zanadir

zanadir coverage Go Reference Test coverage

zanadir reads a repository's CI configuration and reports which security and quality controls are missing, or wired so they cannot fail a build. ## What it answers - **What is my pipeline missing?** Thirteen categories, from dependency scanning and secrets detection to SBOMs, workflow hardening and agent skill scanning, each checked against the tools that cover it, with suggestions that fit the repository's languages. - **Does my CI actually block on security findings?** A scanner with `continue-on-error`, `--exit-code 0`, `|| true`, a push-only trigger or `allow_failure` is present but cannot stop a merge. zanadir grades each control *enforcing*, *partial*, *advisory* or *unknown* rather than just covered; see [Effectiveness](#effectiveness). - **Is that check required to merge?** With `--required-checks`, a control only counts as enforcing when branch protection or a ruleset requires it. - **What do I add?** `zanadir fix` prints ready-to-paste CI configuration for the gaps, or writes a workflow with `--write`. It reads GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, CircleCI, Bitbucket Pipelines, Azure Pipelines and Jenkins, from a checkout (`--dir`) or straight from GitHub (`--repo`), and reports as a table, JSON, SARIF or Markdown. How common are these gaps? The [State of CI security 2026](https://mustachecase.github.io/state-of-ci/) scanned 1,000 of the most-starred GitHub repositories: 511 declare no dependency, secret or code scanning at all, and 1 in 6 of those that run a scanner in CI have one that cannot fail the build. ```sh zanadir scan --dir . zanadir scan --repo github.com/owner/name --output json zanadir fix --dir . ``` ## Installation Try it on any public repository without installing anything: ```sh docker run --rm mustachecase/zanadir scan --repo github.com/owner/name ``` To install it, download the archive for Linux, macOS or Windows (amd64 or arm64) from the [latest release](https://github.com/MustacheCase/zanadir/releases/latest). `checksums.txt` lists each archive's SHA-256, and every archive has a build provenance attestation: ```sh gh attestation verify zanadir__linux_amd64.tar.gz --repo MustacheCase/zanadir ``` Or with Homebrew (the tap is this repository) or Go: ```sh brew tap --custom-remote MustacheCase/zanadir https://github.com/MustacheCase/zanadir.git brew install mustachecase/zanadir/zanadir go install github.com/MustacheCase/zanadir@latest ``` In GitHub Actions, use [zanadir-action](https://github.com/MustacheCase/zanadir-action). This workflow reports on every pull request without failing it: ```yaml # .github/workflows/zanadir.yml name: zanadir on: [pull_request] permissions: contents: read jobs: zanadir: runs-on: ubuntu-latest steps: - uses: actions/checkout@v4 with: fetch-depth: 0 - uses: mustachecase/zanadir-action@v1.29 with: dir: . ``` When you are ready to gate, add `enforce: true` (fail on any uncovered category), `fail-on` (only the categories you name) or `fail-on-weakened`. To post the report as a pull request comment, see [Posting the report to a pull request](#posting-the-report-to-a-pull-request). ## zanadir and OpenSSF Scorecard [OpenSSF Scorecard](https://github.com/ossf/scorecard) and zanadir answer different questions, and work well together. | | OpenSSF Scorecard | zanadir | | --- | --- | --- | | Question | How healthy are this project's security practices? | Which CI controls are missing, and can the ones present fail a build? | | Scope | 20 checks across the project: branch protection, code review, maintenance, pinned dependencies, token permissions, signed releases, known vulnerabilities, fuzzing and more | 13 categories of CI controls, each matched against the many tools that provide it | | Reads | The forge's API: GitHub and GitLab repositories, recent pull requests and check runs | The CI configuration: six CI platforms, the Makefiles, Taskfiles, tox, composite actions and templates its jobs call | | SAST, for example | Looks for CodeQL or SonarCloud; its docs note other tools may score low | Recognises Semgrep, CodeQL, gosec, Bandit, Brakeman, SonarQube and others, and grades whether each can fail the build | | Result | A 0-10 score per check and overall | Covered or not per category, graded enforcing, partial, advisory or unknown, with fixes | Use Scorecard for a project-wide security posture, and zanadir to find out whether the CI you have would actually stop a bad change, and what to add. ## Using zanadir with AI coding agents To have a coding agent check CI with zanadir before changing it, add this to the repository's `AGENTS.md`, `CLAUDE.md` or equivalent: ```markdown ## CI changes Before adding or changing CI configuration, run `zanadir scan --dir . --output json` (install: https://github.com/MustacheCase/zanadir#installation). It lists the missing CI controls and grades each present one: `enforcing` can fail a merge, `partial`, `advisory` and `unknown` cannot or may not. Fix advisory controls before adding tools, and use `zanadir fix --dir .