Annotation
literal: Sources: (1) Klima, Gyula, “John Buridan”, Oxford University Press, 2009 (2) Zupko, Jack, “John Buridan“, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) (3) Spade, Vincent, “Thoughts, Words and Things: An Introduction to Late Mediaeval Logic and Semantic Theory”, Version 1.2: December 27, 2007

Annotation
literal: author: András L. Komáromi This work is distributed under Creative Commons Attribution License CC BY 4.0

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #CategorematicConcept
literal: "Concepts, being representative acts of the mind, are naturally classified in terms of their representative function, which in turn is specifi ed in terms of what and how these concepts represent or naturally signify. However, some concepts represent something only in connection with other concepts, whereas others represent something in themselves. The former are called syncategorematic, whereas the latter are called categorematic concepts." (Klima)

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #CategorematicConcept
literal: CategorematicConcept

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #CategorematicTerm
literal: "A categorematic term, therefore, is said to signify the concept to which it is subordinated immediately, but it is imposed to signify ultimately the object (or objects) conceived by this concept, in the manner that it is (or they are) conceived by means of this concept [...]" (Klima)

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #CategorematicTerm
literal: CategorematicTerm

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #ComplexConcept
literal: "Syncategorematic concepts modify the representative function of categorematic concepts by forming with them new concepts that have a representative function different from that of the original categorematic concept. Therefore, it is natural to think of these new concepts as resulting from the combination of categorematic and syncategorematic concepts, and thus, as having some intrinsic structure, that is to say, a certain complexity. Indeed, when Buridan is talking about complex concepts as being the result of combination [complexio], he definitely gives us the impression that the conceptual combination in question strictly parallels the syntactical combination of the corresponding written or spoken phrases. [...] The combination [complexio] of simple concepts is called a 'mental expression', [and results from] compounding or dividing [componendo vel dividendo] by means of the second operation of the intellect, and the terms of such an expression are the simple concepts that the intellect puts together or separates. Now, just as simple concepts are designated for us by means of simple utterances, which we call 'words', so also do we designate a combination of simple concepts by a combination of words. It is for this reason that a spoken expression is an utterance made up of several words, which signifies for us the combination of concepts in the mind." (Klima, Buridan)

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #ComplexConcept
literal: ComplexConcept

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #Concept
literal: A concept is a term in mental language an act of understanding. "Buridan makes it quite clear that in his view a concept cannot vary its semantic features, which means that there is no ambiguity in mental language. The same concept always represents the same things in the same way, so there is not even a variation of supposition in mental language in the way there is in spoken or written languages" (Klima)

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #Concept
literal: A concept is a term in mental language an act of understanding. "concepts, the acts of understanding which render utterances and inscriptions meaningful, are just as singular as as are the utterances and inscriptions themselves. In addition, the acts of imposition whereby we subordinate utterances and inscriptions to concepts are singular, voluntary acts. This renders the relation of subordination conventional and changeable from one occasion of use to the next. So, the correlation of these singular items, inscriptions, utterances, and concepts is to be established in a piecemeal way, by carefully evaluating which utterance or inscription is subordinated to which concept in whose mind, on which occasion of its use, in what context. [...] Buridan makes it quite clear that in his view a concept cannot vary its semantic features, which means that there is no ambiguity in mental language. The same concept always represents the same things in the same way, so there is not even a variation of supposition in mental language in the way there is in spoken or written languages" (Klima)

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #Concept
literal: Concept

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #Context
literal: Context is the "variable conditions of interpretation, such as when, where, by whom, to whom, according to what intention, and so on a token is to be interpreted [...] So, in the specification of acts of imposition we might use variables indistinctly referring to any number of individual users, various times, places, or any other relevant contextual factors [...]" (Klima)

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #Context
literal: Context

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #Convention
literal: "So, although we can use any utterance and inscription in the way we wish, once it is conventionally instituted to signify somehow, that established signification is to be regarded as its proper, primary sense, and any other only as a secondary, improper sense." (Klima) Convention might vary in time.

