Sources: (1) Studtmann, Paul, “Aristotle’s Categories“, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) (2) Modrak, Deborah K. W., Aristotle’s Theory of Language and Meaning, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 4. (3) Falcon, Andrea, "Aristotle on Causality", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) (4) Cohen, S. Marc and C. D. C. Reeve, "Aristotle’s Metaphysics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) (5) Joe Sachs, "Aristotle: Motion and its Place in Nature", Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (6) Humphreys, Justin, "Aristotle (384 B.C.E.—322 B.C.E.)", Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (7) Shields, Christopher, "Aristotle’s Psychology", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) (8) Shields, Christopher, “Aristotle“, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) (9) Ainsworth, Thomas, “Form vs. Matter“, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) (10) Sorabji, Richard, “Aristotle on demarcating the five senses”, Philosophical Review, 1971 (11) Smith, Robin, “Aristotle’s Logic“, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) (12) Bodnar, Istvan, “Aristotle’s Natural Philosophy”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) (13) Matthen, Mohan, “The Holistic Presuppositions of Aristotle’s Cosmology”, in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 20:171-199 January 2001 (14) Miller, Fred, “Aristotle’s Political Theory“, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) (15) Waerdt, P. A. Vander, “Kingship and Philosophy in Aristotle’s Best Regime”, in Ancient Philosophy 5 1985, (1):77-89. (16) Kraut, Richard, “Aristotle’s Ethics”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) (17) Coppe, Ursula, “Time for Aristotle”, Oxford University Press, 2005 (18) van Fraassen, Bas C., “An introduction to the philosophy of time and space”, Random House, 1970
author: András L. Komáromi This work is distributed under Creative Commons Attribution License CC BY 4.0
particular
present-in
said-off
universal
numberOfRulers
textOfAssertion
desire
mind
rulingFaculty
just
question
composite
name
sensible
spatial
temporal
mode
answerToDifferentia
"a non-substantial [accidental] particular is a dependent entity, individuated only by reference to primary substance that it is present in. Hence, Socrates' whiteness cannot exist without Socrates." (Studtmann) Example: Socrates whiteness
Categories 4-fold division
AccidentalParticular-NonSubstantialParticular
"being is both said-of and present-in a primary substance if it is an accidental universal' The universal whiteness is said-of many primary substances but is only accidental to them." (Studtmann) Example: whiteness, as color
AccidentalUniversal
“The Active Intellect […] is something other than the passive intellect […] is the efficient cause of its thinking (i.e., of its taking on intelligible form). […] Nous poiêtikos [active intellect] is thus not ‘mind’ but an aspect of the mind; an aspect of a person’s mental capacities. The characteristics that have led some to identify nous poiêtikos with God or with something divine are these. It is, Aristotle says: ‘separate, impassive, ever-active, immortal, eternal’ But these attributes can be construed more antiseptically. They are mostly features of the immateriality of nous poiêtikos. Being separate does not imply a possible pre- or post-embodiment existence: rather, it implies nothing more than irreducibility to anything material.”
ActiveIntellect
"active powers or potentialities (dunameis),,, are external principles of change and being at rest (Metaphysics 9.8, 1049b5'10), operative on the corresponding internal passive capacities or potentialities (dunameis again, Metaphysics 9.1, 1046a11'13)" (Bodnar)
ActivePotentiality
"Actuality translates both energeia an entelecheia, and 'actuality' means just that area of overlap between being-at-work and being-at-an-end which expresses what it means to be something determinate. The words energeia and entelecheia have very different meanings, but function as synonyms because the world is such that things have identities, belong to species, act for ends, and form material into enduring organized wholes." (Sachs) Actuality is change what realizes fulfillment of a possibility.
Actuality
Aether is the matter/element for celestial bodies, moved by the Prime Unmoved Mover. It is a perfect element, not generated, and not corruptible.
Aether
An Assertion can be Affirmation or Denial
Affirmation
Agriculture
Air is element of the sublunary bodies. The nature of air is to move upwards.
Air
"the correct conception of justice is aristocratic, assigning political rights to those who make a full contribution to the political community, that is, to those with virtue as well as property and freedom. This is what Aristotle understands by an 'aristocratic' constitution: literally, the rule of the aristoi, i.e., best persons." (Miller) Aristotle proposes that the aristocrats should fulfill offices through rotation.
Aristocracy
Arts
Assertions (apophanseis) are sentences with a specific structure: "every such sentence must have the same structure: it must contain a subject and a predicate and must either affirm or deny the predicate of the subject." (Smith)
Assertion
Logic
AstronomicalTheory
"Aristotle groups together the before and afters in time, in change, and in place as all being of the same general type. Each of them, he says, is defined relative to some origin. [...] Aristotle also invokes the relation of following to explain what he calls 'the before and after' (219a14'19). Some explanation of what it is to be before or after is obviously needed in any account of time. In Aristotle's account, this explanation is of particular importance, as he is going to defne time as 'a number of change with respect to the before and after' (219b1'2). This definition will not be very informative unless he also has something to say about what it is to be before or after. But at this crucial point, he says frustratingly little. Such explanation as he gives, draws once again upon the relations between time, change, and magnitude. The before and after is, he tells us, first of all in place. (In this context, 'place' seems to be just another word for spatial magnitude.) Because there is a before and after in place, there is a before and after in change, and because there is a before and after in change, there is a before and after in time. As he puts it: 'Therefore, the before and after is first of all in place. And there it is in position. But since the before and after is in magnitude, it is necessary that also the before and after is in change, by analogy with the things there. But the before and after is also in time, through the following always of the one upon the other of them.' (219a14'19)" (Coppe)
Before&After
Change is ordered and continuous, because change in place is ordered and continuous: "Because there is a before and after in place, there is a before and after in change." (Coppe)
Before&AfterInChange
Change in place (motion) is ordered and continuous: "Because there is a before and after in place, there is a before and after in change" (Coppe)
Before&AfterInPlace
Being can be: particulars: EssentialParticular-PrimarySubstance; AccidentalParticular-NonSubstantialParticular and universals: EssentialUniversal-SecondarySubstance; AccidentalUniversal (Studtmann)
Being
Biology
Botany
"Aristotle places the following crucial condition on proper knowledge: we think we have knowledge of a thing only when we have grasped its cause (aitia)." (Falcon) "Natures, [...] can feature in any' four causal functions. However, when the matter of an entity functions as its nature' i.e., when its natural motion and rest are explained in terms of the matter it is made of'this matter must possess some causally relevant features, bestowed upon it by its own formal aspect." (Bodnar) Aristotle thinks that we have knowledge of a thing when we grasped its cause.
