

KUSHAL LAMICHHANE

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Department of Economics
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EDUCATION

- Ph.D. in Economics** 2020-2026 (Expected)
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, Arkansas
Field: Experimental/Behavioral Economics
- Master of Arts in Economics** December 2021
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, Arkansas
- Master of Business Administration (MBA) in Finance** May 2018
Southeast Missouri State University, Cape Girardeau, Missouri
- Bachelor of Business Administration (BBA)** August 2015
Thames International College, Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu, Nepal

RESEARCH

Work in Progress

Collusion through worker mobility: An experiment (Job Market Paper with Peter J. McGee)^a

The primary difference between the definitions explicit and tacit collusion in the literature is that the firms communicate directly in the former and do not communicate in the latter. Collusion is easier to establish and maintain with explicit collusion than tacit collusion, but it also comes with increased risks of detection and legal penalties. We investigate a gray area between these two, where collusion occurs through workers moving between firms. In experimental Bertrand markets with either two or four firms, workers moving between firms lead to higher market prices, higher firm prices, more attempts at collusive pricing, and more frequent market sharing. The effects of worker mobility are more pronounced in the four firm market where collusion should be more difficult to achieve. Using team chats, we can see that, while subjects rarely discuss specific collusive prices, they often discuss trying to encourage everyone to raise prices.

Strangers Like Me: Does Group Affiliation Serve as a Noisy Signal of Agents' Types? (with J. Braxton Gately, and Ashley McCrea)^a

The assimilation of immigrants into new societies is a critical factor for the immigrants' success and integration. However, this process can often be hindered by the natives' concern over cultural differences between the immigrants and the host population. These cultural differences extend the concerns to potential challenges in coordination within and between different groups in society. In two pre-registered studies, we explore how group formation impacts the ability of people to coordinate effectively in a complex environment where people have very limited information about who they interact with and the beliefs that people have over how well groups aid coordination. In study 1, we use an extended version of the HFIG game in Gately et al. (2023), adapted to include a group formation mechanism, to investigate these dynamics. The data reveals a surprising result. In this complex coordination environment, groups do not significantly aid coordination. However, we do find that, when given the choice, participants choose to join groups that signal a type that is closer to their own. Given the fact that people joining groups similar to their type suggests that people do think groups help coordination, we use study 2 to investigate people's beliefs over the effectiveness of groups. Interestingly, while people generally overestimated the effectiveness of groups, their beliefs about the probability of coordination without groups were relatively accurate.

Teams, employee mobility and focal point collusion (with Peter J. McGee)^b

The general idea behind the project is to use an experimental setting to explore if teams can help facilitate collusion at price ceilings that acts as a focal point. While evidence of this has been found in field data for specific industries (e.g. credit cards in Knittel and Stango's 2003 AER), previous laboratory work has failed to replicate this result. We speculate that these lab investigations have failed to incorporate two important elements. First, pricing decisions are often made by groups, and industries characterized by regulatory focal points are also likely to result in industry-specific human capital and employee movement within the industry. Our paper, "Collusion through worker mobility: An experiment", in a Bertrand setting finds employees moving from one firm to another in a market facilitates collusion. The paper finds that market prices are significantly higher after team switching, however, firms find it difficult to coordinate on a specific price. The focal point provided through a price ceiling could solve this coordination problem largely increasing firms' profits at the expense of consumers.

^a- Data analysis completed, writing in progress

^b- Data collection in progress

HONORS AND AWARDS

Elinor Ostrom Fellowship x2 Mercatus Center at George Mason University	2023-2025
The Center for Growth and Opportunity Presentation Grant (\$500) Utah State University	2024
University of Arkansas Dr. Yien-I Tu Endowed Scholarship by Sam M. Walton College of Business (\$6,000)	2024-2025
University of Arkansas International Travel Supplement (\$2,000)	2024
University of Arkansas Presentation Travel Grant x2 (\$2,200)	2023, 2024
Graduate Professional Student Congress Travel Grant x2 (\$2,000)	2023, 2024
University of Arkansas Research Travel Grant x2 (\$2,200)	2022, 2023
Behavioral Business Research Lab Small Subjects Payment Grant with Peter J. McGee x2 (\$3,000)	2022, 2023
Economics Faculty Small Grant Fund with Peter J. McGee (\$2,500)	2022
Distinguished Doctoral Fellowship	2020-2024

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Instructor (University of Arkansas)

ECON 2023: Principles of Microeconomics	Fall 2022, 2023, 2024 & Spring 2023, 2024
ECON 2143: Basic Economics: Theory & Practice	Fall 2021, Spring 2022
<i>Class sizes range from 60 to 138 students</i>	

Teaching Assistant (University of Arkansas)

Graduate courses

ECON 6133- Mathematics for Economics Analysis
ECON 5783- Applied Microeconometrics
ECON 5243- Managerial Economics

Undergraduate courses

ECON 4433- Experimental Economics
ECON 3143- Special Topics in Economics
ECON 4003H- Honors Economics Colloquium
ECON 3033- Microeconomic Theory
ECON 4743- Intro to Econometrics

CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS AND INVITED TALKS (*scheduled)

Collusion through worker mobility: An experiment Economic Science Association (ESA) Annual Conference	October 2024
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Seminar Series, Department of Economics, University of Arkansas	October 2024
1st Summer School in Experimental and Behavioral Economics by the European Economic Review	August 2024
Seminar Series, Western Illinois University	April 2024
Southern Economic Association (SEA) Annual Conference	November 2023
Missouri Valley Economic Association Annual Conference	October 2023
Behavioral Business Research Lab (BBRL) Brownbag Seminar, University of Arkansas	April 2023
Strangers Like Me	
Public Choice Society Annual Conference	March 2024

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Causal Inference Workshop by Arnold Ventures	November 2024*
1st Summer School in Experimental and Behavioral Economics by the European Economic Review	August 2024
University of Crete, Greece	
AMIE Mentee	2023-2024
Association for Mentoring & Inclusion in Economics	
The 28th Annual Visiting Graduate Student Workshop in Experimental Economics	January 2023
Chapman University	

SKILLS

Computer:

STATA, oTree, L^AT_EX, SQL, z-Tree

Languages:

English (Fluent), Nepali (Native), Hindi (Conversational), Spanish (Basic)

REFERENCES

Peter J. McGee (Dissertation Chair)
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