AWSTemplateFormatVersion: 2010-09-09
Parameters:
  VpcId:
    Type: AWS::EC2::VPC::Id
    Description: VpcId of your existing Virtual Private Cloud (VPC)
    ConstraintDescription: must be the VPC Id of an existing Virtual Private Cloud.

  Domain:
    Description: "The domain name of your Rapticore instance."
    Type: String
    ConstraintDescription: must be a valid domain name i.e., domain.ore.rapticore.cloud

  HostedZoneID:
    Description: "The ID of your Route 53 hosted zone. Domain name record will be created in this zone."
    Type: "AWS::Route53::HostedZone::Id"

  AzureIdentityLambdaArn:
    Description: "ARN of existing Lambda function to use for Custom Resource to create identity for azure tenant in identity pool"
    Type: String

  TenantId:
    Type: String
    Description: Unique tenant identifier

  CognitoGroupName:
    Type: String
    Description: Cognito group name for this tenant

  CrsAccountId:
    Type: String
    Description: AWS Account ID where CRS runs
    Default: "422753814403"

  CognitoManagementRoleArn:
    Type: String
    Description: ARN of role in CRS account for Cognito management
    Default: "arn:aws:iam::422753814403:role/cognito-management-for-standard-tenants"

  SharedUserPoolId:
    Type: String
    Description: Shared Cognito User Pool ID
    Default: "us-west-2_ugQoEHBWd"

  SharedUserPoolClientId:
    Type: String
    Description: Shared Cognito User Pool Client ID
    Default: "3c0adcuesr3fjrc1tri6g78uf"

  QueuesToDelete:
    Type: CommaDelimitedList
    Default: ""
    Description: "Comma-separated list of SQS Queue ARNs to delete (leave empty if none)"

  MonitoredAccountIds:
    Type: CommaDelimitedList
    Description: "List of AWS Account IDs to monitor for security events(Dummy value as default)"
    Default: "422753814403"

  EventBusName:
    Type: String
    Default: "RapticoreEventBus"
    Description: "Name of the custom EventBridge bus"

  AzureTenantId:
    Type: String
    Default: ""
    Description: "Azure Tenant ID (required only for azure tenant type)"
    AllowedPattern: "^$|^[0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12}$"
    ConstraintDescription: "Must be a valid Azure Tenant ID (GUID format) or empty"

Conditions:
  HasAzureTenant: !Not [!Equals [!Ref AzureTenantId, ""]]

Resources:
  #####
  # Azure Web Identity Resources (Conditional)
  #####
  AzureOpenIDConnectProvider:
    Type: AWS::IAM::OIDCProvider
    Condition: HasAzureTenant
    Properties:
      Url: !Sub "https://sts.windows.net/${AzureTenantId}/"
      ClientIdList:
        - !Sub "api://${AzureTenantId}"
      ThumbprintList:
        - "626d44e704d1ceabe3bf0d53397464ac8080142c"

  AzureWebIdentityRole:
    Type: AWS::IAM::Role
    Condition: HasAzureTenant
    Properties:
      RoleName: !Sub "AzureWebIdentityRoleForAzureRTTM-${TenantId}"
      AssumeRolePolicyDocument: !Sub
        - |
          {
            "Version": "2012-10-17",
            "Statement": [
              {
                "Effect": "Allow",
                "Principal": {
                  "Federated": "${OIDCProvider}"
                },
                "Action": "sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity",
                "Condition": {
                  "StringEquals": {
                    "sts.windows.net/${TenantId}/:aud": "api://${TenantId}"
                  }
                }
              }
            ]
          }
        - OIDCProvider: !Ref AzureOpenIDConnectProvider
          TenantId: !Ref AzureTenantId

      Policies:
        - PolicyName: AzureRTTMSQSPolicy
          PolicyDocument:
            Version: "2012-10-17"
            Statement:
              - Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - sqs:SendMessage
                Resource: !GetAtt RealTimeThreatAlertTriggerAzureQueue.Arn
      Tags:
        - Key: TenantId
          Value: !Ref TenantId