Cause
Celestial Bodies are the stars, the planets, the Sun, and the Moon. These are the most perfect realities, composed of unperishable and incorruptible aether.
CelestialBody
The Celestial Bodies, are located on the (perfect) celestial spheres. The stars are fixed on their own sphere; each planet, the Sun and the Moon circulates on its own sphere. This movement is circular, regular and continuous.
CelestialSphere
"In defining time as a number of change, Aristotle assumes that change is, in an important sense, prior to time. Time is something that is essentially dependent on change, and because of this, a true understanding of time must draw upon a prior understanding of change. This implies that change itself can be defined in a way that makes no reference to time. It thus rules out a certain natural way of using the notion of time to define change. ['] What, then, is Aristotle's account of change? Can he avoid making the nature of change essentially dependent on that of time? He lays out his account of change in books I and III of the Physics. He explains first, in Book I, that change always involves an underlying thing and two contraries. The underlying thing persists through the change, losing one contrary and gaining the other. For instance, when a man becomes musical, the underlying thing is the man. He persists through the change, being first unmusical and then musical. This tells us something about the basic structure of a change, but a full account of change must invoke the notion of potentiality. For such an account, we need to turn to Physics III.1'2. Aristotle says there that change is 'the actuality (entelecheia) of that which potentially is, qua such' (201a10'11)." (Coppe)
Change
ChangeInPlace
ChangeInQuality
ChangeInQuantity
ChangeInSubstance
'' the citizens (polit's) are that minority of the resident population who possess full political rights,' (Miller)
Citizen
"Polis, the city-state is composed of individual citizens, who, along with natural resources, are the 'material' or 'equipment' out of which the city-state is fashioned' the city-state is a hylomorphic (i.e., matter-form) compound of a particular population (i.e., citizen-body) in a given territory (material cause) and a constitution (formal cause)." (Miller)
City-State
Cold is quality of Water and Earth.
Cold
"Different communities (koinonia) are formed based on common functions and interests, as 'households, or economic classes (e.g., the rich and the poor), or demes (i.e., local political units)." (Miller)
Community
A possible role of an Assertion, relative to a Syllogism is Conclusion (sumperasma). E.g. C: Socrates is mortal.
Conclusion
“Aristotle defines the constitution (politeia) as a way of organizing the offices of the city-state, particularly the sovereign office . The constitution thus defines the governing body, which takes different forms: for example, in a democracy it is the people, and in an oligarchy it is a select few (the wealthy or well born)… The formal cause of the city-state is its constitution. Aristotle defines the constitution as ‘a certain ordering of the inhabitants of the city-state’… He also speaks of the constitution of a community as ‘the form of the compound’ and argues that whether the community is the same over time depends on whether it has the same constitution. The constitution is not a written document, but an immanent organizing principle, analogous to the soul of an organism. Hence, the constitution is also ‘the way of life’ of the citizens.” (Miller)
Constitution
"Aristotle defines the constitution (politeia) as a way of organizing the offices of the city-state, particularly the sovereign office. The constitution thus defines the governing body, which takes different [constitutional] forms: for example, in a democracy it is the people, and in an oligarchy it is a select few (the wealthy or well born)'' (Miller)
ConstitutionalForm
"some are typically better able to resist these counter-rational pressures than is the average person. Such people are not virtuous, although they generally do what a virtuous person does. Aristotle calls them 'continent' (enkratos) [person]' An incontinent person has his/her mind in a decent-, while desire in an ordered state, but mind rules desire." (Kraut)
ContinentPerson
"The relation between written and spoken words is conventional, as is the relation between spoken words and the mental states that are the vehicles of meaning; different languages correlate different sounds with the same intentional content and the same sound with different contents." (Modrak)
Convention
"The conception of universal justice undergirds the distinction between correct [forms] (just) and deviant (unjust) constitutions" (Miller)
CorrectForm
Dance
"in democracy (literally rule of the d'mos, i.e., people) it is the poor, so that these economic classes should be included in the definition of these forms.' Democracy is a deviant constitutional form because assumes a false conception of the ultimate end of the city-state, which is not an 'association to promote liberty and equality (as the democrats maintain) '. Instead, Aristotle argues, 'the good life is the end of the city-state, that is, a life consisting of noble actions". (Miller)
Democraty
Denial
Desire (orektikon) initiates motion: "Aristotle concludes, there is a faculty of desire whose activities and objects are primarily, if not autonomously or discretely, responsible for initiating end-directed motion in animals. What animals seek in action is some object of desire which is or seems to them to be good." (Shields)
Desire
A deviant form of constitution is unjust form of constitution.
DeviantForm
Differentia is an attribute, a mode.
Differentia
Categories 10-fold division
Differentia is an attribute, question which is able to differentiate the Genus/Species to the next level.
DifferentiaForGenus
DifferentiaForSpecies
Dry is quality of Fire and Earth.
Dry
Earth is element of the sublunary bodies. The nature of earth is to move downwards.
