(.*)$ 0 /etc/fstab ^\s*\[?[\.\w:-]+\]?[:=][/\w-]+\s+[/\w\\-]+\s+nfs[4]?\s+(.*)$ 0 /etc/fstab ^\s*\[?[\.\w:-]+\]?[:=][/\w-]+\s+[/\w\\-]+\s+nfs[4]?\s+(.*)$ 0 /etc/fstab ^\s*\[?[\.\w:-]+\]?[:=][/\w-]+\s+[/\w\\-]+\s+nfs[4]?\s+(.*)$ 0 /etc/fstab 1 /etc/fstab 1 /etc/fstab ^\s*\[?[\.\w:-]+\]?[:=][/\w-]+\s+[/\w\\-]+\s+nfs[4]?\s+(.*)$ 0 /etc/fstab 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/var/log /etc/fstab ^[\s]*(?!#)[\S]+[\s]+/var/log[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+([\S]+) 1 /var/log /etc/fstab ^[\s]*(?!#)[\S]+[\s]+/var/log[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+([\S]+) 1 /var /etc/fstab ^[\s]*(?!#)[\S]+[\s]+/var[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+([\S]+) 1 /var /etc/fstab ^[\s]*(?!#)[\S]+[\s]+/var[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+([\S]+) 1 /var /etc/fstab ^[\s]*(?!#)[\S]+[\s]+/var[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+([\S]+) 1 /var/tmp /etc/fstab ^[\s]*(?!#)[\S]+[\s]+/var/tmp[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+([\S]+) 1 /var/tmp /etc/fstab ^[\s]*(?!#)[\S]+[\s]+/var/tmp[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+([\S]+) 1 /var/tmp /etc/fstab ^[\s]*(?!#)[\S]+[\s]+/var/tmp[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+([\S]+) 1 389-ds-base GConf2 MFEhiplsm abrt-addon-ccpp abrt-addon-kerneloops abrt-cli abrt-plugin-logger abrt-plugin-rhtsupport abrt-plugin-sosreport abrt aide audispd-plugins audit-audispd-plugins audit avahi-autoipd avahi avahi bind binutils chrony cron crypto-policies cups cyrus-imapd dconf dhcp-server dnf-automatic dnf-plugin-subscription-manager dovecot esc fapolicyd firewalld freeradius ftp gdm gdm geolite2-city geolite2-country gnutls-utils gssproxy httpd inetutils-telnetd iprutils iptables-services iptables-services iptables krb5-server krb5-workstation libcap-ng-utils libreport-plugin-logger libreport-plugin-rhtsupport libreswan libselinux logrotate mailx McAfeeTP mcstrans net-snmp nfs-utils nftables nginx nis nss-tools ntp ntpdate openldap-clients openldap-servers opensc openscap-scanner openssh-clients openssh-server openssh-server pam_ldap libpwquality pcsc-lite pigz policycoreutils-python-utils policycoreutils postfix prelink psacct python3-abrt-addon quagga rear rng-tools rpcbind rsh-server rsh rsync-daemon rsyslog-gnutls rsyslog samba-common samba-common samba scap-security-guide sendmail setroubleshoot-plugins setroubleshoot-server setroubleshoot squid sssd-ipa sssd subscription-manager sudo syslog-ng systemd-journal-remote talk-server talk tar telnet-server telnet telnetd-ssl telnetd tftp-server tftp tmux tuned usbguard vim-enhanced vsftpd vsftpd xinetd xorg-x11-server-common ypbind ypserv /boot /dev/shm /home /opt /srv /tmp /usr /var /var/log /var/log/audit /var/tmp /lib ^.*$ oval:ssg-symlink_file_groupownerroot_permissions_syslibrary_files_uid_0:ste:1 oval:ssg-state_file_groupownerroot_permissions_syslibrary_files_gid_0_0:ste:1 /lib64 ^.*$ oval:ssg-symlink_file_groupownerroot_permissions_syslibrary_files_uid_0:ste:1 oval:ssg-state_file_groupownerroot_permissions_syslibrary_files_gid_0_1:ste:1 /usr/lib ^.*$ oval:ssg-symlink_file_groupownerroot_permissions_syslibrary_files_uid_0:ste:1 oval:ssg-state_file_groupownerroot_permissions_syslibrary_files_gid_0_2:ste:1 /usr/lib64 ^.*$ oval:ssg-symlink_file_groupownerroot_permissions_syslibrary_files_uid_0:ste:1 oval:ssg-state_file_groupownerroot_permissions_syslibrary_files_gid_0_3:ste:1 /etc/rsyslog.conf ^(?:include\([\n\s]*file="([^\s;]+)".*|\$IncludeConfig[\s]+([^\s;]+))$ 1 oval:ssg-var_rsyslog_files_groupownership_include_config_regex:var:1 oval:ssg-var_rsyslog_files_groupownership_syslog_config:var:1 oval:ssg-object_var_rsyslog_files_groupownership_include_config_regex:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_var_rsyslog_files_groupownership_syslog_config:obj:1 ^\s*[^(\s|#|\$)]+\s+.*\s+-?[\w\(="\s]*(\/[^:;\s"]+)+.*$ 1 oval:ssg-state_rsyslog_files_groupownership_ignore_include_paths:ste:1 /etc/group ^root:\w+:(\w+):.* 1 /etc/rsyslog.conf ^(?:include\([\n\s]*file="([^\s;]+)".*|\$IncludeConfig[\s]+([^\s;]+))$ 1 oval:ssg-var_rsyslog_files_ownership_include_config_regex:var:1 oval:ssg-var_rsyslog_files_ownership_syslog_config:var:1 oval:ssg-object_var_rsyslog_files_ownership_include_config_regex:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_var_rsyslog_files_ownership_syslog_config:obj:1 ^\s*[^(\s|#|\$)]+\s+.*\s+-?[\w\(="\s]*(\/[^:;\s"]+)+.*$ 1 oval:ssg-state_rsyslog_files_ownership_ignore_include_paths:ste:1 /etc/passwd ^root:\w+:(\w+):.* 1 /etc/rsyslog.conf ^(?:include\([\n\s]*file="([^\s;]+)".*|\$IncludeConfig[\s]+([^\s;]+))$ 1 oval:ssg-var_rsyslog_files_permissions_include_config_regex:var:1 oval:ssg-var_rsyslog_files_permissions_syslog_config:var:1 oval:ssg-object_var_rsyslog_files_permissions_include_config_regex:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_var_rsyslog_files_permissions_syslog_config:obj:1 ^\s*[^(\s|#|\$)]+\s+.*\s+-?[\w\(="\s]*(\/[^:;\s"]+)+.*$ 1 oval:ssg-state_rsyslog_files_permissions_ignore_include_paths:ste:1 abrt_anon_write abrt_handle_event abrt_upload_watch_anon_write antivirus_can_scan_system antivirus_use_jit auditadm_exec_content authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap authlogin_radius authlogin_yubikey awstats_purge_apache_log_files boinc_execmem cdrecord_read_content cluster_can_network_connect cluster_manage_all_files cluster_use_execmem cobbler_anon_write cobbler_can_network_connect cobbler_use_cifs cobbler_use_nfs collectd_tcp_network_connect condor_tcp_network_connect conman_can_network container_connect_any cron_can_relabel cron_system_cronjob_use_shares cron_userdomain_transition cups_execmem cvs_read_shadow daemons_dump_core daemons_enable_cluster_mode daemons_use_tcp_wrapper daemons_use_tty dbadm_exec_content dbadm_manage_user_files dbadm_read_user_files deny_execmem deny_ptrace dhcpc_exec_iptables dhcpd_use_ldap domain_fd_use domain_kernel_load_modules entropyd_use_audio exim_can_connect_db exim_manage_user_files exim_read_user_files fcron_crond fenced_can_network_connect fenced_can_ssh fips_mode ftpd_anon_write ftpd_connect_all_unreserved ftpd_connect_db ftpd_full_access ftpd_use_cifs ftpd_use_fusefs ftpd_use_nfs ftpd_use_passive_mode git_cgi_enable_homedirs git_cgi_use_cifs git_cgi_use_nfs git_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports git_session_users git_system_enable_homedirs git_system_use_cifs git_system_use_nfs gitosis_can_sendmail glance_api_can_network glance_use_execmem glance_use_fusefs global_ssp gluster_anon_write gluster_export_all_ro gluster_export_all_rw gpg_web_anon_write gssd_read_tmp guest_exec_content haproxy_connect_any httpd_anon_write httpd_builtin_scripting httpd_can_check_spam httpd_can_connect_ftp httpd_can_connect_ldap httpd_can_connect_mythtv httpd_can_connect_zabbix httpd_can_network_connect httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler httpd_can_network_connect_db httpd_can_network_memcache httpd_can_network_relay httpd_can_sendmail httpd_dbus_avahi httpd_dbus_sssd httpd_dontaudit_search_dirs httpd_enable_cgi httpd_enable_ftp_server httpd_enable_homedirs httpd_execmem httpd_graceful_shutdown httpd_manage_ipa httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind httpd_mod_auth_pam httpd_read_user_content httpd_run_ipa httpd_run_preupgrade httpd_run_stickshift httpd_serve_cobbler_files httpd_setrlimit httpd_ssi_exec httpd_sys_script_anon_write httpd_tmp_exec httpd_tty_comm httpd_unified httpd_use_cifs httpd_use_fusefs httpd_use_gpg httpd_use_nfs httpd_use_openstack httpd_use_sasl httpd_verify_dns icecast_use_any_tcp_ports irc_use_any_tcp_ports irssi_use_full_network kdumpgui_run_bootloader kerberos_enabled ksmtuned_use_cifs ksmtuned_use_nfs logadm_exec_content logging_syslogd_can_sendmail logging_syslogd_run_nagios_plugins logging_syslogd_use_tty login_console_enabled logrotate_use_nfs logwatch_can_network_connect_mail lsmd_plugin_connect_any mailman_use_fusefs mcelog_client mcelog_exec_scripts mcelog_foreground mcelog_server minidlna_read_generic_user_content mmap_low_allowed mock_enable_homedirs mount_anyfile mozilla_plugin_bind_unreserved_ports mozilla_plugin_can_network_connect mozilla_plugin_use_bluejeans mozilla_plugin_use_gps mozilla_plugin_use_spice mozilla_read_content mpd_enable_homedirs mpd_use_cifs mpd_use_nfs mplayer_execstack mysql_connect_any nagios_run_pnp4nagios nagios_run_sudo named_tcp_bind_http_port named_write_master_zones neutron_can_network nfs_export_all_ro nfs_export_all_rw nfsd_anon_write nis_enabled nscd_use_shm openshift_use_nfs openvpn_can_network_connect openvpn_enable_homedirs openvpn_run_unconfined pcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports pcp_read_generic_logs piranha_lvs_can_network_connect polipo_connect_all_unreserved polipo_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports polipo_session_users polipo_use_cifs polipo_use_nfs polyinstantiation_enabled postfix_local_write_mail_spool postgresql_can_rsync postgresql_selinux_transmit_client_label postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm postgresql_selinux_users_ddl pppd_can_insmod pppd_for_user privoxy_connect_any prosody_bind_http_port puppetagent_manage_all_files puppetmaster_use_db racoon_read_shadow rsync_anon_write rsync_client rsync_export_all_ro rsync_full_access samba_create_home_dirs samba_domain_controller samba_enable_home_dirs samba_export_all_ro samba_export_all_rw samba_load_libgfapi samba_portmapper samba_run_unconfined samba_share_fusefs samba_share_nfs sanlock_use_fusefs sanlock_use_nfs sanlock_use_samba saslauthd_read_shadow secadm_exec_content secure_mode secure_mode_insmod secure_mode_policyload selinuxuser_direct_dri_enabled selinuxuser_execheap selinuxuser_execmod selinuxuser_execstack selinuxuser_mysql_connect_enabled selinuxuser_ping selinuxuser_postgresql_connect_enabled selinuxuser_rw_noexattrfile selinuxuser_share_music selinuxuser_tcp_server selinuxuser_udp_server selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot sge_domain_can_network_connect sge_use_nfs smartmon_3ware smbd_anon_write spamassassin_can_network spamd_enable_home_dirs squid_connect_any squid_use_tproxy ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs ssh_keysign ssh_sysadm_login staff_exec_content staff_use_svirt swift_can_network sysadm_exec_content telepathy_connect_all_ports telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports tftp_anon_write tftp_home_dir tmpreaper_use_nfs tmpreaper_use_samba tor_bind_all_unreserved_ports tor_can_network_relay unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition unconfined_login unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition unprivuser_use_svirt use_ecryptfs_home_dirs use_fusefs_home_dirs use_lpd_server use_nfs_home_dirs use_samba_home_dirs user_exec_content varnishd_connect_any virt_read_qemu_ga_data virt_rw_qemu_ga_data virt_sandbox_use_all_caps virt_sandbox_use_audit virt_sandbox_use_mknod virt_sandbox_use_netlink virt_sandbox_use_sys_admin virt_transition_userdomain virt_use_comm virt_use_execmem virt_use_fusefs virt_use_nfs virt_use_rawip virt_use_samba virt_use_sanlock virt_use_usb virt_use_xserver webadm_manage_user_files webadm_read_user_files wine_mmap_zero_ignore xdm_bind_vnc_tcp_port xdm_exec_bootloader xdm_sysadm_login xdm_write_home xen_use_nfs xend_run_blktap xend_run_qemu xguest_connect_network xguest_exec_content xguest_mount_media xguest_use_bluetooth xserver_clients_write_xshm xserver_execmem xserver_object_manager zabbix_can_network zarafa_setrlimit zebra_write_config zoneminder_anon_write zoneminder_run_sudo ^abrtd\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^abrtd\.(service|socket)$ LoadState abrt ^acpid\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^acpid\.(service|socket)$ LoadState acpid ^atd\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^atd\.(service|socket)$ LoadState at multi-user.target multi-user.target ^auditd\.(socket|service)$ ActiveState audit ^autofs\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^autofs\.(service|socket)$ LoadState autofs ^avahi-daemon\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^avahi-daemon\.(service|socket)$ LoadState avahi ^bluetooth\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^bluetooth\.(service|socket)$ LoadState bluez ^certmonger\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^certmonger\.(service|socket)$ LoadState certmonger multi-user.target multi-user.target ^chronyd\.(socket|service)$ ActiveState chrony ^cockpit\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^cockpit\.(service|socket)$ LoadState cockpit ^cpupower\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^cpupower\.(service|socket)$ LoadState kernel-tools multi-user.target multi-user.target ^cron\.(socket|service)$ ActiveState cron multi-user.target multi-user.target ^crond\.(socket|service)$ ActiveState cronie ^cups\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^cups\.(service|socket)$ LoadState cups ^debug-shell\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^debug-shell\.(service|socket)$ LoadState systemd ^dhcpd\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^dhcpd\.(service|socket)$ LoadState dhcp-server ^dovecot\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^dovecot\.(service|socket)$ LoadState dovecot multi-user.target multi-user.target ^fapolicyd\.(socket|service)$ ActiveState fapolicyd multi-user.target multi-user.target ^firewalld\.(socket|service)$ ActiveState firewalld ^httpd\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^httpd\.(service|socket)$ LoadState httpd multi-user.target multi-user.target ^ip6tables\.(socket|service)$ ActiveState iptables-ipv6 multi-user.target multi-user.target ^iptables\.(socket|service)$ ActiveState iptables ^kdump\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^kdump\.(service|socket)$ LoadState kexec-tools ^mdmonitor\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^mdmonitor\.(service|socket)$ LoadState mdadm multi-user.target multi-user.target ^nails\.(socket|service)$ ActiveState nails ^named\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^named\.(service|socket)$ LoadState bind ^netconsole\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^netconsole\.(service|socket)$ LoadState netconsole ^netfs\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^netfs\.(service|socket)$ LoadState netfs ^nfs-server\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^nfs-server\.(service|socket)$ LoadState nfs-utils ^nfslock\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^nfslock\.(service|socket)$ LoadState nfs-utils ^nftables\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^nftables\.(service|socket)$ LoadState nftables multi-user.target multi-user.target ^nftables\.(socket|service)$ ActiveState nftables multi-user.target multi-user.target ^ntp\.(socket|service)$ ActiveState ntp multi-user.target multi-user.target ^ntpd\.(socket|service)$ ActiveState ntp ^ntpdate\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^ntpdate\.(service|socket)$ LoadState ntpdate ^oddjobd\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^oddjobd\.(service|socket)$ LoadState oddjob multi-user.target multi-user.target ^pcscd\.(socket|service)$ ActiveState pcsc-lite ^portreserve\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^portreserve\.(service|socket)$ LoadState portreserve multi-user.target multi-user.target ^postfix\.(socket|service)$ ActiveState postfix multi-user.target multi-user.target ^psacct\.(socket|service)$ ActiveState psacct ^qpidd\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^qpidd\.(service|socket)$ LoadState qpid-cpp-server ^quota_nld\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^quota_nld\.(service|socket)$ LoadState quota-nld ^rdisc\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^rdisc\.(service|socket)$ LoadState iputils ^rexec\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^rexec\.(service|socket)$ LoadState rsh-server ^rhnsd\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^rhnsd\.(service|socket)$ LoadState rhnsd ^rhsmcertd\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^rhsmcertd\.(service|socket)$ LoadState subscription-manager ^rlogin\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^rlogin\.(service|socket)$ LoadState rsh-server multi-user.target multi-user.target ^rngd\.(socket|service)$ ActiveState rng-tools ^rpcbind\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^rpcbind\.(service|socket)$ LoadState rpcbind ^rpcgssd\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^rpcgssd\.(service|socket)$ LoadState nfs-utils ^rpcidmapd\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^rpcidmapd\.(service|socket)$ LoadState nfs-utils ^rpcsvcgssd\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^rpcsvcgssd\.(service|socket)$ LoadState nfs-utils ^rsh\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^rsh\.(service|socket)$ LoadState rsh ^rsyncd\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^rsyncd\.(service|socket)$ LoadState rsync-daemon multi-user.target multi-user.target ^rsyslog\.(socket|service)$ ActiveState rsyslog ^saslauthd\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^saslauthd\.(service|socket)$ LoadState cyrus-sasl ^slapd\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^slapd\.(service|socket)$ LoadState openldap-servers ^smb\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^smb\.(service|socket)$ LoadState samba ^snmpd\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^snmpd\.(service|socket)$ LoadState net-snmp ^squid\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^squid\.(service|socket)$ LoadState squid ^sshd\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^sshd\.(service|socket)$ LoadState openssh-server multi-user.target multi-user.target ^sshd\.(socket|service)$ ActiveState openssh-server multi-user.target multi-user.target ^sssd\.(socket|service)$ ActiveState sssd ^syslog\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^syslog\.(service|socket)$ LoadState rsyslog multi-user.target multi-user.target ^syslog-ng\.(socket|service)$ ActiveState syslog-ng ^sysstat\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^sysstat\.(service|socket)$ LoadState sysstat ^systemd-coredump.socket$ LoadState multi-user.target multi-user.target ^systemd-journald\.(socket|service)$ ActiveState systemd ^telnet\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^telnet\.(service|socket)$ LoadState telnet-server ^tftp\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^tftp\.(service|socket)$ LoadState tftp-server multi-user.target multi-user.target ^ufw\.(socket|service)$ ActiveState ufw multi-user.target multi-user.target ^usbguard\.(socket|service)$ ActiveState usbguard ^vsftpd\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^vsftpd\.(service|socket)$ LoadState vsftpd ^xinetd\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^xinetd\.(service|socket)$ LoadState xinetd ^ypbind\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^ypbind\.(service|socket)$ LoadState ypbind ^ypserv\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^ypserv\.(service|socket)$ LoadState ypserv ^zebra\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^zebra\.(service|socket)$ LoadState quagga /etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf ^[\s]*DefaultZone=drop[\s]*$ 1 ^systemd-journal-remote.socket$ LoadState /etc/ssh/sshd_config ^[ \t]*(?i)PermitEmptyPasswords(?-i)[ \t]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 oval:ssg-obj_sshd_disable_empty_passwords:obj:1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config ^[ \t]*(?i)GSSAPIAuthentication(?-i)[ \t]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 oval:ssg-obj_sshd_disable_gssapi_auth:obj:1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config ^[ \t]*(?i)KerberosAuthentication(?-i)[ \t]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 oval:ssg-obj_sshd_disable_kerb_auth:obj:1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config ^[ \t]*(?i)PubkeyAuthentication(?-i)[ \t]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 oval:ssg-obj_sshd_disable_pubkey_auth:obj:1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config ^[ \t]*(?i)IgnoreRhosts(?-i)[ \t]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 oval:ssg-obj_sshd_disable_rhosts:obj:1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config ^[ \t]*(?i)PermitRootLogin(?-i)[ \t]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 oval:ssg-obj_sshd_disable_root_login:obj:1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config ^[ \t]*(?i)PermitRootLogin(?-i)[ \t]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 oval:ssg-obj_sshd_disable_root_password_login:obj:1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config ^[ \t]*(?i)AllowTcpForwarding(?-i)[ \t]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 oval:ssg-obj_sshd_disable_tcp_forwarding:obj:1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config ^[ \t]*(?i)IgnoreUserKnownHosts(?-i)[ \t]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 oval:ssg-obj_sshd_disable_user_known_hosts:obj:1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config ^[ \t]*(?i)X11Forwarding(?-i)[ \t]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 oval:ssg-obj_sshd_disable_x11_forwarding:obj:1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config ^[ \t]*(?i)PermitUserEnvironment(?-i)[ \t]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 oval:ssg-obj_sshd_do_not_permit_user_env:obj:1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config ^[ \t]*(?i)GSSAPIAuthentication(?-i)[ \t]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 oval:ssg-obj_sshd_enable_gssapi_auth:obj:1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config ^[ \t]*(?i)UsePAM(?-i)[ \t]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 oval:ssg-obj_sshd_enable_pam:obj:1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config ^[ \t]*(?i)PubkeyAuthentication(?-i)[ \t]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 oval:ssg-obj_sshd_enable_pubkey_auth:obj:1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config ^[ \t]*(?i)StrictModes(?-i)[ \t]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 oval:ssg-obj_sshd_enable_strictmodes:obj:1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config ^[ \t]*(?i)Banner(?-i)[ \t]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 oval:ssg-obj_sshd_enable_warning_banner:obj:1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config ^[ \t]*(?i)Banner(?-i)[ \t]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 oval:ssg-obj_sshd_enable_warning_banner_net:obj:1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config ^[ \t]*(?i)X11Forwarding(?-i)[ \t]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 oval:ssg-obj_sshd_enable_x11_forwarding:obj:1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config ^[\s]*Include /etc/ssh/sshd_config\.d/\*\.conf[\s]*$ 1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config ^[ \t]*(?i)PrintLastLog(?-i)[ \t]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 oval:ssg-obj_sshd_print_last_log:obj:1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config ^[ \t]*(?i)ClientAliveCountMax(?-i)[ \t]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 oval:ssg-obj_sshd_set_keepalive_0:obj:1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config ^[ \t]*(?i)LogLevel(?-i)[ \t]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 oval:ssg-obj_sshd_set_loglevel_info:obj:1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config ^[ \t]*(?i)LogLevel(?-i)[ \t]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 oval:ssg-obj_sshd_set_loglevel_verbose:obj:1 /etc/sysconfig/sshd ^[ \t]*SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG=(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 /etc/ssh/sshd_config ^[ \t]*(?i)X11UseLocalhost(?-i)[ \t]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) 1 oval:ssg-obj_sshd_x11_use_localhost:obj:1 /etc/sssd/sssd.conf ^[\s]*\[certmap\/.+\/.+\][\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/sudoers(|\.d/.*)$ ^[\s]*Defaults[\s]*\benv_reset.*$ 1 ^/etc/sudoers(|\.d/.*)$ ^[\s]*Defaults[\s]*\bignore_dot.*$ 1 ^/etc/sudoers(|\.d/.*)$ ^[\s]*Defaults[\s]*\bnoexec.*$ 1 ^/etc/sudoers(|\.d/.*)$ ^[\s]*Defaults[\s]*\bpasswd_timeout=(\w+)\b.*$ 1 ^/etc/sudoers(|\.d/.*)$ ^[\s]*Defaults[\s]*\brequiretty.*$ 1 ^/etc/sudoers(|\.d/.*)$ ^[\s]*Defaults[\s]*\bumask=(\w+)\b.*$ 1 ^/etc/sudoers(|\.d/.*)$ ^[\s]*Defaults[\s]*\buse_pty.*$ 1 ^/etc/sudoers(|\.d/.*)$ ^[\s]*Defaults[\s]*\blogfile\s*=\s*("(?:\\"|\\\\|[^"\\\n])*"\B|[^"](?:(?:\\,|\\"|\\ |\\\\|[^", \\\n])*)\b).*$ 1 /usr/bin/sudo oval:ssg-exclude_symlinks_sudo_restrict_others_executable_permission:ste:1 oval:ssg-state_file_permissionssudo_restrict_others_executable_permission_0_mode_4110or_stricter_:ste:1 fs.protected_hardlinks oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_fs_protected_hardlinks:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_fs_protected_hardlinks:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_fs_protected_hardlinks:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_fs_protected_hardlinks:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_fs_protected_hardlinks:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_fs_protected_hardlinks:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_fs_protected_hardlinks:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*fs.protected_hardlinks[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*fs.protected_hardlinks[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*fs.protected_hardlinks[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*fs.protected_hardlinks[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*fs.protected_hardlinks[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 fs.protected_symlinks oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_fs_protected_symlinks:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_fs_protected_symlinks:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_fs_protected_symlinks:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_fs_protected_symlinks:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_fs_protected_symlinks:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_fs_protected_symlinks:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_fs_protected_symlinks:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*fs.protected_symlinks[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*fs.protected_symlinks[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*fs.protected_symlinks[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*fs.protected_symlinks[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*fs.protected_symlinks[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 fs.suid_dumpable oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_fs_suid_dumpable:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_fs_suid_dumpable:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_fs_suid_dumpable:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_fs_suid_dumpable:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_fs_suid_dumpable:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_fs_suid_dumpable:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_fs_suid_dumpable:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*fs.suid_dumpable[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*fs.suid_dumpable[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*fs.suid_dumpable[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*fs.suid_dumpable[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*fs.suid_dumpable[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 kernel.core_pattern oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_core_pattern:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_core_pattern:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_core_pattern:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_kernel_core_pattern:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_core_pattern:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_core_pattern:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_core_pattern:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*kernel.core_pattern[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.core_pattern[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.core_pattern[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.core_pattern[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.core_pattern[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 kernel.core_uses_pid oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_core_uses_pid:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_core_uses_pid:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_core_uses_pid:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_kernel_core_uses_pid:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_core_uses_pid:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_core_uses_pid:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_core_uses_pid:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*kernel.core_uses_pid[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.core_uses_pid[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.core_uses_pid[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.core_uses_pid[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.core_uses_pid[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 kernel.dmesg_restrict oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_dmesg_restrict:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_dmesg_restrict:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_dmesg_restrict:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_kernel_dmesg_restrict:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_dmesg_restrict:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_dmesg_restrict:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_dmesg_restrict:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*kernel.dmesg_restrict[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.dmesg_restrict[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.dmesg_restrict[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.dmesg_restrict[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.dmesg_restrict[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 kernel.kexec_load_disabled oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_kexec_load_disabled:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_kexec_load_disabled:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_kexec_load_disabled:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_kernel_kexec_load_disabled:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_kexec_load_disabled:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_kexec_load_disabled:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_kexec_load_disabled:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*kernel.kexec_load_disabled[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.kexec_load_disabled[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.kexec_load_disabled[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.kexec_load_disabled[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.kexec_load_disabled[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 kernel.kptr_restrict oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_kptr_restrict:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_kptr_restrict:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_kptr_restrict:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_kernel_kptr_restrict:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_kptr_restrict:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_kptr_restrict:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_kptr_restrict:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*kernel.kptr_restrict[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.kptr_restrict[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.kptr_restrict[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.kptr_restrict[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.kptr_restrict[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 kernel.modules_disabled oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_modules_disabled:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_modules_disabled:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_modules_disabled:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_kernel_modules_disabled:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_modules_disabled:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_modules_disabled:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_modules_disabled:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*kernel.modules_disabled[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.modules_disabled[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.modules_disabled[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.modules_disabled[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.modules_disabled[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 kernel.panic_on_oops oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_panic_on_oops:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_panic_on_oops:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_panic_on_oops:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_kernel_panic_on_oops:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_panic_on_oops:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_panic_on_oops:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_panic_on_oops:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*kernel.panic_on_oops[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.panic_on_oops[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.panic_on_oops[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.panic_on_oops[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.panic_on_oops[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_perf_cpu_time_max_percent:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_perf_cpu_time_max_percent:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_perf_cpu_time_max_percent:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_kernel_perf_cpu_time_max_percent:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_perf_cpu_time_max_percent:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_perf_cpu_time_max_percent:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_perf_cpu_time_max_percent:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_perf_event_max_sample_rate:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_perf_event_max_sample_rate:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_perf_event_max_sample_rate:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_kernel_perf_event_max_sample_rate:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_perf_event_max_sample_rate:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_perf_event_max_sample_rate:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_perf_event_max_sample_rate:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 kernel.perf_event_paranoid oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_perf_event_paranoid:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_perf_event_paranoid:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_perf_event_paranoid:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_kernel_perf_event_paranoid:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_perf_event_paranoid:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_perf_event_paranoid:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_perf_event_paranoid:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*kernel.perf_event_paranoid[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.perf_event_paranoid[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.perf_event_paranoid[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.perf_event_paranoid[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.perf_event_paranoid[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 kernel.pid_max oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_pid_max:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_pid_max:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_pid_max:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_kernel_pid_max:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_pid_max:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_pid_max:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_pid_max:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*kernel.pid_max[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.pid_max[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.pid_max[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.pid_max[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.pid_max[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 kernel.randomize_va_space oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_randomize_va_space:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_randomize_va_space:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_randomize_va_space:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_kernel_randomize_va_space:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_randomize_va_space:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_randomize_va_space:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_randomize_va_space:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*kernel.randomize_va_space[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.randomize_va_space[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.randomize_va_space[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.randomize_va_space[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.randomize_va_space[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 kernel.sysrq oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_sysrq:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_sysrq:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_sysrq:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_kernel_sysrq:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_sysrq:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_sysrq:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_sysrq:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*kernel.sysrq[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.sysrq[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.sysrq[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.sysrq[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.sysrq[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_unprivileged_bpf_disabled:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_unprivileged_bpf_disabled:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_unprivileged_bpf_disabled:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_kernel_unprivileged_bpf_disabled:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_unprivileged_bpf_disabled:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_unprivileged_bpf_disabled:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_unprivileged_bpf_disabled:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 kernel.yama.ptrace_scope oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_yama_ptrace_scope:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_yama_ptrace_scope:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_yama_ptrace_scope:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_kernel_yama_ptrace_scope:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_yama_ptrace_scope:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_yama_ptrace_scope:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_yama_ptrace_scope:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*kernel.yama.ptrace_scope[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.yama.ptrace_scope[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.yama.ptrace_scope[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.yama.ptrace_scope[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*kernel.yama.ptrace_scope[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.core.bpf_jit_harden oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_core_bpf_jit_harden:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_core_bpf_jit_harden:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_core_bpf_jit_harden:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_core_bpf_jit_harden:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_core_bpf_jit_harden:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_core_bpf_jit_harden:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_core_bpf_jit_harden:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.core.bpf_jit_harden[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.core.bpf_jit_harden[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.core.bpf_jit_harden[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.core.bpf_jit_harden[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.core.bpf_jit_harden[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_local:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_local:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_local:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_local:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_local:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_local:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_local:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_filter:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_filter:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_filter:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_filter:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_filter:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_filter:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_filter:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_ignore:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_ignore:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_ignore:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_ignore:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_ignore:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_ignore:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_ignore:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_drop_gratuitous_arp:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_drop_gratuitous_arp:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_drop_gratuitous_arp:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_drop_gratuitous_arp:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_drop_gratuitous_arp:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_drop_gratuitous_arp:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_drop_gratuitous_arp:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv4.conf.all.forwarding oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_forwarding:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_forwarding:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_forwarding:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_forwarding:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_forwarding:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_forwarding:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_forwarding:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.forwarding[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.forwarding[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.forwarding[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.forwarding[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.forwarding[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_route_localnet:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_route_localnet:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_route_localnet:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_route_localnet:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_route_localnet:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_route_localnet:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_route_localnet:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_send_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_send_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_send_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_send_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_send_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_send_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_send_redirects:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_shared_media:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_shared_media:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_shared_media:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_shared_media:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_shared_media:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_shared_media:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_shared_media:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_send_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_send_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_send_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_send_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_send_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_send_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_send_redirects:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_shared_media:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_shared_media:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_shared_media:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_shared_media:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_shared_media:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_shared_media:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_shared_media:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv4.ip_forward oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_forward:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_forward:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_forward:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_forward:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_forward:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_forward:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_forward:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv4.ip_forward[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.ip_forward[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.ip_forward[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.ip_forward[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.ip_forward[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_local_port_range:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_local_port_range:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_local_port_range:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_local_port_range:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_local_port_range:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_local_port_range:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_local_port_range:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_invalid_ratelimit:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_invalid_ratelimit:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_invalid_ratelimit:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_invalid_ratelimit:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_invalid_ratelimit:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_invalid_ratelimit:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_invalid_ratelimit:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_rfc1337:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_rfc1337:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_rfc1337:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_rfc1337:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_rfc1337:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_rfc1337:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_rfc1337:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_defrtr:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_defrtr:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_defrtr:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_defrtr:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_defrtr:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_defrtr:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_defrtr:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_pinfo:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_pinfo:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_pinfo:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_pinfo:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_pinfo:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_pinfo:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_pinfo:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_rtr_pref:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_rtr_pref:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_rtr_pref:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_rtr_pref:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_rtr_pref:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_rtr_pref:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_rtr_pref:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_autoconf:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_autoconf:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_autoconf:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_autoconf:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_autoconf:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_autoconf:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_autoconf:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_disable_ipv6:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_disable_ipv6:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_disable_ipv6:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_disable_ipv6:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_disable_ipv6:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_disable_ipv6:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_disable_ipv6:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_forwarding:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_forwarding:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_forwarding:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_forwarding:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_forwarding:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_forwarding:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_forwarding:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_max_addresses:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_max_addresses:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_max_addresses:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_max_addresses:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_max_addresses:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_max_addresses:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_max_addresses:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_router_solicitations:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_router_solicitations:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_router_solicitations:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_router_solicitations:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_router_solicitations:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_router_solicitations:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_router_solicitations:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_defrtr:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_defrtr:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_defrtr:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_defrtr:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_defrtr:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_defrtr:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_defrtr:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_pinfo:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_pinfo:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_pinfo:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_pinfo:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_pinfo:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_pinfo:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_pinfo:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_rtr_pref:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_rtr_pref:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_rtr_pref:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_rtr_pref:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_rtr_pref:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_rtr_pref:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_rtr_pref:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_autoconf:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_autoconf:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_autoconf:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_autoconf:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_autoconf:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_autoconf:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_autoconf:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_disable_ipv6:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_disable_ipv6:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_disable_ipv6:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_disable_ipv6:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_disable_ipv6:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_disable_ipv6:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_disable_ipv6:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_max_addresses:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_max_addresses:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_max_addresses:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_max_addresses:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_max_addresses:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_max_addresses:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_max_addresses:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_router_solicitations:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_router_solicitations:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_router_solicitations:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_router_solicitations:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_router_solicitations:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_router_solicitations:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_router_solicitations:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 user.max_user_namespaces oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_user_max_user_namespaces:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_user_max_user_namespaces:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_user_max_user_namespaces:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_user_max_user_namespaces:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_user_max_user_namespaces:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_user_max_user_namespaces:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_user_max_user_namespaces:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*user.max_user_namespaces[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*user.max_user_namespaces[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*user.max_user_namespaces[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*user.max_user_namespaces[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*user.max_user_namespaces[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 vm.mmap_min_addr oval:ssg-object_static_etc_lib_sysctls_sysctl_vm_mmap_min_addr:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_vm_mmap_min_addr:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_vm_mmap_min_addr:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_vm_mmap_min_addr:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_vm_mmap_min_addr:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_vm_mmap_min_addr:obj:1 oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_vm_mmap_min_addr:obj:1 /etc/sysctl.conf ^[\s]*vm.mmap_min_addr[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /etc/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*vm.mmap_min_addr[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /run/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*vm.mmap_min_addr[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*vm.mmap_min_addr[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 /usr/lib/sysctl.d ^.*\.conf$ ^[\s]*vm.mmap_min_addr[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ 1 multi-user.target dnf-automatic\.timer ActiveState multi-user.target logrotate\.timer ActiveState ^/boot/loader/entries/.*.conf ^options (.*)$ 1 ^/etc/kernel/cmdline ^(.*)$ 1 ^/boot/loader/entries/.*.conf ^options (.*)$ 1 ^/etc/kernel/cmdline ^(.*)$ 1 ^/boot/loader/entries/.*.conf ^options (.*)$ 1 ^/etc/kernel/cmdline ^(.*)$ 1 ^/boot/loader/entries/.*.conf ^options (.*)$ 1 ^/etc/kernel/cmdline ^(.*)$ 1 ^/boot/loader/entries/.*.conf ^options (.*)$ 1 ^/etc/kernel/cmdline ^(.*)$ 1 /etc/pam.d/system-auth ^\s*password\s+(?:(?:required)|(?:requisite))\s+pam_faillock\.so.*$ 1 ^\s*password\s+(?:(?:required)|(?:requisite))\s+pam_pwquality\.so.*$ 1 /usr/lib/systemd/system/auditd.service ^ExecStartPost=\-\/sbin\/auditctl.*$ 1 /usr/lib/systemd/system/auditd.service ^(ExecStartPost=\-\/sbin\/augenrules.*$|Requires=augenrules.service) 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+setdomainname[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])setdomainname([\s]+|[,]))).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+setdomainname[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])setdomainname([\s]+|[,]))).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+setdomainname[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])setdomainname([\s]+|[,]))).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+setdomainname[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])setdomainname([\s]+|[,]))).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+sethostname[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])sethostname([\s]+|[,]))).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+sethostname[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])sethostname([\s]+|[,]))).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+sethostname[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])sethostname([\s]+|[,]))).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/audit.rules ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+sethostname[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])sethostname([\s]+|[,]))).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 1 /etc/audit/auditd.conf ^(log_file\s*=\s*.*)$ 1 /etc/audit/auditd.conf ^[ ]*log_group[ ]+=[ ]+root[ ]*$ 1 /etc/audit/auditd.conf ^[ ]*log_group[ ]+=.*$ 1 /etc/default/grub ^\s*GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=(.*)$ 1 ^/etc/chrony\.(conf|d/.+\.conf)$ ^([\s]*server[\s]+.+$){2,}$ 1 /etc/default/grub ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT=.*$ 1 /boot/loader/entries/ ^.*\.conf$ ^options(?:\s+.*)?\s+\$kernelopts\b.*$ 1 anolis-release centos-release /etc/os-release ^ID="(\w+)"$ 1 /etc/os-release ^VERSION_ID="(\d)"$ 1 /etc/os-release ^ID="(\w+)"$ 1 /etc/os-release ^VERSION_ID="(\d)"$ 1 /etc/debian_version fedora-release.* /etc/system-release-cpe ^cpe:\/o:fedoraproject:fedora:[\d]+$ 1 /etc/os-release ^ID=["']?(\w+)["']?$ 1 oraclelinux-release oraclelinux-release oraclelinux-release /etc/os-release /etc/os-release ^ID=nodistro$ 1 openSUSE-release /etc/os-release /etc/os-release ^ID=poky$ 1 /etc/os-release ^ID="(\w+)"$ 1 /etc/os-release ^VERSION_ID="(\d)\.\d+"$ 1 /etc/os-release ^RHEL_VERSION="(\d).*"$ 1 /etc/os-release ^ID=["']?(\w+)["']?$ 1 redhat-release-client redhat-release-workstation redhat-release-server redhat-release-computenode /etc/redhat-release ^Red Hat Enterprise Linux release (\d)\.\d+$ 1 redhat-release redhat-release redhat-release redhat-release redhat-release redhat-release redhat-release redhat-release redhat-release redhat-release redhat-release redhat-release /etc/redhat-release ^Red Hat Enterprise Linux release (\d)\.\d+$ 1 redhat-release /etc/redhat-release ^Red Hat Enterprise Linux release (\d)\.\d+$ 1 redhat-release-virtualization-host sl-release sled-release sles-release SLES_SAP-release sled-release sles-release SLES_SAP-release SUSE-Manager-Server-release SLE_HPC-release /etc/lsb-release /etc/lsb-release ^DISTRIB_ID=Ubuntu$ 1 /etc/lsb-release ^DISTRIB_CODENAME=xenial$ 1 /etc/lsb-release ^DISTRIB_CODENAME=bionic$ 1 /etc/lsb-release ^DISTRIB_CODENAME=focal$ 1 s390utils-base container /etc/fstab 1 oval:ssg-sshd_required:var:1 oval:ssg-sshd_required:var:1 oval:ssg-sshd_required:var:1 openssh-server /etc/tmux.conf ^/etc/usbguard/(rules|rules\.d/.*)\.conf$ ^.*\S+.*$ 1 oval:ssg-var_accounts_user_umask_umask_as_number:var:1 oval:ssg-var_removable_partition:var:1 oval:ssg-var_umask_for_daemons_umask_as_number:var:1 ^(static|none)$ 0 false false false false false false false false false false false false false false false false false false false false false false false false false false false false false false false false false false false false false false false false false false false 25 ::1 (?i)root ^permit_mynetworks[ \t]*[, \t][ \t]*reject$ ^.*,sec=krb5\:krb5i\:krb5p.*$ 0 0 maxpoll \d+ 2 sec=(krb5i|ntlmv2i) symbolic link /etc/ssh .*_key$ 0 0 false false false false false false false false false false /etc/ssh .*_key$ 0 false false false false false false false false false 32 32 0 0 0 0 10 30 100 ^\s*CRYPTO_POLICY\s*=.*-oKexAlgorithms=(?=[\w-])(\becdh-sha2-nistp256\b,?)?(\becdh-sha2-nistp384\b,?)?(\becdh-sha2-nistp521\b,?)?(\bdiffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256\b,?)?(\bdiffie-hellman-group14-sha256\b,?)?(\bdiffie-hellman-group16-sha512\b,?)?(\bdiffie-hellman-group18-sha512)?(\s.*)?'[\s]*(?:#.*)?$ ^.*pam.*$ ^.*(try_cert_auth|require_cert_auth).*$ ^.*allow_missing_name.*$ false sssd ^LinuxAudit$ /etc/systemd/system/default.target ^(/usr)?/lib/systemd/system/multi-user.target$ /etc/pam.d/fingerprint-auth /etc/authselect/fingerprint-auth /etc/pam.d/password-auth /etc/authselect/password-auth /etc/pam.d/postlogin /etc/authselect/postlogin /etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth /etc/authselect/smartcard-auth /etc/pam.d/system-auth /etc/authselect/system-auth faillog_t 0 /var/run/faillock 2 2 0 5000 /etc/systemd/system/ctrl-alt-del.target /dev/null 0 900 ^root$ -1 ^[x*]$ ^(!|!!|!\*|\*|!locked)$ ^(!\$6\$|!!\$6\$).*$ SHA-512 .* ^(!|!!|!\*|\*|!locked)$ 86400000 1000 ^(nobody|nfsnobody)$ ^/sbin/nologin$ 0 ^[^:]+:[^:]+:[0-9]+:\s*$ 1000 ^(root|halt|sync|shutdown|nfsnobody)$ ^(!|!!|!\*|\*|!locked).*$ 0 directory false false false false false false false false false directory false false false false false false false false false 1 ^(nobody|nfsnobody)$ ^(nobody|nfsnobody)$ 1000 ^(nobody|nfsnobody)$ ^/sbin/nologin$ regular true ^(nobody|nfsnobody)$ ^(nobody|nfsnobody)$ 1000 ^(nobody|nfsnobody)$ ^/sbin/nologin$ ^\/[^\/\n]*\/[^\/\n]{1,}.*$ ^(nobody|nfsnobody)$ ^(nobody|nfsnobody)$ ^(nobody|nfsnobody)$ ^(nobody|nfsnobody)$ ^(nobody|nfsnobody)$ ^(nobody|nfsnobody)$ false false false false false false false 1000 ^(nobody|nfsnobody)$ ^/sbin/nologin$ false false false false false false ^(nobody|nfsnobody)$ ^(nobody|nfsnobody)$ ^(nobody|nfsnobody)$ ^(nobody|nfsnobody)$ false false false false false false false false 1000 ^(nobody|nfsnobody)$ ^/sbin/nologin$ ^(nobody|nfsnobody)$ directory false false false false false false false 1000 ^(nobody|nfsnobody)$ ^/sbin/nologin$ directory false false false false false false false true true symbolic link ^[:\.] :: \.\. [:\.]$ ^[^/] [^\\]:[^/] ^(nobody|nfsnobody)$ ^\.bash_history 0 0 0 true true true true true true true true true 0 0 0 0 0 0 true true true true true true true true true true ^/dev/.*$ nosuid noexec true true ^/var/tmp/dracut.* SYSLOG SINGLE HALT SYSLOG SINGLE HALT rotate single ^(?i)(syslog|single|halt)(?-i)$ ^(?:.*\s)?random\.trust_cpu=on(?:\s.*)?$ ^(?:.*\s)?random\.trust_cpu=off(?:\s.*)?$ ^['|\(](?!fd)(?!cd)(?!usb).*['|\)]$ ^['|\(](?!fd)(?!cd)(?!usb).*['|\)]$ \bsystemd.debug-shell\b \bsystemd.debug-shell\b 416 (?=[\S\s]*\s(?i)protocol(?-i)="tcp")(?=[\S\s]*\s(?i)Target(?-i)="[^"]+?")(?=[\S\s]*\s(?i)port(?-i)="6514")(?=[\S\s]*\s(?i)StreamDriver(?-i)="gtls")(?=[\S\s]*\s(?i)StreamDriverMode(?-i)="1")(?=[\S\s]*\s(?i)StreamDriverAuthMode(?-i)="x509/name")(?=[\S\s]*\s(?i)StreamDriver\.CheckExtendedKeyPurpose(?-i)="on") 0 ResultActive=auth_admin PROMISC UP 0 true false true ^/dev/.*$ 1000 true ^/dev/.*$ 1000 true 0 false false false false false false false false false false true ^/dev/.*$ true ^/dev/.*$ regular true ^/selinux/(?:(?:member)|(?:user)|(?:relabel)|(?:create)|(?:access)|(?:context))$ ^/dev/.*$ ^/dev/.*$ ^/dev/.*$ 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1000 0 true true symbolic link ^.*\bnousb\b.*$ ^/dev/.*$ nodev ^(?i)0(?-i)$ ^(?i)0(?-i)$ ^(?i)none(?-i)$ ^(?i)none(?-i)$ 0 0 1 ^(block|character) special$ device_t unlabeled_t unconfined_service_t ^(enforcing|permissive)$ x86_64 \blm\b ^(x86_64|aarch64|ppc64le|s390x|.*-amd64)$ ^false$ /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/krb5.config 1.2 0:20210617-1 ^TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256$ ^final all$ ^512M 1h$ ^no$ ^aes256-ctr,aes256-cbc,aes128-ctr,aes128-cbc$ ^ssh-rsa,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256$ ^hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256$ ^ecdh-sha2-nistp521,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp256,diffie-hellman-group14-sha1$ ^'-oCiphers=aes256-ctr,aes128-ctr,aes256-cbc,aes128-cbc -oMACs=hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256 -oGSSAPIKeyExchange=no -oKexAlgorithms=ecdh-sha2-nistp521,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp256,diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 -oHostKeyAlgorithms=ssh-rsa,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 -oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes=rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256'$ /etc/profile.d/openssl-rand.sh SHA-256 6488c757642cd493da09dd78ee27f039711a1ad79039900970553772fd2106af fips ^(?:.*\s)?fips=1(?:\s.*)?$ ^FIPS(:(OSPP|NO-SHA1|NO-CAMELLIA))?$ 1 ^p\+i\+n\+u\+g\+s\+b\+acl(|\+selinux)\+xattrs\+sha512$ ^.*sha512.*$ ^.*acl.*$ ^.*xattrs.*$ fail false false fail fail fail /etc/sudoers.d ^yes$ ^security$ 4ae0493b fd431d51 5b32db75 d4082792 5ccc5b19 8483c65d 0 ## Unsuccessful file access (any other opens) This has to go last. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access ## Successful file access (any other opens) This has to go last. ## These next two are likely to result in a whole lot of events -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access ## First rule - delete all -D ## Increase the buffers to survive stress events. ## Make this bigger for busy systems -b 8192 ## This determine how long to wait in burst of events --backlog_wait_time 60000 ## Set failure mode to syslog -f 1 ## Unsuccessful file creation (open with O_CREAT) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create ## Successful file creation (open with O_CREAT) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create ## Unsuccessful file delete -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete ## Successful file delete -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete ## Make the loginuid immutable. This prevents tampering with the auid. --loginuid-immutable ## Unsuccessful file modifications (open for write or truncate) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification ## Successful file modifications (open for write or truncate) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification ## These rules watch for kernel module insertion. By monitoring ## the syscall, we do not need any watches on programs. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S init_module,finit_module -F key=module-load -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S init_module,finit_module -F key=module-load -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S delete_module -F key=module-unload -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S delete_module -F key=module-unload ## The purpose of these rules is to meet the requirements for Operating ## System Protection Profile (OSPP)v4.2. These rules depends on having ## the following rule files copied to /etc/audit/rules.d: ## ## 10-base-config.rules, 11-loginuid.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-1-create-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-1-create-success.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-2-modify-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-2-modify-success.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-3-access-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-3-access-success.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-4-delete-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-4-delete-success.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-failed.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-success.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-failed.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-success.rules ## ## original copies may be found in /usr/share/audit/sample-rules/ ## User add delete modify. This is covered by pam. However, someone could ## open a file and directly create or modify a user, so we'll watch passwd and ## shadow for writes -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify ## User enable and disable. This is entirely handled by pam. ## Group add delete modify. This is covered by pam. However, someone could ## open a file and directly create or modify a user, so we'll watch group and ## gshadow for writes -a always,exit -F path=/etc/passwd -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F path=/etc/shadow -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F path=/etc/group -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=group-modify -a always,exit -F path=/etc/gshadow -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=group-modify ## Use of special rights for config changes. This would be use of setuid ## programs that relate to user accts. This is not all setuid apps because ## requirements are only for ones that affect system configuration. -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/usernetctl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/userhelper -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/seunshare -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/mount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newgrp -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newuidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/gpasswd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newgidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/umount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/passwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/crontab -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/at -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes ## Privilege escalation via su or sudo. This is entirely handled by pam. ## Watch for configuration changes to privilege escalation. -a always,exit -F path=/etc/sudoers -F perm=wa -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F dir=/etc/sudoers.d/ -F perm=wa -F key=special-config-changes ## Audit log access -a always,exit -F dir=/var/log/audit/ -F perm=r -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access-audit-trail ## Attempts to Alter Process and Session Initiation Information -a always,exit -F path=/var/run/utmp -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=session -a always,exit -F path=/var/log/btmp -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=session -a always,exit -F path=/var/log/wtmp -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=session ## Attempts to modify MAC controls -a always,exit -F dir=/etc/selinux/ -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=MAC-policy ## Software updates. This is entirely handled by rpm. ## System start and shutdown. This is entirely handled by systemd ## Kernel Module loading. This is handled in 43-module-load.rules ## Application invocation. The requirements list an optional requirement ## FPT_SRP_EXT.1 Software Restriction Policies. This event is intended to ## state results from that policy. This would be handled entirely by ## that daemon. ## Unsuccessful ownership change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change ## Successful ownership change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-owner-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-owner-change ## Unsuccessful permission change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change ## Successful permission change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change -a always,exit -F 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^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:-S[\s]+(?:[\S]+,)*(open_by_handle_at)(?:,[\S]+)*)[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+a2&03)[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+path=/etc/passwd)[\s]+(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295)[\s]+)(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:-S[\s]+(?:[\S]+,)*(openat)(?:,[\S]+)*)[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+a2&03)[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+path=/etc/passwd)[\s]+(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295)[\s]+)(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:-S[\s]+(?:[\S]+,)*(openat)(?:,[\S]+)*)[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+a2&03)[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+path=/etc/passwd)[\s]+(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295)[\s]+)(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:-S[\s]+(?:[\S]+,)*(open)(?:,[\S]+)*)[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+a1&03)[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+path=/etc/shadow)[\s]+(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295)[\s]+)(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:-S[\s]+(?:[\S]+,)*(open)(?:,[\S]+)*)[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+a1&03)[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+path=/etc/shadow)[\s]+(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295)[\s]+)(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:-S[\s]+(?:[\S]+,)*(open_by_handle_at)(?:,[\S]+)*)[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+a2&03)[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+path=/etc/shadow)[\s]+(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295)[\s]+)(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ 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^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+fchownat[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])fchownat([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+fchownat[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])fchownat([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* [\s]+(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295)[\s]+)(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+fremovexattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])fremovexattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+fremovexattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])fremovexattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* [\s]+(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295)[\s]+)(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+fsetxattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])fsetxattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+fsetxattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])fsetxattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* [\s]+(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295)[\s]+)(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+ftruncate[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])ftruncate([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+ftruncate[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])ftruncate([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* [\s]+(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295)[\s]+)(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+lchown[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])lchown([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+lchown[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])lchown([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* [\s]+(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295)[\s]+)(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+lremovexattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])lremovexattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+lremovexattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])lremovexattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* [\s]+(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295)[\s]+)(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+lsetxattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])lsetxattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+lsetxattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])lsetxattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* [\s]+(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295)[\s]+)(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+open[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])open([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+open[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])open([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* [\s]+(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295)[\s]+)(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+open_by_handle_at[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])open_by_handle_at([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+open_by_handle_at[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])open_by_handle_at([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* [\s]+(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295)[\s]+)(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:-S[\s]+(?:[\S]+,)*(open_by_handle_at)(?:,[\S]+)*)[\s]+ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:-S[\s]+(?:[\S]+,)*(open_by_handle_at)(?:,[\S]+)*)[\s]+ [\s]+(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295)[\s]+)(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ (?:[^.]|\.\s)* (?:-F\s+a2&0100)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+a2&0100)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) (?:-F\s+a2&0100)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+a2&0100)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:-S[\s]+(?:[\S]+,)*(open_by_handle_at)(?:,[\S]+)*)[\s]+ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:-S[\s]+(?:[\S]+,)*(open_by_handle_at)(?:,[\S]+)*)[\s]+ [\s]+(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295)[\s]+)(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ (?:[^.]|\.\s)* (?:-F\s+a2&01003)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+a2&01003)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) (?:-F\s+a2&01003)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+a2&01003)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:-S[\s]+(?:[\S]+,)*(open_by_handle_at)(?:,[\S]+)*)[\s]+ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:-S[\s]+(?:[\S]+,)*(open_by_handle_at)(?:,[\S]+)*)[\s]+ [\s]+(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(?:unset|4294967295)[\s]+)(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ (?:-F\s+a2&0100)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+a2&01003)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+a2&0100)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) (?:-F\s+a2&01003)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) (?:-F\s+a2&0100)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+a2&01003)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+a2&0100)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) (?:-F\s+a2&01003)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) ^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $ ^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $ ^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $ ^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $ ^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $ ^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $ ^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $ ^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:-S[\s]+(?:[\S]+,)*(open)(?:,[\S]+)*)[\s]+ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:-S[\s]+(?:[\S]+,)*(open)(?:,[\S]+)*)[\s]+ [\s]+(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295)[\s]+)(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ (?:[^.]|\.\s)* (?:-F\s+a1&0100)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+a1&0100)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) (?:-F\s+a1&0100)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+a1&0100)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:-S[\s]+(?:[\S]+,)*(open)(?:,[\S]+)*)[\s]+ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:-S[\s]+(?:[\S]+,)*(open)(?:,[\S]+)*)[\s]+ [\s]+(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295)[\s]+)(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ (?:[^.]|\.\s)* (?:-F\s+a1&01003)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+a1&01003)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) (?:-F\s+a1&01003)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+a1&01003)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:-S[\s]+(?:[\S]+,)*(open)(?:,[\S]+)*)[\s]+ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:-S[\s]+(?:[\S]+,)*(open)(?:,[\S]+)*)[\s]+ [\s]+(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(?:unset|4294967295)[\s]+)(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ (?:-F\s+a1&0100)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+a1&01003)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+a1&0100)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) (?:-F\s+a1&01003)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) (?:-F\s+a1&0100)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+a1&01003)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+a1&0100)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) (?:-F\s+a1&01003)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) ^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $ ^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $ ^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $ ^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $ ^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $ ^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $ ^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $ ^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+openat[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])openat([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+openat[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])openat([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* [\s]+(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295)[\s]+)(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:-S[\s]+(?:[\S]+,)*(openat)(?:,[\S]+)*)[\s]+ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:-S[\s]+(?:[\S]+,)*(openat)(?:,[\S]+)*)[\s]+ [\s]+(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295)[\s]+)(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ (?:[^.]|\.\s)* (?:-F\s+a2&0100)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+a2&0100)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) (?:-F\s+a2&0100)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+a2&0100)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:-S[\s]+(?:[\S]+,)*(openat)(?:,[\S]+)*)[\s]+ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:-S[\s]+(?:[\S]+,)*(openat)(?:,[\S]+)*)[\s]+ [\s]+(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295)[\s]+)(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ (?:[^.]|\.\s)* (?:-F\s+a2&01003)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+a2&01003)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) (?:-F\s+a2&01003)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+a2&01003)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:-S[\s]+(?:[\S]+,)*(openat)(?:,[\S]+)*)[\s]+ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:-S[\s]+(?:[\S]+,)*(openat)(?:,[\S]+)*)[\s]+ [\s]+(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(?:unset|4294967295)[\s]+)(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ (?:-F\s+a2&0100)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+a2&01003)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+a2&0100)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) (?:-F\s+a2&01003)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) (?:-F\s+a2&0100)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+a2&01003)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+a2&0100)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) (?:-F\s+a2&01003)[\s]+(?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) ^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $ ^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $ ^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $ ^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $ ^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $ ^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $ ^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $ ^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $\n(^(?! | ).*$\n)*^ $ ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+removexattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])removexattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+removexattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])removexattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* [\s]+(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295)[\s]+)(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+rename[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])rename([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+rename[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])rename([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* [\s]+(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295)[\s]+)(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+renameat[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])renameat([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+renameat[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])renameat([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* [\s]+(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295)[\s]+)(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+setxattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])setxattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+setxattr[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])setxattr([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* [\s]+(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295)[\s]+)(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+truncate[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])truncate([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+truncate[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])truncate([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* [\s]+(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295)[\s]+)(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+unlink[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])unlink([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+unlink[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])unlink([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* [\s]+(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295)[\s]+)(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+unlinkat[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])unlinkat([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+unlinkat[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])unlinkat([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* [\s]+(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295)[\s]+)(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) ^\-w[\s]+ \/var\/log\/sudo.log [\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ ^(?:.*\s)?l1tf= (?:\s.*)?$ ^(?:.*\s)?rng_core.default_quality= (?:\s.*)?$ ^(?:.*\s)?slub_debug= (?:\s.*)?$ ^(?:.*\s)?spec_store_bypass_disable= (?:\s.*)?