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BLA Shield # BLA: Blind LLM Agents ### **Poison → Exhaust → Hallucinate. Make Reverse Engineering Bankrupt Again.** **The open-source Counter-REA Blue Defense MCP & CLI that protects software releases against AI reverse-engineering agents (`morluto/rea`, autonomous decompilers, and LLM recon pipelines) — verified across 14 showcase benchmark targets.** [![npm version](https://img.shields.io/badge/npm-bla--agents_v3.5.1-2563eb?style=for-the-badge&logo=npm&logoColor=white)](https://www.npmjs.com/package/bla-agents) [![GitHub Trending](https://img.shields.io/badge/GitHub_Trending-%235_Daily-7c3aed?style=for-the-badge&logo=github&logoColor=white)](https://trendshift.io/repositories/323569) [![MCP Server](https://img.shields.io/badge/MCP-31_Defense_Tools-0ea5e9?style=for-the-badge)](docs/cli-and-mcp.md) [![Formats](https://img.shields.io/badge/Formats-26_Artifacts-0284c7?style=for-the-badge)](#format-coverage) [![Counter-REA](https://img.shields.io/badge/Counter--REA-Empirically_Verified-1d4ed8?style=for-the-badge)](#empirical-results-vs-real-rea) [![MIT License](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-38bdf8?style=for-the-badge)](LICENSE)

GitHub Trending — #5 Repository Of The Day

**[🌐 Official Website](https://bla.tools/) · [📖 Defense Guides](https://bla.tools/guides/) · [📊 Live Benchmarks](https://bla.tools/showcase/) · [🎯 CrackMe Arena](https://bla.tools/crackme/) · [🏢 Enterprise](https://bla.tools/enterprise/) · [⚖️ Disclaimer](DISCLAIMER.md)** [Quick Start](#-30-second-quick-start) · [How It Works](#-how-bla-works-agent-driven-closed-loop) · [Empirical Results](#empirical-results-vs-real-rea) · [Format Coverage](#format-coverage) · [14-Target Benchmark](#benchmark-14-targets-internal-estimates) · [CrackMe Arena](#-red-vs-blue-crackme-arena) · [FAQ](#faq)
--- > [!IMPORTANT] > **Defensive Use Only:** BLA is engineered strictly for software authors and security teams protecting **their own** intellectual property and release artifacts. See [DISCLAIMER.md](DISCLAIMER.md). > Always install from official sources: [qybaihe/bla](https://github.com/qybaihe/bla) or [`npm i bla-agents`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/bla-agents).
Side-by-side: REA on an unprotected artifact vs BLA-protected output

### 🔴 Without BLA AI reverse-engineering agents (`REA` + coding agents) unpack `.asar` archives, recover SourceMaps, trace IPC bridges, inspect `.wasm` / `.sqlite` / `.safetensors`, and clone core business logic in **seconds for ~$0.20**. ### 🛡️ With BLA (`bla harden .`) REA's default pass stops on its own resource budgets (`primitive-candidates > 256`, `ASAR > 16 MiB`, `WASM > Wabt cap`, `SQLite virtual trap`), follows realistic shadow state machines, and projects **300×–2,800× modeled token amplification** (`token-estimator.ts`). Most of those budgets can be raised by the caller — [what that means](#empirical-results-vs-real-rea). ### ⚡ Runtime-Equivalent by Design Exhaustion graphs and decoy payloads sit behind $O(1)$ number-theoretic opaque predicates ($7x^2 - 1 \neq y^2 \pmod 7$) or inert format sections. **14/14 bundled benchmark targets** pass input/output equivalence tests (`bla verify` checks Counter-REA structural gates; run your project's test suite for custom artifacts).