Earth
“The efficient cause: ‘the primary source of the change or rest’, e.g., the artisan, the art of bronze-casting the statue, the man who gives advice, the father of the child. […] However, an adequate explanation of the production of a statue requires also a reference to the efficient cause or the principle that produces the statue. For Aristotle, this principle is the art of bronze-casting the statue (Phys. 195 a 6–8. Cf. Metaph. 1013 b 6–9).” (Falcon)
EfficientCause
"Aristotle believes that everything is made of earth, air, fire, and water. These elements are defined by their possession of one of each of the two fundamental pairs of opposites, hot/cold and wet/dry. Aristotle also thinks that these elements can change into one another" (Ainsworth)
Element
"The pride of place in this classificatory scheme, according to Aristotle, goes to those entities that are neither said-of nor present-in anything. Such entities, Aristotle says, are primary substances [or essential particulars]. His favorite examples are an individual man and a horse [...] So, it is natural to interpret him as thinking that among primary substances are concrete particulars that are members of natural kinds." (Studtmann) Example: Socrates
EssentialParticular-PrimarySubstance
"in addition to primary substances, which are particulars, there are secondary substances, which are [essential] universals. His example of such an entity is man, which, [...] is a universal in the category of substance' we should interpret secondary substances as essential characteristics of primary substances" (Studtmann) Example: Man
EssentialUniversal-SecondarySubstance
Ethical virtues are virtues of character, like courage, temperance, honor etc. "Ethical virtue is fully developed only when it is combined with practical wisdom' Aristotle describes ethical virtue as a 'hexis' ('state' 'condition' 'disposition')'a tendency or disposition, induced by our habits, to have appropriate feeling. Defective states of character are hexeis (plural of hexis) as well, but they are tendencies to have inappropriate feelings. The significance of Aristotle's characterization of these states as hexeis is his decisive rejection of the thesis, found throughout Plato's early dialogues, that virtue is nothing but a kind of knowledge and vice nothing but a lack of knowledge. Although Aristotle frequently draws analogies between the crafts and the virtues (and similarly between physical health and eudaimonia), he insists that the virtues differ from the crafts and all branches of knowledge in that the former involve appropriate emotional responses and are not purely intellectual conditions." (Kraut)
EthicalVirtue
Ethics
"there is a type of agent [person] who refuses even to try to do what an ethically virtuous agent would do, because he has become convinced that justice, temperance, generosity and the like are of little or no value. Such people Aristotle calls evil [person] (kakos, phaulos). He assumes that evil people are driven by desires for domination and luxury, and although they are single-minded in their pursuit of these goals, he portrays them as deeply divided, because their pleonexia'their desire for more and more'leaves them dissatisfied and full of self-hatred." (Kraut)
EvilPerson
"Aristotle calls the term shared by the premises the middle term (meson) and each of the other two terms in the premises an extreme (akron)." (Smith) E.g: Socrates; are mortal in P1, P2.
Extreme
"The middle term must be either subject or predicate of each premise, and this can occur in three ways: the middle term can be the subject of one premise and the predicate of the other, the predicate of both premises, or the subject of both premises. Aristotle refers to these term arrangements as figures (schemata)". (Smith) There are 3 Figures.
Figure
The final cause: ‘the end, that for the sake of which a thing is done’, e.g., health is the end of walking, losing weight, purging, drugs, and surgical tools. […] A model is made for producing the statue. A mold is prepared for producing the statue. The bronze is melted and poured for producing the statue. Both the prior and the subsequent stage are for the sake of a certain end, the production of the statue. Clearly, the statue enters in the explanation of each step of the artistic production as the final cause or that for the sake of which everything in the production process is done. (Falcon)
FinalCause
Fire is element of the sublunary bodies. The nature of fire is to move upwards.
Fire
FirstPhilosophy-Metaphysics
"When a change, or a state of rest, is not natural [is Forced Motion], both the active and the passive potentiality need to be specified' The presence of the potentiality' can happen in the face of a contrary disposition on the part of the nature of the entity'in which case the change is forced (bi'i) or contrary to nature (para phusin)." (Bodnar)
ForcedMotion
Form of the object "form [in Aristotelian sense] =df that which makes some matter which is potentially F actually F' Acts, forms FormedMatter". (Shields) The form is that which unifies the Matter into a single object, and which provides actuality.
Hylomorphism
Form
“Formal cause, or the expression of what it is”, e.g., the shape of a statue. […] The bronze is melted and poured in order to acquire a new shape, the shape of the statue. This shape enters in the explanation of the production of the statue as the formal cause.” (Falcon)
FormalCause
Formed matter is contained in an Object (not used by Aristotle).
FormedMatter
"every genus must be differentiated by some differentia that falls outside that genus. Hence, if being were a genus, it would have to be differentiated by a differentia that fell outside of it.' (Studtmann)
Genus
Goal of the object Goal of a human person.
Goal
"every ethical virtue is a condition intermediate (a 'golden mean' as it is popularly known) between two other states, one involving excess, and the other deficiency. In this respect, Aristotle says, the virtues are no different from technical skills: every skilled worker knows how to avoid excess and deficiency, and is in a condition intermediate between two extremes. The courageous person, for example, judges that some dangers are worth facing and others not, and experiences fear to a degree that is appropriate to his circumstances. He lies between the coward, who flees every danger and experiences excessive fear, and the rash person, who judges every danger worth facing and experiences little or no fear." (Kraut)
GoldenMean
"Aristotle posits, that: 'the city-state comes into being for the sake of life but exists for the sake of the good life ' The theme that the good life or happiness is the proper end of the city-state recurs throughout the Politics" (Miller)
GoodLife
“Aristotle thinks everyone will agree that the terms ‘eudaimonia‘ (‘happiness‘) and ‘eu zên‘ (‘living well’) designate such an [highest] end… He regards ‘eudaimon‘ as a mere substitute for eu zên (‘living well’).” (Kraut)
Happiness
Health, Wealth are subordinate goals, they promote Happiness.
