# secobserve-mcp
*MCP server for SecObserve — Triage, import and administration from an agent*
[](https://pypi.org/project/secobserve-mcp/)
[](https://pypi.org/project/secobserve-mcp/)
[](https://github.com/SecObserve/SecObserve)
[](LICENSE)
[](https://glama.ai/mcp/servers/nh4ttruong/secobserve-mcp)
[Tools](#tools) • [Install](#install) • [Configure](#configure) • [Register with a client](#register-with-a-client) • [Design](#design)
`secobserve-mcp` exposes the [SecObserve](https://github.com/SecObserve/SecObserve) REST API to an LLM agent over the [Model Context Protocol](https://modelcontextprotocol.io): browse and triage observations, manage products, branches and rules, import scan reports and SBOMs, run scans and background jobs, generate VEX documents. Transport is stdio by default. Listed in the [official MCP Registry](https://registry.modelcontextprotocol.io/?q=secobserve-mcp) as `io.github.nh4ttruong/secobserve-mcp`.
## Tools
18 tools, not one per endpoint. SecObserve has ~50 REST resources and ~40 named actions; registering a tool for each would cost more context than the data ever returns, so the API is modelled as **data** and the tools are the interface to it.
| Tool | Purpose |
| --- | --- |
| `secobserve_list_resources` | The catalogue: every resource, its verbs, its actions. Makes no API call, so it is free to call first. |
| `secobserve_describe_resource` | Exact filters, fields and enums, read from the running instance's OpenAPI schema. |
| `secobserve_list` / `_get` | Read, with filters, sorting, pagination and projection. |
| `secobserve_create` / `_update` / `_delete` | CRUD over any resource in the catalogue. |
| `secobserve_call_action` | The long tail: `apply_rules`, `copy`, `simulate`, `license_overview`, exports. |
| `secobserve_assess_observation` | Triage one finding. Writes an observation log, honours the approval workflow. |
| `secobserve_bulk_assess_observations` | The same assessment across up to 250 findings. |
| `secobserve_approve_observation_log` | Approve or reject pending assessments (four-eyes). |
| `secobserve_product_metrics` | Pre-aggregated counts: current, timeline, the delta between two dates, and how stale they are. |
| `secobserve_upload_file` | Import a scan report, SBOM or VEX document from disk. |
| `secobserve_api_import` | Pull findings through a stored API configuration. Blocks; a timeout reports the work as still running and where to watch it land. |
| `secobserve_trigger_scan` | Run SecObserve's built-in OSV or VulnerableCode scan. Same blocking behaviour. |
| `secobserve_run_periodic_task` | Trigger a background job, or list the registered ones. |
| `secobserve_status` | Version, health, public settings, queue statistics, PURL types. |
| `secobserve_vex_document` | Generate or revise a CSAF / OpenVEX / CycloneDX document. |
## Prompts
Six prompts, for the work that is a sequence of calls rather than one. A prompt is fetched by name when someone picks it, so it costs nothing per session — unlike a tool schema, which is sent on every connection.
| Prompt | Purpose |
| --- | --- |
| `triage-product` | Work one product's open findings, highest severity and `fix_available` first, assessing each with evidence. |
| `daily-changes` | What changed since local midnight: new, parser-changed, resolved, human-assessed. |
| `weekly-changes` | The same feed over the past 7 days, broken down by day. |
| `daily-report` | Today's counts per product, what moved today, what is still open. |
| `weekly-report` | The same three parts over the past 7 days, for the report someone sends on. |
| `monthly-report` | A month's closing numbers and the month-over-month delta. |
Each one carries the caveats that decide whether the report is right: metrics cover the default branch only and answer `200` with every count at zero when the job has not run, no filter expresses a calendar month, and nothing in SecObserve is a due date or an SLA.
## Install
```bash
uvx secobserve-mcp --help
```
`uvx` downloads and runs it without installing anything permanently. In VS Code: [one-click install](https://vscode.dev/redirect/mcp/install?name=secobserve&config=%7B%22type%22%3A%22stdio%22%2C%22command%22%3A%22uvx%22%2C%22args%22%3A%5B%22secobserve-mcp%40latest%22%5D%7D).
To put it on your `PATH` instead:
```bash
uv tool install secobserve-mcp
```
Once you have done that, `uv tool` owns the name: a bare `uvx secobserve-mcp` runs that pinned copy forever and never notices a newer release, so keep it current with `uv tool upgrade secobserve-mcp`.
The client configurations below therefore say `uvx secobserve-mcp@latest`, which revalidates against PyPI on each launch — once per client session, not once per command.
`--check` deliberately stays on the bare name, because its job is to report on the copy your clients are actually running.