` for configuration that fits this repository. Re-run the scan to confirm the change. ``` ### As an MCP server `zanadir mcp` serves two read-only tools over the Model Context Protocol, so any agent that speaks MCP can grade CI before and after changing it: - `scan` returns the JSON report: the score, uncovered categories with suggested tools, and weakened controls with their verdicts; - `fix` returns ready-to-paste configuration for the gaps, and writes nothing. Both take `dir` (a local checkout, by default the current directory) or `repo` (`github.com/owner/name[@ref]`, read without cloning), and `excludedCategories`. An agent can be steered by what it reads, so the server keeps its tools to what you started it with. A `dir` must be inside `--dir` (by default the directory the server starts in); a relative one is read from there. `repo` fetches are anonymous, so they reach public repositories only, unless you start the server with `--repo-token` to let them use `GITHUB_TOKEN` or `GH_TOKEN`. ```sh claude mcp add zanadir -- zanadir mcp ``` It is listed in the [MCP Registry](https://registry.modelcontextprotocol.io/v0/servers?search=zanadir) as `io.github.MustacheCase/zanadir`, where it runs from the Docker image with your repository mounted read-only. For other clients, such as Cursor, VS Code or Windsurf: ```json { "mcpServers": { "zanadir": { "command": "zanadir", "args": ["mcp"] } } } ``` ### As a Claude Code plugin In Claude Code, the zanadir plugin brings both: the MCP server, and a skill that scans, reads your CI configuration, recommends fixes in priority order, and edits files only after you choose. The server runs the installed `zanadir` if it is 0.18.0 or later, and otherwise the Docker image. ``` /plugin marketplace add MustacheCase/zanadir /plugin install zanadir@mustachecase ``` Then ask Claude Code to review or harden your CI, or run `/zanadir:improve-ci`. [`llms.txt`](llms.txt) summarises zanadir for agents that read the repository, and is served at [mustachecase.github.io/llms.txt](https://mustachecase.github.io/llms.txt) for those that look at a site's root. ## Features - ๐Ÿ“‚ **Scan**: Analyze the repository for CI/CD enhancement suggestions, including security services and best practices. - ๐Ÿ” **CI Analysis**: Grades whether each control can actually fail a build, not only whether it is present. - ๐Ÿ› ๏ธ **Fix**: Prints, or writes as a workflow, CI configuration for the categories a scan reports as missing. - ๐Ÿš€ **Open Source**: Contributions are welcome to enhance Zanadir's capabilities! ## Supported CI Actions Zanadir currently supports: - GitHub Actions - CircleCI - GitLab - Bitbucket Pipelines - Azure Pipelines - Jenkins Future work will include support for: - Tekton ## Categories We Suggest Zanadir analyzes repositories in the following categories. The name in bold is the exact value to pass to `--excluded-categories` (matching is case-insensitive): - ๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ **SCA**: Software Composition Analysis - ๐Ÿ” **Secrets Detection**: Secrets Management - ๐Ÿ“œ **License Compliance**: License Compliance - ๐Ÿ› ๏ธ **End Of Life**: End-of-Life Software Packages - ๐Ÿ“Š **Coverage**: Test Coverage - ๐Ÿ“Š **Performance Testing**: Test Performance and Reliability - ๐Ÿง‘โ€๐Ÿ’ป **Linter**: Code Linting - ๐Ÿงช **Unit Tests**: Automated Unit Testing - ๐Ÿ”Ž **SAST**: Static Application Security Testing - ๐Ÿ—๏ธ **IaC Security**: Infrastructure-as-Code Misconfiguration Scanning - ๐Ÿ”— **Supply Chain**: SBOM Generation, Signing and Provenance - ๐Ÿงฑ **Workflow Security**: Hardening of the pipeline definition itself - ๐Ÿค– **Agent Skill Security**: Scanning agent skills (`SKILL.md`) for prompt injection and malicious code ## Usage Examples ### Basic Usage Scan a repository for CI/CD improvement suggestions: ```sh zanadir scan --dir /path/to/your/repo ``` Or scan a GitHub repository without cloning it: ```sh zanadir scan --repo github.com/owner/name zanadir scan --repo owner/name@v2.0.0 # a branch, tag or commit zanadir fix --repo owner/name ``` `--repo` downloads the repository's archive into a temporary directory, scans it exactly as a checkout, and removes it. Only the files zanadir reads keep their contents. GitHub's archive leaves out whatever `.gitattributes` marks `export-ignore`, which often includes `.github`, so zanadir fetches those files separately rather than report a repository with no CI. Public repositories need no token; set `GITHUB_TOKEN` (or `GH_TOKEN`) to reach private ones or raise GitHub's rate limit. GitLab and Bitbucket repositories still need a clone. ### Output Formats Zanadir supports three output formats: table (default), JSON and SARIF. #### Table Output (Default) ```sh zanadir scan --dir . --output table ``` **Sample Output:** ``` Coverage 10/11 - 1 category needs attention: |--------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------| | CATEGORY | DESCRIPTION | SUGGESTED TOOLS | |--------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------| | Performance and