Health
"Aristotle's search for the good is a search for the highest good [goal], and he assumes that the highest good, whatever it turns out to be, has three characteristics: it is desirable for itself, it is not desirable for the sake of some other good, and all other goods are desirable for its sake." (Kraut)
HighestGoal
Hot is quality of Fire and Air.
Hot
"'the impetuous person [propeteia] does not go through a process of deliberation and does not make a reasoned choice; he simply acts under the influence of a passion. At the time of action, the impetuous person experiences no internal conflict. But once his act has been completed, he regrets what he has done. One could say that he deliberates, if deliberation were something that post-dated rather than preceded action; but the thought process he goes through after he acts comes too late to save him from error." (Kraut)
ImpetuousPerson
is a characterization of the Motion (Change)
InPlace
InQuality
InQuantity
InSubstance
"others are less successful than the average person in resisting these counter-pressures. They are 'incontinent' (akratos) [person]' Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of akrasia: impetuosity (propeteia) and weakness (astheneia)." (Kraut) A continent person has his/her mind in a decent-, while desire in an ordered state, but desire rules mind.
IncontinentPerson
"the various kinds of intellectual virtues: theoretical wisdom, science (episteme), intuitive understanding (nous), practical wisdom, and craft expertise." (Kraut)
IntelectualVirtue
The active intellect, that which thinks’ (to noêtikon) takes on the immaterial intelligible form linked to the object of thought (noêton)..
IntelligibleForm
"absolute kingship is a limiting case of aristocracy', when political power is exercised by one single person. Kingship is the best regime, when a ruler of kingly wirtue is present in the City-State. Aristotle suggests, that when such a person is present, 'that in the case of the best regime it would be unjust to expel such men or force them to share ruling with others, so that the natural course is for everyone to accept them gladly as permanent kings." (Vander Waerdt)
Kingship
"Aristotle places the following crucial condition on proper knowledge [of object]: we think we have knowledge of a thing only when we have grasped its cause (aitia). That proper knowledge is knowledge of the cause is repeated in the Physics: we think we do not have knowledge of a thing until we have grasped its why, that is to say, its cause" (Falcon)
KnowledgeOfObject
"The most important task for the politician is, in the role of lawgiver (nomothet's), to frame the appropriate constitution for the city-state" (Miller)
Lawgiver
LivingBeing
"the presence of the soul explains why this matter is the matter of a human being, as opposed to some other kind of thing. Now, this way of looking at soul-[living] body relations as a special case of form-matter relations treats reference to the soul as an integral part of any complete explanation of a living being, of any kind. To this degree, Aristotle thinks that Plato and other dualists are right to stress the importance of the soul in explanations of living beings. At the same time, he sees their commitment to the separability of the soul from the body as unjustified merely by appeal to formal causation: he will allow that the soul is distinct from the body, and is indeed the actuality of the body, but he sees that these concessions by themselves provide no grounds for supposing that the soul can exist without the body. His hylomorphism, then, embraces neither reductive materialism nor Platonic dualism. Instead, it seeks to steer a middle course between these alternatives by pointing out, implicitly, and rightly, that these are not exhaustive options." (Shields)
LivingBody
“The material cause: ‘that out of which’, e.g., the bronze of a statue. […] The bronze enters in the explanation of the production of the statue as the material cause. Note that the bronze is not only the material out of which the statue is made; it is also the subject of change, that is, the thing that undergoes the change and results in a statue. The bronze is melted and poured in order to acquire a new shape, the shape of the statue.” (Falcon)
MaterialCause
Mathematics
Matter provides the Potentiality for the Object. The matter is that which persists in the object, and which provides potentiality.
Matter
Mean by which the object was created
Mean
"The meaning is the intentional content of the psychological state for which the word stands'' (Modrak)
Meaning
Medicine
"the name-bearing mental state (pathema)" (Modrak)
MentalState
"Aristotle calls the term shared by the premises the middle term (meson)..." (Smith) E.g: man in P1, P2
MiddleTerm
"In De Anima III.4-5. “Aristotle gives an account of thinking (or intellect [mind]—noêsis) that is modeled on his account of perception in Book II. Just as in perception, ‘that which perceives’ (to aisthêtikon) takes on sensible form (without matter), so in thinking ‘that which thinks’ (to noêtikon) takes on intelligible form (without matter). Similarly, just as in perception, the perceiver has the quality of the object potentially, but not actually, so, too, in understanding, the intellect is potentially (although not actually) each of its objects. […] ‘intellect understands all things’ (nous panta noei, 429a19). Not only can you think about the objects of perception (colors, odors, sounds, the son of Diares, etc.), but you can think about things that can’t be perceived at all (numbers, virtues, etc.), either intrinsically or coincidentally. You can think about anything. This universality of the objects of thought has several important consequences. Intellect is ‘unmixed’ The first is that the intellect “must be unmixed,” i.e., must be pure potential (since it can think about anything, it must be only potentially that thing). So it has no nature of its own—if it did, it would be unable to think about that nature. Intellect is separable, perception is bodily ‘It is unreasonable for intellect to be mixed with the body, since it would then acquire some quality (for instance, hot or cold) or even, like the perceiving part, have some organ, whereas in fact it has none. (42925-27)’ Since intellect does not have a bodily organ, it is separable from the body: ‘… intellect is separable, whereas the perceiving part requires a body. (429b5)'” (Cohen)
Mind or intellect is a faculty posessed just by humans; it has 2 sub-types: Theoretical and Practical mind. 'Human minds do more than understand, however. It is equally essential to the human being to plan and deliberate, to ponder alternatives and strategize, and generally to chart courses of action.' (Shields) "Given that time is by definition something countable, the question naturally arises whether its existence depends on the existence of beings, like ourselves, who can count it. Aristotle raises this question towards the end of his discussion (223a21'9). Someone might be puzzled, he says, about whether there could be time if there were no ensouled beings. He presents an argument that there could not be. The argument is that since time is a kind of number, it is necessarily countable. As such, it can only exist in a world in which there are beings that can count. Since the only beings that can count are beings that have intellective souls [minds], there can only be time in a world in which there are such beings. He goes on to point out that this argument gives us no reason to think that change depends on the soul, since change, though it is closely connected to time, is not something that is necessarily countable" (Coppe)
Mind
"In Prior Analytics I.4'6, Aristotle shows that the premise combinations given in the following table yield deductions and that all other premise combinations fail to yield a deduction. In the terminology traditional since the middle ages, each of these combinations is known as a mood Latin modus, 'way', which in turn is a translation of Greek tropos). Aristotle, however, does not use this expression and instead refers to 'the arguments in the figures". (Smith) There are 14 Moods: 4 for the First figure, 4 for the Second figure, and 6 for the Third figure.