$ /etc/modprobe.d /etc/modules-load.d /run/modprobe.d /run/modules-load.d /usr/lib/modprobe.d /usr/lib/modules-load.d /etc/modprobe.d /etc/modules-load.d /run/modprobe.d /run/modules-load.d /usr/lib/modprobe.d /usr/lib/modules-load.d /etc/modprobe.d /etc/modules-load.d /run/modprobe.d /run/modules-load.d /usr/lib/modprobe.d /usr/lib/modules-load.d /etc/modprobe.d /etc/modules-load.d /run/modprobe.d /run/modules-load.d /usr/lib/modprobe.d /usr/lib/modules-load.d /etc/modprobe.d /etc/modules-load.d /run/modprobe.d /run/modules-load.d /usr/lib/modprobe.d /usr/lib/modules-load.d /etc/modprobe.d /etc/modules-load.d /run/modprobe.d /run/modules-load.d /usr/lib/modprobe.d /usr/lib/modules-load.d /etc/modprobe.d /etc/modules-load.d /run/modprobe.d /run/modules-load.d /usr/lib/modprobe.d /usr/lib/modules-load.d /etc/modprobe.d /etc/modules-load.d /run/modprobe.d /run/modules-load.d /usr/lib/modprobe.d /usr/lib/modules-load.d /etc/modprobe.d /etc/modules-load.d /run/modprobe.d /run/modules-load.d /usr/lib/modprobe.d /usr/lib/modules-load.d /etc/modprobe.d /etc/modules-load.d /run/modprobe.d /run/modules-load.d /usr/lib/modprobe.d /usr/lib/modules-load.d /etc/modprobe.d /etc/modules-load.d /run/modprobe.d /run/modules-load.d /usr/lib/modprobe.d /usr/lib/modules-load.d /etc/modprobe.d /etc/modules-load.d /run/modprobe.d /run/modules-load.d /usr/lib/modprobe.d /usr/lib/modules-load.d /etc/modprobe.d /etc/modules-load.d /run/modprobe.d /run/modules-load.d /usr/lib/modprobe.d /usr/lib/modules-load.d /etc/modprobe.d /etc/modules-load.d /run/modprobe.d /run/modules-load.d /usr/lib/modprobe.d /usr/lib/modules-load.d /etc/modprobe.d /etc/modules-load.d /run/modprobe.d /run/modules-load.d /usr/lib/modprobe.d /usr/lib/modules-load.d /etc/modprobe.d /etc/modules-load.d /run/modprobe.d /run/modules-load.d /usr/lib/modprobe.d /usr/lib/modules-load.d /etc/modprobe.d /etc/modules-load.d /run/modprobe.d /run/modules-load.d /usr/lib/modprobe.d /usr/lib/modules-load.d /etc/modprobe.d /etc/modules-load.d /run/modprobe.d /run/modules-load.d /usr/lib/modprobe.d /usr/lib/modules-load.d /etc/modprobe.d /etc/modules-load.d /run/modprobe.d /run/modules-load.d /usr/lib/modprobe.d /usr/lib/modules-load.d /etc/modprobe.d /etc/modules-load.d /run/modprobe.d /run/modules-load.d /usr/lib/modprobe.d /usr/lib/modules-load.d /etc/modprobe.d /etc/modules-load.d /run/modprobe.d /run/modules-load.d /usr/lib/modprobe.d /usr/lib/modules-load.d /etc/modprobe.d /etc/modules-load.d /run/modprobe.d /run/modules-load.d /usr/lib/modprobe.d /usr/lib/modules-load.d /dev/cdrom /dev/dvd /dev/scd0 /dev/sr0 ^[\s]* [\s]+[/\w]+[\s]+[\w]+[\s]+([^\s]+)(?:[\s]+[\d]+){2}$ ^[\s]* [\s]+[/\w]+[\s]+[\w]+[\s]+([^\s]+)(?:[\s]+[\d]+){2}$ /dev/cdrom /dev/dvd /dev/scd0 /dev/sr0 ^[\s]* [\s]+[/\w]+[\s]+[\w]+[\s]+([^\s]+)(?:[\s]+[\d]+){2}$ ^[\s]* [\s]+[/\w]+[\s]+[\w]+[\s]+([^\s]+)(?:[\s]+[\d]+){2}$ /dev/cdrom /dev/dvd /dev/scd0 /dev/sr0 ^[\s]* [\s]+[/\w]+[\s]+[\w]+[\s]+([^\s]+)(?:[\s]+[\d]+){2}$ ^[\s]* [\s]+[/\w]+[\s]+[\w]+[\s]+([^\s]+)(?:[\s]+[\d]+){2}$ hidepid= ^/etc/rsyslog.conf$ ^/etc/rsyslog.conf$ ^/etc/rsyslog.conf$ /etc/pam.d/system-auth /dev/cdrom /dev/dvd /dev/scd0 /dev/sr0 64 8 64 8 build_shorthand.py from SCAP Security Guide ssg: 0.1.72 2.0 2024-01-26T00:06:41 Verify Permissions on cron.d ocil:ssg-file_permissions_cron_d_action:testaction:1 Install dnf-automatic Package ocil:ssg-package_dnf-automatic_installed_action:testaction:1 Configure auditing of successful permission changes ocil:ssg-audit_perm_change_success_action:testaction:1 Disable the mozilla_plugin_use_bluejeans SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_mozilla_plugin_use_bluejeans_action:testaction:1 Disable the authlogin_radius SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_authlogin_radius_action:testaction:1 Verify nftables Service is Enabled ocil:ssg-service_nftables_enabled_action:testaction:1 Verify that System Executables Have Restrictive Permissions ocil:ssg-file_permissions_binary_dirs_action:testaction:1 Add noexec Option to Removable Media Partitions ocil:ssg-mount_option_noexec_removable_partitions_action:testaction:1 Configure the confidence in TPM for entropy ocil:ssg-grub2_rng_core_default_quality_argument_action:testaction:1 Disable the xguest_mount_media SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_xguest_mount_media_action:testaction:1 Install the Asset Configuration Compliance Module (ACCM) ocil:ssg-install_mcafee_hbss_accm_action:testaction:1 Uninstall talk Package ocil:ssg-package_talk_removed_action:testaction:1 Disable the openvpn_run_unconfined SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_openvpn_run_unconfined_action:testaction:1 Set SSH Client Alive Interval ocil:ssg-sshd_set_idle_timeout_action:testaction:1 Enable Kernel Parameter to Ignore Bogus ICMP Error Responses on IPv4 Interfaces ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses_action:testaction:1 Enable checks on linked list manipulation ocil:ssg-kernel_config_debug_list_action:testaction:1 Ensure Users Cannot Change GNOME3 Screensaver Idle Activation ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_screensaver_idle_activation_locked_action:testaction:1 Verify User Who Owns Backup passwd File ocil:ssg-file_owner_backup_etc_passwd_action:testaction:1 Disable Kernel Image Loading ocil:ssg-sysctl_kernel_kexec_load_disabled_action:testaction:1 Uninstall abrt-cli Package ocil:ssg-package_abrt-cli_removed_action:testaction:1 Disable the git_system_use_nfs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_git_system_use_nfs_action:testaction:1 Disable the xdm_sysadm_login SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_xdm_sysadm_login_action:testaction:1 Record Unsuccessful Ownership Changes to Files - fchownat ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fchownat_action:testaction:1 Disallow magic SysRq key ocil:ssg-sysctl_kernel_sysrq_action:testaction:1 Disable SSH Support for User Known Hosts ocil:ssg-sshd_disable_user_known_hosts_action:testaction:1 Disable Cyrus SASL Authentication Daemon (saslauthd) ocil:ssg-service_saslauthd_disabled_action:testaction:1 Ensure Rsyslog Authenticates Off-Loaded Audit Records ocil:ssg-rsyslog_encrypt_offload_actionsendstreamdriverauthmode_action:testaction:1 Disable the ftpd_connect_db SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_ftpd_connect_db_action:testaction:1 Disable GDM Automatic Login ocil:ssg-gnome_gdm_disable_automatic_login_action:testaction:1 Disable Kernel iwlwifi Module ocil:ssg-kernel_module_iwlwifi_disabled_action:testaction:1 Set Password Minimum Length in login.defs ocil:ssg-accounts_password_minlen_login_defs_action:testaction:1 Ensure All Accounts on the System Have Unique Names ocil:ssg-account_unique_name_action:testaction:1 Configure the gluster_export_all_rw SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_gluster_export_all_rw_action:testaction:1 Enable use of Berkeley Packet Filter with seccomp ocil:ssg-kernel_config_seccomp_filter_action:testaction:1 Enable log_config_module For HTTPD Logging ocil:ssg-httpd_enable_log_config_action:testaction:1 Verify Group Who Owns SSH Server config file ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_sshd_config_action:testaction:1 Add noexec Option to /var/tmp ocil:ssg-mount_option_var_tmp_noexec_action:testaction:1 Disallow kernel profiling by unprivileged users ocil:ssg-sysctl_kernel_perf_event_paranoid_action:testaction:1 Prevent Routing External Traffic to Local Loopback on All IPv4 Interfaces ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_route_localnet_action:testaction:1 Do not allow ACPI methods to be inserted/replaced at run time ocil:ssg-kernel_config_acpi_custom_method_action:testaction:1 Configure SSSD LDAP Backend Client CA Certificate ocil:ssg-sssd_ldap_configure_tls_ca_action:testaction:1 Set PAM''s Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth ocil:ssg-set_password_hashing_algorithm_passwordauth_action:testaction:1 Configure auditing of unsuccessful file modifications ocil:ssg-audit_modify_failed_action:testaction:1 Verify Permissions on group File ocil:ssg-file_permissions_etc_group_action:testaction:1 Set Permissions on the /etc/httpd/conf/ Directory ocil:ssg-dir_perms_etc_httpd_conf_action:testaction:1 Verify /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg User Ownership ocil:ssg-file_owner_efi_user_cfg_action:testaction:1 Configure basic parameters of Audit system ocil:ssg-audit_basic_configuration_action:testaction:1 Ensure All Accounts on the System Have Unique User IDs ocil:ssg-account_unique_id_action:testaction:1 Ensure All World-Writable Directories Are Group Owned by a System Account ocil:ssg-dir_perms_world_writable_system_owned_group_action:testaction:1 Install iptables Package ocil:ssg-package_iptables_installed_action:testaction:1 Disable the antivirus_use_jit SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_antivirus_use_jit_action:testaction:1 Configure SSH Server to Use FIPS 140-2 Validated MACs: opensshserver.config ocil:ssg-harden_sshd_macs_opensshserver_conf_crypto_policy_action:testaction:1 Disable the use_lpd_server SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_use_lpd_server_action:testaction:1 Install rng-tools Package ocil:ssg-package_rng-tools_installed_action:testaction:1 Enable SLUB/SLAB allocator poisoning in zIPL ocil:ssg-zipl_slub_debug_argument_action:testaction:1 Explicit arguments in sudo specifications ocil:ssg-sudoers_explicit_command_args_action:testaction:1 Disable Portreserve (portreserve) ocil:ssg-service_portreserve_disabled_action:testaction:1 Disable Kernel mac80211 Module ocil:ssg-kernel_module_mac80211_disabled_action:testaction:1 Install the ntp service ocil:ssg-package_ntp_installed_action:testaction:1 Authorize Human Interface Devices in USBGuard daemon ocil:ssg-usbguard_allow_hid_action:testaction:1 System Audit Logs Must Be Owned By Root ocil:ssg-file_ownership_var_log_audit_stig_action:testaction:1 Enable the selinuxuser_ping SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_selinuxuser_ping_action:testaction:1 Ensure /tmp Located On Separate Partition ocil:ssg-partition_for_tmp_action:testaction:1 Ensure SELinux is Not Disabled ocil:ssg-selinux_not_disabled_action:testaction:1 Record Unsuccessful Modification Attempts to Files - openat O_TRUNC_WRITE ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_openat_o_trunc_write_action:testaction:1 Record Unsuccessful Access Attempts to Files - creat ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_creat_action:testaction:1 Ensure sudo Ignores Commands In Current Dir - sudo ignore_dot ocil:ssg-sudo_add_ignore_dot_action:testaction:1 Disable the httpd_use_gpg SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_use_gpg_action:testaction:1 Ensure No Daemons are Unconfined by SELinux ocil:ssg-selinux_confinement_of_daemons_action:testaction:1 Uninstall rsync Package ocil:ssg-package_rsync_removed_action:testaction:1 Disable SSH Support for Rhosts RSA Authentication ocil:ssg-sshd_disable_rhosts_rsa_action:testaction:1 Disable kernel support for MISC binaries ocil:ssg-kernel_config_binfmt_misc_action:testaction:1 Uninstall talk-server Package ocil:ssg-package_talk-server_removed_action:testaction:1 Disable All GNOME3 Thumbnailers ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_disable_thumbnailers_action:testaction:1 Disable the virt_sandbox_use_all_caps SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_virt_sandbox_use_all_caps_action:testaction:1 Disable X11 Forwarding ocil:ssg-sshd_disable_x11_forwarding_action:testaction:1 Disable the dhcpc_exec_iptables SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_dhcpc_exec_iptables_action:testaction:1 Ensure System is Not Acting as a Network Sniffer ocil:ssg-network_sniffer_disabled_action:testaction:1 Verify Permissions on Backup passwd File ocil:ssg-file_permissions_backup_etc_passwd_action:testaction:1 Enable PAM ocil:ssg-sshd_enable_pam_action:testaction:1 Disable rsh Service ocil:ssg-service_rsh_disabled_action:testaction:1 Disable the cups_execmem SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_cups_execmem_action:testaction:1 Enable authselect ocil:ssg-enable_authselect_action:testaction:1 The operating system must restrict privilege elevation to authorized personnel ocil:ssg-sudo_restrict_privilege_elevation_to_authorized_action:testaction:1 Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - umount ocil:ssg-audit_rules_dac_modification_umount_action:testaction:1 Disable storing core dumps ocil:ssg-sysctl_kernel_core_pattern_action:testaction:1 Disable x86 vsyscall emulation ocil:ssg-kernel_config_x86_vsyscall_emulation_action:testaction:1 Disable Accepting ICMP Redirects for All IPv6 Interfaces ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects_action:testaction:1 Enable SSH Warning Banner ocil:ssg-sshd_enable_warning_banner_net_action:testaction:1 Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Secure ICMP Redirects on all IPv4 Interfaces ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects_action:testaction:1 Disable DHCP Client in ifcfg ocil:ssg-sysconfig_networking_bootproto_ifcfg_action:testaction:1 Verify that audit tools Have Mode 0755 or less ocil:ssg-file_permissions_audit_binaries_action:testaction:1 Disable support for /proc/kkcore ocil:ssg-kernel_config_proc_kcore_action:testaction:1 Limit the Number of Concurrent Login Sessions Allowed Per User ocil:ssg-accounts_max_concurrent_login_sessions_action:testaction:1 Require modules to be validly signed ocil:ssg-kernel_config_module_sig_force_action:testaction:1 Force initialization of variables containing userspace addresses ocil:ssg-kernel_config_gcc_plugin_structleak_action:testaction:1 Disable the httpd_tmp_exec SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_tmp_exec_action:testaction:1 Disable Automatic Bug Reporting Tool (abrtd) ocil:ssg-service_abrtd_disabled_action:testaction:1 Disable the nfsd_anon_write SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_nfsd_anon_write_action:testaction:1 Configure SSH Server to Use FIPS 140-2 Validated Ciphers: opensshserver.config ocil:ssg-harden_sshd_ciphers_opensshserver_conf_crypto_policy_action:testaction:1 Configure auditing of successful ownership changes ocil:ssg-audit_owner_change_success_action:testaction:1 Installation of a compiler on production web server is prohibited ocil:ssg-httpd_no_compilers_in_prod_action:testaction:1 Set Password Warning Age ocil:ssg-accounts_password_warn_age_login_defs_action:testaction:1 Use Only FIPS 140-2 Validated Ciphers ocil:ssg-sshd_use_approved_ciphers_action:testaction:1 Configure AIDE to Verify Access Control Lists (ACLs) ocil:ssg-aide_verify_acls_action:testaction:1 Verify Group Who Owns cron.d ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_cron_d_action:testaction:1 Disable the secure_mode_policyload SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_secure_mode_policyload_action:testaction:1 Enable the postfix_local_write_mail_spool SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_postfix_local_write_mail_spool_action:testaction:1 Disable the sanlock_use_nfs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_sanlock_use_nfs_action:testaction:1 Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification ocil:ssg-display_login_attempts_action:testaction:1 Mount Remote Filesystems with noexec ocil:ssg-mount_option_noexec_remote_filesystems_action:testaction:1 Ensure All SGID Executables Are Authorized ocil:ssg-file_permissions_unauthorized_sgid_action:testaction:1 Disable the samba_share_fusefs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_samba_share_fusefs_action:testaction:1 Audit Configuration Files Must Be Owned By Root ocil:ssg-file_ownership_audit_configuration_action:testaction:1 Enable Randomized Layout of Virtual Address Space ocil:ssg-sysctl_kernel_randomize_va_space_action:testaction:1 Install the Samba Common Package ocil:ssg-package_samba-common_installed_action:testaction:1 Ensure All Groups on the System Have Unique Group ID ocil:ssg-group_unique_id_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects System Administrator Actions ocil:ssg-audit_rules_sysadmin_actions_action:testaction:1 Disable Kerberos Authentication ocil:ssg-sshd_disable_kerb_auth_action:testaction:1 Verify Group Who Owns Backup gshadow File ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_backup_etc_gshadow_action:testaction:1 System Audit Logs Must Be Owned By Root ocil:ssg-file_ownership_var_log_audit_action:testaction:1 Disable the mcelog_client SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_mcelog_client_action:testaction:1 Ensure that /etc/cron.deny does not exist ocil:ssg-file_cron_deny_not_exist_action:testaction:1 Configure auditing of successful file accesses ocil:ssg-audit_access_success_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - passwd ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_passwd_action:testaction:1 Verify User Who Owns passwd File ocil:ssg-file_owner_etc_passwd_action:testaction:1 Disable the git_cgi_use_nfs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_git_cgi_use_nfs_action:testaction:1 Disable the samba_export_all_ro SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_samba_export_all_ro_action:testaction:1 Verify Permissions on cron.monthly ocil:ssg-file_permissions_cron_monthly_action:testaction:1 Configure The Number of Allowed Simultaneous Requests ocil:ssg-httpd_configure_max_keepalive_requests_action:testaction:1 Install iptables-services Package ocil:ssg-package_iptables-services_installed_action:testaction:1 Disable the httpd_use_cifs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_use_cifs_action:testaction:1 Record Events that Modify User/Group Information - /etc/security/opasswd ocil:ssg-audit_rules_usergroup_modification_opasswd_action:testaction:1 Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Enforce for Local Accounts Only ocil:ssg-accounts_password_pam_enforce_local_action:testaction:1 Add nosuid Option to /srv ocil:ssg-mount_option_srv_nosuid_action:testaction:1 Disable rexec Service ocil:ssg-service_rexec_disabled_action:testaction:1 Appropriate Action Must be Setup When the Internal Audit Event Queue is Full ocil:ssg-auditd_overflow_action_action:testaction:1 Verify Permissions on SSH Server config file ocil:ssg-file_permissions_sshd_config_action:testaction:1 Disable debug-shell SystemD Service ocil:ssg-service_debug-shell_disabled_action:testaction:1 Record Successful Creation Attempts to Files - open O_TRUNC_WRITE ocil:ssg-audit_rules_successful_file_modification_open_o_trunc_write_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects Information on Kernel Module Loading - init_module ocil:ssg-audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_init_action:testaction:1 Enable ExecShield via sysctl ocil:ssg-sysctl_kernel_exec_shield_action:testaction:1 Verify that Shared Library Files Have Restrictive Permissions ocil:ssg-file_permissions_library_dirs_action:testaction:1 Disable Kernel Parameter for IPv4 Forwarding on all IPv4 Interfaces ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_forwarding_action:testaction:1 Disable the nagios_run_pnp4nagios SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_nagios_run_pnp4nagios_action:testaction:1 Configure the deny_execmem SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_deny_execmem_action:testaction:1 Configure session renegotiation for SSH client ocil:ssg-ssh_client_rekey_limit_action:testaction:1 Verify Group Who Owns passwd File ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_etc_passwd_action:testaction:1 Verify /boot/grub2/grub.cfg User Ownership ocil:ssg-file_owner_grub2_cfg_action:testaction:1 Disable Avahi Server Software ocil:ssg-service_avahi-daemon_disabled_action:testaction:1 Install fapolicyd Package ocil:ssg-package_fapolicyd_installed_action:testaction:1 Disable Modprobe Loading of USB Storage Driver ocil:ssg-kernel_module_usb-storage_disabled_action:testaction:1 Specify a Remote NTP Server ocil:ssg-ntpd_specify_remote_server_action:testaction:1 Disable IPv6 Addressing on All IPv6 Interfaces ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_disable_ipv6_action:testaction:1 All Interactive Users Home Directories Must Exist ocil:ssg-accounts_user_interactive_home_directory_exists_action:testaction:1 Verify User Who Owns /etc/cron.allow file ocil:ssg-file_owner_cron_allow_action:testaction:1 Set number of records to cause an explicit flush to audit logs ocil:ssg-auditd_freq_action:testaction:1 Use Only FIPS 140-2 Validated Key Exchange Algorithms ocil:ssg-sshd_use_approved_kex_ordered_stig_action:testaction:1 Verify nftables Service is Disabled ocil:ssg-service_nftables_disabled_action:testaction:1 Disable CAN Support ocil:ssg-kernel_module_can_disabled_action:testaction:1 Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - setxattr ocil:ssg-audit_rules_dac_modification_setxattr_action:testaction:1 Limit Password Reuse: system-auth ocil:ssg-accounts_password_pam_pwhistory_remember_system_auth_action:testaction:1 Disable the IPv6 protocol ocil:ssg-kernel_config_ipv6_action:testaction:1 Disable the pppd_can_insmod SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_pppd_can_insmod_action:testaction:1 All Interactive User Home Directories Must Have mode 0750 Or Less Permissive ocil:ssg-file_permissions_home_directories_action:testaction:1 Enable syslog-ng Service ocil:ssg-service_syslogng_enabled_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - newuidmap ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_newuidmap_action:testaction:1 Enable the domain_fd_use SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_domain_fd_use_action:testaction:1 Disable storing core dump ocil:ssg-coredump_disable_storage_action:testaction:1 Disable Bluetooth Kernel Module ocil:ssg-kernel_module_bluetooth_disabled_action:testaction:1 Public web server resources must not be shared with private assets ocil:ssg-httpd_public_resources_not_shared_action:testaction:1 Disable the samba_enable_home_dirs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_samba_enable_home_dirs_action:testaction:1 Disable Accepting ICMP Redirects for All IPv4 Interfaces ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - newgidmap ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_newgidmap_action:testaction:1 Disable the httpd_serve_cobbler_files SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_serve_cobbler_files_action:testaction:1 Uninstall setroubleshoot-server Package ocil:ssg-package_setroubleshoot-server_removed_action:testaction:1 System Audit Directories Must Be Group Owned By Root ocil:ssg-directory_group_ownership_var_log_audit_action:testaction:1 Record Unsuccessful Ownership Changes to Files - chown ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_chown_action:testaction:1 Disable the polipo_use_cifs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_polipo_use_cifs_action:testaction:1 Install policycoreutils-python-utils package ocil:ssg-package_policycoreutils-python-utils_installed_action:testaction:1 Disable Quagga Service ocil:ssg-service_zebra_disabled_action:testaction:1 Disable the glance_use_execmem SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_glance_use_execmem_action:testaction:1 Ensure Red Hat GPG Key Installed ocil:ssg-ensure_redhat_gpgkey_installed_action:testaction:1 Harden OpenSSL Crypto Policy ocil:ssg-harden_openssl_crypto_policy_action:testaction:1 Configure Denying Router Solicitations on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_router_solicitations_action:testaction:1 Ensure SELinux Not Disabled in /etc/default/grub ocil:ssg-grub2_enable_selinux_action:testaction:1 Ensure /dev/shm is configured ocil:ssg-partition_for_dev_shm_action:testaction:1 Ensure all users last password change date is in the past ocil:ssg-accounts_password_last_change_is_in_past_action:testaction:1 Install vim Package ocil:ssg-package_vim_installed_action:testaction:1 Disable the authlogin_yubikey SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_authlogin_yubikey_action:testaction:1 Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Uppercase Characters ocil:ssg-accounts_password_pam_ucredit_action:testaction:1 Disable the selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot_action:testaction:1 Ensure Logrotate Runs Periodically ocil:ssg-ensure_logrotate_activated_action:testaction:1 Configure the polyinstantiation_enabled SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_polyinstantiation_enabled_action:testaction:1 Disable the CUPS Service ocil:ssg-service_cups_disabled_action:testaction:1 Configure System to Forward All Mail From Postmaster to The Root Account ocil:ssg-postfix_client_configure_mail_alias_postmaster_action:testaction:1 Disable the httpd_verify_dns SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_verify_dns_action:testaction:1 Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - lremovexattr ocil:ssg-audit_rules_dac_modification_lremovexattr_action:testaction:1 Disable the httpd_run_ipa SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_run_ipa_action:testaction:1 Configure SELinux Policy ocil:ssg-selinux_policytype_action:testaction:1 Configure Backups of User Data ocil:ssg-configure_user_data_backups_action:testaction:1 Set configuration for IPv6 loopback traffic ocil:ssg-set_ipv6_loopback_traffic_action:testaction:1 The Installed Operating System Is FIPS 140-2 Certified ocil:ssg-installed_OS_is_FIPS_certified_action:testaction:1 Uninstall abrt-plugin-logger Package ocil:ssg-package_abrt-plugin-logger_removed_action:testaction:1 Disable Network File System (nfs) ocil:ssg-service_nfs_disabled_action:testaction:1 Disable the httpd_can_network_memcache SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_can_network_memcache_action:testaction:1 Disable the httpd_can_connect_zabbix SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_can_connect_zabbix_action:testaction:1 Verify User Who Owns gshadow File ocil:ssg-file_owner_etc_gshadow_action:testaction:1 Add hidepid Option to /proc ocil:ssg-mount_option_proc_hidepid_action:testaction:1 Enable poison of pages after freeing ocil:ssg-kernel_config_page_poisoning_action:testaction:1 Verify Group Ownership on SSH Server Public *.pub Key Files ocil:ssg-file_groupownership_sshd_pub_key_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_action:testaction:1 Configure Maximum Number of Autoconfigured Addresses on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_max_addresses_action:testaction:1 Disable LDAP Server (slapd) ocil:ssg-service_slapd_disabled_action:testaction:1 Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts ocil:ssg-accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time_action:testaction:1 Enable Kernel Parameter to Use Reverse Path Filtering on all IPv4 Interfaces ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter_action:testaction:1 Remove telnet Clients ocil:ssg-package_telnet_removed_action:testaction:1 Install audispd-plugins Package ocil:ssg-package_audispd-plugins_installed_action:testaction:1 Disable the postgresql_selinux_transmit_client_label SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_postgresql_selinux_transmit_client_label_action:testaction:1 Disable Full User Name on Splash Shield ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_screensaver_user_info_action:testaction:1 Add nodev Option to /var ocil:ssg-mount_option_var_nodev_action:testaction:1 An SELinux Context must be configured for the pam_faillock.so records directory ocil:ssg-account_password_selinux_faillock_dir_action:testaction:1 Audit Configuration Files Must Be Owned By Group root ocil:ssg-file_groupownership_audit_configuration_action:testaction:1 Enable HTTPD System Logging ocil:ssg-httpd_enable_system_logging_action:testaction:1 Enforce pam_faillock for Local Accounts Only ocil:ssg-accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_enforce_local_action:testaction:1 Disable the polipo_session_users SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_polipo_session_users_action:testaction:1 Verify Permissions on /var/log/messages File ocil:ssg-file_permissions_var_log_messages_action:testaction:1 Disable the samba_share_nfs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_samba_share_nfs_action:testaction:1 Verify /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg Permissions ocil:ssg-file_permissions_efi_user_cfg_action:testaction:1 Ensure Users Cannot Change GNOME3 Screensaver Settings ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_screensaver_user_locks_action:testaction:1 Record Attempts to Alter Time Through clock_settime ocil:ssg-audit_rules_time_clock_settime_action:testaction:1 Verify Permissions on /etc/audit/auditd.conf ocil:ssg-file_permissions_etc_audit_auditd_action:testaction:1 Ensure the Default Umask is Set Correctly in login.defs ocil:ssg-accounts_umask_etc_login_defs_action:testaction:1 Disable the sge_use_nfs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_sge_use_nfs_action:testaction:1 Disable the daemons_use_tcp_wrapper SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_daemons_use_tcp_wrapper_action:testaction:1 Enable page allocator poisoning in zIPL ocil:ssg-zipl_page_poison_argument_action:testaction:1 Use Only Strong MACs ocil:ssg-sshd_use_strong_macs_action:testaction:1 Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting ICMP Redirects by Default on IPv4 Interfaces ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects_action:testaction:1 Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts ocil:ssg-accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny_action:testaction:1 Perform general configuration of Audit for OSPP ocil:ssg-audit_ospp_general_action:testaction:1 Disable the haproxy_connect_any SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_haproxy_connect_any_action:testaction:1 Record Successful Permission Changes to Files - fchmodat ocil:ssg-audit_rules_successful_file_modification_fchmodat_action:testaction:1 Ensure remote access methods are monitored in Rsyslog ocil:ssg-rsyslog_remote_access_monitoring_action:testaction:1 Make the kernel text and rodata read-only ocil:ssg-kernel_config_strict_kernel_rwx_action:testaction:1 Enable the nfs_export_all_rw SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_nfs_export_all_rw_action:testaction:1 Install binutils Package ocil:ssg-package_binutils_installed_action:testaction:1 Verify that Interactive Boot is Disabled ocil:ssg-grub2_disable_interactive_boot_action:testaction:1 Ensure rsyncd service is disabled ocil:ssg-service_rsyncd_disabled_action:testaction:1 Ensure invoking users password for privilege escalation when using sudo ocil:ssg-sudoers_validate_passwd_action:testaction:1 Add nodev Option to /var/log/audit ocil:ssg-mount_option_var_log_audit_nodev_action:testaction:1 Remove Host-Based Authentication Files ocil:ssg-no_host_based_files_action:testaction:1 The Postfix package is installed ocil:ssg-package_postfix_installed_action:testaction:1 Uninstall cyrus-imapd Package ocil:ssg-package_cyrus-imapd_removed_action:testaction:1 Uninstall squid Package ocil:ssg-package_squid_removed_action:testaction:1 Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on all IPv4 Interfaces ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route_action:testaction:1 Configure BIND to use System Crypto Policy ocil:ssg-configure_bind_crypto_policy_action:testaction:1 Verify Permissions on /etc/at.allow file ocil:ssg-file_permissions_at_allow_action:testaction:1 Force frequent session key renegotiation ocil:ssg-sshd_rekey_limit_action:testaction:1 Require Authentication for Emergency Systemd Target ocil:ssg-require_emergency_target_auth_action:testaction:1 Enable the GNOME3 Login Smartcard Authentication ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_enable_smartcard_auth_action:testaction:1 Enable the user_exec_content SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_user_exec_content_action:testaction:1 Restrict Exposed Kernel Pointer Addresses Access ocil:ssg-sysctl_kernel_kptr_restrict_action:testaction:1 Verify Group Who Owns cron.hourly ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_cron_hourly_action:testaction:1 Record Successful Permission Changes to Files - lremovexattr ocil:ssg-audit_rules_successful_file_modification_lremovexattr_action:testaction:1 Ensure Users Re-Authenticate for Privilege Escalation - sudo ocil:ssg-sudo_require_authentication_action:testaction:1 Verify Permissions on cron.daily ocil:ssg-file_permissions_cron_daily_action:testaction:1 Disable the tftp_anon_write SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_tftp_anon_write_action:testaction:1 Disable the zebra_write_config SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_zebra_write_config_action:testaction:1 Disable IPv6 Networking Support Automatic Loading ocil:ssg-kernel_module_ipv6_option_disabled_action:testaction:1 Disable the pppd_for_user SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_pppd_for_user_action:testaction:1 Enable the mount_anyfile SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_mount_anyfile_action:testaction:1 Record Events that Modify User/Group Information via openat syscall - /etc/gshadow ocil:ssg-audit_rules_etc_gshadow_openat_action:testaction:1 Shutdown System When Auditing Failures Occur ocil:ssg-audit_rules_system_shutdown_action:testaction:1 Set Boot Loader Password in grub2 ocil:ssg-grub2_password_action:testaction:1 Verify that All World-Writable Directories Have Sticky Bits Set ocil:ssg-dir_perms_world_writable_sticky_bits_action:testaction:1 Randomize the address of the kernel image (KASLR) ocil:ssg-kernel_config_randomize_base_action:testaction:1 Disable the tor_can_network_relay SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_tor_can_network_relay_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - crontab ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_crontab_action:testaction:1 Verify Group Who Owns /etc/cron.allow file ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_cron_allow_action:testaction:1 Ensure All Files Are Owned by a User ocil:ssg-no_files_unowned_by_user_action:testaction:1 Ensure Users Cannot Change GNOME3 Session Idle Settings ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_session_idle_user_locks_action:testaction:1 Disable the mcelog_foreground SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_mcelog_foreground_action:testaction:1 Disable the mplayer_execstack SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_mplayer_execstack_action:testaction:1 Add noexec Option to /boot ocil:ssg-mount_option_boot_noexec_action:testaction:1 Configure Sending and Accepting Shared Media Redirects for All IPv4 Interfaces ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_shared_media_action:testaction:1 Disable the pcp_read_generic_logs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_pcp_read_generic_logs_action:testaction:1 Disable the selinuxuser_rw_noexattrfile SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_selinuxuser_rw_noexattrfile_action:testaction:1 Disable the rsync_full_access SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_rsync_full_access_action:testaction:1 Install usbguard Package ocil:ssg-package_usbguard_installed_action:testaction:1 Ensure Rsyslog Encrypts Off-Loaded Audit Records ocil:ssg-rsyslog_encrypt_offload_defaultnetstreamdriver_action:testaction:1 Disable the ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs_action:testaction:1 Enable Kernel Page-Table Isolation (KPTI) ocil:ssg-grub2_pti_argument_action:testaction:1 Record Events that Modify User/Group Information ocil:ssg-audit_rules_usergroup_modification_action:testaction:1 Direct root Logins Not Allowed ocil:ssg-no_direct_root_logins_action:testaction:1 Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog ocil:ssg-kernel_config_security_dmesg_restrict_action:testaction:1 Enable the unconfined_login SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_unconfined_login_action:testaction:1 Verify Group Who Owns /var/log Directory ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_var_log_action:testaction:1 Disable the samba_export_all_rw SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_samba_export_all_rw_action:testaction:1 Enable the spamd_enable_home_dirs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_spamd_enable_home_dirs_action:testaction:1 Record Any Attempts to Run chcon ocil:ssg-audit_rules_execution_chcon_action:testaction:1 Configure Accepting Router Preference in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_rtr_pref_action:testaction:1 Enable Kernel Parameter to Use TCP RFC 1337 on IPv4 Interfaces ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_rfc1337_action:testaction:1 Assign Expiration Date to Emergency Accounts ocil:ssg-account_emergency_expire_date_action:testaction:1 Remove User Host-Based Authentication Files ocil:ssg-no_user_host_based_files_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects System Administrator Actions - /etc/sudoers ocil:ssg-audit_rules_sudoers_action:testaction:1 Disable the git_system_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_git_system_enable_homedirs_action:testaction:1 Install crypto-policies package ocil:ssg-package_crypto-policies_installed_action:testaction:1 Ensure /usr Located On Separate Partition ocil:ssg-partition_for_usr_action:testaction:1 Disable RDS Support ocil:ssg-kernel_module_rds_disabled_action:testaction:1 Set Default firewalld Zone for Incoming Packets ocil:ssg-set_firewalld_default_zone_action:testaction:1 Configure opensc Smart Card Drivers ocil:ssg-configure_opensc_card_drivers_action:testaction:1 Disable the staff_use_svirt SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_staff_use_svirt_action:testaction:1 Disable the selinuxuser_udp_server SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_selinuxuser_udp_server_action:testaction:1 The Chrony package is installed ocil:ssg-package_chrony_installed_action:testaction:1 Configure the Use of the pam_faillock.so Module in the /etc/pam.d/system-auth File. ocil:ssg-account_password_pam_faillock_system_auth_action:testaction:1 Verify Group Ownership of Message of the Day Banner ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_etc_motd_action:testaction:1 Verify Permissions on Backup group File ocil:ssg-file_permissions_backup_etc_group_action:testaction:1 Configure Auto Configuration on All IPv6 Interfaces ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_autoconf_action:testaction:1 Disable the rsync_client SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_rsync_client_action:testaction:1 Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace ocil:ssg-kernel_config_hardened_usercopy_action:testaction:1 Disable the racoon_read_shadow SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_racoon_read_shadow_action:testaction:1 Write Audit Logs to the Disk ocil:ssg-auditd_write_logs_action:testaction:1 Set existing passwords a period of inactivity before they been locked ocil:ssg-accounts_set_post_pw_existing_action:testaction:1 Record Events that Modify User/Group Information via open syscall - /etc/gshadow ocil:ssg-audit_rules_etc_gshadow_open_action:testaction:1 Disable the httpd_ssi_exec SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_ssi_exec_action:testaction:1 Only the VDSM User Can Use sudo NOPASSWD ocil:ssg-sudo_vdsm_nopasswd_action:testaction:1 Disable Recovery Booting ocil:ssg-grub2_disable_recovery_action:testaction:1 Prevent applications from mapping low portion of virtual memory ocil:ssg-sysctl_vm_mmap_min_addr_action:testaction:1 Verify Group Who Owns Backup passwd File ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_backup_etc_passwd_action:testaction:1 Disable DHCP Service ocil:ssg-service_dhcpd_disabled_action:testaction:1 Ensure /var/log/audit Located On Separate Partition ocil:ssg-partition_for_var_log_audit_action:testaction:1 Create Warning Banners for All FTP Users ocil:ssg-ftp_present_banner_action:testaction:1 Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on all IPv6 Interfaces ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route_action:testaction:1 Set the UEFI Boot Loader Admin Username to a Non-Default Value ocil:ssg-grub2_uefi_admin_username_action:testaction:1 The web server password(s) must be entrusted to the SA or Web Manager ocil:ssg-httpd_entrust_passwords_action:testaction:1 Add nosuid Option to /var/log ocil:ssg-mount_option_var_log_nosuid_action:testaction:1 Disable the httpd_dontaudit_search_dirs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_dontaudit_search_dirs_action:testaction:1 Disable the xguest_connect_network SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_xguest_connect_network_action:testaction:1 HTTPD Log Files Must Be Owned By Root ocil:ssg-http_configure_log_file_ownership_action:testaction:1 Record Events that Modify User/Group Information via openat syscall - /etc/shadow ocil:ssg-audit_rules_etc_shadow_openat_action:testaction:1 Ensure Home Directories are Created for New Users ocil:ssg-accounts_have_homedir_login_defs_action:testaction:1 Enable the fips_mode SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_fips_mode_action:testaction:1 Verify User Who Owns /var/log/messages File ocil:ssg-file_owner_var_log_messages_action:testaction:1 Disable the xserver_object_manager SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_xserver_object_manager_action:testaction:1 Disable Kernel Parameter for Sending ICMP Redirects on all IPv4 Interfaces by Default ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_send_redirects_action:testaction:1 Only Authorized Local User Accounts Exist on Operating System ocil:ssg-accounts_authorized_local_users_action:testaction:1 Enable the LDAP Client For Use in Authconfig ocil:ssg-enable_ldap_client_action:testaction:1 Disable the daemons_enable_cluster_mode SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_daemons_enable_cluster_mode_action:testaction:1 Configure Error Log Format ocil:ssg-httpd_configure_log_format_action:testaction:1 Ignore HTTPD .htaccess Files ocil:ssg-httpd_ignore_htaccess_files_action:testaction:1 Set SSH Daemon LogLevel to VERBOSE ocil:ssg-sshd_set_loglevel_verbose_action:testaction:1 Record Attempts to Alter Time Through stime ocil:ssg-audit_rules_time_stime_action:testaction:1 Disable the httpd_mod_auth_pam SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_mod_auth_pam_action:testaction:1 Harden SSHD Crypto Policy ocil:ssg-harden_sshd_crypto_policy_action:testaction:1 Install rear Package ocil:ssg-package_rear_installed_action:testaction:1 Uninstall abrt-addon-kerneloops Package ocil:ssg-package_abrt-addon-kerneloops_removed_action:testaction:1 Disable the use_fusefs_home_dirs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_use_fusefs_home_dirs_action:testaction:1 Enable checks on credential management ocil:ssg-kernel_config_debug_credentials_action:testaction:1 Configure the Firewalld Ports ocil:ssg-configure_firewalld_ports_action:testaction:1 Ensure All Files Are Owned by a Group ocil:ssg-file_permissions_ungroupowned_action:testaction:1 Disable Cockpit Management Server ocil:ssg-service_cockpit_disabled_action:testaction:1 Install OpenSSH client software ocil:ssg-package_openssh-clients_installed_action:testaction:1 Ensure debug-shell service is not enabled in zIPL ocil:ssg-zipl_systemd_debug-shell_argument_absent_action:testaction:1 Disable the mozilla_plugin_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_mozilla_plugin_can_network_connect_action:testaction:1 Set the GNOME3 Login Warning Banner Text ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_login_banner_text_action:testaction:1 Enable Kernel Paremeter to Log Martian Packets on all IPv4 Interfaces by Default ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians_action:testaction:1 Sign kernel modules with SHA-512 ocil:ssg-kernel_config_module_sig_sha512_action:testaction:1 Uninstall Automatic Bug Reporting Tool (abrt) ocil:ssg-package_abrt_removed_action:testaction:1 Record Successful Ownership Changes to Files - lchown ocil:ssg-audit_rules_successful_file_modification_lchown_action:testaction:1 Configure auditd space_left Action on Low Disk Space ocil:ssg-auditd_data_retention_space_left_action_action:testaction:1 Set Permissions on All Configuration Files Inside /etc/httpd/conf.d/ ocil:ssg-file_permissions_httpd_server_conf_d_files_action:testaction:1 Require Encryption for Remote Access in GNOME3 ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_remote_access_encryption_action:testaction:1 Enable Kernel Parameter to Use TCP Syncookies on Network Interfaces ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies_action:testaction:1 Verify Permissions on SSH Server Public *.pub Key Files ocil:ssg-file_permissions_sshd_pub_key_action:testaction:1 Configure dnf-automatic to Install Only Security Updates ocil:ssg-dnf-automatic_security_updates_only_action:testaction:1 Disable the saslauthd_read_shadow SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_saslauthd_read_shadow_action:testaction:1 Disable the boinc_execmem SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_boinc_execmem_action:testaction:1 Disable the mozilla_plugin_use_gps SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_mozilla_plugin_use_gps_action:testaction:1 Certificate status checking in SSSD ocil:ssg-sssd_certificate_verification_action:testaction:1 Uninstall rsh Package ocil:ssg-package_rsh_removed_action:testaction:1 Disable Access to Network bpf() Syscall From Unprivileged Processes ocil:ssg-sysctl_kernel_unprivileged_bpf_disabled_action:testaction:1 Install nftables Package ocil:ssg-package_nftables_installed_action:testaction:1 Kernel panic on oops ocil:ssg-sysctl_kernel_panic_on_oops_action:testaction:1 Record Unsuccessful Access Attempts to Files - ftruncate ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_ftruncate_action:testaction:1 Set SSH Client Alive Count Max to zero ocil:ssg-sshd_set_keepalive_0_action:testaction:1 Disable the guest_exec_content SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_guest_exec_content_action:testaction:1 Install libreswan Package ocil:ssg-package_libreswan_installed_action:testaction:1 Disable the polipo_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_polipo_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports_action:testaction:1 Enable cron Service ocil:ssg-service_crond_enabled_action:testaction:1 Uninstall openldap-servers Package ocil:ssg-package_openldap-servers_removed_action:testaction:1 Record Any Attempts to Run setfacl ocil:ssg-audit_rules_execution_setfacl_action:testaction:1 Record Attempts to Alter Logon and Logout Events - lastlog ocil:ssg-audit_rules_login_events_lastlog_action:testaction:1 Configure Polyinstantiation of /var/tmp Directories ocil:ssg-accounts_polyinstantiated_var_tmp_action:testaction:1 A private web server must be located on a separate controlled access subnet ocil:ssg-httpd_private_server_on_separate_subnet_action:testaction:1 Install the SSSD Package ocil:ssg-package_sssd_installed_action:testaction:1 Disable SSH Root Login ocil:ssg-sshd_disable_root_login_action:testaction:1 Disable the dbadm_manage_user_files SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_dbadm_manage_user_files_action:testaction:1 Disable the rsync_anon_write SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_rsync_anon_write_action:testaction:1 User Initialization Files Must Not Run World-Writable Programs ocil:ssg-accounts_user_dot_no_world_writable_programs_action:testaction:1 Disable the LDT (local descriptor table) ocil:ssg-kernel_config_modify_ldt_syscall_action:testaction:1 Disable the fenced_can_ssh SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_fenced_can_ssh_action:testaction:1 Disable the mock_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_mock_enable_homedirs_action:testaction:1 Disable core dump backtraces ocil:ssg-coredump_disable_backtraces_action:testaction:1 Set Existing Passwords Minimum Age ocil:ssg-accounts_password_set_min_life_existing_action:testaction:1 Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth ocil:ssg-accounts_password_pam_unix_rounds_system_auth_action:testaction:1 Verify Permissions and Ownership of Old Passwords File ocil:ssg-file_etc_security_opasswd_action:testaction:1 Disable the httpd_tty_comm SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_tty_comm_action:testaction:1 Ensure /var Located On Separate Partition ocil:ssg-partition_for_var_action:testaction:1 Disable the varnishd_connect_any SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_varnishd_connect_any_action:testaction:1 Verify that audit tools are owned by root ocil:ssg-file_ownership_audit_binaries_action:testaction:1 Configure auditd admin_space_left Action on Low Disk Space ocil:ssg-auditd_data_retention_admin_space_left_action_action:testaction:1 Verify Permissions on cron.hourly ocil:ssg-file_permissions_cron_hourly_action:testaction:1 Ensure sudo passwd_timeout is appropriate - sudo passwd_timeout ocil:ssg-sudo_add_passwd_timeout_action:testaction:1 Disable Postfix Network Listening ocil:ssg-postfix_network_listening_disabled_action:testaction:1 Record Events that Modify User/Group Information via openat syscall - /etc/passwd ocil:ssg-audit_rules_etc_passwd_openat_action:testaction:1 Disable the sanlock_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_sanlock_use_fusefs_action:testaction:1 Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fsetxattr ocil:ssg-audit_rules_dac_modification_fsetxattr_action:testaction:1 Record Unsuccessful Access Attempts to Files - truncate ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_truncate_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects Information on Exporting to Media (successful) ocil:ssg-audit_rules_media_export_action:testaction:1 Remove the kernel mapping in user mode ocil:ssg-kernel_config_page_table_isolation_action:testaction:1 Verify Permissions on Backup shadow File ocil:ssg-file_permissions_backup_etc_shadow_action:testaction:1 Enable the GNOME3 Screen Locking On Smartcard Removal ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal_action:testaction:1 Disable the swift_can_network SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_swift_can_network_action:testaction:1 Remove .java And .jpp Files ocil:ssg-httpd_limit_java_files_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - unix_update ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_unix_update_action:testaction:1 Add nodev Option to Non-Root Local Partitions ocil:ssg-mount_option_nodev_nonroot_local_partitions_action:testaction:1 Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Categories ocil:ssg-accounts_password_pam_minclass_action:testaction:1 Install Virus Scanning Software ocil:ssg-install_antivirus_action:testaction:1 Verify Owner on cron.monthly ocil:ssg-file_owner_cron_monthly_action:testaction:1 Deactivate Wireless Network Interfaces ocil:ssg-wireless_disable_interfaces_action:testaction:1 Generate USBGuard Policy ocil:ssg-usbguard_generate_policy_action:testaction:1 Audit Configuration Files Permissions are 640 or More Restrictive ocil:ssg-file_permissions_audit_configuration_action:testaction:1 Configure file name of core dumps ocil:ssg-sysctl_kernel_core_uses_pid_action:testaction:1 Uninstall abrt-plugin-rhtsupport Package ocil:ssg-package_abrt-plugin-rhtsupport_removed_action:testaction:1 Add nodev Option to Removable Media Partitions ocil:ssg-mount_option_nodev_removable_partitions_action:testaction:1 Set the UEFI Boot Loader Password ocil:ssg-grub2_uefi_password_action:testaction:1 Modify the System Message of the Day Banner ocil:ssg-banner_etc_motd_action:testaction:1 Disable the ftpd_anon_write SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_ftpd_anon_write_action:testaction:1 Verify Group Ownership on SSH Server Private *_key Key Files ocil:ssg-file_groupownership_sshd_private_key_action:testaction:1 Disable the piranha_lvs_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_piranha_lvs_can_network_connect_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - usermod ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_usermod_action:testaction:1 Enable Process Accounting (psacct) ocil:ssg-service_psacct_enabled_action:testaction:1 Disable Compression Or Set Compression to delayed ocil:ssg-sshd_disable_compression_action:testaction:1 Verify that System Executable Directories Have Restrictive Permissions ocil:ssg-dir_permissions_binary_dirs_action:testaction:1 Ensure SELinux Not Disabled in zIPL ocil:ssg-zipl_enable_selinux_action:testaction:1 Record Unsuccessful Permission Changes to Files - fremovexattr ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fremovexattr_action:testaction:1 Require Re-Authentication When Using the sudo Command ocil:ssg-sudo_require_reauthentication_action:testaction:1 Ensure iptables Firewall Rules Exist for All Open Ports ocil:ssg-iptables_rules_for_open_ports_action:testaction:1 Remove the FreeRadius Server Package ocil:ssg-package_freeradius_removed_action:testaction:1 Disable the httpd_can_connect_ldap SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_can_connect_ldap_action:testaction:1 Audit Tools Must Be Owned by Root ocil:ssg-file_audit_tools_ownership_action:testaction:1 Install subscription-manager Package ocil:ssg-package_subscription-manager_installed_action:testaction:1 Support session locking with tmux ocil:ssg-configure_bashrc_exec_tmux_action:testaction:1 Unmap kernel when running in userspace (aka KAISER) ocil:ssg-kernel_config_unmap_kernel_at_el0_action:testaction:1 Add nosuid Option to /boot ocil:ssg-mount_option_boot_nosuid_action:testaction:1 Ensure rsyslog Does Not Accept Remote Messages Unless Acting As Log Server ocil:ssg-rsyslog_nolisten_action:testaction:1 Make the auditd Configuration Immutable ocil:ssg-audit_rules_immutable_action:testaction:1 Disable Network Router Discovery Daemon (rdisc) ocil:ssg-service_rdisc_disabled_action:testaction:1 Disable the mozilla_plugin_use_spice SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_mozilla_plugin_use_spice_action:testaction:1 Ensure rsyslog-gnutls is installed ocil:ssg-package_rsyslog-gnutls_installed_action:testaction:1 Disable Certmonger Service (certmonger) ocil:ssg-service_certmonger_disabled_action:testaction:1 Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fremovexattr ocil:ssg-audit_rules_dac_modification_fremovexattr_action:testaction:1 Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode ocil:ssg-kernel_config_seccomp_action:testaction:1 Verify ufw Enabled ocil:ssg-service_ufw_enabled_action:testaction:1 Disable the cron_system_cronjob_use_shares SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_cron_system_cronjob_use_shares_action:testaction:1 Configure auditd Disk Error Action on Disk Error ocil:ssg-auditd_data_disk_error_action_action:testaction:1 Disable Dovecot Service ocil:ssg-service_dovecot_disabled_action:testaction:1 Ensure a dedicated group owns sudo ocil:ssg-sudo_dedicated_group_action:testaction:1 Disable the postgresql_can_rsync SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_postgresql_can_rsync_action:testaction:1 Uninstall xinetd Package ocil:ssg-package_xinetd_removed_action:testaction:1 Enable SSH Server firewalld Firewall Exception ocil:ssg-firewalld_sshd_port_enabled_action:testaction:1 Restrict Access to Kernel Message Buffer ocil:ssg-sysctl_kernel_dmesg_restrict_action:testaction:1 Disable the logging_syslogd_run_nagios_plugins SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_logging_syslogd_run_nagios_plugins_action:testaction:1 Disable the openvpn_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_openvpn_can_network_connect_action:testaction:1 Disable vsyscalls in zIPL ocil:ssg-zipl_vsyscall_argument_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - ssh-keysign ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_ssh_keysign_action:testaction:1 Kernel panic timeout ocil:ssg-kernel_config_panic_timeout_action:testaction:1 Configure GNOME3 DConf User Profile ocil:ssg-enable_dconf_user_profile_action:testaction:1 Enable the NTP Daemon ocil:ssg-service_ntpd_enabled_action:testaction:1 Disable the dbadm_read_user_files SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_dbadm_read_user_files_action:testaction:1 Record Unsuccessful Permission Changes to Files - chmod ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_chmod_action:testaction:1 Disable the ssh_sysadm_login SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_ssh_sysadm_login_action:testaction:1 Root Path Must Be Vendor Default ocil:ssg-root_path_default_action:testaction:1 Disable User Administration in GNOME3 ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_disable_user_admin_action:testaction:1 Verify and Correct File Permissions with RPM ocil:ssg-rpm_verify_permissions_action:testaction:1 Backup interactive scripts on the production web server are prohibited ocil:ssg-httpd_remove_backups_action:testaction:1 Disable the 32-bit vDSO ocil:ssg-kernel_config_compat_vdso_action:testaction:1 Enforce Spectre v2 mitigation ocil:ssg-grub2_spectre_v2_argument_action:testaction:1 Disable the named_tcp_bind_http_port SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_named_tcp_bind_http_port_action:testaction:1 Don't define allowed commands in sudoers by means of exclusion ocil:ssg-sudoers_no_command_negation_action:testaction:1 Configure a Sufficiently Large Partition for Audit Logs ocil:ssg-auditd_audispd_configure_sufficiently_large_partition_action:testaction:1 Uninstall tuned Package ocil:ssg-package_tuned_removed_action:testaction:1 Ensure SSH LoginGraceTime is configured ocil:ssg-sshd_set_login_grace_time_action:testaction:1 Disable the logwatch_can_network_connect_mail SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_logwatch_can_network_connect_mail_action:testaction:1 Restrict Virtual Console Root Logins ocil:ssg-securetty_root_login_console_only_action:testaction:1 Disable the git_cgi_use_cifs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_git_cgi_use_cifs_action:testaction:1 Ensure Software Patches Installed ocil:ssg-security_patches_up_to_date_action:testaction:1 Disable the global_ssp SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_global_ssp_action:testaction:1 Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Length ocil:ssg-accounts_password_pam_minlen_action:testaction:1 Enable different security models ocil:ssg-kernel_config_security_action:testaction:1 Disable the use_samba_home_dirs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_use_samba_home_dirs_action:testaction:1 Map System Users To The Appropriate SELinux Role ocil:ssg-selinux_user_login_roles_action:testaction:1 Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate Group ocil:ssg-rsyslog_files_groupownership_action:testaction:1 Each Web Content Directory Must Contain An index.html File ocil:ssg-httpd_configure_documentroot_action:testaction:1 Disable the glance_api_can_network SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_glance_api_can_network_action:testaction:1 Verify that local System.map file (if exists) is readable only by root ocil:ssg-file_permissions_systemmap_action:testaction:1 Verify permissions on System Login Banner ocil:ssg-file_permissions_etc_issue_action:testaction:1 Uninstall telnet-server Package ocil:ssg-package_telnet-server_removed_action:testaction:1 Disable Mounting of cramfs ocil:ssg-kernel_module_cramfs_disabled_action:testaction:1 Ensure the Default Umask is Set Correctly in /etc/profile ocil:ssg-accounts_umask_etc_profile_action:testaction:1 Do not allow usercopy whitelist violations to fallback to object size ocil:ssg-kernel_config_hardened_usercopy_fallback_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - userhelper ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_userhelper_action:testaction:1 Disable the daemons_dump_core SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_daemons_dump_core_action:testaction:1 Record Unsuccessful Access Attempts to Files - openat ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_openat_action:testaction:1 Disable Secure RPC Server Service (rpcsvcgssd) ocil:ssg-service_rpcsvcgssd_disabled_action:testaction:1 Disable network management of chrony daemon ocil:ssg-chronyd_no_chronyc_network_action:testaction:1 Ensure gpgcheck Enabled for Local Packages ocil:ssg-ensure_gpgcheck_local_packages_action:testaction:1 Record Unsuccessful Permission Changes to Files - lremovexattr ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_lremovexattr_action:testaction:1 Disable PubkeyAuthentication Authentication ocil:ssg-sshd_disable_pubkey_auth_action:testaction:1 Ensure Only Users Logged In To Real tty Can Execute Sudo - sudo use_pty ocil:ssg-sudo_add_use_pty_action:testaction:1 Disable the git_system_use_cifs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_git_system_use_cifs_action:testaction:1 Enable the httpd_graceful_shutdown SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_graceful_shutdown_action:testaction:1 Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth ocil:ssg-accounts_password_pam_unix_rounds_password_auth_action:testaction:1 Disable Host-Based Authentication ocil:ssg-disable_host_auth_action:testaction:1 Ensure McAfee Endpoint Security for Linux (ENSL) is running ocil:ssg-agent_mfetpd_running_action:testaction:1 Ensure journald is configured to send logs to rsyslog ocil:ssg-journald_forward_to_syslog_action:testaction:1 Disable the samba_domain_controller SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_samba_domain_controller_action:testaction:1 Record Unsuccessful Creation Attempts to Files - open_by_handle_at O_CREAT ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open_by_handle_at_o_creat_action:testaction:1 Ensure a Table Exists for Nftables ocil:ssg-set_nftables_table_action:testaction:1 Verify Permissions on crontab ocil:ssg-file_permissions_crontab_action:testaction:1 Enable the USBGuard Service ocil:ssg-service_usbguard_enabled_action:testaction:1 Disable the selinuxuser_share_music SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_selinuxuser_share_music_action:testaction:1 Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - removexattr ocil:ssg-audit_rules_dac_modification_removexattr_action:testaction:1 Ensure that System Accounts Are Locked ocil:ssg-no_password_auth_for_systemaccounts_action:testaction:1 Set Interactive Session Timeout ocil:ssg-accounts_tmout_action:testaction:1 Record Successful Ownership Changes to Files - chown ocil:ssg-audit_rules_successful_file_modification_chown_action:testaction:1 Verify that System Executables Have Root Ownership ocil:ssg-file_ownership_binary_dirs_action:testaction:1 Disable the GNOME3 Login User List ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_disable_user_list_action:testaction:1 Enable Public Key Authentication ocil:ssg-sshd_enable_pubkey_auth_action:testaction:1 Modify the System Login Banner ocil:ssg-banner_etc_issue_action:testaction:1 Ensure journald is configured to compress large log files ocil:ssg-journald_compress_action:testaction:1 Disable the virt_use_samba SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_virt_use_samba_action:testaction:1 Disable kernel debugfs ocil:ssg-kernel_config_debug_fs_action:testaction:1 Verify permissions on System Login Banner for Remote Connections ocil:ssg-file_permissions_etc_issue_net_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - gpasswd ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_gpasswd_action:testaction:1 Configure Speculative Store Bypass Mitigation ocil:ssg-grub2_spec_store_bypass_disable_argument_action:testaction:1 Record Any Attempts to Run chacl ocil:ssg-audit_rules_execution_chacl_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - umount ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_umount_action:testaction:1 Enable Use of Strict Mode Checking ocil:ssg-sshd_enable_strictmodes_action:testaction:1 Enable the antivirus_can_scan_system SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_antivirus_can_scan_system_action:testaction:1 Record Successful Delete Attempts to Files - unlink ocil:ssg-audit_rules_successful_file_modification_unlink_action:testaction:1 Uninstall krb5-workstation Package ocil:ssg-package_krb5-workstation_removed_action:testaction:1 Disable the httpd_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_can_network_connect_action:testaction:1 Verify Any Configured IPSec Tunnel Connections ocil:ssg-libreswan_approved_tunnels_action:testaction:1 Disable System Statistics Reset Service (sysstat) ocil:ssg-service_sysstat_disabled_action:testaction:1 Ensure only owner and members of group owner of /usr/bin/sudo can execute it ocil:ssg-sudo_restrict_others_executable_permission_action:testaction:1 Disable the httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler_action:testaction:1 Add noexec Option to /var/log ocil:ssg-mount_option_var_log_noexec_action:testaction:1 Disable IA32 emulation ocil:ssg-kernel_config_ia32_emulation_action:testaction:1 Add nosuid Option to /tmp ocil:ssg-mount_option_tmp_nosuid_action:testaction:1 Add nosuid Option to /var/log/audit ocil:ssg-mount_option_var_log_audit_nosuid_action:testaction:1 Disable the logrotate_use_nfs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_logrotate_use_nfs_action:testaction:1 Uninstall libreport-plugin-logger Package ocil:ssg-package_libreport-plugin-logger_removed_action:testaction:1 Set Permissions on All Configuration Files Inside /etc/httpd/conf/ ocil:ssg-file_permissions_httpd_server_conf_files_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - unix_chkpwd ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_unix_chkpwd_action:testaction:1 Record Events that Modify User/Group Information via open_by_handle_at syscall - /etc/group ocil:ssg-audit_rules_etc_group_open_by_handle_at_action:testaction:1 Disable the selinuxuser_postgresql_connect_enabled SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_selinuxuser_postgresql_connect_enabled_action:testaction:1 Configure SSSD to run as user sssd ocil:ssg-sssd_run_as_sssd_user_action:testaction:1 Ensure logging is configured ocil:ssg-rsyslog_logging_configured_action:testaction:1 Set Default iptables Policy for Incoming Packets ocil:ssg-set_iptables_default_rule_action:testaction:1 Enable Yama support ocil:ssg-kernel_config_security_yama_action:testaction:1 Set the Boot Loader Admin Username to a Non-Default Value ocil:ssg-grub2_admin_username_action:testaction:1 Disable the dhcpd_use_ldap SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_dhcpd_use_ldap_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - chage ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_chage_action:testaction:1 Disable the wine_mmap_zero_ignore SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_wine_mmap_zero_ignore_action:testaction:1 Ensure All User Initialization Files Have Mode 0740 Or Less Permissive ocil:ssg-file_permission_user_init_files_action:testaction:1 Ensure users' .netrc Files are not group or world accessible ocil:ssg-accounts_users_netrc_file_permissions_action:testaction:1 The Installed Operating System Is Vendor Supported ocil:ssg-installed_OS_is_vendor_supported_action:testaction:1 Record Unsuccessful Permission Changes to Files - lsetxattr ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_lsetxattr_action:testaction:1 Record Unsuccessful Ownership Changes to Files - fchown ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fchown_action:testaction:1 Install McAfee Endpoint Security for Linux (ENSL) ocil:ssg-package_mcafeetp_installed_action:testaction:1 Verify User Who Owns Backup gshadow File ocil:ssg-file_owner_backup_etc_gshadow_action:testaction:1 Enable Certmap in SSSD ocil:ssg-sssd_enable_certmap_action:testaction:1 Ensure /srv Located On Separate Partition ocil:ssg-partition_for_srv_action:testaction:1 Verify Group Who Owns gshadow File ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_etc_gshadow_action:testaction:1 Disable the squid_use_tproxy SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_squid_use_tproxy_action:testaction:1 Uninstall setroubleshoot-plugins Package ocil:ssg-package_setroubleshoot-plugins_removed_action:testaction:1 Disable Anonymous FTP Access ocil:ssg-httpd_disable_anonymous_ftp_access_action:testaction:1 Disable vsftpd Service ocil:ssg-service_vsftpd_disabled_action:testaction:1 Set SSH authentication attempt limit ocil:ssg-sshd_set_max_auth_tries_action:testaction:1 Make the module text and rodata read-only ocil:ssg-kernel_config_strict_module_rwx_action:testaction:1 Enable the secadm_exec_content SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_secadm_exec_content_action:testaction:1 Add noexec Option to /var ocil:ssg-mount_option_var_noexec_action:testaction:1 Verify User Who Owns /var/log Directory ocil:ssg-file_owner_var_log_action:testaction:1 Disable the httpd_run_preupgrade SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_run_preupgrade_action:testaction:1 Disable the xserver_execmem SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_xserver_execmem_action:testaction:1 System Audit Logs Must Be Group Owned By Root ocil:ssg-file_group_ownership_var_log_audit_action:testaction:1 Uninstall httpd Package ocil:ssg-package_httpd_removed_action:testaction:1 Record Events that Modify User/Group Information - /etc/shadow ocil:ssg-audit_rules_usergroup_modification_shadow_action:testaction:1 Do Not Allow SSH Environment Options ocil:ssg-sshd_do_not_permit_user_env_action:testaction:1 Enable automatic signing of all modules ocil:ssg-kernel_config_module_sig_all_action:testaction:1 Configure maximum number of process identifiers ocil:ssg-sysctl_kernel_pid_max_action:testaction:1 Disable /dev/kmem virtual device support ocil:ssg-kernel_config_devkmem_action:testaction:1 Verify /boot/grub2/grub.cfg Group Ownership ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_grub2_cfg_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - sudoedit ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_sudoedit_action:testaction:1 Disable the gluster_anon_write SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_gluster_anon_write_action:testaction:1 Disable the virt_read_qemu_ga_data SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_virt_read_qemu_ga_data_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects File Deletion Events by User - unlinkat ocil:ssg-audit_rules_file_deletion_events_unlinkat_action:testaction:1 Ensure the Default Umask is Set Correctly For Interactive Users ocil:ssg-accounts_umask_interactive_users_action:testaction:1 Install AIDE ocil:ssg-package_aide_installed_action:testaction:1 Add nosuid Option to /home ocil:ssg-mount_option_home_nosuid_action:testaction:1 Enable auditd Service ocil:ssg-service_auditd_enabled_action:testaction:1 Configure CA certificate for rsyslog remote logging ocil:ssg-rsyslog_remote_tls_cacert_action:testaction:1 Install the pcsc-lite package ocil:ssg-package_pcsc-lite_installed_action:testaction:1 Disable the smbd_anon_write SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_smbd_anon_write_action:testaction:1 Disable the git_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_git_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects Information on Kernel Module Unloading - create_module ocil:ssg-audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_create_action:testaction:1 Ensure '/etc/system-fips' exists ocil:ssg-etc_system_fips_exists_action:testaction:1 Install libcap-ng-utils Package ocil:ssg-package_libcap-ng-utils_installed_action:testaction:1 Use Centralized and Automated Authentication ocil:ssg-account_use_centralized_automated_auth_action:testaction:1 Record Attempts to perform maintenance activities ocil:ssg-audit_sudo_log_events_action:testaction:1 Configure Time Service Maxpoll Interval ocil:ssg-chronyd_or_ntpd_set_maxpoll_action:testaction:1 Ensure there are no legacy + NIS entries in /etc/passwd ocil:ssg-no_legacy_plus_entries_etc_passwd_action:testaction:1 Configure auditing of unsuccessful file accesses ocil:ssg-audit_access_failed_action:testaction:1 Disable the mmap_low_allowed SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_mmap_low_allowed_action:testaction:1 Make sure that the dconf databases are up-to-date with regards to respective keyfiles ocil:ssg-dconf_db_up_to_date_action:testaction:1 Enable cron Service ocil:ssg-service_cron_enabled_action:testaction:1 Log USBGuard daemon audit events using Linux Audit ocil:ssg-configure_usbguard_auditbackend_action:testaction:1 Enable GSSAPI Authentication ocil:ssg-sshd_enable_gssapi_auth_action:testaction:1 Build and Test AIDE Database ocil:ssg-aide_build_database_action:testaction:1 Disable the openvpn_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_openvpn_enable_homedirs_action:testaction:1 Disable the puppetmaster_use_db SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_puppetmaster_use_db_action:testaction:1 Record Successful Creation Attempts to Files - openat O_CREAT ocil:ssg-audit_rules_successful_file_modification_openat_o_creat_action:testaction:1 Disable the polipo_use_nfs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_polipo_use_nfs_action:testaction:1 Account Lockouts Must Be Logged ocil:ssg-account_passwords_pam_faillock_audit_action:testaction:1 Record Events that Modify User/Group Information via open_by_handle_at syscall - /etc/shadow ocil:ssg-audit_rules_etc_shadow_open_by_handle_at_action:testaction:1 Uninstall pigz Package ocil:ssg-package_pigz_removed_action:testaction:1 All User Files and Directories In The Home Directory Must Have Mode 0750 Or Less Permissive ocil:ssg-accounts_users_home_files_permissions_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects Unauthorized Access Attempts to Files (unsuccessful) ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_action:testaction:1 Verify User Who Owns shadow File ocil:ssg-file_owner_etc_shadow_action:testaction:1 Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Lowercase Characters ocil:ssg-accounts_password_pam_lcredit_action:testaction:1 Uninstall CUPS Package ocil:ssg-package_cups_removed_action:testaction:1 Disable the xguest_use_bluetooth SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_xguest_use_bluetooth_action:testaction:1 Configure AIDE to Verify the Audit Tools ocil:ssg-aide_check_audit_tools_action:testaction:1 Account Lockouts Must Be Logged ocil:ssg-accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_audit_action:testaction:1 All User Files and Directories In The Home Directory Must Be Group-Owned By The Primary Group ocil:ssg-accounts_users_home_files_groupownership_action:testaction:1 Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts ocil:ssg-accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny_root_action:testaction:1 Record Unsuccessful Permission Changes to Files - fchmod ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fchmod_action:testaction:1 Disable merging of slabs with similar size ocil:ssg-grub2_slab_nomerge_argument_action:testaction:1 Enable the pcscd Service ocil:ssg-service_pcscd_enabled_action:testaction:1 Verify Owner on cron.hourly ocil:ssg-file_owner_cron_hourly_action:testaction:1 Disable IPv6 Addressing on IPv6 Interfaces by Default ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_disable_ipv6_action:testaction:1 Disable httpd Service ocil:ssg-service_httpd_disabled_action:testaction:1 User Initialization Files Must Be Owned By the Primary User ocil:ssg-accounts_user_dot_user_ownership_action:testaction:1 SSSD Has a Correct Trust Anchor ocil:ssg-sssd_has_trust_anchor_action:testaction:1 Resolve information before writing to audit logs ocil:ssg-auditd_log_format_action:testaction:1 Verify and Correct Ownership with RPM ocil:ssg-rpm_verify_ownership_action:testaction:1 Configure auditing of unsuccessful permission changes ocil:ssg-audit_perm_change_failed_action:testaction:1 Enable NX or XD Support in the BIOS ocil:ssg-bios_enable_execution_restrictions_action:testaction:1 Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth ocil:ssg-accounts_password_pam_pwquality_password_auth_action:testaction:1 Record Events that Modify User/Group Information via openat syscall - /etc/group ocil:ssg-audit_rules_etc_group_openat_action:testaction:1 Disable the telepathy_connect_all_ports SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_telepathy_connect_all_ports_action:testaction:1 Enable Transport Layer Security (TLS) Encryption ocil:ssg-httpd_configure_tls_action:testaction:1 Disable the tor_bind_all_unreserved_ports SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_tor_bind_all_unreserved_ports_action:testaction:1 Disable xinetd Service ocil:ssg-service_xinetd_disabled_action:testaction:1 Ensure the audit Subsystem is Installed ocil:ssg-package_audit_installed_action:testaction:1 Disable Ctrl-Alt-Del Reboot Activation ocil:ssg-disable_ctrlaltdel_reboot_action:testaction:1 Ensure Chrony is only configured with the server directive ocil:ssg-chronyd_server_directive_action:testaction:1 Disable the glance_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_glance_use_fusefs_action:testaction:1 Randomize slab freelist ocil:ssg-kernel_config_slab_freelist_random_action:testaction:1 Verify the UEFI Boot Loader grub.cfg Permissions ocil:ssg-file_permissions_efi_grub2_cfg_action:testaction:1 Record Unsuccessful Permission Changes to Files - fchmodat ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fchmodat_action:testaction:1 Enable dnf-automatic Timer ocil:ssg-timer_dnf-automatic_enabled_action:testaction:1 Ensure /boot Located On Separate Partition ocil:ssg-partition_for_boot_action:testaction:1 Disable Quota Netlink (quota_nld) ocil:ssg-service_quota_nld_disabled_action:testaction:1 Enable the virt_sandbox_use_audit SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_virt_sandbox_use_audit_action:testaction:1 Web Content Directories Must Not Be Shared Anonymously ocil:ssg-httpd_anonymous_content_sharing_action:testaction:1 Virus Scanning Software Definitions Are Updated ocil:ssg-mcafee_antivirus_definitions_updated_action:testaction:1 Verify Permissions on cron.weekly ocil:ssg-file_permissions_cron_weekly_action:testaction:1 Ensure that User Home Directories are not Group-Writable or World-Readable ocil:ssg-file_permissions_home_dirs_action:testaction:1 Disable the selinuxuser_mysql_connect_enabled SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_selinuxuser_mysql_connect_enabled_action:testaction:1 Disable the httpd_run_stickshift SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_run_stickshift_action:testaction:1 Ensure Users Re-Authenticate for Privilege Escalation - sudo !authenticate ocil:ssg-sudo_remove_no_authenticate_action:testaction:1 Disable the irssi_use_full_network SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_irssi_use_full_network_action:testaction:1 Verify All Account Password Hashes are Shadowed with SHA512 ocil:ssg-accounts_password_all_shadowed_sha512_action:testaction:1 Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Special Characters ocil:ssg-accounts_password_pam_ocredit_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - at ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_at_action:testaction:1 Enable GNOME3 Login Warning Banner ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_banner_enabled_action:testaction:1 Disable SSH Support for .rhosts Files ocil:ssg-sshd_disable_rhosts_action:testaction:1 Enable GNOME3 Screensaver Lock After Idle Period ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_enabled_action:testaction:1 Configure Multiple DNS Servers in /etc/resolv.conf ocil:ssg-network_configure_name_resolution_action:testaction:1 Disable the ftpd_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_ftpd_use_fusefs_action:testaction:1 Disable the ksmtuned_use_cifs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_ksmtuned_use_cifs_action:testaction:1 Disable XDMCP in GDM ocil:ssg-gnome_gdm_disable_xdmcp_action:testaction:1 Verify /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg Group Ownership ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_efi_user_cfg_action:testaction:1 Disable the gluster_export_all_ro SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_gluster_export_all_ro_action:testaction:1 Configure auditing of successful file deletions ocil:ssg-audit_delete_success_action:testaction:1 Ensure System Log Files Have Correct Permissions ocil:ssg-rsyslog_files_permissions_action:testaction:1 Use zero for poisoning instead of debugging value ocil:ssg-kernel_config_page_poisoning_zero_action:testaction:1 Set Password Hashing Algorithm in /etc/login.defs ocil:ssg-set_password_hashing_algorithm_logindefs_action:testaction:1 Ensure /home Located On Separate Partition ocil:ssg-partition_for_home_action:testaction:1 Verify Owner on crontab ocil:ssg-file_owner_crontab_action:testaction:1 Configure SSSD to Expire SSH Known Hosts ocil:ssg-sssd_ssh_known_hosts_timeout_action:testaction:1 Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - chmod ocil:ssg-audit_rules_dac_modification_chmod_action:testaction:1 Ensure Privileged Escalated Commands Cannot Execute Other Commands - sudo NOEXEC ocil:ssg-sudo_add_noexec_action:testaction:1 Set Existing Passwords Warning Age ocil:ssg-accounts_password_set_warn_age_existing_action:testaction:1 Verify ownership of Message of the Day Banner ocil:ssg-file_owner_etc_motd_action:testaction:1 Disable telnet Service ocil:ssg-service_telnet_disabled_action:testaction:1 Disable the Automounter ocil:ssg-service_autofs_disabled_action:testaction:1 Enable the mcelog_exec_scripts SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_mcelog_exec_scripts_action:testaction:1 Record Successful Ownership Changes to Files - fchownat ocil:ssg-audit_rules_successful_file_modification_fchownat_action:testaction:1 Record Successful Creation Attempts to Files - open_by_handle_at O_CREAT ocil:ssg-audit_rules_successful_file_modification_open_by_handle_at_o_creat_action:testaction:1 Add nodev Option to /dev/shm ocil:ssg-mount_option_dev_shm_nodev_action:testaction:1 Use Only FIPS 140-2 Validated MACs ocil:ssg-sshd_use_approved_macs_action:testaction:1 Enable nails Service ocil:ssg-service_nails_enabled_action:testaction:1 Verify Group Who Owns Crontab ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_crontab_action:testaction:1 Disable the rsync_export_all_ro SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_rsync_export_all_ro_action:testaction:1 Limit Users' SSH Access ocil:ssg-sshd_limit_user_access_action:testaction:1 Ensure that /etc/at.deny does not exist ocil:ssg-file_at_deny_not_exist_action:testaction:1 Configure System Cryptography Policy ocil:ssg-configure_crypto_policy_action:testaction:1 A remote time server for Chrony is configured ocil:ssg-chronyd_specify_remote_server_action:testaction:1 All Interactive Users Must Have A Home Directory Defined ocil:ssg-accounts_user_interactive_home_directory_defined_action:testaction:1 Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - umount2 ocil:ssg-audit_rules_dac_modification_umount2_action:testaction:1 Prevent Login to Accounts With Empty Password ocil:ssg-no_empty_passwords_action:testaction:1 Configure SSSD LDAP Backend Client CA Certificate Location ocil:ssg-sssd_ldap_configure_tls_ca_dir_action:testaction:1 Disable SSH Access via Empty Passwords ocil:ssg-sshd_disable_empty_passwords_action:testaction:1 Disable the ftpd_use_cifs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_ftpd_use_cifs_action:testaction:1 Disable X Windows Startup By Setting Default Target ocil:ssg-xwindows_runlevel_target_action:testaction:1 Encrypt Audit Records Sent With audispd Plugin ocil:ssg-auditd_audispd_encrypt_sent_records_action:testaction:1 Add nodev Option to /home ocil:ssg-mount_option_home_nodev_action:testaction:1 Verify the system-wide library files in directories "/lib", "/lib64", "/usr/lib/" and "/usr/lib64" are group-owned by root. ocil:ssg-root_permissions_syslibrary_files_action:testaction:1 Record Events that Modify User/Group Information - /etc/group ocil:ssg-audit_rules_usergroup_modification_group_action:testaction:1 Record Unsuccessful Access Attempts to Files - open ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open_action:testaction:1 Set GNOME3 Screensaver Lock Delay After Activation Period ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_delay_action:testaction:1 Verify /boot/grub2/user.cfg Group Ownership ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_user_cfg_action:testaction:1 Disable Odd Job Daemon (oddjobd) ocil:ssg-service_oddjobd_disabled_action:testaction:1 Ensure LDAP client is not installed ocil:ssg-package_openldap-clients_removed_action:testaction:1 Disable the lsmd_plugin_connect_any SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_lsmd_plugin_connect_any_action:testaction:1 Disable the httpd_unified SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_unified_action:testaction:1 Record Events When Executables Are Run As Another User ocil:ssg-audit_rules_suid_auid_privilege_function_action:testaction:1 Verify Only Root Has UID 0 ocil:ssg-accounts_no_uid_except_zero_action:testaction:1 Disable the polipo_connect_all_unreserved SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_polipo_connect_all_unreserved_action:testaction:1 Verify No .forward Files Exist ocil:ssg-no_forward_files_action:testaction:1 Add usrquota Option to /home ocil:ssg-mount_option_home_usrquota_action:testaction:1 Disable the mozilla_plugin_bind_unreserved_ports SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_mozilla_plugin_bind_unreserved_ports_action:testaction:1 Ensure journald is configured to write log files to persistent disk ocil:ssg-journald_storage_action:testaction:1 Prevent Unrestricted Mail Relaying ocil:ssg-postfix_prevent_unrestricted_relay_action:testaction:1 Configure low address space to protect from user allocation ocil:ssg-kernel_config_default_mmap_min_addr_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - sudo ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_sudo_action:testaction:1 Verify Group Ownership of System Login Banner for Remote Connections ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_etc_issue_net_action:testaction:1 Verify Group Who Owns /etc/at.allow file ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_at_allow_action:testaction:1 Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fchownat ocil:ssg-audit_rules_dac_modification_fchownat_action:testaction:1 Enable Postfix Service ocil:ssg-service_postfix_enabled_action:testaction:1 Disable the entropyd_use_audio SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_entropyd_use_audio_action:testaction:1 Ensure yum Removes Previous Package Versions ocil:ssg-clean_components_post_updating_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - kmod ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_kmod_action:testaction:1 Verify User Who Owns /var/log/syslog File ocil:ssg-file_owner_var_log_syslog_action:testaction:1 Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - chown ocil:ssg-audit_rules_dac_modification_chown_action:testaction:1 Verify Who Owns /etc/shells File ocil:ssg-file_owner_etc_shells_action:testaction:1 Disable Kernel Parameter for IPv6 Forwarding ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_forwarding_action:testaction:1 Disable Printer Browsing Entirely if Possible ocil:ssg-cups_disable_browsing_action:testaction:1 Implement Blank Screensaver ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_screensaver_mode_blank_action:testaction:1 Disable the webadm_manage_user_files SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_webadm_manage_user_files_action:testaction:1 Enable Kernel Parameter to Log Martian Packets on all IPv4 Interfaces ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians_action:testaction:1 Configure Sending and Accepting Shared Media Redirects by Default ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_shared_media_action:testaction:1 Disable the mpd_use_cifs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_mpd_use_cifs_action:testaction:1 Ensure zIPL bootmap is up to date ocil:ssg-zipl_bootmap_is_up_to_date_action:testaction:1 Uninstall geolite2-city Package ocil:ssg-package_geolite2-city_removed_action:testaction:1 Verify the SSH Private Key Files Have a Passcode ocil:ssg-ssh_keys_passphrase_protected_action:testaction:1 Disable the sanlock_use_samba SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_sanlock_use_samba_action:testaction:1 Disable the httpd_can_check_spam SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_can_check_spam_action:testaction:1 Disable Kernel iwlmvm Module ocil:ssg-kernel_module_iwlmvm_disabled_action:testaction:1 Mount Remote Filesystems with Kerberos Security ocil:ssg-mount_option_krb_sec_remote_filesystems_action:testaction:1 Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts ocil:ssg-accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_interval_action:testaction:1 Ensure the Default Bash Umask is Set Correctly ocil:ssg-accounts_umask_etc_bashrc_action:testaction:1 Disable the abrt_handle_event SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_abrt_handle_event_action:testaction:1 Disable the selinuxuser_tcp_server SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_selinuxuser_tcp_server_action:testaction:1 Specify module signing key to use ocil:ssg-kernel_config_module_sig_key_action:testaction:1 Install libselinux Package ocil:ssg-package_libselinux_installed_action:testaction:1 Verify that System Executable Have Root Ownership ocil:ssg-dir_ownership_binary_dirs_action:testaction:1 All User Files and Directories In The Home Directory Must Have a Valid Owner ocil:ssg-accounts_users_home_files_ownership_action:testaction:1 Disable SSH Server If Possible ocil:ssg-service_sshd_disabled_action:testaction:1 IOMMU configuration directive ocil:ssg-grub2_enable_iommu_force_action:testaction:1 Record Successful Delete Attempts to Files - rename ocil:ssg-audit_rules_successful_file_modification_rename_action:testaction:1 Disable the daemons_use_tty SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_daemons_use_tty_action:testaction:1 Uninstall geolite2-country Package ocil:ssg-package_geolite2-country_removed_action:testaction:1 Restrict Web Browser Use for Administrative Accounts ocil:ssg-no_root_webbrowsing_action:testaction:1 Strong Stack Protector ocil:ssg-kernel_config_stackprotector_strong_action:testaction:1 Verify Group Who Owns shadow File ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_etc_shadow_action:testaction:1 Uninstall abrt-plugin-sosreport Package ocil:ssg-package_abrt-plugin-sosreport_removed_action:testaction:1 Harden SSH client Crypto Policy ocil:ssg-harden_ssh_client_crypto_policy_action:testaction:1 Record Events that Modify the System's Mandatory Access Controls in usr/share ocil:ssg-audit_rules_mac_modification_usr_share_action:testaction:1 Configure Kernel Parameter for Accepting Secure Redirects By Default ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects_action:testaction:1 Generate some entropy during boot and runtime ocil:ssg-kernel_config_gcc_plugin_latent_entropy_action:testaction:1 Disable the ksmtuned_use_nfs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_ksmtuned_use_nfs_action:testaction:1 Set GNOME3 Screensaver Inactivity Timeout ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_screensaver_idle_delay_action:testaction:1 Ensure Logs Sent To Remote Host ocil:ssg-rsyslog_remote_loghost_action:testaction:1 Configure the httpd_enable_cgi SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_enable_cgi_action:testaction:1 Verify No netrc Files Exist ocil:ssg-no_netrc_files_action:testaction:1 Disable tftp Service ocil:ssg-service_tftp_disabled_action:testaction:1 Configure audispd's Plugin network_failure_action On Network Failure ocil:ssg-auditd_audispd_network_failure_action_action:testaction:1 Disallow Configuration to Bypass Password Requirements for Privilege Escalation ocil:ssg-disallow_bypass_password_sudo_action:testaction:1 Configure firewall to Allow Access to the Web Server ocil:ssg-httpd_configure_firewall_action:testaction:1 Disable the virt_use_sanlock SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_virt_use_sanlock_action:testaction:1 Enforce Usage of pam_wheel with Group Parameter for su Authentication ocil:ssg-use_pam_wheel_group_for_su_action:testaction:1 All GIDs referenced in /etc/passwd must be defined in /etc/group ocil:ssg-gid_passwd_group_same_action:testaction:1 Audit Tools Must Be Group-owned by Root ocil:ssg-file_audit_tools_group_ownership_action:testaction:1 Ensure gpgcheck Enabled for Repository Metadata ocil:ssg-ensure_gpgcheck_repo_metadata_action:testaction:1 Record Unsuccessful Creation Attempts to Files - open O_CREAT ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open_o_creat_action:testaction:1 Configure Accepting Prefix Information in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_pinfo_action:testaction:1 Disable SCTP Support ocil:ssg-kernel_module_sctp_disabled_action:testaction:1 Uninstall iprutils Package ocil:ssg-package_iprutils_removed_action:testaction:1 Set Default iptables Policy for Forwarded Packets ocil:ssg-set_iptables_default_rule_forward_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - init ocil:ssg-audit_privileged_commands_init_action:testaction:1 Install the cron service ocil:ssg-package_cron_installed_action:testaction:1 Ensure there are no legacy + NIS entries in /etc/shadow ocil:ssg-no_legacy_plus_entries_etc_shadow_action:testaction:1 Enable the nfs_export_all_ro SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_nfs_export_all_ro_action:testaction:1 Disable mutable hooks ocil:ssg-kernel_config_security_writable_hooks_action:testaction:1 Record Successful Access Attempts to Files - truncate ocil:ssg-audit_rules_successful_file_modification_truncate_action:testaction:1 Disable Ctrl-Alt-Del Reboot Key Sequence in GNOME3 ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_disable_ctrlaltdel_reboot_action:testaction:1 Uninstall vsftpd Package ocil:ssg-package_vsftpd_removed_action:testaction:1 Disable acquiring, saving, and processing core dumps ocil:ssg-service_systemd-coredump_disabled_action:testaction:1 Configure TLS for rsyslog remote logging ocil:ssg-rsyslog_remote_tls_action:testaction:1 Disable the httpd_manage_ipa SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_manage_ipa_action:testaction:1 Verify Group Who Owns /var/log/syslog File ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_var_log_syslog_action:testaction:1 Disable the gpg_web_anon_write SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_gpg_web_anon_write_action:testaction:1 Disable the fcron_crond SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_fcron_crond_action:testaction:1 Configure System to Forward All Mail through a specific host ocil:ssg-postfix_client_configure_relayhost_action:testaction:1 SSH client uses strong entropy to seed (Bash-like shells) ocil:ssg-ssh_client_use_strong_rng_sh_action:testaction:1 Verify Owner on cron.daily ocil:ssg-file_owner_cron_daily_action:testaction:1 Prevent remote hosts from connecting to the proxy display ocil:ssg-sshd_x11_use_localhost_action:testaction:1 Ensure sudo umask is appropriate - sudo umask ocil:ssg-sudo_add_umask_action:testaction:1 Enable the File Access Policy Service ocil:ssg-service_fapolicyd_enabled_action:testaction:1 Configure Kerberos to use System Crypto Policy ocil:ssg-configure_kerberos_crypto_policy_action:testaction:1 All Interactive User Home Directories Must Be Group-Owned By The Primary Group ocil:ssg-file_groupownership_home_directories_action:testaction:1 Uninstall gssproxy Package ocil:ssg-package_gssproxy_removed_action:testaction:1 Uninstall Sendmail Package ocil:ssg-package_sendmail_removed_action:testaction:1 Limit CPU consumption of the Perf system ocil:ssg-sysctl_kernel_perf_cpu_time_max_percent_action:testaction:1 Record Successful Permission Changes to Files - fchmod ocil:ssg-audit_rules_successful_file_modification_fchmod_action:testaction:1 Verify Owner on SSH Server config file ocil:ssg-file_owner_sshd_config_action:testaction:1 Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth ocil:ssg-accounts_password_pam_pwquality_system_auth_action:testaction:1 Disable ATM Support ocil:ssg-kernel_module_atm_disabled_action:testaction:1 Record Any Attempts to Run setsebool ocil:ssg-audit_rules_execution_setsebool_action:testaction:1 Disable the sge_domain_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_sge_domain_can_network_connect_action:testaction:1 Limit Password Reuse ocil:ssg-accounts_password_pam_unix_remember_action:testaction:1 Specify a Remote NTP Server ocil:ssg-chronyd_or_ntpd_specify_remote_server_action:testaction:1 Set Permissions on All Configuration Files Inside /etc/httpd/conf.modules.d/ ocil:ssg-file_permissions_httpd_server_modules_files_action:testaction:1 Enable the postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm_action:testaction:1 Disable the httpd_can_sendmail SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_can_sendmail_action:testaction:1 System Audit Logs Must Have Mode 0640 or Less Permissive ocil:ssg-file_permissions_var_log_audit_action:testaction:1 Disable anacron Service ocil:ssg-disable_anacron_action:testaction:1 Verify /boot/grub2/user.cfg Permissions