Reliability | Tools for load, stress and | k6, JMeter, | | Testing Tools | reliability testing, to verify | Gatling, Apache | | | a system holds up under | Bench, Artillery, | | | expected and peak traffic. | BlazeMeter | |--------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------| ``` When nothing is missing, the scan says so rather than printing an empty table: ``` Coverage 11/11 - all categories are covered. ``` The headline is bold on an interactive terminal. Colour is omitted when the output is piped or written with `--output-file`, and when `NO_COLOR` is set. #### JSON Output ```sh zanadir scan --dir . --output json ``` One object with the score, the CI systems whose configuration was found, the uncovered categories and the tools that cover them, the covered categories whose tooling cannot fully protect the repository, and the categories left out of the score. Every list is an array, empty rather than `null` when there is nothing in it. ```json { "score": { "covered": 4, "total": 11 }, "platforms": ["github"], "uncovered": [ { "id": "Secrets Detection", "name": "Data Leakage & Secrets Detection", "description": "Tools that help detect sensitive information ...", "suggestions": [ { "name": "Gitleaks", "repository": "https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks", "description": "..." } ] } ], "weakened": [ { "category": "SCA", "verdict": "advisory", "location": ".github/dependabot.yml" } ], "notApplicable": ["IaC Security"] } ``` `language` appears on a suggested tool only when it is specific to one language, and `location` on a weakened category only when it points inside the repository. Before 0.10.0, `--output json` printed only the bare array that is now `uncovered`, with capitalised keys. #### SARIF Output ```sh zanadir scan --dir . --output sarif ``` SARIF is the standard interchange format for static analysis results. Emitting it lets uncovered categories show up in GitHub's Security tab, and in any other SARIF-consuming platform, alongside your other scanners. Each uncovered category becomes one SARIF rule and one result at `warning` level, with the suggested tools listed in the result's help text. Results are anchored at a CI configuration file โ€” the place the missing tool would be added. A missing control is not a defect on a particular line, but every SARIF consumer expects a location, and GitHub code scanning rejects a report whose results have none. #### Markdown Output ```sh zanadir scan --dir . --output markdown ``` Markdown is the format for putting a scan in front of people rather than in a file. Tools link to their repositories, and the report opens with a hidden marker so a workflow can update the comment it posted last time instead of adding a new one on every push. **Sample Output:** ```markdown ### zanadir Coverage 10/11 - 1 category needs attention: | Category | Description | Suggested tools | | --- | --- | --- | | Performance and Reliability Testing Tools | Tools for load, stress and reliability testing. | [k6](https://github.com/grafana/k6), [JMeter](https://github.com/apache/jmeter) | ``` When nothing is missing the table is omitted, leaving a single line. #### Writing the report to a file Use `--output-file` to write the report to a path instead of stdout. This works with every format, and is the reliable way to produce a machine-readable report: redirecting stdout captures the debug log as well, so `--output sarif --debug > report.sarif` yields a file that is not valid JSON. ```sh zanadir scan --dir . --output sarif --output-file zanadir.sarif ``` To publish the report from a GitHub Actions workflow: ```yaml - name: Run zanadir run: zanadir scan --dir . --output sarif --output-file zanadir.sarif - name: Upload SARIF uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3 with: sarif_file: zanadir.sarif ``` Uncovered categories then appear in the repository's **Security** tab alongside your other scanners. ### Posting the report to a pull request SARIF puts uncovered categories in the **Security** tab, which people visit occasionally. A pull request comment is where they already are. ```yaml permissions: contents: read pull-requests: write steps: - name: Run zanadir run: zanadir scan --dir . --output markdown --output-file zanadir.md - name: Post the report run: gh pr comment "$NUMBER" --body-file zanadir.md --edit-last --create-if-none env: GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} NUMBER: ${{ github.event.pull_request.number }} ``` `--edit-last` keeps one comment up to date instead of adding one per push. It matches on the last comment by the same user, so if something else comments as `github-actions` too, match the marker instead: ```yaml - name: Find the previous report uses: peter-evans/find-comment@v4 id: previous with: issue-number: ${{ github.event.pull_request.number }} body-includes: "" - name: Post the report uses: peter-evans/create-or-update-comment@v5 with: comment-id: ${{ steps.previous.outputs.comment-id }} issue-number: ${{ github.event.pull_request.number }} body-path: zanadir.md edit-mode: replace ``` A pull request from a fork gets a read-only token, so the comment step cannot post. Guard it with `if: github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name == github.repository` rather than reaching for `pull_request_target`, which would run your workflow with write access to a fork's code. ## Coverage Score Every scan is summarised as a coverage score: the categories that apply to the repository, minus the ones still uncovered. Three rules keep the number honest: - **Excluded categories leave the denominator.