Mood
Moved (Passive Object) is set in motion, changed by the Active Object
MovedPassiveObject
Mover (Active Object) includes (Active) Potentiality which initiates motion, change in a Passive Object through its Passive Potentiality.
MoverActiveObject
Music
"the object in the world (pragma) that is the referent of the name (word)" (Modrak)
NameBearerObject
"when the matter of an entity functions as its nature'i.e., when its natural motion and rest are explained in terms of the matter it is made of'this matter must possess some causally relevant features, bestowed upon it by its own formal aspect' The presence of the potentiality can, nevertheless, be in accordance with the nature of the object'in which case the change is natural (phusei)" (Bodnar)
NaturalMotion
NaturalPhilosophy-Physics
"Nature [of an Object], according to Aristotle, is an inner principle of change and being at rest… This means that when an entity moves or is at rest according to its nature reference to its nature may serve as an explanation of the event… Natures, then, in a way do double duty: once a nature is operative, neither a further active, nor a further passive capacity needs to be invoked.” (Bodnar)
Nature
Non-citizens are all the resident persons in the resident population, who are not citizens (e.g., women, slaves, foreigners, children, old people, and some others).
Non-Citizen
"Mind includes the non-human animal level sense-perception [perceptive faculty], which includes the plant level nutrition." (Shields)
Nutrition
A material object. ''ordinary objects' as a first approximation, it serves to rely on the sorts of examples Aristotle himself employs when motivating hylomorphism: statues and houses, horses and humans." (Shields) Objects are essential particulars, like statues and houses, horses, and humans. Objects, according to Aristotle are primary existents, compounds of Matter and Form.
Object
“Aristotle claims that perception is best understood on the model of hylomorphic change generally… : ‘the perceptive faculty is in potentiality such as the object of perception already is in actuality’ and that when something is affected by an object of perception, ‘it is made like it and is such as that thing is… S perceives O if and only if: (i) S has the capacity requisite for receiving O’s sensible form; (ii) O acts upon that capacity by enforming it; and, as a result, (iii) S’s relevant capacity becomes isomorphic with that form.” (Shields)
ObjectOfPerception
“thinking consists in a mind’s becoming enformed by some object of thought, so that actual thinking occurs whenever some suitably prepared mind is ‘made like’ its object by being affected by it. This hylomorphic analysis of thinking is evidently a simple extension of the general model of hylomorphic change exploited by Aristotle in a host of similar contexts. Accordingly, Aristotle’s initial account of thinking will directly parallel his analysis of perception (De Anima iii 4, 429a13–18). That is, at least in schematic outline, Aristotle will offer the following approach. For any given thinker S and an arbitrary object of thought O: S thinks O if and only if: (i) S has the capacity requisite for receiving O’s intelligible form; (ii) O acts upon that capacity by enforming it; and, as a result, (iii) S’s relevant capacity becomes isomorphic with that form.” (Shields)
"the dominant class in oligarchy (literally rule of the oligoi, i.e., few) is typically the wealthy 'The oligarchs mistakenly think that those who are superior in wealth should also have superior political rights''. This approach of political justice is mistaken because assumes a false conception of the ultimate end of the city-state, which is not a 'business enterprise to maximize wealth (as the oligarchs suppose)'. Instead, Aristotle argues, 'the good life is the end of the city-state, that is, a life consisting of noble actions'". (Miller)
Oligarchy
Particular is the real existent, at the bottom of the hierarchy.
Particular
“Aristotle never actually uses the phrase nous pathêtikos (passive intellect), but the concept is clearly present in his account. We can reconstruct his argument as follows. It begins with the total passivity of an intellect that can ‘become all things.’ The passive intellect is potentially each of its objects, but not actually any of them. (429a16) The passive intellect can think anything. (429a18) Hence, the passive intellect is actually nothing until it thinks. (429a23)”
PassiveIntellect
"the passive potentiality, is in the object undergoing change" (Bodnar)
PassivePotentiality
"Aristotle claims that [sense] perception is best understood on the model of hylomorphic change generally: just as a house changes from blue to white when acted upon by the agency of a painter applying paint, so 'perception comes about with <an organ's> being changed and affected' for it seems to be a kind of alteration'. So in line with his general account of alteration, Aristotle treats perception as a case of interaction between two suitable agents: objects capable of acting and capacities capable of being affected.' Sensible species is the representation of the object in the sense-organs." (Shields)
Perception
The potency of perception.
PerceptiveFaculty
A human person
Person
"Aristotle holds that a happy life must include pleasure, and he therefore opposes those who argue that pleasure is by its nature bad. He insists that there are other pleasures besides those of the senses, and that the best pleasures are the ones experienced by virtuous people who have sufficient resources for excellent activity."