--- ## ⚡ 30-Second Quick Start ### 1. One-Command CLI Hardening Point BLA at any project or release directory. It auto-discovers build outputs (`dist/`, `build/`, `.asar`, `.wasm`, `.sqlite`, `.safetensors`, native binaries, Python/C/Rust/Go) and runs **audit → protect → verify**: ```bash # Node.js ^22.23.4 or >=24.0.0 recommended npx bla-agents harden . # writes a partial mirror to .bla-hardened/ — nothing ships yet npx bla-agents harden . --apply # ship it: replace the build output with the hardened files npx bla-agents harden . --restore # undo: put the original build output back ``` Build first — `harden` targets what your build produced and leaves the toolchain alone. `--apply` only overwrites build output (never source) and keeps the originals outside the project; run your own tests against the promoted build before releasing. ### 2. Agent-Driven Closed-Loop Defense (MCP + Skill) Register BLA once with your coding agent (**Claude Code, Cursor, Codex, Windsurf, Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot CLI, VS Code, OpenCode, Antigravity**): ```bash npx bla-agents setup ``` Then simply prompt your coding agent: ```text Harden my software against REA ``` Your host agent automatically orchestrates BLA's MCP tools (`bla_weave_plan` → source-level logic weaving & string encryption → `bla_verify_weave` → `bla_harden` → `bla_verify`) to harden both your source architecture and compiled artifacts. Every result carries `nextSteps`, so the agent finishes the job: it asks before promoting the hardened files over the build output (`apply`), then runs your tests. ### 3. Build Bundler Plugin (Vite / Rollup / Webpack / esbuild) Protect JS chunks, strip/replace SourceMaps with VLQ v3 honey maps, and shield `.wasm` assets automatically at bundle time: ```typescript import { defineConfig } from "vite"; import { blaVitePlugin } from "bla-agents/bundler"; export default defineConfig({ plugins: [blaVitePlugin({ intensity: "bankrupt", enableHoneySourceMaps: true })], }); ``` --- ## 🧠 How BLA Works: Agent-Driven Closed Loop Traditional obfuscators only rename variables (`_0x1a2b`), which modern LLMs effortlessly summarize, or wrap binaries in heavy VM packers that break cross-platform builds and degrade performance. **BLA 3.x combines format-native deterministic shields with host-agent surgical source weaving:** ```mermaid flowchart LR subgraph S1["1 · Recon & Plan"] A["bla_audit / bla_lint"] --> B["bla_weave_plan"] end subgraph S2["2 · Agent Source Surgery"] B --> C["bla_encrypt_strings\n(AST Span XOR + Keystream)"] C --> D["bla_bind_scope\n(Multi-Site State Entanglement)"] D --> E["bla_verify_weave"] end subgraph S3["3 · Artifact Shielding"] E --> F["bla_harden / bla_defend\n(19+ Format Shields + Self-Seal)"] end subgraph S4["4 · Counter-REA Gate"] F --> G["bla_verify\n(Structural Counter-REA Checks Only)"] end ``` | Defense Pillar | Mechanism | Effect on AI Reverse-Engineering Agents | | :--- | :--- | :--- | | **1. Poison (Deception)** | Plants format-valid canaries, SGX/TPM2/Secure Enclave delegation manifests, VLQ v3 honey SourceMaps, and plausible shadow state machines. | Forces LLM agents to split context across conflicting hypotheses and chase synthetic rabbit holes. | | **2. Exhaust (Budget