id: PYSEC-2026-2751 published: "2026-07-13T15:46:19.727130Z" modified: "2026-07-13T16:05:14.387214Z" aliases: - CVE-2026-54017 - GHSA-r2wg-2mcr-66rv summary: "Open WebUI: Path traversal / SSRF in terminal server proxy via encoded path traversal" details: "### Summary\n\nThe terminal-server reverse proxy in `backend/open_webui/routers/terminals.py` does not fully confine the user-controlled `path` segment before forwarding it to an admin-configured terminal server. An authenticated user who has been granted access to a terminal server can craft `path` values containing encoded `../` traversal sequences that escape the intended path (or policy) scope on that server, reaching unintended endpoints and files on the terminal-server host. Where the terminal server fans requests out to internal services, this also gives SSRF-style reach into those services.\n\nThis is a separate code path from the `/api/v1/retrieval/process/web` SSRF (GHSA-c6xv-rcvw-v685), with its own input. Two distinct vectors are consolidated here:\n\n1. Raw path forwarding / single-encoded traversal (original report).\n2. A bypass of the subsequently-added `_sanitize_proxy_path` mitigation using double-encoded dots (`%252e%252e`).\n\nThe attacker-controlled input is the request `path`, supplied by the non-admin user, not anything an administrator configures, so this is not an admin-trust / Rule-9 situation.\n\n### Affected code\n\nThe proxy route forwards an arbitrary trailing path to the configured terminal server:\n\n```python\n# routers/terminals.py\n@router.api_route('/{server_id}/{path:path}', methods=PROXY_METHODS)\nasync def proxy_terminal(server_id, path, request, user=Depends(get_verified_user)):\n ...\n safe_path = _sanitize_proxy_path(path)\n if safe_path is None:\n return JSONResponse({'error': 'Invalid path'}, status_code=400)\n target_url = f'{base_url}/{safe_path}'\n policy_id = connection.get('policy_id')\n if policy_id:\n target_url = f'{base_url}/p/{policy_id}/{safe_path}'\n```\n\nAccess requires `has_connection_access(user, connection, ...)`, i.e. a non-admin user the administrator has granted to that terminal server.\n\n### Vector 1 — single-encoded traversal (original)\n\nThe path was originally concatenated to the base URL with no sanitization (`target_url = f\"{base_url}/{path}\"`), so single-encoded traversal escaped the intended scope:\n\n```\nGET /api/v1/terminals/server1/..%2F..%2F..%2Finternal-api/secrets\n# proxied to: {base_url}/../../../internal-api/secrets\n```\n\nThis vector is closed at HEAD: `_sanitize_proxy_path` now URL-decodes once, runs `posixpath.normpath`, strips leading slashes, and rejects results beginning with `..` (`unquote('..%2F..%2F') -> '../../' -> normpath -> '../..'` -> rejected).\n\n### Vector 2 — double-encoded bypass of `_sanitize_proxy_path`\n\n`_sanitize_proxy_path` decodes the path only once before the `..` check, so a double-encoded payload survives:\n\n```python\ndef _sanitize_proxy_path(path: str) -> str | None:\n decoded = unquote(path) # single decode pass only\n normalized = posixpath.normpath(decoded)\n cleaned = normalized.lstrip('/')\n if cleaned.startswith('..') or cleaned == '.':\n return None\n ...\n```\n\n`unquote('%252e%252e/secret')` yields `%2e%2e/secret` (not `..`), which `normpath` leaves unchanged and which does not start with `..`, so it passes the check. The proxy then forwards `{base_url}/%2e%2e/secret`, and the upstream terminal server decodes `%2e%2e` into `..` and resolves the traversal the check was meant to prevent.