ocil:ssg-file_permissions_user_cfg_action:testaction:1 Ensure sudo Runs In A Minimal Environment - sudo env_reset ocil:ssg-sudo_add_env_reset_action:testaction:1 Disable the httpd_sys_script_anon_write SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_sys_script_anon_write_action:testaction:1 Record Any Attempts to Run restorecon ocil:ssg-audit_rules_execution_restorecon_action:testaction:1 Install the Host Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS) Module ocil:ssg-package_MFEhiplsm_installed_action:testaction:1 Disable the selinuxuser_execheap SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_selinuxuser_execheap_action:testaction:1 Configure SSSD's Memory Cache to Expire ocil:ssg-sssd_memcache_timeout_action:testaction:1 Disable Core Dumps for SUID programs ocil:ssg-sysctl_fs_suid_dumpable_action:testaction:1 Set Default ip6tables Policy for Incoming Packets ocil:ssg-set_ip6tables_default_rule_action:testaction:1 Add noexec Option to /tmp ocil:ssg-mount_option_tmp_noexec_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects File Deletion Events by User - rename ocil:ssg-audit_rules_file_deletion_events_rename_action:testaction:1 Verify Group Who Owns cron.monthly ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_cron_monthly_action:testaction:1 Record Unsuccessful Delete Attempts to Files - unlinkat ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_unlinkat_action:testaction:1 Verify Permissions on /var/log/syslog File ocil:ssg-file_permissions_var_log_syslog_action:testaction:1 Remove Write Permissions From Filesystem Paths And Server Scripts ocil:ssg-httpd_configure_script_permissions_action:testaction:1 Configure auditing of successful file creations ocil:ssg-audit_create_success_action:testaction:1 Disable the ftpd_full_access SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_ftpd_full_access_action:testaction:1 Record Any Attempts to Run setfiles ocil:ssg-audit_rules_execution_setfiles_action:testaction:1 Install tar Package ocil:ssg-package_tar_installed_action:testaction:1 Enable support for BUG() ocil:ssg-kernel_config_bug_action:testaction:1 Configure auditing of successful file modifications ocil:ssg-audit_modify_success_action:testaction:1 Disable the httpd_use_nfs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_use_nfs_action:testaction:1 Record Successful Creation Attempts to Files - openat O_TRUNC_WRITE ocil:ssg-audit_rules_successful_file_modification_openat_o_trunc_write_action:testaction:1 Verify Group Who Owns cron.weekly ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_cron_weekly_action:testaction:1 Ensure All World-Writable Directories Are Owned by a System Account ocil:ssg-dir_perms_world_writable_system_owned_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - postqueue ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_postqueue_action:testaction:1 Encrypt All File Uploads ocil:ssg-httpd_encrypt_file_uploads_action:testaction:1 Disable Software RAID Monitor (mdmonitor) ocil:ssg-service_mdmonitor_disabled_action:testaction:1 Ensure All World-Writable Directories Are Owned by root User ocil:ssg-dir_perms_world_writable_root_owned_action:testaction:1 Configure auditd max_log_file_action Upon Reaching Maximum Log Size ocil:ssg-auditd_data_retention_max_log_file_action_action:testaction:1 Disable the virt_sandbox_use_mknod SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_virt_sandbox_use_mknod_action:testaction:1 All Interactive User Home Directories Must Be Owned By The Primary User ocil:ssg-file_ownership_home_directories_action:testaction:1 Configure Accepting Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_action:testaction:1 Disable systemd-journal-remote Socket ocil:ssg-socket_systemd-journal-remote_disabled_action:testaction:1 Enforce usage of pam_wheel for su authentication ocil:ssg-use_pam_wheel_for_su_action:testaction:1 Configure auditd space_left on Low Disk Space ocil:ssg-auditd_data_retention_space_left_percentage_action:testaction:1 Disable WIFI Network Connection Creation in GNOME3 ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_disable_wifi_create_action:testaction:1 Disable the minidlna_read_generic_user_content SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_minidlna_read_generic_user_content_action:testaction:1 Verify Permissions on SSH Server Private *_key Key Files ocil:ssg-file_permissions_sshd_private_key_action:testaction:1 Record Events that Modify User/Group Information via open_by_handle_at syscall - /etc/gshadow ocil:ssg-audit_rules_etc_gshadow_open_by_handle_at_action:testaction:1 Disable the zabbix_can_network SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_zabbix_can_network_action:testaction:1 Record Unsuccessful Delete Attempts to Files - renameat ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_renameat_action:testaction:1 Record Events that Modify User/Group Information - /etc/passwd ocil:ssg-audit_rules_usergroup_modification_passwd_action:testaction:1 Avoid speculative indirect branches in kernel ocil:ssg-kernel_config_retpoline_action:testaction:1 Record Attempts to Alter Logon and Logout Events - tallylog ocil:ssg-audit_rules_login_events_tallylog_action:testaction:1 Set kernel parameter 'crypto.fips_enabled' to 1 ocil:ssg-sysctl_crypto_fips_enabled_action:testaction:1 Record Any Attempts to Run semanage ocil:ssg-audit_rules_execution_semanage_action:testaction:1 Ensure that Root's Path Does Not Include World or Group-Writable Directories ocil:ssg-accounts_root_path_dirs_no_write_action:testaction:1 Mount Remote Filesystems with nosuid ocil:ssg-mount_option_nosuid_remote_filesystems_action:testaction:1 Disable Power Settings in GNOME3 ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_disable_power_settings_action:testaction:1 Set SSH Client Alive Count Max ocil:ssg-sshd_set_keepalive_action:testaction:1 Warn on W+X mappings found at boot ocil:ssg-kernel_config_debug_wx_action:testaction:1 Disable Accepting Packets Routed Between Local Interfaces ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_local_action:testaction:1 Remove Rsh Trust Files ocil:ssg-no_rsh_trust_files_action:testaction:1 Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fchown ocil:ssg-audit_rules_dac_modification_fchown_action:testaction:1 Disable GNOME3 Automount Opening ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_disable_automount_open_action:testaction:1 SSH client uses strong entropy to seed (for CSH like shells) ocil:ssg-ssh_client_use_strong_rng_csh_action:testaction:1 Record Unsuccessful Modification Attempts to Files - open_by_handle_at O_TRUNC_WRITE ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open_by_handle_at_o_trunc_write_action:testaction:1 Record Successful Creation Attempts to Files - open_by_handle_at O_TRUNC_WRITE ocil:ssg-audit_rules_successful_file_modification_open_by_handle_at_o_trunc_write_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects Information on Kernel Module Loading and Unloading ocil:ssg-audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_action:testaction:1 The robots.txt Files Must Not Exist ocil:ssg-httpd_remove_robots_file_action:testaction:1 Uninstall rpcbind Package ocil:ssg-package_rpcbind_removed_action:testaction:1 Disable GNOME3 Automount running ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_disable_autorun_action:testaction:1 Add nodev Option to /var/tmp ocil:ssg-mount_option_var_tmp_nodev_action:testaction:1 Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate User ocil:ssg-rsyslog_files_ownership_action:testaction:1 Configure L1 Terminal Fault mitigations ocil:ssg-grub2_l1tf_argument_action:testaction:1 Record Successful Access Attempts to Files - ftruncate ocil:ssg-audit_rules_successful_file_modification_ftruncate_action:testaction:1 Disable the samba_run_unconfined SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_samba_run_unconfined_action:testaction:1 Disable the zoneminder_anon_write SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_zoneminder_anon_write_action:testaction:1 Disable the mailman_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_mailman_use_fusefs_action:testaction:1 Enable Smartcards in SSSD ocil:ssg-sssd_enable_smartcards_action:testaction:1 Disable the kdumpgui_run_bootloader SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_kdumpgui_run_bootloader_action:testaction:1 Remove the X Windows Package Group ocil:ssg-package_xorg-x11-server-common_removed_action:testaction:1 Disable the xdm_bind_vnc_tcp_port SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_xdm_bind_vnc_tcp_port_action:testaction:1 Uninstall ypserv Package ocil:ssg-package_ypserv_removed_action:testaction:1 Ensure Insecure File Locking is Not Allowed ocil:ssg-no_insecure_locks_exports_action:testaction:1 Record Successful Delete Attempts to Files - renameat ocil:ssg-audit_rules_successful_file_modification_renameat_action:testaction:1 Verify File Hashes with RPM ocil:ssg-rpm_verify_hashes_action:testaction:1 Enable HTTPD LogLevel ocil:ssg-httpd_enable_loglevel_action:testaction:1 Ensure /var/tmp Located On Separate Partition ocil:ssg-partition_for_var_tmp_action:testaction:1 Set Password Hashing Algorithm in /etc/libuser.conf ocil:ssg-set_password_hashing_algorithm_libuserconf_action:testaction:1 Configure Libreswan to use System Crypto Policy ocil:ssg-configure_libreswan_crypto_policy_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - poweroff ocil:ssg-audit_privileged_commands_poweroff_action:testaction:1 Firewalld Must Employ a Deny-all, Allow-by-exception Policy for Allowing Connections to Other Systems ocil:ssg-configured_firewalld_default_deny_action:testaction:1 Set Password Maximum Age ocil:ssg-accounts_maximum_age_login_defs_action:testaction:1 Disable the exim_can_connect_db SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_exim_can_connect_db_action:testaction:1 Enable the auditadm_exec_content SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_auditadm_exec_content_action:testaction:1 Configure immutable Audit login UIDs ocil:ssg-audit_rules_immutable_login_uids_action:testaction:1 The mailx Package Is Installed ocil:ssg-package_mailx_installed_action:testaction:1 Install systemd-journal-remote Package ocil:ssg-package_systemd-journal-remote_installed_action:testaction:1 Record Successful Access Attempts to Files - creat ocil:ssg-audit_rules_successful_file_modification_creat_action:testaction:1 Encrypt Partitions ocil:ssg-encrypt_partitions_action:testaction:1 System Audit Directories Must Be Owned By Root ocil:ssg-directory_ownership_var_log_audit_action:testaction:1 Disable the zarafa_setrlimit SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_zarafa_setrlimit_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Rules For Unauthorized Attempts To openat Are Ordered Correctly ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_openat_rule_order_action:testaction:1 Configure Firewalld to Use the Nftables Backend ocil:ssg-firewalld-backend_action:testaction:1 Enable the NTP Daemon ocil:ssg-service_chronyd_or_ntpd_enabled_action:testaction:1 Configure auditd to use audispd's syslog plugin ocil:ssg-auditd_audispd_syslog_plugin_activated_action:testaction:1 Verify that Shared Library Directories Have Root Group Ownership ocil:ssg-dir_group_ownership_library_dirs_action:testaction:1 Uninstall dovecot Package ocil:ssg-package_dovecot_removed_action:testaction:1 Configure GnuTLS library to use DoD-approved TLS Encryption ocil:ssg-configure_gnutls_tls_crypto_policy_action:testaction:1 Limit Password Reuse: password-auth ocil:ssg-accounts_password_pam_pwhistory_remember_password_auth_action:testaction:1 Disable the httpd_dbus_avahi SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_dbus_avahi_action:testaction:1 Disable Ctrl-Alt-Del Burst Action ocil:ssg-disable_ctrlaltdel_burstaction_action:testaction:1 Extend Audit Backlog Limit for the Audit Daemon ocil:ssg-grub2_audit_backlog_limit_argument_action:testaction:1 Disable the use_nfs_home_dirs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_use_nfs_home_dirs_action:testaction:1 Disable the virt_sandbox_use_sys_admin SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_virt_sandbox_use_sys_admin_action:testaction:1 Add nosuid Option to Removable Media Partitions ocil:ssg-mount_option_nosuid_removable_partitions_action:testaction:1 Disable the mpd_use_nfs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_mpd_use_nfs_action:testaction:1 Ensure tftp Daemon Uses Secure Mode ocil:ssg-tftpd_uses_secure_mode_action:testaction:1 Add nosuid Option to /boot/efi ocil:ssg-mount_option_boot_efi_nosuid_action:testaction:1 Disable At Service (atd) ocil:ssg-service_atd_disabled_action:testaction:1 Record Attempts to Alter Logon and Logout Events - faillock ocil:ssg-audit_rules_login_events_faillock_action:testaction:1 Configure auditd Number of Logs Retained ocil:ssg-auditd_data_retention_num_logs_action:testaction:1 Disable ypserv Service ocil:ssg-service_ypserv_disabled_action:testaction:1 Configure SSSD LDAP Backend Client to Demand a Valid Certificate from the Server ocil:ssg-sssd_ldap_configure_tls_reqcert_action:testaction:1 Enable HTTPD Error Logging ocil:ssg-httpd_enable_error_logging_action:testaction:1 Force opensc To Use Defined Smart Card Driver ocil:ssg-force_opensc_card_drivers_action:testaction:1 Disable the collectd_tcp_network_connect SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_collectd_tcp_network_connect_action:testaction:1 Disable SSH root Login with a Password (Insecure) ocil:ssg-sshd_disable_root_password_login_action:testaction:1 Disable the cobbler_anon_write SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_cobbler_anon_write_action:testaction:1 Verify that audit tools are owned by group root ocil:ssg-file_groupownership_audit_binaries_action:testaction:1 Record Successful Permission Changes to Files - fremovexattr ocil:ssg-audit_rules_successful_file_modification_fremovexattr_action:testaction:1 Disable the httpd_can_network_connect_db SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_can_network_connect_db_action:testaction:1 Configure Accepting Router Preference in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_rtr_pref_action:testaction:1 Install Intrusion Detection Software ocil:ssg-install_hids_action:testaction:1 Add nosuid Option to /var/tmp ocil:ssg-mount_option_var_tmp_nosuid_action:testaction:1 Verify Permissions on passwd File ocil:ssg-file_permissions_etc_passwd_action:testaction:1 Set Existing Passwords Maximum Age ocil:ssg-accounts_password_set_max_life_existing_action:testaction:1 Ensure Only Users Logged In To Real tty Can Execute Sudo - sudo requiretty ocil:ssg-sudo_add_requiretty_action:testaction:1 Add noauto Option to /boot ocil:ssg-mount_option_boot_noauto_action:testaction:1 Disable the conman_can_network SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_conman_can_network_action:testaction:1 Configure auditd Disk Full Action when Disk Space Is Full ocil:ssg-auditd_data_disk_full_action_stig_action:testaction:1 Verify Permissions on /etc/shells File ocil:ssg-file_permissions_etc_shells_action:testaction:1 Install the McAfee Runtime Libraries and Linux Agent ocil:ssg-install_mcafee_cma_rt_action:testaction:1 Configure Accepting Default Router in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_defrtr_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Unauthorized Access Attempts To open_by_handle_at Are Ordered Correctly ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open_by_handle_at_rule_order_action:testaction:1 Trigger a kernel BUG when data corruption is detected ocil:ssg-kernel_config_bug_on_data_corruption_action:testaction:1 Uninstall bind Package ocil:ssg-package_bind_removed_action:testaction:1 Record Events that Modify User/Group Information - /etc/gshadow ocil:ssg-audit_rules_usergroup_modification_gshadow_action:testaction:1 Disable the smartmon_3ware SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_smartmon_3ware_action:testaction:1 Uninstall net-snmp Package ocil:ssg-package_net-snmp_removed_action:testaction:1 Enable the cron_userdomain_transition SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_cron_userdomain_transition_action:testaction:1 Enable poison without sanity check ocil:ssg-kernel_config_page_poisoning_no_sanity_action:testaction:1 Add noexec Option to /var/log/audit ocil:ssg-mount_option_var_log_audit_noexec_action:testaction:1 Ensure SMEP is not disabled during boot ocil:ssg-grub2_nosmep_argument_absent_action:testaction:1 Ensure gpgcheck Enabled In Main yum Configuration ocil:ssg-ensure_gpgcheck_globally_activated_action:testaction:1 Audit Tools Must Have a Mode of 0755 or Less Permissive ocil:ssg-file_audit_tools_permissions_action:testaction:1 Remove NIS Client ocil:ssg-package_ypbind_removed_action:testaction:1 UEFI Boot Loader Is Not Installed On Removeable Media ocil:ssg-uefi_no_removeable_media_action:testaction:1 Verify Ownership on SSH Server Private *_key Key Files ocil:ssg-file_ownership_sshd_private_key_action:testaction:1 Ensure SMAP is not disabled during boot ocil:ssg-grub2_nosmap_argument_absent_action:testaction:1 Disable KDump Kernel Crash Analyzer (kdump) ocil:ssg-service_kdump_disabled_action:testaction:1 Configure the httpd_builtin_scripting SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_builtin_scripting_action:testaction:1 Disable the httpd_can_connect_ftp SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_can_connect_ftp_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - newgrp ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_newgrp_action:testaction:1 Verify Owner on cron.d ocil:ssg-file_owner_cron_d_action:testaction:1 Disable the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap_action:testaction:1 Disable the prosody_bind_http_port SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_prosody_bind_http_port_action:testaction:1 Disable the cluster_manage_all_files SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_cluster_manage_all_files_action:testaction:1 Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Characters ocil:ssg-accounts_password_pam_difok_action:testaction:1 Verify Owner on cron.weekly ocil:ssg-file_owner_cron_weekly_action:testaction:1 Perform full reference count validation ocil:ssg-kernel_config_refcount_full_action:testaction:1 Disable Geolocation in GNOME3 ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_disable_geolocation_action:testaction:1 Assign Expiration Date to Temporary Accounts ocil:ssg-account_temp_expire_date_action:testaction:1 Ensure nss-tools is installed ocil:ssg-package_nss-tools_installed_action:testaction:1 Disable the ssh_keysign SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_ssh_keysign_action:testaction:1 Verify Permissions on gshadow File ocil:ssg-file_permissions_etc_gshadow_action:testaction:1 Configure auditing of unsuccessful file creations ocil:ssg-audit_create_failed_action:testaction:1 Disable snmpd Service ocil:ssg-service_snmpd_disabled_action:testaction:1 Ensure that System Accounts Do Not Run a Shell Upon Login ocil:ssg-no_shelllogin_for_systemaccounts_action:testaction:1 Don't target root user in the sudoers file ocil:ssg-sudoers_no_root_target_action:testaction:1 Disable the cron_can_relabel SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_cron_can_relabel_action:testaction:1 Use Only Strong Key Exchange algorithms ocil:ssg-sshd_use_strong_kex_action:testaction:1 Verify Permissions on Backup gshadow File ocil:ssg-file_permissions_backup_etc_gshadow_action:testaction:1 Disable the git_cgi_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_git_cgi_enable_homedirs_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - pt_chown ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_pt_chown_action:testaction:1 Configure auditd admin_space_left on Low Disk Space ocil:ssg-auditd_data_retention_admin_space_left_percentage_action:testaction:1 Install McAfee Virus Scanning Software ocil:ssg-install_mcafee_antivirus_action:testaction:1 System Audit Logs Must Have Mode 0750 or Less Permissive ocil:ssg-directory_permissions_var_log_audit_action:testaction:1 Disable the gitosis_can_sendmail SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_gitosis_can_sendmail_action:testaction:1 Authorize USB hubs in USBGuard daemon ocil:ssg-usbguard_allow_hub_action:testaction:1 Enable Dracut FIPS Module ocil:ssg-enable_dracut_fips_module_action:testaction:1 Disable Kernel Parameter for Sending ICMP Redirects on all IPv4 Interfaces ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_send_redirects_action:testaction:1 Disable the virt_use_usb SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_virt_use_usb_action:testaction:1 Disable IEEE 1394 (FireWire) Support ocil:ssg-kernel_module_firewire-core_disabled_action:testaction:1 Harden slab freelist metadata ocil:ssg-kernel_config_slab_freelist_hardened_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - postdrop ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_postdrop_action:testaction:1 Disable the xserver_clients_write_xshm SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_xserver_clients_write_xshm_action:testaction:1 Enable FIPS Mode ocil:ssg-enable_fips_mode_action:testaction:1 Disable the xdm_write_home SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_xdm_write_home_action:testaction:1 Disable the nis_enabled SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_nis_enabled_action:testaction:1 Enable SLUB debugging support ocil:ssg-kernel_config_slub_debug_action:testaction:1 Install pam_pwquality Package ocil:ssg-package_pam_pwquality_installed_action:testaction:1 Disable the condor_tcp_network_connect SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_condor_tcp_network_connect_action:testaction:1 Record Events that Modify User/Group Information via open syscall - /etc/shadow ocil:ssg-audit_rules_etc_shadow_open_action:testaction:1 Record Events that Modify the System's Mandatory Access Controls ocil:ssg-audit_rules_mac_modification_action:testaction:1 Disable the GNOME3 Login Restart and Shutdown Buttons ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_disable_restart_shutdown_action:testaction:1 Enable the login_console_enabled SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_login_console_enabled_action:testaction:1 Enable Use of Privilege Separation ocil:ssg-sshd_use_priv_separation_action:testaction:1 Disable the cluster_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_cluster_can_network_connect_action:testaction:1 Configure Fapolicy Module to Employ a Deny-all, Permit-by-exception Policy to Allow the Execution of Authorized Software Programs. ocil:ssg-fapolicy_default_deny_action:testaction:1 Ensure SELinux State is Enforcing ocil:ssg-selinux_state_action:testaction:1 Set Password Minimum Age ocil:ssg-accounts_minimum_age_login_defs_action:testaction:1 Enable the unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition_action:testaction:1 Configure HTTP PERL Scripts To Use TAINT Option ocil:ssg-httpd_configure_perl_taint_action:testaction:1 Set Password Hashing Rounds in /etc/login.defs ocil:ssg-set_password_hashing_min_rounds_logindefs_action:testaction:1 Install scap-security-guide Package ocil:ssg-package_scap-security-guide_installed_action:testaction:1 Verify Group Who Owns Backup group File ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_backup_etc_group_action:testaction:1 Ensure Users Re-Authenticate for Privilege Escalation - sudo NOPASSWD ocil:ssg-sudo_remove_nopasswd_action:testaction:1 Add noexec Option to /home ocil:ssg-mount_option_home_noexec_action:testaction:1 Disable Apache Qpid (qpidd) ocil:ssg-service_qpidd_disabled_action:testaction:1 Verify User Who Owns Backup shadow File ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_backup_etc_shadow_action:testaction:1 User Initialization Files Must Be Group-Owned By The Primary Group ocil:ssg-accounts_user_dot_group_ownership_action:testaction:1 Configure Polyinstantiation of /tmp Directories ocil:ssg-accounts_polyinstantiated_tmp_action:testaction:1 Enable page allocator poisoning ocil:ssg-grub2_page_poison_argument_action:testaction:1 Disable CPU Speed (cpupower) ocil:ssg-service_cpupower_disabled_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects File Deletion Events by User ocil:ssg-audit_rules_file_deletion_events_action:testaction:1 Disable the exim_read_user_files SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_exim_read_user_files_action:testaction:1 Use Kerberos Security on All Exports ocil:ssg-use_kerberos_security_all_exports_action:testaction:1 Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting ICMP Redirects by Default on IPv6 Interfaces ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects_action:testaction:1 Configure Accepting Default Router in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_defrtr_action:testaction:1 Configure auditing of unsuccessful ownership changes ocil:ssg-audit_owner_change_failed_action:testaction:1 Add nodev Option to /tmp ocil:ssg-mount_option_tmp_nodev_action:testaction:1 A public web server, if hosted on the NIPRNet, must be isolated in an accredited DoD DMZ extension ocil:ssg-httpd_nipr_accredited_dmz_action:testaction:1 Install the opensc Package For Multifactor Authentication ocil:ssg-package_opensc_installed_action:testaction:1 Record Successful Access Attempts to Files - open_by_handle_at ocil:ssg-audit_rules_successful_file_modification_open_by_handle_at_action:testaction:1 Disable the mcelog_server SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_mcelog_server_action:testaction:1 Disable Kerberos by removing host keytab ocil:ssg-kerberos_disable_no_keytab_action:testaction:1 Configure kernel to trust the CPU random number generator ocil:ssg-grub2_kernel_trust_cpu_rng_action:testaction:1 Configure tmux to lock session after inactivity ocil:ssg-configure_tmux_lock_after_time_action:testaction:1 Require Credential Prompting for Remote Access in GNOME3 ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_remote_access_credential_prompt_action:testaction:1 Enable the logging_syslogd_use_tty SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_logging_syslogd_use_tty_action:testaction:1 Configure Accepting Prefix Information in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_pinfo_action:testaction:1 Record Successful Ownership Changes to Files - fchown ocil:ssg-audit_rules_successful_file_modification_fchown_action:testaction:1 Disable TIPC Support ocil:ssg-kernel_module_tipc_disabled_action:testaction:1 Disable the tmpreaper_use_nfs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_tmpreaper_use_nfs_action:testaction:1 Install sssd-ipa Package ocil:ssg-package_sssd-ipa_installed_action:testaction:1 Disable kexec system call ocil:ssg-kernel_config_kexec_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Rules For Unauthorized Attempts To open Are Ordered Correctly ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open_rule_order_action:testaction:1 Configure Denying Router Solicitations on All IPv6 Interfaces ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_router_solicitations_action:testaction:1 Verify that Shared Library Directories Have Root Ownership ocil:ssg-dir_ownership_library_dirs_action:testaction:1 Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fchmod ocil:ssg-audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmod_action:testaction:1 Disable the httpd_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_enable_homedirs_action:testaction:1 Configure the selinuxuser_direct_dri_enabled SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_selinuxuser_direct_dri_enabled_action:testaction:1 Allow Only SSH Protocol 2 ocil:ssg-sshd_allow_only_protocol2_action:testaction:1 Record Successful Permission Changes to Files - setxattr ocil:ssg-audit_rules_successful_file_modification_setxattr_action:testaction:1 Verify that system commands files are group owned by root or a system account ocil:ssg-file_groupownership_system_commands_dirs_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - chsh ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_chsh_action:testaction:1 Disable the httpd_can_connect_mythtv SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_can_connect_mythtv_action:testaction:1 Ensure logrotate is Installed ocil:ssg-package_logrotate_installed_action:testaction:1 Record Successful Permission Changes to Files - lsetxattr ocil:ssg-audit_rules_successful_file_modification_lsetxattr_action:testaction:1 Add grpquota Option to /home ocil:ssg-mount_option_home_grpquota_action:testaction:1 Remove the GDM Package Group ocil:ssg-package_gdm_removed_action:testaction:1 Disable the httpd_read_user_content SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_read_user_content_action:testaction:1 Ensure that /etc/cron.allow exists ocil:ssg-file_cron_allow_exists_action:testaction:1 Uninstall nginx Package ocil:ssg-package_nginx_removed_action:testaction:1 Configure Periodic Execution of AIDE ocil:ssg-aide_periodic_cron_checking_action:testaction:1 Verify Group Ownership of System Login Banner ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_etc_issue_action:testaction:1 Remove iptables-services Package ocil:ssg-package_iptables-services_removed_action:testaction:1 Disable the logging_syslogd_can_sendmail SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_logging_syslogd_can_sendmail_action:testaction:1 Ensure Users Cannot Change GNOME3 Screensaver Lock After Idle Period ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_locked_action:testaction:1 Disable the httpd_can_network_relay SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_can_network_relay_action:testaction:1 Enable GNOME3 Screensaver Idle Activation ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_screensaver_idle_activation_enabled_action:testaction:1 Limit sampling frequency of the Perf system ocil:ssg-sysctl_kernel_perf_event_max_sample_rate_action:testaction:1 Record attempts to alter time through settimeofday ocil:ssg-audit_rules_time_settimeofday_action:testaction:1 Record Access Events to Audit Log Directory ocil:ssg-directory_access_var_log_audit_action:testaction:1 Ensure /opt Located On Separate Partition ocil:ssg-partition_for_opt_action:testaction:1 Enable the postgresql_selinux_users_ddl SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_postgresql_selinux_users_ddl_action:testaction:1 Configure SSH to use System Crypto Policy ocil:ssg-configure_ssh_crypto_policy_action:testaction:1 Enable the xend_run_blktap SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_xend_run_blktap_action:testaction:1 Ensure Default SNMP Password Is Not Used ocil:ssg-snmpd_not_default_password_action:testaction:1 The Chronyd service is enabled ocil:ssg-service_chronyd_enabled_action:testaction:1 Verify permissions on Message of the Day Banner ocil:ssg-file_permissions_etc_motd_action:testaction:1 Extend Audit Backlog Limit for the Audit Daemon in zIPL ocil:ssg-zipl_audit_backlog_limit_argument_action:testaction:1 Disable the virt_transition_userdomain SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_virt_transition_userdomain_action:testaction:1 Disallow merge of slab caches ocil:ssg-kernel_config_slab_merge_default_action:testaction:1 Authorize Human Interface Devices and USB hubs in USBGuard daemon ocil:ssg-usbguard_allow_hid_and_hub_action:testaction:1 Record Successful Permission Changes to Files - fsetxattr ocil:ssg-audit_rules_successful_file_modification_fsetxattr_action:testaction:1 Install the OpenSSH Server Package ocil:ssg-package_openssh-server_installed_action:testaction:1 Uninstall Samba Package ocil:ssg-package_samba_removed_action:testaction:1 Uninstall 389-ds-base Package ocil:ssg-package_389-ds-base_removed_action:testaction:1 Disable the cobbler_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_cobbler_can_network_connect_action:testaction:1 Disable the virt_use_xserver SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_virt_use_xserver_action:testaction:1 Record Unsuccessful Creation Attempts to Files - openat O_CREAT ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_openat_o_creat_action:testaction:1 Configure SSSD to Expire Offline Credentials ocil:ssg-sssd_offline_cred_expiration_action:testaction:1 Configure AIDE to Verify Extended Attributes ocil:ssg-aide_verify_ext_attributes_action:testaction:1 Ensure Rsyslog Encrypts Off-Loaded Audit Records ocil:ssg-rsyslog_encrypt_offload_actionsendstreamdrivermode_action:testaction:1 Verify /boot/grub2/user.cfg User Ownership ocil:ssg-file_owner_user_cfg_action:testaction:1 Disable the secure_mode SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_secure_mode_action:testaction:1 Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Digit Characters ocil:ssg-accounts_password_pam_dcredit_action:testaction:1 Verify iptables Enabled ocil:ssg-service_iptables_enabled_action:testaction:1 Record Any Attempts to Run seunshare ocil:ssg-audit_rules_execution_seunshare_action:testaction:1 Disable the xguest_exec_content SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_xguest_exec_content_action:testaction:1 Disable the httpd_use_sasl SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_use_sasl_action:testaction:1 Record attempts to alter time through adjtimex ocil:ssg-audit_rules_time_adjtimex_action:testaction:1 Prevent non-Privileged Users from Modifying Network Interfaces using nmcli ocil:ssg-network_nmcli_permissions_action:testaction:1 Configure auditd Disk Full Action when Disk Space Is Full ocil:ssg-auditd_data_disk_full_action_action:testaction:1 Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows ocil:ssg-kernel_config_fortify_source_action:testaction:1 Disable the fenced_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_fenced_can_network_connect_action:testaction:1 Randomize the kernel memory sections ocil:ssg-kernel_config_randomize_memory_action:testaction:1 Disable rlogin Service ocil:ssg-service_rlogin_disabled_action:testaction:1 Enable systemd-journald Service ocil:ssg-service_systemd-journald_enabled_action:testaction:1 Disable GSSAPI Authentication ocil:ssg-sshd_disable_gssapi_auth_action:testaction:1 Configure Certificate Directives for LDAP Use of TLS ocil:ssg-ldap_client_tls_cacertpath_action:testaction:1 Disable Bluetooth Service ocil:ssg-service_bluetooth_disabled_action:testaction:1 Set Password Maximum Consecutive Repeating Characters ocil:ssg-accounts_password_pam_maxrepeat_action:testaction:1 Verify that Shared Library Directories Have Restrictive Permissions ocil:ssg-dir_permissions_library_dirs_action:testaction:1 Verify User Who Owns group File ocil:ssg-file_owner_etc_group_action:testaction:1 Disable the container_connect_any SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_container_connect_any_action:testaction:1 Disable graphical user interface ocil:ssg-xwindows_remove_packages_action:testaction:1 Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Prevent the Use of Dictionary Words ocil:ssg-accounts_password_pam_dictcheck_action:testaction:1 Remove the Kerberos Server Package ocil:ssg-package_krb5-server_removed_action:testaction:1 Configure auditd space_left on Low Disk Space ocil:ssg-auditd_data_retention_space_left_action:testaction:1 Ensure All SUID Executables Are Authorized ocil:ssg-file_permissions_unauthorized_suid_action:testaction:1 Enable the sysadm_exec_content SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_sysadm_exec_content_action:testaction:1 Enable the OpenSSH Service ocil:ssg-service_sshd_enabled_action:testaction:1 Disable chrony daemon from acting as server ocil:ssg-chronyd_client_only_action:testaction:1 Enable the logadm_exec_content SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_logadm_exec_content_action:testaction:1 Configure A Banner Page For Each Website ocil:ssg-httpd_configure_banner_page_action:testaction:1 Record Unsuccessful Permission Changes to Files - setxattr ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_setxattr_action:testaction:1 Disable Core Dumps for All Users ocil:ssg-disable_users_coredumps_action:testaction:1 Configure SSSD LDAP Backend to Use TLS For All Transactions ocil:ssg-sssd_ldap_start_tls_action:testaction:1 Ensure syslog-ng is Installed ocil:ssg-package_syslogng_installed_action:testaction:1 Require Client Certificates ocil:ssg-httpd_require_client_certs_action:testaction:1 Ensure rsyslog Default File Permissions Configured ocil:ssg-rsyslog_filecreatemode_action:testaction:1 Ensure gpgcheck Enabled for All yum Package Repositories ocil:ssg-ensure_gpgcheck_never_disabled_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects File Deletion Events by User - unlink ocil:ssg-audit_rules_file_deletion_events_unlink_action:testaction:1 Disable the httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind_action:testaction:1 Disable Kernel cfg80211 Module ocil:ssg-kernel_module_cfg80211_disabled_action:testaction:1 Disable the exim_manage_user_files SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_exim_manage_user_files_action:testaction:1 Enable SSH Print Last Log ocil:ssg-sshd_print_last_log_action:testaction:1 Disable vsyscalls ocil:ssg-grub2_vsyscall_argument_action:testaction:1 Disable the httpd_enable_ftp_server SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_enable_ftp_server_action:testaction:1 Ensure No World-Writable Files Exist ocil:ssg-file_permissions_unauthorized_world_writable_action:testaction:1 Enable rsyslog Service ocil:ssg-service_rsyslog_enabled_action:testaction:1 Set Permissions on the /var/log/httpd/ Directory ocil:ssg-dir_perms_var_log_httpd_action:testaction:1 Disable ntpdate Service (ntpdate) ocil:ssg-service_ntpdate_disabled_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects System Administrator Actions - /etc/sudoers.d/ ocil:ssg-audit_rules_sudoers_d_action:testaction:1 Disable the zoneminder_run_sudo SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_zoneminder_run_sudo_action:testaction:1 OpenSSL uses strong entropy source ocil:ssg-openssl_use_strong_entropy_action:testaction:1 Enable the dbadm_exec_content SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_dbadm_exec_content_action:testaction:1 Disable the cobbler_use_cifs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_cobbler_use_cifs_action:testaction:1 Ensure debug-shell service is not enabled during boot ocil:ssg-grub2_systemd_debug-shell_argument_absent_action:testaction:1 Mount Remote Filesystems with nodev ocil:ssg-mount_option_nodev_remote_filesystems_action:testaction:1 Disable Advanced Configuration and Power Interface (acpid) ocil:ssg-service_acpid_disabled_action:testaction:1 Require Client SMB Packet Signing, if using smbclient ocil:ssg-require_smb_client_signing_action:testaction:1 Disable the virt_use_rawip SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_virt_use_rawip_action:testaction:1 Configure the tmux Lock Command ocil:ssg-configure_tmux_lock_command_action:testaction:1 Disable the tftp_home_dir SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_tftp_home_dir_action:testaction:1 Disable the tmpreaper_use_samba SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_tmpreaper_use_samba_action:testaction:1 Enable Auditing to Start Prior to the Audit Daemon in zIPL ocil:ssg-zipl_audit_argument_action:testaction:1 Uninstall quagga Package ocil:ssg-package_quagga_removed_action:testaction:1 Include Local Events in Audit Logs ocil:ssg-auditd_local_events_action:testaction:1 Set Daemon Umask ocil:ssg-umask_for_daemons_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - usernetctl ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_usernetctl_action:testaction:1 Disable Red Hat Network Service (rhnsd) ocil:ssg-service_rhnsd_disabled_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - su ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_su_action:testaction:1 Disable the icecast_use_any_tcp_ports SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_icecast_use_any_tcp_ports_action:testaction:1 Configure the Use of the pam_faillock.so Module in the /etc/pam.d/password-auth File. ocil:ssg-account_password_pam_faillock_password_auth_action:testaction:1 Record Successful Delete Attempts to Files - unlinkat ocil:ssg-audit_rules_successful_file_modification_unlinkat_action:testaction:1 Disable Client Dynamic DNS Updates ocil:ssg-network_disable_ddns_interfaces_action:testaction:1 Enable Encrypted X11 Forwarding ocil:ssg-sshd_enable_x11_forwarding_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - mount ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_mount_action:testaction:1 Set configuration for loopback traffic ocil:ssg-set_loopback_traffic_action:testaction:1 Disable the mpd_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_mpd_enable_homedirs_action:testaction:1 Disable GDM Guest Login ocil:ssg-gnome_gdm_disable_guest_login_action:testaction:1 Ensure ip6tables Firewall Rules Exist for All Open Ports ocil:ssg-ip6tables_rules_for_open_ports_action:testaction:1 Verify the UEFI Boot Loader grub.cfg Group Ownership ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_efi_grub2_cfg_action:testaction:1 Configure auditd mail_acct Action on Low Disk Space ocil:ssg-auditd_data_retention_action_mail_acct_action:testaction:1 Disable loading and unloading of kernel modules ocil:ssg-sysctl_kernel_modules_disabled_action:testaction:1 Ensure cron Is Logging To Rsyslog ocil:ssg-rsyslog_cron_logging_action:testaction:1 Add nodev Option to /boot ocil:ssg-mount_option_boot_nodev_action:testaction:1 Disable the samba_create_home_dirs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_samba_create_home_dirs_action:testaction:1 Disable the xdm_exec_bootloader SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_xdm_exec_bootloader_action:testaction:1 Disable the httpd_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_use_fusefs_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - shutdown ocil:ssg-audit_privileged_commands_shutdown_action:testaction:1 Configure audispd Plugin To Send Logs To Remote Server ocil:ssg-auditd_audispd_configure_remote_server_action:testaction:1 Enable the selinuxuser_execmod SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_selinuxuser_execmod_action:testaction:1 Set Kernel Parameter to Increase Local Port Range ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_local_port_range_action:testaction:1 Configure Notification of Post-AIDE Scan Details ocil:ssg-aide_scan_notification_action:testaction:1 Disable Accepting Router Advertisements on all IPv6 Interfaces by Default ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_action:testaction:1 Ensure IPv6 is disabled through kernel boot parameter ocil:ssg-grub2_ipv6_disable_argument_action:testaction:1 Enable SLUB/SLAB allocator poisoning ocil:ssg-grub2_slub_debug_argument_action:testaction:1 Enable Kernel Parameter to Use Reverse Path Filtering on all IPv4 Interfaces by Default ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter_action:testaction:1 Ensure gnutls-utils is installed ocil:ssg-package_gnutls-utils_installed_action:testaction:1 Disable legacy (BSD) PTY support ocil:ssg-kernel_config_legacy_ptys_action:testaction:1 Record Events that Modify User/Group Information via open syscall - /etc/passwd ocil:ssg-audit_rules_etc_passwd_open_action:testaction:1 Disable the abrt_anon_write SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_abrt_anon_write_action:testaction:1 User a virtually-mapped stack ocil:ssg-kernel_config_vmap_stack_action:testaction:1 Disable the cdrecord_read_content SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_cdrecord_read_content_action:testaction:1 Configure auditd max_log_file_action Upon Reaching Maximum Log Size ocil:ssg-auditd_data_retention_max_log_file_action_stig_action:testaction:1 Ensure SNMP Read Write is disabled ocil:ssg-snmpd_no_rwusers_action:testaction:1 Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session ocil:ssg-accounts_password_pam_retry_action:testaction:1 Ensure the Group Used by pam_wheel.so Module Exists on System and is Empty ocil:ssg-ensure_pam_wheel_group_empty_action:testaction:1 Disable the cvs_read_shadow SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_cvs_read_shadow_action:testaction:1 Set SSH MaxSessions limit ocil:ssg-sshd_set_max_sessions_action:testaction:1 Configure SSH Client to Use FIPS 140-2 Validated Ciphers: openssh.config ocil:ssg-harden_sshd_ciphers_openssh_conf_crypto_policy_action:testaction:1 Disable the irc_use_any_tcp_ports SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_irc_use_any_tcp_ports_action:testaction:1 Configure Kernel to Rate Limit Sending of Duplicate TCP Acknowledgments ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_invalid_ratelimit_action:testaction:1 Do Not Show System Messages When Unsuccessful Logon Attempts Occur ocil:ssg-accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_silent_action:testaction:1 Configure the secure_mode_insmod SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_secure_mode_insmod_action:testaction:1 Disable compatibility with brk() ocil:ssg-kernel_config_compat_brk_action:testaction:1 Configure dnf-automatic to Install Available Updates Automatically ocil:ssg-dnf-automatic_apply_updates_action:testaction:1 Disable the git_session_users SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_git_session_users_action:testaction:1 Disable the virt_use_nfs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_virt_use_nfs_action:testaction:1 Configure audit according to OSPP requirements ocil:ssg-audit_rules_for_ospp_action:testaction:1 Record Attempts to Alter the localtime File ocil:ssg-audit_rules_time_watch_localtime_action:testaction:1 Disable the mozilla_read_content SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_mozilla_read_content_action:testaction:1 Enable the SSSD Service ocil:ssg-service_sssd_enabled_action:testaction:1 Verify /boot/grub2/grub.cfg Permissions ocil:ssg-file_permissions_grub2_cfg_action:testaction:1 Disable the spamassassin_can_network SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_spamassassin_can_network_action:testaction:1 Boot Loader Is Not Installed On Removeable Media ocil:ssg-grub2_no_removeable_media_action:testaction:1 Install Smart Card Packages For Multifactor Authentication ocil:ssg-install_smartcard_packages_action:testaction:1 Disable the samba_portmapper SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_samba_portmapper_action:testaction:1 Verify the UEFI Boot Loader grub.cfg User Ownership ocil:ssg-file_owner_efi_grub2_cfg_action:testaction:1 Disable SSH TCP Forwarding ocil:ssg-sshd_disable_tcp_forwarding_action:testaction:1 Disable the virt_use_execmem SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_virt_use_execmem_action:testaction:1 Disable the use_ecryptfs_home_dirs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_use_ecryptfs_home_dirs_action:testaction:1 Disable Network Console (netconsole) ocil:ssg-service_netconsole_disabled_action:testaction:1 Ensure All-Squashing Disabled On All Exports ocil:ssg-no_all_squash_exports_action:testaction:1 Emulate Privileged Access Never (PAN) ocil:ssg-kernel_config_arm64_sw_ttbr0_pan_action:testaction:1 Verify Group Who Owns /etc/shells File ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_etc_shells_action:testaction:1 Ensure that Users Path Contains Only Local Directories ocil:ssg-accounts_user_home_paths_only_action:testaction:1 Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Enforce for root User ocil:ssg-accounts_password_pam_enforce_root_action:testaction:1 Uninstall nfs-utils Package ocil:ssg-package_nfs-utils_removed_action:testaction:1 Require Authentication for Single User Mode ocil:ssg-require_singleuser_auth_action:testaction:1 Configure LDAP Client to Use TLS For All Transactions ocil:ssg-ldap_client_start_tls_action:testaction:1 Disable the use of user namespaces ocil:ssg-sysctl_user_max_user_namespaces_action:testaction:1 Configure Auto Configuration on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_autoconf_action:testaction:1 Disable the httpd_anon_write SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_anon_write_action:testaction:1 Account Lockouts Must Persist ocil:ssg-account_passwords_pam_faillock_dir_action:testaction:1 Disable the webadm_read_user_files SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_webadm_read_user_files_action:testaction:1 Disable vsyscall emulation ocil:ssg-kernel_config_legacy_vsyscall_emulate_action:testaction:1 Disable the cobbler_use_nfs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_cobbler_use_nfs_action:testaction:1 Disable the selinuxuser_execstack SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_selinuxuser_execstack_action:testaction:1 Configure immutable Audit login UIDs ocil:ssg-audit_immutable_login_uids_action:testaction:1 Verify Permissions on /etc/cron.allow file ocil:ssg-file_permissions_cron_allow_action:testaction:1 Configure SNMP Service to Use Only SNMPv3 or Newer ocil:ssg-snmpd_use_newer_protocol_action:testaction:1 Uninstall avahi Server Package ocil:ssg-package_avahi_removed_action:testaction:1 Enable the gssd_read_tmp SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_gssd_read_tmp_action:testaction:1 Harden the operation of the BPF just-in-time compiler ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_core_bpf_jit_harden_action:testaction:1 Configure OpenSSL library to use TLS Encryption ocil:ssg-configure_openssl_tls_crypto_policy_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects File Deletion Events by User - renameat ocil:ssg-audit_rules_file_deletion_events_renameat_action:testaction:1 Require Client SMB Packet Signing, if using mount.cifs ocil:ssg-mount_option_smb_client_signing_action:testaction:1 Verify Permissions on /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules ocil:ssg-file_permissions_etc_audit_rulesd_action:testaction:1 Uninstall DHCP Server Package ocil:ssg-package_dhcp_removed_action:testaction:1 Enable Kernel Parameter to Enforce DAC on Symlinks ocil:ssg-sysctl_fs_protected_symlinks_action:testaction:1 Configure Response Mode of ARP Requests for All IPv4 Interfaces ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_ignore_action:testaction:1 Remove the OpenSSH Server Package ocil:ssg-package_openssh-server_removed_action:testaction:1 Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Maximum Consecutive Repeating Characters from Same Character Class ocil:ssg-accounts_password_pam_maxclassrepeat_action:testaction:1 Prefer to use a 64-bit Operating System when supported ocil:ssg-prefer_64bit_os_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects Information on Kernel Module Loading and Unloading - finit_module ocil:ssg-audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_finit_action:testaction:1 Disable the deny_ptrace SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_deny_ptrace_action:testaction:1 Disable the squid_connect_any SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_squid_connect_any_action:testaction:1 Uninstall rsh-server Package ocil:ssg-package_rsh-server_removed_action:testaction:1 Disable the pcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_pcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports_action:testaction:1 Ensure the Logon Failure Delay is Set Correctly in login.defs ocil:ssg-accounts_logon_fail_delay_action:testaction:1 Record Unsuccessful Ownership Changes to Files - lchown ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_lchown_action:testaction:1 Configure Logind to terminate idle sessions after certain time of inactivity ocil:ssg-logind_session_timeout_action:testaction:1 Ensure network interfaces are assigned to appropriate zone ocil:ssg-set_firewalld_appropriate_zone_action:testaction:1 Set Account Expiration Following Inactivity ocil:ssg-account_disable_post_pw_expiration_action:testaction:1 Record Events that Modify the System's Network Environment ocil:ssg-audit_rules_networkconfig_modification_action:testaction:1 Install openscap-scanner Package ocil:ssg-package_openscap-scanner_installed_action:testaction:1 Specify UID and GID for Anonymous NFS Connections ocil:ssg-nfs_no_anonymous_action:testaction:1 Add nosuid Option to /var ocil:ssg-mount_option_var_nosuid_action:testaction:1 Disable the virt_rw_qemu_ga_data SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_virt_rw_qemu_ga_data_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects Information on Kernel Module Loading and Unloading - query_module ocil:ssg-audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_query_action:testaction:1 Set Up a Private Namespace in PAM Configuration ocil:ssg-enable_pam_namespace_action:testaction:1 Disable the neutron_can_network SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_neutron_can_network_action:testaction:1 Modify the System Login Banner for Remote Connections ocil:ssg-banner_etc_issue_net_action:testaction:1 Disable the unprivuser_use_svirt SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_unprivuser_use_svirt_action:testaction:1 Enable the Hardware RNG Entropy Gatherer Service ocil:ssg-service_rngd_enabled_action:testaction:1 Support session locking with tmux (not enforcing) ocil:ssg-configure_bashrc_tmux_action:testaction:1 Disable vsyscall mapping ocil:ssg-kernel_config_legacy_vsyscall_none_action:testaction:1 Enable the kerberos_enabled SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_kerberos_enabled_action:testaction:1 Record Events When Privileged Executables Are Run ocil:ssg-audit_rules_suid_privilege_function_action:testaction:1 Disable Kernel Parameter for IP Forwarding on IPv4 Interfaces ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_forward_action:testaction:1 Enable Kernel Parameter to Enforce DAC on Hardlinks ocil:ssg-sysctl_fs_protected_hardlinks_action:testaction:1 Ensure there are no legacy + NIS entries in /etc/group ocil:ssg-no_legacy_plus_entries_etc_group_action:testaction:1 Configure auditd Max Log File Size ocil:ssg-auditd_data_retention_max_log_file_action:testaction:1 Enable checks on notifier call chains ocil:ssg-kernel_config_debug_notifiers_action:testaction:1 Record Any Attempts to Run ssh-agent ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_ssh_agent_action:testaction:1 Configure ARP filtering for All IPv4 Interfaces ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_filter_action:testaction:1 Verify Group Who Owns Backup shadow File ocil:ssg-file_owner_backup_etc_shadow_action:testaction:1 Disable the telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports_action:testaction:1 Install the tmux Package ocil:ssg-package_tmux_installed_action:testaction:1 Disable the named_write_master_zones SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_named_write_master_zones_action:testaction:1 Enable the xend_run_qemu SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_xend_run_qemu_action:testaction:1 Configure System to Forward All Mail For The Root Account ocil:ssg-postfix_client_configure_mail_alias_action:testaction:1 Ensure Authentication Required for Single User Mode ocil:ssg-ensure_root_password_configured_action:testaction:1 Record Successful Access Attempts to Files - open ocil:ssg-audit_rules_successful_file_modification_open_action:testaction:1 Record Unsuccessful Delete Attempts to Files - rename ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_rename_action:testaction:1 Ensure Mail Transfer Agent is not Listening on any non-loopback Address ocil:ssg-has_nonlocal_mta_action:testaction:1 Ensure the Default C Shell Umask is Set Correctly ocil:ssg-accounts_umask_etc_csh_cshrc_action:testaction:1 Configure A Valid Server Certificate ocil:ssg-httpd_configure_valid_server_cert_action:testaction:1 Stack Protector buffer overlow detection ocil:ssg-kernel_config_stackprotector_action:testaction:1 Enable Auditing for Processes Which Start Prior to the Audit Daemon ocil:ssg-grub2_audit_argument_action:testaction:1 Add nosuid Option to /dev/shm ocil:ssg-mount_option_dev_shm_nosuid_action:testaction:1 Disable the domain_kernel_load_modules SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_domain_kernel_load_modules_action:testaction:1 Verify All Account Password Hashes are Shadowed ocil:ssg-accounts_password_all_shadowed_action:testaction:1 Enable checks on scatter-gather (SG) table operations ocil:ssg-kernel_config_debug_sg_action:testaction:1 Configure OpenSSL library to use System Crypto Policy ocil:ssg-configure_openssl_crypto_policy_action:testaction:1 Disable Samba ocil:ssg-service_smb_disabled_action:testaction:1 Prevent user from disabling the screen lock ocil:ssg-no_tmux_in_shells_action:testaction:1 Ensure Sudo Logfile Exists - sudo logfile ocil:ssg-sudo_custom_logfile_action:testaction:1 Disable hibernation ocil:ssg-kernel_config_hibernation_action:testaction:1 Record Unsuccessful Permission Changes to Files - fsetxattr ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_fsetxattr_action:testaction:1 Record Unsuccessful Delete Attempts to Files - unlink ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_unlink_action:testaction:1 Disable the awstats_purge_apache_log_files SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_awstats_purge_apache_log_files_action:testaction:1 Disable the virt_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_virt_use_fusefs_action:testaction:1 Set LogLevel to INFO ocil:ssg-sshd_set_loglevel_info_action:testaction:1 Ensure that chronyd is running under chrony user account ocil:ssg-chronyd_run_as_chrony_user_action:testaction:1 Verify ownership of System Login Banner for Remote Connections ocil:ssg-file_owner_etc_issue_net_action:testaction:1 Verify that Shared Library Files Have Root Ownership ocil:ssg-file_ownership_library_dirs_action:testaction:1 Verify Group Who Owns cron.daily ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_cron_daily_action:testaction:1 Configure the tmux lock session key binding ocil:ssg-configure_tmux_lock_keybinding_action:testaction:1 Disable named Service ocil:ssg-service_named_disabled_action:testaction:1 Disable the httpd_execmem SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_execmem_action:testaction:1 Ensure Web Content Located on Separate partition ocil:ssg-partition_for_web_content_action:testaction:1 Disable WIFI Network Notification in GNOME3 ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_disable_wifi_notification_action:testaction:1 Ensure /var/log Located On Separate Partition ocil:ssg-partition_for_var_log_action:testaction:1 Disable the abrt_upload_watch_anon_write SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_abrt_upload_watch_anon_write_action:testaction:1 Disable Squid ocil:ssg-service_squid_disabled_action:testaction:1 Restrict Serial Port Root Logins ocil:ssg-restrict_serial_port_logins_action:testaction:1 Record Successful Access Attempts to Files - openat ocil:ssg-audit_rules_successful_file_modification_openat_action:testaction:1 Install sudo Package ocil:ssg-package_sudo_installed_action:testaction:1 Configure auditd Disk Error Action on Disk Error ocil:ssg-auditd_data_disk_error_action_stig_action:testaction:1 Record Successful Permission Changes to Files - removexattr ocil:ssg-audit_rules_successful_file_modification_removexattr_action:testaction:1 Disable Web Content Symbolic Links ocil:ssg-httpd_disable_content_symlinks_action:testaction:1 Disable the virt_use_comm SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_virt_use_comm_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - pam_timestamp_check ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_pam_timestamp_check_action:testaction:1 Disable the cluster_use_execmem SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_cluster_use_execmem_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - reboot ocil:ssg-audit_privileged_commands_reboot_action:testaction:1 Ensure sudo only includes the default configuration directory ocil:ssg-sudoers_default_includedir_action:testaction:1 Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fchmodat ocil:ssg-audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmodat_action:testaction:1 Enable the staff_exec_content SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_staff_exec_content_action:testaction:1 Restrict usage of ptrace to descendant processes ocil:ssg-sysctl_kernel_yama_ptrace_scope_action:testaction:1 Uninstall python3-abrt-addon Package ocil:ssg-package_python3-abrt-addon_removed_action:testaction:1 Verify Permissions on shadow File ocil:ssg-file_permissions_etc_shadow_action:testaction:1 Enable module signature verification ocil:ssg-kernel_config_module_sig_action:testaction:1 Verify User Who Owns Backup group File ocil:ssg-file_owner_backup_etc_group_action:testaction:1 Uninstall tftp-server Package ocil:ssg-package_tftp-server_removed_action:testaction:1 Disable the uvcvideo module ocil:ssg-kernel_module_uvcvideo_disabled_action:testaction:1 Ensure All Groups on the System Have Unique Group Names ocil:ssg-group_unique_name_action:testaction:1 Configure auditing of loading and unloading of kernel modules ocil:ssg-audit_module_load_action:testaction:1 Configure Maximum Number of Autoconfigured Addresses on All IPv6 Interfaces ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_max_addresses_action:testaction:1 Ensure SELinux Not Disabled in the kernel arguments ocil:ssg-coreos_enable_selinux_kernel_argument_action:testaction:1 Disable the privoxy_connect_any SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_privoxy_connect_any_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects Information on Kernel Module Unloading - delete_module ocil:ssg-audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_delete_action:testaction:1 Detect stack corruption on calls to schedule() ocil:ssg-kernel_config_sched_stack_end_check_action:testaction:1 Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on IPv4 Interfaces by Default ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route_action:testaction:1 Disable the mysql_connect_any SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_mysql_connect_any_action:testaction:1 Configure auditing of unsuccessful file deletions ocil:ssg-audit_delete_failed_action:testaction:1 Record Successful Creation Attempts to Files - open O_CREAT ocil:ssg-audit_rules_successful_file_modification_open_o_creat_action:testaction:1 Ensure the default plugins for the audit dispatcher are Installed ocil:ssg-package_audit-audispd-plugins_installed_action:testaction:1 Enable SSH Warning Banner ocil:ssg-sshd_enable_warning_banner_action:testaction:1 Install dnf-plugin-subscription-manager Package ocil:ssg-package_dnf-plugin-subscription-manager_installed_action:testaction:1 Enable the NTP Daemon ocil:ssg-service_ntp_enabled_action:testaction:1 Configure SSH Client to Use FIPS 140-2 Validated MACs: openssh.config ocil:ssg-harden_sshd_macs_openssh_conf_crypto_policy_action:testaction:1 Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - lchown ocil:ssg-audit_rules_dac_modification_lchown_action:testaction:1 Disable DCCP Support ocil:ssg-kernel_module_dccp_disabled_action:testaction:1 Configure PAM in SSSD Services ocil:ssg-sssd_enable_pam_services_action:testaction:1 Enable logrotate Timer ocil:ssg-timer_logrotate_enabled_action:testaction:1 Scan All Uploaded Content for Malicious Software ocil:ssg-httpd_antivirus_scan_uploads_action:testaction:1 Uninstall abrt-addon-ccpp Package ocil:ssg-package_abrt-addon-ccpp_removed_action:testaction:1 Add noexec Option to /dev/shm ocil:ssg-mount_option_dev_shm_noexec_action:testaction:1 Kernel panic oops ocil:ssg-kernel_config_panic_on_oops_action:testaction:1 Uninstall avahi-autoipd Server Package ocil:ssg-package_avahi-autoipd_removed_action:testaction:1 Record Unsuccessful Access Attempts to Files - open_by_handle_at ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open_by_handle_at_action:testaction:1 Disable the samba_load_libgfapi SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_samba_load_libgfapi_action:testaction:1 Disable Red Hat Subscription Manager Daemon (rhsmcertd) ocil:ssg-service_rhsmcertd_disabled_action:testaction:1 Disable the virt_sandbox_use_netlink SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_virt_sandbox_use_netlink_action:testaction:1 Enable the nscd_use_shm SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_nscd_use_shm_action:testaction:1 Disable the httpd_setrlimit SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_setrlimit_action:testaction:1 Install the Policy Auditor (PA) Module ocil:ssg-install_mcafee_hbss_pa_action:testaction:1 Enable Logging of All FTP Transactions ocil:ssg-ftp_log_transactions_action:testaction:1 Install policycoreutils Package ocil:ssg-package_policycoreutils_installed_action:testaction:1 Record Events that Modify User/Group Information via open syscall - /etc/group ocil:ssg-audit_rules_etc_group_open_action:testaction:1 Verify Ownership on SSH Server Public *.pub Key Files ocil:ssg-file_ownership_sshd_pub_key_action:testaction:1 Verify ip6tables Enabled if Using IPv6 ocil:ssg-service_ip6tables_enabled_action:testaction:1 Ensure No Device Files are Unlabeled by SELinux ocil:ssg-selinux_all_devicefiles_labeled_action:testaction:1 SSH server uses strong entropy to seed ocil:ssg-sshd_use_strong_rng_action:testaction:1 Remove tftp Daemon ocil:ssg-package_tftp_removed_action:testaction:1 Install firewalld Package ocil:ssg-package_firewalld_installed_action:testaction:1 Set type of computer node name logging in audit logs ocil:ssg-auditd_name_format_action:testaction:1 Remove ftp Package ocil:ssg-package_ftp_removed_action:testaction:1 Disable the xen_use_nfs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_xen_use_nfs_action:testaction:1 Disable the ftpd_use_nfs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_ftpd_use_nfs_action:testaction:1 Lock Accounts Must Persist ocil:ssg-accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir_action:testaction:1 Enable TCP/IP syncookie support ocil:ssg-kernel_config_syn_cookies_action:testaction:1 Disable the nagios_run_sudo SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_nagios_run_sudo_action:testaction:1 Ensure all zIPL boot entries are BLS compliant ocil:ssg-zipl_bls_entries_only_action:testaction:1 MIME types for csh or sh shell programs must be disabled ocil:ssg-httpd_disable_mime_types_action:testaction:1 Add nosuid Option to /opt ocil:ssg-mount_option_opt_nosuid_action:testaction:1 Verify Group Who Owns /var/log/messages File ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_var_log_messages_action:testaction:1 Disable ypbind Service ocil:ssg-service_ypbind_disabled_action:testaction:1 Ensure auditd Collects File Deletion Events by User - rmdir ocil:ssg-audit_rules_file_deletion_events_rmdir_action:testaction:1 Set the GNOME3 Login Number of Failures ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_login_retries_action:testaction:1 Specify the hash to use when signing modules ocil:ssg-kernel_config_module_sig_hash_action:testaction:1 Record Unsuccessful Permission Changes to Files - removexattr ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_removexattr_action:testaction:1 Configure auditd flush priority ocil:ssg-auditd_data_retention_flush_action:testaction:1 Verify Group Who Owns group File ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_etc_group_action:testaction:1 Disable the openshift_use_nfs SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_openshift_use_nfs_action:testaction:1 Disable GNOME3 Automounting ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_disable_automount_action:testaction:1 Install the psacct package ocil:ssg-package_psacct_installed_action:testaction:1 Add nodev Option to /var/log ocil:ssg-mount_option_var_log_nodev_action:testaction:1 Ensure rsyslog is Installed ocil:ssg-package_rsyslog_installed_action:testaction:1 Disable the httpd_dbus_sssd SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_dbus_sssd_action:testaction:1 Ensure SSH MaxStartups is configured ocil:ssg-sshd_set_maxstartups_action:testaction:1 Force kernel panic on uncorrected MCEs ocil:ssg-grub2_mce_argument_action:testaction:1 Disable the puppetagent_manage_all_files SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_puppetagent_manage_all_files_action:testaction:1 Disable the ftpd_connect_all_unreserved SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_ftpd_connect_all_unreserved_action:testaction:1 Ensure Remote Administrative Access Is Encrypted ocil:ssg-httpd_configure_remote_session_encryption_action:testaction:1 Record Successful Permission Changes to Files - chmod ocil:ssg-audit_rules_successful_file_modification_chmod_action:testaction:1 Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on IPv6 Interfaces by Default ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route_action:testaction:1 Set PAM''s Password Hashing Algorithm ocil:ssg-set_password_hashing_algorithm_systemauth_action:testaction:1 Enable the unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition_action:testaction:1 Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - lsetxattr ocil:ssg-audit_rules_dac_modification_lsetxattr_action:testaction:1 Record Events that Modify User/Group Information via open_by_handle_at syscall - /etc/passwd ocil:ssg-audit_rules_etc_passwd_open_by_handle_at_action:testaction:1 Configure audispd's Plugin disk_full_action When Disk Is Full ocil:ssg-auditd_audispd_disk_full_action_action:testaction:1 Ensure There Are No Accounts With Blank or Null Passwords ocil:ssg-no_empty_passwords_etc_shadow_action:testaction:1 Disable the httpd_use_openstack SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_httpd_use_openstack_action:testaction:1 Verify ownership of System Login Banner ocil:ssg-file_owner_etc_issue_action:testaction:1 Record Unsuccessful Modification Attempts to Files - open O_TRUNC_WRITE ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open_o_trunc_write_action:testaction:1 Uninstall libreport-plugin-rhtsupport Package ocil:ssg-package_libreport-plugin-rhtsupport_removed_action:testaction:1 Enable Kernel Parameter to Ignore ICMP Broadcast Echo Requests on IPv4 Interfaces ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts_action:testaction:1 Verify Root Has A Primary GID 0 ocil:ssg-accounts_root_gid_zero_action:testaction:1 Verify firewalld Enabled ocil:ssg-service_firewalld_enabled_action:testaction:1 Configure AIDE to Use FIPS 140-2 for Validating Hashes ocil:ssg-aide_use_fips_hashes_action:testaction:1 Drop Gratuitious ARP frames on All IPv4 Interfaces ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_drop_gratuitous_arp_action:testaction:1 Disable the ftpd_use_passive_mode SELinux Boolean ocil:ssg-sebool_ftpd_use_passive_mode_action:testaction:1 Verify Permissions on /var/log Directory ocil:ssg-file_permissions_var_log_action:testaction:1 PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS 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FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL To check the permissions of /etc/cron.d, run the command: $ ls -l /etc/cron.d If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: -rwx------ Is it the case that /etc/cron.d does not have unix mode -rwx------? Run the following command to determine if the dnf-automatic package is installed: $ rpm -q dnf-automatic Is it the case that the package is not installed? To verify that the Audit is correctly configured according to recommended rules, check the content of the file with the following command: cat /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-success.rules The output has to be exactly as follows: ## Successful permission change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change Is it the case that the file does not exist or the content differs? Run the following command to determine if the mozilla_plugin_use_bluejeans SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool mozilla_plugin_use_bluejeans If properly configured, the output should show the following: mozilla_plugin_use_bluejeans --> off Is it the case that mozilla_plugin_use_bluejeans is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the authlogin_radius SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool authlogin_radius If properly configured, the output should show the following: authlogin_radius --> off Is it the case that authlogin_radius is not disabled? Run the following command to determine the current status of the nftables service: $ sudo systemctl is-active nftables If the service is running, it should return the following: active Is it the case that the "nftables" service is disabled, masked, or not started.? Verify the system commands contained in the following directories have mode "755" or less permissive with the following command: $ sudo find -L /bin /sbin /usr/bin /usr/sbin /usr/libexec /usr/local/bin /usr/local/sbin -perm /022 -exec ls -l {} \; Is it the case that any system commands are found to be group-writable or world-writable? To verify that binaries cannot be directly executed from removable media, run the following command: $ grep -v noexec /etc/fstab The resulting output will show partitions which do not have the noexec flag. Verify all partitions in the output are not removable media. Is it the case that removable media partitions are present? Inspect the form of default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system in /etc/default/grub. If it includes rng_core.default_quality=, then the parameter will be configured for newly installed kernels. First check if the GRUB recovery is enabled: $ sudo grep 'GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY' /etc/default/grub If this option is set to true, then check that a line is output by the following command: $ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT.*rng_core.default_quality=.*' /etc/default/grub If the recovery is disabled, check the line with $ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX.*rng_core.default_quality=.*' /etc/default/grub.Moreover, command line parameters for currently installed kernels should be checked as well. Run the following command: $ sudo grubby --info=ALL | grep args | grep -v 'rng_core.default_quality=' The command should not return any output. Is it the case that trust on hardware random number generator is not configured appropriately? Run the following command to determine if the xguest_mount_media SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool xguest_mount_media If properly configured, the output should show the following: xguest_mount_media --> off Is it the case that xguest_mount_media is not disabled? To verify that HBSS ACCM is installed, run the following command(s): $ sudo ls /opt/McAfee/accm/bin/accm Is it the case that the HBSS ACCM module is not installed? Run the following command to determine if the talk package is installed: $ rpm -q talk Is it the case that the package is installed? Run the following command to determine if the openvpn_run_unconfined SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool openvpn_run_unconfined If properly configured, the output should show the following: openvpn_run_unconfined --> off Is it the case that openvpn_run_unconfined is not disabled? Run the following command to see what the timeout interval is: $ sudo grep ClientAliveInterval /etc/ssh/sshd_config If properly configured, the output should be: ClientAliveInterval Is it the case that it is commented out or not configured properly? The runtime status of the net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses 1. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? To ensure that users cannot disable the screensaver idle inactivity setting, run the following: $ grep idle-activation-enabled /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/* If properly configured, the output should be /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/idle-activation-enabled Is it the case that idle-activation-enabled is not locked? To check the ownership of /etc/passwd-, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/passwd- If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: root Is it the case that /etc/passwd- does not have an owner of root? The runtime status of the kernel.kexec_load_disabled kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl kernel.kexec_load_disabled 1. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? Run the following command to determine if the abrt-cli package is installed: $ rpm -q abrt-cli Is it the case that the package is installed? Run the following command to determine if the git_system_use_nfs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool git_system_use_nfs If properly configured, the output should show the following: git_system_use_nfs --> off Is it the case that git_system_use_nfs is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the xdm_sysadm_login SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool xdm_sysadm_login If properly configured, the output should show the following: xdm_sysadm_login --> off Is it the case that xdm_sysadm_login is not disabled? To determine if the system is configured to audit unsuccessful calls to the fchownat system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "fchownat" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? The runtime status of the kernel.sysrq kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl kernel.sysrq 0. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? To determine how the SSH daemon's IgnoreUserKnownHosts option is set, run the following command: $ sudo grep -i IgnoreUserKnownHosts /etc/ssh/sshd_config If a line indicating yes is returned, then the required value is set. Is it the case that the required value is not set? To check that the saslauthd service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled saslauthd Output should indicate the saslauthd service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled saslauthd disabled Run the following command to verify saslauthd is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active saslauthd If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the saslauthd is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show saslauthd | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "saslauthd" is loaded and not masked? Verify the operating system authenticates the remote logging server for off-loading audit logs with the following command: $ sudo grep -i '$ActionSendStreamDriverAuthMode' /etc/rsyslog.conf /etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf The output should be $/etc/rsyslog.conf:$ActionSendStreamDriverAuthMode x509/name Is it the case that $ActionSendStreamDriverAuthMode in /etc/rsyslog.conf is not set to x509/name? Run the following command to determine if the ftpd_connect_db SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool ftpd_connect_db If properly configured, the output should show the following: ftpd_connect_db --> off Is it the case that ftpd_connect_db is not disabled? To verify that automatic logins are disabled, run the following command: $ grep -Pzoi "^\[daemon]\\nautomaticlogin.*" /etc/gdm/custom.conf The output should show the following: [daemon] AutomaticLoginEnable=false Is it the case that GDM allows users to automatically login? If the system is configured to prevent the loading of the iwlwifi kernel module, it will contain lines inside any file in /etc/modprobe.d or the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf. These lines instruct the module loading system to run another program (such as /bin/true) upon a module install event. These lines can also instruct the module loading system to ignore the iwlwifi kernel module via blacklist keyword. Run the following command to search for such lines in all files in /etc/modprobe.d and the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf: $ grep -r iwlwifi /etc/modprobe.conf /etc/modprobe.d Is it the case that no line is returned? To check the minimum password length, run the command: $ grep PASS_MIN_LEN /etc/login.defs The DoD requirement is 15. Is it the case that it is not set to the required value? To verify all accounts have unique names, run the following command: $ sudo getent passwd | awk -F: '{ print $1}' | uniq -d No output should be returned. Is it the case that a line is returned? Run the following command to determine if the gluster_export_all_rw SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool gluster_export_all_rw If properly configured, the output should show the following: gluster_export_all_rw --> off Is it the case that gluster_export_all_rw is not disabled? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? To verify that the log_config_module exists in /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf, run the following command: $ grep log_config_module /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf The output should return: <IfModule log_config_module> Is it the case that it is not? To check the group ownership of /etc/ssh/sshd_config, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/ssh/sshd_config If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: root Is it the case that /etc/ssh/sshd_config does not have a group owner of root? Verify the noexec option is configured for the /var/tmp mount point, run the following command: $ sudo mount | grep '\s/var/tmp\s' . . . /var/tmp . . . noexec . . . Is it the case that the "/var/tmp" file system does not have the "noexec" option set? The runtime status of the kernel.perf_event_paranoid kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl kernel.perf_event_paranoid 2. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? The runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet 0. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_ACPI_CUSTOM_METHOD /boot/config.* Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no lines should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? To verify the operating system implements cryptography to protect the integrity of remote ldap access sessions, run the following command: $ sudo grep ldap_tls_cacert /etc/sssd/sssd.conf The output should return the following with a correctly configured CA cert path: ldap_tls_cacert /path/to/tls/ca.cert Is it the case that the TLS CA cert is not configured? Inspect the password section of /etc/pam.d/password-auth and ensure that the pam_unix.so module includes the argument sha512: $ grep sha512 /etc/pam.d/password-auth Is it the case that it does not? To verify that the Audit is correctly configured according to recommended rules, check the content of the file with the following command: cat /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-2-modify-failed.rules The output has to be exactly as follows: ## Unsuccessful file modifications (open for write or truncate) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification Is it the case that the file does not exist or the content differs? To check the permissions of /etc/group, run the command: $ ls -l /etc/group If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: -rw-r--r-- Is it the case that /etc/group does not have unix mode -rw-r--r--? To check the permissions of /etc/http/conf, run the command: $ ls -l /etc/http/conf If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: -rwxr-x--- Is it the case that ? To check the ownership of /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg, run the command: $ ls -lL /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: root Is it the case that /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg does not have an owner of root? To verify that the Audit is correctly configured according to recommended rules, check the content of the file with the following command: cat /etc/audit/rules.d/10-base-config.rules The output has to be exactly as follows: ## First rule - delete all -D ## Increase the buffers to survive stress events. ## Make this bigger for busy systems -b 8192 ## This determine how long to wait in burst of events --backlog_wait_time 60000 ## Set failure mode to syslog -f 1 Is it the case that the file does not exist or the content differs? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 contains no duplicate User IDs (UIDs) for interactive users. Check that the operating system contains no duplicate UIDs for interactive users with the following command: $ sudo awk -F ":" 'list[$3]++{print $1, $3}' /etc/passwd Is it the case that output is produced and the accounts listed are interactive user accounts? The following command will discover and print world-writable directories that are not group owned by a system account, given the assumption that only system accounts have a gid lower than 1000. Run it once for each local partition PART: $ sudo find PART -xdev -type d -perm -0002 -gid +999 -print Is it the case that there is output? Run the following command to determine if the iptables package is installed: $ rpm -q iptables Is it the case that the package is not installed? Run the following command to determine if the antivirus_use_jit SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool antivirus_use_jit If properly configured, the output should show the following: antivirus_use_jit --> off Is it the case that antivirus_use_jit is not disabled? To verify if the OpenSSH server uses defined MACs in the Crypto Policy, run: $ grep -Po '(-oMACs=\S+)' /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config and verify that the line matches: -oMACS= Is it the case that Crypto Policy for OpenSSH Server is not configured correctly? Run the following command to determine if the use_lpd_server SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool use_lpd_server If properly configured, the output should show the following: use_lpd_server --> off Is it the case that use_lpd_server is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the rng-tools package is installed: $ rpm -q rng-tools Is it the case that the package is not installed? To check that SLUB/SLAB poisoning is enabled, check all boot entries with following command; sudo grep -L "^options\s+.*\bslub_debug=P\b" /boot/loader/entries/*.conf No line should be returned, each line returned is a boot entry that does not enable poisoning. Is it the case that SLUB/SLAB poisoning is not enabled? To determine if arguments that commands can be executed with are restricted, run the following command: $ sudo grep -PR '^(?:\s*[^#=]+)=(?:\s*(?:\([^\)]+\))?\s*(?!\s*\()[^,\s]+(?:[ \t]+[^,\s]+)+[ \t]*,)*(\s*(?:\([^\)]+\))?\s*(?!\s*\()[^,\s]+[ \t]*(?:,|$))' /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/ The command should return no output. Is it the case that /etc/sudoers file contains user specifications that allow execution of commands with any arguments? To check that the portreserve service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled portreserve Output should indicate the portreserve service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled portreserve disabled Run the following command to verify portreserve is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active portreserve If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the portreserve is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show portreserve | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "portreserve" is loaded and not masked? If the system is configured to prevent the loading of the mac80211 kernel module, it will contain lines inside any file in /etc/modprobe.d or the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf. These lines instruct the module loading system to run another program (such as /bin/true) upon a module install event. These lines can also instruct the module loading system to ignore the mac80211 kernel module via blacklist keyword. Run the following command to search for such lines in all files in /etc/modprobe.d and the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf: $ grep -r mac80211 /etc/modprobe.conf /etc/modprobe.d Is it the case that no line is returned? Run the following command to determine if the ntp package is installed: $ rpm -q ntp Is it the case that the package is not installed? To verify that USB Human Interface Devices will be authorized by the USBGuard daemon, run the following command: $ sudo grep allow /etc/usbguard/rules.conf The output lines should include allow with-interface match-all { 03:*:* } Is it the case that USB devices of class 3 are not authorized? Verify the audit logs are owned by "root". First, determine where the audit logs are stored with the following command: $ sudo grep -iw log_file /etc/audit/auditd.conf log_file = /var/log/audit/audit.log Using the location of the audit log file, determine if the audit log is owned by "root" using the following command: $ sudo stat -c "%n %U" /var/log/audit/audit.log Audit logs must be owned by user root. If the log_file isn't defined in /etc/audit/auditd.conf, check all files in /var/log/audit/ directory instead. Is it the case that the audit log is not owned by root? Run the following command to determine if the selinuxuser_ping SELinux boolean is enabled: $ getsebool selinuxuser_ping If properly configured, the output should show the following: selinuxuser_ping --> on Is it the case that selinuxuser_ping is not enabled? Verify that a separate file system/partition has been created for /tmp with the following command: $ mountpoint /tmp Is it the case that "/tmp is not a mountpoint" is returned? Ensure that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 does not disable SELinux. Check if "SELinux" is active and in "enforcing" or "permissive" mode with the following command: $ sudo getenforce Enforcing -OR- Permissive Is it the case that SELinux is disabled? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 generates an audit record for unsuccessful attempts to modify files using the openat system call with O_TRUNC_WRITE flag. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "augenrules" program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), run the following command: $ sudo grep -r openat /etc/audit/rules.d If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "auditctl" utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, run the following command: $ sudo grep openat /etc/audit/audit.rules The output should be the following: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 generates an audit record for unsuccessful attempts to use the creat system call. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "augenrules" program to to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), run the following command: $ sudo grep -r creat /etc/audit/rules.d If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "auditctl" utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, run the following command: $ sudo grep creat /etc/audit/audit.rules The output should be the following: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? To determine if ignore_dot has been configured for sudo, run the following command: $ sudo grep -ri "^[\s]*Defaults.*\bignore_dot\b.*" /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/ The command should return a matching output. Is it the case that ignore_dot is not enabled in sudo? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_use_gpg SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_use_gpg If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_use_gpg --> off Is it the case that httpd_use_gpg is not disabled? Ensure there are no unconfined daemons running on the system, the following command should produce no output: $ sudo ps -eZ | grep "unconfined_service_t" Is it the case that There are unconfined daemons running on the system? Run the following command to determine if the rsync-daemon package is installed: $ rpm -q rsync-daemon Is it the case that the package is installed? To check which SSH protocol version is allowed, check version of openssh-server with following command: $ rpm -qi openssh-server | grep Version Versions equal to or higher than 7.4 have deprecated the RhostsRSAAuthentication option. If version is lower than 7.4, run the following command to check configuration: To determine how the SSH daemon's RhostsRSAAuthentication option is set, run the following command: $ sudo grep -i RhostsRSAAuthentication /etc/ssh/sshd_config If a line indicating no is returned, then the required value is set. Is it the case that the required value is not set? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC /boot/config.* Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no lines should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? Run the following command to determine if the talk-server package is installed: $ rpm -q talk-server Is it the case that the package is installed? These settings can be verified by running the following: $ gsettings get org.gnome.desktop.thumbnailers disable-all If properly configured, the output should be true. To ensure that users cannot how long until the screensaver locks, run the following: $ grep disable-all /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/* If properly configured, the output should be /org/gnome/desktop/thumbnailers/disable-all Is it the case that GNOME thumbnailers are not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the virt_sandbox_use_all_caps SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool virt_sandbox_use_all_caps If properly configured, the output should show the following: virt_sandbox_use_all_caps --> off Is it the case that virt_sandbox_use_all_caps is not disabled? To determine how the SSH daemon's X11Forwarding option is set, run the following command: $ sudo grep -i X11Forwarding /etc/ssh/sshd_config If a line indicating no is returned, then the required value is set. Is it the case that the required value is not set? Run the following command to determine if the dhcpc_exec_iptables SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool dhcpc_exec_iptables If properly configured, the output should show the following: dhcpc_exec_iptables --> off Is it the case that dhcpc_exec_iptables is not disabled? Verify that Promiscuous mode of an interface is disabled, run the following command: $ ip link | grep PROMISC Is it the case that any network device is in promiscuous mode? To check the permissions of /etc/passwd-, run the command: $ ls -l /etc/passwd- If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: -rw-r--r-- Is it the case that /etc/passwd- does not have unix mode -rw-r--r--? To determine how the SSH daemon's UsePAM option is set, run the following command: $ sudo grep -i UsePAM /etc/ssh/sshd_config If a line indicating yes is returned, then the required value is set. Is it the case that the required value is not set? To check that the rsh service is disabled in system boot configuration with xinetd, run the following command: $ chkconfig rsh --list Output should indicate the rsh service has either not been installed, or has been disabled, as shown in the example below: $ chkconfig rsh --list Note: This output shows SysV services only and does not include native systemd services. SysV configuration data might be overridden by native systemd configuration. If you want to list systemd services use 'systemctl list-unit-files'. To see services enabled on particular target use 'systemctl list-dependencies [target]'. rsh off To check that the rsh socket is disabled in system boot configuration with systemd, run the following command: $ systemctl is-enabled rsh Output should indicate the rsh socket has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled rshdisabled Run the following command to verify rsh is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active rsh If the socket is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The socket will also be masked, to check that the rsh is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show rsh | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the socket is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that service and/or socket are running? Run the following command to determine if the cups_execmem SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool cups_execmem If properly configured, the output should show the following: cups_execmem --> off Is it the case that cups_execmem is not disabled? Verify that authselect is enabled by running authselect current If authselect is enabled on the system, the output should show the ID of the profile which is currently in use. Is it the case that authselect is not used to manage user authentication setup on the system? Determine if "sudoers" file restricts sudo access run the following commands: $ sudo grep -PR '^\s*ALL\s+ALL\=\(ALL\)\s+ALL\s*$' /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/* $ sudo grep -PR '^\s*ALL\s+ALL\=\(ALL\:ALL\)\s+ALL\s*$' /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/* Is it the case that either of the commands returned a line? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 generates an audit record for all uses of the "umount" and system call. To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the "umount" system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "umount" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line like the following. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S umount -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-umount Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? The runtime status of the kernel.core_pattern kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl kernel.core_pattern |/bin/false. Is it the case that the returned line does not have a value of "|/bin/false", or a line is not returned and the need for core dumps is not documented with the Information System Security Officer (ISSO) as an operational requirement? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION /boot/config.* Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no lines should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? The runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects 0. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? To determine how the SSH daemon's Banner option is set, run the following command: $ sudo grep -i Banner /etc/ssh/sshd_config If a line indicating /etc/issue.net is returned, then the required value is set. Is it the case that the required value is not set? The runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects 0. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? To verify that DHCP is not being used, examine the following file for each interface: # /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifcfg-interface Look for the following: BOOTPROTO=none and the following, substituting the appropriate values based on your site's addressing scheme: NETMASK=255.255.255.0 IPADDR=192.168.1.2 GATEWAY=192.168.1.1 Is it the case that it does not? Verify it by running the following command: $ stat -c "%n %a" /sbin/auditctl /sbin/aureport /sbin/ausearch /sbin/autrace /sbin/auditd /sbin/audispd /sbin/augenrules /sbin/auditctl 755 /sbin/aureport 755 /sbin/ausearch 755 /sbin/autrace 755 /sbin/auditd 755 /sbin/audispd 755 /sbin/augenrules 755 If the command does not return all the above lines, the missing ones need to be added. Run the following command to correct the permissions of the missing entries: $ sudo chmod 0755 [audit_tool] Replace "[audit_tool]" with the audit tool that does not have the correct permissions. Is it the case that ? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_PROC_KCORE /boot/config.* Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no lines should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 limits the number of concurrent sessions to "" for all accounts and/or account types with the following command: $ grep -r -s maxlogins /etc/security/limits.conf /etc/security/limits.d/*.conf /etc/security/limits.conf:* hard maxlogins 10 This can be set as a global domain (with the * wildcard) but may be set differently for multiple domains. Is it the case that the "maxlogins" item is missing, commented out, or the value is set greater than "<sub idref="var_accounts_max_concurrent_login_sessions" />" and is not documented with the Information System Security Officer (ISSO) as an operational requirement for all domains that have the "maxlogins" item assigned'? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_tmp_exec SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_tmp_exec If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_tmp_exec --> off Is it the case that httpd_tmp_exec is not disabled? To check that the abrtd service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled abrtd Output should indicate the abrtd service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled abrtd disabled Run the following command to verify abrtd is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active abrtd If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the abrtd is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show abrtd | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "abrtd" is loaded and not masked? Run the following command to determine if the nfsd_anon_write SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool nfsd_anon_write If properly configured, the output should show the following: nfsd_anon_write --> off Is it the case that nfsd_anon_write is not disabled? To verify if the OpenSSH server uses defined ciphers in the Crypto Policy, run: $ grep -Po '(-oCiphers=\S+)' /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config and verify that the line matches: -oCiphers= Is it the case that Crypto Policy for OpenSSH Server is not configured correctly? To verify that the Audit is correctly configured according to recommended rules, check the content of the file with the following command: cat /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-success.rules The output has to be exactly as follows: ## Successful ownership change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-owner-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-owner-change Is it the case that the file does not exist or the content differs? Query the SA and the Web Manager to determine if a compiler is present on the server. Is it the case that the web server is part of an application suite and a comiler is needed for installation, patching, and upgrading of the suite or if the compiler is embedded and can't be removed without breaking the suite, document the installation of the compiler with the ISSO/ISSM and verify that the compiler is restricted to administrative users only. If documented and restricted to administrative users, this is not a finding. If an undocumented compiler is present, and available to non-administrative users? To check the password warning age, run the command: $ grep PASS_WARN_AGE /etc/login.defs The DoD requirement is 7. Is it the case that it is not set to the required value? Only FIPS ciphers should be used. To verify that only FIPS-approved ciphers are in use, run the following command: $ sudo grep Ciphers /etc/ssh/sshd_config The output should contain only those ciphers which are FIPS-approved. Is it the case that FIPS ciphers are not configured or the enabled ciphers are not FIPS-approved? To determine that AIDE is verifying ACLs, run the following command: $ grep acl /etc/aide.conf Verify that the acl option is added to the correct ruleset. Is it the case that the acl option is missing or not added to the correct ruleset? To check the group ownership of /etc/cron.d, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/cron.d If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: root Is it the case that /etc/cron.d does not have a group owner of root? Run the following command to determine if the secure_mode_policyload SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool secure_mode_policyload If properly configured, the output should show the following: secure_mode_policyload --> off Is it the case that secure_mode_policyload is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the postfix_local_write_mail_spool SELinux boolean is enabled: $ getsebool postfix_local_write_mail_spool If properly configured, the output should show the following: postfix_local_write_mail_spool --> on Is it the case that postfix_local_write_mail_spool is not enabled? Run the following command to determine if the sanlock_use_nfs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool sanlock_use_nfs If properly configured, the output should show the following: sanlock_use_nfs --> off Is it the case that sanlock_use_nfs is not disabled? Verify users are provided with feedback on when account accesses last occurred with the following command: $ sudo grep pam_lastlog /etc/pam.d/postlogin session [default=1] pam_lastlog.so showfailed Is it the case that "pam_lastlog.so" is not properly configured in "/etc/pam.d/postlogin" file? To verify the noexec option is configured for all NFS mounts, run the following command: $ mount | grep nfs All NFS mounts should show the noexec setting in parentheses. This is not applicable if NFS is not implemented. Is it the case that the setting does not show? To find SGID files, run the following command: $ sudo find / -xdev -type f -perm -2000 Is it the case that there is output? Run the following command to determine if the samba_share_fusefs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool samba_share_fusefs If properly configured, the output should show the following: samba_share_fusefs --> off Is it the case that samba_share_fusefs is not disabled? To properly set the owner of /etc/audit/, run the command: $ sudo chown root /etc/audit/ To properly set the owner of /etc/audit/rules.d/, run the command: $ sudo chown root /etc/audit/rules.d/ Is it the case that ? The runtime status of the kernel.randomize_va_space kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl kernel.randomize_va_space 2. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? Run the following command to determine if the samba-common package is installed: $ rpm -q samba-common Is it the case that the package is not installed? Run the following command to check for duplicate group names: Check that the operating system contains no duplicate group names for interactive users by running the following command: cut -d : -f 3 /etc/group | uniq -d If output is produced, this is a finding. Configure the operating system to contain no duplicate names for groups. Edit the file "/etc/group" and provide each group that has a duplicate group id with a unique group id. Is it the case that the system has duplicate group ids? To verify that auditing is configured for system administrator actions, run the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep "watch=/etc/sudoers\|watch=/etc/sudoers.d\|-w /etc/sudoers\|-w /etc/sudoers.d" Is it the case that there is not output? To determine how the SSH daemon's KerberosAuthentication option is set, run the following command: $ sudo grep -i KerberosAuthentication /etc/ssh/sshd_config If a line indicating no is returned, then the required value is set. Is it the case that the required value is not set? To check the group ownership of /etc/gshadow-, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/gshadow- If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: root Is it the case that /etc/gshadow- does not have a group owner of root? To properly set the owner of /var/log/audit, run the command: $ sudo chown root /var/log/audit To properly set the owner of /var/log/audit/*, run the command: $ sudo chown root /var/log/audit/* Is it the case that ? Run the following command to determine if the mcelog_client SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool mcelog_client If properly configured, the output should show the following: mcelog_client --> off Is it the case that mcelog_client is not disabled? The file /etc/cron.deny should not exist. This can be checked by runnig the following stat /etc/cron.deny and the output should be stat: cannot stat `/etc/cron.deny': No such file or directory Is it the case that the file /etc/cron.deny exists? To verify that the Audit is correctly configured according to recommended rules, check the content of the file with the following command: cat /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-3-access-success.rules The output has to be exactly as follows: ## Successful file access (any other opens) This has to go last. ## These next two are likely to result in a whole lot of events -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access Is it the case that the file does not exist or the content differs? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to audit the execution of the "passwd" command with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep passwd -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/passwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-passwd Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? To check the ownership of /etc/passwd, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/passwd If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: root Is it the case that /etc/passwd does not have an owner of root? Run the following command to determine if the git_cgi_use_nfs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool git_cgi_use_nfs If properly configured, the output should show the following: git_cgi_use_nfs --> off Is it the case that git_cgi_use_nfs is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the samba_export_all_ro SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool samba_export_all_ro If properly configured, the output should show the following: samba_export_all_ro --> off Is it the case that samba_export_all_ro is not disabled? To check the permissions of /etc/cron.monthly, run the command: $ ls -l /etc/cron.monthly If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: -rwx------ Is it the case that /etc/cron.monthly does not have unix mode -rwx------? To verify if MaxKeepAliveRequests is configured correctly in /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf, run the following command: $ grep -i maxkeepaliverequests /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf The command should return the following: MaxKeepAliveRequests 100 Is it the case that it is not? Run the following command to determine if the iptables-services package is installed: $ rpm -q iptables-services Is it the case that the iptables-services package is not installed? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_use_cifs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_use_cifs If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_use_cifs --> off Is it the case that httpd_use_cifs is not disabled? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 generates audit records for all account creations, modifications, disabling, and termination events that affect "/etc/security/opasswd" with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep -E '(/etc/security/opasswd)' -w /etc/security/opasswd -p wa -k identity Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? To verify if password complexities are only enforce on local users, run the following command: $ grep local_users_only /etc/security/pwquality.conf The output should return local_users_only uncommented. Is it the case that local_users_only is not uncommented or configured correctly? Verify the nosuid option is configured for the /srv mount point, run the following command: $ sudo mount | grep '\s/srv\s' . . . /srv . . . nosuid . . . Is it the case that the "/srv" file system does not have the "nosuid" option set? To check that the rexec service is disabled in system boot configuration with xinetd, run the following command: $ chkconfig rexec --list Output should indicate the rexec service has either not been installed, or has been disabled, as shown in the example below: $ chkconfig rexec --list Note: This output shows SysV services only and does not include native systemd services. SysV configuration data might be overridden by native systemd configuration. If you want to list systemd services use 'systemctl list-unit-files'. To see services enabled on particular target use 'systemctl list-dependencies [target]'. rexec off To check that the rexec socket is disabled in system boot configuration with systemd, run the following command: $ systemctl is-enabled rexec Output should indicate the rexec socket has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled rexecdisabled Run the following command to verify rexec is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active rexec If the socket is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The socket will also be masked, to check that the rexec is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show rexec | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the socket is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that service and/or socket are running? Verify the audit system is configured to take an appropriate action when the internal event queue is full: $ sudo grep -i overflow_action /etc/audit/auditd.conf The output should contain overflow_action = syslog If the value of the "overflow_action" option is not set to syslog, single, halt or the line is commented out, ask the System Administrator to indicate how the audit logs are off-loaded to a different system or media. Is it the case that auditd overflow action is not set correctly? To check the permissions of /etc/ssh/sshd_config, run the command: $ ls -l /etc/ssh/sshd_config If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: -rw------- Is it the case that /etc/ssh/sshd_config does not have unix mode -rw-------? To check that the debug-shell service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled debug-shell Output should indicate the debug-shell service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled debug-shell disabled Run the following command to verify debug-shell is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active debug-shell If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the debug-shell is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show debug-shell | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "debug-shell" is loaded and not masked? To determine if the system is configured to audit successful calls to the open system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "open" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the init_module system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "init_module" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? To verify ExecShield is enabled on 64-bit Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 systems, run the following command: $ dmesg | grep '[NX|DX]*protection' The output should not contain 'disabled by kernel command line option'. Inspect the form of default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system in /etc/default/grub. If it includes noexec=off, then the parameter will be configured for newly installed kernels. First check if the GRUB recovery is enabled: $ sudo grep 'GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY' /etc/default/grub If this option is set to true, then check that a line is output by the following command: $ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT.*noexec=off.*' /etc/default/grub If the recovery is disabled, check the line with $ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX.*noexec=off.*' /etc/default/grub.Moreover, command line parameters for currently installed kernels should be checked as well. Run the following command: $ sudo grubby --info=ALL | grep args | grep -v 'noexec=off' The command should not return any output. Is it the case that ExecShield is not supported by the hardware, is not enabled, or has been disabled by the kernel configuration.? Verify the system-wide shared library files contained in the following directories have mode "755" or less permissive with the following command: $ sudo find -L /lib /lib64 /usr/lib /usr/lib64 -perm /022 -type f -exec ls -l {} \; Is it the case that any system-wide shared library file is found to be group-writable or world-writable? The runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.forwarding kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.forwarding 0. The ability to forward packets is only appropriate for routers. Is it the case that IP forwarding value is "1" and the system is not router? Run the following command to determine if the nagios_run_pnp4nagios SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool nagios_run_pnp4nagios If properly configured, the output should show the following: nagios_run_pnp4nagios --> off Is it the case that nagios_run_pnp4nagios is not disabled? Run the following command to get the current configured value for deny_execmem SELinux boolean: $ getsebool deny_execmem The expected cofiguration is . "on" means true, and "off" means false Is it the case that deny_execmem is not set as expected? To check if RekeyLimit is set correctly, run the following command: $ sudo grep RekeyLimit /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/*.conf If configured properly, output should be /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-rekey-limit.conf: RekeyLimit Check also the main configuration file with the following command: $ sudo grep RekeyLimit /etc/ssh/ssh_config The command should not return any output. Is it the case that it is commented out or is not set? To check the group ownership of /etc/passwd, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/passwd If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: root Is it the case that /etc/passwd does not have a group owner of root? To check the ownership of /boot/grub2/grub.cfg, run the command: $ ls -lL /boot/grub2/grub.cfg If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: root Is it the case that /boot/grub2/grub.cfg does not have an owner of root? To check that the avahi-daemon service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled avahi-daemon Output should indicate the avahi-daemon service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled avahi-daemon disabled Run the following command to verify avahi-daemon is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active avahi-daemon If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the avahi-daemon is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show avahi-daemon | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "avahi-daemon" is loaded and not masked? Run the following command to determine if the fapolicyd package is installed: $ rpm -q fapolicyd Is it the case that the fapolicyd package is not installed? If the system is configured to prevent the loading of the usb-storage kernel module, it will contain lines inside any file in /etc/modprobe.d or the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf. These lines instruct the module loading system to run another program (such as /bin/true) upon a module install event. These lines can also instruct the module loading system to ignore the usb-storage kernel module via blacklist keyword. Run the following command to search for such lines in all files in /etc/modprobe.d and the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf: $ grep -r usb-storage /etc/modprobe.conf /etc/modprobe.d Is it the case that no line is returned? To verify that a remote NTP service is configured for time synchronization, open the following file: /etc/ntp.conf In the file, there should be a section similar to the following: server ntpserver Is it the case that this is not the case? If the system uses IPv6, this is not applicable. If the system is configured to prevent the usage of the ipv6 on network interfaces, it will contain a line of the form: net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 = 1 Such lines may be inside any file in the /etc/sysctl.d directory. This permits insertion of the IPv6 kernel module (which other parts of the system expect to be present), but otherwise keeps all network interfaces from using IPv6. Run the following command to search for such lines in all files in /etc/sysctl.d: $ grep -r ipv6 /etc/sysctl.d Is it the case that the ipv6 support is disabled on all network interfaces? Verify the assigned home directories of all interactive users on the system exist with the following command: $ sudo pwck -r user 'mailnull': directory 'var/spool/mqueue' does not exist The output should not return any interactive users. Is it the case that users home directory does not exist? To check the ownership of /etc/cron.allow, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/cron.allow If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: root Is it the case that /etc/cron.allow does not have an owner of root? To verify that Audit Daemon is configured to flush to disk after every records, run the following command: $ sudo grep freq /etc/audit/auditd.conf The output should return the following: freq = Is it the case that freq isn't set to <sub idref="var_auditd_freq" />? Only FIPS-approved key exchange algorithms must be used. To verify that only FIPS-approved key exchange algorithms are in use, run the following command: $ sudo grep -i kexalgorithms /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config The output should contain only following algorithms (or a subset) in the exact order: CRYPTO_POLICY='-oKexAlgorithms=ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512' Is it the case that KexAlgorithms option is commented out, contains non-approved algorithms, or the FIPS-approved algorithms are not in the exact order? To check that the nftables service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled nftables Output should indicate the nftables service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled nftables disabled Run the following command to verify nftables is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active nftables If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the nftables is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show nftables | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "nftables" is loaded and not masked? If the system is configured to prevent the loading of the can kernel module, it will contain lines inside any file in /etc/modprobe.d or the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf. These lines instruct the module loading system to run another program (such as /bin/true) upon a module install event. These lines can also instruct the module loading system to ignore the can kernel module via blacklist keyword. Run the following command to search for such lines in all files in /etc/modprobe.d and the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf: $ grep -r can /etc/modprobe.conf /etc/modprobe.d Is it the case that no line is returned? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the setxattr system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "setxattr" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 use the "pam_pwhistory.so" module in the /etc/pam.d/system-auth file and is configured to prohibit password reuse for a minimum of generations. Verify the "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" file with the following command: $ grep pam_pwhistory.so /etc/pam.d/system-auth password pam_pwhistory.so use_authtok remember= Verify the "/etc/security/pwhistory.conf" file using the following command: $ grep remember /etc/security/pwhistory.conf remember = The pam_pwhistory.so "remember" option must be configured only in one file. Is it the case that the pam_pwhistory.so module is not used, the "remember" module option is not set in /etc/pam.d/system-auth or in /etc/security/pwhistory.conf, or is set in both files, or is set with a value less than "<sub idref="var_password_pam_remember" />"? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_IPV6 /boot/config.* Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no lines should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? Run the following command to determine if the pppd_can_insmod SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool pppd_can_insmod If properly configured, the output should show the following: pppd_can_insmod --> off Is it the case that pppd_can_insmod is not disabled? To verify the assigned home directory of all interactive user home directories have a mode of 0750 or less permissive, run the following command: $ sudo ls -l /home Inspect the output for any directories with incorrect permissions. Is it the case that they are more permissive? Run the following command to determine the current status of the syslog-ng service: $ sudo systemctl is-active syslog-ng If the service is running, it should return the following: active Is it the case that the "syslog-ng" service is disabled, masked, or not started.? To verify that auditing of privileged command use is configured, run the following command: $ sudo grep newuidmap /etc/audit/audit.rules /etc/audit/rules.d/* It should return a relevant line in the audit rules. Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? Run the following command to determine if the domain_fd_use SELinux boolean is enabled: $ getsebool domain_fd_use If properly configured, the output should show the following: domain_fd_use --> on Is it the case that domain_fd_use is not enabled? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 disables storing core dumps for all users by issuing the following command: $ grep -i storage /etc/systemd/coredump.conf Storage=none Is it the case that Storage is not set to none or is commented out and the need for core dumps is not documented with the Information System Security Officer (ISSO) as an operational requirement for all domains that have the "core" item assigned? If the system is configured to prevent the loading of the bluetooth kernel module, it will contain lines inside any file in /etc/modprobe.d or the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf. These lines instruct the module loading system to run another program (such as /bin/true) upon a module install event. These lines can also instruct the module loading system to ignore the bluetooth kernel module via blacklist keyword. Run the following command to search for such lines in all files in /etc/modprobe.d and the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf: $ grep -r bluetooth /etc/modprobe.conf /etc/modprobe.d Is it the case that no line is returned? Configure the public web server to not have a trusted relationship with any system resources that is also not accessible to the public. Web content is not to be shared via Microsoft shares or NFS mounts. Determine whether the public web server has a two-way trust relationship with any private asset located within the network. Private web server resources (e.g. drives, folders, printers, etc.) will not be directly mapped to or shared with public web servers. Is it the case that sharing is selected for any web folder, this is a finding. If private resources (e.g. drives, partitions, folders/directories, printers, etc.) are sharedw ith the public web server? Run the following command to determine if the samba_enable_home_dirs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool samba_enable_home_dirs If properly configured, the output should show the following: samba_enable_home_dirs --> off Is it the case that samba_enable_home_dirs is not disabled? The runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects 0. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? To verify that auditing of privileged command use is configured, run the following command: $ sudo grep newgidmap /etc/audit/audit.rules /etc/audit/rules.d/* It should return a relevant line in the audit rules. Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_serve_cobbler_files SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_serve_cobbler_files If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_serve_cobbler_files --> off Is it the case that httpd_serve_cobbler_files is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the setroubleshoot-server package is installed: $ rpm -q setroubleshoot-server Is it the case that the package is installed? Determine the audit log group by running the following command: $ sudo grep -P '^[ ]*log_group[ ]+=.*$' /etc/audit/auditd.conf Then, check that all directories within the /var/log/audit directory are owned by the group specified as log_group or by root if the log_group is not specified. Run the following command: $ sudo find /var/log/audit -type d -printf "%p %g\n" All listed directories must be owned by the log_group or by root if the log_group is not specified. Is it the case that there is a directory owned by different group? To determine if the system is configured to audit unsuccessful calls to the chown system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "chown" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Run the following command to determine if the polipo_use_cifs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool polipo_use_cifs If properly configured, the output should show the following: polipo_use_cifs --> off Is it the case that polipo_use_cifs is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the policycoreutils-python-utils package is installed: $ rpm -q policycoreutils-python-utils Is it the case that the package is not installed? To check that the zebra service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled zebra Output should indicate the zebra service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled zebra disabled Run the following command to verify zebra is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active zebra If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the zebra is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show zebra | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "zebra" is loaded and not masked? Run the following command to determine if the glance_use_execmem SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool glance_use_execmem If properly configured, the output should show the following: glance_use_execmem --> off Is it the case that glance_use_execmem is not disabled? To ensure that the GPG key is installed, run: $ rpm -q --queryformat "%{SUMMARY}\n" gpg-pubkey The command should return the string below: gpg(Red Hat, Inc. (release key 2) <security@redhat.com> Is it the case that the Red Hat GPG Key is not installed? To verify if the OpenSSL uses defined Crypto Policy, run: $ grep 'Ciphersuites' /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config | tail -n 1 and verify that the line matches Ciphersuites = TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 Is it the case that Crypto Policy for OpenSSL is not configured according to CC requirements? The runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations 0. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? Inspect /etc/default/grub for any instances of selinux=0 in the kernel boot arguments. Presence of selinux=0 indicates that SELinux is disabled at boot time. Is it the case that SELinux is disabled at boot time? Verify that a separate file system/partition has been created for /dev/shm with the following command: $ mountpoint /dev/shm Is it the case that "/dev/shm is not a mountpoint" is returned? Verify that the interactive user account passwords last change time is not in the future The following command should return no output $ sudo expiration=$(cat /etc/shadow|awk -F ':' '{print $3}'); for edate in ${expiration[@]}; do if [[ $edate > $(( $(date +%s)/86400 )) ]]; then echo "Expiry date in future"; fi; done Is it the case that any interactive user password that has last change time in the future? Run the following command to determine if the vim-enhanced package is installed: $ rpm -q vim-enhanced Is it the case that the package is not installed? Run the following command to determine if the authlogin_yubikey SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool authlogin_yubikey If properly configured, the output should show the following: authlogin_yubikey --> off Is it the case that authlogin_yubikey is not disabled? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 enforces password complexity by requiring that at least one upper-case character. Check the value for "ucredit" with the following command: $ sudo grep ucredit /etc/security/pwquality.conf /etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/*.conf ucredit = -1 Is it the case that the value of "ucredit" is a positive number or is commented out? Run the following command to determine if the selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot If properly configured, the output should show the following: selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot --> off Is it the case that selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot is not disabled? To determine the status and frequency of logrotate, run the following command: $ sudo grep logrotate /var/log/cron* If logrotate is configured properly, output should include references to /etc/cron.daily. Is it the case that logrotate is not configured to run daily? Run the following command to get the current configured value for polyinstantiation_enabled SELinux boolean: $ getsebool polyinstantiation_enabled The expected cofiguration is . "on" means true, and "off" means false Is it the case that polyinstantiation_enabled is not set as expected? To check that the cups service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled cups Output should indicate the cups service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled cups disabled Run the following command to verify cups is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active cups If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the cups is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show cups | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "cups" is loaded and not masked? Find the list of alias maps used by the Postfix mail server: $ sudo postconf alias_maps Query the Postfix alias maps for an alias for the postmaster user: $ sudo postmap -q postmaster hash:/etc/aliases The output should return root. Is it the case that the alias is not set or is not root? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_verify_dns SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_verify_dns If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_verify_dns --> off Is it the case that httpd_verify_dns is not disabled? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the lremovexattr system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "lremovexattr" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_run_ipa SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_run_ipa If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_run_ipa --> off Is it the case that httpd_run_ipa is not disabled? Verify the SELINUX on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is using the policy with the following command: $ sestatus | grep policy Loaded policy name: Is it the case that the loaded policy name is not "<sub idref="var_selinux_policy_name" />"? Verify that the system backups user data. Is it the case that it is not? Verify that the ipv6 loopback interface has required rules in order: $ iptables -L INPUT -v -n Is it the case that ipv6 loopback traffic is not configured? To verify that the installed operating system is supported or certified, run the following command: The output should contain something similar to: Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Is it the case that the installed operating system is not FIPS 140-2 certified? Run the following command to determine if the abrt-plugin-logger package is installed: $ rpm -q abrt-plugin-logger Is it the case that the package is installed? To check that the nfs-server service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled nfs-server Output should indicate the nfs-server service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled nfs-server disabled Run the following command to verify nfs-server is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active nfs-server If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the nfs-server is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show nfs-server | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "nfs-server" is loaded and not masked? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_can_network_memcache SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_can_network_memcache If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_can_network_memcache --> off Is it the case that httpd_can_network_memcache is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_can_connect_zabbix SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_can_connect_zabbix If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_can_connect_zabbix --> off Is it the case that httpd_can_connect_zabbix is not disabled? To check the ownership of /etc/gshadow, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/gshadow If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: root Is it the case that /etc/gshadow does not have an owner of root? Verify the hidepid=value option is configured for the /proc mount point, run the following command: $ sudo mount | grep '\s/proc\s' . . . /proc . . . hidepid=value . . . Is it the case that the "/proc" file system does not have the "hidepid=value" option set? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? To check the group ownership of /etc/ssh/*.pub, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/ssh/*.pub If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: root Is it the case that /etc/ssh/*.pub does not have a group owner of root? To verify that auditing of privileged command use is configured, run the following command to search privileged commands in relevant partitions and check if they are covered by auditd rules: FILTER_NODEV=$(awk '/nodev/ { print $2 }' /proc/filesystems | paste -sd,) PARTITIONS=$(findmnt -n -l -k -it $FILTER_NODEV | grep -Pv "noexec|nosuid" | awk '{ print $1 }') for PARTITION in $PARTITIONS; do for PRIV_CMD in $(find "${PARTITION}" -xdev -perm /6000 -type f 2>/dev/null); do grep -qr "${PRIV_CMD}" /etc/audit/rules.d /etc/audit/audit.rules && printf "OK: ${PRIV_CMD}\n" || printf "WARNING - rule not found for: ${PRIV_CMD}\n" done done The output should not contain any WARNING. Is it the case that any setuid or setgid programs doesn't have a line in the audit rules? The runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses 1. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? To check that the slapd service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled slapd Output should indicate the slapd service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled slapd disabled Run the following command to verify slapd is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active slapd If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the slapd is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show slapd | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "slapd" is loaded and not masked? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to lock an account until released by an administrator after unsuccessful logon attempts with the command: $ grep 'unlock_time =' /etc/security/faillock.conf unlock_time = Is it the case that the "unlock_time" option is not set to "<sub idref="var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time" />", the line is missing, or commented out? The runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter The output of the command should indicate either: net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = 1 or: net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = 2 The output of the command should not indicate: net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = 0 The preferable way how to assure the runtime compliance is to have correct persistent configuration, and rebooting the system. The persistent sysctl parameter configuration is performed by specifying the appropriate assignment in any file located in the /etc/sysctl.d directory. Verify that there is not any existing incorrect configuration by executing the following command: $ grep -r '^\s*net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter\s*=' /etc/sysctl.conf /etc/sysctl.d The command should not find any assignments other than: net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = 1 or: net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = 2 Conflicting assignments are not allowed. Is it the case that the net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter is not set to 1 or 2 or is configured to be 0? The telnet package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase telnet Is it the case that ? Run the following command to determine if the audispd-plugins package is installed: $ rpm -q audispd-plugins Is it the case that the package is not installed? Run the following command to determine if the postgresql_selinux_transmit_client_label SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool postgresql_selinux_transmit_client_label If properly configured, the output should show the following: postgresql_selinux_transmit_client_label --> off Is it the case that postgresql_selinux_transmit_client_label is not disabled? To ensure the splash screen is configured not to show user name, run the following command: $ gsettings get org.gnome.desktop.screensaver show-full-name-in-top-bar If properly configured, the output should be false. To ensure that users cannot enable user name on the lock screen, run the following: $ grep show-full-name-in-top-bar /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/* If properly configured, the output should be /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/show-full-name-in-top-bar Is it the case that it is not set or configured properly? Verify the nodev option is configured for the /var mount point, run the following command: $ sudo mount | grep '\s/var\s' . . . /var . . . nodev . . . Is it the case that the "/var" file system does not have the "nodev" option set? If the system does not have SELinux enabled and enforcing a targeted policy, or if the pam_faillock.so module is not configured for use, this requirement is not applicable. Verify the location of the non-default tally directory for the pam_faillock.so module with the following command: $ sudo grep -w dir /etc/security/faillock.conf dir = /var/log/faillock Check the security context type of the non-default tally directory with the following command: $ sudo ls -Zd /var/log/faillock unconfined_u:object_r:faillog_t:s0 /var/log/faillock Is it the case that the security context type of the non-default tally directory is not "faillog_t"? To properly set the group owner of /etc/audit/, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /etc/audit/ To properly set the group owner of /etc/audit/rules.d/, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /etc/audit/rules.d/ Is it the case that ? To verify if CustomLog is configured correctly in /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf, run the following command: $ grep -i customlog /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf The output should return the following: CustomLog "logs/access_log" combined Is it the case that it is not? To check if only local user are impacted by pam_faillock, run the following command: $ grep local_users_only /etc/security/faillock.conf The output should return local_users_only not commented. Is it the case that local_users_only is not uncommented or configured correctly? Run the following command to determine if the polipo_session_users SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool polipo_session_users If properly configured, the output should show the following: polipo_session_users --> off Is it the case that polipo_session_users is not disabled? To check the permissions of /var/log/messages, run the command: $ ls -l /var/log/messages If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: -rw-r----- Is it the case that /var/log/messages does not have unix mode -rw-r-----? Run the following command to determine if the samba_share_nfs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool samba_share_nfs If properly configured, the output should show the following: samba_share_nfs --> off Is it the case that samba_share_nfs is not disabled? To check the permissions of /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg, run the command: $ ls -l /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: -rw------- Is it the case that /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg does not have unix mode -rw-------? To ensure that users cannot change session idle and lock settings, run the following: $ grep 'lock-delay' /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/* If properly configured, the output should return: /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-delay Is it the case that GNOME3 session settings are not locked or configured properly? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the clock_settime system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "clock_settime" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? To check the permissions of /etc/audit/auditd.conf, run the command: $ ls -l /etc/audit/auditd.conf If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: -rw-r----- Is it the case that /etc/audit/auditd.conf does not have unix mode -rw-r-----? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 defines default permissions for all authenticated users in such a way that the user can only read and modify their own files with the following command: # grep -i umask /etc/login.defs UMASK Is it the case that the value for the "UMASK" parameter is not "<sub idref="var_accounts_user_umask" />", or the "UMASK" parameter is missing or is commented out? Run the following command to determine if the sge_use_nfs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool sge_use_nfs If properly configured, the output should show the following: sge_use_nfs --> off Is it the case that sge_use_nfs is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the daemons_use_tcp_wrapper SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool daemons_use_tcp_wrapper If properly configured, the output should show the following: daemons_use_tcp_wrapper --> off Is it the case that daemons_use_tcp_wrapper is not disabled? To check that page poisoning is enabled at boot time, check all boot entries with following command: sudo grep -L "^options\s+.*\bpage_poison=1\b" /boot/loader/entries/*.conf No line should be returned, each line returned is a boot entry that doesn't enable page poisoning. Is it the case that page allocator poisoning is not enabled? Only strong MACs should be used. To verify that only strong MACs are in use, run the following command: $ sudo grep -i macs /etc/ssh/sshd_config The output should contain only those MACs which are strong, namely, hash functions. Is it the case that MACs option is commented out or not using strong hash algorithms? The runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects 0. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to lock an account after unsuccessful logon attempts with the command: $ grep 'deny =' /etc/security/faillock.conf deny = . Is it the case that the "deny" option is not set to "<sub idref="var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny" />" or less (but not "0"), is missing or commented out? To verify that the Audit is correctly configured according to recommended rules, check the content of the file with the following command: cat /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42.rules The output has to be exactly as follows: ## The purpose of these rules is to meet the requirements for Operating ## System Protection Profile (OSPP)v4.2. These rules depends on having ## the following rule files copied to /etc/audit/rules.d: ## ## 10-base-config.rules, 11-loginuid.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-1-create-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-1-create-success.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-2-modify-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-2-modify-success.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-3-access-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-3-access-success.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-4-delete-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-4-delete-success.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-failed.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-success.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-failed.rules, ## 30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-success.rules ## ## original copies may be found in /usr/share/audit/sample-rules/ ## User add delete modify. This is covered by pam. However, someone could ## open a file and directly create or modify a user, so we'll watch passwd and ## shadow for writes -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify ## User enable and disable. This is entirely handled by pam. ## Group add delete modify. This is covered by pam. However, someone could ## open a file and directly create or modify a user, so we'll watch group and ## gshadow for writes -a always,exit -F path=/etc/passwd -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F path=/etc/shadow -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify -a always,exit -F path=/etc/group -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=group-modify -a always,exit -F path=/etc/gshadow -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=group-modify ## Use of special rights for config changes. This would be use of setuid ## programs that relate to user accts. This is not all setuid apps because ## requirements are only for ones that affect system configuration. -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/usernetctl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/userhelper -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/seunshare -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/mount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newgrp -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newuidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/gpasswd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newgidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/umount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/passwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/crontab -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/at -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes ## Privilege escalation via su or sudo. This is entirely handled by pam. ## Watch for configuration changes to privilege escalation. -a always,exit -F path=/etc/sudoers -F perm=wa -F key=special-config-changes -a always,exit -F dir=/etc/sudoers.d/ -F perm=wa -F key=special-config-changes ## Audit log access -a always,exit -F dir=/var/log/audit/ -F perm=r -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access-audit-trail ## Attempts to Alter Process and Session Initiation Information -a always,exit -F path=/var/run/utmp -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=session -a always,exit -F path=/var/log/btmp -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=session -a always,exit -F path=/var/log/wtmp -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=session ## Attempts to modify MAC controls -a always,exit -F dir=/etc/selinux/ -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=MAC-policy ## Software updates. This is entirely handled by rpm. ## System start and shutdown. This is entirely handled by systemd ## Kernel Module loading. This is handled in 43-module-load.rules ## Application invocation. The requirements list an optional requirement ## FPT_SRP_EXT.1 Software Restriction Policies. This event is intended to ## state results from that policy. This would be handled entirely by ## that daemon. Is it the case that the file does not exist or the content differs? Run the following command to determine if the haproxy_connect_any SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool haproxy_connect_any If properly configured, the output should show the following: haproxy_connect_any --> off Is it the case that haproxy_connect_any is not disabled? To determine if the system is configured to audit successful calls to the fchmodat system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "fchmodat" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? To verify that remote access methods are logging to rsyslog, run the following command: grep -rE '(auth.\*|authpriv.\*|daemon.\*)' /etc/rsyslog.* The output should contain auth.*, authpriv.*, and daemon.* pointing to a log file. Is it the case that remote access methods are not logging to rsyslog? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_WRX /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? Run the following command to determine if the nfs_export_all_rw SELinux boolean is enabled: $ getsebool nfs_export_all_rw If properly configured, the output should show the following: nfs_export_all_rw --> on Is it the case that nfs_export_all_rw is not enabled? Run the following command to determine if the binutils package is installed: $ rpm -q binutils Is it the case that the package is not installed? Inspect /etc/default/grub for any instances of systemd.confirm_spawn=(1|yes|true|on) in the kernel boot arguments. Presence of a systemd.confirm_spawn=(1|yes|true|on) indicates that interactive boot is enabled at boot time and verify that GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=true to disable recovery boot. Is it the case that Interactive boot is enabled at boot time? To check that the rsyncd service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled rsyncd Output should indicate the rsyncd service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled rsyncd disabled Run the following command to verify rsyncd is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active rsyncd If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the rsyncd is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show rsyncd | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "rsyncd" is loaded and not masked? Run the following command to Verify that the sudoers security policy is configured to use the invoking user's password for privilege escalation: sudo cvtsudoers -f sudoers /etc/sudoers | grep -E '^Defaults !?(rootpw|targetpw|runaspw)' or if cvtsudoers not supported: sudo find /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d \( \! -name '*~' -a \! -name '*.*' \) -exec grep -E --with-filename '^[[:blank:]]*Defaults[[:blank:]](.*[[:blank:]])?!?\b(rootpw|targetpw|runaspw)' -- {} \; If no results are returned, this is a finding. If conflicting results are returned, this is a finding. If "Defaults !targetpw" is not defined, this is a finding. If "Defaults !rootpw" is not defined, this is a finding. If "Defaults !runaspw" is not defined, this is a finding. Is it the case that invoke user passwd when using sudo? Verify the nodev option is configured for the /var/log/audit mount point, run the following command: $ sudo mount | grep '\s/var/log/audit\s' . . . /var/log/audit . . . nodev . . . Is it the case that the "/var/log/audit" file system does not have the "nodev" option set? Verify that there are no shosts.equiv files on the system, run the following command: $ find / -name shosts.equiv Is it the case that shosts.equiv files exist? Run the following command to determine if the postfix package is installed: $ rpm -q postfix Is it the case that the package is not installed? Run the following command to determine if the cyrus-imapd package is installed: $ rpm -q cyrus-imapd Is it the case that the package is installed? Run the following command to determine if the squid package is installed: $ rpm -q squid Is it the case that the package is installed? The runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route 0. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? To verify that BIND uses the system crypto policy, check out that the BIND config file /etc/named.conf contains the include "/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/bind.config"; directive: $ sudo grep 'include "/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/bind.config";' /etc/named.conf Verify that the directive is at the bottom of the options section of the config file. Is it the case that BIND is installed and the BIND config file doesn't contain the <pre>include "/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/bind.config";</pre> directive? To check the permissions of /etc/at.allow, run the command: $ ls -l /etc/at.allow If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: -rw------- Is it the case that /etc/at.allow does not have unix mode -rw-------? To check if RekeyLimit is set correctly, run the following command: $ sudo grep RekeyLimit /etc/ssh/sshd_config If configured properly, output should be RekeyLimit Is it the case that it is commented out or is not set? To check if authentication is required for emergency mode, run the following command: $ grep sulogin /usr/lib/systemd/system/emergency.service The output should be similar to the following, and the line must begin with ExecStart and /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sulogin-shell. ExecStart=-/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sulogin-shell emergency Then, check if the emergency target requires the emergency service: Run the following command: $ sudo grep Requires /usr/lib/systemd/system/emergency.target The output should be the following: Requires=emergency.service Then, check if there is no custom emergency target configured in systemd configuration. Run the following command: $ sudo grep -r emergency.target /etc/systemd/system/ The output should be empty. Then, check if there is no custom emergency service configured in systemd configuration. Run the following command: $ sudo grep -r emergency.service /etc/systemd/system/ The output should be empty. Is it the case that the output is different? To ensure smart card authentication on the login screen is enabled, run the following command: $ grep enable-smartcard-authentication /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/* The output should be true. To ensure that users cannot disable smart card authentication on the login screen, run the following: $ grep enable-smartcard-authentication /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/* If properly configured, the output should be /org/gnome/login-screen/enable-smartcard-authentication Is it the case that enable-smartcard-authentication has not been configured or is disabled? Run the following command to determine if the user_exec_content SELinux boolean is enabled: $ getsebool user_exec_content If properly configured, the output should show the following: user_exec_content --> on Is it the case that user_exec_content is not enabled? The runtime status of the kernel.kptr_restrict kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl kernel.kptr_restrict The output of the command should indicate either: kernel.kptr_restrict = 1 or: kernel.kptr_restrict = 2 The output of the command should not indicate: kernel.kptr_restrict = 0 The preferable way how to assure the runtime compliance is to have correct persistent configuration, and rebooting the system. The persistent kernel parameter configuration is performed by specifying the appropriate assignment in any file located in the /etc/sysctl.d directory. Verify that there is not any existing incorrect configuration by executing the following command: $ grep -r '^\s*kernel.kptr_restrict\s*=' /etc/sysctl.conf /etc/sysctl.d The command should not find any assignments other than: kernel.kptr_restrict = 1 or: kernel.kptr_restrict = 2 Conflicting assignments are not allowed. Is it the case that the kernel.kptr_restrict is not set to 1 or 2 or is configured to be 0? To check the group ownership of /etc/cron.hourly, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/cron.hourly If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: root Is it the case that /etc/cron.hourly does not have a group owner of root? To determine if the system is configured to audit successful calls to the lremovexattr system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "lremovexattr" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? To determine if NOPASSWD or !authenticate have been configured for sudo, run the following command: $ sudo grep -ri "nopasswd\|\!authenticate" /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/ The command should return no output. Is it the case that nopasswd and/or !authenticate is enabled in sudo? To check the permissions of /etc/cron.daily, run the command: $ ls -l /etc/cron.daily If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: -rwx------ Is it the case that /etc/cron.daily does not have unix mode -rwx------? Run the following command to determine if the tftp_anon_write SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool tftp_anon_write If properly configured, the output should show the following: tftp_anon_write --> off Is it the case that tftp_anon_write is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the zebra_write_config SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool zebra_write_config If properly configured, the output should show the following: zebra_write_config --> off Is it the case that zebra_write_config is not disabled? If the system uses IPv6, this is not applicable. If the system is configured to disable the ipv6 kernel module, it will contain a line of the form: options ipv6 disable=1 Such lines may be inside any file in /etc/modprobe.d or the deprecated/etc/modprobe.conf. This permits insertion of the IPv6 kernel module (which other parts of the system expect to be present), but otherwise keeps it inactive. Run the following command to search for such lines in all files in /etc/modprobe.d and the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf: $ grep -r ipv6 /etc/modprobe.conf /etc/modprobe.d Is it the case that the ipv6 kernel module is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the pppd_for_user SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool pppd_for_user If properly configured, the output should show the following: pppd_for_user --> off Is it the case that pppd_for_user is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the mount_anyfile SELinux boolean is enabled: $ getsebool mount_anyfile If properly configured, the output should show the following: mount_anyfile --> on Is it the case that mount_anyfile is not enabled? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the openat system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "openat" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? To verify that the system will shutdown when auditd fails, run the following command: $ sudo grep "\-f " /etc/audit/audit.rules The output should contain: -f Is it the case that the system is not configured to shutdown on auditd failures? First, check whether the password is defined in either /boot/grub2/user.cfg or /boot/grub2/grub.cfg. Run the following commands: $ sudo grep '^[\s]*GRUB2_PASSWORD=grub\.pbkdf2\.sha512.*$' /boot/grub2/user.cfg $ sudo grep '^[\s]*password_pbkdf2[\s]+.*[\s]+grub\.pbkdf2\.sha512.*$' /boot/grub2/grub.cfg Second, check that a superuser is defined in /boot/grub2/grub.cfg. $ sudo grep '^[\s]*set[\s]+superusers=("?)[a-zA-Z_]+\1$' /boot/grub2/grub.cfg Is it the case that it does not produce any output? To find world-writable directories that lack the sticky bit, run the following command: $ sudo find / -type d \( -perm -0002 -a ! -perm -1000 \) -print 2>/dev/null fixtext: |- Configure all world-writable directories to have the sticky bit set to prevent unauthorized and unintended information transferred via shared system resources. Set the sticky bit on all world-writable directories using the command, replace "[World-Writable Directory]" with any directory path missing the sticky bit: $ chmod a+t [World-Writable Directory] srg_requirement: A sticky bit must be set on all Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 public directories to prevent unauthorized and unintended information transferred via shared system resources. Is it the case that any world-writable directories are missing the sticky bit? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? Run the following command to determine if the tor_can_network_relay SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool tor_can_network_relay If properly configured, the output should show the following: tor_can_network_relay --> off Is it the case that tor_can_network_relay is not disabled? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to audit the execution of the "crontab" command with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep crontab -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/crontab -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-crontab Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? To check the group ownership of /etc/cron.allow, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/cron.allow If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: root Is it the case that /etc/cron.allow does not have a group owner of root? The following command will locate the mount points related to local devices: $ findmnt -n -l -k -it $(awk '/nodev/ { print $2 }' /proc/filesystems | paste -sd,) The following command will show files which do not belong to a valid user: $ sudo find MOUNTPOINT -xdev -nouser 2>/dev/null Replace MOUNTPOINT by the mount points listed by the fist command. No files without a valid user should be located. Is it the case that files exist that are not owned by a valid user? To ensure that users cannot change session idle and lock settings, run the following: $ grep 'idle-delay' /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/* If properly configured, the output should return: /org/gnome/desktop/session/idle-delay Is it the case that idle-delay is not locked? Run the following command to determine if the mcelog_foreground SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool mcelog_foreground If properly configured, the output should show the following: mcelog_foreground --> off Is it the case that mcelog_foreground is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the mplayer_execstack SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool mplayer_execstack If properly configured, the output should show the following: mplayer_execstack --> off Is it the case that mplayer_execstack is not disabled? Verify the noexec option is configured for the /boot mount point, run the following command: $ sudo mount | grep '\s/boot\s' . . . /boot . . . noexec . . . Is it the case that the "/boot" file system does not have the "noexec" option set? The runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media 0. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? Run the following command to determine if the pcp_read_generic_logs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool pcp_read_generic_logs If properly configured, the output should show the following: pcp_read_generic_logs --> off Is it the case that pcp_read_generic_logs is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the selinuxuser_rw_noexattrfile SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool selinuxuser_rw_noexattrfile If properly configured, the output should show the following: selinuxuser_rw_noexattrfile --> off Is it the case that selinuxuser_rw_noexattrfile is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the rsync_full_access SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool rsync_full_access If properly configured, the output should show the following: rsync_full_access --> off Is it the case that rsync_full_access is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the usbguard package is installed: $ rpm -q usbguard Is it the case that the package is not installed? Verify the operating system encrypts audit records off-loaded onto a different system or media from the system being audited with the following commands: $ sudo grep -i '$DefaultNetstreamDriver' /etc/rsyslog.conf /etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf The output should be: /etc/rsyslog.conf:$DefaultNetstreamDriver gtls Is it the case that rsyslogd DefaultNetstreamDriver not set to gtls? Run the following command to determine if the ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs If properly configured, the output should show the following: ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs --> off Is it the case that ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs is not disabled? Inspect the form of default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system in /etc/default/grub. If it includes pti=on, then the parameter will be configured for newly installed kernels. First check if the GRUB recovery is enabled: $ sudo grep 'GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY' /etc/default/grub If this option is set to true, then check that a line is output by the following command: $ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT.*pti=on.*' /etc/default/grub If the recovery is disabled, check the line with $ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX.*pti=on.*' /etc/default/grub.Moreover, command line parameters for currently installed kernels should be checked as well. Run the following command: $ sudo grubby --info=ALL | grep args | grep -v 'pti=on' The command should not return any output. Is it the case that Kernel page-table isolation is not enabled? To determine if the system is configured to audit account changes, run the following command: auditctl -l | grep -E '(/etc/passwd|/etc/shadow|/etc/group|/etc/gshadow|/etc/security/opasswd)' If the system is configured to watch for account changes, lines should be returned for each file specified (and with perm=wa for each). Is it the case that the system is not configured to audit account changes? To ensure root may not directly login to the system over physical consoles, run the following command: cat /etc/securetty If any output is returned, this is a finding. Is it the case that the /etc/securetty file is not empty? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? Run the following command to determine if the unconfined_login SELinux boolean is enabled: $ getsebool unconfined_login If properly configured, the output should show the following: unconfined_login --> on Is it the case that unconfined_login is not enabled? To check the group ownership of /var/log, run the command: $ ls -lL /var/log If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: root Is it the case that /var/log does not have a group owner of root? Run the following command to determine if the samba_export_all_rw SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool samba_export_all_rw If properly configured, the output should show the following: samba_export_all_rw --> off Is it the case that samba_export_all_rw is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the spamd_enable_home_dirs SELinux boolean is enabled: $ getsebool spamd_enable_home_dirs If properly configured, the output should show the following: spamd_enable_home_dirs --> on Is it the case that spamd_enable_home_dirs is not enabled? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to audit the execution of the "chcon" command with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep chcon -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chcon -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k perm_mod Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? The runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref 0. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? The runtime status of the net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337 kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337 1. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? Verify emergency accounts have been provisioned with an expiration date of 72 hours. For every emergency account, run the following command to obtain its account aging and expiration information: $ sudo chage -l emergency_account_name Verify each of these accounts has an expiration date set within 72 hours or as documented. Is it the case that any emergency accounts have no expiration date set or do not expire within 72 hours? To verify that there are no .shosts files on the system, run the following command: $ sudo find / -name '.shosts' Is it the case that .shosts files exist? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 generates audit records for all account creations, modifications, disabling, and termination events that affect "/etc/sudoers" with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep /etc/sudoers -w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k identity Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? Run the following command to determine if the git_system_enable_homedirs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool git_system_enable_homedirs If properly configured, the output should show the following: git_system_enable_homedirs --> off Is it the case that git_system_enable_homedirs is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the crypto-policies package is installed: $ rpm -q crypto-policies Is it the case that the package is not installed? Verify that a separate file system/partition has been created for /usr with the following command: $ mountpoint /usr Is it the case that "/usr is not a mountpoint" is returned? If the system is configured to prevent the loading of the rds kernel module, it will contain lines inside any file in /etc/modprobe.d or the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf. These lines instruct the module loading system to run another program (such as /bin/true) upon a module install event. These lines can also instruct the module loading system to ignore the rds kernel module via blacklist keyword. Run the following command to search for such lines in all files in /etc/modprobe.d and the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf: $ grep -r rds /etc/modprobe.conf /etc/modprobe.d Is it the case that no line is returned? Inspect the file /etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf to determine the default zone for the firewalld. It should be set to DefaultZone=drop: $ sudo grep DefaultZone /etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf Is it the case that the default zone is not set to DROP? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 loads the driver with the following command: $ grep card_drivers /etc/opensc.conf card_drivers = ; Is it the case that "<sub idref="var_smartcard_drivers" />" is not listed as a card driver, or there is no line returned for "card_drivers"? Run the following command to determine if the staff_use_svirt SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool staff_use_svirt If properly configured, the output should show the following: staff_use_svirt --> off Is it the case that staff_use_svirt is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the selinuxuser_udp_server SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool selinuxuser_udp_server If properly configured, the output should show the following: selinuxuser_udp_server --> off Is it the case that selinuxuser_udp_server is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the chrony package is installed: $ rpm -q chrony Is it the case that the package is not installed? Verify the pam_faillock.so module is present in the "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" file: $ sudo grep pam_faillock.so /etc/pam.d/system-auth auth required pam_faillock.so preauth auth required pam_faillock.so authfail account required pam_faillock.so Is it the case that the pam_faillock.so module is not present in the "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" file with the "preauth" line listed before pam_unix.so? To check the group ownership of /etc/motd, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/motd If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: root Is it the case that /etc/motd does not have a group owner of root? To check the permissions of /etc/group-, run the command: $ ls -l /etc/group- If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: -rw-r--r-- Is it the case that /etc/group- does not have unix mode -rw-r--r--? The runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf 0. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? Run the following command to determine if the rsync_client SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool rsync_client If properly configured, the output should show the following: rsync_client --> off Is it the case that rsync_client is not disabled? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? Run the following command to determine if the racoon_read_shadow SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool racoon_read_shadow If properly configured, the output should show the following: racoon_read_shadow --> off Is it the case that racoon_read_shadow is not disabled? To verify that Audit Daemon is configured to write logs to the disk, run the following command: $ sudo grep write_logs /etc/audit/auditd.conf The output should return the following: write_logs = yes Is it the case that write_logs isn't set to yes? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 's INACTIVE conforms to site policy (no more than 30 days) with the following command: $ sudo awk -F: '$7 > 30 {print $1 " " $7}' /etc/shadow Is it the case that the value of INACTIVE is greater than the expected value or is -1? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the open system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "open" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_ssi_exec SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_ssi_exec If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_ssi_exec --> off Is it the case that httpd_ssi_exec is not disabled? To determine if NOPASSWD has been configured for the vdsm user for sudo, run the following command: $ sudo grep -ri nopasswd /etc/sudoers.d/ The command should return output only for the vdsm user. Is it the case that nopasswd is set for any users beyond vdsm? Verify that GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY is set to true in /etc/default/grub to disable recovery boot. Run the following command: $ sudo grep GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY /etc/default/grub Is it the case that GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY is not set to true or is missing? The runtime status of the vm.mmap_min_addr kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl vm.mmap_min_addr 65536. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? To check the group ownership of /etc/passwd-, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/passwd- If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: root Is it the case that /etc/passwd- does not have a group owner of root? To check that the dhcpd service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled dhcpd Output should indicate the dhcpd service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled dhcpd disabled Run the following command to verify dhcpd is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active dhcpd If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the dhcpd is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show dhcpd | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "dhcpd" is loaded and not masked? Verify that a separate file system/partition has been created for /var/log/audit with the following command: $ mountpoint /var/log/audit Is it the case that "/var/log/audit is not a mountpoint" is returned? If FTP services are not installed, this is not applicable. To verify this configuration, run the following command: grep "banner_file" /etc/vsftpd/vsftpd.conf The output should show the value of banner_file is set to /etc/issue, an example of which is shown below: $ sudo grep "banner_file" /etc/vsftpd/vsftpd.conf banner_file=/etc/issue Is it the case that it does not? The runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route 0. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? To verify the boot loader superuser account has been set, run the following command: sudo grep -A1 "superusers" /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg The output should show the following: set superusers="superusers-account" export superusers where superusers-account is the actual account name different from common names like root, admin, or administrator and different from any other existing user name. Is it the case that superuser account is not set or is set to an existing name or to a common name? The reviewed should make a note of the name of the account being used for the web service. This information may be needed later in the SRR. There may also be other server services running related to the web server in support of a particular web application, these passwords must be entrusted to the SA or Web Manager as well. Query the SA or Web Manager to determine if they have the web service password(s). NOTE: For installations that run as a service, or without a password, the SA or Web Manager having an Admin account on the system would meet the intent of this check. Is it the case that the web server password(s) are not entrusted to the SA or Web Manager? Verify the nosuid option is configured for the /var/log mount point, run the following command: $ sudo mount | grep '\s/var/log\s' . . . /var/log . . . nosuid . . . Is it the case that the "/var/log" file system does not have the "nosuid" option set? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_dontaudit_search_dirs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_dontaudit_search_dirs If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_dontaudit_search_dirs --> off Is it the case that httpd_dontaudit_search_dirs is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the xguest_connect_network SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool xguest_connect_network If properly configured, the output should show the following: xguest_connect_network --> off Is it the case that xguest_connect_network is not disabled? To properly set the owner of /var/log/httpd, run the command: $ sudo chown root /var/log/httpd To properly set the owner of /var/log/httpd/*, run the command: $ sudo chown root /var/log/httpd/* Is it the case that ? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the openat system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "openat" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Verify all local interactive users on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 are assigned a home directory upon creation with the following command: $ grep -i create_home /etc/login.defs CREATE_HOME yes Is it the case that the value for "CREATE_HOME" parameter is not set to "yes", the line is missing, or the line is commented out? Run the following command to determine if the fips_mode SELinux boolean is enabled: $ getsebool fips_mode If properly configured, the output should show the following: fips_mode --> on Is it the case that fips_mode is not enabled? To check the ownership of /var/log/messages, run the command: $ ls -lL /var/log/messages If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: root Is it the case that /var/log/messages does not have an owner of root? Run the following command to determine if the xserver_object_manager SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool xserver_object_manager If properly configured, the output should show the following: xserver_object_manager --> off Is it the case that xserver_object_manager is not disabled? The runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects 0. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? To verify that there are no unauthorized local user accounts, run the following command: $ less /etc/passwd Inspect the results, and if unauthorized local user accounts exist, remove them by running the following command: $ sudo userdel unauthorized_user Is it the case that there are unauthorized local user accounts on the system? To determine if LDAP is being used for authentication, use the following command: $ sudo grep -i useldapauth /etc/sysconfig/authconfig The output should return: USELDAPAUTH=yes Is it the case that USELDAPAUTH=yes is not configured correctly in /etc/sysconfig/authconfig? Run the following command to determine if the daemons_enable_cluster_mode SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool daemons_enable_cluster_mode If properly configured, the output should show the following: daemons_enable_cluster_mode --> off Is it the case that daemons_enable_cluster_mode is not disabled? To verify if LogFormat is configured correctly in /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf, run the following command: $ grep -i logformat /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf The output should contain the following: LogFormat "a %A %h %H %l %m %s %t %u %U \"%{Referer}i\" \"%{User-Agent}i\"" combined Is it the case that it is not? To preclude access to the servers root directory, ensure the following directive is in the httpd.conf file. This entry will also stop users from setting up .htaccess files which can override security features configured in /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf. AllowOverride none Is it the case that it is not? To determine how the SSH daemon's LogLevel option is set, run the following command: $ sudo grep -i LogLevel /etc/ssh/sshd_config If a line indicating VERBOSE is returned, then the required value is set. Is it the case that the required value is not set? If the system is not configured to audit time changes, this is a finding. If the system is 64-bit only, this is not applicable ocil: | To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the stime system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "stime" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_mod_auth_pam SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_mod_auth_pam If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_mod_auth_pam --> off Is it the case that httpd_mod_auth_pam is not disabled? To verify if the OpenSSH server uses defined Crypto Policy, run: $ grep 'CRYPTO_POLICY' /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config | tail -n 1 and verify that the line matches CRYPTO_POLICY='-oCiphers=aes256-ctr,aes128-ctr,aes256-cbc,aes128-cbc -oMACs=hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256 -oGSSAPIKeyExchange=no -oKexAlgorithms=ecdh-sha2-nistp521,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp256,diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 -oHostKeyAlgorithms=ssh-rsa,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 -oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes=rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256' Is it the case that Crypto Policy for OpenSSH Server is not configured according to CC requirements? Run the following command to determine if the rear package is installed: $ rpm -q rear Is it the case that the package is not installed? Run the following command to determine if the abrt-addon-kerneloops package is installed: $ rpm -q abrt-addon-kerneloops Is it the case that the package is installed? Run the following command to determine if the use_fusefs_home_dirs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool use_fusefs_home_dirs If properly configured, the output should show the following: use_fusefs_home_dirs --> off Is it the case that use_fusefs_home_dirs is not disabled? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? Inspect the list of enabled firewall ports and verify they are configured correctly by running the following command: $ sudo firewall-cmd --list-all Ask the System Administrator for the site or program Ports, Protocols, and Services Management Component Local Service Assessment (PPSM CLSA). Verify the services allowed by the firewall match the PPSM CLSA. Is it the case that there are additional ports, protocols, or services that are not in the PPSM CLSA, or there are ports, protocols, or services that are prohibited by the PPSM Category Assurance List (CAL), or there are no firewall rules configured? The following command will locate the mount points related to local devices: $ findmnt -n -l -k -it $(awk '/nodev/ { print $2 }' /proc/filesystems | paste -sd,) The following command will show files which do not belong to a valid group: $ sudo find MOUNTPOINT -xdev -nogroup 2>/dev/null Replace MOUNTPOINT by the mount points listed by the fist command. No files without a valid group should be located. Is it the case that there is output? To check that the cockpit service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled cockpit Output should indicate the cockpit service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled cockpit disabled Run the following command to verify cockpit is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active cockpit If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the cockpit is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show cockpit | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "cockpit" is loaded and not masked? Run the following command to determine if the openssh-clients package is installed: $ rpm -q openssh-clients Is it the case that the package is not installed? Ensure that debug-shell service is not enabled with the following command: sudo grep -L "^options\s+.*\bsystemd.debug-shell=1\b" /boot/loader/entries/*.conf No line should be returned, each line returned is a boot entry that enables the debug-shell. Is it the case that the comand returns a line? Run the following command to determine if the mozilla_plugin_can_network_connect SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool mozilla_plugin_can_network_connect If properly configured, the output should show the following: mozilla_plugin_can_network_connect --> off Is it the case that mozilla_plugin_can_network_connect is not disabled? To ensure the login warning banner text is properly set, run the following: $ grep banner-message-text /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/* If properly configured, the proper banner text will appear. To ensure the login warning banner text is locked and cannot be changed by a user, run the following: $ grep banner-message-text /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/* If properly configured, the output should be /org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-text. Is it the case that it does not? The runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians 1. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA512 /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? Run the following command to determine if the abrt package is installed: $ rpm -q abrt Is it the case that the package is installed? To determine if the system is configured to audit successful calls to the lchown system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "lchown" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 notifies the SA and ISSO (at a minimum) when allocated audit record storage volume reaches 75 percent of the repository maximum audit record storage capacity with the following command: $ sudo grep -w space_left_action /etc/audit/auditd.conf space_left_action = If the value of the "space_left_action" is not set to "", or if the line is commented out, ask the System Administrator to indicate how the system is providing real-time alerts to the SA and ISSO. Is it the case that there is no evidence that real-time alerts are configured on the system? To check the permissions of /etc/http/conf.d/*, run the command: $ ls -l /etc/http/conf.d/* If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: -rw-r----- Is it the case that /etc/http/conf.d/* does not have unix mode -rw-r-----? To ensure that remote access connections are encrypted, run the following command: $ gsettings get org.gnome.Vino require-encrpytion If properly configured, the output should be true. To ensure that users cannot disable encrypted remote connections, run the following: $ grep require-encryption /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/* If properly configured, the output should be /org/gnome/Vino/require-encryption Is it the case that remote access connections are not encrypted? The runtime status of the net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies 1. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? To check the permissions of /etc/ssh/*.pub, run the command: $ ls -l /etc/ssh/*.pub If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: -rw-r--r-- Is it the case that /etc/ssh/*.pub does not have unix mode -rw-r--r--? To verify that only security updates will be automatically installed by dnf-automatic, run the following command: $ sudo grep upgrade_type /etc/dnf/automatic.conf The output should return the following: upgrade_type = security Is it the case that the upgrade_type is not set to security? Run the following command to determine if the saslauthd_read_shadow SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool saslauthd_read_shadow If properly configured, the output should show the following: saslauthd_read_shadow --> off Is it the case that saslauthd_read_shadow is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the boinc_execmem SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool boinc_execmem If properly configured, the output should show the following: boinc_execmem --> off Is it the case that boinc_execmem is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the mozilla_plugin_use_gps SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool mozilla_plugin_use_gps If properly configured, the output should show the following: mozilla_plugin_use_gps --> off Is it the case that mozilla_plugin_use_gps is not disabled? Check to see if Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) is enabled and using the proper digest value on the system with the following command: $ sudo grep certificate_verification /etc/sssd/sssd.conf /etc/sssd/conf.d/*.conf | grep -v "^#" If configured properly, output should look like certificate_verification = ocsp_dgst= Is it the case that certificate_verification in sssd is not configured? The rsh package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase rsh Is it the case that ? The runtime status of the kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled 1. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? Run the following command to determine if the nftables package is installed: $ rpm -q nftables Is it the case that the package is not installed? The runtime status of the kernel.panic_on_oops kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl kernel.panic_on_oops 1. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 generates an audit record for unsuccessful attempts to use the ftruncate system call. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "augenrules" program to to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), run the following command: $ sudo grep -r ftruncate /etc/audit/rules.d If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "auditctl" utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, run the following command: $ sudo grep ftruncate /etc/audit/audit.rules The output should be the following: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? To ensure ClientAliveInterval is set correctly, run the following command: $ sudo grep ClientAliveCountMax /etc/ssh/sshd_config If properly configured, the output should be: ClientAliveCountMax 0 In this case, the SSH timeout occurs precisely when the ClientAliveInterval is set. Is it the case that it is commented out or not configured properly? Run the following command to determine if the guest_exec_content SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool guest_exec_content If properly configured, the output should show the following: guest_exec_content --> off Is it the case that guest_exec_content is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the libreswan package is installed: $ rpm -q libreswan Is it the case that the package is not installed? Run the following command to determine if the polipo_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool polipo_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports If properly configured, the output should show the following: polipo_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports --> off Is it the case that polipo_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports is not disabled? Run the following command to determine the current status of the crond service: $ sudo systemctl is-active crond If the service is running, it should return the following: active Is it the case that ? To verify the openldap-servers package is not installed, run the following command: $ rpm -q openldap-servers The output should show the following: package openldap-servers is not installed Is it the case that it does not? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to audit the execution of the "setfacl" command with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep setfacl -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/setfacl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k perm_mod Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 generates audit records for all account creations, modifications, disabling, and termination events that affect "/var/log/lastlog" with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep /var/log/lastlog -w /var/log/lastlog -p wa -k logins Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? Run the following command to ensure that /var/tmp is configured as a polyinstantiated directory: $ sudo grep /var/tmp /etc/security/namespace.conf The output should return the following: /var/tmp /var/tmp/tmp-inst/ level root,adm Is it the case that is not configured? Verify the site's network diagram and visually check the web server, to ensure that the private web server is located on a separate controlled access subnet and is not part of the public DMZ that houses the public web servers. In addition, the private web server needs to be isolated via a controlled access mechanism from the local general population lan. Is it the case that the private web server is not on a separate controlled access subnet? Run the following command to determine if the sssd package is installed: $ rpm -q sssd Is it the case that the package is not installed? To determine how the SSH daemon's PermitRootLogin option is set, run the following command: $ sudo grep -i PermitRootLogin /etc/ssh/sshd_config If a line indicating no is returned, then the required value is set. Is it the case that the required value is not set? Run the following command to determine if the dbadm_manage_user_files SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool dbadm_manage_user_files If properly configured, the output should show the following: dbadm_manage_user_files --> off Is it the case that dbadm_manage_user_files is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the rsync_anon_write SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool rsync_anon_write If properly configured, the output should show the following: rsync_anon_write --> off Is it the case that rsync_anon_write is not disabled? Verify that local initialization files do not execute world-writable programs with the following command: Note: The example will be for a system that is configured to create user home directories in the "/home" directory. $ sudo find /home -perm -002 -type f -name ".[^.]*" -exec ls -ld {} \; Is it the case that any local initialization files are found to reference world-writable files? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL /boot/config.* Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no lines should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? Run the following command to determine if the fenced_can_ssh SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool fenced_can_ssh If properly configured, the output should show the following: fenced_can_ssh --> off Is it the case that fenced_can_ssh is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the mock_enable_homedirs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool mock_enable_homedirs If properly configured, the output should show the following: mock_enable_homedirs --> off Is it the case that mock_enable_homedirs is not disabled? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 disables core dump backtraces by issuing the following command: $ grep -i process /etc/systemd/coredump.conf ProcessSizeMax=0 Is it the case that the "ProcessSizeMax" item is missing, commented out, or the value is anything other than "0" and the need for core dumps is not documented with the Information System Security Officer (ISSO) as an operational requirement for all domains that have the "core" item assigned? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 has configured the minimum time period between password changes for each user account is one day or greater with the following command: $ sudo awk -F: '$4 < 1 {print $1 " " $4}' /etc/shadow Is it the case that any results are returned that are not associated with a system account? To verify the number of rounds for the password hashing algorithm is configured, run the following command: $ sudo grep rounds /etc/pam.d/system-auth The output should show the following match: password sufficient pam_unix.so sha512 rounds= Is it the case that rounds is not set to <sub idref="var_password_pam_unix_rounds" /> or is commented out? To check the ownership of /etc/security/opasswd, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/security/opasswd If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: root To check the group ownership of /etc/security/opasswd, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/security/opasswd If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: root To check the permissions of /etc/security/opasswd, run the command: $ ls -l /etc/security/opasswd If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: 0600 Is it the case that /etc/security/opasswd does not have an owner of root and /etc/security/opasswd does not have a group owner of root and /etc/security/opasswd does not have unix mode 0600? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_tty_comm SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_tty_comm If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_tty_comm --> off Is it the case that httpd_tty_comm is not disabled? Verify that a separate file system/partition has been created for /var with the following command: $ mountpoint /var Is it the case that "/var is not a mountpoint" is returned? Run the following command to determine if the varnishd_connect_any SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool varnishd_connect_any If properly configured, the output should show the following: varnishd_connect_any --> off Is it the case that varnishd_connect_any is not disabled? Verify it by running the following command: $ stat -c "%n %U" /sbin/auditctl /sbin/aureport /sbin/ausearch /sbin/autrace /sbin/auditd /sbin/audispd /sbin/augenrules /sbin/auditctl root /sbin/aureport root /sbin/ausearch root /sbin/autrace root /sbin/auditd root /sbin/audispd root /sbin/augenrules root If the command does not return all the above lines, the missing ones need to be added. Run the following command to correct the permissions of the missing entries: $ sudo chown root [audit_tool] Replace "[audit_tool]" with each audit tool not owned by root. Is it the case that ? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to take action in the event of allocated audit record storage volume reaches 95 percent of the repository maximum audit record storage capacity with the following command: $ sudo grep admin_space_left_action /etc/audit/auditd.conf admin_space_left_action = single If the value of the "admin_space_left_action" is not set to "single", or if the line is commented out, ask the System Administrator to indicate how the system is providing real-time alerts to the SA and ISSO. Is it the case that there is no evidence that real-time alerts are configured on the system? To check the permissions of /etc/cron.hourly, run the command: $ ls -l /etc/cron.hourly If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: -rwx------ Is it the case that /etc/cron.hourly does not have unix mode -rwx------? To determine if passwd_timeout has been configured for sudo, run the following command: $ sudo grep -ri '^Defaults.*passwd_timeout=' /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/ The command should return a matching output. Is it the case that passwd_timeout is not set with the appropriate value for sudo? Run the following command to ensure postfix accepts mail messages from only the local system: $ grep inet_interfaces /etc/postfix/main.cf If properly configured, the output should show only . Is it the case that it does not? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the openat system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "openat" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Run the following command to determine if the sanlock_use_fusefs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool sanlock_use_fusefs If properly configured, the output should show the following: sanlock_use_fusefs --> off Is it the case that sanlock_use_fusefs is not disabled? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the fsetxattr system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "fsetxattr" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 generates an audit record for unsuccessful attempts to use the truncate system call. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "augenrules" program to to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), run the following command: $ sudo grep -r truncate /etc/audit/rules.d If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "auditctl" utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, run the following command: $ sudo grep truncate /etc/audit/audit.rules The output should be the following: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the mount system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "mount" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? To check the permissions of /etc/shadow-, run the command: $ ls -l /etc/shadow- If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: ---------- Is it the case that /etc/shadow- does not have unix mode ----------? To ensure screen locking on smartcard removal is enabled, run the following command: $ grep removal-action /etc/dconf/db/local.d/* The output should be 'lock-screen'. To ensure that users cannot disable screen locking on smartcard removal, run the following: $ grep removal-action /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/* If properly configured, the output should be /org/gnome/settings-daemon/peripherals/smartcard/removal-action Is it the case that removal-action has not been configured? Run the following command to determine if the swift_can_network SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool swift_can_network If properly configured, the output should show the following: swift_can_network --> off Is it the case that swift_can_network is not disabled? To verify that no .java and .jpp files exist, run the following command: find / -name *.java -o -name *.jpp The output should not return any .java or .jpp files Is it the case that it is not? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to audit the execution of the "unix_update" command with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep unix_update -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/unix_update -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-unix_update Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? To verify the nodev option is configured for non-root local partitions, run the following command: $ sudo mount | grep '^/dev\S* on /\S' | grep --invert-match 'nodev' The output shows local non-root partitions mounted without the nodev option, and there should be no output at all. Is it the case that some mounts appear among output lines? Verify the value of the "minclass" option in "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" with the following command: $ grep minclass /etc/security/pwquality.conf minclass = Is it the case that the value of "minclass" is set to less than "<sub idref="var_password_pam_minclass" />" or is commented out? Verify an anti-virus solution is installed on the system. The anti-virus solution may be bundled with an approved host-based security solution. Is it the case that there is no anti-virus solution installed on the system? To check the ownership of /etc/cron.monthly, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/cron.monthly If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: root Is it the case that /etc/cron.monthly does not have an owner of root? Verify that there are no wireless interfaces configured on the system with the following command: Note: This requirement is Not Applicable for systems that do not have physical wireless network radios. $ nmcli device status DEVICE TYPE STATE CONNECTION virbr0 bridge connected virbr0 wlp7s0 wifi connected wifiSSID enp6s0 ethernet disconnected -- p2p-dev-wlp7s0 wifi-p2p disconnected -- lo loopback unmanaged -- virbr0-nic tun unmanaged -- Is it the case that a wireless interface is configured and has not been documented and approved by the Information System Security Officer (ISSO)? Verify the USBGuard has a policy configured with the following command: $ usbguard list-rules allow id 1d6b:0001 serial If the command does not return results or an error is returned, ask the SA to indicate how unauthorized peripherals are being blocked. Is it the case that there is no evidence that unauthorized peripherals are being blocked before establishing a connection? To properly set the permissions of /etc/audit/, run the command: $ sudo chmod 0640 /etc/audit/ To properly set the permissions of /etc/audit/rules.d/, run the command: $ sudo chmod 0640 /etc/audit/rules.d/ Is it the case that ? The runtime status of the kernel.core_uses_pid kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl kernel.core_uses_pid 0. Is it the case that the returned line does not have a value of 0? Run the following command to determine if the abrt-plugin-rhtsupport package is installed: $ rpm -q abrt-plugin-rhtsupport Is it the case that the package is installed? Verify file systems that are used for removable media are mounted with the "nodev" option with the following command: $ sudo more /etc/fstab UUID=2bc871e4-e2a3-4f29-9ece-3be60c835222 /mnt/usbflash vfat noauto,owner,ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec 0 0 Is it the case that a file system found in "/etc/fstab" refers to removable media and it does not have the "nodev" option set? To verify the boot loader superuser password has been set, run the following command: $ sudo grep "^[\s]*GRUB2_PASSWORD=grub\.pbkdf2\.sha512.*$" /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg The output should be similar to: GRUB2_PASSWORD=grub.pbkdf2.sha512.10000.C4E08AC72FBFF7E837FD267BFAD7AEB3D42DDC 2C99F2A94DD5E2E75C2DC331B719FE55D9411745F82D1B6CFD9E927D61925F9BBDD1CFAA0080E0 916F7AB46E0D.1302284FCCC52CD73BA3671C6C12C26FF50BA873293B24EE2A96EE3B57963E6D7 0C83964B473EC8F93B07FE749AA6710269E904A9B08A6BBACB00A2D242AD828 Is it the case that no password is set? To check if the system motd banner is compliant, run the following command: $ cat /etc/motd Is it the case that it does not display the required banner? Run the following command to determine if the ftpd_anon_write SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool ftpd_anon_write If properly configured, the output should show the following: ftpd_anon_write --> off Is it the case that ftpd_anon_write is not disabled? To check the group ownership of /etc/ssh/*_key, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/ssh/*_key If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: root Is it the case that /etc/ssh/*_key does not have a group owner of root? Run the following command to determine if the piranha_lvs_can_network_connect SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool piranha_lvs_can_network_connect If properly configured, the output should show the following: piranha_lvs_can_network_connect --> off Is it the case that piranha_lvs_can_network_connect is not disabled? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to audit the execution of the "usermod" command with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep usermod -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/usermod -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-usermod Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? To check that the psacct service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled psacct Output should indicate the psacct service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled psacct disabled Run the following command to verify psacct is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active psacct If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the psacct is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show psacct | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "psacct" is loaded and not masked? To check if compression is enabled or set correctly, run the following command: $ sudo grep Compression /etc/ssh/sshd_config If configured properly, output should be no or delayed. Is it the case that it is commented out, or is not set to no or delayed? System executables are stored in the following directories by default: /bin /sbin /usr/bin /usr/sbin /usr/local/bin /usr/local/sbin To find system executables directories that are group-writable or world-writable, run the following command for each directory DIR which contains system executables: $ sudo find -L DIR -perm /022 -type d Is it the case that any of these files are group-writable or world-writable? To check that SELinux is not disabled at boot time; Check that no boot entry disables selinux: sudo grep -L "^options\s+.*\bselinux=0\b" /boot/loader/entries/*.conf No line should be returned, each line returned is a boot entry that disables SELinux. Is it the case that SELinux is disabled at boot time? To determine if the system is configured to audit unsuccessful calls to the fremovexattr system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "fremovexattr" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Verify the operating system requires re-authentication when using the "sudo" command to elevate privileges, run the following command: sudo grep -ri '^Defaults.*timestamp_timeout' /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d The output should be: /etc/sudoers:Defaults timestamp_timeout=0 or "timestamp_timeout" is set to a positive number. If conflicting results are returned, this is a finding. Is it the case that timestamp_timeout is not set with the appropriate value for sudo? Run the following command to determine open ports: # ss -4tuln Run the following command to determine firewall rules: # iptables -L INPUT -v -n For each port identified in the audit which does not have a firewall rule, add rule for accepting or denying inbound connections # iptables -A INPUT -p --dport -m state --state NEW -j ACCEPT Is it the case that open ports are denied connection? Run the following command to determine if the freeradius package is installed: $ rpm -q freeradius Is it the case that the package is installed? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_can_connect_ldap SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_can_connect_ldap If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_can_connect_ldap --> off Is it the case that httpd_can_connect_ldap is not disabled? Verify the audit tools are owned by "root" to prevent any unauthorized access, deletion, or modification. Check the owner of each audit tool by running the following command: $ sudo stat -c "%U %n" /sbin/auditctl /sbin/aureport /sbin/ausearch /sbin/autrace /sbin/auditd /sbin/rsyslogd /sbin/augenrules root /sbin/auditctl root /sbin/aureport root /sbin/ausearch root /sbin/autrace root /sbin/auditd root /sbin/rsyslogd root /sbin/augenrules Is it the case that any audit tools are not owned by root? Run the following command to determine if the subscription-manager package is installed: $ rpm -q subscription-manager Is it the case that the package is not installed? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 shell initialization file is configured to start each shell with the tmux terminal multiplexer. Determine the location of the tmux script with the following command: $ sudo grep tmux /etc/bashrc /etc/profile.d/* /etc/profile.d/tmux.sh: case "$name" in (sshd|login) exec tmux ;; esac Review the tmux script by using the following example: $ cat /etc/profile.d/tmux.sh if [ "$PS1" ]; then parent=$(ps -o ppid= -p $$) name=$(ps -o comm= -p $parent) case "$name" in (sshd|login) exec tmux ;; esac fi If the shell file is not configured as the example above, is commented out, or is missing, this is a finding. Determine if tmux is currently running with the following command: $ sudo ps all | grep tmux | grep -v grep Is it the case that the command does not produce output? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? Verify the nosuid option is configured for the /boot mount point, run the following command: $ sudo mount | grep '\s/boot\s' . . . /boot . . . nosuid . . . Is it the case that the "/boot" file system does not have the "nosuid" option set? Verify that the system is not accepting "rsyslog" messages from other systems unless it is documented as a log aggregation server. Display the contents of the rsyslog configuration files: find /etc -maxdepth 2 -regex '/etc/rsyslog\(\.conf\|\.d\/.*\.conf\)' -exec cat '{}' \; If any of the below lines are found, ask to see the documentation for the system being used for log aggregation: If using legacy syntax: $ModLoad imtcp $InputTCPServerRun port $ModLoad imudp $UDPServerRun port $ModLoad imrelp $InputRELPServerRun port If using RainerScript syntax: module(load="imtcp") module(load="imudp") input(type="imtcp" port="514") input(type="imudp" port="514") Is it the case that rsyslog accepts remote messages and is not documented as a log aggregation system? Verify the audit system prevents unauthorized changes with the following command: $ sudo grep "^\s*[^#]" /etc/audit/audit.rules | tail -1 -e 2 Is it the case that the audit system is not set to be immutable by adding the "-e 2" option to the end of "/etc/audit/audit.rules"? To check that the rdisc service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled rdisc Output should indicate the rdisc service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled rdisc disabled Run the following command to verify rdisc is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active rdisc If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the rdisc is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show rdisc | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "rdisc" is loaded and not masked? Run the following command to determine if the mozilla_plugin_use_spice SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool mozilla_plugin_use_spice If properly configured, the output should show the following: mozilla_plugin_use_spice --> off Is it the case that mozilla_plugin_use_spice is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the rsyslog-gnutls package is installed: $ rpm -q rsyslog-gnutls Is it the case that the package is installed? To check that the certmonger service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled certmonger Output should indicate the certmonger service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled certmonger disabled Run the following command to verify certmonger is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active certmonger If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the certmonger is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show certmonger | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "certmonger" is loaded and not masked? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the fremovexattr system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "fremovexattr" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_SECCOMP /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? Run the following command to determine the current status of the ufw service: $ sudo systemctl is-active ufw If the service is running, it should return the following: active Is it the case that the service is not enabled? Run the following command to determine if the cron_system_cronjob_use_shares SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool cron_system_cronjob_use_shares If properly configured, the output should show the following: cron_system_cronjob_use_shares --> off Is it the case that cron_system_cronjob_use_shares is not disabled? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 takes the appropriate action when an audit processing failure occurs. Check that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 takes the appropriate action when an audit processing failure occurs with the following command: $ sudo grep disk_error_action /etc/audit/auditd.conf disk_error_action = If the value of the "disk_error_action" option is not "SYSLOG", "SINGLE", or "HALT", or the line is commented out, ask the system administrator to indicate how the system takes appropriate action when an audit process failure occurs. Is it the case that there is no evidence of appropriate action? To check that the dovecot service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled dovecot Output should indicate the dovecot service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled dovecot disabled Run the following command to verify dovecot is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active dovecot If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the dovecot is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show dovecot | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "dovecot" is loaded and not masked? To check the group ownership of /usr/bin/sudo, run the command: $ ls -lL /usr/bin/sudo If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: Is it the case that /usr/bin/sudo does not have a group owner of <sub idref="var_sudo_dedicated_group" />? Run the following command to determine if the postgresql_can_rsync SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool postgresql_can_rsync If properly configured, the output should show the following: postgresql_can_rsync --> off Is it the case that postgresql_can_rsync is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the xinetd package is installed: $ rpm -q xinetd Is it the case that the package is installed? To determine if firewalld is configured to allow access on port 22/tcp, run the following command(s): firewall-cmd --list-ports to ssh firewall-cmd --list-services If firewalld is configured to allow access through the firewall, something similar to the following will be output: If it is a service: ssh If it is a port: 22/tcp Is it the case that sshd service is not enabled in the proper firewalld zone? The runtime status of the kernel.dmesg_restrict kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl kernel.dmesg_restrict 1. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? Run the following command to determine if the logging_syslogd_run_nagios_plugins SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool logging_syslogd_run_nagios_plugins If properly configured, the output should show the following: logging_syslogd_run_nagios_plugins --> off Is it the case that logging_syslogd_run_nagios_plugins is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the openvpn_can_network_connect SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool openvpn_can_network_connect If properly configured, the output should show the following: openvpn_can_network_connect --> off Is it the case that openvpn_can_network_connect is not disabled? To check that virtual syscalls are disabled at boot time, check all boot entries with following command: sudo grep -L "^options\s+.*\bvsyscall=none\b" /boot/loader/entries/*.conf No line should be returned, each line returned is a boot entry that doesn't disable virtual syscalls. Is it the case that vsyscalls are enabled? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to audit the execution of the "ssh-keysign" command with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep ssh-keysign -a always,exit -F path=/usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-ssh-keysign Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_PANIC_TIMEOUT /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? To verify that the DConf User profile is configured correctly, run the following command: $ cat /etc/dconf/profile/user The output should show the following: user-db:user system-db:local system-db:site system-db:distro Is it the case that DConf User profile does not exist or is not configured correctly? Run the following command to determine the current status of the ntpd service: $ sudo systemctl is-active ntpd If the service is running, it should return the following: active Is it the case that ? Run the following command to determine if the dbadm_read_user_files SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool dbadm_read_user_files If properly configured, the output should show the following: dbadm_read_user_files --> off Is it the case that dbadm_read_user_files is not disabled? To determine if the system is configured to audit unsuccessful calls to the chmod system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "chmod" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Run the following command to determine if the ssh_sysadm_login SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool ssh_sysadm_login If properly configured, the output should show the following: ssh_sysadm_login --> off Is it the case that ssh_sysadm_login is not disabled? To view the root user's PATH, run the following command: $ sudo env | grep PATH If correctly configured, the PATH must: use vendor default settings, have no empty entries, and have no entries beginning with a character other than a slash (/). Is it the case that any of these conditions are not met? To ensure the GUI does not allow user administratrion capabilities to all users, run the following command: $ gsettings get org.gnome.desktop.lockdown user-administration-disabled If properly configured, the output should be true. To ensure that users cannot enable user administration, run the following: $ grep user-administration /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/* If properly configured, the output should be /org/gnome/desktop/lockdown/user-administration-disabled Is it the case that user administration is not configured or disabled? The following command will list which files on the system have permissions different from what is expected by the RPM database: $ rpm -Va | awk '{ if (substr($0,2,1)=="M") print $NF }' Is it the case that there is output? Ensure that CGI backup scripts are not left on the production web server. This check is limited to CGI/interactive content and not static HTML. Search for backup copies of CGI scripts on the web server or ask the Web Administrator if they keep backup copies of CGI scripts on the web server. Common backup file extensions are: *.bak, *.old, *.temp, *.tmp, *.backup, *.??0. This would also apply to .jsp files. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux, run the following commands to find backup scripts: find / name "*.bak" -print find / name "*.*" -print find / name "*.old" -print Is it the case that If fileos with these extensions have no relationship with web activity, such as backup batch file for operating system utility, and they are not accessible by the web application, this is not a finding. If files with these extensions are found in either the document directory or the home directory of the web server, this is a finding. If files with these extensions are stored in a repository (not in the document root) as backups for the web server? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO /boot/config.* Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no lines should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? Inspect the form of default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system in /etc/default/grub. If it includes spectre_v2=on, then the parameter will be configured for newly installed kernels. First check if the GRUB recovery is enabled: $ sudo grep 'GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY' /etc/default/grub If this option is set to true, then check that a line is output by the following command: $ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT.*spectre_v2=on.*' /etc/default/grub If the recovery is disabled, check the line with $ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX.*spectre_v2=on.*' /etc/default/grub.Moreover, command line parameters for currently installed kernels should be checked as well. Run the following command: $ sudo grubby --info=ALL | grep args | grep -v 'spectre_v2=on' The command should not return any output. Is it the case that spectre_v2 mitigation is not enforced? Run the following command to determine if the named_tcp_bind_http_port SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool named_tcp_bind_http_port If properly configured, the output should show the following: named_tcp_bind_http_port --> off Is it the case that named_tcp_bind_http_port is not disabled? To determine if negation is used to define commands users are allowed to execute using sudo, run the following command: $ sudo grep -PR '^(?:\s*[^#=]+)=(?:\s*(?:\([^\)]+\))?\s*(?!\s*\()[^,!\n][^,\n]+,)*\s*(?:\([^\)]+\))?\s*(?!\s*\()(!\S+).*' /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/ The command should return no output. Is it the case that /etc/sudoers file contains rules that define the set of allowed commands using negation? To verify whether audispd plugin off-loads audit records onto a different system or media from the system being audited, run the following command: $ sudo grep -i remote_server /etc/audit/audisp-remote.conf The output should return something similar to where REMOTE_SYSTEM is an IP address or hostname: remote_server = REMOTE_SYSTEM Determine which partition the audit records are being written to with the following command: $ sudo grep log_file /etc/audit/auditd.conf log_file = /var/log/audit/audit.log Check the size of the partition that audit records are written to with the following command and verify whether it is sufficiently large: $ sudo df -h /var/log/audit/ /dev/sda2 24G 10.4G 13.6G 43% /var/log/audit Is it the case that audispd is not sending logs to a remote system and the local partition has inadequate space? Run the following command to determine if the tuned package is installed: $ rpm -q tuned Is it the case that the package is installed? To ensure LoginGraceTime is set correctly, run the following command: $ sudo grep LoginGraceTime /etc/ssh/sshd_config If properly configured, the output should be: LoginGraceTime If the option is set to a number greater than 0, then the unauthenticated session will be disconnected after the configured number seconds. Is it the case that it is commented out or not configured properly? Run the following command to determine if the logwatch_can_network_connect_mail SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool logwatch_can_network_connect_mail If properly configured, the output should show the following: logwatch_can_network_connect_mail --> off Is it the case that logwatch_can_network_connect_mail is not disabled? To check for virtual console entries which permit root login, run the following command: $ sudo grep ^vc/[0-9] /etc/securetty If any output is returned, then root logins over virtual console devices is permitted. Is it the case that root login over virtual console devices is permitted? Run the following command to determine if the git_cgi_use_cifs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool git_cgi_use_cifs If properly configured, the output should show the following: git_cgi_use_cifs --> off Is it the case that git_cgi_use_cifs is not disabled? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 security patches and updates are installed and up to date. Updates are required to be applied with a frequency determined by organizational policy. Obtain the list of available package security updates from Red Hat. The URL for updates is https://access.redhat.com/errata-search/. It is important to note that updates provided by Red Hat may not be present on the system if the underlying packages are not installed. Check that the available package security updates have been installed on the system with the following command: $ sudo yum history list | more Loaded plugins: langpacks, product-id, subscription-manager ID | Command line | Date and time | Action(s) | Altered ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 70 | install aide | 2020-03-05 10:58 | Install | 1 69 | update -y | 2020-03-04 14:34 | Update | 18 EE 68 | install vlc | 2020-02-21 17:12 | Install | 21 67 | update -y | 2020-02-21 17:04 | Update | 7 EE Typical update frequency may be overridden by Information Assurance Vulnerability Alert (IAVA) notifications from CYBERCOM. Is it the case that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is in non-compliance with the organizational patching policy? Run the following command to determine if the global_ssp SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool global_ssp If properly configured, the output should show the following: global_ssp --> off Is it the case that global_ssp is not disabled? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 enforces a minimum -character password length with the following command: $ grep minlen /etc/security/pwquality.conf minlen = Is it the case that the command does not return a "minlen" value of "<sub idref="var_password_pam_minlen" />" or greater, does not return a line, or the line is commented out? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_SECURITY /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? Run the following command to determine if the use_samba_home_dirs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool use_samba_home_dirs If properly configured, the output should show the following: use_samba_home_dirs --> off Is it the case that use_samba_home_dirs is not disabled? To verify the operating system prevents non-privileged users from executing privileged functions to include disabling, circumventing, or altering implemented security safeguards/countermeasures, run the following command: $ sudo semanage login -l All administrators must be mapped to the sysadm_u or staff_u users with the appropriate domains (sysadm_t and staff_t). All authorized non-administrative users must be mapped to the user_u role or the appropriate domain (user_t). Is it the case that non-admin users are not confined correctly? The group-owner of all log files written by rsyslog should be root. These log files are determined by the second part of each Rule line in /etc/rsyslog.conf and typically all appear in /var/log. To see the group-owner of a given log file, run the following command: $ ls -l LOGFILE Is it the case that the group-owner is not correct? To verify that each web content directory has an index.html file, run the following command: $ sudo find `grep -i documentroot /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf | awk -F'"' '{print $2}'` -name index.html The output should return an index.html file for every DocumentRoot that is set. Is it the case that it is not? Run the following command to determine if the glance_api_can_network SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool glance_api_can_network If properly configured, the output should show the following: glance_api_can_network --> off Is it the case that glance_api_can_network is not disabled? To check the permissions of /boot/Sysem.map-*, run the command: $ ls -l /boot/Sysem.map-* If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: -rw------- Is it the case that ? To check the permissions of /etc/issue, run the command: $ ls -l /etc/issue If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: -rw-r--r-- Is it the case that /etc/issue does not have unix mode -rw-r--r--? Run the following command to determine if the telnet-server package is installed: $ rpm -q telnet-server Is it the case that the package is installed? If the system is configured to prevent the loading of the cramfs kernel module, it will contain lines inside any file in /etc/modprobe.d or the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf. These lines instruct the module loading system to run another program (such as /bin/true) upon a module install event. These lines can also instruct the module loading system to ignore the cramfs kernel module via blacklist keyword. Run the following command to search for such lines in all files in /etc/modprobe.d and the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf: $ grep -r cramfs /etc/modprobe.conf /etc/modprobe.d Is it the case that no line is returned? Verify the umask setting is configured correctly in the /etc/profile file or scripts within /etc/profile.d directory with the following command: $ grep "umask" /etc/profile* umask Is it the case that the value for the "umask" parameter is not "<sub idref="var_accounts_user_umask" />", or the "umask" parameter is missing or is commented out? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK /boot/config.* Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no lines should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to audit the execution of the "userhelper" command with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep userhelper -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/userhelper -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-userhelper Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? Run the following command to determine if the daemons_dump_core SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool daemons_dump_core If properly configured, the output should show the following: daemons_dump_core --> off Is it the case that daemons_dump_core is not disabled? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 generates an audit record for unsuccessful attempts to use the openat system call. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "augenrules" program to to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), run the following command: $ sudo grep -r openat /etc/audit/rules.d If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "auditctl" utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, run the following command: $ sudo grep openat /etc/audit/audit.rules The output should be the following: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? To check that the rpcsvcgssd service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled rpcsvcgssd Output should indicate the rpcsvcgssd service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled rpcsvcgssd disabled Run the following command to verify rpcsvcgssd is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active rpcsvcgssd If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the rpcsvcgssd is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show rpcsvcgssd | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "rpcsvcgssd" is loaded and not masked? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 disables network management of the chrony daemon with the following command: $ grep -w cmdport /etc/chrony.conf cmdport 0 Is it the case that the "cmdport" option is not set to "0", is commented out, or is missing? Verify that yum verifies the signature of local packages prior to install with the following command: $ grep localpkg_gpgcheck /etc/yum.conf localpkg_gpgcheck=1 If "localpkg_gpgcheck" is not set to "1", or if the option is missing or commented out, ask the System Administrator how the certificates for patches and other operating system components are verified. Is it the case that there is no process to validate certificates for local packages that is approved by the organization? To determine if the system is configured to audit unsuccessful calls to the lremovexattr system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "lremovexattr" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? To determine how the SSH daemon's PubkeyAuthentication option is set, run the following command: $ sudo grep -i PubkeyAuthentication /etc/ssh/sshd_config If a line indicating no is returned, then the required value is set. Is it the case that the required value is not set? To determine if use_pty has been configured for sudo, run the following command: $ sudo grep -ri "^[\s]*Defaults.*\buse_pty\b.*" /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/ The command should return a matching output. Is it the case that use_pty is not enabled in sudo? Run the following command to determine if the git_system_use_cifs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool git_system_use_cifs If properly configured, the output should show the following: git_system_use_cifs --> off Is it the case that git_system_use_cifs is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_graceful_shutdown SELinux boolean is enabled: $ getsebool httpd_graceful_shutdown If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_graceful_shutdown --> on Is it the case that httpd_graceful_shutdown is not enabled? To verify the number of rounds for the password hashing algorithm is configured, run the following command: $ sudo grep rounds /etc/pam.d/password-auth The output should show the following match: password sufficient pam_unix.so sha512 rounds= Is it the case that rounds is not set to <sub idref="var_password_pam_unix_rounds" /> or is commented out? To determine how the SSH daemon's HostbasedAuthentication option is set, run the following command: $ sudo grep -i HostbasedAuthentication /etc/ssh/sshd_config If a line indicating no is returned, then the required value is set. Is it the case that the required value is not set? To verify that McAfee Endpoint Security for Linux is running, run the following command: $ sudo ps -ef | grep -i mfetpd Is it the case that virus scanning software is not running? Storing logs remotely protects the integrity of the data from local attacks. Run the following command to verify that journald is forwarding logs to a remote host. grep "^\sForwardToSyslog" /etc/systemd/journald.conf /etc/systemd/journald.conf.d/*.conf and it should return ForwardToSyslog=yes Is it the case that is commented out or not configured correctly? Run the following command to determine if the samba_domain_controller SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool samba_domain_controller If properly configured, the output should show the following: samba_domain_controller --> off Is it the case that samba_domain_controller is not disabled? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 generates an audit record for unsuccessful attempts to create files using the open_by_handle_at system call with O_CREAT flag. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "augenrules" program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), run the following command: $ sudo grep -r open_by_handle_at /etc/audit/rules.d If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "auditctl" utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, run the following command: $ sudo grep open_by_handle_at /etc/audit/audit.rules The output should be the following: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? To verify that a nftables table exists, run the following command: $ sudo nft list tables Output should include a list of nftables similar to: table inet filter Is it the case that a nftables table does not exist? To check the permissions of /etc/crontab, run the command: $ ls -l /etc/crontab If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: -rw------- Is it the case that /etc/crontab does not have unix mode -rw-------? Run the following command to determine the current status of the usbguard service: $ sudo systemctl is-active usbguard If the service is running, it should return the following: active Is it the case that the service is not enabled? Run the following command to determine if the selinuxuser_share_music SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool selinuxuser_share_music If properly configured, the output should show the following: selinuxuser_share_music --> off Is it the case that selinuxuser_share_music is not disabled? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the removexattr system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "removexattr" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? To obtain a list of all users and the content of their shadow password field, run the command: $ sudo readarray -t systemaccounts Verify if all accounts are locked. Is it the case that system accounts are not locked? Run the following command to ensure the TMOUT value is configured for all users on the system: $ sudo grep TMOUT /etc/profile /etc/profile.d/*.sh The output should return the following: TMOUT= Is it the case that value of TMOUT is not less than or equal to expected setting? To determine if the system is configured to audit successful calls to the chown system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "chown" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Verify the system commands contained in the following directories are owned by "root" with the following command: $ sudo find -L /bin /sbin /usr/bin /usr/sbin /usr/libexec /usr/local/bin /usr/local/sbin ! -user root -exec ls -l {} \; Is it the case that any system commands are found to not be owned by root? To ensure the user list is disabled, run the following command: $ grep disable-user-list /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/* The output should be true. To ensure that users cannot enable displaying the user list, run the following: $ grep disable-user-list /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/* If properly configured, the output should be /org/gnome/login-screen/disable-user-list Is it the case that disable-user-list has not been configured or is not disabled? To determine how the SSH daemon's PubkeyAuthentication option is set, run the following command: $ sudo grep -i PubkeyAuthentication /etc/ssh/sshd_config If a line indicating yes is returned, then the required value is set. Is it the case that the required value is not set? To check if the system login banner is compliant, run the following command: $ cat /etc/issue Is it the case that it does not display the required banner? Storing logs with compression can help avoid filling the system disk. Run the following command to verify that journald is compressing logs. grep "^\sCompress" /etc/systemd/journald.conf /etc/systemd/journald.conf.d/*.conf and it should return Compress=yes Is it the case that is commented out or not configured correctly? Run the following command to determine if the virt_use_samba SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool virt_use_samba If properly configured, the output should show the following: virt_use_samba --> off Is it the case that virt_use_samba is not disabled? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_DEBUG_FS /boot/config.* Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no lines should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? To check the permissions of /etc/issue.net, run the command: $ ls -l /etc/issue.net If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: -rw-r--r-- Is it the case that /etc/issue.net does not have unix mode -rw-r--r--? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to audit the execution of the "gpasswd" command with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep gpasswd -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/gpasswd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-gpasswd Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? Inspect the form of default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system in /etc/default/grub. If it includes spec_store_bypass_disable=, then the parameter will be configured for newly installed kernels. First check if the GRUB recovery is enabled: $ sudo grep 'GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY' /etc/default/grub If this option is set to true, then check that a line is output by the following command: $ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT.*spec_store_bypass_disable=.*' /etc/default/grub If the recovery is disabled, check the line with $ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX.*spec_store_bypass_disable=.*' /etc/default/grub.Moreover, command line parameters for currently installed kernels should be checked as well. Run the following command: $ sudo grubby --info=ALL | grep args | grep -v 'spec_store_bypass_disable=' The command should not return any output. Is it the case that SSB is not configured appropriately? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to audit the execution of the "chacl" command with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep chacl -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chacl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k perm_mod Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to audit the execution of the "umount" command with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep umount -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/umount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-umount Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? To determine how the SSH daemon's StrictModes option is set, run the following command: $ sudo grep -i StrictModes /etc/ssh/sshd_config If a line indicating yes is returned, then the required value is set. Is it the case that the required value is not set? Run the following command to determine if the antivirus_can_scan_system SELinux boolean is enabled: $ getsebool antivirus_can_scan_system If properly configured, the output should show the following: antivirus_can_scan_system --> on Is it the case that antivirus_can_scan_system is not enabled? To determine if the system is configured to audit successful calls to the unlink system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "unlink" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Run the following command to determine if the krb5-workstation package is installed: $ rpm -q krb5-workstation Is it the case that the package is installed? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_can_network_connect SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_can_network_connect If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_can_network_connect --> off Is it the case that httpd_can_network_connect is not disabled? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 does not have unauthorized IP tunnels configured. # yum list installed libreswan libreswan.x86-64 3.20-5.el7_4 If "libreswan" is installed, check to see if the "IPsec" service is active with the following command: # systemctl status ipsec ipsec.service - Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Protocol Daemon for IPsec Loaded: loaded (/usr/lib/systemd/system/ipsec.service; disabled) Active: inactive (dead) If the "IPsec" service is active, check for configured IPsec connections (conn), perform the following: grep -rni conn /etc/ipsec.conf /etc/ipsec.d/ Verify any returned results for organizational approval. Is it the case that the IPSec tunnels are not approved? To check that the sysstat service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled sysstat Output should indicate the sysstat service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled sysstat disabled Run the following command to verify sysstat is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active sysstat If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the sysstat is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show sysstat | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "sysstat" is loaded and not masked? To check the permissions of /usr/bin/sudo, run the command: $ ls -l /usr/bin/sudo If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: ---s--x--- Is it the case that /usr/bin/sudo does not have unix mode ---s--x---? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler --> off Is it the case that httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler is not disabled? Verify the noexec option is configured for the /var/log mount point, run the following command: $ sudo mount | grep '\s/var/log\s' . . . /var/log . . . noexec . . . Is it the case that the "/var/log" file system does not have the "noexec" option set? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION /boot/config.* Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no lines should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? Verify the nosuid option is configured for the /tmp mount point, run the following command: $ sudo mount | grep '\s/tmp\s' . . . /tmp . . . nosuid . . . Is it the case that the "/tmp" file system does not have the "nosuid" option set? Verify the nosuid option is configured for the /var/log/audit mount point, run the following command: $ sudo mount | grep '\s/var/log/audit\s' . . . /var/log/audit . . . nosuid . . . Is it the case that the "/var/log/audit" file system does not have the "nosuid" option set? Run the following command to determine if the logrotate_use_nfs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool logrotate_use_nfs If properly configured, the output should show the following: logrotate_use_nfs --> off Is it the case that logrotate_use_nfs is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the libreport-plugin-logger package is installed: $ rpm -q libreport-plugin-logger Is it the case that the package is installed? To check the permissions of /etc/http/conf/*, run the command: $ ls -l /etc/http/conf/* If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: -rw-r----- Is it the case that /etc/http/conf/* does not have unix mode -rw-r-----? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to audit the execution of the "unix_chkpwd" command with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep unix_chkpwd -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/unix_chkpwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-unix_chkpwd Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the open_by_handle_at system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "open_by_handle_at" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Run the following command to determine if the selinuxuser_postgresql_connect_enabled SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool selinuxuser_postgresql_connect_enabled If properly configured, the output should show the following: selinuxuser_postgresql_connect_enabled --> off Is it the case that selinuxuser_postgresql_connect_enabled is not disabled? To verify that SSSD is configured to run as user sssd, run the following command: $ sudo grep -r '\buser\b' /etc/sssd If configured properly, output should similar to /etc/sssd/conf.d/ospp.conf:user = sssd. Sanity of SSSD configuration in general can be checked using $ sudo sssctl config-check Is it the case that it does not exist or is not configured properly? Review the contents of the /etc/rsyslog.conf and /etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf files to ensure appropriate logging is set. In addition, run the following command: ls -l /var/log/ and verify that the log files are logging information Is it the case that no logging is configured? Inspect the file /etc/sysconfig/iptables to determine the default policy for the INPUT chain. It should be set to DROP: $ sudo grep ":INPUT" /etc/sysconfig/iptables Is it the case that the default policy for the INPUT chain is not set to DROP? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? To verify the boot loader superuser account has been set, run the following command: sudo grep -A1 "superusers" /boot/grub2/grub.cfg The output should show the following: set superusers="superusers-account" export superusers where superusers-account is the actual account name different from common names like root, admin, or administrator and different from any other existing user name. Is it the case that superuser account is not set or is set to root, admin, administrator or any other existing user name? Run the following command to determine if the dhcpd_use_ldap SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool dhcpd_use_ldap If properly configured, the output should show the following: dhcpd_use_ldap --> off Is it the case that dhcpd_use_ldap is not disabled? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to audit the execution of the "chage" command with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep chage -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-chage Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? Run the following command to determine if the wine_mmap_zero_ignore SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool wine_mmap_zero_ignore If properly configured, the output should show the following: wine_mmap_zero_ignore --> off Is it the case that wine_mmap_zero_ignore is not disabled? To verify that all user initialization files have a mode of 0740 or less permissive, run the following command: $ sudo find /home -type f -name '\.*' \( -perm -0002 -o -perm -0020 \) There should be no output. Is it the case that they are not 0740 or more permissive? To verify .netrc file in interactive user home directory is not group or world accessible", run the following command: $ sudo ls -lLR /home/USER/.netrc Is it the case that the group and world permissions are incorrect? To verify that the installed operating system is supported, run the following command: $ grep -i "red hat" /etc/redhat-release Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Is it the case that the installed operating system is not supported? To determine if the system is configured to audit unsuccessful calls to the lsetxattr system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "lsetxattr" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? To determine if the system is configured to audit unsuccessful calls to the fchown system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "fchown" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Run the following command to determine if the McAfeeTP package is installed: $ rpm -q McAfeeTP Is it the case that the package is not installed? To check the ownership of /etc/gshadow-, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/gshadow- If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: root Is it the case that /etc/gshadow- does not have an owner of root? To verify Certmap is enabled in SSSD, run the following command: $ sudo cat /etc/sssd/sssd.conf If configured properly, output should contain section like the following [certmap/testing.test/rule_name] matchrule =<SAN>.*EDIPI@mil maprule = (userCertificate;binary={cert!bin}) domains = testing.test Is it the case that Certmap is not configured in SSSD? Verify that a separate file system/partition has been created for /srv with the following command: $ mountpoint /srv Is it the case that "/srv is not a mountpoint" is returned? To check the group ownership of /etc/gshadow, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/gshadow If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: root Is it the case that /etc/gshadow does not have a group owner of root? Run the following command to determine if the squid_use_tproxy SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool squid_use_tproxy If properly configured, the output should show the following: squid_use_tproxy --> off Is it the case that squid_use_tproxy is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the setroubleshoot-plugins package is installed: $ rpm -q setroubleshoot-plugins Is it the case that the package is installed? Locate the directories containing the CGI scripts. These directories should be language-specific (e.g., PERL, ASP, JS, JSP, etc.). Examine the file permissions on the directories using the following command: ls -l directories Anonymous FTP users must not have access to these directories. Is it the case that it is not? To check that the vsftpd service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled vsftpd Output should indicate the vsftpd service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled vsftpd disabled Run the following command to verify vsftpd is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active vsftpd If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the vsftpd is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show vsftpd | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "vsftpd" is loaded and not masked? To ensure the MaxAuthTries parameter is set, run the following command: $ sudo grep MaxAuthTries /etc/ssh/sshd_config If properly configured, output should be: MaxAuthTries Is it the case that it is commented out or not configured properly? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? Run the following command to determine if the secadm_exec_content SELinux boolean is enabled: $ getsebool secadm_exec_content If properly configured, the output should show the following: secadm_exec_content --> on Is it the case that secadm_exec_content is not enabled? Verify the noexec option is configured for the /var mount point, run the following command: $ sudo mount | grep '\s/var\s' . . . /var . . . noexec . . . Is it the case that the "/var" file system does not have the "noexec" option set? To check the ownership of /var/log, run the command: $ ls -lL /var/log If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: root Is it the case that /var/log does not have an owner of root? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_run_preupgrade SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_run_preupgrade If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_run_preupgrade --> off Is it the case that httpd_run_preupgrade is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the xserver_execmem SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool xserver_execmem If properly configured, the output should show the following: xserver_execmem --> off Is it the case that xserver_execmem is not disabled? Check group owners of the system audit logs. First, determine where the audit log file is located. $ sudo grep -iw ^log_file /etc/audit/auditd.conf log_file = /var/log/audit/audit.log The log_file option specifies the audit log file path. If the log_file option isn't defined, check all files within /var/log/audit directory. Then, determine the audit log group by running the following command: $ sudo grep -P '^[ ]*log_group[ ]+=.*$' /etc/audit/auditd.conf Then, check that the audit log file is owned by the correct group. Run the following command to display the owner of the audit log file: $ sudo stat -c "%n %G" log_file The audit log file must be owned by the log_group or by root if the log_group is not specified. Is it the case that audit log files are owned by incorrect group? Run the following command to determine if the httpd package is installed: $ rpm -q httpd Is it the case that the package is installed? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 generates audit records for all account creations, modifications, disabling, and termination events that affect "/etc/passwd with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep -E '(/etc/shadow)' -w /etc/shadow -p wa -k identity Is it the case that command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? To determine how the SSH daemon's PermitUserEnvironment option is set, run the following command: $ sudo grep -i PermitUserEnvironment /etc/ssh/sshd_config If a line indicating no is returned, then the required value is set. Is it the case that the required value is not set? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_ALL /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? The runtime status of the kernel.pid_max kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl kernel.pid_max 65536. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_DEVKMEM /boot/config.* Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no lines should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? To check the group ownership of /boot/grub2/grub.cfg, run the command: $ ls -lL /boot/grub2/grub.cfg If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: root Is it the case that /boot/grub2/grub.cfg does not have a group owner of root? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to audit the execution of the "sudoedit" command with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep sudoedit -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/sudoedit -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-sudoedit Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? Run the following command to determine if the gluster_anon_write SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool gluster_anon_write If properly configured, the output should show the following: gluster_anon_write --> off Is it the case that gluster_anon_write is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the virt_read_qemu_ga_data SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool virt_read_qemu_ga_data If properly configured, the output should show the following: virt_read_qemu_ga_data --> off Is it the case that virt_read_qemu_ga_data is not disabled? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the unlinkat system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "unlinkat" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Verify that the default umask for all local interactive users is "077". Identify the locations of all local interactive user home directories by looking at the "/etc/passwd" file. Check all local interactive user initialization files for interactive users with the following command: Note: The example is for a system that is configured to create users home directories in the "/home" directory. # grep -ri umask /home/ /home/smithj/.bash_history:grep -i umask /etc/bashrc /etc/csh.cshrc /etc/profile /home/smithj/.bash_history:grep -i umask /etc/login.defs Is it the case that any local interactive user initialization files are found to have a umask statement that sets a value less restrictive than "077"? Run the following command to determine if the aide package is installed: $ rpm -q aide Is it the case that the package is not installed? Verify the nosuid option is configured for the /home mount point, run the following command: $ sudo mount | grep '\s/home\s' . . . /home . . . nosuid . . . Is it the case that the "/home" file system does not have the "nosuid" option set? Run the following command to determine the current status of the auditd service: $ sudo systemctl is-active auditd If the service is running, it should return the following: active Is it the case that the auditd service is not running? To verify that rsyslog's Forwarding Output Module has CA certificate configured for its TLS connections to remote server, run the following command: $ grep DefaultNetstreamDriverCAFile /etc/rsyslog.conf /etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf The output should include record similar to global(DefaultNetstreamDriverCAFile="/etc/pki/tls/cert.pem") where the path to the CA file (/etc/pki/tls/cert.pem in case above) must point to the correct CA certificate. Is it the case that CA certificate for rsyslog remote logging via TLS is not set? Run the following command to determine if the pcsc-lite package is installed: $ rpm -q pcsc-lite Is it the case that the package is not installed? Run the following command to determine if the smbd_anon_write SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool smbd_anon_write If properly configured, the output should show the following: smbd_anon_write --> off Is it the case that smbd_anon_write is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the git_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool git_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports If properly configured, the output should show the following: git_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports --> off Is it the case that git_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports is not disabled? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the create_module system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "create_module" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? To verify /etc/system-fips exists, run the following command: ls -l /etc/system-fips The output should be similar to the following: -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 36 Nov 26 11:31 /etc/system-fips Is it the case that /etc/system-fips does not exist? Run the following command to determine if the libcap-ng-utils package is installed: $ rpm -q libcap-ng-utils Is it the case that the package is not installed? Verify that the system is integrated with a centralized authentication mechanism such as as Active Directory, Kerberos, Directory Server, etc. that has automated account mechanisms in place. Is it the case that the system is not using a centralized authentication mechanism, or it is not automated? Verify the operating system audits activities performed during nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic sessions. Run the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep sudo.log -w /var/log/sudo.log -p wa -k maintenance Is it the case that Audit rule is not present? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is securely comparing internal information system clocks at a regular interval with an NTP server with the following command: $ sudo grep maxpoll /etc/ntp.conf /etc/chrony.conf server [ntp.server.name] iburst maxpoll . Is it the case that "maxpoll" has not been set to the value of "<sub idref="var_time_service_set_maxpoll" />", is commented out, or is missing? To check for legacy lines in /etc/passwd, run the following command: grep '^\+' /etc/passwd The command should not return any output. Is it the case that the file contains legacy lines? To verify that the Audit is correctly configured according to recommended rules, check the content of the file with the following command: cat /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-3-access-failed.rules The output has to be exactly as follows: ## Unsuccessful file access (any other opens) This has to go last. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access Is it the case that the file does not exist or the content differs? Run the following command to determine if the mmap_low_allowed SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool mmap_low_allowed If properly configured, the output should show the following: mmap_low_allowed --> off Is it the case that mmap_low_allowed is not disabled? In order to be sure that the databases are up-to-date, run the dconf update command as the administrator. Is it the case that The system-wide dconf databases are up-to-date with regards to respective keyfiles? Run the following command to determine the current status of the cron service: $ sudo systemctl is-active cron If the service is running, it should return the following: active Is it the case that ? To verify that Linux Audit logging is enabled for the USBGuard daemon, run the following command: $ sudo grep AuditBackend /etc/usbguard/usbguard-daemon.conf The output should be AuditBackend=LinuxAudit Is it the case that AuditBackend is not set to LinuxAudit? To determine how the SSH daemon's GSSAPIAuthentication option is set, run the following command: $ sudo grep -i GSSAPIAuthentication /etc/ssh/sshd_config If a line indicating yes is returned, then the required value is set. Is it the case that the required value is not set? To find the location of the AIDE database file, run the following command: $ sudo ls -l DBDIR/database_file_name Is it the case that there is no database file? Run the following command to determine if the openvpn_enable_homedirs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool openvpn_enable_homedirs If properly configured, the output should show the following: openvpn_enable_homedirs --> off Is it the case that openvpn_enable_homedirs is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the puppetmaster_use_db SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool puppetmaster_use_db If properly configured, the output should show the following: puppetmaster_use_db --> off Is it the case that puppetmaster_use_db is not disabled? To determine if the system is configured to audit successful calls to the openat system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "openat" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Run the following command to determine if the polipo_use_nfs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool polipo_use_nfs If properly configured, the output should show the following: polipo_use_nfs --> off Is it the case that polipo_use_nfs is not disabled? Verify the "/etc/security/faillock.conf" file is configured to log user name information when unsuccessful logon attempts occur: $ sudo grep audit /etc/security/faillock.conf audit Is it the case that the "audit" option is not set, is missing or commented out? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the open_by_handle_at system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "open_by_handle_at" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Run the following command to determine if the pigz package is installed: $ rpm -q pigz Is it the case that the package is installed? To verify all files and directories contained in interactive user home directory, excluding local initialization files, have a mode of 0750, run the following command: $ sudo ls -lLR /home/USER Is it the case that home directory files or folders have incorrect permissions? To verify that the audit system collects unauthorized file accesses, run the following commands: $ sudo grep EACCES /etc/audit/audit.rules $ sudo grep EPERM /etc/audit/audit.rules Is it the case that 32-bit and 64-bit system calls to creat, open, openat, open_by_handle_at, truncate, and ftruncate are not audited during EACCES and EPERM? To check the ownership of /etc/shadow, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/shadow If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: root Is it the case that /etc/shadow does not have an owner of root? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 enforces password complexity by requiring that at least one lower-case character. Check the value for "lcredit" with the following command: $ sudo grep lcredit /etc/security/pwquality.conf /etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/*.conf /etc/security/pwquality.conf:lcredit = -1 Is it the case that the value of "lcredit" is a positive number or is commented out? Run the following command to determine if the cups package is installed: $ rpm -q cups Is it the case that the package is installed? Run the following command to determine if the xguest_use_bluetooth SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool xguest_use_bluetooth If properly configured, the output should show the following: xguest_use_bluetooth --> off Is it the case that xguest_use_bluetooth is not disabled? Check that AIDE is properly configured to protect the integrity of the audit tools by running the following command: # sudo cat /etc/aide.conf | grep /usr/sbin/au /usr/sbin/auditctl p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512 /usr/sbin/auditd p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512 /usr/sbin/ausearch p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512 /usr/sbin/aureport p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512 /usr/sbin/autrace p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512 /usr/sbin/augenrules p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512 If AIDE is configured properly to protect the integrity of the audit tools, all lines listed above will be returned from the command. If one or more lines are missing, this is a finding. Is it the case that integrity checks of the audit tools are missing or incomplete? Verify the "/etc/security/faillock.conf" file is configured to log user name information when unsuccessful logon attempts occur: $ sudo grep audit /etc/security/faillock.conf audit Is it the case that the "audit" option is not set, is missing or commented out? To verify all files and directories in interactive user home directory are group-owned by a group the user is a member of, run the following command: $ sudo ls -lLR /home/USER Is it the case that the group ownership is incorrect? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to lock the root account after unsuccessful logon attempts with the command: $ grep even_deny_root /etc/security/faillock.conf even_deny_root Is it the case that the "even_deny_root" option is not set, is missing or commented out? To determine if the system is configured to audit unsuccessful calls to the fchmod system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "fchmod" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Inspect the form of default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system in /etc/default/grub. If it includes slab_nomerge=yes, then the parameter will be configured for newly installed kernels. First check if the GRUB recovery is enabled: $ sudo grep 'GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY' /etc/default/grub If this option is set to true, then check that a line is output by the following command: $ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT.*slab_nomerge=yes.*' /etc/default/grub If the recovery is disabled, check the line with $ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX.*slab_nomerge=yes.*' /etc/default/grub.Moreover, command line parameters for currently installed kernels should be checked as well. Run the following command: $ sudo grubby --info=ALL | grep args | grep -v 'slab_nomerge=yes' The command should not return any output. Is it the case that merging of slabs with similar size is enabled? Run the following command to determine the current status of the pcscd service: $ sudo systemctl is-active pcscd If the service is running, it should return the following: active Is it the case that the pcscd service is not enabled? To check the ownership of /etc/cron.hourly, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/cron.hourly If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: root Is it the case that /etc/cron.hourly does not have an owner of root? If the system uses IPv6, this is not applicable. If the system is configured to prevent the usage of the ipv6 on network interfaces, it will contain a line of the form: net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 = 1 Such lines may be inside any file in the /etc/sysctl.d directory. This permits insertion of the IPv6 kernel module (which other parts of the system expect to be present), but otherwise keeps network interfaces from using IPv6. Run the following command to search for such lines in all files in /etc/sysctl.d: $ grep -r ipv6 /etc/sysctl.d Is it the case that the ipv6 support is disabled by default on network interfaces? To check that the httpd service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled httpd Output should indicate the httpd service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled httpd disabled Run the following command to verify httpd is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active httpd If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the httpd is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show httpd | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "httpd" is loaded and not masked? To verify all local initialization files for interactive users are owned by the primary user, run the following command: $ sudo ls -al /home/USER/.