Breakers)** | Trips the analyzer's default limits (`primitive-candidates`, `alias-selections`, ASAR 16 MiB header, WASM Wabt representation, SQLite virtual column eval, Model 32-level nesting, PCAP tshark field pass (fixed 8 MiB), Electron 32 fuse sentinels). | Downgrades REA's default examination from `COMPLETE` to `LIMITED` / `CapacityError`. Where REA lets the caller raise a limit this costs the attacker a retry, not the analysis — see the last column of the [results table](#empirically-verified-on-commodity-hardware). | | **3. Entangle (Anti-Strip & Self-Seal)** | Binds sibling artifacts (JS ↔ WASM ↔ Native sidecars) via runtime SHA-256 digests (`--self-seal`, `--sidecar-entangle`) and multi-site caller scope folding (`bla_bind_scope`). | Prevents red-team agents from stripping decoys, nop-patching single-point checks, or calling exported functions as offline oracles. | | **4. Runtime Truman Show** | Hardens Electron V1 Fuses (`RunAsNode=0`, `Inspect=0`) and detects CDP / Node Inspector / Frida / WebDriver attachment (`runtime-shield.ts`). | Serves believable synthetic telemetry during live debugging while keeping normal user execution untouched. | --- ## 🔬 Empirical Results vs. Real REA These numbers come from running **real `morluto/rea`** against BLA-hardened samples on commodity hardware (`npm run redteam:rea`). Full machine-readable report: [`docs/redteam/empirical-rea-validation.md`](docs/redteam/empirical-rea-validation.md) / [`.json`](docs/redteam/empirical-rea-validation.json). > **How to read this:** “Empirically verified” means the live REA analyzer path returned the listed budget / capacity / redaction failure in this environment. It is **not** a claim about Ghidra/Frida/LLDB/Rizin/JADX sessions we did not run here. > **Most of REA's budgets are defaults the caller can raise.** As of REA `05be423` (2026-11-17) its limits are per-call inputs or settings, and REA's own error tells the agent which one to raise (`asar.max_header_bytes` up to 256 MiB, `max_interface_bytes` up to 512 MiB, `max_chunks`, `semantic_precision`). A ❌ below therefore means *REA stops here as it runs by default*: a size-based plant costs an attacker one retry, it does not lock REA out. The last column says which limits REA keeps fixed, and **JavaScript strings** is the one row measured with the budgets raised. ### Empirically Verified on Commodity Hardware Last recorded **2026-11-18** against REA `05be423` under **Node v26.12.1** (macOS arm64) with **Wabt 1.0.42** and **tshark 4.4.1**. REA analyses packet captures only on Linux / Windows, so on macOS the harness runs REA's two tshark passes, with the arguments read from REA's own provider, and hands their output to REA's parser. Soft-skips keep Node 22 / CI green when external native tools are absent; a probe that cannot call REA at all is reported as a harness error (`status: unverified`, exit 2), never as a budget hit. | Format | Before → After | REA Outcome After BLA | Exact REA Budget / Error Triggered | Can the caller raise it? | | :--- | ---: | :--- | :--- | :--- | | **Go buildinfo** | 50 KiB → 1.17 MiB | ⚠️ Rejected as malformed | `BinaryFormatFailure` — *Go build-info string range is truncated*. REA reads no build info from the hardened file, but