From a checkout, for development:
```bash
uv venv && uv pip install -e ".[dev]"
```
## Configure
| Variable | Default | Notes |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `SECOBSERVE_BASE_URL` | `http://localhost:8000` | Base URL **without** `/api`. |
| `SECOBSERVE_API_TOKEN` | — | User or product API token. Recommended. |
| `SECOBSERVE_JWT` | — | Alternative to an API token. |
| `SECOBSERVE_TIMEOUT` | `60` | Seconds. SecObserve imports and scans inside the request, and a timeout does not cancel one; raise it to get the counts back from the call itself. |
| `SECOBSERVE_VERIFY_SSL` | `true` | Set false only for a self-signed dev certificate. |
| `SECOBSERVE_READ_ONLY` | `false` | `true` refuses every non-GET call. |
| `SECOBSERVE_ALLOW_DELETE` | `false` | `secobserve_delete` is off until this is set. |
| `SECOBSERVE_IMPORT_DIR` | working directory | Uploads may only be read from this tree. |
| `SECOBSERVE_EXPORT_DIR` | `./secobserve-exports` | Exports and VEX documents are written here. |
| `SECOBSERVE_AUDIT_LOG` | `true` | One JSON line per tool call on stderr. `false` switches it off. |
Create a user API token:
```bash
curl -X POST "$SECOBSERVE_BASE_URL/api/authentication/create_user_api_token/" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"username": "you", "password": "...", "name": "mcp"}'
```
Check the wiring before handing it to a client:
```bash
uvx secobserve-mcp --check
```
It prints the instance version, the authenticated user, whether read-only and delete are enabled, and how this install compares to the newest release on PyPI.
That last part is the only place this server calls pypi.org, it needs one short-lived request, and it degrades to a single line when the index is unreachable.
## Run as a container
```bash
docker run --rm -p 8931:8931 \
-e SECOBSERVE_BASE_URL=https://secobserve.example.com \
-e SECOBSERVE_API_TOKEN=... \
ghcr.io/nh4ttruong/secobserve-mcp \
--transport http --host 0.0.0.0 --shared-identity
```
The image is built for `linux/amd64` and `linux/arm64`, runs as a non-root user, and answers `GET /healthz` with its version.
`/healthz` is liveness only and never calls SecObserve, so a backend outage does not get this server restarted.
`--shared-identity` is required and not in the image's default command: the token is baked into the environment, so every caller of the port acts as that one SecObserve identity, and the server refuses to start over HTTP until someone says that is intended.
It then **refuses every write**, because an assessment made under a shared token records the wrong actor in the observation log and in four-eyes approval.
Arguments to `docker run` replace `CMD` rather than extend it, which is why the transport flags are repeated above.
Keep it behind a gateway that authenticates the caller, and off any public port.
For a single user, `uvx` over stdio is the better fit: one process, one token, writes included.
## Register with a client
The server prints its own registration snippet, so none of the blocks below have
to be copied by hand:
```bash
uvx secobserve-mcp --print-config claude # or: codex, vscode, json
```
It reads `SECOBSERVE_BASE_URL` from the environment and always leaves the token
as a placeholder — the snippet is meant to be pasted somewhere, and a token
should not travel with it. The hint goes to stderr, so `--print-config json >
mcp.json` writes a clean file.
### Claude Code
```bash
claude mcp add secobserve --env SECOBSERVE_BASE_URL=http://localhost:8000 --env SECOBSERVE_API_TOKEN=... -- uvx secobserve-mcp@latest
```
### Codex CLI
In `~/.codex/config.toml`:
```toml
[mcp_servers.secobserve]
command = "uvx"
args = ["secobserve-mcp@latest"]
env = { SECOBSERVE_BASE_URL = "http://localhost:8000", SECOBSERVE_API_TOKEN = "..." }
```
### Other MCP clients
Most clients take the same JSON shape:
```json
{
"mcpServers": {
"secobserve": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": ["secobserve-mcp@latest"],
"env": {
"SECOBSERVE_BASE_URL": "http://localhost:8000",
"SECOBSERVE_API_TOKEN": "..."
}
}
}
}
```
For a shared deployment, run streamable HTTP with stateless JSON behind a gateway that authenticates the caller:
```bash
uvx secobserve-mcp --transport http --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8931 --shared-identity
```
`--shared-identity` is what makes this start: the transport has no authentication of its own, so every caller acts as the one identity in `SECOBSERVE_API_TOKEN`, and the flag accepts that and forces read-only for the process.
## Design
Three decisions worth knowing before reading the code:
**Responses are projected.** SecObserve's serializers return every model column; an Observation has around 100. Each resource carries a default field set, and every list result says what it dropped. Pass `fields=["*"]` to opt out.
**Resource help comes from the instance, not from this repo.** `secobserve_describe_resource` reads `/api/oa3/schema/` on the running backend, so filter names and enums cannot drift from the deployed version. The same schema is used to reject unknown filter names before a request is sent: django-filter **silently ignores** parameters it does not recognise, so `filters={"vulnerability_id": "CVE-2021-44228"}` would otherwise return the *entire* unfiltered list and the agent would report a confident wrong answer. It now fails with the list of filters that do exist.
**Validation lives in the schema wherever a rule exists.** An assessment with no comment, a rejection with no remark, a bulk call over 250 ids, or a create with neither `product_id` nor `product_name` is refused by the input model before any HTTP request. Everything else is passed through, and the API's 400 body — which names the offending field — is returned verbatim.
Expected failures come back as tool *text*, not as a raised exception: MCP reports a raised exception to the client as a bare `Error executing tool