OPEN INTEREST

LEAD: Hoodi’s Glamsterdam activation is postponed. [https://blog.ethereum.org/2026/10/22/glamsterdam-hoodi-delay] TEST EDITION | October 26, 2026 The Ethereum Foundation withdrew Hoodi’s October 26, 2026 activation schedule. [https://blog.ethereum.org/2026/10/22/glamsterdam-hoodi-delay] Its announcement sets no replacement date. [https://blog.ethereum.org/2026/10/22/glamsterdam-hoodi-delay] Core developers delayed the upgrade to investigate interactions between EIP-8037 and mainnet smart contracts, according to the Foundation’s October 22, 2026 announcement. [https://blog.ethereum.org/2026/10/22/glamsterdam-hoodi-delay] The decision removes the scheduled execution and consensus upgrades, plus the planned increase in Hoodi’s gas limit to 200 million. [https://blog.ethereum.org/2026/10/22/glamsterdam-hoodi-delay] The change revises a future configuration; it does not reverse Hoodi’s chain history. [https://blog.ethereum.org/2026/10/22/glamsterdam-hoodi-delay] The updated configuration contains no replacement activation epoch or timestamp. [https://blog.ethereum.org/2026/10/22/glamsterdam-hoodi-delay] The Foundation says it will announce the replacement schedule separately. [https://blog.ethereum.org/2026/10/22/glamsterdam-hoodi-delay] The Foundation directs operators to check execution and consensus clients for releases explicitly incorporating the postponement. [https://blog.ethereum.org/2026/10/22/glamsterdam-hoodi-delay] It warns that release tables in the original announcement do not establish whether those versions include the revised configuration. [https://blog.ethereum.org/2026/10/22/glamsterdam-hoodi-delay] Validator operators also need to review instructions for validator clients and builder infrastructure, the announcement says. [https://blog.ethereum.org/2026/10/22/glamsterdam-hoodi-delay] The notice concerns Hoodi and establishes no mainnet activation date. [https://blog.ethereum.org/2026/10/22/glamsterdam-hoodi-delay] It requires no action from Ethereum mainnet users or ETH holders. [https://blog.ethereum.org/2026/10/22/glamsterdam-hoodi-delay] ALSO TODAY: [GOVERNANCE] LlamaRisk supports USDG borrowing on Aave Arbitrum. [https://governance.aave.com/t/direct-to-aip-asset-listing-usdg-arbitrum/25811] In its October 24, 2026 response, LlamaRisk recommends listing USDG as borrowable, with collateral use disabled. [https://governance.aave.com/t/direct-to-aip-asset-listing-usdg-arbitrum/25811] It recommends a 30 million USDG supply cap and 27 million USDG borrow cap; these remain recommendations. [https://governance.aave.com/t/direct-to-aip-asset-listing-usdg-arbitrum/25811] [SECURITY] Bitquery traces X100’s governance takeover. [https://bitquery.io/investigations/x100-hack] Its investigation, verified October 25, 2026, reports that an attacker obtained two of three Senate seats using borrowed funds. [https://bitquery.io/investigations/x100-hack] Bitquery reports approximately $4.85 million in USDT taken from the trading pool across two transactions on October 24, 2026. [https://bitquery.io/investigations/x100-hack] [BRIDGES] Bitquery identifies negative fees in the WAX bridge theft. [https://bitquery.io/investigations/wax-bridge-hack] Its investigation, verified October 24, 2026, attributes the October 22, 2026 withdrawals to fees that cancelled the amounts charged. [https://bitquery.io/investigations/wax-bridge-hack] Bitquery values five withdrawals at approximately $90,500, using stablecoins at $1 and swap prices for the other assets. [https://bitquery.io/investigations/wax-bridge-hack] READING LIST: [https://blog.ethereum.org/2026/10/22/glamsterdam-hoodi-delay] The Foundation specifies the withdrawn schedule and operator checks. [https://governance.aave.com/t/direct-to-aip-asset-listing-usdg-arbitrum/25811] The thread separates TokenLogic’s listing proposal from LlamaRisk’s parameter recommendations. [https://bitquery.io/investigations/x100-hack] The investigation explains how Senate voting and treasury execution connected. [https://bitquery.io/investigations/wax-bridge-hack] The accounting identifies the assets included in Bitquery’s loss estimate. METHOD: The sweep covered the Ethereum Foundation blog, Ethereum Research, Aave’s governance forum and Bitquery’s research blog. The target window was October 24–26, 2026, a 48-hour date span; the lead uses an October 22 announcement governing October 26. Search surfaced price forecasts, which were excluded. Claims about attacker identities, exchange freezes and an independently confirmed mainnet schedule were cut for failed verification. Both security items rest on Bitquery’s analysis; this edition did not independently replay transactions. Their figures remain attributed to Bitquery. The edition follows the fetched house guide. [https://raw.githubusercontent.com/openinterest-ai/paper/main/style-guide.html]