--- name: juicebox-security-basics description: 'Apply Juicebox security best practices. Trigger: "juicebox security", "juicebox api key security". ' allowed-tools: Read, Write, Grep version: 1.16.0 license: MIT author: Jeremy Longshore tags: - saas - recruiting - juicebox compatibility: Designed for Claude Code --- # Juicebox Security Basics ## Overview Juicebox provides AI-powered people search and analysis, processing datasets containing professional profiles, contact enrichment data, and query results. Security concerns include API key protection, GDPR/CCPA compliance for candidate and contact data, data retention policy enforcement, and ensuring enriched contact information (emails, phone numbers) is not leaked through logs or unencrypted storage. A compromised API key grants access to people search and enrichment capabilities. ## API Key Management ```typescript function createJuiceboxClient(): { apiKey: string; baseUrl: string } { const apiKey = process.env.JUICEBOX_API_KEY; if (!apiKey) { throw new Error("Missing JUICEBOX_API_KEY — store in secrets manager, never in code"); } // Juicebox keys access people data — treat as PII-adjacent console.log("Juicebox client initialized (key suffix:", apiKey.slice(-4), ")"); return { apiKey, baseUrl: "https://api.juicebox.ai/v1" }; } ``` ## Webhook Signature Verification ```typescript import crypto from "crypto"; import { Request, Response, NextFunction } from "express"; function verifyJuiceboxWebhook(req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction): void { const signature = req.headers["x-juicebox-signature"] as string; const secret = process.env.JUICEBOX_WEBHOOK_SECRET!; const expected = crypto.createHmac("sha256", secret).update(req.body).digest("hex"); if (!signature || !crypto.timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(signature), Buffer.from(expected))) { res.status(401).send("Invalid signature"); return; } next(); } ``` ## Input Validation ```typescript import { z } from "zod"; const PeopleSearchSchema = z.object({ query: z.string().min(1).max(500), filters: z.object({ location: z.string().optional(), company: z.string().optional(), title: z.string().optional(), industry: z.string().optional(), }).optional(), max_results: z.number().int().min(1).max(100).default(25), enrich_contacts: z.boolean().default(false), }); function validateSearchQuery(data: unknown) { return PeopleSearchSchema.parse(data); } ``` ## Data Protection ```typescript const JUICEBOX_PII_FIELDS = ["personal_email", "phone_number", "social_profiles", "home_address", "enrichment_data"]; function redactJuiceboxLog(record: Record): Record { const redacted = { ...record }; for (const field of JUICEBOX_PII_FIELDS) { if (field in redacted) redacted[field] = "[REDACTED]"; } return redacted; } ``` ## Security Checklist - [ ] API keys stored in secrets manager, separate keys per environment - [ ] Enriched contact data encrypted at rest - [ ] GDPR consent documented for EU candidate data - [ ] CCPA opt-out mechanism implemented for California residents - [ ] Data retention policy enforced (auto-delete after defined period) - [ ] Contact enrichment results never logged in plaintext - [ ] Search queries redacted in application logs - [ ] Pre-commit hook blocks `jb_live_*` credential patterns ## Error Handling | Vulnerability | Risk | Mitigation | |---|---|---| | Leaked API key | Unauthorized people search and enrichment | Secrets manager + key rotation | | Contact data in logs | PII exposure violating GDPR/CCPA | Field-level redaction pipeline | | Missing data retention | Stale candidate data accumulates | Automated retention enforcement | | Enrichment without consent | Privacy regulation violation | Consent gate before enrichment calls | | Unencrypted contact storage | Bulk PII breach from database leak | Encryption at rest + access controls | ## Resources - Juicebox Privacy - [OWASP API Security Top 10](https://owasp.org/www-project-api-security/) ## Next Steps See `juicebox-prod-checklist`.