  RealTimeThreatMonitoringRule:
    Type: AWS::Events::Rule
    Properties:
      Name: !Sub "Rapticore${TenantId}ReceiverRule"
      Description: !Sub "Receiver rule for ${TenantId} tenancy"
      EventBusName: !Ref EventBusName
      EventPattern:
        source:
          - "aws.ec2"
          - "aws.iam"
          - "aws.signin"
          - "aws.s3"
          - "aws.sqs"
          - "aws.sns"
          - "aws.rds"
          - "aws.sso"
        account: !Ref MonitoredAccountIds
      State: ENABLED
      Targets:
        - Arn: !GetAtt RealTimeThreatAlertTriggerQueue.Arn
          Id: "RealTimeThreatSQSTarget"

  RealTimeThreatAlertQueuePolicy:
    Type: AWS::SQS::QueuePolicy
    Properties:
      Queues:
        - !Ref RealTimeThreatAlertTriggerQueue
      PolicyDocument:
        Version: "2012-10-17"
        Statement:
          - Effect: Allow
            Principal:
              Service: events.amazonaws.com
            Action: sqs:SendMessage
            Resource: !GetAtt RealTimeThreatAlertTriggerQueue.Arn
            Condition:
              ArnEquals:
                aws:SourceArn: !GetAtt RealTimeThreatMonitoringRule.Arn

  #####
  # S3 Bucket resources
  #####

  # VCS S3 Bucket
  VcsContentBucket:
    Type: AWS::S3::Bucket
    Properties:
      BucketName: !Sub "vcs-content-${TenantId}"
      PublicAccessBlockConfiguration:
        BlockPublicAcls: true
        BlockPublicPolicy: true
        IgnorePublicAcls: true
        RestrictPublicBuckets: true
      Tags:
        - Key: TenantId
          Value: !Ref TenantId

  #####
  # SQS Queue resources
  #####

  # Rapticore Vulnerability Queue
  RapticoreVulnerabilityDLQ:
    Type: AWS::SQS::Queue
    Properties:
      QueueName: !Sub "rapticore-vulnerability-${TenantId}-dlq"
      MessageRetentionPeriod: 1209600 # 14 days

  RapticoreVulnerabilityQueue:
    Type: AWS::SQS::Queue
    Properties:
      QueueName: !Sub "rapticore-vulnerability-${TenantId}"
      MessageRetentionPeriod: 43200 # 12 hours
      RedrivePolicy:
        deadLetterTargetArn: !GetAtt RapticoreVulnerabilityDLQ.Arn
        maxReceiveCount: 3

  # Rapticore Container Vulnerability Queue
  RapticoreContainerVulnerabilityDLQ:
    Type: AWS::SQS::Queue
    Properties:
      QueueName: !Sub "rapticore-container-vulnerability-${TenantId}-dlq"
      MessageRetentionPeriod: 1209600 # 14 days

  RapticoreContainerVulnerabilityQueue:
    Type: AWS::SQS::Queue
    Properties:
      QueueName: !Sub "rapticore-container-vulnerability-${TenantId}"
      MessageRetentionPeriod: 43200 # 12 hours
      RedrivePolicy:
        deadLetterTargetArn: !GetAtt RapticoreContainerVulnerabilityDLQ.Arn
        maxReceiveCount: 3

  # Rapticore Resource Vulnerability Summary Queue
  RapticoreResourceVulnerabilitySummaryDLQ:
    Type: AWS::SQS::Queue
    Properties:
      QueueName: !Sub "rapticore-resource-vulnerability-summary-${TenantId}-dlq"
      MessageRetentionPeriod: 1209600 # 14 days