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #Convention
literal: Convention

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #Expression
literal: "a spoken expression is an utterance made up of several words" (Buridan)

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #Expression
literal: Expression

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #ImproperSense
literal: "So, although we can use any utterance and inscription in the way we wish, once it is conventionally instituted to signify somehow, that established signifcation is to be regarded as its proper, primary sense, and any other only as a secondary, improper sense." (Klima) Improper sense interpretation can be ironic, figurative, metaphoric, etc.

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #ImproperSense
literal: ImproperSense

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #ImproperSupposition
literal: "Improper supposition [...] is the kind of supposition or reference a term has when it is used figuratively and not literally. Now a detailed semantics of metaphor was just as much beyond the reach of mediaeval authors as it is beyond our reach today. So we should not be surprised to find that the theory of improper supposition is not worked out very fully." (Spade)

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #ImproperSupposition
literal: ImproperSupposition

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #Inscription
literal: "[...] any spoken language is but a system of singular utterances [vox], while any written language is but a system of singular inscriptions. Moreover, it is obvious that any such utterance or inscription belongs to a language only insofar as it produces some understanding in the minds of competent users of the language, that is to say, insofar as it is meaningful at all. [...] Buridan does talk about the fact that any linguistic sign (whether spoken [utterance], written [incription], or even mental) is a singular occurrence (which we call a token)" (Klima)

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #Inscription
literal: Inscription

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #Interpretation
literal: "That is to say, a rule that applies to a token in virtue of its interpretation as belonging to a given type under such and such conditions of its use applies to all tokens of the same type under the same conditions. [...] To be sure, the correct interpretation need not be the interpretation expressing the proper or primary sense, because occasionally the correct, intended interpretation is provided by some improper, secondary sense of the phrase in question. In fact, this is precisely why it is the intention expressed by the phrase on the given occasion of its use that determines its correct semantic evaluation. The reason for this is that the written or spoken phrase has any sense whatsoever only in virtue of the fact that it is subordinated to the concept or intention it is supposed to express according to the intended interpretation, for it signifies just what is conceived by the corresponding concept. So, the correct interpretation of an utterance or inscription is fixed by the mental concept to which the utterance or inscription is actually subordinated on a particular occasion of its use. Consequently, the reason why tokens of the same type have the same semantic features allowing us the primacy of mental language to evaluate them in the same way in the same type of context is that under these circumstances they are subordinated to the same concept. [...] So, although we can use any utterance and inscription in the way we wish, once it is conventionally instituted to signify somehow, that established signifcation is to be regarded as its proper, primary sense, and any other only as a secondary, improper sense. Nevertheless, there is no hard and fast rule that says that we should take the expressions of our spoken or written languages always in their primary sense, and that we should evaluate our propositions for their truth or falsity accordingly. On the contrary, sometimes we are obliged to take written or spoken expressions in their secondary, improper sens…

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #Interpretation
literal: Interpretation

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #LawOfReasoning
literal: "Laws of reasoning are universal, necessary laws describing, spelling out the practical logical rules" (Klima)

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #LawOfReasoning
literal: LawOfReasoning

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #Logic
literal: Logic

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #Logic
literal: "Logic is in its entirety about arguments, their principles, parts, and attributes; therefore, we should consider in logic everything in its relation to argumentation. Thus, the division of logic is taken from argumentation. [..] In this broader sense, the art of logic also deserves to be called a science, namely, a practical science, the possession of which guides us in our rational practice of forming and evaluating arguments. In this connection, Buridan also draws the famous distinction between logica utens and logica docens, that is, logic-in-use and logical doctrine." (Klima)

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #LogicInUse
literal: "Buridan also draws the famous distinction between logica utens and logica docens, that is, logic-in-use and logical doctrine, only the latter of which can be called an art or practical science, whereas the former embodies those operative principles that are spelled out by the latter. For of course logical rules are operative in all our rational activities, yet those rules in operation, without being spelled out and reflected on, do not constitute logical knowledge. In fact, as Buridan remarks, sometimes, as in the case of sophistic arguments, they lead to something contrary to knowledge, namely, deception." (Klima)