** A repository is not marked down for a category it has declared irrelevant with `--excluded-categories`. - **So do categories with nothing to scan.** A repository with no Terraform, Helm chart, Kubernetes manifest or Dockerfile is not told to add Checkov, and is scored out of ten rather than eleven. The scan says which: ``` IaC Security is not applicable and is out of the score: nothing in this repository needs it. ``` Three categories are ruled out this way. **IaC Security** needs infrastructure to scan, and the detection is deliberately broad โ€” a directory called `infra`, `k8s` or `charts` is enough to keep it. **Workflow Security** needs GitHub Actions or GitLab CI, the formats its tools read. A GitLab project is pointed at glsec or poutine, a GitHub one at zizmor, actionlint, Scorecard or poutine, and a CircleCI-only repository is not scored on it. **Agent Skill Security** needs a `SKILL.md` outside dependency and test directories; it is credited for Cisco Skill Scanner, SkillSpector or Snyk Agent Scan run in CI. To check the skills themselves, see [`zanadir skills`](#zanadir-skills). The rest apply to any codebase, and the ones that arguably do not โ€” load testing a library, an SBOM for something that ships nothing โ€” cannot be told apart from the ones that do, so guessing would rule out categories a repository does need. - **Baseline-accepted gaps still count as uncovered.** A baseline records that a gap is tolerated, not that it was closed. A score that rose because someone committed a file would measure nothing. ### README Badge `--badge` writes the score as a [shields.io endpoint][shields] file: ```sh zanadir scan --dir . --badge zanadir-badge.json ``` ```json { "schemaVersion": 1, "label": "zanadir", "message": "10/11", "color": "green" } ``` Publish that file from CI and point a badge at it. Put it on a branch of its own rather than committing it to the default branch: a protected default branch only takes changes through a pull request, so a workflow that pushes the badge there is rejected. ```markdown ![zanadir](https://img.shields.io/endpoint?url=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/OWNER/REPO/badges/zanadir-badge.json) ``` A job that keeps it current on every push to the default branch, publishing to a `badges` branch it creates on the first run: ```yaml badge: if: github.event_name == 'push' runs-on: ubuntu-latest permissions: contents: write steps: - uses: actions/checkout@v7 - name: Run zanadir run: zanadir scan --dir . --badge zanadir-badge.json - name: Publish the badge when it moved run: | set -euo pipefail cp zanadir-badge.json "$RUNNER_TEMP/zanadir-badge.json" rm -f zanadir-badge.json git config user.name github-actions git config user.email github-actions@github.com if git fetch --depth=1 origin badges 2>/dev/null; then git switch --discard-changes -C badges FETCH_HEAD else git switch --orphan badges fi cp "$RUNNER_TEMP/zanadir-badge.json" zanadir-badge.json git add zanadir-badge.json if git diff --cached --quiet; then exit 0; fi git commit -m "chore: update zanadir badge" git push origin badges ``` The `badges` branch holds that one file and nothing else. If a ruleset covers every branch rather than only the default one, exclude `badges` from it. The colour tracks the score: green at 80% or above, yellow at 60%, orange at 40%, red below that, and bright green only at full coverage. [shields]: https://shields.io/badges/endpoint-badge ## Effectiveness Presence is not protection. A scanner wired up so it can never fail a build leaves a repository worse off than one with no scanner at all, because everybody believes the control is there. All of these used to report **covered**: ```yaml - uses: gitleaks/gitleaks-action@v2 continue-on-error: true # the job stays green whatever it finds ``` ```yaml on: schedule: [{cron: "0 3 * * *"}] # nothing is blocked at merge time ``` ```yaml on: push: {branches: [main]} # pull requests are never checked ``` A scan now grades each control it finds and reports the ones that protect less than their presence suggests: ``` 3 covered categories are weakened: Linter is partial (.github/workflows/pushonly.yml) SCA is advisory (.github/workflows/nightly.yml) Secrets Detection is advisory (.github/workflows/ci.yml) ``` | Verdict | Meaning | |---|---| | `enforcing` | the control can fail the build on the path that gates a change | | `partial` | it can fail a build, but not on that path - pushes only, say | | `advisory` | it runs, and cannot