Pleasure
"Political offices were different bodies. “In Athens, for example, citizens had the right to attend the assembly, the council, and other bodies, or to sit on juries. The Athenian system differed from a modern representative democracy in that the citizens were more directly involved in governing.” (Miller)
PoliticalOffice
"Political science studies the tasks of the politician or statesman (politikos), in much the way that medical science concerns the work of the physician. It is, in fact, the body of knowledge that such practitioners, if truly expert, will also wield in pursuing their tasks." (Miller)
Politician
Politics
"polity is' a kind of 'mixed' constitution typified by rule of the 'middle' group of citizens, a moderately wealthy class between the rich and poor." (Miller)
Polity
"A Potential State (dunamis) is the of an object capacity to be in a different and more completed state'' (Cohen, Mark, Reeve) Potentiality is 'possibility' that a thing can have. e.g: a piece of bronze, casted into a statue or into a bowl. In Aristotle's terminology, the piece of bronze has (at least) two different potentialities, since it is potentially a statue and also potentially a bowl. "change always requires the existence of a potentiality which can be actualised' Aristotle's formulation strongly suggests that the potentiality actualised in the process of change is not a separate and independent potentiality for motion' Accordingly, potentialities of change are admitted into the ontology. They, nevertheless, do not need to feature as potentialities in their own right, but as the incomplete variants of the fundamental potentiality for an end result' The definition of motion as the actuality of a potentiality of the entity undergoing motion in so far as it is potential requires that in each case the passive potentiality for the change is present in the changing object." (Bodnar)
Potentiality
PracticalSciences
'practical wisdom (phron'sis), '. cannot be acquired solely by learning general rules. We must also acquire, through practice, those deliberative, emotional, and social skills that enable us to put our general understanding of well-being into practice in ways that are suitable to each occasion.' (Kraut) Mastery of politics is the highest level of practical wisdom.
PracticalWisdom
A Predicate (katêgorein) is an essential part of Assertion. E.g: are mortal; is man; is mortal in P1, P2, C.
Predicate
A possible role of an Assertion, relative to a Syllogism is Premise (protasis). E.g. P1: All man are mortal. P2: Socrates is a man.
Premise
"According to the traditional interpretation of Aristotle prime matter is: 'the matter of the elements' This prime matter is usually described as pure potentiality, just as, on the form side, the unmoved movers are said by Aristotle to be pure actuality, form without any matter. What it means to call prime matter 'pure potentiality' is that it is capable of taking on any form whatsoever, and thus is completely without any essential properties of its own. It exists eternally, since, if it were capable of being created or destroyed, there would have to be some even lower matter to underlie those changes. Because it is the matter of the elements, which are themselves present in all more complex bodies, it is omnipresent, and underlies not only elemental generation and destruction, but all physical changes." (Ainsworth) Prime matter is usually described as pure potentiality, unformed. Prime matter is usually described as pure potentiality, unformed.
PrimeMatter
ProductiveSciences
For each Mood there is a logical Proof provided by Aristotle.
Proof
Psychology
'' any creature with perception will also have the ability to take on nutrition and to reproduce' (Shields)
Reproduction
"A resident person is a human who is resident of the City-State, living under the rule of the Constitution. 'human beings are by nature political animals, who naturally want to live together" (Miller)
ResidentPerson
Resident population is a collective of resident persons.
ResidentPopulation
Right (exousia) in this context relates citizen with political office.
Right
“The existence of the city-state also requires an efficient cause, namely, its ruler (archôn). On Aristotle’s view, a community of any sort can possess order only if it has a ruling element or authority.” (Miller)
Ruler
"Aristotelian sciences divide into three: (i) theoretical, (ii) practical, and (iii) productive. The principles of division are straightforward: theoretical science seeks knowledge for its own sake; practical science concerns conduct and goodness in action, both individual and societal; and productive science aims at the creation of beautiful or useful objects '. Science or knowledge (epistem') is about universal, necessary things with identified causes. Logic in this sense is not a science, it is 'just' a tool." (Shields)
Science-Knowledge
Ship-building
"the presence of the soul explains why this matter is the matter of a human being, as opposed to some other kind of thing. Now, this way of looking at soul-[human] body relations as a special case of form-matter relations treats reference to the soul as an integral part of any complete explanation of a living being, of any kind. To this degree, Aristotle thinks that Plato and other dualists are right to stress the importance of the soul in explanations of living beings. At the same time, he sees their commitment to the separability of the soul from the body as unjustified merely by appeal to formal causation: he will allow that the soul is distinct from the body, and is indeed the actuality of the body, but he sees that these concessions by themselves provide no grounds for supposing that the soul can exist without the body. His hylomorphism, then, embraces neither reductive materialism nor Platonic dualism. Instead, it seeks to steer a middle course between these alternatives by pointing out, implicitly, and rightly, that these are not exhaustive options." (Shields)
Soul
SpecialSciences
'the essence of any species, according to Aristotle, consists in its genus and the differentia that together with that genus defines the species.' (Studtmann)
Species
The spoken form of a word
SpokenWord
StateOfMind
A Subject (hupokeimenon) is an essential part of an Assertion. E.g: All man; Socrates in P1, P2, C.
Subject
Sublunary bodies are located under the Celestial Sphere of the Moon. They include the Earth ' the center of the universe, ad all the natural (e.g. minerals, living beings, humans) and man-made objects (e.g. houses, statues) in the Earth. Sublunary bodies can move naturally ' depending on the Nature of the Sublunary Matter they are composed of -, and can have forced movements.
SublunaryBody
"[sublunary] matter [in Aristotelian sense] =df that which persists and which is, for some range of Fs, potentially F" (Shields) Sublunary matter, at the bottom level, is composed of a mix of the four elements, is generated and corruptible.