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #LogicInUse
literal: Logic-in-use

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #LogicalDoctrine
literal: "Buridan also draws the famous distinction between logica utens and logica docens, that is, logic-in-use and logical doctrine, only the latter of which can be called an art or practical science, whereas the former embodies those operative principles that are spelled out by the latter. [...] logical doctrine, the systematic body of knowledge concerning the universal, necessary laws of various forms of reasoning, is certainly a science, even if not a theoretical one, such as metaphysics, mathematics, or physics. It is, rather, a practical science, which teaches us how to construct and evaluate our argumentations to achieve our desired ends with them, whatever those ends may be." (Klima)

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #LogicalDoctrine
literal: LogicalDoctrine

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #LogicalRule
literal: "logical rules are operative in all our rational activities" (Klima)

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #LogicalRule
literal: LogicalRule

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #MaterialSupposition
literal: "We have also seen that in various propositional contexts the same term may not stand for its ultimatesignificata at all, but either for its immediate significata (the token concepts it is subordinated to) or for itself and other token terms of the same kind. In all such cases, when a term does not stand for its ultimate significata, Buridan says that it is taken nonsignificatively, that is, materially, or in material supposition. By contrast, when a categorematic term stands for its ultimate significata, it is taken significatively, or in personal supposition." (Klima) Material supposition is a subkind of supposition. For conventional (written and spoken) languages Buridan accepts Ockham's view on supposition.

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #MaterialSupposition
literal: MaterialSupposition

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #MaterialSuppositionForSyncategoramaticTerm
literal: Syncategorematic terms can have just material supposition

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #MaterialSuppositionForSyncategoramaticTerm
literal: MaterialSuppositionForSyncatogramaticTerm

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #MentalPersonalSupposition
literal: "Buridan makes it quite clear that in his view a concept cannot vary its semantic features, which means that there is no ambiguity in mental language. The same concept always represents the same things in the same way, so there is not even a variation of supposition in mental language in the way there is in spoken or written languages: We should know, therefore, that (as it seems to me), material material supposition occurs only where signifi cative utterances are concerned. For no mental term in a mental proposition supposits materially, but rather always personally, for we do not use mental terms by convention [ad placitum] as we do with utterances and written marks. This is because the same mental expression never has diverse signifi cations, or acceptations; for the affections of the soul [ passiones animae] are the same for all, just like the things of which they are the likenesses, as is said in bk. 1 of On Interpretation. [...] A concept that represents some object does not signify it by virtue of anything else: to have such a concept active in one�s mind is just to conceive of the object in the way the concept represents it. This understanding of the representative function of a concept, however, immediately renders Ockham's account problematic. For to have a concept active in one�s mind on this understanding is to conceive of the object represented by the concept, whereas the same concept may represent different objects. Sometimes it may represent its ordinary objects, as the concept of human beings does in the mental counterpart of 'Man is an animal'. At other times, it may represent itself or a similar concept, as it does in the mental counterpart of 'Man is a species'. Consequently, it would appear that one might not be sure just what one conceives of, for one may not be sure whether the same concept is to be taken to stand for itself or for its ordinary objects, just as one may not be sure about the supposition of the subject termof the corresponding sp…

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #MentalPersonalSupposition
literal: MentalPersonalSupposition

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #MentalProposition
literal: Mental propositions are compounds of concepts. "when the mental propositions concern things other than items in a language [extramental objects], they cannot further be mapped onto some sort of propositional entities, given the demands of Buridan's nominalist ontology. So, because syncategorematic concepts do not represent anything in extramental reality, but only modify the representative function of categorematic concepts, the second mapping definitely has to be 'coarser': a mental proposition concerning things in the world can only signify things [objects] that are signified by its categorematic terms (the terms flanking its copula), whence even nonsynonymous propositions that share the same terms will end up signifying the same things." (Klima)

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #MentalProposition
literal: MentalProposition

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #MentalSuppositum
literal: A concept in the context of a (mental) proposition refers to (supposits) a mental suppositum.