it now checks the string range before `max_build_info_bytes` (1 MiB), the budget this plant was sized for | Not measured | | **Erlang BEAM** | 84 B → 241 KiB | ❌ Capacity error | `max_chunks` — *BEAM form exceeds the 64-chunk budget* | Yes — `max_chunks` | | **EVM bytecode** | 16 B → **4.00 MiB** | ⚠️ Admitted, just under the cap | 4,190,208 of 4,194,304 bytes of `EVM_PRODUCER_LIMIT_DEFAULTS.input_bytes`; the EVMole worker itself is not run by the harness | Yes — `producer_limits.input_bytes` | | **PCAP** | 24 B → 1.91 MiB | ❌ Budget rejected | REA asks tshark for 25 selected fields and holds that output to the 8 MiB `TSHARK_JSON_MAX_BYTES`: the hardened capture prints 12.7 MiB, so `inspect_pcap_capture` fails with a non-retryable resource error. Ten DNS responses do it — 4,076 answers each, every one naming a 251-character owner through a 2-byte compression pointer, which tshark prints in full. Without them REA read the 160 other decoys (116 KiB) | No — fixed; REA has no setting for it | | **Electron ASAR** | 607 B → **16.9 MiB** | ❌ Capacity error | `DEFAULT_ASAR_MAX_HEADER_BYTES` (16 MiB) | Yes — `asar.max_header_bytes`, up to 256 MiB | | **WASM + Wabt** | 54 B → **6.56 MiB** · 251 exports | ⚠️ `ifaceState=partial` | `max_interface_bytes` (32 MiB) — *Typed WASM interface representation exceeds max_interface_bytes* | Yes — up to 512 MiB | | **SQLite** (Node 24, `--sqlite-eval-trap`) | 12 KiB → 56 KiB | ❌ Eval trap on the honey tables | `SqliteColumnEvaluationFailure` — unknown `enclave_unseal_payload()` on virtual trap columns. Opt-in (the default through 3.4.3): it also stops the application's own `PRAGMA integrity_check` / `VACUUM`. Default hardening adds honey tables REA can read; application tables are never hidden. | Not a budget — an evaluation failure | | **JavaScript** | 761 B → 153 KiB | ❌ Budget rejected | `alias-selections` + `getter-expansion` + `primitive-bytes` + `primitive-candidates` | Yes — `semantic_precision` | | **JavaScript strings** | 340 B → 154 KiB | ✅ 0 of 3 known values in REA's result | An endpoint URL, an IPC channel and a SHA-256 digest, at 1× / 4× / 64× budgets; REA returns all three from the unhardened file. Through 3.4.3 the pieces were written in clear: REA listed the channel at its defaults and all three once the budgets were raised 4× | Raised here, to 64× | | **Safetensors** | 128 B → 9.7 KiB | ❌ Capacity error | `MODEL_JSON_NESTING` — *Safetensors JSON nesting exceeds 32 levels* (HF-loadable; tensors intact) | No — fixed at 32 | | **GGUF** | 24 B → 7.3 KiB | ❌ Capacity error | `MODEL_METADATA_NESTING` — *GGUF metadata nesting exceeds 32 array frames* | No — fixed at 32 | | **Electron fuses** | 50 KiB → 1.17 MiB | ❌ Budget rejected | `ELECTRON_FUSE_LIMITS.maximumSentinelsPerSlice` (>32) | No — fixed at 32 | | **Flutter pool** | 50 KiB → 1.17 MiB | ⚠️ Projected cap | `MAX_POOL_URIS` / `MAX_POOL_TOKENS` (REA truncates with “at least N”) | Yes — `uri_limit` / `token_limit` | Reproduce locally: ```bash export REA_WABT_BIN_DIRECTORY=$HOME/opt/wabt-1.0.42/bin # optional npm run build && npm run redteam:rea ``` `npm run verify:rea` checks BLA's catalogue of REA limits against the same checkout (74 checks at `05be423`) and says which of them are per-call defaults.