SublunaryMatter
"all subordinate goals' are sought because they promote well-being, not because they are what well-being consists in' Aristotle makes it clear that in order to be happy one must possess others goods as well'such goods as friends, wealth, and power. And one's happiness is endangered if one is severely lacking in certain advantages'if, for example, one is extremely ugly, or has lost children or good friends through death." (Kraut)
SubordinateGoal
"every genus must be differentiated by some differentia that falls outside that genus. Hence, if being were a genus, it would have to be differentiated by a differentia that fell outside of it. In other words, being would have to be differentiated by some non-being, which, according to Aristotle, is a metaphysical absurdity. Although he does not explicitly make this claim, Aristotle's argument, if cogent, would generalize to any proposal for a single highest kind. Hence, he does not think that there is one single highest kind. Instead, he thinks that there are ten." Supreme genus (highest kind) can be of have 10: (1) substance; (2) quantity; (3) quality; (4) relatives; (5) somewhere; (6) sometime; (7) being in a position; (8) having; (9) acting; and (10) being acted upon. (Studtmann)
SupremeGenus-HighestKind
A syllogism is an "inference with two premises, each of which is a categorical sentence, having exactly one term in common, and having as a conclusion a categorical sentence the terms of which are just those two terms not shared by the premises". (Smith) Not all the triplets of two premises and one conclusion of the required structure are syllogisms, only just those who lead to a valid inference, listed in the moods. E.g. P1: All man are mortal. P2: Socrates is man, C: Socrates is mortal.
Syllogism
Subjects and predicates of assertions are terms (horos) which can be either individual, e.g. Socrates, or universal, e.g. human. Subjects may be individual or universal, but predicates can only be universals.
Term
Territory and assets, like: natural resources, buildings, roads etc.
Territory&Assets
Theatre
TheoreticalSciences
'exercising theoretical wisdom is a more important component of our ultimate goal than practical wisdom'' The happiest life is lived by someone who conducts virtuous activity based on theoretixal wisdom: 'has a full understanding of the basic causal principles that govern the operation of the universe, and who has the resources needed for living a life devoted to the exercise of that understanding. Evidently Aristotle believes that his own life and that of his philosophical friends was the best available to a human being. He compares it to the life of a god: god thinks without interruption and endlessly, and a philosopher enjoys something similar for a limited period of time.' (Kraut)
TheroraticalWisdom
"thinking consists in a mind's becoming enformed by some object of thought, so that actual thinking occurs whenever some suitably prepared mind is 'made like' its object by being affected by it. This hylomorphic analysis of thinking is evidently a simple extension of the general model of hylomorphic change exploited by Aristotle in a host of similar contexts. Accordingly, Aristotle's initial account of thinking will directly parallel his analysis of perception (De Anima iii 4, 429a13'18). That is, at least in schematic outline, Aristotle will offer the following approach. For any given thinker S and an arbitrary object of thought O: S thinks O if and only if: (i) S has the capacity requisite for receiving O's intelligible form; (ii) O acts upon that capacity by enforming it; and, as a result, (iii) S's relevant capacity becomes isomorphic with that form." (Shields) Thinking: 'the active intellect makes things thinkable by making them actually thought-about.'
Thinking
Tyranny is power exercised by one person, who rules according to its own interests, not of his subjects.
Tiranny
"in the De caelo Aristotle treats of the universe as a single individual substance [object] with form and matter' 'Since the universe is perceptible, it is an individual thing [object]; for every perceptible thing exists in matter' Aristotle's assertion, in De caelo 1. 9, that the universe is individual occurs in the context of his rejecting the atomist's many-worlds thesis: 'Such a plurality is impossible if this world is made from the entirety of matter, as it is'. In general, form admits of plural instantiations, he concedes. However, when a form is instantiated in all matter, it can be instantiated only once.' (Matthen)
Universe
"The unmoved movers are methaphysiscal, non-material entities, which are not part of the physical world. 'Aristotle postulates that the processes of the universe depend on an eternal motion (or on several eternal motions), the eternal revolution of the heavenly spheres, which in turn is dependent on one or several unmoved movers' (Bodnar) 'In the De caelo Aristotle posits an unchanging intelligent being that exists beyond the heavens, enjoying there 'the best and most selfsufficient life' (1. 9, 279121-2). In Physics 8 and Metaphysics this entity becomes the Prime Unmoved Mover, ultimately responsible for all movement, change, and generation in the universe' The Prime Mover is the unmoved mover (see [1.3.13]) of the sublunary elements. So it seems natural to assume that the self-mover responsible for the motion of fire and earth has the Prime Mover as its unmoved part. The Prime Mover moves the aether, and as we have seen, the aether moves the sublunary elements." (Matthen, 2001)
UnmovedMover
Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of virtue: "those that pertain to the part of the soul that engages in reasoning (virtues of mind or intellect), and those that pertain to the part of the soul that cannot itself reason but is nonetheless capable of following reason (ethical virtues, virtues of character)." (Kraut)
Virtue
inheresIn
'Aristotle asks what the ergon ('function', 'task', 'work') of a human being is, and argues that it consists in activity of the rational part of the soul in accordance with virtue [virtuous activity]' The good of a human being must have something to do with being human; and what sets humanity off from other species, giving us the potential to live a better life, is our capacity to guide ourselves by using reason. If we use reason well, we live well as human beings; or, to be more precise, using reason well over the course of a full life is what happiness consists in. Doing anything well requires virtue or excellence, and therefore living well consists in activities caused by the rational soul in accordance with virtue or excellence' Living well consists in doing something, not just being in a certain state or condition. It consists in those lifelong activities that actualize the virtues of the rational part of the soul.' (Kraut)
VirtuousActivity
"Like anyone who has developed a skill in performing a complex and difficult activity, the virtuous person takes pleasure in exercising his intellectual skills. Furthermore, when he has decided what to do, he does not have to contend with internal pressures to act otherwise. He does not long to do something that he regards as shameful; and he is not greatly distressed at having to give up a pleasure that he realizes he should forego." (Kraut) A virtuous person has his/her mind in a very good-, while desire in an ordered state.