  RapticoreResourceVulnerabilitySummaryQueue:
    Type: AWS::SQS::Queue
    Properties:
      QueueName: !Sub "rapticore-resource-vulnerability-summary-${TenantId}"
      MessageRetentionPeriod: 43200 # 12 hours
      RedrivePolicy:
        deadLetterTargetArn: !GetAtt RapticoreResourceVulnerabilitySummaryDLQ.Arn
        maxReceiveCount: 3

  # Rapticore Reactive Remediation Queue
  RapticoreReactiveRemediationDLQ:
    Type: AWS::SQS::Queue
    Properties:
      QueueName: !Sub "rapticore-reactive-remediation-${TenantId}-dlq"
      MessageRetentionPeriod: 1209600 # 14 days

  RapticoreReactiveRemediationQueue:
    Type: AWS::SQS::Queue
    Properties:
      QueueName: !Sub "rapticore-reactive-remediation-${TenantId}"
      MessageRetentionPeriod: 43200 # 12 hours
      RedrivePolicy:
        deadLetterTargetArn: !GetAtt RapticoreReactiveRemediationDLQ.Arn
        maxReceiveCount: 3

  # Real-time Threat Alert Trigger Queue (tenant-specific)
  RealTimeThreatAlertTriggerDLQ:
    Type: AWS::SQS::Queue
    Properties:
      QueueName: !Sub "real-time-threat-alert-trigger-${TenantId}-dlq"
      MessageRetentionPeriod: 1209600 # 14 days

  RealTimeThreatAlertTriggerQueue:
    Type: AWS::SQS::Queue
    Properties:
      QueueName: !Sub "real-time-threat-alert-trigger-${TenantId}"
      MessageRetentionPeriod: 43200 # 12 hours
      RedrivePolicy:
        deadLetterTargetArn: !GetAtt RealTimeThreatAlertTriggerDLQ.Arn
        maxReceiveCount: 3

  # Real-time Threat Alert Trigger Azure Queue (Conditional)
  RealTimeThreatAlertTriggerAzureDLQ:
    Type: AWS::SQS::Queue
    Condition: HasAzureTenant
    Properties:
      QueueName: !Sub "real-time-threat-alert-trigger-azure-${TenantId}-dlq"
      MessageRetentionPeriod: 1209600 # 14 days

  RealTimeThreatAlertTriggerAzureQueue:
    Type: AWS::SQS::Queue
    Condition: HasAzureTenant
    Properties:
      QueueName: !Sub "real-time-threat-alert-trigger-azure-${TenantId}"
      MessageRetentionPeriod: 43200 # 12 hours
      RedrivePolicy:
        deadLetterTargetArn: !GetAtt RealTimeThreatAlertTriggerAzureDLQ.Arn
        maxReceiveCount: 3

  # VCS Trigger AppSec Queue
  VcsTriggerAppSecDLQ:
    Type: AWS::SQS::Queue
    Properties:
      QueueName: !Sub "vcs-trigger-appsec-${TenantId}-dlq"
      MessageRetentionPeriod: 1209600 # 14 days

  VcsTriggerAppSecQueue:
    Type: AWS::SQS::Queue
    Properties:
      QueueName: !Sub "vcs-trigger-appsec-${TenantId}"
      MessageRetentionPeriod: 43200 # 12 hours
      RedrivePolicy:
        deadLetterTargetArn: !GetAtt VcsTriggerAppSecDLQ.Arn
        maxReceiveCount: 3

  # VCS Trigger Post Scan Queue
  VcsTriggerPostScanDLQ:
    Type: AWS::SQS::Queue
    Properties:
      QueueName: !Sub "vcs-trigger-post-scan-${TenantId}-dlq"
      MessageRetentionPeriod: 1209600 # 14 days

  VcsTriggerPostScanQueue:
    Type: AWS::SQS::Queue
    Properties:
      QueueName: !Sub "vcs-trigger-post-scan-${TenantId}"
      MessageRetentionPeriod: 43200 # 12 hours
      RedrivePolicy:
        deadLetterTargetArn: !GetAtt VcsTriggerPostScanDLQ.Arn
        maxReceiveCount: 3