* The user initialization files should be owned by USER. Is it the case that they are not? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 for PKI-based authentication has valid certificates by constructing a certification path (which includes status information) to an accepted trust anchor. Check that the system has a valid DoD root CA installed with the following command: $ sudo openssl x509 -text -in /etc/sssd/pki/sssd_auth_ca_db.pem Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 1 (0x1) Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption Issuer: C = US, O = U.S. Government, OU = DoD, OU = PKI, CN = DoD Root CA 3 Validity Not Before: Mar 20 18:46:41 2012 GMT Not After : Dec 30 18:46:41 2029 GMT Subject: C = US, O = U.S. Government, OU = DoD, OU = PKI, CN = DoD Root CA 3 Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption Is it the case that root CA file is not a DoD-issued certificate with a valid date and installed in the /etc/sssd/pki/sssd_auth_ca_db.pem location? To verify that Audit Daemon is configured to resolve all uid, gid, syscall, architecture, and socket address information before writing the event to disk, run the following command: $ sudo grep log_format /etc/audit/auditd.conf The output should return the following: log_format = ENRICHED Is it the case that log_format isn't set to ENRICHED? The following command will list which files on the system have ownership different from what is expected by the RPM database: $ rpm -Va | rpm -Va --nofiledigest | awk '{ if (substr($0,6,1)=="U" || substr($0,7,1)=="G") print $NF }' Is it the case that there is output? To verify that the Audit is correctly configured according to recommended rules, check the content of the file with the following command: cat /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-failed.rules The output has to be exactly as follows: ## Unsuccessful permission change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change Is it the case that the file does not exist or the content differs? Verify the NX (no-execution) bit flag is set on the system. Check that the no-execution bit flag is set with the following commands: $ sudo dmesg | grep NX [ 0.000000] NX (Execute Disable) protection: active If "dmesg" does not show "NX (Execute Disable) protection" active, check the cpuinfo settings with the following command: $ sudo grep flags /proc/cpuinfo flags : fpu vme de pse tsc ms nx rdtscp lm constant_ts The output should contain the "nx" flag. Is it the case that NX is disabled? To check if pam_pwquality.so is enabled in password-auth, run the following command: $ grep pam_pwquality /etc/pam.d/password-auth The output should be similar to the following: password requisite pam_pwquality.so Is it the case that pam_pwquality.so is not enabled in password-auth? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the openat system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "openat" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Run the following command to determine if the telepathy_connect_all_ports SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool telepathy_connect_all_ports If properly configured, the output should show the following: telepathy_connect_all_ports --> off Is it the case that telepathy_connect_all_ports is not disabled? To verify that TLS is configured properly in /etc/httpd/conf.modules.d/ssl.conf, run the following command: $ grep -i "sslengine\|sslprotocol" /etc/httpd/conf.d/ssl.conf The output should return the following: SSLEngine on SSLProtocol all -SSLv2 -SSLv3 -TLSv1 -TLSv1.1 Is it the case that it is not? Run the following command to determine if the tor_bind_all_unreserved_ports SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool tor_bind_all_unreserved_ports If properly configured, the output should show the following: tor_bind_all_unreserved_ports --> off Is it the case that tor_bind_all_unreserved_ports is not disabled? If network services are using the xinetd service, this is not applicable. To check that the xinetd service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled xinetd Output should indicate the xinetd service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled xinetd disabled Run the following command to verify xinetd is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active xinetd If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the xinetd is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show xinetd | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "xinetd" is loaded and not masked? Run the following command to determine if the audit package is installed: $ rpm -q audit Is it the case that the audit package is not installed? To ensure the system is configured to mask the Ctrl-Alt-Del sequence, Check that the ctrl-alt-del.target is masked and not active with the following command: sudo systemctl status ctrl-alt-del.target The output should indicate that the target is masked and not active. It might resemble following output: ctrl-alt-del.target Loaded: masked (/dev/null; bad) Active: inactive (dead) Is it the case that the system is configured to reboot when Ctrl-Alt-Del is pressed? Run the following command and verify that time sources are only configured with server directive: # grep -E "^(server|pool)" /etc/chrony.conf A line with the appropriate server should be returned, any line returned starting with pool is a finding. Is it the case that an authoritative remote time server is not configured or configured with pool directive? Run the following command to determine if the glance_use_fusefs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool glance_use_fusefs If properly configured, the output should show the following: glance_use_fusefs --> off Is it the case that glance_use_fusefs is not disabled? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? To check the permissions of /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg, run the command: $ sudo ls -lL /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: -rwx------ Is it the case that it does not? To determine if the system is configured to audit unsuccessful calls to the fchmodat system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "fchmodat" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Run the following command to determine the current status of the dnf-automatic timer: $ sudo systemctl is-active dnf-automatic.timer If the timer is running, it should return the following: active Is it the case that the dnf-automatic.timer is not enabled? Verify that a separate file system/partition has been created for /boot with the following command: $ mountpoint /boot Is it the case that "/boot is not a mountpoint" is returned? To check that the quota_nld service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled quota_nld Output should indicate the quota_nld service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled quota_nld disabled Run the following command to verify quota_nld is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active quota_nld If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the quota_nld is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show quota_nld | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "quota_nld" is loaded and not masked? Run the following command to determine if the virt_sandbox_use_audit SELinux boolean is enabled: $ getsebool virt_sandbox_use_audit If properly configured, the output should show the following: virt_sandbox_use_audit --> on Is it the case that virt_sandbox_use_audit is not enabled? To verify that web content directories should not be shared anonymously over remote filesystems such as nfs and smb, inspect each instance of DocumentRoot and serverRoot and verify that no entry in /etc/fstab exists or no remote filesystem process is running for any instance. $ ps -ef | grep "nfs\|smb" Is it the case that it is not? To check on the age of McAfee virus definition files, run the following command: $ sudo cd /opt/NAI/LinuxShield/engine/dat $ sudo ls -la avvscan.dat avvnames.dat avvclean.dat Is it the case that signatures are out of date? To check the permissions of /etc/cron.weekly, run the command: $ ls -l /etc/cron.weekly If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: -rwx------ Is it the case that /etc/cron.weekly does not have unix mode -rwx------? To ensure the user home directory is not group-writable or world-readable, run the following: # ls -ld /home/USER Is it the case that the user home directory is group-writable or world-readable? Run the following command to determine if the selinuxuser_mysql_connect_enabled SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool selinuxuser_mysql_connect_enabled If properly configured, the output should show the following: selinuxuser_mysql_connect_enabled --> off Is it the case that selinuxuser_mysql_connect_enabled is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_run_stickshift SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_run_stickshift If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_run_stickshift --> off Is it the case that httpd_run_stickshift is not disabled? To determine if !authenticate has not been configured for sudo, run the following command: $ sudo grep -r \!authenticate /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/ The command should return no output. Is it the case that !authenticate is specified in the sudo config files? Run the following command to determine if the irssi_use_full_network SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool irssi_use_full_network If properly configured, the output should show the following: irssi_use_full_network --> off Is it the case that irssi_use_full_network is not disabled? Verify that the interactive user account passwords are using a strong password hash with the following command: $ sudo cut -d: -f2 /etc/shadow $6$kcOnRq/5$NUEYPuyL.wghQwWssXRcLRFiiru7f5JPV6GaJhNC2aK5F3PZpE/BCCtwrxRc/AInKMNX3CdMw11m9STiql12f/ Password hashes ! or * indicate inactive accounts not available for logon and are not evaluated. Is it the case that any interactive user password hash does not begin with "$6"? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 enforces password complexity by requiring that at least one special character with the following command: $ sudo grep ocredit /etc/security/pwquality.conf /etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/*.conf ocredit = Is it the case that value of "ocredit" is a positive number or is commented out? To verify that auditing of privileged command use is configured, run the following command: $ sudo grep '\bat\b' /etc/audit/audit.rules /etc/audit/rules.d/* It should return a relevant line in the audit rules. Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? To ensure a login warning banner is enabled, run the following: $ grep banner-message-enable /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/* If properly configured, the output should be true. To ensure a login warning banner is locked and cannot be changed by a user, run the following: $ grep banner-message-enable /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/* If properly configured, the output should be /org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-enable. Is it the case that it is not? To determine how the SSH daemon's IgnoreRhosts option is set, run the following command: $ sudo grep -i IgnoreRhosts /etc/ssh/sshd_config If a line indicating yes is returned, then the required value is set. Is it the case that the required value is not set? To check the status of the idle screen lock activation, run the following command: $ gsettings get org.gnome.desktop.screensaver lock-enabled If properly configured, the output should be true. To ensure that users cannot change how long until the screensaver locks, run the following: $ grep lock-enabled /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/* If properly configured, the output for lock-enabled should be /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled Is it the case that screensaver locking is not enabled and/or has not been set or configured correctly? Verify that DNS servers have been configured properly, perform the following: $ sudo grep nameserver /etc/resolv.conf Is it the case that less than two lines are returned that are not commented out? Run the following command to determine if the ftpd_use_fusefs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool ftpd_use_fusefs If properly configured, the output should show the following: ftpd_use_fusefs --> off Is it the case that ftpd_use_fusefs is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the ksmtuned_use_cifs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool ksmtuned_use_cifs If properly configured, the output should show the following: ksmtuned_use_cifs --> off Is it the case that ksmtuned_use_cifs is not disabled? To ensure that XDMCP is disabled in /etc/gdm/custom.conf, run the following command: grep -Pzo "\[xdmcp\]\nEnable=false" /etc/gdm/custom.conf The output should return the following: [xdmcp] Enable=false Is it the case that the Enable is not set to false or is missing in the xdmcp section of the /etc/gdm/custom.conf gdm configuration file? To check the group ownership of /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg, run the command: $ ls -lL /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: root Is it the case that /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/user.cfg does not have a group owner of root? Run the following command to determine if the gluster_export_all_ro SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool gluster_export_all_ro If properly configured, the output should show the following: gluster_export_all_ro --> off Is it the case that gluster_export_all_ro is not disabled? To verify that the Audit is correctly configured according to recommended rules, check the content of the file with the following command: cat /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-4-delete-success.rules The output has to be exactly as follows: ## Successful file delete -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete Is it the case that the file does not exist or the content differs? The file permissions for all log files written by rsyslog should be set to 640, or more restrictive. These log files are determined by the second part of each Rule line in /etc/rsyslog.conf and typically all appear in /var/log. To see the permissions of a given log file, run the following command: $ ls -l LOGFILE The permissions should be 640, or more restrictive. Is it the case that the permissions are not correct? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? Verify that the shadow password suite configuration is set to encrypt password with a FIPS 140-2 approved cryptographic hashing algorithm. Check the hashing algorithm that is being used to hash passwords with the following command: $ sudo grep -i ENCRYPT_METHOD /etc/login.defs ENCRYPT_METHOD Is it the case that ENCRYPT_METHOD is not set to <sub idref="var_password_hashing_algorithm" />? Verify that a separate file system/partition has been created for /home with the following command: $ mountpoint /home Is it the case that "/home is not a mountpoint" is returned? To check the ownership of /etc/crontab, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/crontab If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: root Is it the case that /etc/crontab does not have an owner of root? To verify that SSSD expires known SSH host keys, run the following command: $ sudo grep ssh_known_hosts_timeout /etc/sssd/sssd.conf If configured properly, output should be ssh_known_hosts_timeout = Is it the case that it does not exist or is not configured properly? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the chmod system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "chmod" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? To determine if NOEXEC has been configured for sudo, run the following command: $ sudo grep -ri "^[\s]*Defaults.*\bnoexec\b.*" /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/ The command should return a matching output. Is it the case that noexec is not enabled in sudo? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 set the days of warning before a password expires to or more for users with a password: $ sudo awk -F: '$6 || $6 == "" {print $1}' /etc/shadow Is it the case that any results are returned that are not associated with a system account? To check the ownership of /etc/motd, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/motd If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: root Is it the case that /etc/motd does not have an owner of root? To check that the telnet service is disabled in system boot configuration with xinetd, run the following command: $ chkconfig telnet --list Output should indicate the telnet service has either not been installed, or has been disabled, as shown in the example below: $ chkconfig telnet --list Note: This output shows SysV services only and does not include native systemd services. SysV configuration data might be overridden by native systemd configuration. If you want to list systemd services use 'systemctl list-unit-files'. To see services enabled on particular target use 'systemctl list-dependencies [target]'. telnet off To check that the telnet socket is disabled in system boot configuration with systemd, run the following command: $ systemctl is-enabled telnet Output should indicate the telnet socket has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled telnetdisabled Run the following command to verify telnet is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active telnet If the socket is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The socket will also be masked, to check that the telnet is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show telnet | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the socket is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that service and/or socket are running? To check that the autofs service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled autofs Output should indicate the autofs service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled autofs disabled Run the following command to verify autofs is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active autofs If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the autofs is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show autofs | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "autofs" is loaded and not masked? Run the following command to determine if the mcelog_exec_scripts SELinux boolean is enabled: $ getsebool mcelog_exec_scripts If properly configured, the output should show the following: mcelog_exec_scripts --> on Is it the case that mcelog_exec_scripts is not enabled? To determine if the system is configured to audit successful calls to the fchownat system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "fchownat" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? To determine if the system is configured to audit successful calls to the open_by_handle_at system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "open_by_handle_at" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Verify the nodev option is configured for the /dev/shm mount point, run the following command: $ sudo mount | grep '\s/dev/shm\s' . . . /dev/shm . . . nodev . . . Is it the case that the "/dev/shm" file system does not have the "nodev" option set? Only FIPS-approved MACs should be used. To verify that only FIPS-approved MACs are in use, run the following command: $ sudo grep -i macs /etc/ssh/sshd_config The output should contain only those MACs which are FIPS-approved. Any use of other ciphers or algorithms will result in the module entering the non-FIPS mode of operation. Is it the case that MACs option is commented out or not using FIPS-approved hash algorithms? Run the following command to determine the current status of the nails service: $ sudo systemctl is-active nails If the service is running, it should return the following: active Is it the case that ? To check the group ownership of /etc/crontab, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/crontab If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: root Is it the case that /etc/crontab does not have a group owner of root? Run the following command to determine if the rsync_export_all_ro SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool rsync_export_all_ro If properly configured, the output should show the following: rsync_export_all_ro --> off Is it the case that rsync_export_all_ro is not disabled? To ensure sshd limits the users who can log in, run the following: pre>$ sudo grep -rPi '^\h*(allow|deny)(users|groups)\h+\H+(\h+.*)?$' /etc/ssh/sshd_config* If properly configured, the output should be a list of usernames and/or groups allowed to log in to this system. Is it the case that sshd does not limit the users who can log in? The file /etc/at.deny should not exist. This can be checked by running the following stat /etc/at.deny and the output should be stat: cannot stat `/etc/at.deny': No such file or directory Is it the case that the file /etc/at.deny exists? To verify that cryptography policy has been configured correctly, run the following command: $ update-crypto-policies --show The output should return . Run the command to check if the policy is correctly applied: $ update-crypto-policies --is-applied The output should be The configured policy is applied. Moreover, check if settings for selected crypto policy are as expected. List all libraries for which it holds that their crypto policies do not have symbolic link in /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends. $ ls -l /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/ | grep '^[^l]' | tail -n +2 | awk -F' ' '{print $NF}' | awk -F'.' '{print $1}' | sort Subsequently, check if matching libraries have drop in files in the /etc/crypto-policies/local.d directory. $ ls /etc/crypto-policies/local.d/ | awk -F'-' '{print $1}' | uniq | sort Outputs of two previous commands should match. Is it the case that cryptographic policy is not configured or is configured incorrectly? Run the following command and verify remote server is configured properly: # grep -E "^(server|pool)" /etc/chrony.conf Is it the case that a remote time server is not configured? Verify that interactive users on the system have a home directory assigned with the following command: $ sudo awk -F: '($3>=1000)&&($7 !~ /nologin/){print $1, $3, $6}' /etc/passwd Inspect the output and verify that all interactive users (normally users with a UID greater than 1000) have a home directory defined. Is it the case that users home directory is not defined? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the umount2 system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "umount2" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? To verify that null passwords cannot be used, run the following command: $ grep nullok /etc/pam.d/system-auth /etc/pam.d/password-auth If this produces any output, it may be possible to log into accounts with empty passwords. Remove any instances of the nullok option to prevent logins with empty passwords. Is it the case that NULL passwords can be used? To verify the operating system implements cryptography to protect the integrity of remote ldap access sessions, run the following command: $ sudo grep ldap_tls_cacertdir /etc/sssd/sssd.conf The output should return the following with a correctly configured CA cert path: ldap_tls_cacertdir /path/to/tls/cacert Is it the case that the TLS CA cert is not configured? To determine how the SSH daemon's PermitEmptyPasswords option is set, run the following command: $ sudo grep -i PermitEmptyPasswords /etc/ssh/sshd_config If a line indicating no is returned, then the required value is set. Is it the case that the required value is not set? Run the following command to determine if the ftpd_use_cifs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool ftpd_use_cifs If properly configured, the output should show the following: ftpd_use_cifs --> off Is it the case that ftpd_use_cifs is not disabled? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to boot to the command line: $ systemctl get-default multi-user.target Is it the case that the system default target is not set to "multi-user.target" and the Information System Security Officer (ISSO) lacks a documented requirement for a graphical user interface? To verify the audispd plugin encrypts audit records off-loaded onto a different system or media from the system being audited, run the following command: $ sudo grep -i transport /etc/audit/audisp-remote.conf The output should return the following: transport = KRB5 Is it the case that audispd is not encrypting audit records when sent over the network? Verify the nodev option is configured for the /home mount point, run the following command: $ sudo mount | grep '\s/home\s' . . . /home . . . nodev . . . Is it the case that the "/home" file system does not have the "nodev" option set? Verify the system-wide shared library files are group-owned by "root" with the following command: $ sudo find -L /lib /lib64 /usr/lib /usr/lib64 ! -group root -exec ls -l {} \; Is it the case that any system wide shared library file is returned and is not group-owned by a required system account? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 generates audit records for all account creations, modifications, disabling, and termination events that affect "/etc/group" with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep -E '(/etc/group)' -w /etc/group -p wa -k identity Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 generates an audit record for unsuccessful attempts to use the open system call. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "augenrules" program to to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), run the following command: $ sudo grep -r open /etc/audit/rules.d If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "auditctl" utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, run the following command: $ sudo grep open /etc/audit/audit.rules The output should be the following: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? To check that the screen locks immediately when activated, run the following command: $ gsettings get org.gnome.desktop.screensaver lock-delay If properly configured, the output should be 'uint32 '. Is it the case that the screensaver lock delay is missing, or is set to a value greater than <sub idref="var_screensaver_lock_delay" />? To check the group ownership of /boot/grub2/user.cfg, run the command: $ ls -lL /boot/grub2/user.cfg If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: root Is it the case that /boot/grub2/user.cfg does not have a group owner of root? To check that the oddjobd service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled oddjobd Output should indicate the oddjobd service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled oddjobd disabled Run the following command to verify oddjobd is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active oddjobd If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the oddjobd is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show oddjobd | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "oddjobd" is loaded and not masked? Run the following command to determine if the openldap-clients package is installed: $ rpm -q openldap-clients Is it the case that the package is installed? Run the following command to determine if the lsmd_plugin_connect_any SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool lsmd_plugin_connect_any If properly configured, the output should show the following: lsmd_plugin_connect_any --> off Is it the case that lsmd_plugin_connect_any is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_unified SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_unified If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_unified --> off Is it the case that httpd_unified is not disabled? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 audits execution as another user. Check if Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to audit the execution of the "execve" system call using the following command: $ sudo grep execve /etc/audit/audit.rules The output should be the following: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S execve -C euid!=uid -F auid!=unset -k user_emulation -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -C euid!=uid -F auid!=unset-k user_emulation Is it the case that the command does not return all lines, or the lines are commented out? Verify that only the "root" account has a UID "0" assignment with the following command: $ awk -F: '$3 == 0 {print $1}' /etc/passwd root Is it the case that any accounts other than "root" have a UID of "0"? Run the following command to determine if the polipo_connect_all_unreserved SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool polipo_connect_all_unreserved If properly configured, the output should show the following: polipo_connect_all_unreserved --> off Is it the case that polipo_connect_all_unreserved is not disabled? To check the system for the existence of any .forward files, run the following command: $ sudo find /home -xdev -name .forward Is it the case that any .forward files exist? Verify the usrquota option is configured for the /home mount point, run the following command: $ sudo mount | grep '\s/home\s' . . . /home . . . usrquota . . . Is it the case that the "/home" file system does not have the "usrquota" option set? Run the following command to determine if the mozilla_plugin_bind_unreserved_ports SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool mozilla_plugin_bind_unreserved_ports If properly configured, the output should show the following: mozilla_plugin_bind_unreserved_ports --> off Is it the case that mozilla_plugin_bind_unreserved_ports is not disabled? Storing logs with persistent storage ensures they are available after a reboot or system crash. Run the command below to verify that logs are being persistently stored to disk. grep "^\sStorage" /etc/systemd/journald.conf /etc/systemd/journald.conf.d/*.conf and it should return Storage=persistent Is it the case that is commented out or not configured correctly? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to prevent unrestricted mail relaying, run the following command: $ sudo postconf -n smtpd_client_restrictions Is it the case that the "smtpd_client_restrictions" parameter contains any entries other than "permit_mynetworks" and "reject"? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "65536" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to audit the execution of the "sudo" command with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep sudo -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/sudo -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-sudo Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? To check the group ownership of /etc/issue.net, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/issue.net If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: root Is it the case that /etc/issue.net does not have a group owner of root? To check the group ownership of /etc/at.allow, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/at.allow If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: root Is it the case that /etc/at.allow does not have a group owner of root? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the fchownat system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "fchownat" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Run the following command to determine the current status of the postfix service: $ sudo systemctl is-active postfix If the service is running, it should return the following: active Is it the case that the system is not a cross domain solution and the service is not enabled? Run the following command to determine if the entropyd_use_audio SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool entropyd_use_audio If properly configured, the output should show the following: entropyd_use_audio --> off Is it the case that entropyd_use_audio is not disabled? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 removes all software components after updated versions have been installed. $ grep clean_requirements_on_remove /etc/yum.conf clean_requirements_on_remove=1 Is it the case that '"clean_requirements_on_remove" is not set to "1"'? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to audit the execution of the "kmod" command with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep kmod -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/kmod -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-kmod Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? To check the ownership of /var/log/syslog, run the command: $ ls -lL /var/log/syslog If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: syslog Is it the case that /var/log/syslog does not have an owner of syslog? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the chown system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "chown" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? To check the ownership of /etc/shells, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/shells If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: root Is it the case that /etc/shells does not have an owner of root? The runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding 0. The ability to forward packets is only appropriate for routers. Is it the case that IP forwarding value is "1" and the system is not router? To verify that CUPS printer browsing is disabled, run the following command: $ sudo grep "Browsing\|BrowseAllow" /etc/cups/cupsd.conf The output should return the following: Browsing Off BrowseAllow none Is it the case that printer browsing is not disabled? To ensure the screensaver is configured to be blank, run the following command: $ gsettings get org.gnome.desktop.screensaver picture-uri If properly configured, the output should be ''. To ensure that users cannot set the screensaver background, run the following: $ grep picture-uri /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/* If properly configured, the output should be /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/picture-uri Is it the case that it is not set or configured properly? Run the following command to determine if the webadm_manage_user_files SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool webadm_manage_user_files If properly configured, the output should show the following: webadm_manage_user_files --> off Is it the case that webadm_manage_user_files is not disabled? The runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians 1. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? The runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media 0. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? Run the following command to determine if the mpd_use_cifs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool mpd_use_cifs If properly configured, the output should show the following: mpd_use_cifs --> off Is it the case that mpd_use_cifs is not disabled? Make sure that /boot/bootmap is newer than /boot/loader/entries/*.conf and /etc/zipl.conf: find /boot/loader/entries/*.conf /etc/zipl.conf -newer /boot/bootmap No line should be returned, if a line is returned /boot/bootmap is outdated and needs to be regenerated. Is it the case that the bootmap is outdated? Run the following command to determine if the geolite2-city package is installed: $ rpm -q geolite2-city Is it the case that the package is installed? For each private key stored on the system, use the following command: $ sudo ssh-keygen -y -f /path/to/file If the contents of the key are displayed, this is a finding. Is it the case that no ssh private key is accessible without a passcode? Run the following command to determine if the sanlock_use_samba SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool sanlock_use_samba If properly configured, the output should show the following: sanlock_use_samba --> off Is it the case that sanlock_use_samba is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_can_check_spam SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_can_check_spam If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_can_check_spam --> off Is it the case that httpd_can_check_spam is not disabled? If the system is configured to prevent the loading of the iwlmvm kernel module, it will contain lines inside any file in /etc/modprobe.d or the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf. These lines instruct the module loading system to run another program (such as /bin/true) upon a module install event. These lines can also instruct the module loading system to ignore the iwlmvm kernel module via blacklist keyword. Run the following command to search for such lines in all files in /etc/modprobe.d and the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf: $ grep -r iwlmvm /etc/modprobe.conf /etc/modprobe.d Is it the case that no line is returned? To verify the sec option is configured for all NFS mounts, run the following command: $ mount | grep "sec=" All NFS mounts should show the sec=krb5:krb5i:krb5p setting in parentheses. This is not applicable if NFS is not implemented. Is it the case that the setting is not configured, has the 'sys' option added, or does not have all Kerberos options added? To ensure the failed password attempt policy is configured correctly, run the following command: $ grep fail_interval /etc/security/faillock.conf The output should show fail_interval = <interval-in-seconds> where interval-in-seconds is or greater. Is it the case that the "fail_interval" option is not set to "<sub idref="var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval" />" or less (but not "0"), the line is commented out, or the line is missing? Verify the umask setting is configured correctly in the /etc/bashrc file with the following command: $ sudo grep "umask" /etc/bashrc umask Is it the case that the value for the "umask" parameter is not "<sub idref="var_accounts_user_umask" />", or the "umask" parameter is missing or is commented out? Run the following command to determine if the abrt_handle_event SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool abrt_handle_event If properly configured, the output should show the following: abrt_handle_event --> off Is it the case that abrt_handle_event is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the selinuxuser_tcp_server SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool selinuxuser_tcp_server If properly configured, the output should show the following: selinuxuser_tcp_server --> off Is it the case that selinuxuser_tcp_server is not disabled? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? Run the following command to determine if the libselinux package is installed: $ rpm -q libselinux Is it the case that the package is not installed? System executables are stored in the following directories by default: /bin /sbin /usr/bin /usr/local/bin /usr/local/sbin /usr/sbin For each of these directories, run the following command to find files not owned by root: $ sudo find -L DIR/ ! -user root -type d -exec chown root {} \; Is it the case that any system executables directories are found to not be owned by root? To verify all files and directories in a local interactive user's home directory have a valid owner, run the following command: $ sudo ls -lLR /home/USER Is it the case that the user ownership is incorrect? To check that the sshd service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled sshd Output should indicate the sshd service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled sshd disabled Run the following command to verify sshd is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active sshd If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the sshd is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show sshd | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "sshd" is loaded and not masked? Inspect the form of default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system in /etc/default/grub. If it includes iommu=force, then the parameter will be configured for newly installed kernels. First check if the GRUB recovery is enabled: $ sudo grep 'GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY' /etc/default/grub If this option is set to true, then check that a line is output by the following command: $ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT.*iommu=force.*' /etc/default/grub If the recovery is disabled, check the line with $ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX.*iommu=force.*' /etc/default/grub.Moreover, command line parameters for currently installed kernels should be checked as well. Run the following command: $ sudo grubby --info=ALL | grep args | grep -v 'iommu=force' The command should not return any output. Is it the case that I/OMMU is not activated? To determine if the system is configured to audit successful calls to the rename system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "rename" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Run the following command to determine if the daemons_use_tty SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool daemons_use_tty If properly configured, the output should show the following: daemons_use_tty --> off Is it the case that daemons_use_tty is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the geolite2-country package is installed: $ rpm -q geolite2-country Is it the case that the package is installed? Check the root home directory for a .mozilla directory. If one exists, ensure browsing is limited to local service administration. Is it the case that this is not the case? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? To check the group ownership of /etc/shadow, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/shadow If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: root Is it the case that /etc/shadow does not have a group owner of root? Run the following command to determine if the abrt-plugin-sosreport package is installed: $ rpm -q abrt-plugin-sosreport Is it the case that the package is installed? To verify if the OpenSSH Client uses defined Crypto Policy, run: $ cat /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-ospp.conf and verify that the line matches Match final all RekeyLimit 512M 1h GSSAPIAuthentication no Ciphers aes256-ctr,aes256-cbc,aes128-ctr,aes128-cbc PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ssh-rsa,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 MACs hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256 KexAlgorithms ecdh-sha2-nistp521,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp256,diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 Is it the case that Crypto Policy for OpenSSH Client is not configured according to CC requirements? To determine if the system is configured to audit changes to its SELinux configuration files, run the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep "dir=/usr/share/selinux" If the system is configured to watch for changes to its SELinux configuration, a line should be returned (including perm=wa indicating permissions that are watched). Is it the case that the system is not configured to audit attempts to change the MAC policy? The runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects 0. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? Run the following command to determine if the ksmtuned_use_nfs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool ksmtuned_use_nfs If properly configured, the output should show the following: ksmtuned_use_nfs --> off Is it the case that ksmtuned_use_nfs is not disabled? To check the current idle time-out value, run the following command: $ gsettings get org.gnome.desktop.session idle-delay If properly configured, the output should be 'uint32 '. To ensure that users cannot change the screensaver inactivity timeout setting, run the following: $ grep idle-delay /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/* If properly configured, the output should be /org/gnome/desktop/session/idle-delay Is it the case that idle-delay is set to 0 or a value greater than <sub idref="inactivity_timeout_value" />? To ensure logs are sent to a remote host, examine the file /etc/rsyslog.conf. If using UDP, a line similar to the following should be present: *.* @ If using TCP, a line similar to the following should be present: *.* @@ If using RELP, a line similar to the following should be present: *.* :omrelp: Is it the case that no evidence that the audit logs are being off-loaded to another system or media? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_enable_cgi SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_enable_cgi If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_enable_cgi --> off Is it the case that httpd_enable_cgi is not disabled? To check the system for the existence of any .netrc files, run the following command: $ sudo find /home -xdev -name .netrc Is it the case that any .netrc files exist? To check that the tftp service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled tftp Output should indicate the tftp service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled tftp disabled Run the following command to verify tftp is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active tftp If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the tftp is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show tftp | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "tftp" is loaded and not masked? Inspect /etc/audit/audisp-remote.conf and locate the following line to determine if the system is configured to perform a correct action according to the policy: $ sudo grep -i network_failure_action /etc/audit/audisp-remote.conf The output should return: network_failure_action = Is it the case that the system is not configured to switch to single user mode for corrective action? Verify the operating system is not configured to bypass password requirements for privilege escalation. Check the configuration of the "/etc/pam.d/sudo" file with the following command: $ sudo grep pam_succeed_if /etc/pam.d/sudo Is it the case that system is configured to bypass password requirements for privilege escalation? Review the web site to determine if HTTP and HTTPs are used in accordance with well known ports (e.g., 80 and 443) or those ports and services as registered and approved for use by the DoD PPSM. To configure firewalld to allow http access, run the following command(s): firewall-cmd --permanent --add-service=http Then run the following command to load the newly created rule(s): firewall-cmd --reload To configure firewalld to allow https access, run the following command(s): firewall-cmd --permanent --add-service=https Then run the following command to load the newly created rule(s): firewall-cmd --reload Is it the case that it is not? Run the following command to determine if the virt_use_sanlock SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool virt_use_sanlock If properly configured, the output should show the following: virt_use_sanlock --> off Is it the case that virt_use_sanlock is not disabled? Run the following command to check if the line is present: grep pam_wheel /etc/pam.d/su The output should contain the following line: auth required pam_wheel.so use_uid group= Is it the case that the line is not in the file or it is commented? To ensure all GIDs referenced in /etc/passwd are defined in /etc/group, run the following command: $ sudo pwck -qr There should be no output. Is it the case that GIDs referenced in /etc/passwd are returned as not defined in /etc/group? Verify the audit tools are group-owned by "root" to prevent any unauthorized access, deletion, or modification. Check the group-owner of each audit tool by running the following command: $ sudo stat -c "%G %n" /sbin/auditctl /sbin/aureport /sbin/ausearch /sbin/autrace /sbin/auditd /sbin/rsyslogd /sbin/augenrules root /sbin/auditctl root /sbin/aureport root /sbin/ausearch root /sbin/autrace root /sbin/auditd root /sbin/rsyslogd root /sbin/augenrules Is it the case that any audit tools are not group-owned by root? To verify that repo_gpgcheck is configured properly, run the following command: $ grep repo_gpgcheck /etc/yum.conf The output should return something similar to: repo_gpgcheck=1 Is it the case that gpgcheck is not enabled or configured correctly to verify repository metadata? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 generates an audit record for unsuccessful attempts to create files using the open system call with O_CREAT flag. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "augenrules" program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), run the following command: $ sudo grep -r open /etc/audit/rules.d If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "auditctl" utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, run the following command: $ sudo grep open /etc/audit/audit.rules The output should be the following: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? The runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo 0. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? If the system is configured to prevent the loading of the sctp kernel module, it will contain lines inside any file in /etc/modprobe.d or the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf. These lines instruct the module loading system to run another program (such as /bin/true) upon a module install event. These lines can also instruct the module loading system to ignore the sctp kernel module via blacklist keyword. Run the following command to search for such lines in all files in /etc/modprobe.d and the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf: $ grep -r sctp /etc/modprobe.conf /etc/modprobe.d Is it the case that no line is returned? Run the following command to determine if the iprutils package is installed: $ rpm -q iprutils Is it the case that the package is installed? Run the following command to ensure the default FORWARD policy is DROP: grep ":FORWARD" /etc/sysconfig/iptables The output should be similar to the following: $ sudo grep ":FORWARD" /etc/sysconfig/iptables :FORWARD DROP [0:0 Is it the case that the default policy for the FORWARD chain is not set to DROP? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to audit the execution of the "init" command with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep init -a always,exit -F path=/init -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-init Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? Run the following command to determine if the cron package is installed: $ rpm -q cron Is it the case that the package is installed? To check for legacy lines in /etc/shadow, run the following command: grep '^\+' /etc/shadow The command should not return any output. Is it the case that the file contains legacy lines? Run the following command to determine if the nfs_export_all_ro SELinux boolean is enabled: $ getsebool nfs_export_all_ro If properly configured, the output should show the following: nfs_export_all_ro --> on Is it the case that nfs_export_all_ro is not enabled? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS /boot/config.* Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no lines should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? To determine if the system is configured to audit successful calls to the truncate system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "truncate" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? To ensure the system is configured to ignore the Ctrl-Alt-Del sequence, run the following command: $ gsettings get org.gnome.settings-daemon.plugins.media-keys logout $ grep logout /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/* If properly configured, the output should be /org/gnome/settings-daemon/plugins/media-keys/logout Is it the case that GNOME3 is configured to reboot when Ctrl-Alt-Del is pressed? Run the following command to determine if the vsftpd package is installed: $ rpm -q vsftpd Is it the case that the package is installed? To verify that acquiring, saving, and processing core dumps is disabled, run the following command: $ systemctl status systemd-coredump.socket The output should be similar to: ● systemd-coredump.socket Loaded: masked (Reason: Unit systemd-coredump.socket is masked.) Active: inactive (dead) ... Is it the case that unit systemd-coredump.socket is not masked or running? To verify that rsyslog's Forwarding Output Module is configured to use TLS for logging to remote server, run the following command: $ grep omfwd /etc/rsyslog.conf /etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf The output should include record similar to action(type="omfwd" protocol="tcp" Target="<remote system>" port="6514" StreamDriver="gtls" StreamDriverMode="1" StreamDriverAuthMode="x509/name" streamdriver.CheckExtendedKeyPurpose="on") where the <remote system> present in the configuration line above must be a valid IP address or a host name of the remote logging server. Is it the case that omfwd is not configured with gtls and AuthMode? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_manage_ipa SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_manage_ipa If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_manage_ipa --> off Is it the case that httpd_manage_ipa is not disabled? To check the group ownership of /var/log/syslog, run the command: $ ls -lL /var/log/syslog If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: adm Is it the case that /var/log/syslog does not have a group owner of adm? Run the following command to determine if the gpg_web_anon_write SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool gpg_web_anon_write If properly configured, the output should show the following: gpg_web_anon_write --> off Is it the case that gpg_web_anon_write is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the fcron_crond SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool fcron_crond If properly configured, the output should show the following: fcron_crond --> off Is it the case that fcron_crond is not disabled? Run the following command to ensure postfix routes mail to this system: $ grep relayhost /etc/postfix/main.cf If properly configured, the output should show only . Is it the case that it is not? Run the following command to verify that SSH client is configured to use 32 bytes of entropy: grep SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG /etc/profile.d/cc-ssh-strong-rng.sh The output should be: export SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG=32 Is it the case that SSH client is not configured to use 32 bytes of entropy or more? To check the ownership of /etc/cron.daily, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/cron.daily If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: root Is it the case that /etc/cron.daily does not have an owner of root? To determine how the SSH daemon's X11UseLocalhost option is set, run the following command: $ sudo grep -i X11UseLocalhost /etc/ssh/sshd_config If a line indicating yes is returned, then the required value is set. Is it the case that the display proxy is listening on wildcard address? To determine if umask has been configured for sudo with the appropriate value, run the following command: $ sudo grep -ri '^Defaults.*umask=' /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/ The command should return a matching output. Is it the case that umask is not set with the appropriate value for sudo? Run the following command to determine the current status of the fapolicyd service: $ sudo systemctl is-active fapolicyd If the service is running, it should return the following: active Is it the case that the service is not enabled? Check that the symlink exists and target the correct Kerberos crypto policy, with the following command: file /etc/krb5.conf.d/crypto-policies If command ouput shows the following line, Kerberos is configured to use the system-wide crypto policy. /etc/krb5.conf.d/crypto-policies: symbolic link to /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/krb5.config Is it the case that the symlink does not exist or points to a different target? To verify the assigned home directory of all interactive users is group- owned by that users primary GID, run the following command: # ls -ld $(awk -F: '($3>=1000)&&($7 !~ /nologin/){print $6}' /etc/passwd) Is it the case that the group ownership is incorrect? Run the following command to determine if the gssproxy package is installed: $ rpm -q gssproxy Is it the case that the package is installed? Run the following command to determine if the sendmail package is installed: $ rpm -q sendmail Is it the case that the package is installed? The runtime status of the kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent 1. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? To determine if the system is configured to audit successful calls to the fchmod system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "fchmod" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? To check the ownership of /etc/ssh/sshd_config, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/ssh/sshd_config If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: root Is it the case that /etc/ssh/sshd_config does not have an owner of root? To check if pam_pwquality.so is enabled in system-auth, run the following command: $ grep pam_pwquality /etc/pam.d/system-auth The output should be similar to the following: password requisite pam_pwquality.so Is it the case that pam_pwquality.so is not enabled in system-auth? If the system is configured to prevent the loading of the atm kernel module, it will contain lines inside any file in /etc/modprobe.d or the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf. These lines instruct the module loading system to run another program (such as /bin/true) upon a module install event. These lines can also instruct the module loading system to ignore the atm kernel module via blacklist keyword. Run the following command to search for such lines in all files in /etc/modprobe.d and the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf: $ grep -r atm /etc/modprobe.conf /etc/modprobe.d Is it the case that no line is returned? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to audit the execution of the "setsebool" command with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep setsebool -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/setsebool -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? Run the following command to determine if the sge_domain_can_network_connect SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool sge_domain_can_network_connect If properly configured, the output should show the following: sge_domain_can_network_connect --> off Is it the case that sge_domain_can_network_connect is not disabled? To verify the password reuse setting is compliant, run the following command: $ grep remember /etc/pam.d/system-auth The output should show the following at the end of the line: remember= In newer systems, the pam_pwhistory PAM module options can also be set in "/etc/security/pwhistory.conf" file. Use the following command to verify: $ grep remember /etc/security/pwhistory.conf remember = The pam_pwhistory remember option must be configured only in one file. Is it the case that the value of remember is not equal to or greater than the expected value? To verify that a remote NTP service is configured for time synchronization, open the following file: /etc/chrony.conf in the case the system in question is configured to use the chronyd as the NTP daemon (default setting) /etc/ntp.conf in the case the system in question is configured to use the ntpd as the NTP daemon In the file, there should be a section similar to the following: server ntpserver Is it the case that this is not the case? To check the permissions of /etc/http/conf.modules.d/*, run the command: $ ls -l /etc/http/conf.modules.d/* If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: -rw-r----- Is it the case that /etc/http/conf.modules.d/* does not have unix mode -rw-r-----? Run the following command to determine if the postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm SELinux boolean is enabled: $ getsebool postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm If properly configured, the output should show the following: postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm --> on Is it the case that postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm is not enabled? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_can_sendmail SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_can_sendmail If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_can_sendmail --> off Is it the case that httpd_can_sendmail is not disabled? Run the following command to check the mode of the system audit logs: $ sudo grep -iw log_file /etc/audit/auditd.conf log_file=/var/log/audit/audit.log $ sudo stat -c "%n %a" /var/log/audit/* $ sudo ls -l /var/log/audit Audit logs must be mode 0640 or less permissive. Is it the case that any permissions are more permissive? Run the following command to determine if the cronie-anacron package is installed: $ rpm -q cronie-anacron Is it the case that the package is installed? To check the permissions of /boot/grub2/user.cfg, run the command: $ ls -l /boot/grub2/user.cfg If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: -rw------- Is it the case that /boot/grub2/user.cfg does not have unix mode -rw-------? To determine if env_reset has been configured for sudo, run the following command: $ sudo grep -ri "^[\s]*Defaults.*\benv_reset\b.*" /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/ The command should return a matching output. Is it the case that env_reset is not enabled in sudo? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_sys_script_anon_write SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_sys_script_anon_write If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_sys_script_anon_write --> off Is it the case that httpd_sys_script_anon_write is not disabled? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to audit the execution of the "restorecon" command with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep restorecon -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/restorecon -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-restorecon Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? To verify that McAfee HIPS is installed, run the following command(s): $ rpm -q MFEhiplsm Is it the case that the HBSS HIPS module is not installed? Run the following command to determine if the selinuxuser_execheap SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool selinuxuser_execheap If properly configured, the output should show the following: selinuxuser_execheap --> off Is it the case that selinuxuser_execheap is not disabled? To verify that SSSD's in-memory cache expires after a day, run the following command: $ sudo grep memcache_timeout /etc/sssd/sssd.conf If configured properly, output should be memcache_timeout = . Is it the case that it does not exist or is not configured properly? The runtime status of the fs.suid_dumpable kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl fs.suid_dumpable 0. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? If IPv6 is disabled, this is not applicable. Inspect the file /etc/sysconfig/ip6tables to determine the default policy for the INPUT chain. It should be set to DROP: $ sudo grep ":INPUT" /etc/sysconfig/ip6tables Is it the case that the default policy for the INPUT chain is not set to DROP? Verify the noexec option is configured for the /tmp mount point, run the following command: $ sudo mount | grep '\s/tmp\s' . . . /tmp . . . noexec . . . Is it the case that the "/tmp" file system does not have the "noexec" option set? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the rename system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "rename" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? To check the group ownership of /etc/cron.monthly, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/cron.monthly If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: root Is it the case that /etc/cron.monthly does not have a group owner of root? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 generates an audit record for unsuccessful attempts to use the unlinkat system call. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "augenrules" program to to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), run the following command: $ sudo grep -r unlinkat /etc/audit/rules.d If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "auditctl" utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, run the following command: $ sudo grep unlinkat /etc/audit/audit.rules The output should be the following: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlinkat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k unsuccessful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlinkat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k unsuccessful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlinkat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k unsuccessful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlinkat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k unsuccessful-delete Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? To check the permissions of /var/log/syslog, run the command: $ ls -l /var/log/syslog If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: -rw-r----- Is it the case that /var/log/syslog does not have unix mode -rw-r-----? Verify that the files and directories of each instance of Alias, ScriptAlias, and ScriptAliasMatch that exist have the correct file and directory permissions applied. Is it the case that it is not? To verify that the Audit is correctly configured according to recommended rules, check the content of the file with the following command: cat /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-1-create-success.rules The output has to be exactly as follows: ## Successful file creation (open with O_CREAT) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create Is it the case that the file does not exist or the content differs? Run the following command to determine if the ftpd_full_access SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool ftpd_full_access If properly configured, the output should show the following: ftpd_full_access --> off Is it the case that ftpd_full_access is not disabled? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to audit the execution of the "setfiles" command with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep setfiles -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/setfiles -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-unix-update Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? Run the following command to determine if the tar package is installed: $ rpm -q tar Is it the case that the package is not installed? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_BUG /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? To verify that the Audit is correctly configured according to recommended rules, check the content of the file with the following command: cat /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-2-modify-success.rules The output has to be exactly as follows: ## Successful file modifications (open for write or truncate) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification Is it the case that the file does not exist or the content differs? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_use_nfs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_use_nfs If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_use_nfs --> off Is it the case that httpd_use_nfs is not disabled? To determine if the system is configured to audit successful calls to the openat system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "openat" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? To check the group ownership of /etc/cron.weekly, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/cron.weekly If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: root Is it the case that /etc/cron.weekly does not have a group owner of root? The following command will discover and print world-writable directories that are not owned by a system account, given the assumption that only system accounts have a uid lower than 500. Run it once for each local partition PART: $ sudo find PART -xdev -type d -perm -0002 -uid +1000 -print Is it the case that there is output? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to audit the execution of the "postqueue" command with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep postqueue -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/postqueue -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-postqueue Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? Determine if there is a process for the uploading of files to the web site. This process should include the requirement for the use of a secure encrypted logon and secure encrypted connection. If the remote users are uploading files without utilizing approved encryption methods, this is a finding. Is it the case that it is not? To check that the mdmonitor service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled mdmonitor Output should indicate the mdmonitor service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled mdmonitor disabled Run the following command to verify mdmonitor is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active mdmonitor If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the mdmonitor is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show mdmonitor | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "mdmonitor" is loaded and not masked? The following command will discover and print world-writable directories that are not owned by root. Run it once for each local partition PART: $ sudo find PART -xdev -type d -perm -0002 -uid +0 -print Is it the case that there are world-writable directories not owned by root? Verify that the SA and ISSO (at a minimum) are notified when the audit storage volume is full. Check which action Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 takes when the audit storage volume is full with the following command: $ sudo grep max_log_file_action /etc/audit/auditd.conf max_log_file_action = Is it the case that the value of the "max_log_file_action" option is set to "ignore", "rotate", or "suspend", or the line is commented out? Run the following command to determine if the virt_sandbox_use_mknod SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool virt_sandbox_use_mknod If properly configured, the output should show the following: virt_sandbox_use_mknod --> off Is it the case that virt_sandbox_use_mknod is not disabled? To verify the home directory ownership, run the following command: # ls -ld $(awk -F: '($3>=1000)&&($7 !~ /nologin/){print $6}' /etc/passwd) Is it the case that the user ownership is incorrect? The runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra 0. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? To check that the systemd-journal-remote.socket socket is disabled in system boot configuration with systemd, run the following command: $ systemctl is-enabled systemd-journal-remote.socket Output should indicate the systemd-journal-remote.socket socket has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled systemd-journal-remote.socketdisabled Run the following command to verify systemd-journal-remote.socket is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active systemd-journal-remote.socket If the socket is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The socket will also be masked, to check that the systemd-journal-remote.socket is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show systemd-journal-remote.socket | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the socket is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the systemd-journal-remote socket is not masked? Run the following command to check if the line is present: grep pam_wheel /etc/pam.d/su The output should contain the following line: auth required pam_wheel.so use_uid Is it the case that the line is not in the file or it is commented? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 takes action when allocated audit record storage volume reaches 75 percent of the repository maximum audit record storage capacity with the following command: $ sudo grep -w space_left /etc/audit/auditd.conf space_left = % Is it the case that the value of the "space_left" keyword is not set to <sub idref="var_auditd_space_left_percentage" />% of the storage volume allocated to audit logs, or if the line is commented out, ask the System Administrator to indicate how the system is providing real-time alerts to the SA and ISSO. If the "space_left" value is not configured to the correct value? To ensure that WIFI connections caanot be created, run the following command: $ gsettings get org.gnome.nm-applet disable-wifi-create If properly configured, the output should be true. To ensure that users cannot enable WIFI connection creation, run the following: $ grep wifi-create /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/* If properly configured, the output should be /org/gnome/nm-applet/disable-wifi-create Is it the case that WIFI connections can be created through GNOME? Run the following command to determine if the minidlna_read_generic_user_content SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool minidlna_read_generic_user_content If properly configured, the output should show the following: minidlna_read_generic_user_content --> off Is it the case that minidlna_read_generic_user_content is not disabled? To check the permissions of /etc/ssh/*_key, run the command: $ ls -l /etc/ssh/*_key If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: -rw------- Is it the case that /etc/ssh/*_key does not have unix mode -rw-------? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the open_by_handle_at system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "open_by_handle_at" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Run the following command to determine if the zabbix_can_network SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool zabbix_can_network If properly configured, the output should show the following: zabbix_can_network --> off Is it the case that zabbix_can_network is not disabled? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 generates an audit record for unsuccessful attempts to use the renameat system call. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "augenrules" program to to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), run the following command: $ sudo grep -r renameat /etc/audit/rules.d If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "auditctl" utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, run the following command: $ sudo grep renameat /etc/audit/audit.rules The output should be the following: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S renameat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k unsuccessful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S renameat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k unsuccessful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k unsuccessful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k unsuccessful-delete Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 generates audit records for all account creations, modifications, disabling, and termination events that affect "/etc/passwd" with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep -E '(/etc/passwd)' -w /etc/passwd -p wa -k identity Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_RETPOLINE /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 generates audit records for all account creations, modifications, disabling, and termination events that affect "/var/log/tallylog" with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep /var/log/tallylog -w /var/log/tallylog -p wa -k logins Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? To verify that kernel parameter 'crypto.fips_enabled' is set properly, run the following command: sysctl crypto.fips_enabled The output should contain the following: crypto.fips_enabled = 1 Is it the case that crypto.fips_enabled is not 1? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to audit the execution of the "semanage" command with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep semanage -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/semanage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-unix-update Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? To ensure write permissions are disabled for group and other for each element in root's path, run the following command: # ls -ld DIR Is it the case that group or other write permissions exist? To verify the nosuid option is configured for all NFS mounts, run the following command: $ mount | grep nfs All NFS mounts should show the nosuid setting in parentheses. This is not applicable if NFS is not implemented. Is it the case that the setting does not show? To ensure that the GUI power settings are not active, run the following command: $ gsettings get org.gnome.settings-daemon.plugins.power active If properly configured, the output should be false. To ensure that users cannot enable the power settings, run the following: $ grep power /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/* If properly configured, the output should be /org/gnome/settings-daemon/plugins/power/active Is it the case that power settings are enabled and are not disabled? To ensure ClientAliveInterval is set correctly, run the following command: $ sudo grep ClientAliveCountMax /etc/ssh/sshd_config If properly configured, the output should be: ClientAliveCountMax For SSH earlier than v8.2, a ClientAliveCountMax value of 0 causes a timeout precisely when the ClientAliveInterval is set. Starting with v8.2, a value of 0 disables the timeout functionality completely. If the option is set to a number greater than 0, then the session will be disconnected after ClientAliveInterval * ClientAliveCountMax seconds without receiving a keep alive message. Is it the case that it is commented out or not configured properly? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_DEBUG_WX /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? The runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local 0. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? The existence of the file /etc/hosts.equiv or a file named .rhosts inside a user home directory indicates the presence of an Rsh trust relationship. Is it the case that these files exist? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the fchown system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "fchown" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? These settings can be verified by running the following: $ gsettings get org.gnome.desktop.media-handling automount-open If properly configured, the output for automount-openshould be false. To ensure that users cannot enable automount opening in GNOME3, run the following: $ grep 'automount-open' /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/* If properly configured, the output for automount-open should be /org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount-open Is it the case that GNOME automounting is not disabled? Run the following command to verify that SSH client is configured to use 32 bytes of entropy: grep SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG /etc/profile.d/cc-ssh-strong-rng.csh It should return the following output: setenv SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG 32. Is it the case that SSH client is not configured to use 32 bytes of entropy or more? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 generates an audit record for unsuccessful attempts to modify files using the open_by_handle_at system call with O_TRUNC_WRITE flag. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "augenrules" program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), run the following command: $ sudo grep -r open_by_handle_at /etc/audit/rules.d If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "auditctl" utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, run the following command: $ sudo grep open_by_handle_at /etc/audit/audit.rules The output should be the following: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? To determine if the system is configured to audit successful calls to the open_by_handle_at system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "open_by_handle_at" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the init_module system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "init_module" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the finit_module system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "finit_module" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the delete_module system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "delete_module" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Inspect all instances of DocumentRoot and Alias. No robots.txt file should exist. Is it the case that it is not? Run the following command to determine if the rpcbind package is installed: $ rpm -q rpcbind Is it the case that the package is installed? These settings can be verified by running the following: $ gsettings get org.gnome.desktop.media-handling autorun-never If properly configured, the output for autorun-nevershould be true. To ensure that users cannot enable autorun in GNOME3, run the following: $ grep 'autorun-never' /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/* If properly configured, the output for autorun-never should be /org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/autorun-never Is it the case that GNOME autorun is not disabled? Verify the nodev option is configured for the /var/tmp mount point, run the following command: $ sudo mount | grep '\s/var/tmp\s' . . . /var/tmp . . . nodev . . . Is it the case that the "/var/tmp" file system does not have the "nodev" option set? The owner of all log files written by rsyslog should be root. These log files are determined by the second part of each Rule line in /etc/rsyslog.conf and typically all appear in /var/log. To see the owner of a given log file, run the following command: $ ls -l LOGFILE Is it the case that the owner is not correct? Inspect the form of default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system in /etc/default/grub. If it includes l1tf=, then the parameter will be configured for newly installed kernels. First check if the GRUB recovery is enabled: $ sudo grep 'GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY' /etc/default/grub If this option is set to true, then check that a line is output by the following command: $ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT.*l1tf=.*' /etc/default/grub If the recovery is disabled, check the line with $ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX.*l1tf=.*' /etc/default/grub.Moreover, command line parameters for currently installed kernels should be checked as well. Run the following command: $ sudo grubby --info=ALL | grep args | grep -v 'l1tf=' The command should not return any output. Is it the case that l1tf mitigations are not configured appropriately? To determine if the system is configured to audit successful calls to the ftruncate system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "ftruncate" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Run the following command to determine if the samba_run_unconfined SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool samba_run_unconfined If properly configured, the output should show the following: samba_run_unconfined --> off Is it the case that samba_run_unconfined is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the zoneminder_anon_write SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool zoneminder_anon_write If properly configured, the output should show the following: zoneminder_anon_write --> off Is it the case that zoneminder_anon_write is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the mailman_use_fusefs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool mailman_use_fusefs If properly configured, the output should show the following: mailman_use_fusefs --> off Is it the case that mailman_use_fusefs is not disabled? To verify that smart cards are enabled in SSSD, run the following command: $ sudo grep pam_cert_auth /etc/sssd/sssd.conf If configured properly, output should be pam_cert_auth = True To verify that smart cards are enabled in PAM files, run the following command: $ sudo grep -e "auth.*pam_sss\.so.*\(allow_missing_name\|try_cert_auth\)" /etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth /etc/pam.d/system-auth If configured properly, output should be /etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth:auth sufficient pam_sss.so allow_missing_name /etc/pam.d/system-auth:auth [success=done authinfo_unavail=ignore ignore=ignore default=die] pam_sss.so try_cert_auth Is it the case that smart cards are not enabled in SSSD? Run the following command to determine if the kdumpgui_run_bootloader SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool kdumpgui_run_bootloader If properly configured, the output should show the following: kdumpgui_run_bootloader --> off Is it the case that kdumpgui_run_bootloader is not disabled? To ensure the X Windows package group is removed, run the following command: $ rpm -qi xorg-x11-server-common The output should be: package xorg-x11-server-common is not installed Is it the case that the X Windows package group or xorg-x11-server-common has not be removed? Run the following command to determine if the xdm_bind_vnc_tcp_port SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool xdm_bind_vnc_tcp_port If properly configured, the output should show the following: xdm_bind_vnc_tcp_port --> off Is it the case that xdm_bind_vnc_tcp_port is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the ypserv package is installed: $ rpm -q ypserv Is it the case that the package is installed? To verify insecure file locking has been disabled, run the following command: $ grep insecure_locks /etc/exports Is it the case that there is output? To determine if the system is configured to audit successful calls to the renameat system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "renameat" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? The following command will list which files on the system have file hashes different from what is expected by the RPM database. $ rpm -Va --noconfig | awk '$1 ~ /..5/' Is it the case that there is output? To verify if LogLevel is configured correctly in /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf, run the following command: $ grep -i loglevel /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf The command should return the following: LogLevel warn Is it the case that it is not? Verify that a separate file system/partition has been created for /var/tmp with the following command: $ mountpoint /var/tmp Is it the case that "/var/tmp is not a mountpoint" is returned? Verify that the libuser is set to encrypt password with a FIPS 140-2 approved cryptographic hashing algorithm. Check the hashing algorithm that is being used to hash passwords with the following command: $ sudo grep -i crypt_style /etc/libuser.conf crypt_style = sha512 Is it the case that crypt_style is not set to sha512? Verify that the IPSec service uses the system crypto policy. If the ipsec service is not installed is not applicable. Check to see if the "IPsec" service is active with the following command: $ systemctl status ipsec ipsec.service - Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Protocol Daemon for IPsec Loaded: loaded (/usr/lib/systemd/system/ipsec.service; disabled) Active: inactive (dead) If the "IPsec" service is active, check to see if it is using the system crypto policy with the following command: $ sudo grep include /etc/ipsec.conf /etc/ipsec.d/*.conf /etc/ipsec.conf:include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/libreswan.config Is it the case that the "IPsec" service is active and the ipsec configuration file does not contain does not contain <tt>include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/libreswan.config</tt>? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to audit the execution of the "poweroff" command with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep poweroff -a always,exit -F path=/poweroff -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-poweroff Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? Verify "firewalld" is configured to employ a deny-all, allow-by-exception policy for allowing connections to other systems with the following commands: $ sudo firewall-cmd --state running $ sudo firewall-cmd --get-active-zones [custom] interfaces: ens33 $ sudo firewall-cmd --info-zone=[custom] | grep target target: DROP Is it the case that no zones are active on the interfaces or if the target is set to a different option other than "DROP"? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 enforces a -day maximum password lifetime for new user accounts by running the following command: $ grep -i pass_max_days /etc/login.defs PASS_MAX_DAYS Is it the case that the "PASS_MAX_DAYS" parameter value is greater than "<sub idref="var_accounts_maximum_age_login_defs" />", or commented out? Run the following command to determine if the exim_can_connect_db SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool exim_can_connect_db If properly configured, the output should show the following: exim_can_connect_db --> off Is it the case that exim_can_connect_db is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the auditadm_exec_content SELinux boolean is enabled: $ getsebool auditadm_exec_content If properly configured, the output should show the following: auditadm_exec_content --> on Is it the case that auditadm_exec_content is not enabled? To determine if the system is configured to make login UIDs immutable, run one of the following commands. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), run the following: sudo grep immutable /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, run the following command: sudo grep immutable /etc/audit/audit.rules The following line should be returned: --loginuid-immutable Is it the case that the system is not configured to make login UIDs immutable? Run the following command to determine if the mailx package is installed: $ rpm -q mailx Is it the case that the package is not installed? Run the following command to determine if the systemd-journal-remote package is installed: $ rpm -q systemd-journal-remote Is it the case that the package is not installed? To determine if the system is configured to audit successful calls to the creat system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "creat" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Check the system partitions to determine if they are encrypted with the following command: blkid Output will be similar to: /dev/sda1: UUID=" ab12c3de-4f56-789a-8f33-3850cc8ce3a2 " TYPE="crypto_LUKS" /dev/sda2: UUID=" bc98d7ef-6g54-321h-1d24-9870de2ge1a2 " TYPE="crypto_LUKS" The boot partition and pseudo-file systems, such as /proc, /sys, and tmpfs, are not required to use disk encryption and are not a finding. Is it the case that partitions do not have a type of crypto_LUKS? Determine where the audit logs are stored with the following command: $ sudo grep -iw log_file /etc/audit/auditd.conf log_file = /var/log/audit/audit.log Determine the owner of the audit log directory by using the output of the above command (default: "/var/log/audit/"). Run the following command with the correct audit log directory path: $ sudo ls -ld /var/log/audit drwx------ 2 root root 23 Jun 11 11:56 /var/log/audit The audit log directory must be owned by "root" Is it the case that the directory is not owned by root? Run the following command to determine if the zarafa_setrlimit SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool zarafa_setrlimit If properly configured, the output should show the following: zarafa_setrlimit --> off Is it the case that zarafa_setrlimit is not disabled? Verify that rules for unsuccessful calls of the openat syscall are in the order shown below. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "augenrules" program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), check the order of rules below in a file with suffix ".rules" in the directory "/etc/audit/rules.d". If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "auditctl" utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, check the order of rules below in "/etc/audit/audit.rules" file. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access Is it the case that the rules are in a different order? Verify "nftables" is configured to allow rate limits on any connection to the system with the following command: Verify "firewalld" has "nftables" set as the default backend: $ sudo grep -i firewallbackend /etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf # FirewallBackend FirewallBackend=nftables Is it the case that the "nftables" is not set as the "firewallbackend"? Run the following command to determine the current status of the chronyd service: $ sudo systemctl is-active chronyd If the service is running, it should return the following: active Run the following command to determine the current status of the ntpd service: $ sudo systemctl is-active ntpd If the service is running, it should return the following: active Is it the case that ? To verify the audispd's syslog plugin is active, run the following command: $ sudo grep active /etc/audit/plugins.d/syslog.conf If the plugin is active, the output will show yes. Is it the case that it is not activated? Verify the system-wide shared library directories are group-owned by "root" with the following command: $ sudo find /lib /lib64 /usr/lib /usr/lib64 ! -group root -type d -exec stat -c "%n %G" '{}' \; If any system-wide shared library directory is returned and is not group-owned by a required system account, this is a finding. Is it the case that any system-wide shared library directory is returned and is not group-owned by a required system account? Run the following command to determine if the dovecot package is installed: $ rpm -q dovecot Is it the case that the package is installed? To verify if GnuTLS uses defined DoD-approved TLS Crypto Policy, run: $ sudo grep '+VERS-ALL:-VERS-DTLS0.9:-VERS-SSL3.0:-VERS-TLS1.0:-VERS-TLS1.1:-VERS-DTLS1.0' /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/gnutls.config and verify that a match exists. Is it the case that cryptographic policy for gnutls is not configured or is configured incorrectly? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 use the "pam_pwhistory.so" module in the /etc/pam.d/password-auth file and is configured to prohibit password reuse for a minimum of generations. Verify the "/etc/pam.d/password-auth" file with the following command: $ grep pam_pwhistory.so /etc/pam.d/password-auth password pam_pwhistory.so use_authtok remember= Verify the "/etc/security/pwhistory.conf" file using the following command: $ grep remember /etc/security/pwhistory.conf remember = The pam_pwhistory.so "remember" option must be configured only in one file. Is it the case that the pam_pwhistory.so module is not used, the "remember" module option is not set in /etc/pam.d/password-auth or in /etc/security/pwhistory.conf, or is set in both files, or is set with a value less than "<sub idref="var_password_pam_remember" />"? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_dbus_avahi SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_dbus_avahi If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_dbus_avahi --> off Is it the case that httpd_dbus_avahi is not disabled? To ensure the system is configured to ignore the Ctrl-Alt-Del setting, enter the following command: $ sudo grep -i ctrlaltdelburstaction /etc/systemd/system.conf The output should return: CtrlAltDelBurstAction=none Is it the case that the system is configured to reboot when Ctrl-Alt-Del is pressed more than 7 times in 2 seconds.? Inspect the form of default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system in /etc/default/grub. If it includes audit_backlog_limit=8192, then the parameter will be configured for newly installed kernels. First check if the GRUB recovery is enabled: $ sudo grep 'GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY' /etc/default/grub If this option is set to true, then check that a line is output by the following command: $ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT.*audit_backlog_limit=8192.*' /etc/default/grub If the recovery is disabled, check the line with $ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX.*audit_backlog_limit=8192.*' /etc/default/grub.Moreover, command line parameters for currently installed kernels should be checked as well. Run the following command: $ sudo grubby --info=ALL | grep args | grep -v 'audit_backlog_limit=8192' The command should not return any output. Is it the case that audit backlog limit is not configured? Run the following command to determine if the use_nfs_home_dirs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool use_nfs_home_dirs If properly configured, the output should show the following: use_nfs_home_dirs --> off Is it the case that use_nfs_home_dirs is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the virt_sandbox_use_sys_admin SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool virt_sandbox_use_sys_admin If properly configured, the output should show the following: virt_sandbox_use_sys_admin --> off Is it the case that virt_sandbox_use_sys_admin is not disabled? Verify file systems that are used for removable media are mounted with the "nosuid" option with the following command: $ sudo more /etc/fstab UUID=2bc871e4-e2a3-4f29-9ece-3be60c835222 /mnt/usbflash vfat noauto,owner,ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec 0 0 Is it the case that file system found in "/etc/fstab" refers to removable media and it does not have the "nosuid" option set? Run the following command to determine if the mpd_use_nfs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool mpd_use_nfs If properly configured, the output should show the following: mpd_use_nfs --> off Is it the case that mpd_use_nfs is not disabled? Verify the TFTP daemon is configured to operate in secure mode. Check if a TFTP server is installed with the following command: $ rpm -qa | grep tftp If a TFTP server is not installed, this is Not Applicable. If a TFTP server is installed, verify TFTP is configured by with the -s option by running the following command: grep "server_args" /etc/xinetd.d/tftp server_args = -s Is it the case that '"server_args" line does not have a "-s" option, and a subdirectory is not assigned'? Verify the nosuid option is configured for the /boot/efi mount point, run the following command: $ sudo mount | grep '\s/boot/efi\s' . . . /boot/efi . . . nosuid . . . Is it the case that the "/boot/efi" file system does not have the "nosuid" option set? To check that the atd service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled atd Output should indicate the atd service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled atd disabled Run the following command to verify atd is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active atd If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the atd is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show atd | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "atd" is loaded and not masked? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 generates audit records for all account creations, modifications, disabling, and termination events that affect "/etc/security/opasswd" with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep -w -p wa -k logins Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? Inspect /etc/audit/auditd.conf and locate the following line to determine how many logs the system is configured to retain after rotation: $ sudo grep num_logs /etc/audit/auditd.conf num_logs = 5 Is it the case that the system log file retention has not been properly configured? To check that the ypserv service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled ypserv Output should indicate the ypserv service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled ypserv disabled Run the following command to verify ypserv is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active ypserv If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the ypserv is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show ypserv | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "ypserv" is loaded and not masked? To verify the LDAP client backend demands a valid certificate from the server in remote LDAP access sessions, run the following command: $ sudo grep ldap_tls_reqcert /etc/sssd/sssd.conf The output should return the following: ldap_tls_reqcert = demand Is it the case that the TLS reqcert is not set to demand? To verify if ErrorLog is configured correctly in /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf, run the following command: $ grep -i errorlog /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf The output should return the following: ErrorLog "logs/error_log" Is it the case that it is not? To verify that is configured as the smart card driver, run the following command: $ grep force_card_driver /etc/opensc.conf The output should return something similar to: force_card_driver = ; Is it the case that the smart card driver is not configured correctly? Run the following command to determine if the collectd_tcp_network_connect SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool collectd_tcp_network_connect If properly configured, the output should show the following: collectd_tcp_network_connect --> off Is it the case that collectd_tcp_network_connect is not disabled? To determine how the SSH daemon's PermitRootLogin option is set, run the following command: $ sudo grep -i PermitRootLogin /etc/ssh/sshd_config If a line indicating prohibit-password is returned, then the required value is set. Is it the case that it is commented out or not configured properly? Run the following command to determine if the cobbler_anon_write SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool cobbler_anon_write If properly configured, the output should show the following: cobbler_anon_write --> off Is it the case that cobbler_anon_write is not disabled? Verify it by running the following command: $ stat -c "%n %G" /sbin/auditctl /sbin/aureport /sbin/ausearch /sbin/autrace /sbin/auditd /sbin/audispd /sbin/augenrules /sbin/auditctl root /sbin/aureport root /sbin/ausearch root /sbin/autrace root /sbin/auditd root /sbin/audispd root /sbin/augenrules root If the command does not return all the above lines, the missing ones need to be added. Run the following command to correct the permissions of the missing entries: $ sudo chown :root [audit_tool] Replace "[audit_tool]" with each audit tool not group-owned by root. Is it the case that ? To determine if the system is configured to audit successful calls to the fremovexattr system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "fremovexattr" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_can_network_connect_db SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_can_network_connect_db If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_can_network_connect_db --> off Is it the case that httpd_can_network_connect_db is not disabled? The runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref 0. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? Inspect the system to determine if intrusion detection software has been installed. Verify this intrusion detection software is active. Is it the case that no host-based intrusion detection tools are installed? Verify the nosuid option is configured for the /var/tmp mount point, run the following command: $ sudo mount | grep '\s/var/tmp\s' . . . /var/tmp . . . nosuid . . . Is it the case that the "/var/tmp" file system does not have the "nosuid" option set? To check the permissions of /etc/passwd, run the command: $ ls -l /etc/passwd If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: -rw-r--r-- Is it the case that /etc/passwd does not have unix mode -rw-r--r--? Check whether the maximum time period for existing passwords is restricted to days with the following commands: $ sudo awk -F: '$5 > 60 {print $1 " " $5}' /etc/shadow $ sudo awk -F: '$5 <= 0 {print $1 " " $5}' /etc/shadow Is it the case that any results are returned that are not associated with a system account? To determine if requiretty has been configured for sudo, run the following command: $ sudo grep -ri "^[\s]*Defaults.*\brequiretty\b.*" /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/ The command should return a matching output. Is it the case that requiretty is not enabled in sudo? Verify the noauto option is configured for the /boot mount point, run the following command: $ sudo mount | grep '\s/boot\s' . . . /boot . . . noauto . . . Is it the case that the "/boot" file system does not have the "noauto" option set? Run the following command to determine if the conman_can_network SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool conman_can_network If properly configured, the output should show the following: conman_can_network --> off Is it the case that conman_can_network is not disabled? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 takes the appropriate action when the audit storage volume is full. Check that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 takes the appropriate action when the audit storage volume is full with the following command: $ sudo grep disk_full_action /etc/audit/auditd.conf disk_full_action = If the value of the "disk_full_action" option is not "SYSLOG", "SINGLE", or "HALT", or the line is commented out, ask the system administrator to indicate how the system takes appropriate action when an audit storage volume is full. Is it the case that there is no evidence of appropriate action? To check the permissions of /etc/shells, run the command: $ ls -l /etc/shells If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: 0644 Is it the case that /etc/shells does not have unix mode 0644? To verify that McAfee Runtime Libraries (MFErt) and Linux Agent (MFEcma) are installed, run the following command(s): $ rpm -q MFEcma $ rpm -q MFErt Is it the case that the HBSS HIPS module is not installed? The runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr 0. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? Verify that rules for unsuccessful calls of the open_by_handle_at syscall are in the order shown below. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "augenrules" program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), check the order of rules below in a file with suffix ".rules" in the directory "/etc/audit/rules.d". If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "auditctl" utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, check the order of rules below in "/etc/audit/audit.rules" file. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access Is it the case that the rules are in a different order? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? Run the following command to determine if the bind package is installed: $ rpm -q bind Is it the case that the package is installed? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 generates audit records for all account creations, modifications, disabling, and termination events that affect "/etc/gshadow" with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep -E '(/etc/gshadow)' -w /etc/gshadow -p wa -k identity If the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out, this is a finding. Is it the case that the system is not configured to audit account changes? Run the following command to determine if the smartmon_3ware SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool smartmon_3ware If properly configured, the output should show the following: smartmon_3ware --> off Is it the case that smartmon_3ware is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the net-snmp package is installed: $ rpm -q net-snmp Is it the case that the package is installed? Run the following command to determine if the cron_userdomain_transition SELinux boolean is enabled: $ getsebool cron_userdomain_transition If properly configured, the output should show the following: cron_userdomain_transition --> on Is it the case that cron_userdomain_transition is not enabled? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_NO_SANITY /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? Verify the noexec option is configured for the /var/log/audit mount point, run the following command: $ sudo mount | grep '\s/var/log/audit\s' . . . /var/log/audit . . . noexec . . . Is it the case that the "/var/log/audit" file system does not have the "noexec" option set? Make sure that the kernel is not disabling SMEP with the following commands. grep -q nosmep /boot/config-`uname -r` If the command returns a line, it means that SMEP is being disabled. Is it the case that the kernel is configured to disable SMEP? Verify that yum verifies the signature of packages from a repository prior to install with the following command: $ grep gpgcheck /etc/yum.conf gpgcheck=1 If "gpgcheck" is not set to "1", or if the option is missing or commented out, ask the System Administrator how the certificates for patches and other operating system components are verified. Is it the case that there is no process to validate certificates that is approved by the organization? Verify the audit tools are protected from unauthorized access, deletion, or modification by checking the permissive mode. Check the octal permission of each audit tool by running the following command: $ sudo stat -c "%U %n" /sbin/auditctl /sbin/aureport /sbin/ausearch /sbin/autrace /sbin/auditd /sbin/rsyslogd /sbin/augenrules Is it the case that any of these files have more permissive permissions than 0755? The ypbind package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase ypbind Is it the case that ? To verify the system is not configured to use a boot loader on removable media, check that the grub configuration file has the set root command in each menu entry with the following commands: $ sudo grep -cw menuentry /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg Note that the -c option for the grep command will print only the count of menuentry occurrences. This number should match the number of occurrences reported by the following command: $ sudo grep "set root='hd0" /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg The output should return something similar to: set root='hd0,msdos1' usb0, cd, fd0, etc. are some examples of removeable media which should not exist in the lines: set root='hd0,msdos1' Is it the case that it is not? To check the ownership of /etc/ssh/*_key, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/ssh/*_key If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: root Is it the case that /etc/ssh/*_key does not have an owner of root? Make sure that the kernel is not disabling SMAP with the following commands. grep -q nosmap /boot/config-`uname -r` If the command returns a line, it means that SMAP is being disabled. Is it the case that the kernel is configured to disable SMAP? To check that the kdump service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled kdump Output should indicate the kdump service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled kdump disabled Run the following command to verify kdump is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active kdump If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the kdump is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show kdump | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "kdump" is loaded and not masked? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_builtin_scripting SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_builtin_scripting If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_builtin_scripting --> off Is it the case that httpd_builtin_scripting is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_can_connect_ftp SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_can_connect_ftp If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_can_connect_ftp --> off Is it the case that httpd_can_connect_ftp is not disabled? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to audit the execution of the "newgrp" command with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep newgrp -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newgrp -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-newgrp Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? To check the ownership of /etc/cron.d, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/cron.d If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: root Is it the case that /etc/cron.d does not have an owner of root? Run the following command to determine if the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap If properly configured, the output should show the following: authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap --> off Is it the case that authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the prosody_bind_http_port SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool prosody_bind_http_port If properly configured, the output should show the following: prosody_bind_http_port --> off Is it the case that prosody_bind_http_port is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the cluster_manage_all_files SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool cluster_manage_all_files If properly configured, the output should show the following: cluster_manage_all_files --> off Is it the case that cluster_manage_all_files is not disabled? Verify the value of the "difok" option in "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" with the following command: $ sudo grep difok /etc/security/pwquality.conf difok = Is it the case that the value of "difok" is set to less than "<sub idref="var_password_pam_difok" />", or is commented out? To check the ownership of /etc/cron.weekly, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/cron.weekly If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: root Is it the case that /etc/cron.weekly does not have an owner of root? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? To ensure that system location tracking is not active, run the following command: $ gsettings get org.gnome.system.location enabled $ gsettings get org.gnome.clocks geolocation If properly configured, the output should be false. To ensure that users cannot enable system location tracking, run the following: $ grep location /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/* If properly configured, the output should be /org/gnome/system/location/enabled and /org/gnome/clocks/geolocation. Is it the case that geolocation is enabled and not disabled? Verify that temporary accounts have been provisioned with an expiration date of 72 hours. For every temporary account, run the following command to obtain its account aging and expiration information: $ sudo chage -l temporary_account_name Verify each of these accounts has an expiration date set within 72 hours or as documented. Is it the case that any temporary accounts have no expiration date set or do not expire within 72 hours? Run the following command to determine if the nss-tools package is installed: $ rpm -q nss-tools Is it the case that the package is not installed? Run the following command to determine if the ssh_keysign SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool ssh_keysign If properly configured, the output should show the following: ssh_keysign --> off Is it the case that ssh_keysign is not disabled? To check the permissions of /etc/gshadow, run the command: $ ls -l /etc/gshadow If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: ---------- Is it the case that /etc/gshadow does not have unix mode ----------? To verify that the Audit is correctly configured according to recommended rules, check the content of the file with the following command: cat /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-1-create-failed.rules The output has to be exactly as follows: ## Unsuccessful file creation (open with O_CREAT) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create Is it the case that the file does not exist or the content differs? To check that the snmpd service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled snmpd Output should indicate the snmpd service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled snmpd disabled Run the following command to verify snmpd is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active snmpd If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the snmpd is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show snmpd | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "snmpd" is loaded and not masked? To obtain a listing of all users, their UIDs, and their shells, run the command: $ awk -F: '{print $1 ":" $3 ":" $7}' /etc/passwd Identify the system accounts from this listing. These will primarily be the accounts with UID numbers less than 1000, other than root. Is it the case that any system account other than root has a login shell? To determine if the users are allowed to run commands as root, run the following commands: $ sudo grep -PR '^\s*((?!root\b)[\w]+)\s*(\w+)\s*=\s*(.*,)?\s*[^\(\s]' /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/ and $ sudo grep -PR '^\s*((?!root\b)[\w]+)\s*(\w+)\s*=\s*(.*,)?\s*\([\w\s]*\b(root|ALL)\b[\w\s]*\)' /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/ Both commands should return no output. Is it the case that /etc/sudoers file contains rules that allow non-root users to run commands as root? Run the following command to determine if the cron_can_relabel SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool cron_can_relabel If properly configured, the output should show the following: cron_can_relabel --> off Is it the case that cron_can_relabel is not disabled? Only strong KEX algorithms should be used. To verify that only strong KexAlgorithms are in use, run the following command: $ sudo grep -i kexalgorithms /etc/ssh/sshd_config The output should contain only those KexAlgorithms which are strong, namely, Is it the case that KexAlgorithms option is commented out or not using strong hash algorithms? To check the permissions of /etc/gshadow-, run the command: $ ls -l /etc/gshadow- If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: ---------- Is it the case that /etc/gshadow- does not have unix mode ----------? Run the following command to determine if the git_cgi_enable_homedirs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool git_cgi_enable_homedirs If properly configured, the output should show the following: git_cgi_enable_homedirs --> off Is it the case that git_cgi_enable_homedirs is not disabled? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to audit the execution of the "pt_chown" command with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep pt_chown -a always,exit -F path=/usr/libexec/pt_chown -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-pt_chown Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 takes action when allocated audit record storage volume reaches 95 percent of the repository maximum audit record storage capacity with the following command: $ sudo grep -w admin_space_left /etc/audit/auditd.conf admin_space_left = % If the value of the "admin_space_left" keyword is not set to % of the storage volume allocated to audit logs, or if the line is commented out, ask the System Administrator to indicate how the system is taking action if the allocated storage is about to reach capacity. Is it the case that the "admin_space_left" value is not configured to the correct value? To verify that McAfee VirusScan Enterprise for Linux is installed and running, run the following command(s): $ sudo systemctl status nails $ rpm -q McAfeeVSEForLinux Is it the case that virus scanning software is not installed or running? Verify the audit log directories have a correct mode or less permissive mode. Find the location of the audit logs: $ sudo grep "^log_file" /etc/audit/auditd.conf Run the following command to check the mode of the system audit logs: $ sudo stat -c "%a %n" [audit_log_directory] Replace "[audit_log_directory]" to the correct audit log directory path, by default this location is "/var/log/audit". The correct permissions are 0700 Is it the case that audit logs have a more permissive mode? Run the following command to determine if the gitosis_can_sendmail SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool gitosis_can_sendmail If properly configured, the output should show the following: gitosis_can_sendmail --> off Is it the case that gitosis_can_sendmail is not disabled? To verify that USB hubs will be authorized by the USBGuard daemon, run the following command: $ sudo grep allow /etc/usbguard/rules.conf One of the output lines should be allow with-interface match-all { 09:00:* } Is it the case that USB devices of class 9 are not authorized? To verify that the Dracut FIPS module is enabled, run the following command: grep "add_dracutmodules" /etc/dracut.conf.d/40-fips.conf The output should look like this: add_dracutmodules+=" fips " Is it the case that the Dracut FIPS module is not enabled? The runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects 0. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? Run the following command to determine if the virt_use_usb SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool virt_use_usb If properly configured, the output should show the following: virt_use_usb --> off Is it the case that virt_use_usb is not disabled? If the system is configured to prevent the loading of the firewire-core kernel module, it will contain lines inside any file in /etc/modprobe.d or the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf. These lines instruct the module loading system to run another program (such as /bin/true) upon a module install event. These lines can also instruct the module loading system to ignore the firewire-core kernel module via blacklist keyword. Run the following command to search for such lines in all files in /etc/modprobe.d and the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf: $ grep -r firewire-core /etc/modprobe.conf /etc/modprobe.d Is it the case that no line is returned? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to audit the execution of the "postdrop" command with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep postdrop -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/postdrop -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-postdrop Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? Run the following command to determine if the xserver_clients_write_xshm SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool xserver_clients_write_xshm If properly configured, the output should show the following: xserver_clients_write_xshm --> off Is it the case that xserver_clients_write_xshm is not disabled? To verify that FIPS mode is enabled properly, run the following command: fips-mode-setup --check The output should contain the following: FIPS mode is enabled. To verify that the cryptographic policy has been configured correctly, run the following command: $ update-crypto-policies --show The output should return . Is it the case that FIPS mode is not enabled? Run the following command to determine if the xdm_write_home SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool xdm_write_home If properly configured, the output should show the following: xdm_write_home --> off Is it the case that xdm_write_home is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the nis_enabled SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool nis_enabled If properly configured, the output should show the following: nis_enabled --> off Is it the case that nis_enabled is not disabled? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? Run the following command to determine if the libpwquality package is installed: $ rpm -q libpwquality Is it the case that the package is not installed? Run the following command to determine if the condor_tcp_network_connect SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool condor_tcp_network_connect If properly configured, the output should show the following: condor_tcp_network_connect --> off Is it the case that condor_tcp_network_connect is not disabled? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the open system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "open" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? To determine if the system is configured to audit changes to its SELinux configuration files, run the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep "dir=/etc/selinux" If the system is configured to watch for changes to its SELinux configuration, a line should be returned (including perm=wa indicating permissions that are watched). Is it the case that the system is not configured to audit attempts to change the MAC policy? To ensure disable and restart on the login screen are disabled, run the following command: $ grep disable-restart-buttons /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/* The output should be true. To ensure that users cannot enable disable and restart on the login screen, run the following: $ grep disable-restart-buttons /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/* If properly configured, the output should be /org/gnome/login-screen/disable-restart-buttons Is it the case that disable-restart-buttons has not been configured or is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the login_console_enabled SELinux boolean is enabled: $ getsebool login_console_enabled If properly configured, the output should show the following: login_console_enabled --> on Is it the case that login_console_enabled is not enabled? To check if UsePrivilegeSeparation is enabled or set correctly, run the following command: $ sudo grep UsePrivilegeSeparation /etc/ssh/sshd_config If configured properly, output should be . Is it the case that it is commented out or is not enabled? Run the following command to determine if the cluster_can_network_connect SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool cluster_can_network_connect If properly configured, the output should show the following: cluster_can_network_connect --> off Is it the case that cluster_can_network_connect is not disabled? Verify the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 "fapolicyd" employs a deny-all, permit-by-exception policy. Check that "fapolicyd" is in enforcement mode with the following command: $ sudo grep permissive /etc/fapolicyd/fapolicyd.conf permissive = 0 Check that fapolicyd employs a deny-all policy on system mounts with the following commands: For RHEL 8.5 systems and older: $ sudo tail /etc/fapolicyd/fapolicyd.rules For RHEL 8.6 systems and newer: $ sudo tail /etc/fapolicyd/compiled.rules allow exe=/usr/bin/python3.7 : ftype=text/x-python deny_audit perm=any pattern=ld_so : all deny perm=any all : all Is it the case that fapolicyd is not running in enforcement mode with a deny-all, permit-by-exception policy? Ensure that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 verifies correct operation of security functions. Check if "SELinux" is active and in "" mode with the following command: $ sudo getenforce Is it the case that SELINUX is not set to enforcing? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 enforces 24 hours/1 day as the minimum password lifetime for new user accounts. Check for the value of "PASS_MIN_DAYS" in "/etc/login.defs" with the following command: $ grep -i pass_min_days /etc/login.defs PASS_MIN_DAYS Is it the case that the "PASS_MIN_DAYS" parameter value is not "<sub idref="var_accounts_minimum_age_login_defs" />" or greater, or is commented out? Run the following command to determine if the unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition SELinux boolean is enabled: $ getsebool unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition If properly configured, the output should show the following: unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition --> on Is it the case that unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition is not enabled? To verify if the mod_perl is installed, run the following command: $ rpm -qa | grep mod_perl If the mod_perl module is installed, verify that PerlSwitches -T is enabled in /etc/httpd/conf.d/perl.conf by running the following command: $ grep -i "PerlSwitches -T" /etc/httpd/conf.d/perl.conf The output should return uncommented: PerlSwitches -T Is it the case that it is not? Inspect /etc/login.defs and ensure that if eihter SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS or SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS are set, they must have the minimum value of 5000. Is it the case that it does not? Run the following command to determine if the scap-security-guide package is installed: $ rpm -q scap-security-guide Is it the case that the package is not installed? To check the group ownership of /etc/group-, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/group- If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: root Is it the case that /etc/group- does not have a group owner of root? To determine if NOPASSWD has been configured for sudo, run the following command: $ sudo grep -ri nopasswd /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/ The command should return no output. Is it the case that nopasswd is specified in the sudo config files? Verify the noexec option is configured for the /home mount point, run the following command: $ sudo mount | grep '\s/home\s' . . . /home . . . noexec . . . Is it the case that the "/home" file system does not have the "noexec" option set? To check that the qpidd service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled qpidd Output should indicate the qpidd service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled qpidd disabled Run the following command to verify qpidd is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active qpidd If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the qpidd is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show qpidd | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "qpidd" is loaded and not masked? To check the group ownership of /etc/shadow-, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/shadow- If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: root Is it the case that /etc/shadow- does not have a group owner of root? To verify the local initialization files of all local interactive users are group- owned by the appropriate user, inspect the primary group of the respective users in /etc/passwd and verify all initialization files under the respective users home directory. Check the group owner of all local interactive users initialization files. Is it the case that they are not? Run the following command to ensure that /tmp is configured as a polyinstantiated directory: $ sudo grep /tmp /etc/security/namespace.conf The output should return the following: /tmp /tmp/tmp-inst/ level root,adm Is it the case that is not configured? Inspect the form of default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system in /etc/default/grub. If it includes page_poison=1, then the parameter will be configured for newly installed kernels. First check if the GRUB recovery is enabled: $ sudo grep 'GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY' /etc/default/grub If this option is set to true, then check that a line is output by the following command: $ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT.*page_poison=1.*' /etc/default/grub If the recovery is disabled, check the line with $ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX.*page_poison=1.*' /etc/default/grub.Moreover, command line parameters for currently installed kernels should be checked as well. Run the following command: $ sudo grubby --info=ALL | grep args | grep -v 'page_poison=1' The command should not return any output. Is it the case that page allocator poisoning is not enabled? To check that the cpupower service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled cpupower Output should indicate the cpupower service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled cpupower disabled Run the following command to verify cpupower is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active cpupower If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the cpupower is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show cpupower | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "cpupower" is loaded and not masked? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the rmdir system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "rmdir" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the unlink system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "unlink" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the unlinkat system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "unlinkat" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the rename system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "rename" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the renameat system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "renameat" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Run the following command to determine if the exim_read_user_files SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool exim_read_user_files If properly configured, the output should show the following: exim_read_user_files --> off Is it the case that exim_read_user_files is not disabled? To verify the sec option is configured for all NFS mounts, run the following command: $ grep "sec=" /etc/exports All configured NFS exports should show the sec=krb5:krb5i:krb5p setting in parentheses. This is not applicable if NFS is not implemented. Is it the case that the setting is not configured, has the 'sys' option added, or does not have all Kerberos options added? The runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects 0. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? The runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr 0. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? To verify that the Audit is correctly configured according to recommended rules, check the content of the file with the following command: cat /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-failed.rules The output has to be exactly as follows: ## Unsuccessful ownership change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change Is it the case that the file does not exist or the content differs? Verify the nodev option is configured for the /tmp mount point, run the following command: $ sudo mount | grep '\s/tmp\s' . . . /tmp . . . nodev . . . Is it the case that the "/tmp" file system does not have the "nodev" option set? Interview the SA or web administrator to see where the public web server is logically located in the data center. Review the site network diagram to see how the web server is connected to the LAN. Visually check the web server hardware connections to see if it conforms to the site network diagram. Is it the case that the web server is not isolated in an accredited DoD DMZ Extension? Run the following command to determine if the opensc package is installed: $ rpm -q opensc Is it the case that the package is not installed? To determine if the system is configured to audit successful calls to the open_by_handle_at system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "open_by_handle_at" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Run the following command to determine if the mcelog_server SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool mcelog_server If properly configured, the output should show the following: mcelog_server --> off Is it the case that mcelog_server is not disabled? Run the following command to see if there are some keytabs that would potentially allow the use of Kerberos by system daemons. $ ls -la /etc/*.keytab The expected result is ls: cannot access '/etc/*.keytab': No such file or directory Is it the case that a keytab file is present on the system? Make sure that the kernel is configured to trust the CPU RNG by following commands. To check if the option was correctly configured at kernel compile time, run the following command: grep -q CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU=y /boot/config-`uname -r` If the command outputs: CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU=y, it means that the option is compiled into the kernel. Make sure that the option is not overridden through a boot parameter: sudo grep 'kernelopts.*random\.trust_cpu=off.*' /boot/grub2/grubenv The command should not return any output. If the option is not compiled into the kernel, check that the option is configured through boot parameter. Inspect the form of default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system in /etc/default/grub. If it includes random.trust_cpu=on, then the parameter will be configured for newly installed kernels. First check if the GRUB recovery is enabled: $ sudo grep 'GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY' /etc/default/grub If this option is set to true, then check that a line is output by the following command: $ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT.*random.trust_cpu=on.*' /etc/default/grub If the recovery is disabled, check the line with $ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX.*random.trust_cpu=on.*' /etc/default/grub.Moreover, command line parameters for currently installed kernels should be checked as well. Run the following command: $ sudo grubby --info=ALL | grep args | grep -v 'random.trust_cpu=on' The command should not return any output. Is it the case that the kernel is not configured to trust the CPU RNG? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 initiates a session lock after 15 minutes of inactivity. Check the value of the system inactivity timeout with the following command: $ grep -i lock-after-time /etc/tmux.conf set -g lock-after-time 900 Then, verify that the /etc/tmux.conf file can be read by other users than root: $ sudo ls -al /etc/tmux.conf Is it the case that "lock-after-time" is not set to "900" or less in the global tmux configuration file to enforce session lock after inactivity? To ensure that remote access requires credentials, run the following command: $ gsettings get org.gnome.Vino authentication-methods If properly configured, the output should be false. To ensure that users cannot disable credentials for remote access, run the following: $ grep authentication-methods /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/* If properly configured, the output should be /org/gnome/Vino/authentication-methods Is it the case that wireless network notification is enabled and not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the logging_syslogd_use_tty SELinux boolean is enabled: $ getsebool logging_syslogd_use_tty If properly configured, the output should show the following: logging_syslogd_use_tty --> on Is it the case that logging_syslogd_use_tty is not enabled? The runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo 0. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? To determine if the system is configured to audit successful calls to the fchown system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "fchown" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? If the system is configured to prevent the loading of the tipc kernel module, it will contain lines inside any file in /etc/modprobe.d or the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf. These lines instruct the module loading system to run another program (such as /bin/true) upon a module install event. These lines can also instruct the module loading system to ignore the tipc kernel module via blacklist keyword. Run the following command to search for such lines in all files in /etc/modprobe.d and the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf: $ grep -r tipc /etc/modprobe.conf /etc/modprobe.d Is it the case that no line is returned? Run the following command to determine if the tmpreaper_use_nfs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool tmpreaper_use_nfs If properly configured, the output should show the following: tmpreaper_use_nfs --> off Is it the case that tmpreaper_use_nfs is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the sssd-ipa package is installed: $ rpm -q sssd-ipa Is it the case that the package is not installed? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_KEXEC /boot/config.* Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no lines should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? Verify that rules for unsuccessful calls of the open syscall are in the order shown below. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "augenrules" program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), check the order of rules below in a file with suffix ".rules" in the directory "/etc/audit/rules.d". If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "auditctl" utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, check the order of rules below in "/etc/audit/audit.rules" file. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-access Is it the case that the rules are in a different order? The runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations 0. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? Verify the system-wide shared library directories are owned by "root" with the following command: $ sudo find /lib /lib64 /usr/lib /usr/lib64 ! -user root -type d -exec stat -c "%n %U" '{}' \; Is it the case that any system-wide shared library directory is not owned by root? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the fchmod system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "fchmod" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_enable_homedirs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_enable_homedirs If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_enable_homedirs --> off Is it the case that httpd_enable_homedirs is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the selinuxuser_direct_dri_enabled SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool selinuxuser_direct_dri_enabled If properly configured, the output should show the following: selinuxuser_direct_dri_enabled --> off Is it the case that selinuxuser_direct_dri_enabled is not disabled? To check which SSH protocol version is allowed, check version of openssh-server with following command: $ rpm -qi openssh-server | grep Version Versions equal to or higher than 7.4 only allow Protocol 2. If version is lower than 7.4, run the following command to check configuration: $ sudo grep Protocol /etc/ssh/sshd_config If configured properly, output should be Protocol 2 Is it the case that it is commented out or is not set correctly to Protocol 2? To determine if the system is configured to audit successful calls to the setxattr system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "setxattr" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Verify the system commands contained in the following directories are group-owned by "root", or a required system account, with the following command: $ sudo find -L /bin /sbin /usr/bin /usr/sbin /usr/local/bin /usr/local/sbin ! -group root -exec ls -l {} \; Is it the case that any system commands are returned and is not group-owned by a required system account? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to audit the execution of the "chsh" command with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep chsh -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chsh -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-chsh Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_can_connect_mythtv SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_can_connect_mythtv If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_can_connect_mythtv --> off Is it the case that httpd_can_connect_mythtv is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the logrotate package is installed: $ rpm -q logrotate Is it the case that the package is not installed? To determine if the system is configured to audit successful calls to the lsetxattr system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "lsetxattr" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Verify the grpquota option is configured for the /home mount point, run the following command: $ sudo mount | grep '\s/home\s' . . . /home . . . grpquota . . . Is it the case that the "/home" file system does not have the "grpquota" option set? To ensure the gdm package group is removed, run the following command: $ rpm -qi gdm The output should be: package gdm is not installed Is it the case that gdm has not been removed? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_read_user_content SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_read_user_content If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_read_user_content --> off Is it the case that httpd_read_user_content is not disabled? The file /etc/cron.allow should exist. This can be checked by running the following command: stat /etc/cron.allow and the output should list the file. Is it the case that the file /etc/cron.allow does not exist? Run the following command to determine if the nginx package is installed: $ rpm -q nginx Is it the case that the package is installed? Verify the operating system routinely checks the baseline configuration for unauthorized changes. To determine that periodic AIDE execution has been scheduled, run the following command: $ grep aide /etc/crontab The output should return something similar to the following: 05 4 * * * root /usr/sbin/aide --check NOTE: The usage of special cron times, such as @daily or @weekly, is acceptable. Is it the case that AIDE is not configured to scan periodically? To check the group ownership of /etc/issue, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/issue If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: root Is it the case that /etc/issue does not have a group owner of root? Run the following command to determine if the iptables-services package is installed: $ rpm -q iptables-services Is it the case that the iptables-services package is installed? Run the following command to determine if the logging_syslogd_can_sendmail SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool logging_syslogd_can_sendmail If properly configured, the output should show the following: logging_syslogd_can_sendmail --> off Is it the case that logging_syslogd_can_sendmail is not disabled? To ensure that users cannot change how long until the screensaver locks, run the following: $ grep lock-enabled /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/* If properly configured, the output for lock-enabled should be /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled Is it the case that screensaver locking is not locked? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_can_network_relay SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_can_network_relay If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_can_network_relay --> off Is it the case that httpd_can_network_relay is not disabled? To check the screensaver mandatory use status, run the following command: $ gsettings get org.gnome.desktop.screensaver idle-activation-enabled If properly configured, the output should be true. To ensure that users cannot disable the screensaver idle inactivity setting, run the following: $ grep idle-activation-enabled /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/* If properly configured, the output should be /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/idle-activation-enabled Is it the case that idle-activation-enabled is not enabled or configured? The runtime status of the kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate 1. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the settimeofday system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "settimeofday" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? To determine if the system is configured to audit accesses to /var/log/audit directory, run the following command: $ sudo grep "dir=/var/log/audit" /etc/audit/audit.rules If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Verify that a separate file system/partition has been created for /opt with the following command: $ mountpoint /opt Is it the case that "/opt is not a mountpoint" is returned? Run the following command to determine if the postgresql_selinux_users_ddl SELinux boolean is enabled: $ getsebool postgresql_selinux_users_ddl If properly configured, the output should show the following: postgresql_selinux_users_ddl --> on Is it the case that postgresql_selinux_users_ddl is not enabled? Verify that sshd isn't configured to ignore the system wide cryptographic policy. Check that the CRYPTO_POLICY variable is not set or is commented out in the /etc/sysconfig/sshd. Run the following command: $ sudo grep CRYPTO_POLICY /etc/sysconfig/sshd Is it the case that the CRYPTO_POLICY variable is set or is not commented out in the /etc/sysconfig/sshd? Run the following command to determine if the xend_run_blktap SELinux boolean is enabled: $ getsebool xend_run_blktap If properly configured, the output should show the following: xend_run_blktap --> on Is it the case that xend_run_blktap is not enabled? To ensure the default password is not set, run the following command: $ sudo grep -v "^#" /etc/snmp/snmpd.conf| grep -E 'public|private' There should be no output. Is it the case that the default SNMP passwords public and private have not been changed or removed? Run the following command to determine the current status of the chronyd service: $ sudo systemctl is-active chronyd If the service is running, it should return the following: active Is it the case that the chronyd process is not running? To check the permissions of /etc/motd, run the command: $ ls -l /etc/motd If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: -rw-r--r-- Is it the case that /etc/motd does not have unix mode -rw-r--r--? To check that all boot entries extend the backlog limit; Check that all boot entries extend the log events queue: sudo grep -L "^options\s+.*\baudit_backlog_limit=8192\b" /boot/loader/entries/*.conf No line should be returned, each line returned is a boot entry that does not extend the log events queue. Is it the case that audit backlog limit is not configured? Run the following command to determine if the virt_transition_userdomain SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool virt_transition_userdomain If properly configured, the output should show the following: virt_transition_userdomain --> off Is it the case that virt_transition_userdomain is not disabled? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT /boot/config.* Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no lines should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? To verify that USB Human Interface Devices and hubs will be authorized by the USBGuard daemon, run the following command: $ sudo grep allow /etc/usbguard/rules.conf The output lines should include allow with-interface match-all { 03:*:* 09:00:* } Is it the case that USB devices of class 3 and 9:00 are not authorized? To determine if the system is configured to audit successful calls to the fsetxattr system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "fsetxattr" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Run the following command to determine if the openssh-server package is installed: $ rpm -q openssh-server Is it the case that the package is not installed? Run the following command to determine if the samba package is installed: $ rpm -q samba Is it the case that the package is installed? To verify the 389-ds-base package is not installed, run the following command: $ rpm -q 389-ds-base The output should show the following: package 389-ds-base is not installed Is it the case that the package is installed? Run the following command to determine if the cobbler_can_network_connect SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool cobbler_can_network_connect If properly configured, the output should show the following: cobbler_can_network_connect --> off Is it the case that cobbler_can_network_connect is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the virt_use_xserver SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool virt_use_xserver If properly configured, the output should show the following: virt_use_xserver --> off Is it the case that virt_use_xserver is not disabled? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 generates an audit record for unsuccessful attempts to create files using the openat system call with O_CREAT flag. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "augenrules" program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), run the following command: $ sudo grep -r openat /etc/audit/rules.d If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "auditctl" utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, run the following command: $ sudo grep openat /etc/audit/audit.rules The output should be the following: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? Check if SSSD allows cached authentications with the following command: $ sudo grep cache_credentials /etc/sssd/sssd.conf cache_credentials = true If "cache_credentials" is set to "false" or is missing no further checks are required. To verify that SSSD expires offline credentials, run the following command: $ sudo grep offline_credentials_expiration /etc/sssd/sssd.conf If configured properly, output should be offline_credentials_expiration = 1 Is it the case that it does not exist or is not configured properly? To determine that AIDE is verifying extended file attributes, run the following command: $ grep xattrs /etc/aide.conf Verify that the xattrs option is added to the correct ruleset. Is it the case that the xattrs option is missing or not added to the correct ruleset? Verify the operating system encrypts audit records off-loaded onto a different system or media from the system being audited with the following commands: $ sudo grep -i '$ActionSendStreamDriverMode' /etc/rsyslog.conf /etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf The output should be: /etc/rsyslog.conf:$ActionSendStreamDriverMode 1 Is it the case that rsyslogd ActionSendStreamDriverMode is not set to 1? To check the ownership of /boot/grub2/user.cfg, run the command: $ ls -lL /boot/grub2/user.cfg If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: root Is it the case that /boot/grub2/user.cfg does not have an owner of root? Run the following command to determine if the secure_mode SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool secure_mode If properly configured, the output should show the following: secure_mode --> off Is it the case that secure_mode is not disabled? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 enforces password complexity by requiring that at least one numeric character be used. Check the value for "dcredit" with the following command: $ sudo grep dcredit /etc/security/pwquality.conf /etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/*.conf /etc/security/pwquality.conf:dcredit = Is it the case that the value of "dcredit" is a positive number or is commented out? Run the following command to determine the current status of the iptables service: $ sudo systemctl is-active iptables If the service is running, it should return the following: active Is it the case that ? To verify that execution of the command is being audited, run the following command: $ sudo grep "path=/usr/sbin/seunshare" /etc/audit/audit.rules /etc/audit/rules.d/* The output should return something similar to: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/seunshare -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged Is it the case that ? Run the following command to determine if the xguest_exec_content SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool xguest_exec_content If properly configured, the output should show the following: xguest_exec_content --> off Is it the case that xguest_exec_content is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_use_sasl SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_use_sasl If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_use_sasl --> off Is it the case that httpd_use_sasl is not disabled? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the adjtimex system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "adjtimex" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Using a non-privileged account, verify that users cannot modify or change network settings with the nmcli command with the following command: $ nmcli general permissions The output should contain the following: PERMISSION VALUE org.freedesktop.NetworkManager.enable-disable-network auth org.freedesktop.NetworkManager.enable-disable-wifi auth org.freedesktop.NetworkManager.enable-disable-wwan auth org.freedesktop.NetworkManager.enable-disable-wimax auth org.freedesktop.NetworkManager.sleep-wake auth org.freedesktop.NetworkManager.network-control auth org.freedesktop.NetworkManager.wifi.share.protected auth org.freedesktop.NetworkManager.wifi.share.open auth org.freedesktop.NetworkManager.settings.modify.system auth org.freedesktop.NetworkManager.settings.modify.own auth org.freedesktop.NetworkManager.settings.modify.hostname auth org.freedesktop.NetworkManager.settings.modify.global-dns auth org.freedesktop.NetworkManager.reload auth org.freedesktop.NetworkManager.checkpoint-rollback auth org.freedesktop.NetworkManager.enable-disable-statistics auth org.freedesktop.NetworkManager.enable-disable-connectivity-check auth org.freedesktop.NetworkManager.wifi.scan auth Is it the case that non-privileged users can modify or change network settings? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 takes the appropriate action when the audit storage volume is full. Check that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 takes the appropriate action when the audit storage volume is full with the following command: $ sudo grep disk_full_action /etc/audit/auditd.conf disk_full_action = If the value of the "disk_full_action" option is not "SYSLOG", "SINGLE", or "HALT", or the line is commented out, ask the system administrator to indicate how the system takes appropriate action when an audit storage volume is full. Is it the case that there is no evidence of appropriate action? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? Run the following command to determine if the fenced_can_network_connect SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool fenced_can_network_connect If properly configured, the output should show the following: fenced_can_network_connect --> off Is it the case that fenced_can_network_connect is not disabled? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? To check that the rlogin service is disabled in system boot configuration with xinetd, run the following command: $ chkconfig rlogin --list Output should indicate the rlogin service has either not been installed, or has been disabled, as shown in the example below: $ chkconfig rlogin --list Note: This output shows SysV services only and does not include native systemd services. SysV configuration data might be overridden by native systemd configuration. If you want to list systemd services use 'systemctl list-unit-files'. To see services enabled on particular target use 'systemctl list-dependencies [target]'. rlogin off To check that the rlogin socket is disabled in system boot configuration with systemd, run the following command: $ systemctl is-enabled rlogin Output should indicate the rlogin socket has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled rlogindisabled Run the following command to verify rlogin is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active rlogin If the socket is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The socket will also be masked, to check that the rlogin is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show rlogin | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the socket is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that service and/or socket are running? Run the following command to determine the current status of the systemd-journald service: $ sudo systemctl is-active systemd-journald If the service is running, it should return the following: active Is it the case that the systemd-journald service is not running? To determine how the SSH daemon's GSSAPIAuthentication option is set, run the following command: $ sudo grep -i GSSAPIAuthentication /etc/ssh/sshd_config If a line indicating no is returned, then the required value is set. Is it the case that the required value is not set? To ensure TLS is configured with trust certificates, run the following command: $ grep cert /etc/nslcd.conf Is it the case that LDAP is not in use, the line is commented out, or not configured correctly? To check that the bluetooth service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled bluetooth Output should indicate the bluetooth service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled bluetooth disabled Run the following command to verify bluetooth is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active bluetooth If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the bluetooth is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show bluetooth | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "bluetooth" is loaded and not masked? Verify the value of the "maxrepeat" option in "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" with the following command: $ grep maxrepeat /etc/security/pwquality.conf maxrepeat = Is it the case that the value of "maxrepeat" is set to more than "<sub idref="var_password_pam_maxrepeat" />" or is commented out? Shared libraries are stored in the following directories: /lib /lib64 /usr/lib /usr/lib64 To find shared libraries that are group-writable or world-writable, run the following command for each directory DIR which contains shared libraries: $ sudo find -L DIR -perm /022 -type d Is it the case that any of these files are group-writable or world-writable? To check the ownership of /etc/group, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/group If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: root Is it the case that /etc/group does not have an owner of root? Run the following command to determine if the container_connect_any SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool container_connect_any If properly configured, the output should show the following: container_connect_any --> off Is it the case that container_connect_any is not disabled? To ensure the X Windows package group is removed, run the following command: $ rpm -qi xorg-x11-server-Xorg xorg-x11-server-common xorg-x11-server-utils xorg-x11-server-Xwayland For each package mentioned above you should receive following line: package <package> is not installed Is it the case that xorg related packages are not removed and run level is not correctly configured? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 prevents the use of dictionary words for passwords with the following command: $ sudo grep dictcheck /etc/security/pwquality.conf /etc/pwquality.conf.d/*.conf /etc/security/pwquality.conf:dictcheck=1 Is it the case that "dictcheck" does not have a value other than "0", or is commented out? Run the following command to determine if the krb5-server package is installed: $ rpm -q krb5-server Is it the case that the package is installed? Inspect /etc/audit/auditd.conf and locate the following line to determine if the system is configured correctly: space_left SIZE_in_MB Is it the case that the system is not configured a specfic size in MB to notify administrators of an issue? To find SUID files, run the following command: $ sudo find / -xdev -type f -perm -4000 Is it the case that only authorized files appear in the output of the find command? Run the following command to determine if the sysadm_exec_content SELinux boolean is enabled: $ getsebool sysadm_exec_content If properly configured, the output should show the following: sysadm_exec_content --> on Is it the case that sysadm_exec_content is not enabled? Run the following command to determine the current status of the sshd service: $ sudo systemctl is-active sshd If the service is running, it should return the following: active Is it the case that sshd service is disabled? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 disables the chrony daemon from acting as a server with the following command: $ grep -w port /etc/chrony.conf port 0 Is it the case that the "port" option is not set to "0", is commented out, or is missing? Run the following command to determine if the logadm_exec_content SELinux boolean is enabled: $ getsebool logadm_exec_content If properly configured, the output should show the following: logadm_exec_content --> on Is it the case that logadm_exec_content is not enabled? The document, DoDI 8500.01, establishes the policy on the use of DoD information systems. It requires the use of a standard Notice and Consent Banner and standard text to be included in user agreements. The banner should be set to the following: Is it the case that it is not display the required banner? To determine if the system is configured to audit unsuccessful calls to the setxattr system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "setxattr" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Verify that core dumps are disabled for all users, run the following command: $ grep core /etc/security/limits.conf * hard core 0 Is it the case that the "core" item is missing, commented out, or the value is anything other than "0" and the need for core dumps is not documented with the Information System Security Officer (ISSO) as an operational requirement for all domains that have the "core"? If the system is not using TLS, set the ldap_id_use_start_tls option in /etc/sssd/sssd.conf to true. Is it the case that the 'ldap_id_use_start_tls' option is not set to 'true'? Run the following command to determine if the syslog-ng-core package is installed: $ rpm -q syslog-ng-core Is it the case that the package is not installed? To verify if SSLVerifyClient is configured correctly in /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf, run the following command: $ grep -i sslverifyclient /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf The command should return the following: SSLVerifyClient require Is it the case that it is not? Run the following command: # grep ^\$FileCreateMode /etc/rsyslog.conf /etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf Verify the output matches: $FileCreateMode 0640 Should a site policy dictate less restrictive permissions, ensure to follow said policy. Is it the case that $FileCreateMode is not set or is more permissive than 0640? To determine whether yum has been configured to disable gpgcheck for any repos, inspect all files in /etc/yum.repos.d and ensure the following does not appear in any sections: gpgcheck=0 A value of 0 indicates that gpgcheck has been disabled for that repo. Is it the case that GPG checking is disabled? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the unlink system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "unlink" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind --> off Is it the case that httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind is not disabled? If the system is configured to prevent the loading of the cfg80211 kernel module, it will contain lines inside any file in /etc/modprobe.d or the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf. These lines instruct the module loading system to run another program (such as /bin/true) upon a module install event. These lines can also instruct the module loading system to ignore the cfg80211 kernel module via blacklist keyword. Run the following command to search for such lines in all files in /etc/modprobe.d and the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf: $ grep -r cfg80211 /etc/modprobe.conf /etc/modprobe.d Is it the case that no line is returned? Run the following command to determine if the exim_manage_user_files SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool exim_manage_user_files If properly configured, the output should show the following: exim_manage_user_files --> off Is it the case that exim_manage_user_files is not disabled? To determine how the SSH daemon's PrintLastLog option is set, run the following command: $ sudo grep -i PrintLastLog /etc/ssh/sshd_config If a line indicating yes is returned, then the required value is set. Is it the case that the required value is not set? Inspect the form of default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system in /etc/default/grub. If it includes vsyscall=none, then the parameter will be configured for newly installed kernels. First check if the GRUB recovery is enabled: $ sudo grep 'GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY' /etc/default/grub If this option is set to true, then check that a line is output by the following command: $ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT.*vsyscall=none.*' /etc/default/grub If the recovery is disabled, check the line with $ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX.*vsyscall=none.*' /etc/default/grub.Moreover, command line parameters for currently installed kernels should be checked as well. Run the following command: $ sudo grubby --info=ALL | grep args | grep -v 'vsyscall=none' The command should not return any output. Is it the case that vsyscalls are enabled? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_enable_ftp_server SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_enable_ftp_server If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_enable_ftp_server --> off Is it the case that httpd_enable_ftp_server is not disabled? To find world-writable files, run the following command: $ sudo find / -xdev -type f -perm -002 Is it the case that there is output? Run the following command to determine the current status of the rsyslog service: $ sudo systemctl is-active rsyslog If the service is running, it should return the following: active Is it the case that the "rsyslog" service is disabled, masked, or not started.? Run the following command to check the mode of the httpd log directory: $ ls -l /var/log/ | grep httpd Log directory must be mode 0700 or less permissive. Is it the case that it is more permissive? To check that the ntpdate service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled ntpdate Output should indicate the ntpdate service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled ntpdate disabled Run the following command to verify ntpdate is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active ntpdate If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the ntpdate is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show ntpdate | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "ntpdate" is loaded and not masked? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 generates audit records for all account creations, modifications, disabling, and termination events that affect "/etc/sudoers.d/" with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep/etc/sudoers.d -w /etc/sudoers.d/ -p wa -k identity Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? Run the following command to determine if the zoneminder_run_sudo SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool zoneminder_run_sudo If properly configured, the output should show the following: zoneminder_run_sudo --> off Is it the case that zoneminder_run_sudo is not disabled? To determine whether OpenSSL is wrapped by a shell function that ensures that every invocation uses a SP800-90A compliant entropy source, make sure that the /etc/profile.d/openssl-rand.sh file contents exactly match those that are included in the rule's description. Is it the case that there is no <tt>/etc/profile.d/openssl-rand.sh</tt> file, or its contents don't match those in the description? Run the following command to determine if the dbadm_exec_content SELinux boolean is enabled: $ getsebool dbadm_exec_content If properly configured, the output should show the following: dbadm_exec_content --> on Is it the case that dbadm_exec_content is not enabled? Run the following command to determine if the cobbler_use_cifs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool cobbler_use_cifs If properly configured, the output should show the following: cobbler_use_cifs --> off Is it the case that cobbler_use_cifs is not disabled? Ensure that debug-shell service is not enabled with the following command: grep systemd\.debug-shell=1 /boot/grub2/grubenv /etc/default/grub If the command returns a line, it means that debug-shell service is being enabled. Is it the case that the comand returns a line? To verify the nodev option is configured for all NFS mounts, run the following command: $ mount | grep nfs All NFS mounts should show the nodev setting in parentheses. This is not applicable if NFS is not implemented. Is it the case that the setting does not show? To check that the acpid service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled acpid Output should indicate the acpid service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled acpid disabled Run the following command to verify acpid is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active acpid If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the acpid is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show acpid | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "acpid" is loaded and not masked? To verify that Samba clients running smbclient must use packet signing, run the following command: $ grep signing /etc/samba/smb.conf The output should show: client signing = mandatory Is it the case that it is not? Run the following command to determine if the virt_use_rawip SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool virt_use_rawip If properly configured, the output should show the following: virt_use_rawip --> off Is it the case that virt_use_rawip is not disabled? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 enables the user to initiate a session lock with the following command: $ grep lock-command /etc/tmux.conf set -g lock-command vlock Then, verify that the /etc/tmux.conf file can be read by other users than root: $ sudo ls -al /etc/tmux.conf Is it the case that the "lock-command" is not set in the global settings to call "vlock"? Run the following command to determine if the tftp_home_dir SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool tftp_home_dir If properly configured, the output should show the following: tftp_home_dir --> off Is it the case that tftp_home_dir is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the tmpreaper_use_samba SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool tmpreaper_use_samba If properly configured, the output should show the following: tmpreaper_use_samba --> off Is it the case that tmpreaper_use_samba is not disabled? To check that audit is enabled at boot time, check all boot entries with following command: sudo grep -L "^options\s+.*\baudit=1\b" /boot/loader/entries/*.conf No line should be returned, each line returned is a boot entry that doesn't enable audit. Is it the case that auditing is not enabled at boot time? Run the following command to determine if the quagga package is installed: $ rpm -q quagga Is it the case that the package is installed? To verify that Audit Daemon is configured to include local events, run the following command: $ sudo grep local_events /etc/audit/auditd.conf The output should return the following: local_events = yes Is it the case that local_events isn't set to yes? To check the value of the umask, run the following command: $ grep umask /etc/init.d/functions The output should show . Is it the case that it does not? To verify that auditing of privileged command use is configured, run the following command: $ sudo grep usernetctl /etc/audit/audit.rules /etc/audit/rules.d/* It should return a relevant line in the audit rules. Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? To check that the rhnsd service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled rhnsd Output should indicate the rhnsd service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled rhnsd disabled Run the following command to verify rhnsd is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active rhnsd If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the rhnsd is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show rhnsd | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "rhnsd" is loaded and not masked? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to audit the execution of the "su" command with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep su -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/su -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-su Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? Run the following command to determine if the icecast_use_any_tcp_ports SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool icecast_use_any_tcp_ports If properly configured, the output should show the following: icecast_use_any_tcp_ports --> off Is it the case that icecast_use_any_tcp_ports is not disabled? Verify the pam_faillock.so module is present in the "/etc/pam.d/password-auth" file: $ sudo grep pam_faillock.so /etc/pam.d/password-auth auth required pam_faillock.so preauth auth required pam_faillock.so authfail account required pam_faillock.so Is it the case that the pam_faillock.so module is not present in the "/etc/pam.d/password-auth" file with the "preauth" line listed before pam_unix.so? To determine if the system is configured to audit successful calls to the unlinkat system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "unlinkat" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? To verify that clients cannot automatically update DNS records, perform the following: $ grep -i dhcp_hostname /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifcfg-* $ grep -rni "send host-name" /etc/dhclient.conf /etc/dhcp The output should return no results. Is it the case that client Dynamic DNS updates are not disabled? To determine how the SSH daemon's X11Forwarding option is set, run the following command: $ sudo grep -i X11Forwarding /etc/ssh/sshd_config If a line indicating yes is returned, then the required value is set. Is it the case that the required value is not set? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to audit the execution of the "mount" command with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep mount -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/mount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-mount Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? Run the following commands and verify output: # iptables -L INPUT -v -n | grep lo | grep ACCEPT # iptables -L INPUT -v -n | grep 127.0.0.0\/8 | grep DROP # iptables -L OUTPUT -v -n | grep lo | grep ACCEPT Is it the case that loopback traffic is not configured? Run the following command to determine if the mpd_enable_homedirs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool mpd_enable_homedirs If properly configured, the output should show the following: mpd_enable_homedirs --> off Is it the case that mpd_enable_homedirs is not disabled? To verify that timed logins are disabled, run the following command: $ grep -Pzoi "^\[daemon]\\ntimedlogin.*" /etc/gdm/custom.conf The output should show the following: [daemon] TimedLoginEnable=false Is it the case that GDM allows a guest to login without credentials? Run the following command to determine open ports: # ss -6tuln Run the following command to determine firewall rules: # ip6tables -L INPUT -v -n For each port identified in the audit which does not have a firewall rule, add rule for accepting or denying inbound connections # ip6tables -A INPUT -p \ --dport \ -m state --state NEW -j ACCEPT Is it the case that open ports are denied connection? To check the group ownership of /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg, run the command: $ ls -lL /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: root Is it the case that /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg does not have a group owner of root? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to notify the SA and/or ISSO (at a minimum) in the event of an audit processing failure with the following command: $ sudo grep action_mail_acct /etc/audit/auditd.conf action_mail_acct = Is it the case that the value of the "action_mail_acct" keyword is not set to "<sub idref="var_auditd_action_mail_acct" />" and/or other accounts for security personnel, the "action_mail_acct" keyword is missing, or the retuned line is commented out, ask the system administrator to indicate how they and the ISSO are notified of an audit process failure. If there is no evidence of the proper personnel being notified of an audit processing failure? The runtime status of the kernel.modules_disabled kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl kernel.modules_disabled 1. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? Verify that cron is logging to rsyslog, run the following command: grep -rni "cron\.\*" /etc/rsyslog.* cron.* /var/log/cron Is it the case that cron is not logging to rsyslog? Verify the nodev option is configured for the /boot mount point, run the following command: $ sudo mount | grep '\s/boot\s' . . . /boot . . . nodev . . . Is it the case that the "/boot" file system does not have the "nodev" option set? Run the following command to determine if the samba_create_home_dirs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool samba_create_home_dirs If properly configured, the output should show the following: samba_create_home_dirs --> off Is it the case that samba_create_home_dirs is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the xdm_exec_bootloader SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool xdm_exec_bootloader If properly configured, the output should show the following: xdm_exec_bootloader --> off Is it the case that xdm_exec_bootloader is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_use_fusefs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_use_fusefs If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_use_fusefs --> off Is it the case that httpd_use_fusefs is not disabled? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to audit the execution of the "shutdown" command with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep shutdown -a always,exit -F path=/shutdown -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-shutdown Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? To verify the audispd plugin off-loads audit records onto a different system or media from the system being audited, run the following command: $ sudo grep -i remote_server /etc/audit/audisp-remote.conf The output should return something similar to remote_server = Is it the case that audispd is not sending logs to a remote system? Run the following command to determine if the selinuxuser_execmod SELinux boolean is enabled: $ getsebool selinuxuser_execmod If properly configured, the output should show the following: selinuxuser_execmod --> on Is it the case that selinuxuser_execmod is not enabled? The runtime status of the net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range 32768 65535. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? To determine that periodic AIDE execution has been scheduled, run the following command: $ grep aide /etc/crontab The output should return something similar to the following: 05 4 * * * root /usr/sbin/aide --check | /bin/mail -s "$(hostname) - AIDE Integrity Check" root@localhost The email address that the notifications are sent to can be changed by overriding . Is it the case that AIDE has not been configured or has not been configured to notify personnel of scan details? The runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra 0. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? Inspect the form of default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system in /etc/default/grub. If it includes ipv6.disable=1, then the parameter will be configured for newly installed kernels. First check if the GRUB recovery is enabled: $ sudo grep 'GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY' /etc/default/grub If this option is set to true, then check that a line is output by the following command: $ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT.*ipv6.disable=1.*' /etc/default/grub If the recovery is disabled, check the line with $ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX.*ipv6.disable=1.