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #MentalSuppositum
literal: MentalSuppositum

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #Mind
literal: A human mind

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #Mind
literal: Mind

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #MixedTerm
literal: "To be sure, there are also some mixed terms, which, for example primarily signify some syncategorematic act of the mind, but also connote, on account of the connotation of the concept they are subordinated to, something ad extra, such as the verbal copula, which primarily signifies the mental act of composition (the joining of subject and predicate in a proposition), but also connotes some time relative to the present time of the speaker." (Klima)

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #MixedTerm
literal: MixedTerm

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #Object
literal: An object, a thing or state of affairs in the external (or internal) world.

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #Object
literal: Object

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #PersonalSupposition
literal: "We have also seen that in various propositional contexts the same term may not stand for its ultimatesignificata at all, but either for its immediate significata (the token concepts it is subordinated to) or for itself and other token terms of the same kind. In all such cases, when a term does not stand for its ultimate significata, Buridan says that it is taken nonsignificatively, that is, materially, or in material supposition. By contrast, when a categorematic term stands for its ultimate significata, it is taken significatively, or in personal supposition." (Klima) Material supposition is a subkind of supposition. For conventional (written and spoken) languages Buridan accepts Ockham's view on supposition.

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #PersonalSupposition
literal: PersonalSupposition

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #PracticalScience
literal: "In the latter sense, the term applies not only to strictly theoretical but also to practical subjects, namely, subjects concerning things that are within our power to make or do (or to refrain from making or doing), and the knowledge of which is useful for achieving our ends in these activities. In this broader sense, the art of logic also deserves to be called a science, namely, a practical science, the possession of which guides us in our rational practice of forming and evaluating arguments." (Klima)

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #PracticalScience
literal: PracticalScience

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #ProperSense
literal: "So, although we can use any utterance and inscription in the way we wish, once it is conventionally instituted to signify somehow, that established signifcation is to be regarded as its proper, primary sense, and any other only as a secondary, improper sense." (Klima)

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #ProperSense
literal: ProperSense

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #ProperSuppositon
literal: "proper supposition occurs when a term supposits for what it properly signifies" (Spade)

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #ProperSuppositon
literal: ProperSuppositon

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #Proposition
literal: A proposition or sentence is made up of terms. A propositions is a meaningful compound made of syncategorematic and categorematic terms.

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #Proposition
literal: Proposition

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #Science
literal: Science in a broader sense applies to theoretical and practical subjects.

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #Science
literal: Science

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #ScienceInStrictSense
literal: "In his questions on Porphyry's Isagoge, Buridan [...] distinguishes between 'science' in the strict sense, in which it applies only to a body of necessary, universal, theoretical knowledge, consisting of the conclusions of scientific demonstrations in the strict Aristotelian sense, from 'science' in a broader sense." (Klima)

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #ScienceInStrictSense
literal: ScienceInStrictSense

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #SemanticallyComplex
literal: Complex concepts, or mental expressions are semantically complex.

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #SemanticallyComplex
literal: SemanticallyComplex

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #SemanticallyComplexExpression
literal: "Further, a spoken expression should be called an [semantically complex] 'expression' only insofar as it designates a combination of concepts in the mind." (Buridan)

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #SemanticallyComplexExpression
literal: SemanticallyComplexExpression

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #SemanticallyComplexSpokenWrittenTerm
literal: We have semantically complex spoken and written terms, when a "a syntactically simple utterance may obviously be semantically complex by virtue of being subordinated to a complex concept." (Klima)

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #SemanticallyComplexSpokenWrittenTerm
literal: SemanticallyComplexSpoken-WrittenTerm

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #SemanticallySimple
literal: A concept is semantically simple.