  #####
  # Azure Workload Identity Resources
  #####
  AzureWorkloadIdentityPool:
    Type: AWS::Cognito::IdentityPool
    Properties:
      IdentityPoolName: !Join
        - ""
        - - "azure_workload_identity_pool_"
          - !Select [0, !Split [".", !Ref Domain]]
      AllowUnauthenticatedIdentities: false
      DeveloperProviderName: !Join
        - ""
        - - "azure_workload_identity_"
          - !Select [0, !Split [".", !Ref Domain]]

  LambdaPermission:
    Type: AWS::Lambda::Permission
    Properties:
      Action: "lambda:InvokeFunction"
      FunctionName: !Ref AzureIdentityLambdaArn
      Principal: "cloudformation.amazonaws.com"
      SourceAccount: !Ref "AWS::AccountId"

  # Custom Resource that uses the existing Lambda function
  GetOpenIdTokenCustomResource:
    Type: Custom::GetOpenIdToken
    DependsOn:
      - LambdaPermission
    Properties:
      ServiceToken: !Ref AzureIdentityLambdaArn
      IdentityPoolId: !Ref AzureWorkloadIdentityPool
      #####
      # Login Key should be same as developer provider name
      #####
      LoginKey: !Join
        - ""
        - - "azure_workload_identity_"
          - !Select [0, !Split [".", !Ref Domain]]
      LoginValue: !Select [0, !Split [".", !Ref Domain]]

  #####
  # CRS Cross-Account Authentication Resources
  #####
  CrsServiceUserPassword:
    Type: AWS::SecretsManager::Secret
    Properties:
      Name: !Sub "CrsServiceUserPassword-${TenantId}"
      GenerateSecretString:
        SecretStringTemplate: !Sub '{"username": "crs-service-${TenantId}@rapticore.com"}'
        GenerateStringKey: password
        ExcludeCharacters: '"@/\'
        PasswordLength: 32
        RequireEachIncludedType: true

  CrsUserManagementRole:
    Type: AWS::IAM::Role
    Properties:
      AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
        Version: "2012-10-17"
        Statement:
          - Effect: Allow
            Principal:
              Service: lambda.amazonaws.com
            Action: sts:AssumeRole
      ManagedPolicyArns:
        - arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/service-role/AWSLambdaBasicExecutionRole
      Policies:
        - PolicyName: CognitoUserManagement
          PolicyDocument:
            Version: "2012-10-17"
            Statement:
              - Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - sts:AssumeRole
                Resource: !Ref CognitoManagementRoleArn
              - Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - secretsmanager:GetSecretValue
                Resource: !Ref CrsServiceUserPassword

  CrsUserManagementFunction:
    Type: AWS::Lambda::Function
    Properties:
      FunctionName: !Sub "CrsUserManagement-${TenantId}"
      Runtime: python3.11
      Handler: index.handler
      Role: !GetAtt CrsUserManagementRole.Arn
      Timeout: 60
      Code:
        ZipFile: |
          import boto3
          import json
          import cfnresponse

          def handler(event, context):
              try:
                  # Assume cross-account role first
                  sts = boto3.client('sts')
                  cognito_mgmt_role_arn = event['ResourceProperties']['CognitoManagementRoleArn']
                  
                  assumed_role = sts.assume_role(
                      RoleArn=cognito_mgmt_role_arn,
                      RoleSessionName='cognito-user-management'
                  )
                  