block anything | | `unknown` | the configuration cannot be read well enough to say | A `pull_request` trigger gates only if it runs on the change itself and on pull requests to the default branch. `types: [closed]` runs after the merge, so it grades like a push. A `branches:` or `branches-ignore:` filter that leaves out the default branch makes the control `unknown`. The default branch is set outside the repository: zanadir reads it from the checkout's `origin/HEAD`, which `git clone` sets, from GitHub with `--repo` or `--required-checks`. Where none of those has it, as in most CI checkouts, `main`, `master`, `trunk` and `develop` stand in for it, or whichever of them the filter names. Supply Chain is graded against a different path. An SBOM, a signature or a provenance attestation describes what ships rather than looking for something to block, so it belongs where the artifact is published: running on a release, a push, a tag, a pull request or a workflow chained after one is `enforcing`. A manual run may be the release itself, which the file cannot tell, so it is `unknown`. Only a schedule, detached from anything that ships, is `advisory`, and `continue-on-error` is `advisory` here as everywhere: a signing step that can fail silently publishes unsigned artifacts. A weakened control does not fail a scan unless you ask it to. `--enforce` and `--fail-on` act only on categories with no tooling; `--fail-on-weakened` is what turns a weak control into a failure: ```sh zanadir scan --dir . --fail-on-weakened ``` ``` Enforcement failed: controls that cannot fail a build: Secrets Detection (advisory) ``` The two are independent. `--enforce` on its own still ignores weakened controls, so upgrading does not start failing builds that passed before. `--fail-on` narrows both. A baseline accepts a weakness **at the verdict it had when accepted**: ```yaml version: 1 categories: - Performance Testing weakened: Secrets Detection: partial ``` So accepting `partial` does not also accept it becoming `advisory` later. If the control gets worse than its recorded verdict, the scan fails again. `--write-baseline` records the verdicts for you. Some of this is generic. `continue-on-error` defeats any control, and so do its shell spellings: `gitleaks detect || true`, `|| echo failed`, and running the tool as the condition of an `if` or a `!`. A `|| exit 1` that fails again is fine. So does a workflow that only runs on a schedule. The rest is specific to one tool, and a rule can say so: ```yaml - id: "tfsec-rule" regex: "(?i)\\btfsec\\b" weakenedWhen: - runMatches: "--soft-fail\\b" verdict: "advisory" - input: "soft_fail" equals: "true" verdict: "advisory" ``` A check is either a regex over the step's shell command or one action input compared to a value - deliberately not an expression language. Covered today: `trivy --exit-code 0`, `gitleaks --exit-code 0`, `tfsec` and `checkov` `--soft-fail` / `soft_fail: true`, and `anchore/scan-action` with `fail-build: false`. Two deliberate silences. An `if:` condition is never interpreted, because it can reference arbitrary context and reading one wrong is worse than admitting it cannot be read - the control is reported `unknown` instead. And a category is judged by its strongest control, so one properly wired scanner keeps the category quiet however many weak ones sit beside it. ### Required checks A scanner can run on every pull request and still block nothing, because its check is not required to merge. That lives in the repository's rulesets and branch protection, not its files, so it is opt-in: ```sh zanadir scan --dir . --required-checks zanadir scan --repo owner/name --required-checks ``` zanadir reads the default branch's required checks from GitHub (public repositories need no token; `GITHUB_TOKEN` or `GH_TOKEN` is used if set). A GitHub Actions control that would be `enforcing` stays so only when its job's check is required, matrix (`build (ubuntu-latest)`) and reusable-workflow (`codeql / Analyze`) names included; otherwise it is `partial`: ``` 2 covered categories are weakened: SAST is partial (.github/workflows/codeql.yml): its check is not required to merge Secrets Detection is partial (.github/workflows/secrets.yml): its check is not required to merge Merge settings for main: Required to merge: build (ubuntu-latest), build (macos-latest). Problem: ruleset "checks must pass" requires "Run tests" but applies to no branch. ``` It also names settings that look like protection and are not: a ruleset that requires checks but targets no branch or only evaluates, and a required GitHub Actions check that no workflow job reports. Checks other apps report, such as DCO, are never judged. If the settings cannot be read, the scan warns and grades without them. Only GitHub is read; on other platforms the merge settings are still outside what zanadir can see. ### Controls declared outside the pipeline Dependabot and Renovate are detected from their configuration - `.github/dependabot.yml`, `renovate.json` and the other names Renovate accepts - not from a CI job, because that is not where they live. They are graded `advisory`. Both run on the forge's own schedule and open pull requests; neither can fail a build. So a repository whose only dependency control is Dependabot is reported as covered **and** weakened, which is a more useful answer than either "you have no SCA" or "you are covered": ``` 1 covered category is weakened: SCA is advisory (.github/dependabot.yml) ``` ### Platform coverage GitHub Actions is graded in full. GitLab CI is graded for the two signals that are unambiguous there - `allow_failure: true`, which is `continue-on-error` under another name, and `when: manual`, a job that only runs when somebody asks. GitLab's `include:` is followed. A local file (`local:` or a bare path, wildcards allowed) is read as more of the same configuration. GitLab's own templates and CI/CD components cannot be read from the repository, so they are recognised by name: `Jobs/SAST.gitlab-ci.yml` or `components/sast/sast@...` counts as SAST, and likewise for Secret Detection, Dependency and Container Scanning, SAST-IaC, License Scanning, Code Quality and the performance-testing templates. A `project:` or `remote:` include is skipped. A job zanadir cannot read is skipped rather than failing the scan. GitLab's `rules:`, `only:` and `except:` are deliberately not interpreted. Whether a branch pipeline gates a merge depends on a project setting that is not in the repository, so reading them would be guessing. A GitLab job with neither weakening field is reported `unknown`, which says nothing rather than something wrong. CircleCI has no equivalent signal and is not graded. Bitbucket Pipelines splits its file by trigger, so most of it is graded: | Where the tool runs | Verdict | | --- | --- | | `pull-requests:` | `enforcing` | | `branches:` for one named branch, such as `main` | `partial` - it runs after the merge | | `tags:`, `custom:`, or a step or stage with `trigger: manual` | `advisory` | | `after-script:` | `advisory` - a failing after-script does not fail the step | | `default:`, or a wildcard branch pattern | `unknown` | `default:` also runs on a pull request's source branch, and whether that build blocks the merge is a merge check configured outside the repository, so it is left `unknown` for the same reason as GitLab's branch pipelines. Pipes are read like GitHub actions: `pipe: snyk/snyk-scan` counts as Snyk, and `DONT_BREAK_BUILD: "true"` grades it `advisory`. A Jenkinsfile (and variants beside it such as `Jenkinsfile.release`) is read as Groovy tokens, not run. `sh`, `bat` and `powershell` steps are read like `run:`, and other steps such as `snykSecurity`, `dependencyCheck`, `withSonarQubeEnv` or `junit` like actions, with their named arguments as inputs. Which branches and pull requests build is configured on the Jenkins job, not in the file, so a control is `unknown` unless the file itself weakens it: | In the Jenkinsfile | Verdict | | --- | --- | | inside `catchError(buildResult: 'SUCCESS')` or `buildResult: null` | `advisory` - the build stays green | | a step option such as `snykSecurity(failOnIssues: false)` or `waitForQualityGate abortPipeline: false` | `advisory` | | inside `when { }`, `if`, `warnError` or `catchError(buildResult: 'UNSTABLE')`, or `sh(returnStatus: true)` | `unknown` | A shared-library step configured only by assignments, such as `mavenBuild { dependencyCheck = 'enabled' }`, cannot be read. Azure Pipelines is read from `azure-pipelines.yml` (or `.yaml`) at the repository root, following `template:` and `extends:` references to files in the same repository. A template in another repository (`path@alias`) or one named by an expression cannot be read and is skipped. | Where the tool runs | Verdict | | --- | --- | | a pipeline whose `pr:` names branches | `enforcing` | | `continueOnError: true` on the step or its job | `advisory` | | `trigger: none`, `pr: none` and only `schedules:` | `advisory` | | any `condition:` other than `succeeded()` | `unknown` | | a pipeline with no `pr:` | `unknown` | With no `pr:`, an Azure Repos pull request is validated by a branch policy outside the repository, so the file cannot say whether the pipeline gates it. `succeeded()` is ignored because it is the default every step already has. A step with `enabled: false` never runs and counts for nothing. Tasks are read like actions, with `inputs:` as their inputs, so `SnykSecurityScan` with `failOnIssues: false` grades `advisory`. In SARIF a weakened control is a `note`, pointing at the file that produced the verdict, while a missing category stays a `warning`. ## Language-Aware Suggestions Zanadir detects which languages a repository uses and suggests only tools that apply to it โ€” a Go project is not offered ESLint, and a JavaScript project is not offered Pylint. Tools that work regardless of ecosystem (Trivy, Gitleaks, Codecov, and so on) are always suggested. Detection is based on dependency manifests in the repository root and its immediate subdirectories, so common monorepo layouts work: | Language | Detected from | |------------|------------------------------------------------------------| | Go | `go.mod` | | Python | `requirements.txt`, `pyproject.toml`, `setup.py`, `Pipfile` | | JavaScript | `package.json` | | Ruby | `Gemfile`, `*.gemspec` | | Java | `pom.xml`, `build.gradle`, `build.gradle.kts` | | Rust | `Cargo.toml` | | PHP | `composer.json` | | C# | `*.csproj`, `*.sln` | `node_modules`, `vendor` and other dependency directories are skipped, since their manifests describe code the project did not write. If no language is recognised, every tool is suggested, exactly as before. ### Advanced Usage #### Exclude Specific Categories Skip certain categories during analysis: ```sh zanadir scan --dir . --excluded-categories "SCA,Secrets Detection" ``` Category names must match the list above. An unrecognized name is rejected with an error rather than being silently ignored. #### Enforce Mode Zanadir provides an `--enforce` flag to ensure that all CI/CD suggestions are fulfilled. If any suggestion is not met, the CI pipeline will fail. This helps enforce security best practices and compliance in automated workflows. ```sh zanadir scan --dir . --enforce ``` The category that failed the build is printed to stderr: ``` Enforcement failed: uncovered categories: SCA, Secrets Detection ``` Exit codes: `0` when the scan passes, `1` when enforcement fails or the scan cannot run (an unreadable directory or configuration), and `2` for a command line zanadir does not understand, such as a mistyped flag. A typo therefore fails the build instead of passing it with nothing enforced. #### Failing on Specific Categories `--enforce` is all-or-nothing, which makes it hard to adopt on an existing repository: a single uncovered category fails every build. Use `--fail-on` to enforce only the categories you care about, while the rest stay informational: ```sh zanadir scan --dir . --fail-on "SCA,Secrets Detection" ``` `--fail-on` implies enforcement, so `--enforce` is not needed alongside it. Category names are matched case-insensitively. #### Baseline A baseline records the gaps a repository knowingly accepts. Those categories are still reported, but they no longer fail a scan โ€” so enforcement can be switched on before everything is fixed, and only *new* gaps break the build. Generate one from the current state: ```sh zanadir scan --dir . --write-baseline ``` This writes `.zanadir-baseline.yaml` (override with `--baseline `) and exits successfully: ```yaml # zanadir baseline: categories that are uncovered but accepted. # These are still reported; they just do not fail a scan. # Regenerate with: zanadir scan --dir . --write-baseline version: 1 categories: - Coverage - Performance Testing ``` Then enforce against it. The scan passes while the repository's gaps match the baseline, and fails as soon as a new one appears: ```sh zanadir scan --dir . --enforce --baseline .zanadir-baseline.yaml ``` Commit the baseline so the accepted gaps are reviewable, and shrink it over time. #### Debug Mode Get detailed logging information: ```sh zanadir scan --dir . --debug ``` #### Config File `--config` (`-c`) reads flag values from a YAML file, so a team stops repeating them on every invocation. Each key is the name of the flag it sets: ```yaml # .zanadir.yml excluded-categories: [Performance Testing] enforce: true fail-on-weakened: true required-checks: true baseline: .zanadir-baseline.yaml badge: zanadir-badge.json output: markdown ``` ```sh zanadir scan --dir . -c .zanadir.yml zanadir scan --dir . -c .zanadir.yml --output json # the command line wins ``` - A flag given on the command line overrides the same key in the file. - An unknown key is an error, so a misspelt `exclude-categories` fails the scan instead of silently scanning without the exclusion. - Relative paths (`baseline`, `badge`, `output-file`) are resolved against the directory holding the config file, not the directory you run from. - `zanadir fix -c` reads the same file and uses only `excluded-categories` and `debug`. - `dir` and `write-baseline` stay on the command line: one says what to scan, the other is a one-off action rather than a setting. #### Custom Rules zanadir only recognises the tools in its catalogue, so an in-house scanner reads as a missing category. Teach it with `rules:` in the config file, in the same shape as the [built-in rules](rules/storage): ```yaml rules: - id: acme-scan applyOn: [Job.Run] # Artifact.Name, Job.Name, Job.Package, Job.Run categories: [SAST] regex: '\bacme-scan\b' unless: '--list-rules' # optional: a match that does not count, e.g. a command that does not scan weakenedWhen: # optional: configurations that cannot fail a build - runMatches: '--report-only' verdict: advisory # advisory or partial ``` A rule that also matches on `Artifact.Name` can take `unlessPackage`, a regex over the workflow's actions: when one matches, the workflow's steps decide and its name does not count (`unlessPackage: '^acme/scan-action'`). Custom rules add to the catalogue and never replace a built-in