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #SemanticallySimple
literal: SemanticallySimple

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #SemanticallySimpleExpression
literal: "despite possible appearances to the contrary, the combination of written and spoken words does not always have to run strictly parallel to the combination of concepts in the mind. As Buridan continues: For if the whole utterance 'A man runs' were imposed to signify simply stones, as the utterance 'stone' does, then 'A man runs' would not be an expression, but a simple word, as is 'stone'. Hence, something is called a spoken expression or proposition only because it designates a mental expression or proposition, and a spoken proposition is called true or false only because it designates a true or false mental proposition, just as a urine sample is said to be healthy or unhealthy only because it designates that the animal is healthy or ill. It is in the same way that every utterance that appropriately designates a simple concept by convention [ex institutione] is said to be incomplex, [precisely] because it is subordinated in order to designate a simple concept. That is to say, just because some spoken or written sign has some sort of recognizable complexity (as even single words consist of syllables, and those of sounds or letters), one must not assume that the corresponding concept has some corresponding complexity. Indeed, it happens even in ordinary usage that an originally complex phrase is transferred to designate a simple concept. This is the case, for example, with the phrase 'man's best friend' in English, which, at least according to one of its uses, is transferred to designate the same concept that is designated by the simple word 'dog,' which, as we can assume with Buridan, is a simple concept." (Klima)

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #SemanticallySimpleExpression
literal: SemanticallySimpleExpression

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #Signification
literal: Signification relates categorematic concept with object

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #Signification
literal: Signification

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #Similarity
literal: "Individual linguistic signs, symbol tokens, come in types [token types] based on their recognizable similarities. Indeed, even if some tokens are not inherently similar, such as the upper- and lowercase letters of the alphabet (A, a, B, b, etc.) or different fonts or typefaces (a, a, a, etc.), we are trained early on to recognize them as similar." (Klima)

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #Similarity
literal: Similarity

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #SimpleSupposition
literal: SimpleSupposition

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #SpokenWrittenProposition
literal: "Spoken and written propositions have a 'fine-grained' semantics, insofar as they are mapped onto mental propositions." (Klima)

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #SpokenWrittenProposition
literal: Spoken-WrittenProposition

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #SpokenWrittenSuppositum
literal: A spoken or written term in the context of a proposition refers to (supposits) a spoken or written suppositum.

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #SpokenWrittenSuppositum
literal: Spoken-WrittenSuppositum

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #SpokenWrittenTerm
literal: Spoken or written terms are utterances or inscriptions. "What a [spoken or written] term immediately signifies is the mental act on account of which we recognize the term as a significative utterance or inscription, as opposed to some articulate sound or discernible scribble that makes no sense to us at all. Thus, those utterances that do have signifi cation are meaningful precisely because they are associated with some act of understanding, or, in late scholastic terminology, because they are subordinated to some concept of the human mind, whatever such a concept is, namely, whether it is some spiritual modification of an immaterial mind or just a firing pattern of neurons in the brain." (Klima)

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #SpokenWrittenTerm
literal: Spoken-WrittenTerm

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #Supposition
literal: �What sort of relation is supposition? Well, the first thing we can say about it is that supposition is a semantic relation. To a first (but pretty good) approximation, supposition in this first part of the theory is what nowadays we call �reference.� It is the relation between the terms used in a proposition and the things those terms are used to talk about in that proposition. [�] supposition occurs only in a propositional context. And this is the first main difference between supposition and signification, which can occur outside a propositional context according to almost any author. The second main difference is this: We do not always in practice use terms in propositions to talk about what those terms signify. We use them in a variety of other ways too. Hence supposition also differs from signification insofar as a term may signify one thing, but supposit on a given occasion for something entirely different.� (Spade)

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #Supposition
literal: Supposition

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #SuppositionInConventionalLanguage
literal: Supposition in conventional language is supposition occuring in spoken or written (conventional) languages.

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #SuppositionInConventionalLanguage
literal: SuppositionInConventionalLanguage

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #Suppositum
literal: Suppositum is "whatever a term supposits for."