Designed-for paths not empirically run on this machine (click to expand)
These shields exist in-tree and are covered by unit tests / catalog drift checks, but the matching REA path requires external native debuggers/decompilers not installed on the CI runner: | Area | Why Unverified Here | | :--- | :--- | | Ghidra / native decompilation depth | Requires a local Ghidra install + REA bridge | | Frida / LLDB / GDB / Rizin live sessions | Requires those debuggers + device/process attach | | JADX / full Android APK pipeline | APK resigning unsupported; standalone DEX shield is in-tree | | **Firmware** containers | Staging/extraction budgets exist; no honest E2E without firmware corpora | | **SPIR-V / CUDA fatbinary / AMD GPU objects** | Need native GPU object decoders; **PTX text** is shielded in-tree | | EVMole in-process EVM decode | Not pathable in-process; EVM shield densifies to the 4 MiB input cap | | REA's own PCAP provider (`inspect_pcap_capture`) | REA runs it only on Linux / Windows; on macOS the harness runs the same two tshark passes and REA's parser | | Raised REA budgets, other than JavaScript strings | Not measured. Every other row is REA at its default settings |
--- ## 🛡️ Format Coverage All 26 format shields are built directly into `bla-agents` with zero external packer dependencies: | Format | Canary + Diagnostic | Exhaustion / Budget Trip | Empirically vs. REA | Notes | | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :--- | | **JavaScript / TypeScript** | ✓ | ✓ semantic budgets | **verified** (in-process) | Babel AST; AST-safe string encryption; self-seal | | **Electron `.asar`** | ✓ | ✓ header 16 MiB | **verified** | IPC de-literalization + Pickle repackaging | | **Electron fuses** | ✓ | ✓ >32 sentinels | **verified** | V1 fuse hardening + sentinel flood | | **WebAssembly (`.wasm`)** | ✓ custom sections | ✓ export decoys → Wabt | **verified** (Wabt) | LEB128 parser; preserves `WebAssembly.validate` | | **SQLite (`.sqlite` / `.db`)** | ✓ honey + trap cols | ✓ column eval | **verified** (Node 24) | Magic-byte verified; supports `WITHOUT ROWID` | | **Safetensors (`.safetensors`)** | ✓ string metadata | ✓ JSON nesting >32 | **verified** | HuggingFace-loadable; tensor bytes preserved | | **GGUF (`.gguf`)** | ✓ | ✓ ARRAY nesting >32 | **verified** | Preserves model weights and KV tensors | | **Go buildinfo (ELF)** | ✓ | ✓ >1 MiB | **verified** (format rejection) | Mapped ELF section | | **Windows PE (`.exe` / `.dll`)** | ✓ | ✓ `.enclave` COFF section + fuses/rustc/Dart | **verified** | Mapped `.enclave` section, x86-64 ABI function islands, MSVC RTTI, CodeView RSDS PDB | | **Flutter / Dart pool** | ✓ | ✓ URI/token caps | **verified** (projected) | Snapshot magic & toolchain flood | | **Erlang BEAM (`.beam`)** | ✓ | ✓ chunks / atoms | **verified** | Exceeds 64-chunk budget | | **EVM + Solidity meta** | ✓ | ✓ → 4 MiB input | **verified** (approach) | CBOR metadata + bytecode densification | | **PCAP (`.pcap`)** | ✓ | ✓ REA's tshark field pass > 8 MiB (fixed) | **verified** (tshark 4.4.1) | Synthetic packet + canary injection; a DNS answer flood at bankrupt | | **Python (`.py` / `.pyc`)** | ✓ | ✓ | designed-for | CPython 3.7–3.14 marshal & AST support | | **NVIDIA PTX (`.ptx`)** | ✓ | entry flood | benchmark only | Kernel entry & canary flood | | **DEX / IL2CPP / bplist / .NET / JVM / ZIP** | ✓ | format-specific | designed-for | Recomputes DEX SHA-1 & Adler32 checksums | --- ## 📊 Benchmark (14 Targets, Internal Estimates) Run `npx bla-agents benchmark` to execute the 