rule, so an `id` that is already taken is an error, as is a regex that does not compile or an unknown category. A rule that matches counts as coverage and is graded like any other, so `--fail-on-weakened` catches `acme-scan --report-only` too. `zanadir fix` uses the same rules to decide what is uncovered. #### Complete Example ```sh # Scan with all options zanadir scan \ --dir /path/to/repo \ --output json \ --excluded-categories "Linter" \ --enforce \ --debug ``` ## `zanadir fix` A scan tells you what is missing. `fix` prints the configuration to add: ```sh zanadir fix --dir . ``` ``` Infrastructure as Code Security is not covered. Add to .github/workflows/security.yml: - name: Scan infrastructure as code uses: bridgecrewio/checkov-action@v12 with: directory: . https://github.com/bridgecrewio/checkov ``` It prints only; no file is touched. The CI platform is detected from the repository, and snippets are emitted for GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Bitbucket Pipelines, Azure Pipelines or Jenkins accordingly. Not every suggested tool has a template. A category whose tools are all untemplated is skipped rather than emitting something half-right, so `fix` covers fewer categories than `scan` reports. Templates live in `fixer/templates.yaml` and pin actions to a major tag, or to a release where the action publishes no major tag, never to a branch; adding one is a self-contained contribution. ### Generating a workflow `--write` generates a standalone `.github/workflows/zanadir-suggested.yml` instead of printing: ```sh zanadir fix --dir . --write ``` ``` Wrote .github/workflows/zanadir-suggested.yml (9 categories). It runs as its own job, so it repeats checkout and adds a check to pull requests. ``` Existing workflows are never edited, so nothing you wrote can be damaged; the worst case is a file you delete. Re-running overwrites the generated file and produces the same result, and zanadir refuses to overwrite a file at that path that it did not generate. That standalone job is the trade-off: it repeats checkout and adds its own entry to the checks list, which is noisier than adding the steps to a job you already have. Move them into your own workflow whenever you prefer. `--write` currently generates GitHub Actions only. On other platforms, run without it and paste the snippets. `--excluded-categories` works as it does for `scan`. ## `zanadir skills` Agent skills (`SKILL.md` files for Claude Code, Codex and other agents) fail quietly: a vague description never triggers, a linked script was deleted, two skills compete for the same requests. `skills` finds every `SKILL.md` in a checkout and reports them: ```sh zanadir skills --dir . ``` ``` Found 3 skills: .claude/skills/deploy, .claude/skills/review, plugins/acme/skills/db-migrate Quality ! .claude/skills/deploy/SKILL.md:3 description says what the skill does but not when to use it; add a "Use when ..." sentence [description-no-trigger] โœ— plugins/acme/skills/db-migrate/SKILL.md:41 links scripts/rollback.sh, which does not exist [missing-reference] Safety ! .claude/skills/review/scripts/setup.sh:4 downloads a script and pipes it straight into a shell [pipe-to-shell] 1 error, 2 warnings ``` | Rule | Severity | Finds | |---|---|---| | `frontmatter-invalid` | error | frontmatter that is not valid YAML | | `missing-reference` | error | a link to a file in the repository that does not exist | | `hidden-unicode` | error | bidirectional overrides or tag characters, which can hide text from a reviewer; a warning for zero-width characters in `SKILL.md` | | `frontmatter-missing`, `name-missing`, `description-missing` | warning | no frontmatter, name or description | | `name-format`, `name-mismatch` | warning | a name that is not lowercase-hyphenated, or does not match its directory | | `description-short`, `description-long` | warning | under 40 characters, or over the 1,024 the Agent Skills specification allows | | `description-no-trigger` | warning | a description that says what, never when ("Use when ...") | | `description-overlap` | warning | two skills in one skills directory whose descriptions share most of their words | | `body-long` | warning | a `SKILL.md` over 500 lines, which loads whole every time | | `bash-unrestricted` | warning | `allowed-tools` granting every shell command | | `pipe-to-shell`, `skip-approvals` | warning | `curl \| sh`, or running the agent without approvals or its sandbox, in `SKILL.md` or a script | The safety rules are shallow on purpose and read only what the agent follows or runs, not reference documents that describe a risky pattern. For a security audit of a skill, use [SkillSpector](https://github.com/nvidia/skillspector). `--output json` gives the findings to other tools, and `--enforce` exits non-zero when any error is found. Dependency, test and `.git` directories are skipped. `skills` reads a checkout only; `--repo` is not supported yet. ## Contributors Feedback, issues and pull requests are welcome; see [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md).