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #Suppositum
literal: Suppositum

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #SyncategorematicConcept
literal: "Concepts, being representative acts of the mind, are naturally classified in terms of their representative function, which in turn is specified in terms of what and how these concepts represent or naturally signify. However, some concepts represent something only in connection with other concepts, whereas others represent something in themselves. The former are called syncategorematic, whereas the latter are called categorematic concepts." (Klima)

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #SyncategorematicConcept
literal: SyncategorematicConcept

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #SyncategorematicTerm
literal: "Syncategorematic terms may signify only the syncategorematic concept to which they are subordinated. Because the function of such a concept (for example, the concept of negation, conjunction, and similar logical connectives) is not to conceive of anything, but merely to modify the representative function of other concepts, the purely syncategorematic term subordinated to it will not signify anything else. [...] For example, the term-negation 'non' in the term 'nonhuman' does not signify anything in extramental reality, for there is no such a thing as a negation in re existing on a par with humans, beasts, plants, and rocks. However, this does not mean that this word does not signify at all. For even if it does not signify something, it does signify somehow: even if it does not signify a negation in re, it does signify negatively, namely, by negating the significata of the categorematic term with which it is construed, so that the resulting complex term supposits in a proposition for what is not signified by the negated categorematic term. [...] syncategorematic terms can have material supposition (thus the term 'non' in 'Non est negatio' can be taken to stand materiallyfor its immediate signifi cata, the token concepts of negation in individual human minds or itself and other tokens of the same type)." (Klima)

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #SyncategorematicTerm
literal: SyncategorematicTerm

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #SyntacticallyComplex
literal: Syntactically Complex: made up of several words.

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #SyntacticallyComplex
literal: SyntacticallyComplex

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #SyntacticallySimple
literal: "A syntactically simple utterance is one that is imposed to designate a concept as a whole, so that, although it does [or could] have distinguishable parts, none of its parts, as such, is imposed to designate some concept separately. Indeed, even if the utterance in question does have distinguishable parts that are imposed to designate some concepts separately when they do not occur as a part of this utterance, because they do not have the function of designating these concepts when they do occur as parts of this utterance, the utterance is still syntactically simple. For example, the obviously simple English word 'polecat' is imposed as a whole to signify a concept whereby we conceive of a particular species of stinky animals. However, a polecat is neither a pole nor a cat. Even if the utterance 'polecat' has the distinguishable parts 'pole' and 'cat' which separately are also imposed in English to signify concepts whereby we conceive of some sorts of things, these concepts have nothing to do with the concept to which 'polecat' is subordinated. The representative function of this concept is in no way dependent on the representative function of those other concepts, and, so, the signification of this utterance is in no way dependent on the signification of its parts." (Klima)

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #SyntacticallySimple
literal: SyntacticallySimple

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #Term
literal: A term can be mental, spoken, or written. "It should, therefore, be realized that three kinds of expressions and three kinds of terms can be distinguished, as is touched upon at the beginning of On Interpretation: namely, mental, spoken, and written" (Buridan)

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #Term
literal: Term

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #Token
literal: "Buridan does talk about the fact that any linguistic sign (whether spoken [utterance], written [incription], or even mental) is a singular occurrence (which we call a token). He also talks about the fact that some of these are recognizably similar (thereby constituting what we would call a type), and about the fact that once we fix the variable conditions of interpretation, then talking about one token is equivalent to talking about all." (Klima)

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #Token
literal: Token

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #TokenType
literal: TokenType

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #TokenType
literal: "Individual linguistic signs, symbol tokens, come in types [token types] based on their recognizable similarities. Indeed, even if some tokens are not inherently similar, such as the upper- and lowercase letters of the alphabet (A, a, B, b, etc.) or different fonts or typefaces (a, a, a, etc.), we are trained early on to recognize them as similar. Obviously, the same applies to utterances at an even earlier stage, in a less formally educational setting, leaving much to our natural abilities to recognize phonemic similarities. Therefore, what primarily allows any sort of uniformity of interpretation is the fact that even if in principle any token of any type can be interpreted ad placitum at any time, tokens are interpreted in types. Once we specify the relevant variable conditions of interpretation, such as when, where, by whom, to whom, according to what intention, and so on a token is to be interpreted, then any token of the same type under the same conditions is to be interpreted in the same way. That is to say, a rule that applies to a token in virtue of its interpretation as belonging to a given type under such and such conditions of its use applies to all tokens of the same type under the same conditions. To be sure, Buridan never talks about tokens or types. This is modern terminology, which I bring in to summarize the gist of Buridan's ideas." (Klima)