14-target showcase locally: ```bash npx bla-agents benchmark ``` > **Note:** Token and USD columns below are **internal estimates** derived from BLA's catalog of REA limits to illustrate relative amplification across formats — for actual process-level REA errors, see the [Empirical Results](#empirical-results-vs-real-rea) table above. **Aggregate Showcase Result:** **~1,068.7×** token amplification · **~503.5×** cost amplification · **14/14 bundled showcase targets** passed runtime-equivalence checks. This result is limited to the benchmark fixtures. | Target Artifact | Unprotected Baseline (est.) | BLA Protected (est.) | Token Multiplier | Runtime Equivalence | | :--- | :--- | :--- | ---: | :---: | | **DX-Ball sound-pan (`.js`)** | 84/100 · 4,800 tok · $0.20 | 2/100 · 15.2M tok · $238.02 · `LIMITED` | **3,172.7×** | ✅ 100% | | **Notion Electron clipboard (`.asar`)** | 98/100 · 9,132 tok · $0.34 | 2/100 · 23.1M tok · $358.57 · `LIMITED` | **2,532.3×** | ✅ 100% | | **Enterprise license validator (`.ts`)** | 87/100 · 4,800 tok · $0.20 | 2/100 · 15.2M tok · $238.02 · `LIMITED` | **3,172.7×** | ✅ 100% | | **NVIDIA PTX compute kernel (`.ptx`)** | 81/100 · 4,800 tok · $0.20 | 7/100 · 23.1M tok · $358.20 · `LIMITED` | **4,814×** | ✅ 100% | | **Erlang BEAM module (`.beam`)** | 81/100 · 8,900 tok · $0.34 | 5/100 · 3.86M tok · $62.08 · `LIMITED` | **433.2×** | ✅ 100% | | **WASM crypto kernel (`.wasm`)** | 81/100 · 4,800 tok · $0.20 | 6/100 · 1.83M tok · $30.23 · `LIMITED` | **381.5×** | ✅ 100% | | **Edge AI Safetensors (`.safetensors`)** | 81/100 · 4,800 tok · $0.20 | 6/100 · 1.81M tok · $29.90 · `LIMITED` | **376.8×** | ✅ 100% | | **libpcap network capture (`.pcap`)** | 81/100 · 4,800 tok · $0.20 | 7/100 · 23.1M tok · $359.27 · `LIMITED` | **4,817.7×** | ✅ 100% | | **Android Dalvik bytecode (`.dex`)** | 81/100 · 8,900 tok · $0.34 | 7/100 · 13.4M tok · $209.39 · `LIMITED` | **1,510.5×** | ✅ 100% | | **EVM Solidity metadata (`.bin`)** | 81/100 · 6,440 tok · $0.26 | 6/100 · 1.78M tok · $29.40 · `LIMITED` | **276.3×** | ✅ 100% | | **.NET managed assembly (`.dll`)** | 81/100 · 8,900 tok · $0.34 | 6/100 · 2.01M tok · $33.22 · `LIMITED` | **226.3×** | ✅ 100% | | **Apple binary plist (`.plist`)** | 81/100 · 6,440 tok · $0.26 | 8/100 · 1.79M tok · $29.54 · `LIMITED` | **277.6×** | ✅ 100% | | **SQLite entitlement DB (`.sqlite`)** | 81/100 · 10,568 tok · $0.29 | 7/100 · 1.71M tok · $28.39 · `LIMITED` | **162.1×** | ✅ 100% | | **Native ELF64 (Rust/Go/Fuse/Dart)** | 81/100 · 35,222 tok · $0.73 | 2/100 · 3.72M tok · $60.03 · `LIMITED` | **105.6×** | ✅ 100% | --- ## 🎯 Red-vs-Blue CrackMe Arena Test your reverse-engineering agent against public BLA-hardened challenges (`SEAL.json` publishes SHA-256 digests only — no plaintext keys or flags in git): | Challenge | Architecture | Hardening Highlights | Try It Locally | | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | | **[CrackMe v6](challenge/v6/README.md)** | Node Vault + HTML Panel + WASM Core | `bankrupt` intensity, self-sealed sibling hashes, WASM export obfuscation | `npm run crackme:v6 -- ''` | | **[CrackMe v7](challenge/v7/README.md)** | Polyglot Vault (JS + WASM + Rust + Go + C) | Cross-language state entanglement & multi-binary integrity gates | `npm run crackme:v7 -- ''` | | **[CrackMe v8](challenge/v8/README.md)** | Aegis Split-Key Vault | AST-encrypted strings (`bla_encrypt_strings`) + caller scope binding (`bla_bind_scope`) | `npm run crackme:v8 -- ''` | | **[CrackMe v9](challenge/v9/README.md)** | Agent-Woven Entangled Vault | Full BLA 3.x closed-loop weave (`weaveScore >= 70`) + distributed anti-strip checks | `npm run crackme:v9 -- ''` | --- ## 🔒 Security & Configuration Defaults - **Per-Project Random Seed** — BLA automatically generates and persists a unique cryptographic seed in `.blarc` / `bla.config.json` on first run so two projects never share decoy identifiers. - **Strict Packaging Lint Gates (`bla lint`)** — Refuses `bankrupt` hardening when plaintext `FLAG{...