                  # Create Cognito client with assumed role credentials
                  cognito = boto3.client(
                      'cognito-idp',
                      region_name='us-west-2',
                      aws_access_key_id=assumed_role['Credentials']['AccessKeyId'],
                      aws_secret_access_key=assumed_role['Credentials']['SecretAccessKey'],
                      aws_session_token=assumed_role['Credentials']['SessionToken']
                  )
                  
                  secrets = boto3.client('secretsmanager')
                  
                  user_pool_id = event['ResourceProperties']['UserPoolId']
                  username = event['ResourceProperties']['Username']
                  group_name = event['ResourceProperties']['GroupName']
                  password_secret_arn = event['ResourceProperties']['PasswordSecretArn']
                  
                  if event['RequestType'] == 'Create' or event['RequestType'] == 'Update':
                      # Check if group exists, create if not
                      try:
                          cognito.get_group(GroupName=group_name, UserPoolId=user_pool_id)
                          print(f"Group {group_name} already exists")
                      except cognito.exceptions.ResourceNotFoundException:
                          print(f"Creating group {group_name}")
                          cognito.create_group(
                              GroupName=group_name,
                              UserPoolId=user_pool_id,
                              Description=f"CRS tenant group for {group_name}"
                          )
                      
                      # Check if user exists
                      user_exists = False
                      try:
                          cognito.admin_get_user(UserPoolId=user_pool_id, Username=username)
                          user_exists = True
                          print(f"User {username} already exists")
                      except cognito.exceptions.UserNotFoundException:
                          print(f"User {username} does not exist, creating")
                      
                      if not user_exists:
                          # Get password from secret
                          secret = secrets.get_secret_value(SecretId=password_secret_arn)
                          password_data = json.loads(secret['SecretString'])
                          password = password_data['password']
                          
                          # Create user
                          cognito.admin_create_user(
                              UserPoolId=user_pool_id,
                              Username=username,
                              MessageAction='SUPPRESS',
                              TemporaryPassword='TempPassword123!'
                          )
                          
                          # Set permanent password
                          cognito.admin_set_user_password(
                              UserPoolId=user_pool_id,
                              Username=username,
                              Password=password,
                              Permanent=True
                          )
                      
                      # Always ensure user is in group
                      try:
                          cognito.admin_add_user_to_group(
                              UserPoolId=user_pool_id,
                              Username=username,
                              GroupName=group_name
                          )
                      except cognito.exceptions.UserNotConfirmedException:
                          pass  # User already in group
                      
                      cfnresponse.send(event, context, cfnresponse.SUCCESS, {'Username': username})
                  
                  elif event['RequestType'] == 'Delete':
                      # Don't delete user - preserve it for reuse
                      cfnresponse.send(event, context, cfnresponse.SUCCESS, {})
                      
              except Exception as e:
                  print(f"Error: {str(e)}")
                  cfnresponse.send(event, context, cfnresponse.FAILED, {'Error': str(e)})

  CreateCrsServiceUser:
    Type: Custom::CrsServiceUser
    Properties:
      ServiceToken: !GetAtt CrsUserManagementFunction.Arn
      UserPoolId: !Ref SharedUserPoolId
      Username: !Sub "crs-service-${TenantId}@rapticore.com"
      GroupName: !Ref CognitoGroupName
      PasswordSecretArn: !Ref CrsServiceUserPassword
      CognitoManagementRoleArn: !Ref CognitoManagementRoleArn
      Timestamp: "2025-08-17-19-11"

  CrsCredentials:
    Type: AWS::SecretsManager::Secret
    DependsOn: CreateCrsServiceUser
    Properties:
      Name: !Sub "CrsCredentials-${TenantId}"
      SecretString: !Sub |
        {
          "tenant_id": "${TenantId}",
          "aws_region": "us-west-2",
          "user_pool_id": "${SharedUserPoolId}",
          "client_id": "${SharedUserPoolClientId}",
          "service_username": "crs-service-${TenantId}@rapticore.com",
          "service_password": "{{resolve:secretsmanager:${CrsServiceUserPassword}:SecretString:password}}",
          "target_account_id": "${AWS::AccountId}",
          "api_endpoint": "https://${Domain}/api/v1/ingest/sarif",
          "cognito_group": "${CognitoGroupName}",
          "cross_account_role_arn": "arn:aws:iam::${CrsAccountId}:role/crs-cognito-access-standard-tenancy"
        }
  #####
  # Queue Deletion Custom Resource
  #####
  QueueDeletionRole:
    Type: AWS::IAM::Role
    Properties:
      AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
        Version: "2012-10-17"
        Statement:
          - Effect: Allow
            Principal:
              Service: lambda.amazonaws.com
            Action: sts:AssumeRole
      ManagedPolicyArns:
        - arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/service-role/AWSLambdaBasicExecutionRole
      Policies:
        - PolicyName: SQSDeletePolicy
          PolicyDocument:
            Version: "2012-10-17"
            Statement:
              - Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - sqs:DeleteQueue
                  - sqs:GetQueueAttributes
                  - sqs:ListQueues
                Resource: "*"