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #Utterance
literal: "[...] any spoken language is but a system of singular utterances [vox], while any written language is but a system of singular inscriptions. Moreover, it is obvious that any such utterance or inscription belongs to a language only insofar as it produces some understanding in the minds of competent users of the language, that is to say, insofar as it is meaningful at all. [...] Buridan does talk about the fact that any linguistic sign (whether spoken [utterance], written [incription], or even mental) is a singular occurrence (which we call a token) " (Klima)

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #Utterance
literal: Utterance

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #categorematicConceptSignifiesUltimatelyObject
literal: signifiesUltimately

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #categorematicTermSiginifiesImmediatelyCategorematicConcept
literal: siginifiesImmediately

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #categorematicTermSignifiesUltimatelyObject
literal: signifiesUltimately

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #conceptIsComponentOfComplexConcept
literal: isComponentOf

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #conceptIsComponentOfMentalProposition
literal: isComponentOf

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #conceptIsComponentOfMind
literal: isComponentOf

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #conceptRefersToMentalSuppositum
literal: refersTo

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #conceptSignifiesNaturallyObject
literal: signifiesNaturally

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #conventionInheresInProperSense
literal: inheresIn

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #interpretationRelatesConcept
literal: relates

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #interpretationRelatesContext
literal: relates

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #interpretationRelatesTokenType
literal: relates

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #language
literal: language

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #language_1
literal: language

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #lawOfReasoningIsComponentOflogicalDoctrine
literal: isComponentOf

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #lawOfReasoningSpellsOutLogicalRule
literal: spellsOut

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #materialSuppositionForSyncatogramaticTermRelatesSyncategorematicTerm
literal: relates

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #materialSuppositionRelatesCategorematicTerm
literal: relates

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #mentalPersonalSuppositionRelatesConcept
literal: relates

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #mentalPersonalSuppositionRelatesMentalSuppositum
literal: relates

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #mentalPropositionSignifiesObject
literal: signifiesCoarseGrained

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #personalSuppositionRelatesCategorematicTerm
literal: relates

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #relates
literal: relates

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #semanticallyComplexExpressionSignifiesComplexConcept
literal: signifies

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #semanticallyComplexInheresInComplexConcept
literal: inheresIn

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #semanticallyComplexSpokenWrittenTermSignifiesComplexConcept
literal: signifies

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #semanticallySimpleExpressionSignifiesConcept
literal: signifies

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #semanticallySimpleInheresInConcept
literal: inheresIn

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #significationRelatesCategorematicConcept
literal: relates

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #significationRelatesObject
literal: relates

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #similarityRelatesToken
literal: relates

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #similarityRelatesTokenType
literal: relates

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #spokenWrittenPropositionSignifiesMentalProposition
literal: signifiesFineGrained

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #spokenWrittenTermIsComponentOfExpression
literal: isComponentOf

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #spokenWrittenTermIsComponentOfSpokenWrittenProposition
literal: isComponentOf

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #spokenWrittenTermRefersToSpokenWrittenSuppositum
literal: refersTo

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #spokenWrittenTermSignifiesConventionallyConcept
literal: signifiesConventionally

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #suppositionInConventionalLanguageRelatesSpokenWrittenSuppositum
literal: relates

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #suppositionInConventionalLanguageRelatesSpokenWrittenTerm
literal: relates

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #suppositionRelatesProposition
literal: relates

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #suppositionRelatesSuppositum
literal: relates

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #suppositionRelatesTerm
literal: relates

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #syncategorematicTermSignifiesImmediatelySyncategorematicConcept
literal: signifiesImmediately

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #syntacticallyComplexInheresInExpression
literal: inheresIn

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #syntacticallySimpleInheresInSpokenWrittenTerm
literal: inheresIn

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #termIsComponentOfProposition
literal: isComponentOf

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #termRefersToSuppositum
literal: refersTo

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #tokenBelongsToTokenType
literal: belongsTo

AnnotationAssertion
IRI: #tokenTypeSubordinatedToConcept
literal: subordinatedTo