VirtuousPerson
Water is element of the sublunary bodies. The nature of water is to move downwards.
Water
"The person who is weak [astheneia] goes through a process of deliberation and makes a choice; but rather than act in accordance with his reasoned choice, he acts under the influence of a passion." (Kraut)
WeakPerson
Wealth
Wet is quality of Water and Air.
Wet
A word in a given language
Word
The written form of a word
WrittenWord
initiates
necessaryFor
actsUponEnforms
mediates
IsContainedIn
aetherMovesElement
isComponentOf
locatedOn
has
aimsTo
generallyDoes
dryInheresInEarth
isSubquantityOf
actsOn
creates
refersTo
createdFor
createdWith
moves
enforms
participatedIn
holds
deduction
promotes
isAggregateMemberOf
rules
sometimesDoes
forms
generates
"In the Metaphysics, Aristotle presents what I shall call a 'presentrelative' view of temporal order. It is a view that defines the temporal 'before' and 'after' [in time] in terms of distance from the present. This view is striking both because of the central role it accords to the present and because it makes temporal order depend upon duration (upon 'distance' from the present). Because of the reference to the present, it is, in a certain sense, a static account of the before and after in time. It describes temporal order as from some particular present and tells us nothing about the relation between this order and temporal order as from some other present." (Coppe)
Before&AfterInTime
Past, present and future are phases of time. According to Aristotle past and present is necessary, the future is contingent.
Future
Number
Past
Present
"Aristotle's account represents time as a kind of universal order and that this is why he defines it, oddly, as a number. It is, he says, a 'number of change', a single order within which all changes are related to one another. [...] Time is something that is essentially dependent on change [...] Aristotle defines time as a kind of number. 'It is 'a number of change with respect to the before and after' (219b1'2). He introduces this definition as if it is quite uncontroversial. He simply says, 'for this is what time is [...] ' (219b1). Though he goes on to explain the sense in which time is a kind of number, he does not really give us an argument for defining it in this way." (Coppe)
Time
Imagination (phantasia) to produces images: "Aristotle identifies imagination as 'that in virtue of which an image occurs in us', where this is evidently given a broad range of application to the activities involved in thoughts, dreams, and memories'' (Shields) Aristotle regards the images used in cognitive processes in two ways: 1/ as having its very form in the mind (conformity), 2/ a mental image in the mind that naturally resembles the object (resemblance).
Imagination
Memory stores and recollects images.
Memory
"desire and practical reason [mind] (De Anima iii 10, 433a17'19), though they do not work in isolation from one another. Rather, practical reason, broadly construed to incorporate the kind of image-processing present in non-human animals, is a source of movement when it focuses upon an object of desire as something desirable. So, practical reason and desire act corporately as the sources of purposive motion in all animals, both human and non-human (De Anima iii 10, 433a9'16), even though, ultimately, it is desire whose objects prick practical intellect and set it in motion (De Anima iii 10, 433a17'2)." (Shields)
PracticalMind
Theoretical mind (sophia): from experience grasps of first principles (ta pr'ta); generates knowledge (epistem').
TheoreticalMind
Common sense (koine aisthesis) unifies and monitors the 5 senses.
CommonSense
"Aristotle claims that [sense] perception [hearing] is best understood on the model of hylomorphic change generally: just as a house changes from blue to white when acted upon by the agency of a painter applying paint, so 'perception comes about with <an organ's> being changed and affected' for it seems to be a kind of alteration'. So in line with his general account of alteration, Aristotle treats perception as a case of interaction between two suitable agents: objects capable of acting and capacities capable of being affected." (Shields) Sensible species is the representation of the object in the sense-organs.
HearPerception
"Aristotle claims that [sense] perception [see] is best understood on the model of hylomorphic change generally: just as a house changes from blue to white when acted upon by the agency of a painter applying paint, so 'perception comes about with <an organ's> being changed and affected' for it seems to be a kind of alteration'. So in line with his general account of alteration, Aristotle treats perception as a case of interaction between two suitable agents: objects capable of acting and capacities capable of being affected." (Shields) Sensible species is the representation of the object in the sense-organs.
SeePerception
"Aristotle claims that [sense] perception [smell] is best understood on the model of hylomorphic change generally: just as a house changes from blue to white when acted upon by the agency of a painter applying paint, so 'perception comes about with <an organ's> being changed and affected' for it seems to be a kind of alteration'. So in line with his general account of alteration, Aristotle treats perception as a case of interaction between two suitable agents: objects capable of acting and capacities capable of being affected." (Shields) Sensible species is the representation of the object in the sense-organs.
SmellPerception
"Aristotle claims that [sense] perception [taste] is best understood on the model of hylomorphic change generally: just as a house changes from blue to white when acted upon by the agency of a painter applying paint, so 'perception comes about with <an organ's> being changed and affected' for it seems to be a kind of alteration'. So in line with his general account of alteration, Aristotle treats perception as a case of interaction between two suitable agents: objects capable of acting and capacities capable of being affected." (Shields) Sensible species is the representation of the object in the sense-organs.
TastePerception
"Aristotle claims that [sense] perception [Touch] is best understood on the model of hylomorphic change generally: just as a house changes from blue to white when acted upon by the agency of a painter applying paint, so 'perception comes about with <an organ's> being changed and affected' for it seems to be a kind of alteration'. So in line with his general account of alteration, Aristotle treats perception as a case of interaction between two suitable agents: objects capable of acting and capacities capable of being affected." (Shields) Sensible species is the representation of the object in the sense-organs.
TouchPerception
exist
real
activity
necessarily_the_case
essential
senseRelated
textOfTerm
Language
Convention SubClassOf conventionMediatesSpokenWord some SpokenWord
Whiteness_as_colour Type AccidentalUniversal