  QueueDeletionFunction:
    Type: AWS::Lambda::Function
    Properties:
      FunctionName: !Sub "QueueDeletion-${TenantId}"
      Runtime: python3.11
      Handler: index.handler
      Role: !GetAtt QueueDeletionRole.Arn
      Timeout: 300
      Code:
        ZipFile: |
          import boto3
          import json
          import cfnresponse
          import logging

          logger = logging.getLogger()
          logger.setLevel(logging.INFO)

          def handler(event, context):
              try:
                  logger.info(f"Event: {json.dumps(event)}")
                  
                  sqs = boto3.client('sqs')
                  queue_arns = event['ResourceProperties'].get('QueueArns', [])
                  
                  # Handle empty list or empty string
                  if not queue_arns or (len(queue_arns) == 1 and queue_arns[0] == ''):
                      logger.info("No queues to delete")
                      cfnresponse.send(event, context, cfnresponse.SUCCESS, {
                          'Message': 'No queues specified',
                          'DeletedQueues': [],
                          'FailedQueues': [],
                          'TotalProcessed': 0,
                          'SuccessCount': 0,
                          'FailureCount': 0
                      })
                      return
                  
                  deleted_queues = []
                  failed_queues = []
                  
                  if event['RequestType'] in ['Create', 'Update']:
                      for queue_arn in queue_arns:
                          try:
                              # Extract queue URL from ARN
                              # ARN format: arn:aws:sqs:region:account:queue-name
                              arn_parts = queue_arn.split(':')
                              if len(arn_parts) >= 6:
                                  region = arn_parts[3]
                                  account = arn_parts[4]
                                  queue_name = arn_parts[5]
                                  queue_url = f"https://sqs.{region}.amazonaws.com/{account}/{queue_name}"
                              else:
                                  logger.error(f"Invalid ARN format: {queue_arn}")
                                  failed_queues.append(queue_arn)
                                  continue
                              
                              logger.info(f"Attempting to delete queue: {queue_url}")
                              
                              # Check if queue exists first
                              try:
                                  sqs.get_queue_attributes(QueueUrl=queue_url, AttributeNames=['QueueArn'])
                                  logger.info(f"Queue exists, proceeding with deletion: {queue_url}")
                              except sqs.exceptions.QueueDoesNotExist:
                                  logger.info(f"Queue does not exist, skipping: {queue_url}")
                                  deleted_queues.append(queue_arn)
                                  continue
                              
                              # Delete the queue
                              sqs.delete_queue(QueueUrl=queue_url)
                              deleted_queues.append(queue_arn)
                              logger.info(f"Successfully deleted queue: {queue_url}")
                              
                          except Exception as e:
                              logger.error(f"Failed to delete queue {queue_arn}: {str(e)}")
                              failed_queues.append(queue_arn)
                  
                  elif event['RequestType'] == 'Delete':
                      logger.info("Stack deletion - no queue cleanup needed")
                  
                  # Prepare response
                  response_data = {
                      'DeletedQueues': deleted_queues,
                      'FailedQueues': failed_queues,
                      'TotalProcessed': len(queue_arns) if queue_arns and queue_arns[0] != '' else 0,
                      'SuccessCount': len(deleted_queues),
                      'FailureCount': len(failed_queues)
                  }
                  