\n\n```\nGET /api/v1/terminals/server1/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/sensitive-file\n# passes _sanitize_proxy_path as %2e%2e/%2e%2e/sensitive-file\n# upstream decodes -> ../../sensitive-file\n```\n\nThe `policy_id` form (`{base_url}/p/{policy_id}/{safe_path}`) is the higher-impact target: traversal escapes the policy namespace and reaches other policies or the terminal-server root.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn authenticated user with access to a terminal server can escape the intended path/policy scope on that server, reaching unintended endpoints and files, and, where the terminal server routes onward to internal services, reach those services. CWE-22 (Path Traversal) and CWE-918 (SSRF).\n\n### Fix\n\nDecode the proxy path until it is stable before normalising and checking, so no depth of encoding can smuggle a traversal sequence past the check to be re-decoded upstream:\n\n```python\ndecoded = path\nfor _ in range(8):\n once = unquote(decoded)\n if once == decoded:\n break\n decoded = once\nnormalized = posixpath.normpath(decoded)\ncleaned = normalized.lstrip('/')\nif cleaned.startswith('..') or cleaned == '.':\n return None\n```\n\nThis rejects `%2e%2e`, `%252e%252e`, `%25252e%25252e`, `..%2f..%2f`, etc., while leaving legitimate paths (including singly-encoded characters such as `%20`) intact.\n\n### Credits\n\n- **Tulgaaaaaaaa** — original report (terminal-proxy path SSRF / single-encoded traversal).\n- **sermikr0** — double-encoded (`%252e%252e`) bypass of the `_sanitize_proxy_path` mitigation." affected: - package: name: open-webui ecosystem: PyPI purl: pkg:pypi/open-webui ranges: - type: ECOSYSTEM events: - introduced: "0" - fixed: 0.9.6 versions: - 0.1.124 - 0.1.125 - 0.2.0 - 0.2.1 - 0.2.2 - 0.2.3 - 0.2.4 - 0.2.5 - 0.3.0 - 0.3.1 - 0.3.10 - 0.3.12 - 0.3.13 - 0.3.14 - 0.3.15 - 0.3.16 - 0.3.17 - 0.3.17.dev2 - 0.3.17.dev3 - 0.3.17.dev4 - 0.3.17.dev5 - 0.3.18 - 0.3.19 - 0.3.2 - 0.3.20 - 0.3.21 - 0.3.22 - 0.3.23 - 0.3.24 - 0.3.25 - 0.3.26 - 0.3.27 - 0.3.27.dev1 - 0.3.27.dev2 - 0.3.27.dev3 - 0.3.28 - 0.3.29 - 0.3.3 - 0.3.30 - 0.3.30.dev1 - 0.3.30.dev2 - 0.3.31 - 0.3.31.dev1 - 0.3.32 - 0.3.33 - 0.3.33.dev1 - 0.3.34 - 0.3.35 - 0.3.4 - 0.3.5 - 0.3.6 - 0.3.7 - 0.3.8 - 0.3.9 - 0.4.0 - 0.4.0.dev1 - 0.4.0.dev2 - 0.4.1 - 0.4.2 - 0.4.3 - 0.4.4 - 0.4.5 - 0.4.6 - 0.4.6.dev1 - 0.4.7 - 0.4.8 - 0.5.0 - 0.5.0.dev1 - 0.5.0.dev2 - 0.5.1 - 0.5.10 - 0.5.11 - 0.5.12 - 0.5.13 - 0.5.14 - 0.5.15 - 0.5.16 - 0.5.17 - 0.5.18 - 0.5.19 - 0.5.2 - 0.5.20 - 0.5.3 - 0.5.3.dev1 - 0.5.4 - 0.5.5 - 0.5.6 - 0.5.7 - 0.5.8 - 0.5.9 - 0.6.0 - 0.6.1 - 0.6.10 - 0.6.11 - 0.6.12 - 0.6.13 - 0.6.14 - 0.6.15 - 0.6.16 - 0.6.18 - 0.6.19 - 0.6.2 - 0.6.20 - 0.6.21 - 0.6.22 - 0.6.23 - 0.6.24 - 0.6.25 - 0.6.26 - 0.6.26.dev1 - 0.6.27 - 0.6.28 - 0.6.29 - 0.6.3 - 0.6.30 - 0.6.31 - 0.6.32 - 0.6.33 - 0.6.34 - 0.6.35 - 0.6.36 - 0.6.37 - 0.6.38 - 0.6.39 - 0.6.4 - 0.6.40 - 0.6.41 - 0.6.42 - 0.6.43 - 0.6.5 - 0.6.6 - 0.6.6.dev1 - 0.6.7 - 0.6.8 - 0.6.9 - 0.7.0 - 0.7.1 - 0.7.2 - 0.8.0 - 0.8.1 - 0.8.10 - 0.8.11 - 0.8.12 - 0.8.2 - 0.8.3 - 0.8.4 - 0.8.5 - 0.8.6 - 0.8.7 - 0.8.8 - 0.8.9 - 0.9.0 - 0.9.1 - 0.9.2 - 0.9.3 - 0.9.4 - 0.9.5 references: - type: WEB url: https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-r2wg-2mcr-66rv - type: PACKAGE url: https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui - type: PACKAGE url: https://pypi.org/project/open-webui - type: ADVISORY url: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r2wg-2mcr-66rv - type: ADVISORY url: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54017 severity: - type: CVSS_V3 score: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N