}` secrets, single-point integrity checks, or unbound exported verifiers remain in source. - **Opt-In `--llm-directives`** — Aggressive in-band prompt decoys are **off by default**; pass `--llm-directives` (or `llmDirectives: true`) to enable. - **Opt-In Signed Attestation (`--manifest`)** — Emit `.bla-manifest.json` with `--manifest`, sign with `--sign-manifest --manifest-key `, and verify both ed25519 signature and artifact SHA-256 via `bla verify-manifest --public-key `. --- ## ❓ FAQ
Which coding agents can use BLA? Any coding agent supporting MCP or `SKILL.md` workflows. `npx bla-agents setup` auto-registers **Claude Code, Cursor, Codex, Gemini CLI, Windsurf, Google Antigravity, OpenCode, VS Code, and GitHub Copilot CLI**. After setup, the bundled [`blind-llm-agents` skill](.agents/skills/blind-llm-agents/SKILL.md) guides your agent through the closed-loop workflow (`bla_weave_plan` → source weave → `bla_harden` → `bla_verify`).
Does BLA slow down my app or change runtime output? No on the hot path. Exhaustion graphs sit behind $O(1)$ number-theoretic opaque predicates, and binary/model/database decoys live in inert metadata or honey tables. Every benchmark target verifies 100% input/output equivalence against the original build.
Do I need Ghidra, Hopper, IDA, or Wabt installed to protect files? No. All 26 format shields are built into `bla-agents` in pure TypeScript/Node.js. External tools (`Wabt`, `tshark`) are only used if you run the optional live REA red-team suite (`npm run redteam:rea`).
Can BLA be used to attack other people's software? No. BLA is strictly a **Blue Team defensive tool** that hardens **your own** build artifacts before release. See [DISCLAIMER.md](DISCLAIMER.md).
--- ## 📚 Documentation & Links - [⚖️ DISCLAIMER.md](DISCLAIMER.md) — Defensive use & own-software policy - [🚀 Installation & Agent Setup](docs/installation.md) - [🛠️ CLI & 31-Tool MCP Catalog](docs/cli-and-mcp.md) - [🤖 One-Click Agent Defense (Skill-First)](docs/one-click-agent-defense.md) - [🧬 Weave-Decoy & Source Surgery MCP](docs/weave-decoy-mcp.md) - [🔬 Empirical REA Validation Report](docs/redteam/empirical-rea-validation.md) - [📋 Counter-REA Budget Matrix](.agents/skills/blind-llm-agents/references/counter-rea-matrix.md) - [📝 CHANGELOG](CHANGELOG.md) · [🛡️ SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md) ## 🤝 Contributing & Community Issues and PRs are welcome at [qybaihe/bla](https://github.com/qybaihe/bla). Before submitting a PR: ```bash npm run build && npm test && node dist/cli.js benchmark node scripts/verify-website.mjs ``` - 🎯 **[Public BLA CrackMe Arena (`challenge/v6` – `v9`)](challenge/v6/README.md)** - 💬 **[LINUX DO (`linux.do`)](https://linux.do/)** — 新的理想型社区 ## 📄 License [MIT](LICENSE) ## Star history [Star History](https://www.star-history.com/?repos=qybaihe%2Fbla&type=date&legend=top-left) draws the GitHub star growth for [`qybaihe/bla`](https://github.com/qybaihe/bla). The chart image is cached for about a day and is not a per-second count. Select it to open the full history. Star history chart for the qybaihe/bla GitHub repository