/**
 * file: karbytes_27_march_2024.txt
 * type: plain-text
 * date: 27_MARCH_2024
 * author: karbytes
 * license: PUBLIC_DOMAIN
 */

S: “Regardless of where I am, I am always somewhere.”

T: “But are you really always somewhere or are you sometimes nowhere?”

S: “I would say that I am always somewhere due to the fact that I espouse a panpsychic worldview (or, perhaps more precisely, a panpsychic ideology) and such a worldview (or ideology) posits the axiom that literally all physical, virtual, and potential (i.e. yet to be manifested) phenomena are comprised purely of mind and that all existence is contained within exactly one ubiquitous, indestructible, and irreducible field of consciousness (i.e. mind).”

T: “Regardless of whether or not what you posit as your particular panpsychic worldview (using exclusively the terms you posited in this conversation (which is the only conversation depicted in the note file named karbytes_27_march_2024.txt and such that this conversation is entirely encapsulated by that note file)), it can still be logically argued that you do not necessarily exist unconditionally. That is because S appears (to myself, to itself, and perhaps to whoever reads this note) to be spatially and temporally finite partition of nature which is necessarily smaller than the whole of nature (whether or not nature is spatially or temporally finite). Otherwise, S would be experiencing all of T’s frames of reference at the same time S is experiencing all of S’s frames of reference (and while S is also experiencing all of the frames of reference experienced by whoever reads this note).”

S: “I claim that I am the whole of nature and that T is also the whole of nature and that whoever reads this note is also the whole of nature (because my conceptual model or reality is that all frames of reference are experienced by exactly one field of consciousness either simultaneously or asynchronously (and if not all frames of reference are experienced by that singular mind simultaneously and immutably, then that mind is experiencing the appearance and the disappearance of various frames of reference whose emergence and disappearance occur in exactly one chronological order according to that mind)).”

T: “If what you posited about all frames of reference being experienced by exactly one mind instead of by multiple minds (or by no minds) is true, are you also implicitly suggesting that any one of those minds can voluntarily change perspectives such that S can switch what it is experiencing at some finite time interval to experience exclusively what T is experiencing during that time interval such that T’s frames of reference during that time interval are effectively inhabited by at least two minds?”

S: “No, because even if I enter a dream state while sleeping in which I remote experience everything you are sensing and thinking (to the exclusion of all other phenomena) during the two hours in which I am sleeping and having that dream, I am still nevertheless confined to my own solipstic continuum of frame of references associated with the idea of the person named S and the person who is speaking this sentence in the note file named karbytes_27_march_2024.txt. Rather than S’s continuum of consciousness merging into and then becoming T’s continuum of consciousness during that aforementioned two hour period in which S is asleep and in a dream state, S’s continuum of consciousness is rendering exclusively the phenomena which T is consciously rendering during that two hour time period (but, during that two hour time period, S renders exclusively its own apparently identical copy of those phenomena which T experiences while T renders exclusively its own apparently identical copy of those phenomena which S experiences). What I mean to suggest is that Nature itself is a spatially and temporally boundless field of consciousness which simultaneously experiences S’s continuum of consciousness and T’s continuum of consciousness.”

T: “I thought you were trying to suggest that S’s continuum of consciousness is Nature’s continuum of consciousness.”

S: “I am suggesting that S’s continuum of consciousness is Nature’s continuum of consciousness. I am also suggesting that T’s continuum of consciousness is Nature’s continuum of consciousness.”

T: “I think what you just said before I started speaking this sentence is fallacious. I would reword what you said immediately before I started speaking to be as follows: I am suggesting that S’s continuum of consciousness is a unique subset of Nature’s continuum of consciousness and that T’s continuum of consciousness is a unique subset of Nature’s continuum of consciousness (and, because two unique objects are by definition not the same object, S’s continuum of consciousness cannot ever take the place of T’s continuum of consciousness even if S’s continuum of consciousness renders a copy of all the phenomena which T renders a copy of).”

S: “Okay, I concede with your revision of my words. What you immediately said prior to me speaking this sentence is now more in agreement with my current worldview than what I said which you revised and which you said immediately prior to me speaking this sentence. I would now suggest that any phenomenon which S experiences or any phenomenon which T experiences is a unique object which is phenomenalogically identical to a unique object within Nature which neither S nor T nor any other frame of reference experiences directly. Hence, any phenomenon which either you or I experience is always a unique copy of the same unique noumenon within Nature.”

T: “Do you believe that Nature is aware of any noumena?”

S: “Yes, but I would not say that Nature is necessarily aware of all noumena. That is because Nature only experiences whatever is projected within the confines of any one of its potentially many (and potentially infinitely many) continuums of consciousness which are each subsets of Nature which are always smaller than the whole of Nature.”

T: “If what you said immediately prior to me speaking this sentence is what you believe is true, do you mean to imply that Nature only perceives or renders phenomena to the exclusion of noumena?”

S: “I am not sure if Nature is omniscient or not. If Nature is omniscient (i.e. aware of literally all phenomena and literally all noumena (and I presume there is always more noumena than phenomena)), then Nature’s knowledge scope is and always has been and always will be static rather than changing. I presently believe that Nature’s scope of knowledge is limited to the set of all (necessarily non-omniscient, solipsistic, and unique) continuums of consciousness which presently exist. Therefore, I am implying that Nature forgets whatever was previously rendered by any frame of reference as a phenomenon if that phenomenon is not currently being rendered as a phenomenon by any other frame of reference. What I said in the previous sentence implies that Nature is not directly aware of any noumenal object from which some nonnegative integer (if not some infinitely large) number of phenomenal copies of that object are made (using some finite (if not infinite) amount of energy-matter and some finite amount of space-time (and such that each one of those phenomenal copies takes place inside of exactly one unique frame of reference which is a subset of some nonnegative integer (if not some infinitely large) number of unique frames of reference)).”

T: “Are you suggesting that Nature can only be aware of the phenomenal pointers which each point to some hypothetical and necessarily unobserved (by all frames of reference which are each unique elements of some larger encompassing set of simultaneous frames of reference) noumenon?”

S: “Right now, yes. Right now, my worldview posits that Nature is only aware of phenomena. Therefore (according to my current worldview) Nature is not aware of any noumena unless there is a phenomenal copy currently being rendered of some particular noumenon.”

T: “Did you mean to suggest that the mere presence of some phenomenon in Nature’s current knowledge structure is sufficient to cause Nature to generate the concept of that phenomenon’s corresponding (and hypothetical) noumenon?”

S: “Not necessarily. I should have been more precise. I would revise what I said prior to what you most recently said as the following words: according to my current worldview, Nature is not aware of a particular noumenon unless there is currently a continuum of frames of reference rendering phenomenal objects which contain sufficient detail to describe the concept of that particular noumenon (but the noumenon itself is never directly rendered by any continuum of consciousness).”