                  # Determine success/failure
                  if failed_queues:
                      logger.warning(f"Some queues failed to delete: {failed_queues}")
                      # Still report success if at least some queues were processed
                      cfnresponse.send(event, context, cfnresponse.SUCCESS, response_data)
                  else:
                      logger.info("All specified queues processed successfully")
                      cfnresponse.send(event, context, cfnresponse.SUCCESS, response_data)
                      
              except Exception as e:
                  logger.error(f"Unexpected error: {str(e)}")
                  cfnresponse.send(event, context, cfnresponse.FAILED, {'Error': str(e)})

  DeleteSpecifiedQueues:
    Type: Custom::QueueDeletion
    Properties:
      ServiceToken: !GetAtt QueueDeletionFunction.Arn
      QueueArns: !Ref QueuesToDelete
      Timestamp: "2025-08-13-20-30" # Change this to force re-execution

Outputs:
  RapticoreStandardURL:
    Value: !Join ["", ["https://", !Ref Domain]]
    Description: Rapticore Standard URL

  AzureWorkloadIdentityPoolId:
    Description: The ID of the Cognito Identity Pool for Azure workload identity
    Value: !Ref AzureWorkloadIdentityPool

  CreatedIdentityId:
    Description: The ID of the created identity in the identity pool
    Value:
      Fn::GetAtt:
        - GetOpenIdTokenCustomResource
        - IdentityId

  CrsServiceUsername:
    Description: CRS Service Username created
    Value: !Sub "crs-service-${TenantId}@rapticore.com"

  CrsRoleArn:
    Description: Cross-account role ARN for CRS authentication (in CRS account)
    Value: !Ref CognitoManagementRoleArn

  CrsCredentialsSecret:
    Description: Secret containing CRS authentication details
    Value: !Ref CrsCredentials

  VulnerabilityQueueURL:
    Description: URL of the vulnerability queue
    Value: !GetAtt RapticoreVulnerabilityQueue.QueueUrl

  ContainerVulnerabilityQueueURL:
    Description: URL of the container vulnerability queue
    Value: !GetAtt RapticoreContainerVulnerabilityQueue.QueueUrl

  ResourceVulnerabilitySummaryQueueURL:
    Description: URL of the resource vulnerability summary queue
    Value: !GetAtt RapticoreResourceVulnerabilitySummaryQueue.QueueUrl

  ReactiveRemediationQueueURL:
    Description: URL of the reactive remediation queue
    Value: !GetAtt RapticoreReactiveRemediationQueue.QueueUrl

  RealTimeThreatAlertTriggerQueueURL:
    Description: URL of the real-time threat alert trigger queue
    Value: !GetAtt RealTimeThreatAlertTriggerQueue.QueueUrl

  RealTimeThreatAlertTriggerAzureQueueURL:
    Description: URL of the real-time threat alert trigger azure queue
    Condition: HasAzureTenant
    Value: !GetAtt RealTimeThreatAlertTriggerAzureQueue.QueueUrl

  VcsContentBucketName:
    Description: Name of the VCS content S3 bucket
    Value: !Ref VcsContentBucket

  VcsTriggerAppSecQueueURL:
    Description: URL of the VCS trigger appsec queue
    Value: !GetAtt VcsTriggerAppSecQueue.QueueUrl

  VcsTriggerPostScanQueueURL:
    Description: URL of the VCS trigger post scan queue
    Value: !GetAtt VcsTriggerPostScanQueue.QueueUrl

  QueueDeletionResults:
    Description: Results of queue deletion operation
    Value: !Sub |
      Deleted: ${DeleteSpecifiedQueues.SuccessCount} queues
      Failed: ${DeleteSpecifiedQueues.FailureCount} queues
      Total Processed: ${DeleteSpecifiedQueues.TotalProcessed} queues