*' /etc/default/grub.Moreover, command line parameters for currently installed kernels should be checked as well. Run the following command: $ sudo grubby --info=ALL | grep args | grep -v 'ipv6.disable=1' The command should not return any output. Is it the case that IPv6 is not disabled? Inspect the form of default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system in /etc/default/grub. If it includes slub_debug=, then the parameter will be configured for newly installed kernels. First check if the GRUB recovery is enabled: $ sudo grep 'GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY' /etc/default/grub If this option is set to true, then check that a line is output by the following command: $ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT.*slub_debug=.*' /etc/default/grub If the recovery is disabled, check the line with $ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX.*slub_debug=.*' /etc/default/grub.Moreover, command line parameters for currently installed kernels should be checked as well. Run the following command: $ sudo grubby --info=ALL | grep args | grep -v 'slub_debug=' The command should not return any output. Is it the case that SLUB/SLAB poisoning is not enabled? The runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter 1. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? Run the following command to determine if the gnutls-utils package is installed: $ rpm -q gnutls-utils Is it the case that the package is not installed? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_LEGACY_PTYS /boot/config.* Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no lines should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the open system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "open" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Run the following command to determine if the abrt_anon_write SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool abrt_anon_write If properly configured, the output should show the following: abrt_anon_write --> off Is it the case that abrt_anon_write is not disabled? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_VMAP_STACK /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? Run the following command to determine if the cdrecord_read_content SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool cdrecord_read_content If properly configured, the output should show the following: cdrecord_read_content --> off Is it the case that cdrecord_read_content is not disabled? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 takes the appropriate action when the audit files have reached maximum size. Check that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 takes the appropriate action when the audit files have reached maximum size with the following command: $ sudo grep max_log_file_action /etc/audit/auditd.conf max_log_file_action = Is it the case that the value of the "max_log_file_action" option is not "ROTATE", "SINGLE", or the line is commented out, ask the system administrator to indicate how the system takes appropriate action when an audit storage volume is full. If there is no evidence of appropriate action? To ensure there are no read-write users, run the following command: $ sudo grep -v "^#" /etc/snmp/snmpd.conf| grep 'rwuser' There should be no output. Is it the case that there are users who can write to SNMP values? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to limit the "pwquality" retry option to . Check for the use of the "pwquality" retry option in the pwquality.conf file with the following command: $ grep retry /etc/security/pwquality.conf Is it the case that the value of "retry" is set to "0" or greater than "<sub idref="var_password_pam_retry" />", or is missing? Run the following command to check if the group exists: grep /etc/group The output should contain the following line: :x: Is it the case that group exists and has no user members? Run the following command to determine if the cvs_read_shadow SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool cvs_read_shadow If properly configured, the output should show the following: cvs_read_shadow --> off Is it the case that cvs_read_shadow is not disabled? Run the following command to see what the max sessions number is: $ sudo grep MaxSessions /etc/ssh/sshd_config If properly configured, the output should be: MaxSessions Is it the case that MaxSessions is not configured or not configured correctly? To verify if the OpenSSH client uses defined Cipher suite in the Crypto Policy, run: $ grep -i ciphers /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config and verify that the line matches: Ciphers Is it the case that Crypto Policy for OpenSSH client is not configured correctly? Run the following command to determine if the irc_use_any_tcp_ports SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool irc_use_any_tcp_ports If properly configured, the output should show the following: irc_use_any_tcp_ports --> off Is it the case that irc_use_any_tcp_ports is not disabled? To verify that the operating system protects against or limits the effects of DoS attacks by ensuring implementation of rate-limiting measures on impacted network interfaces, run the following command: # grep 'net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit' /etc/sysctl.conf /etc/sysctl.d/* The command should output the following line: /etc/sysctl.conf:net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit = The file where the line has been found can differ, but it must be either /etc/sysctl.conf or a file located under the /etc/sysctl.d/ directory. Is it the case that rate limiting of duplicate TCP acknowledgments is not configured? To ensure that the system prevents messages from being shown when three unsuccessful logon attempts occur, run the following command: $ grep silent /etc/security/faillock.conf The output should show silent. Is it the case that the system shows messages when three unsuccessful logon attempts occur? Run the following command to get the current configured value for secure_mode_insmod SELinux boolean: $ getsebool secure_mode_insmod The expected cofiguration is . "on" means true, and "off" means false Is it the case that secure_mode_insmod is not set as expected? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK /boot/config.* Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no lines should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? To verify that packages comprising the available updates will be automatically installed by dnf-automatic, run the following command: $ sudo grep apply_updates /etc/dnf/automatic.conf The output should return the following: apply_updates = yes Is it the case that apply_updates is not set to yes? Run the following command to determine if the git_session_users SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool git_session_users If properly configured, the output should show the following: git_session_users --> off Is it the case that git_session_users is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the virt_use_nfs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool virt_use_nfs If properly configured, the output should show the following: virt_use_nfs --> off Is it the case that virt_use_nfs is not disabled? To verify that audit is configured for OSPP v4.2.1, run the following commands: for file in "10-base-config" "11-loginuid" "30-ospp-v42" "43-module-load";do diff /etc/audit/rules.d/$file.rules /usr/share/doc/audit*/rules/$file.rules; done If the system is configured properly, no lines should be returned. Is it the case that the files are not there or differ? To determine if the system is configured to audit attempts to alter time via the /etc/localtime file, run the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep "watch=/etc/localtime" If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that the system is not configured to audit time changes? Run the following command to determine if the mozilla_read_content SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool mozilla_read_content If properly configured, the output should show the following: mozilla_read_content --> off Is it the case that mozilla_read_content is not disabled? Run the following command to determine the current status of the sssd service: $ sudo systemctl is-active sssd If the service is running, it should return the following: active Is it the case that the service is not enabled? To check the permissions of /boot/grub2/grub.cfg, run the command: $ sudo ls -lL /boot/grub2/grub.cfg If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: -rw------- Is it the case that it does not? Run the following command to determine if the spamassassin_can_network SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool spamassassin_can_network If properly configured, the output should show the following: spamassassin_can_network --> off Is it the case that spamassassin_can_network is not disabled? To verify the system is not configured to use a boot loader on removable media, check that the grub configuration file has the set root command in each menu entry with the following commands: $ sudo grep -cw menuentry /boot/grub2/grub.cfg Note that the -c option for the grep command will print only the count of menuentry occurrences. This number should match the number of occurrences reported by the following command: $ sudo grep "set root='hd0" /boot/grub2/grub.cfg The output should return something similar to: set root='hd0,msdos1' usb0, cd, fd0, etc. are some examples of removeable media which should not exist in the lines: set root='hd0,msdos1' Is it the case that it is not? Check that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 has the packages for smart card support installed. Run the following command to determine if the openssl-pkcs11 package is installed: $ rpm -q openssl-pkcs11 Is it the case that smartcard software is not installed? Run the following command to determine if the samba_portmapper SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool samba_portmapper If properly configured, the output should show the following: samba_portmapper --> off Is it the case that samba_portmapper is not disabled? To check the ownership of /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg, run the command: $ ls -lL /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: root Is it the case that /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg does not have an owner of root? To determine how the SSH daemon's AllowTcpForwarding option is set, run the following command: $ sudo grep -i AllowTcpForwarding /etc/ssh/sshd_config If a line indicating no is returned, then the required value is set. Is it the case that The AllowTcpForwarding option exists and is disabled? Run the following command to determine if the virt_use_execmem SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool virt_use_execmem If properly configured, the output should show the following: virt_use_execmem --> off Is it the case that virt_use_execmem is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the use_ecryptfs_home_dirs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool use_ecryptfs_home_dirs If properly configured, the output should show the following: use_ecryptfs_home_dirs --> off Is it the case that use_ecryptfs_home_dirs is not disabled? To check that the netconsole service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled netconsole Output should indicate the netconsole service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled netconsole disabled Run the following command to verify netconsole is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active netconsole If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the netconsole is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show netconsole | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "netconsole" is loaded and not masked? To verify all squashing has been disabled, run the following command: $ grep all_squash /etc/exports Is it the case that there is output? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? To check the group ownership of /etc/shells, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/shells If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: root Is it the case that /etc/shells does not have a group owner of root? Verify that all local interactive user initialization file executable search path statements do not contain statements that will reference a working directory other than user home directories with the following commands: $ sudo grep -i path= /home/*/.* /home/[localinteractiveuser]/.bash_profile:PATH=$PATH:$HOME/.local/bin:$HOME/bin Is it the case that any local interactive user initialization files have executable search path statements that include directories outside of their home directory and is not documented with the ISSO as an operational requirement? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 enforces password complexity rules for the root account. Check if root user is required to use complex passwords with the following command: $ grep enforce_for_root /etc/security/pwquality.conf /etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/*.conf /etc/security/pwquality.conf:enforce_for_root Is it the case that "enforce_for_root" is commented or missing? Run the following command to determine if the nfs-utils package is installed: $ rpm -q nfs-utils Is it the case that the package is installed? To check if authentication is required for single-user mode, run the following command: $ grep sulogin /usr/lib/systemd/system/rescue.service The output should be similar to the following, and the line must begin with ExecStart and /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sulogin-shell. ExecStart=-/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sulogin-shell rescue Is it the case that the output is different? To ensure LDAP is configured to use TLS for all transactions, run the following command: $ grep start_tls /etc/pam_ldap.conf The result should contain: ssl start_tls Is it the case that LDAP is not in use, the line is commented out, or not configured correctly? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 disables the use of user namespaces with the following commands: Note: User namespaces are used primarily for Linux containers. If containers are in use, this requirement is not applicable. The runtime status of the user.max_user_namespaces kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl user.max_user_namespaces 0. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? The runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf 0. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_anon_write SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_anon_write If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_anon_write --> off Is it the case that httpd_anon_write is not disabled? Verify the "/etc/security/faillock.conf" file is configured use a non-default faillock directory to ensure contents persist after reboot: $ sudo grep 'dir =' /etc/security/faillock.conf dir = /var/log/faillock Is it the case that the "dir" option is not set to a non-default documented tally log directory, is missing or commented out? Run the following command to determine if the webadm_read_user_files SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool webadm_read_user_files If properly configured, the output should show the following: webadm_read_user_files --> off Is it the case that webadm_read_user_files is not disabled? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_EMULATE /boot/config.* Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no lines should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? Run the following command to determine if the cobbler_use_nfs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool cobbler_use_nfs If properly configured, the output should show the following: cobbler_use_nfs --> off Is it the case that cobbler_use_nfs is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the selinuxuser_execstack SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool selinuxuser_execstack If properly configured, the output should show the following: selinuxuser_execstack --> off Is it the case that selinuxuser_execstack is not disabled? To verify that the Audit is correctly configured according to recommended rules, check the content of the file with the following command: $ sudo cat /etc/audit/rules.d/11-loginuid.rules The output has to be exactly as follows: ## Make the loginuid immutable. This prevents tampering with the auid. --loginuid-immutable Is it the case that the file does not exist or the content differs? To check the permissions of /etc/cron.allow, run the command: $ ls -l /etc/cron.allow If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: -rw------- Is it the case that /etc/cron.allow does not have unix mode -rw-------? To ensure only SNMPv3 or newer is used, run the following command: $ sudo grep 'rocommunity\|rwcommunity\|com2sec' /etc/snmp/snmpd.conf | grep -v "^#" There should be no output. Is it the case that there is output? Run the following command to determine if the avahi package is installed: $ rpm -q avahi Is it the case that the package is installed? Run the following command to determine if the gssd_read_tmp SELinux boolean is enabled: $ getsebool gssd_read_tmp If properly configured, the output should show the following: gssd_read_tmp --> on Is it the case that gssd_read_tmp is not enabled? The runtime status of the net.core.bpf_jit_harden kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.core.bpf_jit_harden 2. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? To verify if the OpenSSL uses defined TLS Crypto Policy, run: $ grep -P '^(TLS\.)?MinProtocol' /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config and verify that the value is TLSv1.2 Is it the case that cryptographic policy for openssl is not configured or is configured incorrectly? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the renameat system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "renameat" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? To verify that Samba clients using mount.cifs must use packet signing, run the following command: $ grep sec /etc/fstab The output should show either krb5i or ntlmv2i in use. Is it the case that it does not? To check the permissions of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, run the command: $ ls -l /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: -rw-r----- Is it the case that /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules does not have unix mode -rw-r-----? Run the following command to determine if the dhcp-server package is installed: $ rpm -q dhcp-server Is it the case that the package is installed? The runtime status of the fs.protected_symlinks kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl fs.protected_symlinks 1. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? The runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore . Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? Run the following command to determine if the openssh-server package is installed: $ rpm -q openssh-server Is it the case that the package is installed? Verify the value of the "maxclassrepeat" option in "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" with the following command: $ grep maxclassrepeat /etc/security/pwquality.conf maxclassrepeat = Is it the case that the value of "maxclassrepeat" is set to "0", more than "<sub idref="var_password_pam_maxclassrepeat" />" or is commented out? To check if the installed Operating System is 64-bit, run the following command: $ uname -m The output should be one of the following: x86_64, aarch64, ppc64le or s390x. If the output is i686 or i386 the operating system is 32-bit. Check if the installed CPU supports 64-bit operating systems by running the following command: $ lscpu | grep "CPU op-mode" If the output contains 64bit, the CPU supports 64-bit operating systems. Is it the case that the installed operating sytem is 32-bit but the CPU supports operation in 64-bit? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the finit_module system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "finit_module" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Run the following command to determine if the deny_ptrace SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool deny_ptrace If properly configured, the output should show the following: deny_ptrace --> off Is it the case that deny_ptrace is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the squid_connect_any SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool squid_connect_any If properly configured, the output should show the following: squid_connect_any --> off Is it the case that squid_connect_any is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the rsh-server package is installed: $ rpm -q rsh-server Is it the case that the package is installed? Run the following command to determine if the pcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool pcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports If properly configured, the output should show the following: pcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports --> off Is it the case that pcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports is not disabled? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 enforces a delay of at least seconds between console logon prompts following a failed logon attempt with the following command: $ sudo grep -i "FAIL_DELAY" /etc/login.defs FAIL_DELAY Is it the case that the value of "FAIL_DELAY" is not set to "<sub idref="var_accounts_fail_delay" />" or greater, or the line is commented out? To determine if the system is configured to audit unsuccessful calls to the lchown system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "lchown" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Display the contents of the file /etc/systemd/logind.conf: cat /etc/systemd/logind.conf Ensure that there is a section [login] which contains the configuration StopIdleSessionSec=. Is it the case that the option is not configured? To verify that the interface(s) follow site policy for zone assignment run the following command: $ sudo nmcli -t connection show | awk -F: '{if($4){print $4}}' | while read INT; do firewall-cmd --get-active-zones | grep -B1 $INT; done If your have to assign an interface to the appropriate zone run the following command: $ sudo firewall-cmd --zone= --change-interface= Is it the case that Your system accepts all incoming packets for unnecessary services and ports? To verify the INACTIVE setting, run the following command: $ grep "INACTIVE" /etc/default/useradd The output should indicate the INACTIVE configuration option is set to an appropriate integer as shown in the example below: $ grep "INACTIVE" /etc/default/useradd INACTIVE= Is it the case that the value of INACTIVE is greater than the expected value or is -1? To determine if the system is configured to audit changes to its network configuration, run the following command: auditctl -l | grep -E '(/etc/issue|/etc/issue.net|/etc/hosts|/etc/sysconfig/network)' If the system is configured to watch for network configuration changes, a line should be returned for each file specified (and perm=wa should be indicated for each). Is it the case that the system is not configured to audit changes of the network configuration? Run the following command to determine if the openscap-scanner package is installed: $ rpm -q openscap-scanner Is it the case that the package is not installed? Inspect the mounts configured in /etc/exports. Each mount should specify a value greater than UID_MAX and GID_MAX as defined in /etc/login.defs. Is it the case that anonuid or anongid are not set to a value greater than UID_MAX (for anonuid) and GID_MAX (for anongid)? Verify the nosuid option is configured for the /var mount point, run the following command: $ sudo mount | grep '\s/var\s' . . . /var . . . nosuid . . . Is it the case that the "/var" file system does not have the "nosuid" option set? Run the following command to determine if the virt_rw_qemu_ga_data SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool virt_rw_qemu_ga_data If properly configured, the output should show the following: virt_rw_qemu_ga_data --> off Is it the case that virt_rw_qemu_ga_data is not disabled? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the query_module system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "query_module" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? To check if pam_namespace.so is required for user login, run the following command: $ grep pam_namespace.so /etc/pam.d/login The output should return the following uncommented: session required pam_namespace.so Is it the case that pam_namespace.so is not required or is commented out? Run the following command to determine if the neutron_can_network SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool neutron_can_network If properly configured, the output should show the following: neutron_can_network --> off Is it the case that neutron_can_network is not disabled? To check if the system login banner is compliant, run the following command: $ cat /etc/issue.net Is it the case that it does not display the required banner? Run the following command to determine if the unprivuser_use_svirt SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool unprivuser_use_svirt If properly configured, the output should show the following: unprivuser_use_svirt --> off Is it the case that unprivuser_use_svirt is not disabled? Run the following command to determine the current status of the rngd service: $ sudo systemctl is-active rngd If the service is running, it should return the following: active Is it the case that the "rngd" service is disabled, masked, or not started.? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 shell initialization file is configured to start each shell with the tmux terminal multiplexer. Determine the location of the tmux script with the following command: $ sudo grep tmux /etc/bashrc /etc/profile.d/* /etc/profile.d/tmux.sh: case "$name" in (sshd|login) tmux ;; esac Review the tmux script by using the following example: $ cat /etc/profile.d/tmux.sh if [ "$PS1" ]; then parent=$(ps -o ppid= -p $$) name=$(ps -o comm= -p $parent) case "$name" in (sshd|login) tmux ;; esac fi If the shell file is not configured as the example above, is commented out, or is missing, this is a finding. Determine if tmux is currently running with the following command: $ sudo ps all | grep tmux | grep -v grep Is it the case that the command does not produce output? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? Run the following command to determine if the kerberos_enabled SELinux boolean is enabled: $ getsebool kerberos_enabled If properly configured, the output should show the following: kerberos_enabled --> on Is it the case that kerberos_enabled is not enabled? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 audits the execution of privileged functions. Check if Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to audit the execution of the "execve" system call using the following command: $ sudo grep execve /etc/audit/audit.rules The output should be the following: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S execve -C uid!=euid -F euid=0 -k setuid -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -C uid!=euid -F euid=0 -k setuid -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S execve -C gid!=egid -F egid=0 -k setgid -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -C gid!=egid -F egid=0 -k setgid Is it the case that the command does not return all lines, or the lines are commented out? The runtime status of the net.ipv4.ip_forward kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv4.ip_forward 0. The ability to forward packets is only appropriate for routers. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? The runtime status of the fs.protected_hardlinks kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl fs.protected_hardlinks 1. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? To check for legacy lines in /etc/group, run the following command: grep '^\+' /etc/group The command should not return any output. Is it the case that the file contains legacy lines? Inspect /etc/audit/auditd.conf and locate the following line to determine how much data the system will retain in each audit log file: $ sudo grep max_log_file /etc/audit/auditd.conf max_log_file = 6 Is it the case that the system audit data threshold has not been properly configured? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_DEBUG_NOTIFIERS /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to audit the execution of the "ssh-agent" command with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep ssh-agent -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/ssh-agent -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-ssh-agent Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? The runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter . Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? To check the ownership of /etc/shadow-, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/shadow- If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: root Is it the case that /etc/shadow- does not have an owner of root? Run the following command to determine if the telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports If properly configured, the output should show the following: telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports --> off Is it the case that telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the tmux package is installed: $ rpm -q tmux Is it the case that the package is not installed? Run the following command to determine if the named_write_master_zones SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool named_write_master_zones If properly configured, the output should show the following: named_write_master_zones --> off Is it the case that named_write_master_zones is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the xend_run_qemu SELinux boolean is enabled: $ getsebool xend_run_qemu If properly configured, the output should show the following: xend_run_qemu --> on Is it the case that xend_run_qemu is not enabled? Find the list of alias maps used by the Postfix mail server: $ sudo postconf alias_maps Query the Postfix alias maps for an alias for the root user: $ sudo postmap -q root hash:/etc/aliases The output should return an alias. Is it the case that the alias is not set? root password is not set Is it the case that Perform the following to determine if a password is set for the root user: <pre># grep -Eq '^root:\$[0-9]' /etc/shadow || echo "root is locked"</pre> No results should be returned. Otherwise, run the following command and follow the prompts to set a password for the root user: <pre># passwd root</pre>? To determine if the system is configured to audit successful calls to the open system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "open" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 generates an audit record for unsuccessful attempts to use the rename system call. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "augenrules" program to to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), run the following command: $ sudo grep -r rename /etc/audit/rules.d If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "auditctl" utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, run the following command: $ sudo grep rename /etc/audit/audit.rules The output should be the following: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S rename -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k unsuccessful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S rename -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k unsuccessful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S rename -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k unsuccessful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S rename -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k unsuccessful-delete Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? Run the following command to verify that the MTA is not listening on any non-loopback address (127.0.0.1 or ::1). # ss -lntu | grep -E ':25\s' | grep -E -v '\s(127.0.0.1|::1):25\s' Nothing should be returned Is it the case that MTA is listening on any non-loopback address? Verify the "umask" setting is configured correctly in the "/etc/csh.cshrc" file with the following command: $ grep umask /etc/csh.cshrc umask 077 umask 077 Is it the case that the value for the "umask" parameter is not "<sub idref="var_accounts_user_umask" />", or the "umask" parameter is missing or is commented out? Open browser window and browse to the appropriate site. Before entry to the site, you should be presented with the server's PKI credentials. Review these credentials for authenticity. For DoD, find an entry which cites: Issuer: CN = DOD CLASS 3 CA-3 OU = PKI OU = DoD O = U.S. Government C = US Is it the case that it is not? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? Inspect the form of default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system in /etc/default/grub. If it includes audit=1, then the parameter will be configured for newly installed kernels. First check if the GRUB recovery is enabled: $ sudo grep 'GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY' /etc/default/grub If this option is set to true, then check that a line is output by the following command: $ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT.*audit=1.*' /etc/default/grub If the recovery is disabled, check the line with $ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX.*audit=1.*' /etc/default/grub.Moreover, command line parameters for currently installed kernels should be checked as well. Run the following command: $ sudo grubby --info=ALL | grep args | grep -v 'audit=1' The command should not return any output. Is it the case that auditing is not enabled at boot time? Verify the nosuid option is configured for the /dev/shm mount point, run the following command: $ sudo mount | grep '\s/dev/shm\s' . . . /dev/shm . . . nosuid . . . Is it the case that the "/dev/shm" file system does not have the "nosuid" option set? Run the following command to determine if the domain_kernel_load_modules SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool domain_kernel_load_modules If properly configured, the output should show the following: domain_kernel_load_modules --> off Is it the case that domain_kernel_load_modules is not disabled? To check that no password hashes are stored in /etc/passwd, run the following command: awk '!/\S:x|\*/ {print}' /etc/passwd If it produces any output, then a password hash is stored in /etc/passwd. Is it the case that any stored hashes are found in /etc/passwd? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_DEBUG_SG /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? To verify that OpenSSL uses the system crypto policy, check out that the OpenSSL config file /etc/pki/tls/openssl.cnf contains the [ crypto_policy ] section with the .include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config directive: $ sudo grep '\.include\s* /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config$' /etc/pki/tls/openssl.cnf. Is it the case that the OpenSSL config file doesn't contain the whole section, or the section doesn't contain the <pre>.include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config</pre> directive? To check that the smb service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled smb Output should indicate the smb service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled smb disabled Run the following command to verify smb is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active smb If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the smb is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show smb | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "smb" is loaded and not masked? To verify that tmux is not listed as allowed shell on the system run the following command: $ grep 'tmux$' /etc/shells The output should be empty. Is it the case that tmux is listed in /etc/shells? To determine if logfile has been configured for sudo, run the following command: $ sudo grep -ri "^[\s]*Defaults\s*\blogfile\b.*" /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/ The command should return a matching output. Is it the case that logfile is not enabled in sudo? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_HIBERNATION /boot/config.* Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no lines should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? To determine if the system is configured to audit unsuccessful calls to the fsetxattr system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "fsetxattr" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 generates an audit record for unsuccessful attempts to use the unlink system call. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "augenrules" program to to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), run the following command: $ sudo grep -r unlink /etc/audit/rules.d If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "auditctl" utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, run the following command: $ sudo grep unlink /etc/audit/audit.rules The output should be the following: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k unsuccessful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k unsuccessful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k unsuccessful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k unsuccessful-delete Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? Run the following command to determine if the awstats_purge_apache_log_files SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool awstats_purge_apache_log_files If properly configured, the output should show the following: awstats_purge_apache_log_files --> off Is it the case that awstats_purge_apache_log_files is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the virt_use_fusefs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool virt_use_fusefs If properly configured, the output should show the following: virt_use_fusefs --> off Is it the case that virt_use_fusefs is not disabled? To determine how the SSH daemon's LogLevel option is set, run the following command: $ sudo grep -i LogLevel /etc/ssh/sshd_config If a line indicating INFO is returned, then the required value is set. Is it the case that the required value is not set? # grep "^OPTIONS.*-u" /etc/sysconfig/chronyd | grep -v -e '-u\s*chrony\b' returns no output Is it the case that chronyd is not running under chrony user account? To check the ownership of /etc/issue.net, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/issue.net If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: root Is it the case that /etc/issue.net does not have an owner of root? Verify the system-wide shared library files are owned by "root" with the following command: $ sudo find -L /lib /lib64 /usr/lib /usr/lib64 ! -user root -exec ls -l {} \; Is it the case that any system wide shared library file is not owned by root? To check the group ownership of /etc/cron.daily, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/cron.daily If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: root Is it the case that /etc/cron.daily does not have a group owner of root? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 enables the user to initiate a session lock trhough key bindings with the following commands: $ grep "lock-session" /etc/tmux.conf bind X lock-session Then, verify that the /etc/tmux.conf file can be read by other users than root: $ sudo ls -al /etc/tmux.conf Is it the case that the "lock-session" is not bound to a specific key? To check that the named service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled named Output should indicate the named service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled named disabled Run the following command to verify named is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active named If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the named is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show named | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "named" is loaded and not masked? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_execmem SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_execmem If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_execmem --> off Is it the case that httpd_execmem is not disabled? To verify that each web content directory exists on separate partitions, run the following command: $ grep `grep -i documentroot /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf | awk -F'"' '{print $2}'` /etc/fstab Each of the corresponding DocumentRoot entries should have a corresponding entry in /etc/fstab. Is it the case that it is not? To ensure that wireless network notification is disabled, run the following command: $ gsettings get org.gnome.nm-applet suppress-wireless-networks-available If properly configured, the output should be true. To ensure that users cannot enable wireless notification, run the following: $ grep wireless-networks-available /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/* If properly configured, the output should be /org/gnome/nm-applet/suppress-wireless-networks-available Is it the case that wireless network notification is enabled and not disabled? Verify that a separate file system/partition has been created for /var/log with the following command: $ mountpoint /var/log Is it the case that "/var/log is not a mountpoint" is returned? Run the following command to determine if the abrt_upload_watch_anon_write SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool abrt_upload_watch_anon_write If properly configured, the output should show the following: abrt_upload_watch_anon_write --> off Is it the case that abrt_upload_watch_anon_write is not disabled? To check that the squid service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled squid Output should indicate the squid service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled squid disabled Run the following command to verify squid is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active squid If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the squid is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show squid | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "squid" is loaded and not masked? To check for serial port entries which permit root login, run the following command: $ sudo grep ^ttyS/[0-9] /etc/securetty If any output is returned, then root login over serial ports is permitted. Is it the case that root login over serial ports is permitted? To determine if the system is configured to audit successful calls to the openat system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "openat" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Run the following command to determine if the sudo package is installed: $ rpm -q sudo Is it the case that the package is not installed? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 takes the appropriate action when an audit processing failure occurs. Check that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 takes the appropriate action when an audit processing failure occurs with the following command: $ sudo grep disk_error_action /etc/audit/auditd.conf disk_error_action = HALT If the value of the "disk_error_action" option is not "SYSLOG", "SINGLE", or "HALT", or the line is commented out, ask the system administrator to indicate how the system takes appropriate action when an audit process failure occurs. Is it the case that there is no evidence of appropriate action? To determine if the system is configured to audit successful calls to the removexattr system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "removexattr" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Inspect each <Directory> instance and verify that either FollowSymLinks does not exist, or Options SymLinksIfOwnerMatchDisable is configured properly. Is it the case that it is not? Run the following command to determine if the virt_use_comm SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool virt_use_comm If properly configured, the output should show the following: virt_use_comm --> off Is it the case that virt_use_comm is not disabled? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to audit the execution of the "pam_timestamp_check" command with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep pam_timestamp_check -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/pam_timestamp_check -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-pam_timestamp_check Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? Run the following command to determine if the cluster_use_execmem SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool cluster_use_execmem If properly configured, the output should show the following: cluster_use_execmem --> off Is it the case that cluster_use_execmem is not disabled? Verify that Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is configured to audit the execution of the "reboot" command with the following command: $ sudo auditctl -l | grep reboot -a always,exit -F path=/reboot -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-reboot Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? To determine whether sudo command includes configuration files from the appropriate directory, run the following command: $ sudo grep -rP '^[#@]include(dir)?' /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d If only the line /etc/sudoers:#includedir /etc/sudoers.d is returned, then the drop-in include configuration is set correctly. Any other line returned is a finding. Is it the case that the /etc/sudoers doesn't include /etc/sudores.d or includes other directories?? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the fchmodat system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "fchmodat" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Run the following command to determine if the staff_exec_content SELinux boolean is enabled: $ getsebool staff_exec_content If properly configured, the output should show the following: staff_exec_content --> on Is it the case that staff_exec_content is not enabled? The runtime status of the kernel.yama.ptrace_scope kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl kernel.yama.ptrace_scope 1. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? Run the following command to determine if the python3-abrt-addon package is installed: $ rpm -q python3-abrt-addon Is it the case that the package is installed? To check the permissions of /etc/shadow, run the command: $ ls -l /etc/shadow If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: ---------- Is it the case that /etc/shadow does not have unix mode ----------? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_MODULE_SIG /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? To check the ownership of /etc/group-, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/group- If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: root Is it the case that /etc/group- does not have an owner of root? Run the following command to determine if the tftp-server package is installed: $ rpm -q tftp-server Is it the case that the package is installed? If the device or Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 does not have a camera installed, this requirement is not applicable. This requirement is not applicable to mobile devices (smartphones and tablets), where the use of the camera is a local AO decision. This requirement is not applicable to dedicated VTC suites located in approved VTC locations that are centrally managed. For an external camera, if there is not a method for the operator to manually disconnect the camera at the end of collaborative computing sessions, this is a finding. For a built-in camera, the camera must be protected by a camera cover (e.g., laptop camera cover slide) when not in use. If the built-in camera is not protected with a camera cover, or is not physically disabled, this is a finding. If the camera is not disconnected, covered, or physically disabled, determine if it is being disabled via software with the following commands: Verify the operating system disables the ability to load the uvcvideo kernel module. $ sudo grep -r uvcvideo /etc/modprobe.d/* | grep "/bin/true" install uvcvideo /bin/true Is it the case that the command does not return any output, or the line is commented out, and the collaborative computing device has not been authorized for use? Run the following command to check for duplicate group names: Check that the operating system contains no duplicate group names for interactive users by running the following command: cut -d : -f 1 /etc/group | uniq -d If output is produced, this is a finding. Configure the operating system to contain no duplicate names for groups. Edit the file "/etc/group" and provide each group that has a duplicate group name with a unique group name. Is it the case that has duplicate group names? To verify that the Audit is correctly configured according to recommended rules, check the content of the file with the following command: cat /etc/audit/rules.d/43-module-load.rules The output has to be exactly as follows: ## These rules watch for kernel module insertion. By monitoring ## the syscall, we do not need any watches on programs. -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S init_module,finit_module -F key=module-load -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S init_module,finit_module -F key=module-load -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S delete_module -F key=module-unload -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S delete_module -F key=module-unload Is it the case that the file does not exist or the content differs? The runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses 1. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? Inspect /proc/cmdline for any instances of selinux=0 in the kernel boot arguments. Presence of selinux=0 indicates that SELinux is disabled at boot time. If it would be disabled anywhere, make sure to enable it via a MachineConfig object. Is it the case that SELinux is disabled at boot time? Run the following command to determine if the privoxy_connect_any SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool privoxy_connect_any If properly configured, the output should show the following: privoxy_connect_any --> off Is it the case that privoxy_connect_any is not disabled? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the delete_module system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "delete_module" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? The runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route 0. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? Run the following command to determine if the mysql_connect_any SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool mysql_connect_any If properly configured, the output should show the following: mysql_connect_any --> off Is it the case that mysql_connect_any is not disabled? To verify that the Audit is correctly configured according to recommended rules, check the content of the file with the following command: cat /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-4-delete-failed.rules The output has to be exactly as follows: ## Unsuccessful file delete -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete Is it the case that the file does not exist or the content differs? To determine if the system is configured to audit successful calls to the open system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "open" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Is it the case that the package is not installed? To determine how the SSH daemon's Banner option is set, run the following command: $ sudo grep -i Banner /etc/ssh/sshd_config If a line indicating /etc/issue is returned, then the required value is set. Is it the case that the required value is not set? Run the following command to determine if the dnf-plugin-subscription-manager package is installed: $ rpm -q dnf-plugin-subscription-manager Is it the case that the package is not installed? Run the following command to determine the current status of the ntp service: $ sudo systemctl is-active ntp If the service is running, it should return the following: active Is it the case that ? To verify if the OpenSSH client uses defined MACs in the Crypto Policy, run: $ grep -i macs /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config and verify that the line matches: MACs Is it the case that Crypto Policy for OpenSSH client is not configured correctly? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the lchown system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "lchown" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? If the system is configured to prevent the loading of the dccp kernel module, it will contain lines inside any file in /etc/modprobe.d or the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf. These lines instruct the module loading system to run another program (such as /bin/true) upon a module install event. These lines can also instruct the module loading system to ignore the dccp kernel module via blacklist keyword. Run the following command to search for such lines in all files in /etc/modprobe.d and the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf: $ grep -r dccp /etc/modprobe.conf /etc/modprobe.d Is it the case that no line is returned? To verify that SSSD is configured for PAM services, run the following command: $ sudo grep services /etc/sssd/sssd.conf If configured properly, output should be similar to services = pam Is it the case that it does not exist or 'pam' is not added to the 'services' option under the 'sssd' section? Run the following command to determine the current status of the logrotate timer: $ sudo systemctl is-active logrotate.timer If the timer is running, it should return the following: active Is it the case that logrotate timer is not enabled? Remote web authors should not be able to upload files to the Document Root directory structure without virus checking and checking for malicious or mobile code. Is it the case that it is not? Run the following command to determine if the abrt-addon-ccpp package is installed: $ rpm -q abrt-addon-ccpp Is it the case that the package is installed? Verify the noexec option is configured for the /dev/shm mount point, run the following command: $ sudo mount | grep '\s/dev/shm\s' . . . /dev/shm . . . noexec . . . Is it the case that the "/dev/shm" file system does not have the "noexec" option set? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_PANIC_ON_OOPS /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? Run the following command to determine if the avahi-autoipd package is installed: $ rpm -q avahi-autoipd Is it the case that the package is installed? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 generates an audit record for unsuccessful attempts to use the open_by_handle_at system call. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "augenrules" program to to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), run the following command: $ sudo grep -r open_by_handle_at /etc/audit/rules.d If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "auditctl" utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, run the following command: $ sudo grep open_by_handle_at /etc/audit/audit.rules The output should be the following: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? Run the following command to determine if the samba_load_libgfapi SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool samba_load_libgfapi If properly configured, the output should show the following: samba_load_libgfapi --> off Is it the case that samba_load_libgfapi is not disabled? To check that the rhsmcertd service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled rhsmcertd Output should indicate the rhsmcertd service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled rhsmcertd disabled Run the following command to verify rhsmcertd is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active rhsmcertd If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the rhsmcertd is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show rhsmcertd | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "rhsmcertd" is loaded and not masked? Run the following command to determine if the virt_sandbox_use_netlink SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool virt_sandbox_use_netlink If properly configured, the output should show the following: virt_sandbox_use_netlink --> off Is it the case that virt_sandbox_use_netlink is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the nscd_use_shm SELinux boolean is enabled: $ getsebool nscd_use_shm If properly configured, the output should show the following: nscd_use_shm --> on Is it the case that nscd_use_shm is not enabled? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_setrlimit SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_setrlimit If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_setrlimit --> off Is it the case that httpd_setrlimit is not disabled? To verify that HBSS PA is installed, run the following command(s): $ sudo ls /opt/McAfee/auditengine/bin/auditmanager Is it the case that the HBSS PA module is not installed? Find if logging is applied to the FTP daemon. Procedures: If vsftpd is started by xinetd the following command will indicate the xinetd.d startup file: $ grep vsftpd /etc/xinetd.d/* $ grep server_args vsftpd xinetd.d startup file This will indicate the vsftpd config file used when starting through xinetd. If the server_args line is missing or does not include the vsftpd configuration file, then the default config file (/etc/vsftpd/vsftpd.conf) is used. $ sudo grep xferlog_enable vsftpd config file Is it the case that xferlog_enable is missing, or is not set to yes? Run the following command to determine if the policycoreutils package is installed: $ rpm -q policycoreutils Is it the case that the policycoreutils package is not installed? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the open system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "open" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? To check the ownership of /etc/ssh/*.pub, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/ssh/*.pub If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: root Is it the case that /etc/ssh/*.pub does not have an owner of root? If IPv6 is disabled, this is not applicable. Run the following command to determine the current status of the ip6tables service: $ sudo systemctl is-active ip6tables If the service is running, it should return the following: active Is it the case that ? To check for incorrectly labeled device files, run following commands: $ sudo find /dev -context *:device_t:* \( -type c -o -type b \) -printf "%p %Z\n" $ sudo find /dev -context *:unlabeled_t:* \( -type c -o -type b \) -printf "%p %Z\n" It should produce no output in a well-configured system. Is it the case that there is output? To determine whether the SSH service is configured to use strong entropy seed, run $ sudo grep SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG /etc/sysconfig/sshd If a line indicating that SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG is set to 32 is returned, then the option is set correctly. Is it the case that the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG is not set to 32 in /etc/sysconfig/sshd? The tftp package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase tftp Is it the case that ? Run the following command to determine if the firewalld package is installed: $ rpm -q firewalld Is it the case that the package is not installed? To verify that Audit Daemon is configured to record the computer node name in the audit events, run the following command: $ sudo grep name_format /etc/audit/auditd.conf The output should return the following: name_format = Is it the case that name_format isn't set to <sub idref="var_auditd_name_format" />? The ftp package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase ftp Is it the case that ? Run the following command to determine if the xen_use_nfs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool xen_use_nfs If properly configured, the output should show the following: xen_use_nfs --> off Is it the case that xen_use_nfs is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the ftpd_use_nfs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool ftpd_use_nfs If properly configured, the output should show the following: ftpd_use_nfs --> off Is it the case that ftpd_use_nfs is not disabled? To ensure the tally directory is configured correctly, run the following command: $ sudo grep 'dir =' /etc/security/faillock.conf The output should show that dir is set to something other than "/var/run/faillock" Is it the case that the "dir" option is not set to a non-default documented tally log directory, is missing or commented out? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? Run the following command to determine if the nagios_run_sudo SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool nagios_run_sudo If properly configured, the output should show the following: nagios_run_sudo --> off Is it the case that nagios_run_sudo is not disabled? Check that no boot image file is specified in /etc/zipl.conf: grep -R "^image\s*=" /etc/zipl.conf No line should be returned, if a line is returned non BLS compliant boot entries are configured for zIPL. Is it the case that a non BLS boot entry is configured? Enter the following commands: grep Action /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf grep AddHandler /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf Is it the case that either of these exist and they configure csh, or any other shell as a viewer for documents? Verify the nosuid option is configured for the /opt mount point, run the following command: $ sudo mount | grep '\s/opt\s' . . . /opt . . . nosuid . . . Is it the case that the "/opt" file system does not have the "nosuid" option set? To check the group ownership of /var/log/messages, run the command: $ ls -lL /var/log/messages If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: root Is it the case that /var/log/messages does not have a group owner of root? To check that the ypbind service is disabled in system boot configuration, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled ypbind Output should indicate the ypbind service has either not been installed, or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: $ sudo systemctl is-enabled ypbind disabled Run the following command to verify ypbind is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: $ sudo systemctl is-active ypbind If the service is not running the command will return the following output: inactive The service will also be masked, to check that the ypbind is masked, run the following command: $ sudo systemctl show ypbind | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: LoadState=masked UnitFileState=masked Is it the case that the "ypbind" is loaded and not masked? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the rmdir system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "rmdir" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? To ensure the login screen resets after a specified number of failures, run the following command: $ grep allowed-failures /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/* The output should be 3 or less. To ensure that users cannot change or configure the resets after a specified number of failures on the login screen, run the following: $ grep allowed-failures /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/* If properly configured, the output should be /org/gnome/login-screen/allowed-failures Is it the case that allowed-failures is not equal to or less than the expected value? To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: $ grep CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH /boot/config.* For each kernel installed, a line with value "" should be returned. Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? To determine if the system is configured to audit unsuccessful calls to the removexattr system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "removexattr" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Inspect /etc/audit/auditd.conf and locate the following line to determine if the system is configured to synchronize audit event data with the log files on the disk: $ sudo grep flush /etc/audit/auditd.conf flush = DATA Acceptable values are DATA, and SYNC. The setting is case-insensitive. Is it the case that auditd is not configured to synchronously write audit event data to disk? To check the group ownership of /etc/group, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/group If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: root Is it the case that /etc/group does not have a group owner of root? Run the following command to determine if the openshift_use_nfs SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool openshift_use_nfs If properly configured, the output should show the following: openshift_use_nfs --> off Is it the case that openshift_use_nfs is not disabled? These settings can be verified by running the following: $ gsettings get org.gnome.desktop.media-handling automount If properly configured, the output for automount should be false. To ensure that users cannot enable automount in GNOME3, run the following: $ grep 'automount' /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/* If properly configured, the output for automount should be /org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount Is it the case that GNOME automounting is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the psacct package is installed: $ rpm -q psacct Is it the case that the package is not installed? Verify the nodev option is configured for the /var/log mount point, run the following command: $ sudo mount | grep '\s/var/log\s' . . . /var/log . . . nodev . . . Is it the case that the "/var/log" file system does not have the "nodev" option set? Run the following command to determine if the rsyslog package is installed: $ rpm -q rsyslog Is it the case that the package is not installed? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_dbus_sssd SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_dbus_sssd If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_dbus_sssd --> off Is it the case that httpd_dbus_sssd is not disabled? To check if MaxStartups is configured, run the following command: $ sudo grep MaxStartups /etc/ssh/sshd_config If configured, this command should output the configuration. Is it the case that maxstartups is not configured? Inspect the form of default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system in /etc/default/grub. If it includes mce=0, then the parameter will be configured for newly installed kernels. First check if the GRUB recovery is enabled: $ sudo grep 'GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY' /etc/default/grub If this option is set to true, then check that a line is output by the following command: $ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT.*mce=0.*' /etc/default/grub If the recovery is disabled, check the line with $ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX.*mce=0.*' /etc/default/grub.Moreover, command line parameters for currently installed kernels should be checked as well. Run the following command: $ sudo grubby --info=ALL | grep args | grep -v 'mce=0' The command should not return any output. Is it the case that MCE tolerance is not set to zero? Run the following command to determine if the puppetagent_manage_all_files SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool puppetagent_manage_all_files If properly configured, the output should show the following: puppetagent_manage_all_files --> off Is it the case that puppetagent_manage_all_files is not disabled? Run the following command to determine if the ftpd_connect_all_unreserved SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool ftpd_connect_all_unreserved If properly configured, the output should show the following: ftpd_connect_all_unreserved --> off Is it the case that ftpd_connect_all_unreserved is not disabled? Run the following command to determine the current status of the sshd service: $ sudo systemctl is-active sshd If the service is running, it should return the following: active Is it the case that ? To determine if the system is configured to audit successful calls to the chmod system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "chmod" /etc/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? The runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route 0. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? Inspect the password section of /etc/pam.d/system-auth and ensure that the pam_unix.so module is configured to use the argument sha512: $ sudo grep "^password.*pam_unix\.so.*sha512" /etc/pam.d/system-auth password sufficient pam_unix.so sha512 Is it the case that "sha512" is missing, or is commented out? Run the following command to determine if the unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition SELinux boolean is enabled: $ getsebool unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition If properly configured, the output should show the following: unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition --> on Is it the case that unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition is not enabled? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the lsetxattr system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "lsetxattr" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the open_by_handle_at system call, run the following command: $ sudo grep "open_by_handle_at" /etc/audit/audit.* If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. Is it the case that no line is returned? Inspect /etc/audit/audisp-remote.conf and locate the following line to determine if the system is configured to either send to syslog, switch to single user mode, or halt when the disk is full: $ sudo grep -i disk_full_action /etc/audit/audisp-remote.conf The output should return something similar to: disk_full_action = single Acceptable values also include syslog and halt. Is it the case that the system is not configured to switch to single user mode for corrective action? To verify that null passwords cannot be used, run the following command: $ sudo awk -F: '!$2 {print $1}' /etc/shadow If this produces any output, it may be possible to log into accounts with empty passwords. Is it the case that Blank or NULL passwords can be used? Run the following command to determine if the httpd_use_openstack SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool httpd_use_openstack If properly configured, the output should show the following: httpd_use_openstack --> off Is it the case that httpd_use_openstack is not disabled? To check the ownership of /etc/issue, run the command: $ ls -lL /etc/issue If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: root Is it the case that /etc/issue does not have an owner of root? Verify Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 generates an audit record for unsuccessful attempts to modify files using the open system call with O_TRUNC_WRITE flag. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "augenrules" program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), run the following command: $ sudo grep -r open /etc/audit/rules.d If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "auditctl" utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, run the following command: $ sudo grep open /etc/audit/audit.rules The output should be the following: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? Run the following command to determine if the libreport-plugin-rhtsupport package is installed: $ rpm -q libreport-plugin-rhtsupport Is it the case that the package is installed? The runtime status of the net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts 1. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? To verify that root's primary group is zero run the following command: grep '^root:' /etc/passwd | cut -d : -f 4 The command should return: 0 Is it the case that root has a primary gid not equal to zero? Run the following command to determine the current status of the firewalld service: $ sudo systemctl is-active firewalld If the service is running, it should return the following: active Is it the case that the "firewalld" service is disabled, masked, or not started.? To determine that AIDE is configured for FIPS 140-2 file hashing, run the following command: $ grep sha512 /etc/aide.conf Verify that the sha512 option is added to the correct ruleset. Is it the case that the sha512 option is missing or not added to the correct ruleset? The runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp kernel parameter can be queried by running the following command: $ sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp 1. Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? Run the following command to determine if the ftpd_use_passive_mode SELinux boolean is disabled: $ getsebool ftpd_use_passive_mode If properly configured, the output should show the following: ftpd_use_passive_mode --> off Is it the case that ftpd_use_passive_mode is not disabled? To check the permissions of /var/log, run the command: $ ls -l /var/log If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: drwxr-xr-x Is it the case that /var/log does not have unix mode drwxr-xr-x? Script combine_ovals.py from SCAP Security Guide ssg: [0, 1, 72], python: 3.10.12 5.11 2024-01-26T00:06:20 Alibaba Cloud Linux 2 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Alibaba Cloud Linux 2 Alibaba Cloud Linux 3 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Alibaba Cloud Linux 3 Anolis OS 8 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Anolis OS 8 Debian Linux 10 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Debian 10 Debian Linux 11 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Debian 11 Debian Linux 12 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Debian 12 openSUSE Leap 15 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is openSUSE Leap 15. openSUSE Leap 42 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is openSUSE Leap 42. Ubuntu 22.04 LTS Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Ubuntu 22.04 LTS UnionTech OS Server 20 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is UnionTech OS Server 20 Red Hat Virtualization 4 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The application installed installed on the system is Red Hat Virtualization 4. Package grub2 is installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Checks if package grub2-common is installed. Package providing /etc/login.defs is installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Checks if package providing /etc/login.defs and is installed. Check if the system doesn't act as an oVirt host or manager Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check if the system has neither ovirt-host nor ovirt-engine installed. Check if the system acts as an oVirt host or manager Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check if the system has ovirt-host or ovirt-engine installed WiFi interface is present Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Checks if any wifi interface is present. Check if the scan target is a container Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check for presence of files characterizing container filesystems. Check if the scan target is a machine Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check for absence of files characterizing container filesystems. System runs on UEK kernel Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check if System is running on UEK kernel. Kerberos server is older than 1.17-18 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check if version of Kerberos server is lesser than 1.17-18 Kerberos workstation is older than 1.17-18 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check if version of Kerberos workstation is lesser than 1.17-18 Test that the architecture is aarch64 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check that architecture of kernel in /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease is aarch64 Test for different architecture than aarch64 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check that architecture of kernel in /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease is not aarch64 Test for different architecture than s390x Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check that architecture of kernel in /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease is not s390x Test that the architecture is ppc64le Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check that architecture of kernel in /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease is ppc64le Test that the architecture is s390x Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check that architecture of kernel in /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease is s390x Running kernel has fips mode enabled Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check if sysctl crypto.fips_enabled = 1 Secure Boot status check Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check if System has Secure Boot enabled. SELinux status check Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check if System has SELinux enabled. SSSD is configured to use LDAP Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Identification provider is not set to ad within /etc/sssd/sssd.conf Non-UEFI system boot mode check Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check if System boot mode is non-UEFI. UEFI system boot mode check Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check if system boot mode is UEFI. Anolis OS 23 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Anolis OS 23 CentOS 7 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is CentOS 7 CentOS 8 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is CentOS 8 CentOS Stream 9 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is CentOS Stream 9 Debian Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed is a Debian System Installed operating system is Fedora Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Fedora Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Installed OS is OL Oracle Linux 7 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Oracle Linux 7 Oracle Linux 8 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Oracle Linux 8 Oracle Linux 9 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Oracle Linux 9 OpenEmbedded Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed is an OpenEmbedded based system openSUSE Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is openSUSE. Installed operating system is part of the Unix family Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is part of the Unix OS family Poky Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed is a Poky based System Red Hat Enterprise Linux CoreOS Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux CoreOS release 4 Red Hat Enterprise Linux CoreOS RHEL9 Based Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux CoreOS RHEL9 Based Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Installed OS is RHEL Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.0 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.0 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.1 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.1 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.2 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.2 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.3 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.3 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.4 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.4 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.5 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.5 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.6 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.6 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.7 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.7 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.8 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.8 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.9 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.9 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.10 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.10 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 Red Hat Virtualization 4 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Virtualization Host 4.4+ or Red Hat Enterprise Host. Scientific Linux 7 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Scientific Linux 7 SUSE Linux Enterprise 12 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is SUSE Linux Enterprise 12. SUSE Linux Enterprise 15 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is SUSE Linux Enterprise 15. Ubuntu Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed is an Ubuntu System Ubuntu 16.04 LTS Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Ubuntu 16.04 LTS Ubuntu 18.04 LTS Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Ubuntu 18.04 LTS Ubuntu 20.04 LTS Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The operating system installed on the system is Ubuntu 20.04 LTS System uses zIPL Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Checks if system uses zIPL bootloader. Check if the environment is a OSBuild pipeline Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Check the value of environment variable container. IPv6 is enabled on system Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Mountpoint /home is active (mounted) or configured in /etc/fstab Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Mountpoint /opt is active (mounted) or configured in /etc/fstab Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Mountpoint /srv is active (mounted) or configured in /etc/fstab Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Mountpoint /tmp is active (mounted) or configured in /etc/fstab Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Mountpoint /var/log/audit is active (mounted) or configured in /etc/fstab Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Mountpoint /var/log is active (mounted) or configured in /etc/fstab Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Mountpoint /var/tmp is active (mounted) or configured in /etc/fstab Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Mountpoint /var is active (mounted) or configured in /etc/fstab Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Operating System is ol Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The installed operating system is Oracle Linux Operating System is ol Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The installed operating system is Oracle Linux Operating System is rhel Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The installed operating system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux Operating System is rhel Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The installed operating system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux Operating System is rhel Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The installed operating system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux Operating System is rhel Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The installed operating system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux Operating System is rhel Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The installed operating system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux Operating System is rhel Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The installed operating system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux Operating System is rhel Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The installed operating system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux Operating System is rhel Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The installed operating system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux Package audit is installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package audit should be installed. Package autofs is installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package autofs should be installed. Package avahi is installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package avahi should be installed. Package bash is installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package bash should be installed. Package chrony is installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package chrony should be installed. Package firewalld is installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package firewalld should be installed. Package gdm is installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package gdm should be installed. Package iptables is installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package iptables should be installed. Package libuser is installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package libuser should be installed. Package logrotate is installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package logrotate should be installed. Package net-snmp is installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package net-snmp should be installed. Package nftables is installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package nftables should be installed. Package nss-pam-ldapd is installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package nss-pam-ldapd should be installed. Package ntp is installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package ntp should be installed. Package pam is installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package pam should be installed. Package polkit is installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package polkit should be installed. Package postfix is installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package postfix should be installed. Package rsh-server is installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package rsh-server should be installed. Package shadow-utils is installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package shadow-utils should be installed. Package net-snmp is installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package net-snmp should be installed. Package squid is installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package squid should be installed. Package sssd-common is installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package sssd-common should be installed. Package sudo is installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package sudo should be installed. Package systemd is installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package systemd should be installed. Package telnet-server is installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package telnet-server should be installed. Package tftp-server is installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package tftp-server should be installed. Package tmux is installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package tmux should be installed. Package ufw is installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package ufw should be installed. Package usbguard is installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package usbguard should be installed. Package yum is installed Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The RPM package yum should be installed. The firewalld is disabled on the system Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 The firewalld service should be disabled. alinux-release alinux-release anolis-release /etc/debian_version ^10.[0-9]+$ 1 /etc/debian_version ^11.[0-9]+$ 1 /etc/debian_version ^12.[0-9]+$ 1 openSUSE-release openSUSE-release /etc/lsb-release ^DISTRIB_CODENAME=jammy$ 1 uos-release rhvm-appliance grub2-common /sys/firmware/opal shadow-utils ovirt-host ovirt-engine /proc/net/wireless /.dockerenv /run/.containerenv krb5-server krb5-workstation /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ^.*\.(.*)$ 1 /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ^.*\.(.*)$ 1 /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ^.*\.(.*)$ 1 crypto.fips_enabled ^/sys/firmware/efi/efivars/SecureBoot-.* SHA-256 /etc/selinux/config ^SELINUX=(.*)$ 1 /etc/sssd/sssd.conf ^[\s]*\[domain\/[^]]*]([^\n\[\]]*\n+)+?[\s]*id_provider[ \t]*=[ \t]*((?i)ad)[ \t]*$ 1 /sys/firmware/efi anolis-release centos-release /etc/os-release ^ID="(\w+)"$ 1 /etc/os-release ^VERSION_ID="(\d)"$ 1 /etc/os-release ^ID="(\w+)"$ 1 /etc/os-release ^VERSION_ID="(\d)"$ 1 /etc/debian_version fedora-release.* /etc/system-release-cpe ^cpe:\/o:fedoraproject:fedora:[\d]+$ 1 /etc/os-release ^ID=["']?(\w+)["']?$ 1 oraclelinux-release oraclelinux-release oraclelinux-release /etc/os-release /etc/os-release ^ID=nodistro$ 1 openSUSE-release /etc/os-release /etc/os-release ^ID=poky$ 1 /etc/os-release ^ID="(\w+)"$ 1 /etc/os-release ^VERSION_ID="(\d)\.\d+"$ 1 /etc/os-release ^RHEL_VERSION="(\d).*"$ 1 /etc/os-release ^ID=["']?(\w+)["']?$ 1 redhat-release-client redhat-release-workstation redhat-release-server redhat-release-computenode /etc/redhat-release ^Red Hat Enterprise Linux release (\d)\.\d+$ 1 redhat-release redhat-release redhat-release redhat-release redhat-release redhat-release redhat-release redhat-release redhat-release redhat-release redhat-release redhat-release /etc/redhat-release ^Red Hat Enterprise Linux release (\d)\.\d+$ 1 redhat-release /etc/redhat-release ^Red Hat Enterprise Linux release (\d)\.\d+$ 1 redhat-release-virtualization-host sl-release sled-release sles-release SLES_SAP-release sled-release sles-release SLES_SAP-release SUSE-Manager-Server-release SLE_HPC-release /etc/lsb-release /etc/lsb-release ^DISTRIB_ID=Ubuntu$ 1 /etc/lsb-release ^DISTRIB_CODENAME=xenial$ 1 /etc/lsb-release ^DISTRIB_CODENAME=bionic$ 1 /etc/lsb-release ^DISTRIB_CODENAME=focal$ 1 s390utils-base container /etc/default/grub ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX=".*ipv6\.disable=(\d).*$ 1 /home /etc/fstab ^[\s]*[\S]+[\s]+/home[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+([\S]+) 1 /opt /etc/fstab ^[\s]*[\S]+[\s]+/opt[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+([\S]+) 1 /srv /etc/fstab ^[\s]*[\S]+[\s]+/srv[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+([\S]+) 1 /tmp /etc/fstab ^[\s]*[\S]+[\s]+/tmp[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+([\S]+) 1 /var/log/audit /etc/fstab ^[\s]*[\S]+[\s]+/var/log/audit[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+([\S]+) 1 /var/log /etc/fstab ^[\s]*[\S]+[\s]+/var/log[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+([\S]+) 1 /var/tmp /etc/fstab ^[\s]*[\S]+[\s]+/var/tmp[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+([\S]+) 1 /var /etc/fstab ^[\s]*[\S]+[\s]+/var[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+([\S]+) 1 /etc/os-release ^ID=["']?(\w+)["']?$ 1 /etc/os-release ^VERSION_ID=["']?([\w.]+)["']?$ 1 /etc/os-release ^ID=["']?(\w+)["']?$ 1 /etc/os-release ^VERSION_ID=["']?([\w.]+)["']?$ 1 /etc/os-release ^ID=["']?(\w+)["']?$ 1 /etc/os-release ^VERSION_ID=["']?([\w.]+)["']?$ 1 /etc/os-release ^ID=["']?(\w+)["']?$ 1 /etc/os-release ^VERSION_ID=["']?([\w.]+)["']?$ 1 /etc/os-release ^ID=["']?(\w+)["']?$ 1 /etc/os-release ^VERSION_ID=["']?([\w.]+)["']?$ 1 /etc/os-release ^ID=["']?(\w+)["']?$ 1 /etc/os-release ^VERSION_ID=["']?([\w.]+)["']?$ 1 /etc/os-release ^ID=["']?(\w+)["']?$ 1 /etc/os-release ^VERSION_ID=["']?([\w.]+)["']?$ 1 /etc/os-release ^ID=["']?(\w+)["']?$ 1 /etc/os-release ^VERSION_ID=["']?([\w.]+)["']?$ 1 /etc/os-release ^ID=["']?(\w+)["']?$ 1 /etc/os-release ^VERSION_ID=["']?([\w.]+)["']?$ 1 /etc/os-release ^ID=["']?(\w+)["']?$ 1 /etc/os-release ^VERSION_ID=["']?([\w.]+)["']?$ 1 audit autofs avahi bash chrony firewalld gdm iptables libuser logrotate net-snmp nftables nss-pam-ldapd ntp pam polkit postfix rsh-server shadow-utils net-snmp squid sssd-common sudo systemd telnet-server tftp-server tmux ufw usbguard yum ^firewalld\.(service|socket)$ ActiveState ^firewalld\.(service|socket)$ LoadState firewalld ^2.*$ ^3.*$ ^8.*$ ^15.*$ ^42.*$ ^20.*$ ^4.*$ ^.*uek.* 0:1.17-18 0:1.17-18 ^aarch64$ ^ppc64le$ ^s390x$ 1 b401b4bd7e4f321db95fcae00d274ab8aa2cf1852d1495c382356d981f63d771 ^(enforcing|permissive)$ ^23.*$ ^7.*$ centos 8 centos 9 ol ^7.*$ ^8.*$ ^9.*$ openSUSE-release unix rhcos 4 9 rhel unix ^7.*$ ^7.*$ ^7.*$ ^7.*$ 7 unix ^8.*$ ^8.0*$ ^8.1*$ ^8.2*$ ^8.3*$ ^8.4*$ ^8.5*$ ^8.6*$ ^8.7*$ ^8.8*$ ^8.9*$ ^8.10*$ 8 unix ^9.*$ 9 0:4.4 ^7.*$ unix ^12.*$ ^12.*$ ^12.*$ unix ^15.*$ ^15.*$ ^15.*$ ^4.*$ ^15.*$ bwrap-osbuild ppc64le 0 ol 8.7 ol 9.0 rhel 8.2 rhel 8.7 rhel 9 rhel 9.0 rhel 8.3 rhel 8.4 rhel 8.5 rhel 9.0 inactive|failed masked